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
SECRET (NOFORN) (unclassified upon removal of basic material)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:pmm over
5750 Ser: 00275-67 of 28Jul67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-30
June 1967

1. Forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

Copy to:
CG, 1stMarDiv

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3/SBC/s HEADQUARTERS III MAF

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Ser: **00239567**

4 AUG 1967

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:pmm 5750 Ser:
00275-67 of 28Jul67

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for
1-30 June 1967

1. Forwarded.

2. This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED when re-
moved from the basic correspondence.

Fred Haynes
FRED HAYNES
BY DIRECTION

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

3: HIST:pmm
5750
Ser: 00275-67
JUL 28 1967

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
From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AC3D)
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-30 June 1967

Ref: (a) MCC 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-30 June 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.



DON J. ROBERTSON

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FTF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 June to 30 June 1967

INDEX

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. (U) DESIGNATION

1st Marine Division (Rein)

MajGen Donn J. ROBERTSON

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Chu Lai Installation Coordinator

BGen F. C. LAHUE

Headquarters Bn

Col W. A. LEITNER

1st Marines (Rein)

Col E. J. RADICS

5th Marines (-)

Col K. J. HOUGHTON

7th Marines (Rein)

Col C. C. CROSSFIELD II

11th Marines (-) (Rein)

Col G. E. NORRIS (To 28Jun67)

LtCol C. HENDRICKS (Fr 29Jun67)

LtCol M. C. JACKSON

2nd Bn, 5th Marines

Maj B. G. LOWERY

1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)

Maj J. M. MCKENZIE

1st Engr Bn (-)

LtCol F. W. HARRIS III

7th Engr Bn#

LtCol G. A. BABE

9th Engr Bn#

LtCol E. H. JONES

1st SP Bn (-)

Maj K. H. REAGAN (To 18Jun67)

1st MT Bn

LtCol K. M. BUSS (Fr 19Jun67)

11th MT Bn

Maj R. C. TASHJIAN

3rd Amtrac Bn (-)

Maj F. N. VANSANT (To 25Jun67)

7th Comm Bn (-)

LtCol R. L. SHUFORD (Fr 26Jun67)

1st AT Bn (-)

LtCol W. M. CLELLAND

1st Tank Bn (-)

LtCol J. J. KEEFE (To 4Jun67)

1st Med Bn

Maj P. S. GALLIGAN (Fr 5Jun67)

1st Hospital Co

LtCol R. M. TAYLOR

1st Dental Co (-)

Cdr P. D. COOPER, MC, USN

3rd Dental Co (-)*

Cdr C. H. LOWERY, MC, USN

Capt T. J. PAPE, DC, USN

Capt L. H. CORDONIER, DC, USN

* OPCON ONLY

ADCON ONLY

2. (U) LOCATION

1-30 June 1967: Danang, RVN

3. (U) STAFF OFFICERS

Chief of Staff

Col E. L. BALE, JR (To 12Jun67)

Deputy Chief of Staff

Col H. J. WOESSNER II (Fr 13Jun67)

Staff Secretary

Col E. L. BALE, JR (Fr 28Jun67)

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

Capt F. A. WATERS

Col W. R. EARNEY

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Compt
 Adjutant
 Air Officer
 Artillery Officer

 Band Officer
 Chaplain
 Comm-Electronics Officer
 Dental Officer
 Disbursing Officer
 Division Clubs Officer
 Division Exchange Officer
 Embarkation Officer
 Engineer Officer
 Field Historian
 Food Services Officer
 Information Services Officer
 Inspector
 Legal Officer
 Motor Transport Officer
 Naval Gunfire Officer
 Ordnance Officer
 Photographic Officer
 Postal Officer
 Provost Marshal
 Reproduction Officer
 Special Services Officer
 Supply Officer
 Surgeon
 Tank Officer

Col S. DAVIS
 Col H. E. ING, JR.
 Col E. L. BALE, JR. (To 27Jun67)
 LtCol E. K. VICKERS (Fr 28Jun67)
 LtCol R. F. PETERSON
 Col R. S. ROBERTSON
 LtCol E. R. SCHIFFMAN
 Col F. C. LANG
 Col G. E. NORRIS (To 28Jun67)
 LtCol C. HENDRICKS (Fr 29Jun67)
 WO E. W. ELFES
 Capt D. J. CASAZZA, CHC, USN
 Col E. P. CLAUDE
 Capt T. J. PAPE
 Maj G. W. COLBURN
 Capt R. J. PLACHY
 Capt C. E. LAND
 Maj R. PETROFF
 LtCol G. A. MERRILL
 Maj H. T. KENNEDY
 WO J. J. LAGGIS
 Capt D. R. HUDSON
 Col W. W. CURTIS
 LtCol W. T. WESTMORELAND
 Maj L. V. BARKLEY
 LCdr R. A. WHITCOMB, USN
 Maj H. SOBOL
 2ndLt J. E. MCKAY
 2ndLt W. NEW
 Maj D. L. DIAMOND
 2ndLt J. M. WHEATLEY
 Maj J. E. FORDE
 Col P. J. DUPRE
 Capt R. W. JONES
 LtCol R. M. TAYLOR

4. (U) Average Monthly Strength

	<u>USMC</u>			<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>		<u>ENL</u>		<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1047		23785		138	1136

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARYPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. (C) Replacement and Rotation of Personnel

a. Total of Marine replacements received and Marines rotated during June 1967 were:

Replacements:	
Officer	186
Enlisted	1504

Rotation:	
Officer	157
Enlisted	1553

b. There were 11 officers and 512 enlisted personnel medically evacuated. 2 officers and 68 enlisted personnel who were previously evacuated were returned to duty. 35 personnel departed on emergency leave/permanent change of station orders.

c. A total of 12 officers and 213 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour in RVN in conjunction with the 30 day free leave policy. 5 officers and 326 enlisted personnel departed on 30 day free leave during June 1967.

2. (C) Casualty and Graves Registration. The below casualties were sustained by units ADCON to the 1st Marine Division during June, 1967.

	KIA	WIA	**DOW	MIA	CPTR	OTHER	*NON-BATTLE DEATH INJURED	**TOTAL
<u>USMC</u>								
OFF	10	20						30
ENL	124	949	19	1			1 11	1086
<u>USN</u>								
OFF								
ENL	3	18	1					21
TOTAL	137	987	20	1			1 11	1137

* Injuries which result in absence from duty for more than 24 hours.

** DOW figures included in WIA totals and not in horizontal total.

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3. (C) Awards. During the period 1-30 June 1967, 254 award recommendations were processed and forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. In addition, 1153 Purple Heart Medals were awarded. 82 Commanding General Certificates of Commendation were awarded during the period.

4. (C) Discipline, Law and Order. The following criminal investigations were reported. Fifteen cases are presently under investigation:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Larceny of Government Property	<u>1</u>
Total	1

Ninety-one traffic violations were reported for the month of June 1967.

Sixty offense reports were issued to violators as follows:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Weapons Violation	2
Disorderly Conduct	3
Failure to obey a Lawful Order	1
Curfew Violations	15
Off Limits	35
Missing Persons	2
Other	<u>2</u>
Total	60

5. (C) Industrial Relations

a. Current utilization totals:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>
Headquarters Battalion	70	70
Headquarters, 1st Marines	16	15
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines	10	0
Headquarters, 5th Marines	10	0
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	0
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	0
Headquarters, 7th Marines	20	19
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	10	4
Headquarters, 11th Marines	60	57
3rd 8" Howitzer Battery	10	10
1st Antitank Battalion	24	24
1st Tank Battalion	18	11
3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion	18	10

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>
7th Communication Battalion	25	27
1st Engineer Battalion	60	57
7th Engineer Battalion	88	84
9th Engineer Battalion	62	73
1st Hospital Company	14	11
1st Medical Battalion	32	32
1st Motor Transport Battalion	26	26
11th Motor Transport Battalion	33	32
1st Reconnaissance Battalion	11	11
1st Shore Party Battalion	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTAL	659	595

b. A total of 108 security clearance applications and 12 family allowance applications were submitted for the month of June 1967.

c. Seventy people were given physicals at 1st Medical Battalion and Camp Tien Sha (Chest X-Ray, Urinalysis, VDRL).

d. Twelve employees attended the June Basic English Class at the Industrial Relations Training Department, Danang.

6. (U) Personal and Morale Services

a. Chaplain. At the end of June the on-board strength of Chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division was as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Denomination</u>
17	Protestant
7	Catholic
<u>1</u>	Eastern Orthodox
TOTAL	25

The following services were conducted during the month:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number Attending</u>
Catholic Sunday Divine Services	89	3,078
Catholic Weekday Services	132	1,554
Protestant Sunday Divine Services	181	4,041
Protestant Weekday Services	76	1,095
Protestant Lay Leader	7	80
Protestant Bible Study	14	81
Lectures/Vietnamese People and Their Religion	35	1,538
Memorial Services	26	2,436

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b. Division Clubs. The gross income during June was \$375,781.91. 3 officers, 5 SMC's and 7 enlisted personnel operated the 62 clubs and 8 battalion accounts. No additional clubs are planned.

c. Exchange System. Gross sales during the month of June were \$356,512.48. 2 officers and 58 enlisted personnel operated 11 stores and 5 mobile units within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's.

d. Division Band. The Division Band performed at 7 Marine military formations, 2 military concerts, and 1 civic action function.

e. Informational Services. During June the Informational Services Office produced 225 news releases and 4,035 Fleet Home Town News Releases. The ISO Radio-TV section produced 210 Fleet Home Town radio tapes and 18 feature interviews for release to major radio networks in the United States.

Writer-Photographer teams covered the following named operations:

Union II	Adair
Butler	Brown
Arizona	Calhoun

f. Postal

(1) The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this command has received and dispatched during June 1967:

<u>Total Received</u>	<u>Total Dispatched</u>	<u>Total Handled</u>
1,234,613	239,650	1,474,263

(2) The following figures represent financial business transacted during June 1967:

U. S. Money Orders and Fees	\$794,010.55
Stamps, postage and insurance sales	\$30,098.45

(3) During the month of June, 21 mail rooms were inspected with none being found unsatisfactory. 12 unit post offices were inspected and audited during this period, as well as the audit of the main stamp stock retained by the Division Postal Chief.

g. Career Advisory. The following statistics represent reenlistment and extension of enlistment percentages for the month of June 1967:

(1) Reenlistment Percentages

a. First term	17.1%
b. Career	90.9%
c. Total	42.2%

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(2) Extensions of enlistment executed

a. Career	2
b. Short term	17
c. Total	19

Eleven staff and career advisory visits were conducted during the month of June 1967.

h. Special Services. Personnel of the 1st Marine Division were entertained during the month of June 1967 by the appearance of the following shows and/or well known personalities:

9Jun67 - Lana Turner (Handshake Tour) - 1st Med Bn
15Jun67 - Hugh O'Brian's Guys & Dolls Show - Hill 327 Amphitheater
26Jun67 - Floyd Patterson (Handshake Tour) - 1st Med Bn

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ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN1. ENEMY

a.(C) Main Force. Enemy Main Force units, after suffering heavy losses in an effort to maintain control of the Que Son Valley early in this month, avoided contact throughout the remainder of the period. Both the 3rd and 21st Regiments withdrew to the mountains south of Que Son to possibly regroup and train replacements. Most of the replacements were probably received within two weeks of the engagement. These units can be expected to operate in small units, conducting extensive reconnaissance and security patrols, while training these new troops. There is substantial information that the 70th Battalion has been detached from the 1st Regiment and has displaced to Quang Tin Province. The mission of this unit is not known at this time.

b.(C) Local Force. Local Forces continued to direct their attentions to harassment of RD units, ARVN outposts, and CAC units. Operations launched against these units yielded only moderate enemy personnel losses, but supply bases, training camps, and base areas were penetrated and destroyed. These forces will continue to operate in company and smaller size units, conducting political agitation and attacks by fire. A recent rallier indicated that a new mission has been given to the local forces. The V.25th Battalion has been assigned the mission of a sapper unit, the R.20th will conduct ambushes, and district companies will attack ARVN outposts and RD units.

2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a.(U) General. Hot and humid weather characterized the reporting period. Maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 99 degrees and 79 degrees respectively. The average humidity was 82%. The winds were variable at 5-10 knots and visibility averaged 7 miles. The cumulative precipitation for June was 1.89 inches.

b.(U) Effects of the Weather. The weather had little or no effect on air operations. Air support was unhindered during the month since clouds were of the cumulus type and broken. Ground units continued to experience some heat casualties.

c.(U) Effect of the Weather on Terrain. No change in the condition of the terrain was in evidence during June, as it remained in the same dry state as May.

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION ACTIVITY1. ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

a.(U) Services and Support. During the period the unit provided general administrative services for the G-2 Section. Primary emphasis was placed on continued improvement of the system for staffing intelligence reports and staff procedures.

b.(C) Personnel. During the period the G-2 Section operated with an average of 98 percent of its assigned manning level of 29 officers and 53 enlisted personnel.

c.(U) Logistics and Allowances. During the period approximately 60 percent of materials and supplies necessary for the operation of the Section and its attached teams were received as ordered. There still is a need for garrison items most noticeable chairs and filing cabinets.

d.(U) Training. Maximum effort was made to train personnel in their MOS as well as participation in general military subjects training at the Headquarters Company level. M-16 training has been received by all members of the G-2 Section.

2.(U) ACQUISITION SECTION. During the period cognizance of the DIOCC program was transferred to the Division Staff Counterintelligence Officer. The Acquisition Unit now is cognizant of the following sub-sections; OPCON Units, COC, PIIU, Recon, FI, ITT, and AO's.

a.(U) Photo Imagery Interpretation Unit. The PIIU continued to support the First Marine Division with vertical aerial photography, high and low altitude panaramic photography, photo mosaics, and various overlays associated with photo intelligence. During the period 28 missions were requested, 22 were received and eight are still pending.

b.(C) Air Observation Unit. During the month of June, Air Observers flew 302 sorties for 666.6 hours of Visual Reconnaissance in the Danang Area. In conjunction with normal VR flights, the following missions were performed: 4 photo, 62 artillery, 313 air strike TAC(A) and 6 Naval gunfire. The AO Unit also provided support for Operations Union II, Arizona, Brown, Beacon Torch, Adair and Calhoun.

c.(U) Interrogation-Translation Team (3rd ITT and 9th ITT). A total of 244 detainees were interrogated at the III MAF Collection Point of which 216 had Viet Cong association. Number of documents translated during the month of June totals 18. In addition, 416 detainees were screened at Battalion level.

d.(U) Combat Operations Center. COC-2 continues to serve as a focal point for the receipt of Spot Reports from subordinate units, and higher headquarters and for the dissemination of current intelligence and indications to consumers.

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3.(C) PRODUCTION. The Basic Intelligence Section continued routine issue of maps, made charts, recorded and processed captured weapons and materials, started reorganizing the filing system, and effected liaison with Special Forces concerning a Happy Valley study. The Current Intelligence/Indications Section continued to put out daily briefs, supplementary intelligence summaries, maintained estimates of the current enemy situation initiated a new and improved targeting system and started a new intelligence evaluation program in accordance with MACV Directive No. 381-38. The Estimative Intelligence Section continued to produce two daily intelligence summaries, published PERINTREP 10-67, prepared and disseminated to all subordinate units a study of MY SON and vicinity (Base Area 116).

4.(C) STAFF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT. During the period the unit provided routine administrative counterintelligence services to the Division Staff. The unit was supported by the 3d CIT. The unit processed 4 requests for Top Secret clearances, 16 request for Top Secret access, 6 requests for Personnel Security Clearance (NAC/BI), 4 requests for ONI/HQMC Files check, 7 request for COFRAM Access, and forwarded 19 completed Personnel Security Investigations. In addition, the unit presented 3 security lectures to incoming personnel, administered the Divisions Reward Fund Program and the Kit Carson Scout Program. The unit maintained liaison with other counterintelligence agencies and with subordinate units.

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

1. (C) During June the Division conducted six major operations and completed Operation UNION II which began in May. A major division operation, CALHOUN began on 25 June after extensive operations around the periphery of NVA/VC Base Area 116. The operation was designed to penetrate the base area and find and destroy the enemy facilities and equipment in the area.
2. (C) Reacting to solid contact encountered by Company K, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines the 5th Marines rapidly committed two battalions and exploited the contact. This action began Operation ADAIR which was completed after nine days of search and destroy. Other major operations and controlling headquarters were as follows:

OPERATION

CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS

UNION II
 BUTLER
 ARIZONA
 ADAIR
 BROWN
 BEACON TORCH
 CALHOUN

Fifth Marines
 Third Bn, Seventh Marines
 Seventh Marines
 Fifth Marines
 Second Bn, First Marines
 SLF Bravo (Second Bn, Third Marines)
 First Marine Division

3. (C) Normal operations consisting of patrols, ambushes, listening posts and sweeps by companies within their TACs maintained relentless pressure on the enemy and combined with the major operations accounted for 1129 VC KIA, 1511 VC KIA(Probable) 58 PWs, 3 Returnees, 339 Detainees, and 100 weapons captured.
4. (C) Five different ships fired a total of 144 naval gunfire missions in support of division units.
5. (U) The Vietnamese Governments Revolutionary Development program was enhanced by the normal patrolling, company sweeps, and County Fair 7-14 which was conducted by the Seventh Marines.

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PLANS

1. (C) During the month studies were prepared on the employment and optimum combat use of LVTs, LVTH-6s, Tanks and Ontos.
2. (C) G3 representatives attended a planning conference and a conference on the control of inland waterways during the month.

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TRAINING

1. (U) During June, thirteen officers and 132 enlisted attended formal schools.
2. (U) Division instructors conducted M16 Training for 156 Combined Action Platoon personnel and 290 personnel from Second Bn, Eleventh Marines.
3. (U) A four day MUMPS school was conducted for 67 supply men from the division.
4. (U) A two day familiarization course on outboard motors and boats was conducted by instructors from 1st FSR personnel who utilize this type equipment for guarding bridges in the division TAOR.
5. (U) An M16A1 contact team visited all division units equipped with the M16A1 for the purpose of providing instruction on proper care and cleaning of the rifle.

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COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

1. (U) A review of the CAC Program in the 1st Marine Division was conducted under the cognizance of the Division Inspector in an effort to improve the program. Each functional area was reviewed, problems were identified and discussed, and recommendations were set forth. Guidance based on these recommendations will be included in the Division CAC SOP which is now being staffed.
2. (U) Four Combined Action platoons in the DANANG TAOR were redesignated from "B" platoons to "Q" platoons and a Combined Action Company Headquarters "Q" was activated. The company headquarters will supervise the "Q" platoons and is under the operational control of the 7th Marines.
3. (C) The 23 CAP's in the DANANG Area conducted 1232 patrols and 587 ambushes. There were 29 contacts which resulted in enemy casualties of 14 KIA, 2 WIA, 9 PW and 32 detainees.

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

1. (U) The major logistical activity during this reporting period was directed toward the support of combat operations.
2. (U) During the reporting period, the Division Supply Officer conducted seven (7) Supply Inspection/Instruction visits and twenty-four (24) Supply Staff visits. Additionally, the Division Embarkation Officer, Engineer Officer, Motor Transport Officer, Food Services Officer and Surgeon conducted informal staff visits and inspections.
3. (U) On the 4th and 6th of June a special congressional subcommittee visited this Command to inquire into the problems associated with the M16A1 rifle. The Subcommittee was composed of Representatives Richard ICENORD (D-Mo.), William G. BRAY (R-Ind.) and Speedy O. LONG (D-La.) accompanied by Mr. Earl J. MORGAN, Colonel Edward B. CROSSMAN, USA (Ret), Major James M. FLETCHER, N.C. National Guard, and Colonel Paul X. HENLEY, USMC.
4. (U) M16A1 Instruction Program. This program has been established within the Command to standardize cleaning, lubrication, maintenance procedures, conduct of limited technical inspections and prevention/correction of stoppages. Ordnance officers and Armorers from Division units have been schooled in the aforementioned areas. Phase two of this program consists of instructing all officers and non-commissioned officers. Phase two is scheduled to commence on 1 July 1967.
5. (C) 182 cartridges 106mm APERS (Beehive) XM581 were allocated to this Command. Distribution was made to Infantry/Reconnaissance Battalions.
6. (C) Ammunition Controlled by Available Supply Rates. The following ammunition items are controlled by an available supply rate:

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>
1315-G222	Cartridge 81mm High-Explosive
1330-G895	Grenade Hand Illuminating
1370-L312	Signal Illuminating Ground WSP
1370-L314	Signal Illuminating Ground GSC
7. (C) Howitzer 8" SP M110. Information received from the Commandant of the Marine Corps indicates that WestPac in-service date for the 8" Howitzer M110 is now scheduled for 31 August 1967.
8. (U) Administrative control of 7th Motor Transport Battalion passed from the 1st Marine Division to Force Logistic Command ending 17 years of attachment to and in general support of this Division.
9. (U) During the reporting period 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions traveled 306,291 miles and transported 23,211 tons of cargo and 131,533 personnel.

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10. (U) Total airlifts for the month of June of 1st Marine Division units was 193 personnel, 11 vehicles, 49.9 S/T and 6103 cubic feet.

11. (U) Total sealifts for the month of June of 1st Marine Division units was 330 personnel, 180 vehicles, and 1774.8 S/T.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

1.(U) On 21 June, Vietnamese leading citizens and GVN officers in Danang and Hoi An celebrated an "International Day" showing appreciation to the free world units stationed in the Danang area. Visits were made to the 1st Marine Division CP, Quang Nam, CORDS, and MACV Headquarters and the knights of Malta Team in Hoi An.

2.(U) Dedication of the re-built Hieu Nhon District Headquarters was held on 20 June. Principle guests were MajGen Nickerson, Deputy CG, III MAF, MajGen Robertson, CG 1st MarDiv, Col Nguyen Duy Hinh, CO Quang Da Special Zone, LtCol Tri Tin, Quang Nam Province Chief, LtCol R. F. Peterson, 1st MarDiv Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, and Mr. Al Francis, Senior CORDS Representative, Quang Nam District. The former Hieu Nhon District Headquarters was destroyed 13 March during a VC raid. There was a wreath laying ceremony and presentation of gifts to the families of those killed in the raid.

3.(U) The 1st Marine Division CA Conference was also held on the 20th of June. Thirty-nine people attended and heard lectures by the Commanding General; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5; Civil Affairs Officer; Psychological Operations Officer and the Commanding Officer, 29th Civil Affairs Company. Speakers covered a variety of subjects and audience response was very good.

4.(U) On the 28th of June, the Hoa Vinh Dam was dedicated. The building of this dam was a joint effort between local villagers and the 7th Engineer Battalion. The dam will insure two rice crops a year and benefit 1200 people. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, III MAF, and District representatives were present along with the Commanding Officer, 7th Engineer Battalion.

5.(U) On the 19th of June, a fire in Hoa An Hamlet, Hoa Phat Village burned 28 homes. A total of 32 families were left homeless. There were no injuries and MCB-4 immediately set about to rebuild the homes. At this time, six houses have been rebuilt and four more are being constructed.

6.(U) During the month of June, Operations ARIZONA, BROWN, BEACON TORCH, ADAIR and CALHOUN were conducted in the 1st Marine Division TAOR. Operation ARIZONA, which occurred in 3rdBn, 7thMar area, generated 1775 refugees. In addition, 35 head of cattle, 70 water buffalo, and an unknown number of chickens and 100 pigs were brought out of the operational area. Operation BROWN generated 11 refugees, BEACON TORCH 60 and ADAIR 70. Operation CALHOUN, conducted throughout a suspected base area, in Duy Xuyen and Duc Duc Districts, produced 64,000 pounds of rice, 14 head of cattle and 54 water buffalo, 100 pounds of dried potatoes and 200 pounds of sugar. The majority of refugees generated by CALHOUN were handled by ARVN forces in the area. Eleven refugees, however, were evacuated to Dien Ban by Marine Helicopters. The captured commodities were distributed by Province and District officials.

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7.(U) In support of the Vietnamese Industrial Complex at An Hoa, 1,173 tons of building materials, 30,000 gallons of diesel fuel and 47 tons of general cargo was hauled by Division vehicles from Danang to An Hoa during June. Thirty tons of coal was hauled to Danang during the month.

8.(U) Distinguished guests during the month of June included Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, Commanding General, FMFPac, Major General Frank C. Tharin, Deputy Commanding General, FMFPac, and Ambassador Blair, U. S. Ambassador to the Phillipines. General Krulak visited projects of 1st Tank Battalion on 28 June. General Tharin visited the 7th Engineer Battalion Civil Affairs function and Ambassador Blair visited the An Hoa Industrial Complex.

9.(U) Projects underway in June consisted of 6 schools and 4 dispensaries. Construction of the Ha Thanh Dam continues and the Hoa Vinh Dam was completed on the 21st. Other projects included 3 schools being painted, an introduction of goat herds in the 7th Marines area, 7 wells dug, 2 market places constructed, 2 irrigation projects underway, 4 houses rebuilt, 1 road improved and 1 bridge reconstructed.

10.(U) The 7th Engineer Battalion established a brick factory utilizing Vietnamese labor and 40,061 bricks were produced during the month of June. These bricks are used for civilian construction purposes.

11.(U) Assistance rendered in the Danang and Chu Lai areas during the month of June was as follows:

Services:

Medical treatments	28,498
Medical evacuations	123
Dental treatments	323
English language training	190 (hours)

Commodities:

Rice (lbs)	27,200
Animal feed (garbage) lbs	35,292
Clothing (lbs)	843
Soap (bars)	3,248
Cement (bags)	490
Tin (sheets)	420
Sand (truckloads)	16
Lumber (truckloads)	69
Brick	40,061
Bulgar (lbs)	200

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Nails (lbs)	100
Steel Matting (roll)	1
Plywood (sheets)	25
Salad oil (cases)	2
Soybean oil (gal)	60
Sewing kits	200
Paint (gal)	22
Whitewash (lbs)	1,050
School kits	600
Carpenter kits	10
Mason kits	10

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Narrative summary for the period 1-30 June 1967.

1. (U) On both Operations ARIZONA and CALHOUN a special refugee leaflet was printed with instructions on one side and a map on the other side which directed all refugees to the collection points.
2. (U) During the month, III MAF assigned Detachment A, 244th Psychological Operations Company (USA) to the 1st Marine Division. Detachment A consists of one HE Team. The 1st Marine Division further assigned one HB Team to each infantry regiment. The HE Team was retained at Division.
3. (U) A new standard leaflet, 523-67, was originated by 1st Marine Division which encourages people to write their friends and relatives in the VC/NVA and explain the Chieu Hoi Program to them.

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COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

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1. (C) Receipt of cable assets permitted resumption of the rehabilitation, up grading, and expansion of the Division Wire System. A twenty-five pair WD-1/TT cable extending from the Division Main Frame (BT953748) to the Force Logistics Command at Red Beach (BT943795) was replaced by a twenty-five pair polyethelene cable. Cable expansion consisted of installing a twenty-five pair polyethelene cable from the Division Main Frame to the 7th Marines (BT963623). Near future plans envision an extension of wire communications to the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines at AN HOA (AT873473).
2. (C) During the period 1-6 June 1967, the Division Communication Company was tasked to provide two retransmission teams to the 5th Marines in support of UNION II. The retransmission teams were positioned at NUI LAC SON (BTO20290) and utilized AN/PRC-25's with RC-292's. Although manual retransmission was required, reports from the field indicated that communication were reliable and responsive.
3. (U) During the period 1-15 June 1967, a total of 28 technicians received instructions from a 1st FSR team on the installation of the new VHF (FM) Communication equipment in combat vehicles. Subsequently, installation commenced in most units concerned; however, the program has been delayed due to a lack of modification kits.
4. (C) As a result of the conference on realignment of communications support conducted on 29 May 1967, a realignment of communication personnel and equipment assets was accomplished. Communication support requirements have been consolidated and units tasked to accomplish such support in conformance with their capability. The 7th Communication Battalion has been tasked to support the 1st Marine Division, Force Logistics Command, and the 1st Military Police Battalion and to provide the Communication Support Company (-) (Rein) in support of the 3rd Marine Division in the Northern portion of the I Corps Tactical Zone.
5. (U) On 12 June 1967, the Division CEO, Col E. P. CLAUDE, presented a detailed briefing to the Commanding General, Major General Donn J. ROBERTSON, on present and projected communication systems supporting the Division in operations and its Combat Base environment.
6. (C) On 12 June 1967, The Division Assistant CEO, Major James H. BIRD, Jr., and the Operations Chief MSgt Iran R. COURTNEY, attended a frequency coordination conference conducted at and hosted by III MAF. The immediate concern of the conferees was the recent loss of 100 VHF (FM) frequencies in the 30 - 75 MC band and the requirement to redistribute remaining frequency assets without detriment to communications. Considering the congestion in the 30 - 75 MC range, the heavy reliance placed upon equipment operating in this range, and the limited resources, duplication of frequency assignments was the only acceptable solution. The situation is not untenable, however, it will pose some problems should the occasion arise to rapidly deploy reinforcements from one TAOR to another.

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7. (U) During the period 12-14 June 1967, a total of 138 1st Marine Division personnel received a one hour lecture/demonstration on transmission security presented by members of the Sub Unit of the 1st Radio Battalion, FMF. This series of lectures completes the cycle for this quarter. The benefits of this instruction can only be realized by a continuing program and it is intended to have this instruction presented quarterly contingent upon operations.
8. (U) On 13 June 1967, the Division CEO, Col E. P. CLAUDE, briefed the new Chief of Staff, Col H. J. WOESSNER, on the present and projected communications systems supporting the Division.
9. (U) On 13 June 1967, the SLF (CTG 79.5) Communication Officer, Captain HUERING USMC, and the ARG (CTG 76.5) Communication Officer, Lt. THOMAS, USN, called on the Division CEO staff to coordinate communication matters with respect to Operation BEACON TORCH.
10. (C) Communication difficulties during Operation BEACON TORCH necessitated a minor revision in the Communication Plan and the assignment of a Liaison Officer from the Division CEO office to the SLF (CTG 79.5) aboard the USS TRIPOLI. On 18 June 1967, Capt ZIMOWSKI accompanied by one radio/KY-8 technician and two radio relay technicians reported to the SLF. Concurrently the 7th Communication Battalion was tasked to position a radio relay attachment of one AN/MRC-63 with team in the area of THANG BINH (BT175418) and one AN/MRC-62 with team at the 5th Marines CP (BT228308) in a stand-by status. To support helicopter operations, the USS TRIPOLI was required to be continually under way and it was determined that a relay station for the radio relay link from the Division to the SLF was necessary. The AN/MRC-63 was installed using horizontally polarized Yagi for the link to the Division CP and a ground plane antenna for the link to the SLF aboard the USS TRIPOLI. Radio Relay Communications were intermittent, but when working were excellent. It was later determined that the ground plane antennas aboard ship were improperly positioned in a fixed location and were occasionally masked due to the maneuvering of the ship. Despite the intermittent quality of the radio relay link, it did provide a direct means of coordination between the Division FSCG, the 1st MAW DASC and SACC aboard the USS TRIPOLI and a sole user circuit between the Division Combat Operations Center and the SLF operations center aboard ship.
11. (C) On 19 June 1967, the Division Assistant CEO, Major James H. BIRD Jr., made a liaison trip to the SLF (CTG 79.5) aboard the USS TRIPOLI to coordinate establishment of vital circuits between the Division and the SLF (CTG 79.5) and the establishment of a radio relay link between the Division and BLT 2/3 ashore in support of Operation BEACON TORCH. It was determined that the Modem unit, AN/TOC-3, and the multiplex unit TA 219, required technical alignment and that mutual interference was caused by the ship's NAVCOMFNET circuit. Consultation with the ship's communication officer resulted in a shift to another long wire antenna and a subsequent reduction of interference. Lack of reliable and continuous VHF (FM) communications was primarily caused by poorly located antennas which were in the majority of cases masked by the ship and an inability to patch the antenna system. The

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SLF communications officer had decked mounted two AN/MRC 110's and reliable continuous communications were realized. Subsequently a trip was made to BLT 2/3 ashore to coordinate the establishment of a radio relay link to Division. A cursory inspection revealed the equipment was set up on improper frequencies and was utilizing ground plane antennas. Upon installing Yagi antennas and shifting frequencies reliable communications were established.

12. (U) On 21 June 1967, the Division Assistant CSO (Electronics), Major Frank L. BIROU, made a liaison visit to the USS TRIPOLI for the purpose of evaluating all facets of the communications equipment installed for the Landing Force. It was determined that the ship's propagation characteristics were such as to cause mutual circuit interference in certain frequency bands.

13. (U) The lack of signal/circuit power wiring delayed the shift of the Division Communication Center to its new location on the scheduled date. Preparation for the cut-over commenced on the evening of 21 June 1967. Actual circuit cut-over commenced at 230605H June 1967 and the Communication Center was completely operational in its new location by 240425H June 1967. The cut-over was accomplished without loss of communications into the World Wide Network or with the Senior Command, III MAF, a minimum outage time with subordinate units and no disruption of message center service. Expansion and upgrading of the communication center teletype facilities has been planned and programmed and will be initiated upon receipt of requisitioned equipment.

14. (U) On 23 June 1967, the Division received two AN/TTC-7's, each of which is a three operator position 200 line capacity common battery switchboard. Planning provides for parallel wiring which will result in a six operator position 400 line capacity switchboard. Upon installation an upgrade in subscriber service should be realized.

15. (C) On 24 June 1967, the AN/TRC-97 Tropo link from Danang to Chu Lai was deactivated and the equipment was deployed from Chu Lai to the 5th Marines CP (BT228308). A link was activated between the Division and the 5th Marines replacing two AN/MRC-62 radio relay links which have been placed in a standby status.

16. (U) On 26 June 1967, one of the two AN/TRC-97 Tropo radio relay sets authorized the Division was received. This equipment is presently being inventoried and operationally checked.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. (U) The following distinguished visitors visited/toured the command during June 1967:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
3Jun67	MajGen Frank C. THARIN	Deputy CG, FMFPac
4Jun67	Congressman Richard H. ICHORD Congressman Speedy O. LONG	Democrat, Missouri Democrat, Louisiana
6Jun67	Congressman Richard H. ICHORD	Democrat, Missouri
8Jun67	Congressman Speedy O. LONG Mr. Earl MORGAN General WESTMORELAND	Democrat, Louisiana Member Special Staff Armed Forces Committee COMUSMACV
10Jun67	Minister WILSON	Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Manila
17Jun67	Ambassador William G. BLAIR	American Ambassador to the Philippines
20Jun67	Honorable Charles F. BAIRD	Undersecretary of the Navy, Designate
21Jun67	BrigGen G. E. DOOLEY	HQMC
26-27Jun67	LtGen Victor H. KRULAK	CG, FMFPac
29Jun67	Mr. Peter WILKINSON Mr. William T. ROGERS Brigadier D. J. WILLISON	Her Majesty's Ambassador Parliamentary Under Secretary of State

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ENEMY ACTIVITY

Heavy contact with Main Force units occurred early in the month, however, the latter part of June saw only sporadic, harassing enemy activities.

2 June:(C) Two battalions of the 5th Marines engaged in a day long battle with the enemy. An initial contact was made by D/1/5 at 0610H in the vicinity of (BT 139310). Contact increased throughout the morning and close air support was used extensively. By 1130H all elements of 3/5 were engaged with the enemy. At 1250H, a hovering med-evac helo was hit by an unknown caliber recoilless rifle round. The helicopter, at (BT 125299), caught fire and crashed killing 1 Marine and wounding 7 others, most of whom had been previously wounded and were being med-evacuated. Contact continued into the night, but by 0130H on the 3rd, the battlefield was quiet. This action cost the enemy 56 KIA and 96 KIA probable.

6 June:(C) CAP B-4, located at (AT 945665) was attacked by an estimated 100 enemy at 0155H. The enemy force used small arms, automatic weapons, grenades, and satchel charges. 1 ammo bunker was destroyed as were two defensive positions. Small arms, LAAN's and grenades were returned by the CAP unit and 8 VC were observed to fall. Their bodies were dragged away. An I/3/1 reaction force with one tank arrived and the enemy fled. An artillery mission was fired on suspected enemy routes of egress and the area was searched disclosing shrapnel fragments from RPG-2 rockets, pieces of satchel charges and CS grenades, and one .45 caliber pistol.

7 June:(C) At 0230H, in the vicinity of (AT 925856), a CAP in 2/7's area received 10 rounds of 57mm RL, 3 grenades and six to seven hundred rounds of small arms fired, from an estimated enemy company. Small arms fire along with claymores and 3.5 rockets were returned by the unit. Seven VC were probably killed during this action.

17 June:(C) At 1155H, E/2/7 received small arms fire from three enemy at (AT 864514). The three were probably decoys, because the Marines, after returning small arms fire, 3.5 and artillery, encountered 35 enemy in an "L" shaped ambush at 1300H. The VC employed 5 automatic weapons in this action. The Marines returned fire, an LVTH fired .50 caliber and 105mm direct fire, and artillery missions and air strikes were conducted. There was some further action, and air support as well as artillery was utilized; however the main action for the day was over. In the action 35 enemy were killed with 15 additional probably killed.

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- 17 June: (C) At 0200H, in the vicinity of (BT 112302), 3/5's perimeter defense received an estimated 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Counter-battery fire was returned and 39 rounds of 155mm were expended.
- 18 June: (C) At 0530H, F and H 2/7 received 12 rounds of 81mm mortar fire at (AT 858452).
- 18 June: (C) At 0850H, L/3/7, in the vicinity of (AT 873520) made contact with approximately 60 armed enemy who fired 60mm mortar, RPG rockets and an accurate volley of heavy automatic weapons fire. A quick reaction by L/3/7 forced the enemy to break contact and flee. Documents were captured which identified the aggressors as being part of the R.20th Battalion.
- 18 June: (C) At 1400H, in the vicinity of (AT 817468) 11 secondary explosions resulted from an air strike prescribed by G-2.
- 19 June: (C) At 2215H, the 3/7 CP located at (AT 869528), received 20-25 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. Counterbattery fire was returned but no accounting of enemy casualties could be made.
- 19 June: (C) At 2110H, 2/5 was advised by Duc Duc senior advisor that 2 companies of NVA troops were in the vicinity of (AT 8347). A fire mission was called, resulting in 54 secondary explosions. A search of the area and questioning of local civilians revealed the source of these explosions to be a VC mine factory.
- 20 June: (C) At 2000H, the 2/1 Command Group, in the vicinity of (BT 025 525) received 10-12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and some small arms fire. Two secondary explosions were observed when a counter-battery mission was fired.

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

- 1 June (U) - Major General Donn J. ROBERTSON assumed command of the 1st Marine Division effective 0900H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 010343Z Jun 67.
Tab C
- 3 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv submitted to CG III MAF recommendations concerning the use of steel antenna type observation towers.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030315Z Jun 67.
Tab F
- 4 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for employment of ARG/SLF during the last half of June.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 040830Z Jun 67.
Tab F
- 5 June (S) - Termination Operation UNION II effective 051800H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 050847Z Jun 67.
Tab D
- 6 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv requested to CG III MAF that this division be relieved from the requirement of providing security for ASP #1.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 061007Z Jun 67.
Tab F
- 7 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 70-67 directing Rough Rider convoys on 11 and 12 between Danang and Phu Bai.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 070901Z Jun 67.
Tab F, Tab C
- 9 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept of Operation BUTLER.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 090111Z Jun 67.
Tab F
- 9 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv assumed opcon of 1st Platoon, 1st Armored Amphibian Company and passed opcon to CO 11th Marines effective 072250H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 090257Z Jun 67
- 10 June (C) - Operation BUTLER commenced 0700H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 100545Z Jun 67
Tab D
- 10 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv directed that reemphasis be placed on M-16 training.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 100231Z Jun 67.

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- 11 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv requested CG III MAF to provide engineer support on National Route 1.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 190445Z June 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 12 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept of Operation ARIZONA.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 161237Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 12 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 71-67 directing the concept of operations related to Operation BEACON TORCH.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 120149Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 12 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 72-67 (Operation ARIZONA).
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 120239Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 12 June (S) - Termination Operation BUTLER effective 121600H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 120825 Jun 67.
- 12 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv directed certain restrictions on ONTOS employment.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 121455Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 13 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 72-67 (Operation ARIZONA).
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 130805Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 14 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published his planning guidance for July 1967.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 140703Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 14 June (C) - Operation ARIZONA commenced 0600H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 140737Z Jun 67.
Tab D
- 15 June (C) - Operation ADAMS/ADAIR commenced 1215H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 151705Z Jun 67.
Tab D
- 16 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept of Operation ADAIR.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 160145Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 16 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept of Operation BROWN.

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Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 160147Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F

- 16 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of additional measures taken for security of major bridges.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 161237Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 17 June (S) - CG III MAF requested comments concerning the feasibility of opening Highway One from TAY NINH to DONG HA.
Ref: CG III MAF 170120Z Jun 67.
- 18 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv commended 1st Recon Bn on the outstanding skill and competency displayed on the night of 15-16 June by two patrols in Elephant Valley.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180131Z Jun 67.
- 18 June (S) - CG III MAF directed 1st MarDiv to conduct continuous deep reconnaissance in the THUONG DUC/HAPPY VALLEY areas west to North-South Grid Line YG 35.
- 18 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 73-67 directing Rough Rider convoys on 21 and 22 June between Danang and Phu Bai.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180933Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 18 June (C) - CG III MAF cautioned all major commands to insure the enemy does not gain victories because of any lack of alertness on our part.
Ref: CG III MAF 181102Z Jun 67.
- 18 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 73-67 directing Rough Rider convoys on 21 and 22 June between Danang and Phu Bai.
Tab C, Tab F
- 18 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of planned operations for July.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 181347 Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 21 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv assumed opcon SIF BRAVO effective 0600H.
Ref: CG III MAF 210146Z Jun 67.
- 21 June (S) - Termination Operation BROWN effective 221400H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 211641Z Jun 67.
- 21 June (C) - Operation BEACON TORCH commenced 0600H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 211837Z Jun 67.
Tab D

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- 21 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 74-67 (Opcon SIF Bravo).
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 211849Z Jun 67.
- 21 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept of Operation CALHOUN.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 211851Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 22 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the adequacy of M-16 E1 rifle pre-deployment training of replacements.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 220327Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 22 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF on the divisions amphibious tractor assets.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 221009Z Jun 67
Tab C
- 22 June (S) - Termination Operation ARIZONA effective 221800H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 221045Z June 67.
- 23 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 75-67 (Operation CALHOUN).
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 231559Z Jun 67.
Tab C
- 24 June (C) - CG III MAF directed major commands to reemphasize techniques of assault on fortified positions.
Ref: CG III MAF 240514Z Jun 67.
- 24 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 75-67 (Operation Calhoun).
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240647A Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 24 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv directed all units to take necessary precautions in order to reduce effectiveness of enemy employment of chemical munition.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240649Z Jun 67.
Tab C
- 24 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv requested major units participating in Operation CALHOUN to conduct ground battle damage assessment on Arc Light Strikes within unit boundaries.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240857Z Jun 67.
- 24 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Change Two to Frag Order 75-67 (Operation CALHOUN).
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240929Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F

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- 24 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv directed change of opcon of reconnaissance elements in support of Operation CALHOUN.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 241347Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 25 June (C) - CG FMFPAC cautioned major commands to insure adequate command emphasis is placed on the prevention of needless accidents and loss of life.
Ref: CG FMFPAC 250331Z Jun 67.
- 25 June (S) - Termination Operation ADAIR effective 252400H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250349Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 25 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv directed units to arrange installation layouts to minimize possibility of extensive damage due to fires or enemy activity.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250831Z Jun 67.
Tab C
- 25 June (C) - Operation CALHOUN commenced 0600H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 251145Z Jun 67.
Tab D
- 26 June (U) - CG 1st MarDiv recommended to CG III MAF that a message be sent to CG ICFZ expressing the CG 1st MarDiv's appreciation for the excellent conduct of Operation PHI PHUNG 27.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260655Z Jun 67.
Tab F
- 27 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv requested from CG III MAF a special operating area for division operations along National Route 1 and in the Que Son - Thang Binh - Nui Lac Son Basin.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 270337Z Jun 67.
Tab C
- 27 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv informed CG, Co C Fifth SFGA that present commitment to Operation CALHOUN limited large scale reaction capability for operations by Thang Duc CIDG.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 270341Z Jun 67.
Tab F
- 27 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv requested from CG III MAF the approximate locations of all past duds or anti-disturbance fuzed aircraft ordnance.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 270801Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F

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- 28 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised all subordinate commands of the importance of destroying known dual ordnance.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 289521Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 28 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 76-67 directing continuation of Operation CALHOUN.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 280719Z Jun 67.
Tab C
- 30 June(S) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF on the optimum use of tanks and the combat value of ONTOS.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 300705Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 29 June (S) -CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 77-67 directing Rough Rider convoys to Tam Ky on 3 July.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 290803Z Jun 67.
Tab C
- 30 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 77-67 (Rough Rider).
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 300951Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 30 June (S) - CG 1st MarDiv directed the establishment of a 5th Marines Regimental base camp at Hill 63 and operations thereafter.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 300955Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F
- 30 June (C) - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of LVTH-6 utilization by the division.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 301213Z Jun 67.
Tab C, Tab F

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COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

2 June (C). A squad combat patrol from CAP D-2 observed two enemy. When the patrol challenged, the enemy fled. The patrol fired six rounds of small arms at the enemy and on search of the area, found one VC KIA. (SITREP 430 TAB D)

6 June (C). The platoon position of CAP B-4 was assaulted by an estimated 100 enemy using satchel charges, grenades, automatic weapons and small arms. The enemy penetrated the position, destroyed three bunkers, captured seven M-16 rifles, one M-79 launcher and seven LAAWS, and inflicted casualties of five Marines KIA, four Marines WIA and five PF's WIA. The CAP platoon responded with small arms, M-79's, grenades and called artillery fire on likely withdrawal routes. The enemy casualties were eight VC KIA. (SITREP 434 TAB D)

6 June (C). A squad combat patrol from CAP D-7 observed two enemy. The patrol took the enemy under fire with small arms. A search of the area disclosed two VC KIA, six M-26 grenades and two M-14 magazines. (SITREP 434 TAB D)

7 June (C). A squad combat patrol from CAP D-2 observed two enemy running from the patrol. The enemy were challenged but did not halt. The patrol fired five rounds small arms resulting in one VC KIA. (SITREP 435 TAB D)

13 June (C). CAP's B1-1, B1-4, B1-5 and B3-2 were redesignated as CAP's Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 respectively. (1st MarDiv msg 130857Z Jun67)

14 June (C). A village chief reported to CAP B3-2 the location of six enemy. The platoon dispatched two squads to the reported location where they observed the enemy. The squads opened fire with small arms and the enemy returned fire and broke off the engagement. A search of the area revealed no evidence of enemy casualties. (SITREP 442 TAB D)

16 June (C). A squad ambush from CAP D-2 observed two enemy fleeing from the ambush. The squad pursued the enemy and observed that the two were joined by five more VN males. The squad fired 20 rounds of small arms which resulted in one VC KIA, one VC WIA captured and five VN males in area apprehended. (SITREP 444 TAB D)

18 June (C). Local children advised the personnel of CAP B2-2 of the location of an assault rocket. The platoon informed the engineers, who found and destroyed the rocket. A picture of the children was taken and the children were rewarded. (SITREP 446 TAB D)

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
23 June (C). Two Vietnamese boys brought a mine to CAP B2-2. The boys had found it rigged with a trip wire. The mine was destroyed and the boys were rewarded 150 piasters. (SITREP 451 TAB D)

27 June (C). A Vietnamese male reported the location of two 81mm mortar rounds to a squad patrol from CAP Q-3. The patrol located the rounds and destroyed them in place. The Vietnamese was rewarded 600 piasters for locating the rounds and informing the patrol. (SITREP 455 TAB D)

29 June (U). A Company headquarters, CAC Q Hq, was activated under the OPCON of the Seventh Marines. (CG 1stMarDiv msg 302335Z Jun67)


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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 4-6 June 1967 (U) A special congressional subcommittee visited this command to inquire into the problems associated with the M16A1 Rifle.
- 11 June 1967 (U) 1st Motor Transport Battalion conducted a Rough Rider from Danang to Phu Bai returning to Danang on 12 June. One vehicle was disabled by a mine on the return trip. Elements of Headquarters, 1st FAG were transported.
- 21 June 1967 (U) 11th Motor Transport Battalion conducted a Rough Rider from Danang to Phu Bai, returning to Danang on 22 June without incident. Materials of the rear elements of 3rd Marine Division units were transported.

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CIVIC ACTION

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20 June 1967 -(U)- Rededication of the new Hieu Mon District Headquarters.

21 June 1967 -(U)- 1st Marine Division CA Conference.

22 June 1967 -(U)- Vietnamese International Day showing appreciation to the free world units stationed in the Danang area.

25 June 1967 -(U)- Dedication of Ho Vinh Dam.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-30 June 1967.

- 1 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 450,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

Marine patrols distributed 1,670 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Mines Kill Innocent People" and "Report VC Activity."

2/5, 3/1 and 3/7 made 5 hours of ground broadcasts.

- 2 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 310,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Surrender Instructions," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People" and "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps."

2 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 1,534 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation" and "Chieu Hoi."

2/5 reported that 7 Chieu Hoi's had turned themselves in to Duc Duc District Headquarters.

- 3 Jun (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,190,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Health and Sanitation" and "GVN Provides a Better Life."

2 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,590 leaflets. Themes used were: "Marines are Friends," "VC Steal Rice," "Report VC Activity" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Marines made 7 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcasts on "Rewards for Mines" and "Chieu Hoi."

- 4 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 650,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Surrender or Die" and "Chieu Hoi."

2 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Surrender," "Don't Harbor VC" and a tape directed to the NVA about casualties on Operation UNION.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 1,220 leaflets. Themes were: "Health and Sanitation," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Rewards."

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3/7 made a 4 hour ground broadcast on "Chieu Hoi" and "Rules of the River."

- 5 Jun (U) 3 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Theme was: "Exploitation of the Victory on Operation UNION II."

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 1,110 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Health and Sanitation" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

7th Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast at a MEDCAP on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

- 6 Jun (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 282,500 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Rally or Die for HO CHI MINH" and "Don't Harbor VC/NVA."

3 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and a special tape exploiting the allied victories on Operation UNION were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 2,500 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians" and "Health and Sanitation."

100 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

- 7 Jun (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 150,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Atrocities," "Don't Harbor VC" and "Chieu Hoi" directed at the 21st and 31st NVA Regiments.

2 hours and 50 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi" were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 3,900 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Health and Sanitation," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Report VC Activity."

1st Marines made a 30 minute ground broadcast on "US/GVN Co-operation."

- 8 Jun (U) 6 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,500,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Don't Harbor VC/NVA" and "Chieu Hoi" directed at the 21st and 31st NVA Regiments.

3 hours and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi" were conducted.

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1st Marines air dropped 114,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Steal Rice" and "Keep VC Out of Your Homes."

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 1,700 leaflets. Themes used were: "Pledge of Allegiance Cards," "GVN Helps the Vietnamese People" and "Chieu Hoi."

1st Marines made a 1 hour and 30 minute ground broadcast.

A 1st Recon patrol dropped "B-52" leaflets. Subsequent to this, VC were seen reading them.

9 Jun (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 850,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

2 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,050 leaflets. Theme used was: "Health and Sanitation."

"Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

3 movies were shown for 2 hours, and 6 hours of ground broadcasts were conducted at County Fair #7-14.

10 Jun (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 500,000 leaflets. The theme was: "NVA Chieu Hoi."

1 hour and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,588 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Chieu Hoi," "Where is Your Rice?" and "Mines Reward."

1,000 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

11 Jun (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 50,000 leaflets. Theme used was: "VC Atrocity."

5 hours and 45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" and "Harassment" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,450 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People" and "Pledge of Allegiance Cards."

5 movies were shown for 2 hours and 30 minutes by the 1st Marines.

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- 12 Jun (U) 2 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Reward for Mines and Booby Traps," "Report Mined Roads" and "Health and Sanitation."

1st Marines conducted a 1 hour ground broadcast exploiting the VC attack on a VIS Team.

- 13 Jun (U) Marine patrols distributed 2,200 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation" and "Report Mines on Roads."

1st Marines made a 35 minute aerial broadcast directed at the people at their collection point.

- 14 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 200,150 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes" and a special leaflet in support of Operation ARIZONA, instructing people to move to the refugee collection points.

1 hour and 45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and a special tape, in support of operation ARIZONA, instructing the people to move to the collection points were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 8,625 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps" and "Health and Sanitation."

1st Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast and a 35 minute aerial broadcast warning the people to move out of a free-fire zone.

- 15 Jun (U) 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 5,300 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1st Marines made a 30 minute ground broadcast of news and music directed to the people of Nui Kim Son market.

- 16 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 109,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "NVA Leaders Lied" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

7th Marines air dropped 50,000 leaflets in support of Operation ARIZONA. Theme used was: "Instructions to Refugees."

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Marine patrols distributed 3,150 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Report Mines on Roads" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

"Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

7th Marines made 11 hours of ground broadcasts in support of Operation ARIZONA. Themes used were: "Instructions to Refugees" and "Chieu Hoi."

1st Marines made 3 hours of ground broadcasts on "VC Taxation," "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and a recorded Cultural Drama Team performance.

17 Jun (U) 11 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 450,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Chieu Hoi" and "Letter to the Men in the Ranks of NLF."

40 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

1st Marines conducted 29 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcasts. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "VC Taxation," news and music.

A Cultural Drama Team gave 4 performances for the 1st Marines.

Marine patrols distributed 1,400 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Mines Rewards," "Report VC Activity," "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Health and Sanitation."

18 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 223,000 leaflets. 184,000 of these leaflets were dropped in support of Operation BEACON TORCH. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Notice of Clear and Destroy Operation" and "VC Destroy While GVN Builds."

3 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "VC Destroy While GVN Builds" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,025 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Mine Rewards," "Report VC Activity," "Health and Sanitation" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1st Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast on the opening of a new market place at Nui Kim Son.

1st Marines conducted 4 hours of ground broadcasts in support of Operation ARIZONA. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Instructions to Refugees."

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19 Jun (U) 11 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,000,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Mines Rewards," "Truth vs Lies" and "Chieu Hoi."

Marine patrols distributed 1,300 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Report VC Activity" and "Health and Sanitation."

7th Marines made 4 hours of ground broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

A 1 hour aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

20 Jun (U) 7 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 825,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Your Leaders Lied," "NVA Chieu Hoi," "Health and Sanitation," "Warning to Villagers Who Travel This Road" and "Mines Reward."

2 hours and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,350 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Safe Conduct Passes," "GVN Helps Vietnamese People" and "Health and Sanitation."

1st Tk Bn showed 1 movie for 2 hours.

21 Jun (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 933,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi" and "Where Are Your Comrades?"

6 hours and 5 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,300 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "GVN Helps Vietnamese People."

7th Marines made a 1 hour "Chieu Hoi" ground broadcast.

22 Jun (U) 3 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 15,400 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Health and Sanitation" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1st Marines conducted 2 hours and 40 minutes of ground broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

23 Jun (U) 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 674,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Health and Sanitation."

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4 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,600 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Report VC Activity," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps" and "Chieu Hoi."

7th Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

4 movies were shown for 4 hours by the Northern Defense Command.

24 Jun (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 536,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Warning to Villagers Who Travel Roads Mined by VC," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1 hour and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,500 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Health and Sanitation" and "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians."

7th Marines conducted a 1 hour ground broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

25 Jun (U) 6 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 622,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Don't Harbor VC," "Notice of Clear and Destroy Operations," "Show of Strength" and "VC Endanger Lives by Firing on Helicopters." Also dropped was a special leaflet map showing the safe area for refugees on Operation CALHOUN.

3 hours and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

7th Marines distributed 700 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Report VC Activity," "Health and Sanitation," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians" and "Chieu Hoi."

26 Jun (U) 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 682,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Don't Harbor VC" and "VC Destroy While GVN Builds."

6 hours and 25 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Don't Harbor VC" and "Harassment" were conducted in support of Operation CALHOUN.

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Marine patrols distributed 1,975 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines," "Free South" newspapers and "Chieu Hoi."

1st Marines made a 1 hour and 30 minute ground broadcast at a collection point.

27 Jun (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 37,000 leaflets. Theme used was: "Chieu Hoi Appeal."

50 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,650 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Health and Sanitation" and "Report VC Activity."

7th Marines conducted 30 minutes ground broadcast promoting cooperation between villagers and Marines.

1st Tk Bn showed 1 movie for 2 hours to 700 people.

28 Jun (U) 6 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 968,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Support the GVN," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

7 hours and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 3,125 leaflets. Themes used were: "Mine Rewards," "Report VC Activity," "Health and Sanitation" and "Chieu Hoi."

1st Marines made a 2 hour ground broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and Vietnamese music.

29 Jun (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 150,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines," "Chieu Hoi" and "Mines Kill Civilians."

5 hours and 10 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Don't Harbor VC" and "Rewards."

Marine patrols distributed 3,265 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation" and "Report VC Activity."

"Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

2 hours and 15 minutes of ground broadcasts were conducted using themes of "Chieu Hoi" and "Support GVN and Its Programs."

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30 Jun (U) 2 hours and 55 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted on "Don't Harbor VC," "National Reconciliation," "VC Mines Kill Civilians" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

2,860 leaflets were distributed. Themes were: "Pledge of Allegiance Cards," "Don't Harbor VC" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

4 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcasts were conducted using the theme of "Support the GVN."

1st Marines showed movies for 2 hours and 30 minutes to the people of Nui Kim Son.

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COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
 ESSENTIAL LISTING OF
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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- 1 June 1967 (U) Div Asst CTO, Major James W. FLD, Jr., attended the I Corps Comm Coord Conference hosted by III MAF.
- Ref: CTO III MAF ltr IBC/ped over 2000 of 22 May 1967
- 1-15 June 1967 (U) Instructions presented on the installation and installation commenced on the new MPE (FI) equipment in combat vehicles.
- Ref: CG FLC 251418L May 67
- 4 June 1967 (U) Re-alignment of Comm assets directed.
- Ref: III MAF 291316Z May 67
 CG 1st MarDiv 040701Z Jun 67
- 4 June 1967 (U) Div CEC, Col M. P. CLAUDE, made staff visit to 11th Marines.
- 7 June 1967 (U) III MAF CTO made staff visit to 1st MarDiv CTO.
- 12 June 1967 (U) Gen D. J. ROBERTSON, CG 1st MarDiv, was briefed on Communication Systems.
- 12 June 1967 (C) CTG 79.5 (SIF) and CTG 76.5 (ARC) Comm Reprs liaison visit to Div CEC in conjunction with Operation BEACON TORCH.
- 12 June 1967 (U) Div CTO Reps attended Prog Coord Conference conducted by III MAF.
- Ref: III MAF 070236Z Jun 67
- 12-14 June 1967 (U) Transmission Security Instructions presented to 2ndBn, 5thMar; 7thEngrBn; 3rdBn, 1st Mar.
- Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 040327L Jun 67
- 13 June 1967 (U) Col W. J. WESSNER, 1st MarDiv Chief of Staff, was briefed on Communication Systems.
- 14 June 1967 (U) Div CEC attended conference at III MAF concerning reallocation of supporting communication assets.

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15 June 1967 (U) Div CEO Rep attended I Corps Comm Coord Conference.

19 June 1967 (U) Div CEO Reps conducted courtesy Electronics Maintenance and Operational Communications Inspection of 1st Engineer Battalion.

23 June 1967 (U) Received two AN/TTC-7 Switchboards.

24 June 1967 (U) Div Comm Center relocated.

26 June 1967 (U) Div CEO Rep attended the I Corps Cable Coordination Conference.

Ref: III MAF 220228Z Jun 67

26 June 1967 (U) Received one of the two authorized AN/TRC-97 Tropo Radio Relay Sets.

27 June 1967 (U) Provided Comm Spt during LtGen KRULAK, CG FMFPAC, visit to 1stMarDiv.

Ref: CG 1stMarDiv 251349Z Jun 67

28 June 1967 (U) Div CEO Staff Visit to 2ndBn, 5th Marines.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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PART IVSUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

✓ Tab A	First MarDiv PERINTREP 11-67	
✓ Tab B	First MarDiv PERINTREP 12-67	
✓ Tab C	Operational Documents, #1-37	
✓ Tab D	Situation Reports	
✓ Tab E	Photographs and News Releases	<i>Filed Sep</i>
✓ Tab F	G-3 Journal for June 1967	
✓ Tab G	Command Directory	<i>Filed w/ Cmd Chron</i>
✓ Tab H	Hq Bn Command Chronology	
✓ Tab I	First Marines Command Chronology	
✓ Tab J	Fifth Marines Command Chronology	
✓ Tab K	Seventh Marines Command Chronology	<i>Filed</i>
✓ Tab L	Eleventh Marines Command Chronology	
✓ Tab M	First Recon Bn Command Chronology	
✓ Tab N	First AntiTank Bn Command Chronology	
✓ Tab O	First Tank Bn Command Chronology	
✓ Tab P	Third Amtrac Bn Command Chronology	
✓ Tab Q	First Engr Bn Command Chronology	
✓ Tab R	First Motor Transport Command Chronology	
✓ Tab S	Eleventh Motor Transport Command Chronology	
✓ Tab T	First Shore Party Command Chronology	
✓ Tab U	First Medical Bn Command Chronology	<i>Sep</i>
✓ Tab V	Seventh Comm Bn Command Chronology	
✓ Tab W	Seventh Engr Bn Command Chronology	
✓ Tab X	Ninth Engr Bn Command Chronology	

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OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTSSUBJECTORIGINATOR & DTG

1 ✓ Change of Command, <i>1st Marine Div</i>	CG First MarDiv 010343Z Jun 67 (U)
2 ✓ Frag 0 70-67	CG First MarDiv 070901Z Jun 67 (S)
3 ✓ Change of Opcon	CG First MarDiv 090257Z Jun 67 (C)
4 ✓ Engr Support	CG First MarDiv 110445Z Jun 67 (S)
5 ✓ Frag 0 71-67	CG First MarDiv 120149Z Jun 67 (S)
6 ✓ Frag 0 72-67	CG First MarDiv 120239Z Jun 67 (S)
7 ✓ Termination Op Butler	CG First MarDiv 120825Z Jun 67 (S)
8 ✓ Ontos Restrictions	CG First MarDiv 121455Z Jun 67 (S)
9 ✓ Change One to Frag 0 72-67	CG First MarDiv 130805Z Jun 67 (S)
10 ✓ July Planning Guidance	CG First MarDiv 140703Z Jun 67 (S)
11 ✓ Concept Op Adair	CG First MarDiv 160145Z Jun 67 (S)
12 ✓ Concept Op Brown	CG First MarDiv 160147Z Jun 67 (S)
13 ✓ Security Major Bridges	CG First MarDiv 161237Z Jun 67 (S)
14 ✓ Outstanding Performance of Duty	CG First MarDiv 180131Z Jun 67 (C)
15 ✓ Deep Reconnaissance	CG III MAF 180644Z Jun 67 (S)
16 ✓ Frag 0 73-67	CG First MarDiv 180933Z Jun 67 (S)
17 ✓ Ops for July 67	CG First MarDiv 181347Z Jun 67 (S)
18 ✓ Concept Op Calhoun	CG First MarDiv 211851Z Jun 67 (S)
19 ✓ M-16 Training	CG First MarDiv 220327Z Jun 67 (C)
20 ✓ Amtrac Assets	CG First MarDiv 221009Z Jun 67 (S)
21 ✓ Frag 0 75-67	CG First MarDiv 231559Z Jun 67 (S)
22 ✓ Change One to Frag 0 75-67	CG First MarDiv 240647Z Jun 67 (S)
23 ✓ Enemy Employment of Chemical Munitions	CG First MarDiv 240649Z Jun 67 (C)
24 ✓ Change Two to Frag 0 75-67	CG First MarDiv 240929Z Jun 67 (S)
25 ✓ Recon Elements Op Calhoun	CG First MarDiv 241347Z Jun 67 (S)
26 ✓ Termination Op Adair	CG First MarDiv 250349Z Jun 67 (S)
27 ✓ Installation Security	CG First MarDiv 250831Z Jun 67 (C)
28 ✓ Special Operating Area	CG First MarDiv 270337Z Jun 67 (S)
29 ✓ Supporting Arms	CG First MarDiv 271003Z Jun 67 (C)
30 ✓ Duds	CG First MarDiv 280521Z Jun 67 (S)
31 ✓ Frag 0 76-77	CG First MarDiv 280719Z Jun 67 (S)
32 ✓ Duds and Ordnance	CG First MarDiv 280801Z Jun 67 (S)
33 ✓ Frag 0 77-67	CG First MarDiv 290803Z Jun 67 (S)
34 ✓ Tanks and Ontos	CG First MarDiv 300705Z Jun 67 (S)
35 ✓ Change One to Frag 0 77-67	CG First MarDiv 300951Z Jun 67 (S)
36 ✓ Regimental Combat Base <i>Camp, Establish. of</i>	CG First MarDiv 300955Z Jun 67 (S)
37 ✓ IWTB-6 Utilization	CG First MarDiv 301213Z Jun 67 (C)

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PERINTREP NO. 11-67

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF
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First Marine Division
 Danang, Republic of Vietnam
 271800 June 1967

Perintrep No. 11-67

Period covered: 011200H to 260600H June 1967

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. The First Marine Division has the responsibility to conduct offensive operations in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province areas.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation

(1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. Clear skies and warming temperatures dominated the reporting period, and a late afternoon cloud cover appeared frequently. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 99 and 79 respectively with an average humidity of 68%. The winds were variable at 5 to 10 knots, and the cumulative rainfall was 1.89 inches. (Refer to Perintrep No. 10-67 for Astronomical Data.)

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength, Location, Composition. Refer to ANNEX A, this perintrep.

(2) Availability of Reinforcements. The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in Central I Corps with the infiltration of additional forces from North Vietnam. A rallier to ARVN forces in Southern Quang Ngai stated that he recently infiltrated with a regiment, half of which remained in Quang Nam Province. According to Pfc Nguyen Van Chet, captured by elements of the 3rd Marine Division, the 325C division has just received orders from NVN to gather supplies for a relocation to the Danang area in the early part of July.

(2) Movements and Activities

(a) Enemy activity in the 1st Marine Division's area of responsibility has been generalized. He has displayed a growing interest for the northern sector of the TAOR while at the same time he has continued efforts to maintain control of the Que Son Valley. These efforts have been demonstrated by his attacks by fire on U.S. Marines in the area and by his larger scale, well-prepared ambushes. Characteristically, the enemy would strike and withdraw; however, this has not been the case in the Que Son Valley. A determination to control the area has been demonstrated.

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(b) On the 1st the enemy fired 30-40 rounds of mortars into the 1/5 perimeter defense. Battery "D" returned fire and two secondary explosions were observed. Early morning on the 2nd, elements of the 5th Marines in the vicinity of (BT 145299) had only sporadic contact with an estimated reinforced enemy company. Enemy resistance stiffened in all sectors throughout the morning and by noon the enemy strength was estimated to be two companies reinforced. Despite the fact that artillery and air support pounded the enemy positions throughout the day, heavy resistance persisted into the night. When it was all over, Marines counted 147 enemy bodies, and they estimated killing another 216 VC. The 2/5 CI must have been targeted because on three separate occasions (the 3rd, 17th, and 21st) the enemy fired mortars and RR at the position in the vicinity of (BT 120302). The Regimental CI (BT 228318) received 7 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on the 8th. Also on the 8th the 928th RF Company in the vicinity of (BT 218273) received a high volume of automatic weapons, 57mm RR, and 60mm mortar fire. Thirty civilian houses were destroyed as a result of the enemy fire. About noon on the 15th 2/3/5 again contacted an estimated two enemy companies in the vicinity of (BT 162329). The entrenched enemy fired mortars and automatic weapons; the Marines countered with small arms fire, artillery and close air support missions. Light to medium contact continued throughout the day and into the night. On the 25th, Recon patrol, Heleline, called an artillery mission on 4 VC carrying a body into a house (AT 967304). Small arms ammunition explosions were observed along with larger explosions which were believed to be grenades.

(c) In the south-western sector, an estimated two enemy platoons attacked an RD Team in the vicinity of (AT 899570) on 4 June. A reaction force from I/3/7 was dispatched to the area, illumination was provided, and artillery was fired in support. The enemy dispersed, and contact could not be regained. On the 11th a company from the 2nd Battalion 51st AVN Regiment in the vicinity of (AT 972667) received automatic weapons and mortar fire from an unknown enemy position. In the vicinity of (AT 854481) the 2/5 CI received 8 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 11 June. Countermortar fire was returned, and Spooky arrived on station. At the same time a Sparrow-Hawk was deployed to assist a CAC unit which reported unusual movement in front of their position (AT 864514). No further enemy activity was observed. The following night the Refugee camp near Thung Duc received 5 rounds of mortar fire. Two Vietnamese were killed and four were wounded. On the 15th in the vicinity of Co Noi Island, elements of the 7th Marines encountered about 35 enemy (AT 884514) who were set in a "U" shaped ambush. The enemy fired automatic weapons and employed several large caliber weapons; the Marines were supported by IAW-H's which fired .50 caliber and 105mm direct fire. A few kilometers to the northeast a C/1/7 squad received automatic weapons, mortar, and RR fire from an unknown number of enemy in a treeline (AT 948543). A reaction force with four tanks moved to the area, but the enemy thought it prudent to disperse, and the action decreased rapidly. I/3/7 (AT 873524) made contact on the 18th with a well-armed enemy who employed 60mm mortars and 120 rockets with a high degree of accuracy.

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When a 1/7 LVT was sent to the scene, twenty VC fired small arms and automatic weapons in an effort to keep it from reinforcing. 1/3/7 deployed a platoon to support the vehicle, and the enemy fled. Documents captured during the encounter indicated the enemy was from the R-20th Battalion. The enemy fired 12 rounds of 81mm mortar at F and H/2/7 (AT 858542) on the 18th, and on the 19th they fired 20-25 rounds at the 2/7 CF. Both times counterbattery missions were executed, but enemy casualties could not be determined. Again on the 21st the 2/7 CF in the vicinity of (AT 866512) received 12-15 rounds of mortar fire. According to local villagers the numerous secondary explosions in grid square (AT 8247) were caused by a VC mine factory located in the area. When H/2/5 conducted a reconnaissance of the area, they reported that the shrapnel pieces discovered varied greatly in size and appeared to come from a variety of ordnance. Two CAC units within 8 kilometers of each other were probed on the 24th. In the vicinity of (AT 865 574) CAC B2-2 received small arms fire from an estimated 15-20 enemy. Illumination was provided, small arms and M-79 rounds were returned. To the south at (AT 888472) CAC N-2 observed two enemy probing their position. A fire fight which lasted for 15 minutes ensued.

(d) The vicinity of Hoi An continued to be targeted for VC harassing action. ARVN outposts and RD teams were priority targets. The 467th RF Company in the vicinity of (BT 132561) received 5 rounds of mortar fire on the 1st. Friendly air and artillery supported, and the enemy withdrew. The Moc Bai OF (BT 127480) received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the 4th; three days later the enemy fired 57mm RR into the CF. On 5 June the enemy fired 60mm mortars into the night defensive positions of the 579th RF Company. The Phu Phong OF (BT 112497) received 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the 6th and 3 more on the 7th. On the 16th the enemy fired 60mm mortars in the vicinity of the Ba Ren Bridge (BT 120510). In the same vicinity an ARVN unit made contact with an estimated enemy battalion on the night of the 20th. The V.25th Battalion was reportedly operating in that area. Small arms, automatic weapons, 57mm RR, and mortars were fired at the ARVN unit. ARVN Rangers reinforced, and Spooky provided illumination. The SLF assumed a blocking position to the south of the river. Thirty-four VC were killed and 75-80 more were probably killed as a result of this action. On Operation Calhoun 1/3/5 in the vicinity of (BT 067407) found a VC hospital. Beds and medicine were discovered. In the same vicinity a squad patrol found what appeared to be a training center. The area was clean and well kept.

(e) The enemy's continuing interest in the northern sector of the TAOR was displayed throughout the period. An estimated 100 enemy attacked 3/7's CAC B-4 at 0155 on 6 June, the enemy force used small arms, automatic weapons, grenades, and satchel charges; the CAC unit returned small arms, grenades and LAAW's. Eight VC fell and their bodies were dragged away. An 1/3/1 reaction force arrived, and the enemy fled. Artillery and air fired on suspected enemy routes of egress. One ammo bunker and two defensive positions were destroyed by the attackers. Pieces of satchel charges, CS grenades, and one .45 caliber pistol were captured. A CAC unit just north of the Namu bridge was attacked by an estimated company on the 7th.

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Ten rounds of 57mm RR, numerous grenades, and 600-700 rounds of small arms were fired at the position. Small arms, 3.5 rocket rounds and claymores were fired at the attacking enemy force. Artillery fired illumination and HE. Elements of the enemy force penetrated the friendly position, and one enemy who was trying to take an M-16 was killed. Fourteen VC were probably killed and one wounded enemy was captured. In the vicinity of (AT 852851) on 15 June, an estimated enemy company was observed by recon patrol Consulate. Spooky was called and remained on station all night. The patrol observed 48 bodies, but they had been dragged away by morning.

(f) Nguyen Thien Phang, captured by 2/7 after the attack on the CAC unit at (AT 925856) on 7 June claimed to be from the 30th Montagnard Battalion, 301st Regiment, 305th Division whose CP is 12 kilometers west of the A Shau Valley. He was with a group of approximately 190 people whose mission was to attack the ESSO storage plant north of the Namu Bridge. He also claimed that transport companies attached to the 305th Division supply all the units in Quang Nam Province. He said the mission of the M-59 Sapper Company which has been unreported since January is to recon Highway #1 near the Hai Van Pass, and ambush convoys if the opportunity arises.

(g) A document captured by the National Police reveals that the 70th Battalion was detached from the 1st VC Regiment in January, 1967. There are indications that this battalion has moved into Central Quang Tin Province.

(h) A captured document translation report discloses that the enemy is placing added emphasis on Sapper units; Do Xuan Thiet, a recent rallier from the Quang Da Provincial Committee, indicated that the V.25 Battalion is making preparations to become a Sapper unit.

(4) AO and Recon Sightings

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sighting</u>	<u>Movement</u>	<u>Location</u>
010945-1730	22 VC	Mvg W & NE	AT 872376
041255	59 VC		BT 1139
051255	71 VC	Mvg S	ZC 1139
5 June	40 VC	Engaged	ZC 2065
060925	75-100 Wood Cutters	Mvg SE	AT 8961-9061
081012	20 VC	Following patrol	AT 8128
121745	20 VC		AT 8084
131530	40 VC	Mvg E	AT 8566
151625	20 NVA		AT 871522
151420	60 VC	Engaged	BT 158329
15 June	100 VC	On river, road	AT 852851
15 June	28 VC	In boats	AT 8685
181135	100 VC/NVA	In trench	AT 867517
191900	42 VC	Mvg SW	BT 044398
191205	20 VC	Mvg W	BT 034395
200900	18 VC	Mvg E & W	AT 915244

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Sighting</u>	<u>Movement</u>	<u>Location</u>
201745	15-20 VC	Engaged	BT 031399
201030	16 VC	Mvg E	BT 062413
210730	15 VC	Mvg E	AT 836266
211055	22 VC	Mvg E (grps of 3,5)	AT 798255
211500	18 VC	Mvg SW	AT 810263
210730	15 VC	Mvg E	AT 836266
211500	18 VC	Mvg SW	AT 810263
231535	40 VC	Stationary	AT 028548
231830	40 VC	Mvg S	AT 828548
251400	19 VC	On trail	AT 967364
251900	80 VC	Mvg S	AT 828548
261940	12 VC	Mvg E	BT 063447

b. Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) Espionage

(a) Enemy espionage activities during the reporting period centered mainly around the recruitment of children to work for the VC.

(b) Dai Loc DIOCC reported on June 1 that the VC have organized some "Buffalo" girls and boys (Children's Group), at Hoa Phu (V), Hieu Duc (D), to stand and watch Marines for the purpose of gaining information and begging for food. The food is to be given to the VC.

(c) Also on 1 June, DIOCC reported that the Viet Cong had organized a group of youths in the Loc Hiep area to act as an intelligence gathering group. The youths, who range in age from 10 to 15, will be sent for training to (AT 946605), (AT 942610), (AT 948607).

(2) Psychological

(a) On 13 June, at 0900, approximately 300 people conducted a demonstration in the vicinity of (BT 105534). The purpose of the demonstration was to protest artillery firing and bombings. Later the same day, at (AT 070560) a second demonstration occurred. National Police reported the demonstrations "not serious".

(b) These demonstrations appear to have been VC initiated, inasmuch as one well-equipped VC unit appeared in a village at (BT 080597) on the evening of the 12th. They forced the people to assemble for attendance at a meeting during which the people were ordered to go to Dien Ban District to participate in a demonstration early the next morning. The demonstration's purpose was to urge authorities to request the cessation of bombardment and artillery firing near the village.

3. Enemy Capabilities

a. Attack Capabilities

(1) Attack Tien Phuoc CIDG camp or isolated outposts outside our TAOR

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in strength up to and including a regiment with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.

(2) Attack CAC units in company (rein) strength.

(3) Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81 or 120mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.

b. Defense Capability

(1) Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd NVA Regiment, plus additional battalions subordinate to the 2nd NT Division and VC Quang Nam Province.

c. Delay Capability

(1) Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops into the mountainous area.

d. Reinforcement Capability

(1) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in the 1st MarDiv's area of responsibility with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.

e. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Capability

(1) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. Attack Tien Phuoc CIDG camp and isolated ARVN outposts in up to and including regimental strength with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.

(1) The following factors favor the adoption of this capability:

(a) Isolated units and outposts offer the best targets for a quick thrust and rapid withdrawal, even for large scale attacks.

(b) The enemy has had past successes using this method of attack.

(c) The enemy's desires to achieve a tactical success.

(d) The terrain provides many access routes from the mountains.

(2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:

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(a) The demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy troop concentrations, and ability to react rapidly to destroy them by the use of supporting arms and/or by ground attacks

b. Attack CAC units in company (rein) strength.

(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

(a) The enemy's past successes against this type of target.

(b) Enemy Sapper units are organized and equipped to implement this capability.

(2) The following factors militate against this capability:

(a) The ability of friendly units to react rapidly, and to destroy the enemy and his equipment by supporting arms and/or ground attack.

c. Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81 or 120mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.

(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

(a) The base can be attacked from a greater distance with less risk of loss.

(b) Enemy knowledge of the terrain and local populace.

(2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:

(a) The ability of friendly units to react rapidly, and to destroy the enemy and his equipment by supporting arms and/or ground attack.

d. Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd Regiment and forces locally available.

(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

(a) His displayed unwillingness to relinquish control of the populace.

(2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:

(a) The severe defeats he has previously suffered in this area.

(b) His unwillingness to engage FVMAF in conventional warfare.

e. Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available, while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops to the mountainous area.

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(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

(a) Numerous supplies believed to be located within this area would justify delaying actions.

(2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:

(a) He would not want to relinquish control of the population.

(b) It is a major source of supply and an important LOC.

f. Reinforce his present position in the 1st Marine's area of responsibility with the infiltration of additional troops from NVN or Central Laos.

(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

(a) Recent severe attrition of enemy forces in Central I Corps.

(2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:

(a) Food is in such short supply presently that it is doubtful the enemy could logistically support another sizable unit in Central I Corps.

g. Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

(a) It provides the enemy an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms capabilities.

(b) VC knowledge of the terrain and populace.

(c) The enemy's belief that application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage continued U.S./FVMAF participation in RVN.

(d) Guerrilla and Local Force units can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while Main Force units conduct larger operations.

(2) Factors which militate against adoption of this capability:

(a) The loss of small unit leaders to supervise conducting this type warfare.

(b) The successes of the RD program will help retard their progressiveness in this area.

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5. Conclusions

a. Enemy capabilities in relative probability of adoption:

(1) Capability 3.e.

(a) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

(2) Capability 3.a.(2)

(a) Attack CAC units in up to company reinforced strength.

(3) Capability 3.b.

(a) Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd NVA Regiment, and forces locally available. In carrying out this capability, he would attack by ambush and fire.

(4) Capability 3.a.(3)

(a) Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81 or 120mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.

(5) Capability 3.a.(1)

(a) Attack Tien Phuoc CLIC camp and/or isolated ARVN outposts in up to and including regimental strength with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.

(6) Capability 3.d.

(a) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in the 1st MarDiv's area of responsibility with the infiltration of additional troops from NVN or Central Laos,

(7) ~~Capability 3.d.~~

(a) Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops into the mountainous area.

b. Vulnerabilities

(1) The enemy is vulnerable to massed fires from air, artillery, and naval gunfire. Even his deepest base areas and lines of communications are vulnerable to attack by air. When closer to the coast or to friendly positions, any massed formation is subject to detection and subsequent attack by artillery and naval gunfire in

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addition to air. Being unable to effectively counter this fire power, the enemy must rely heavily on camouflage and circumspection in his activities in order to minimize this vulnerability.

(2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations.

(3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold, and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations limits his ability to react to friendly maneuvers unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.

(4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air, deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations.

E. B. Sigmon, Jr.

E. B. SIGMON, JR.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEX:

A. STRENGTH, LOCATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE ENEMY

DISTRIBUTION: "A" less 7, 12, 17-21, 37-67
"B" less 72, 76, 84, 98, 100, 191; plus 80 (15)

Copy to: III MAF	(5)
3rd MarDiv	(2)
1st MAW	(8)
2nd ROKMC Bde	(1)
SA, Quang Ngai Sector	(1)
SA, Quang Tin Sector	(1)
SA, QNSS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
FLC	(1)
MCB 1	(1)
MCB 4	(1)
MCB 58	(1)
MCB 133	(1)
CICV	(1)
1st AIRCAV	(1)
3rd MAW	(2)
7th Marines	(15)
9th MAB	(4)
2nd Bn, 5th Marines	(2)
5th MarDiv	(2)

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USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.
Task Force Oregon
3rd CIT
CLIC

(2)
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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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ANNEX A (STRENGTH, LOCATION, COMPOSITION) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREF PERINTREF NO. 11-67

Main Force

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Estimated Str</u>	<u>Reported Loc/Date</u>	<u>Accepted Loc</u>	<u>Arms & Equipment</u>	<u>Category</u>
2nd NVA Div	7460	AT 9421/ 26 June	AT 9421		C
RQ-20 Sig Bn	220	AT 9925/ 11 Jan			C
RQ-24 Engr Bn	120	BT 1733/ 21 Apr			C
3rd NVA Regt	1073	BT 0255/ 21 Jun	BT 0422		C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300		BT 0422		C
1st Bn	300	BT 1349/ 14 May			C
2nd Bn	223	BT 1336/ 13 May			C
3rd Bn	250	AT 8651/ 9 Jun			C
21st NVA Regt	1000	BT 2004/ 26 Jun	BT 2004		C
Hqs & Spt Unit	200	BT 2004/ 26 Jun	BT 2004	5-82mm, 6-60mm mtr	C
1st Bn	200	BT 1527/ 17 May		17-81mm mtr unk no 60mm mtr unk no 75mm RR 6-60mm mtr 6-81mm mtr 3-mg	C
2nd Bn	200	BT 1526/ 17 May		3-60mm mtr 2-81mm mtr 4-35mm mtr 3-57mm RR	C
3rd Bn	400	BT 1525/ 17 May		3-60mm mtr 5-81mm mtr 4-57mm RR 4-30 cal mg	C

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Local Force

Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
402nd Sapper Bn	342	BT 0664/24 Jun	AT 8060	3-81mm mtr 1-120mm mtr	C
R-20 Bn	450	BT 1153/26 Jun	AT 8458	1-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR 2-mg 5-BAR	C
V.25 Bn	521	BT 0465/26 Jun	BT 1052	2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
72nd Bn	300	BT 1709/14 Jun	BT 2224	4-60mm mtr 2-81mm mtr 3-57mm mtr 6-1mg	C
Q.12 Co	80	BT 1956/23 Jun	BT 1756	1-60mm mtr 9 mg	PROB
Q.13 Co	120	AT 9449/25 Jun		1-60mm mtr 1-30 Cal mg	C
Q.14 Co	70	AT 8456/23 Jun		9-AR 1-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 4-M-79	C
Q.15 Co	80	AT 9857/23 Jun		2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR 3-1mg	C
Q.16 Co	120	AT 9564/23 Jun		2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 6-BAR	C

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Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
K-50 Co	70	BT 2224/9 Dec	BT 0740	1-57mm RR 1-60mm mtr	C
K-51 Co	70	BT 1747/7 Jun	BT 1536	3-30 Cal mg 2-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
K-52 Co	150	BT 2220/8 Jun	BT 1017	5-mg 1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR	C
K-54 Co	130	BT 2220/14 Jun	BT 1561	2-sig 1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR	C
K-55 Co	100	BT 3329/5 Jun		2-mg 1-60mm mtr	C
706th Co	80	BT 3707/12 Jun		1-AA mg 2-30 Cal mg	C
74th Co	50	BT 3611/9 May		1-AA mg 1-60mm mtr 1-60mm mtr	C
14th Co	90	BT 2612/14 Jun		1-30 Cal mg 1-57mm RR 1-lmg 1-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
2nd NVA Div	MR V	Agricultural Site #2, 620th Div, Nam Tu, Chi Lang	CG-BG Viet XO-BG Dao PO-BG Do	20,601GM 20915GM Tay An
3rd NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite #3, 64th Regt, 51st Regt, 31st Regt, 46th Regt, Factory #10	CO-LtCol Viet XO-Maj Tranh Anh Kien PO-Trong Thanh	
1st Bn	3rd NVA Regt	Regt, CT3, Binh Minh	CO-Capt Thao	20825
2nd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X2, Binh Da	CO-Nguyen Tiep	
3rd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	Binh Thien, Mao Chu, Nguyen Trai	CO-Capt Chau CO-Pham Kiet	
21st NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite 21, 2nd, Regt, 36th Regt, Cong Truong 21, A-21	XO-Dang Cong Kiet PO-Tien	
1st Bn	21st NVA Regt	Bach Ma	CO-Tinh	
2nd Bn	21st NVA Regt	11th Bn, 11th Workshop, An Chau	XO-Na PO-Khoi	
3rd Bn	21st NVA Regt	22nd Bn, 135th Bn, Cong Thanh	CO-La XO-Oan PO-Tha	
RQ-20 Bn	2nd NVA Div	33rd Bn, 75th Bn (?) Long Thanh	CO-Dang Hung PO-Nguyen Co	1803/CH
RQ-24 Bn	2nd NVA Div	RQ.20/B Bn, GK 30, RQ.20/A Bn, Ham Tu 2/c, GK-40	CO-Nguyen Ngoc Dong	

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
402nd Sapper Bn	Danang City	T.89	CO-Nguyen Van Tran XO-Sr. Lt. Thanh CO-Nguyen Van Lam	21395GN Dong Hai
R-20 Bn	Quang Nam (P)	Q.N. Independence Bn, Doc Lap Bn, Hai Cang 20 Lam Bn 5th Bn	CO-Capt Thang XO-Tung PO-Khoa CO-Thang Can Cao XO-Danh PO-Thanh CO-Le Hien XO-Nguyen Ngoc CO-Tran Van Cam XO-Nguyen Chi Thien PO-Vo Ca Son CO-Le Thanh CO-Nguyen Hy XO-Than Tu PO-Nguyen Ra CO-Nguyen Doa XO-Nguyen Nhuong	21,443GM 2102
V-25 Bn	Quang Nam (P)	H-65, H-68		
72nd Bn	Quang Tin (P)			
Q.12 Co	Hoi An City	Hoi An Co, X-62 Co		
Q.13 Co	Duy Xuyen (D)	Duy Xuyen Co, H-52, 103rd Co, Than Lap Co		
Q.14 Co	Dai Loc (D)	Dai Loc Co, H-42 Co,		
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban (D)	Dien Ban Co, H-40 Co, H-55, 105th Bn, X-65		2105
Q.16 Co	Hoa Vang (D)	Hoa Vang Co, H-41, H-56, Q.16.B, 100 Co, Hoa Hieu Co		2106
K.50 Co	Que Son (D)	Que Son Co, 105 Unit, A-7	CO-Nguyen Thang Tung	

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
K. 51 Co	Thang Binh(D)	Thang Binh Co, A-10 F-14, D-21 107	CO-Khoa XO-Nguyen Than PO-Anh Vu CO-Ngo XO-Khanh PO-Van CO-Cong XO-Toan PO-Tich CO-Nguyen Lien	
K. 52 Co	Tien Phuoc (D)	A-13 Co, D-22, V-13		
K. 54 Co	Tam Ky (D)	A-16, C-73, V-12, N. Tam Ky		
K. 55 Co	Tam Ky City	A-21, Co 75, V-15, Phi Po A-21 En, Flying Tiger, 106th		
706th Co	Quang Tin (P)		CO-Nguyen Duy Nghia XO-Hoanh	2442GM
74th Co	Quang Tin (P)	V-74, V-20, 74th District Force Co	PO-Phuong CO-Thanh XO-Tran Tien PO-Phuong CO-Pham XO-Ha Dong PO-Khanh	
14th Co	Sy Tin (D)	K-53, A-19, V-14		

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMMF



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 DOD DIR 5200.10

PERINTREP NO. 12-67

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CONFIDENTIAL *Tab B*

First Marine Division (Rein)
 Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam
 041800H July 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Perintrep No. 12-67

Period covered: 260600H June to 030600H July 1967

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. The First Marine Division has the responsibility to conduct offensive operations in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province areas.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. The weather for the reporting period was clear, permitting maximum use of air support throughout the period. Temperatures continued to be in the 90's, reaching 100 degrees on occasion. The winds were variable, and visibility increased to 10 miles. The moon was in the last quarter. During the next 7 days the moon will be in the new phase and illumination will not exceed 14%. (Refer to Annex B for Astronomical Data)

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength, Location and Disposition

(a) Refer to Annex A, First MarDiv Perintrep 11-67

(2) Availability of Reinforcements

(a) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in the 1st MarDiv's AOR with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.

(3) Movements and Activities

(a) Although incidents continued at the same level, no large scale contacts occurred. Earlier in the month contact with Main Force NVN units accounted for the high number of larger contacts. Only two significant incidents occurred during the week. At (AT 974717) on the 30th the Hoa Binh Training Center received 25-30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. On the 2nd a recon patrol, Chargesheet, at (ZC 202491) received automatic weapons fire from an estimated 50 enemy. CS was used to break contact, and the patrol continued its mission without further incident.

(b) Since the 26th recon has had only one significant sighting in the Que Son area. At (AT 955307) on 30 June 40 VC with weapons and helmets were seen moving to the southeast. Thirty six (36) enemy casualties resulted from the

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fire mission called down on [redacted] patrol Commanche. The mission was 100% on target.

(c) In the Operation Calhoun/Beacon Torch area, local and guerrilla forces avoided contact. This is the first real pressure applied to these units since February and March, during Operations Canyon and Stone, when heavy enemy personnel losses were incurred. Operation Calhoun dealt the enemy a severe setback, specifically, with the capture of 32 tons of rice. Thirty two tons of rice will feed an enemy company for three months. Recent ralliers and captives indicate that the food problem is not improving. In fact some say the only place they can be assured of a meal is at home. Documents captured during the operation mentioned the 620 unit and the GK-32 Bn. The 620 unit is an AKA for the Second NVA Division. The GK-32 Bn is an AKA for the RQ-22 Bn which is a support unit for the Second NVA Division and is reportedly equipped with 12-75 millimeter recoilless rifles.

(d) Recently a female was apprehended carrying what appeared to be peach cans and beer cans. Upon closer examination it was discovered the cans contained an acid and an explosive material. By breaking the seal on the acid tube the liquid would flow into a metal arm which obstructs the firing pin, causing a delay of 20-25 minutes.

c. Enemy Unconventional Warfare and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) Enemy activity of an unconventional and psychological nature continued at the same low level. The most numerous were incidents involving mines, booby traps, and harassment against CAC units and RD teams. This type action can be expected to continue, and most probably will increase. Operations Arizona, Brown, Beacon Torch, and Calhoun have undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of these local forces and their desire to operate on battalion level. We can expect them to operate in no larger than company size units. However, the enemy is in want of a victory and we can expect that he will increase his actions involving small forces in an effort to gain local successes which will have a favorable effect upon the local populace.

3. Enemy Capabilities

a. Attack Capabilities

(1) Attack Tien Phuoc CIDG camp or isolated outposts outside our TAOR in strength up to and including a regiment with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.

(2) Attack CAC units in company (rein) strength.

(3) Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81 or 120mm mortar and/or 140mm rockets.

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b. Defense Capability

(1) Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd NVA Regiment, plus additional battalions subordinate to the 2nd NVA Division and VC Quang Nam Province.

c. Delay Capability

(1) Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops into the mountainous area.

d. Reinforcement Capability

(1) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in the 1st Marine Division's area of responsibility with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.

e. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Capability

(1) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. Attack Tien Phuoc CIDG camp and isolated ARVN outposts in up to and including regimental strength with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.

(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

- (a) Isolated units and outposts offer the best targets for a quick thrust and rapid withdrawal, even for large scale attacks.
- (b) The enemy has had past successes using this method of attack.
- (c) The enemy's desires to achieve a tactical success.
- (d) The terrain provides many access routes from the mountains.

(2) The following factor militates against adoption of this capability:

- (a) The demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy troop concentrations, and ability to react rapidly to destroy them by the use of supporting arms and/or by ground attacks.

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b. Attack CAC units in company (rein) strength.

(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

(a) The enemy's past successes against this type of target.

(b) Enemy sapper units are organized and equipped to implement this capability.

(2) The following factor militates against adoption of this capability:

(a) The ability of friendly units to react rapidly, and to destroy the enemy and his equipment by supporting arms and/or ground attack.

c. Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 120mm mortars/81mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.

(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

(a) The base can be attacked from a greater distance with less risk of detection and less risk of loss.

(b) Enemy knowledge of the terrain and local populace.

(2) The following factor militates against adoption of this capability:

(a) The ability of friendly units to react rapidly, and to destroy the enemy and his equipment by supporting arms and/or ground attacks.

d. Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd Regiment and forces locally available.

(1) The following factor favors adoption of this capability:

(a) His displayed unwillingness to relinquish control of the populace in this area.

(2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:

(a) The severe defeats he has previously suffered in this area.

(b) His unwillingness to engage FVMAF in conventional warfare.

e. Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops to the mountainous area.

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[REDACTED]

(1) The following factor favors adoption of this capability:

(a) The desire to save numerous supplies and equipment believed to be located within this area.

(2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:

(a) His reluctance to relinquish control of the population.

(b) It is a major source of supply and an important LOC.

f. Reinforce his present position in Central I Corps with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.

(1) The following factor favors adoption of this capability:

(a) Recent severe attrition of enemy forces in Central I Corps.

(2) The following factor militates against adoption of this capability:

(a) Food is in such short supply presently that it is doubtful the enemy could logistically support another sizeable unit in Central I Corps.

g. Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

(1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

(a) It provides the enemy an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms capabilities.

(b) VC knowledge of the terrain and populace.

(c) The enemy's belief that application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage U.S./FVMAF participation in RVN.

(d) Guerrilla and local forces can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while Main Force units conduct larger operations.

(2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:

(a) The loss of small unit leaders to supervise conducting this type warfare.

(b) The success of the RD program will help retard their progressiveness in this area.

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5. Conclusions

a. Enemy capabilities in relative probability of adoption:

(1) Capability 3.e. Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of ICC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

(2) Capability 3.a.(2) Attack CAC units in up to company (rein) strength.

(3) Capability 3.b. Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd NVA Regiment, and forces locally available. In carrying out this capability he will attack by ambush and fire.

(4) Capabilities 3.a.(3) Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81mm mortars/120mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.

(5) Capability 3.a.(1) Attack Tien Phuoc CIDG camp and/or isolated ARVN outposts in up to and including regimental strength with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.

(6) Capability 3.d. The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in I Corps with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.

(7) Capability 3.c. Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops into the mountainous area.

b. Vulnerabilities

(1) The enemy is vulnerable to massed fire from air, artillery, and naval guns. Even his deepest base areas and lines of communications are vulnerable to attack by air. When closer to the coast or to friendly positions, any massed formation is subject to detection and subsequent attack by artillery and naval gunfire in addition to air. Being unable to effectively counter this fire power, the enemy must rely heavily on camouflage and circumspection in order to minimize this vulnerability.

(2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations.

(3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold, and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations limits his ability to react to friendly maneuvers, unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.

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(4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air, deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations.

E.B. Sigran

E.B. SIGRON
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEX: ✓ A. ASTRONOMICAL DATA

DISTRIBUTION: "A" less 7,12,17-21,37-67
 "B" less 72,76,84,98,100,191; plus 80 (15)

Copy to: III MAF	(5)
3rd MarDiv	(2)
1st MAW	(8)
2nd ROKMC Bde	(1)
SA, Quang Tin Sector	(1)
SA, Quang Ngai Sector	(1)
SA, CNSs Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
FLC	(1)
MCB 1	(1)
MCB 4	(1)
MCB 58	(1)
CICV	(1)
1st AIRCAV	(1)
3rd MAW	(2)
7th Marines	(15)
9th MAB	(4)
2nd Bn, 5th Marines	(2)
5th MarDiv	(2)
USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.	(2)
Task Force Oregon	(2)
3rd CIT	(9)
CLIC	(3)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
 DOD DIR 5200.10



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RELEASABLE TO FVMAF
 AND RVNAF

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ANNEX A (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO 12-67

DATE	B.M.C.T	SUNRISE	SUNSET	B.M.C.T	MOON RISE	MOON SET	MOON PHASE	% ILLUM
JULY 10	0588	0621	1923	1946	0835	2148		06
11	0588	0621	1923	1946	0934	2232		13
12	0559	0622	1923	1946	1032	2313		21
13	0559	0622	1923	1946	1128	2353		31
14	0559	0622	1923	1946	1224	-----	1ST QTR	42
15	0600	0623	1923	1946	1322	0033		54
16	0600	0623	1923	1946	1420	0115		65
17	0601	0624	1922	1945	1522	0200		76
18	0601	0624	1922	1945	1645	0250		85
19	0601	0624	1922	1945	1728	0345		92
20	0601	0624	1922	1945	1828	0444		97
21	0601	0624	1922	1945	1923	0545		99
22	0602	0625	1922	1945	2012	0645	FULL	100
23	0602	0625	1922	1945	2056	0742		98
24	0602	0625	1921	1944	2135	0837		94
25	0603	0626	1921	1944	2211	0927		88
26	0603	0626	1921	1944	2244	1016		81
27	0603	0626	1920	1943	2317	1103		73
28	0604	0627	1920	1943	2350	1149		64
29	0604	0627	1920	1943	-----	1236	1ST QTR	55
30	0604	0627	1919	1942	0025	1324		45
31	0605	0628	1919	1942	0144	1509		36
AUG 1	0605	0628	1918	1941	0231	1606		27
2	0605	0628	1918	1941	0323	1703		19
3	0606	0629	1917	1940	0420	1759		11
4	0606	0629	1917	1940	0622	1942		02
5	0606	0629	1917	1940	0622	1942		02
6	0606	0629	1916	1939	0622	1942	NEW	00
7	0606	0629	1916	1939	0724	2028		01
8	0607	0630	1915	1938	0823	2111		05
9	0607	0630	1915	1938	0922	2151		11
10	0607	0630	1914	1937	1919	2232		19



R 010343Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC (K005)
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 ZEN/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMHIA/CG TASK FORCE OREGON
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD
 ZEN/CLIC
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV ADCON

S/S

BT
 UNCLAS E F T O
 EFFECTIVE 010900H JUN 67 I ASSUMED COMMAND OF FIRST MARDIV
 REIN FMF.
 MGEN DONN J. ROBERTSON
 BT

SECRET



	K	DIC
	C	APIC
	DN	

Br 16

COC

Cmd Chambers

P 070901Z JUNE 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMNVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/FIRST FAG
 ZEN/HQBN FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST MT BN
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAF
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 RUMNVH/CG I CORPS
 ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN

G-3

SECRET

- SUBJ: FRAG O 70-67 (ROUGH RIDER)
- A. CG III MAF 242500Z JUNE 67 (NOTAL)
 - B. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)
 - C. THIRD MARDIV OPC 416-66 (NOTAL)
 - D. FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0807E S E C R E T

E. FIRST MARDIV P0000.2C (CECI)

F. THIRD MARDIV P2000.2F (CCID)

1. IN COMPLIANCE WITH REF A ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SCHEDULED 11 AND 12 JUNE TO MOVE FLMS FIRST FAG TO PHU BAI.

2. FOR CG III MAF

A. REQUEST PROVIDE THREE M-36 TRUCKS AND SUITABLE BRIDGING FOR CONVOYS.

B. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOC'S.

3. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV

A. REQUEST PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOY APPROX EIGHTY VEH ARRIVING PHU BAI 11JUN AND BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES FOR CONVOY PERSONNEL.

B. REQUEST ORGANIZE CONVOY 12 JUNE AND PROVIDE SPT LEFT INF SCTY AND ENGR SPT.

C. THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CONVOY SCTY OF PIPLE PLAT REIN W/ ARTY FO, FAC, ENGR SPT, COM VEH AND WRECKERS.

D. REQUEST P

PROVIDE RIFLE CO(-) REIN AS CONVOY RESERVE WHILE ROUGH RIDER IN THIRD MARDIV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

E. CHOP POINT BOUNDARY BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV.

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 0807E S E C R E T

4. EXECUTION:

A. SEVENTH MAR: REF B

B. ELEVENTH MAR: REF B AS APPLICABLE

C. FIRST MT BN: REF B AS APPLICABLE

D. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3.G. REF

E.

E. COORD INST:

(1) REFS B&C AS APPLICABLE FOR CONVOYS DANANG TO PHU BAI, ADMIN MOVEMENT.

(2) CHECK POINTS: REFS C AND D.

(3) D DAY H HOUR.

(A) DANANG TO PHU BAI: 110900H JUN 67

(B) PHU BAI TO DANANG: 120900H JUNE 67 OR AS

DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.

(4) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOR DAY.

(5) DIR LAUTH ALCON

5. COMM ELFCT

A. REFS E AND F.



B. SEVENTH MAR: MONITOR THIRD MARDIV TAG 1, M-15, FREQ 2244 COMMENCING 0830H UNTIL CONVOY ARRIVES DESTINATION EACH DAY OF SCHED.

GP-4

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Conf Chem

G-3


P 090257Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ELEVENTH MAR
INFO CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
CHANGE OF OPCON (U)


A. CG III MAF 2423221 MAY 67
1. IAW REF A ASSUMED OPCON 1ST PLAT 1ST ARMD AMPH CO 072250H
JUN 67. OPCON FURTHER ASSIGNED 11TH MARINES 072250H JUN 67.

GP-4
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CC



P 110445Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN G.3
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
INFO ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/NINTH ENGR BN
BT

SECRET
ENGR SUPPORT (U)

A. CG III MAF 080548Z JUN 67

1. IN SPT TASKS ASSIGNED BY REF A, UNODIR INTEND CONSOLIDATE PRESENT PSNS FIRST BN FIFTH MAR AT NUY LAC SON/VIST AND AND VIC QUE SON, AND ESTAB COMBAT BASE FOR FIFTH MAR HQ AND THIRD BN FIFTH MAR VIC THANG BINH. MISSION INCLUDES ACTIVE DEFENSE OF LOC'S AND RD PRIORITY AREAS, DESTRUCTION OF EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES IN THANG BINH - TAM KY - QUE SON AREA AND BASE AREA 116, AND EXTENSION OF GVN INFLUENCE THEREIN. INTEND TO REQUEST AREA OF OPERATION VICE EXTENSION OF TAOP FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1272E SECRET

2. USA WILL BE REPOSITIONED FM TAM KY TO THANG BINH TO SPT ABOVE EFFORT. TARGET DATE FOR POSITIONING OF FORCES IS ON OR ABOUT 1 JULY.

3. BASED ON ABOVE, REQUEST ENGR SPT ON NATIONAL RTE ONE BTWN HOI AN AND TAM KY WITH PCL PRIORITY; PCL AN TO THANG BINH - FIRST PRIORITY, TAM KY TO THANG BINH - SECOND PRIORITY. SPT FOR ENGR FORCES FM FIFTH MAR.


4. TO DEFEND FIRST ENGR BN TO BARRIER ROAD FM NATL RTE ONE TO QUE SON REQUEST FORCE ENGR BN BE TASKED WITH UPGRADING BARRIER ROAD. FIRST ENGR BN WILL COMMENCE WORK ON QUE SON ROAD WHEN NATL RTE ONE OPEN TO PERMIT MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIP.

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C	Boie
Don	

G-3 COC
CC

0 120149Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIFST MAR
FIFTH MAR
SEVENTH MAR
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
FIRST RECON BN - CONR
INFO CG III MAF
CG FMAW
BT

S E C R E T

PAG 0 71-67 (CPNS RELATED TO CPN BEACON TORCH)

1. SITUATION. COMMENCING O/A 18JUN67 SLF BRAVO EXECUTES OPN BEACON TORCH, LANDING ON LITTORAL SOUTH OF HOI AN BY HELICOPTER AND LANDING CRAFT AND SWEEPING WESTWARD TO CARRY OUT DETAILED S&D BTWN NATL RTE ONE AND EASTERN EDGE OF BASE AREA 116.
2. MISSION. FIRST MARDIV CONDUCTS OPNS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE TAOR TO ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM DENSITY OF EN FORCES WITHIN SLF TARGET AREA AND TO PROFIT FM EN MOVEMENTS ADJACENT TO THIS AREA.
3. EXECUTION.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1348F **S E C R E T**

A. FIRST MAR.

(1) COMMENCING 18 JUN 67 CONDUCT OPN BROWN, BN MINUS S&D OPN ON GO NOI ISLAND AND ENVIRONS TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES IN AREA.

(2) CONDUCT LIAISON WITH QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE IN EFFORT TO OBTAIN ARVN PARTICIPATION TO EXPAND OPN TO INCLUDE ENTIRE AREA VIC DUY XUYEN, I.F. SOUTH OF TAOR AND BOUNDED ON SOUTH BY SONG THU BON, SONG BA REN AND ROAD BTWN BT 061510 AND BT 003519.

(3) COORDINATE WITH SEVENTH MAR AND SECOND BN FIFTH MAR FOR DESIRED OPNS WITH THEIR SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

B. FIFTH MAR

(1) COMMENCING NLT 18JUN67 CONDUCT OPN ADAMS, REGT MINUS OPNS IN THANG BINH - QUE SON AREA WEST OF NATL RTE ONE AND SOUTH OF AREA BOUNDED BY LINE FM BT 175419 TO BRIDGE AT BT 138408 WESTWARD ALONG SUOI CHO DUN TO INTERSECTION WITH TAOR AT AT 994410.

(2) CONDUCT LIAISON WITH SIXTH REGT SECOND ARVN DIV TO ARRANGE FOR COINCIDENTAL ARVN CLEARING OPN EAST OF HIGHWAY SOUTH OF LINE FM BT 253460 TO BT 214438 ALONG ROAD TO INTERSECTION

13

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1348E S E C R E T
WITH NATL RTE ONE.

C. SEVENTH MAR.

CONDUCT OPN ARIZONA COMMENCING 14JUN67 IN NEW CASTLE
AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG VU GIA, ON EAST BY SONG THU BON-
SONG TINH YEN, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL45 AND ON WEST BY TAOR.
CONCEPT PASEP.

D. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR.

(1) IAW SEP INSTRNS PROVIDE FORCES TO SEVENTH MAR FOR
OPN ARIZONA.

(2) UPON CONCLUSION OPN ARIZONA CONDUCT ACTIVE PATROLLING
AND AMBUSHING IN CO STRENGTH VIC GS AT 9545, AT 9646 AND
AT 9747.

E. FIRST RECON BN

IAW INSTRNS PASE PROVIDE RECON SPT FOR OPN BEACON
TORCH AND RELATED OPNS.

F. COORD INSTRNS

(1) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(2) AO OF OPN BEACON TORCH FOLLOWING CHOP TO FIRST MARDIV
BOUNDED ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON SOUTH BY LINE FM BT 253460
TO BT 214438 ALONG SOUTH SIDE ROAD TO INTERSECTION WITH NATL RTE
ONE TO BRIDGE AT BT 138408 WESTWARD ALONG SUOI CHO DUN TO INTER-

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1348E S E C R E T

SECTION WITH TAOR AT AT994410, ON WEST BY TAOR, AND ON NORTH BY ROAD
FM BT 003519 TO BT 061510, THENCE ALONG SONG BA RFN TO SONG THU
BON TO SOUTH CHINA SEA.

(3) INF UNITS

(A) PROVIDE CONCEPT SUBJ OPNS TO THIS HQ MLT
141200H JUN67.

(B) BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT CONTACTS IN AO'S AND TO ASSUME
OPCON ADDL FORCES FOR THIS PURPOSE.

(C) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO TERMINATE SUBJ OPN
AND PROVIDE ADDL FORCES TO EXPLOIT CONTACTS ELSEWHERE WITHIN
OR OUTSIDE TAOR.

(4) EST DURATION OPN BEACON TORCH: 9-12 DAYS.

(5) DESIRED DURATION RELATED OPNS: MINIMUM 5 DAYS, NOTIFY
THIS HQ 24 HRS PRIOR DESIRED TERMINATION.


GP-4

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SECRET

SECRET

	OIC
<i>W</i>	<i>ADIC</i>



CC

COC

P 120825Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO SEVENTH MAR
 INFO CG FMAW

G-3

BT
 S E C R E T
 TERMINATION OPN BUTLER (U)
 A. III MAF COC 120511Z JUN 67
 1. IAW REF A TERMINATE OPN BUTLER AS CF 121600H JUN 67.
 GP-4
 BT

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SECRET

SECRET



G-3

OP 130005Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FMAW
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAP
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
ZEN/FIRST AT BN
ZEN/FIRST SP BN
INFO RUMHFL/CG FLC
BT

SECRET
CHANGE ONE TO FRAG O 72-67 (OPN ARIZONA) (U)
A. CG FIRST MARDIV 120239Z JUN67
1. MODIFY REF A AS FOL:
A. CHANGE PARAS 2.F. AND 2.G. TO 2.G. AND 2.H. RESPECTIVELY.
B. INSERT NEW PARA 2.F. AS FOL:
FIRST AT BN: PROVIDE CO REIN IN SUPPORT.
GP-4
BT

11


SECRET

SECRET

CC

K	dic
C	Amic
AM	

CO



-3

DE RUMLA 1625L 1558103
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 140703Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO FIRST MAR
 FIFTH MAR
 SEVENTH MAR
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 INFO FIRST RECON BN

BT

SECRET

SECTION ONE OF TWO

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR JULY 67 (U)

A. III MAF INTELLIGENCE NOE ESTIMATE 16-66 (I CTZ).

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 260649Z JAN67 (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT).

C. I CORPS COORD INSTR 05530.1 OF 4 JAN 67 (CONTROL, DISPOSITION, AND SAFEGUARDING OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND FOOD SUPPLIES).

D. MACV DIRECTIVE 525-3 OF 7 SEP 67 (COMBAT OPERATIONS, MINIMIZING NON-COMBATANT CASUALTIES).

E. FORCE/SA I CORPS ORDER 3046.3

1. PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH PLANNED BN OR LARGER OPNS

PAGE 2 RUMLA 1625L SECRET

AND COUNCIL PAPER FOR JULY 67 TO ARRIVE THIS HQ NLT 171000H JUN67. FORMAT FOR EACH BN OR LARGER OPM:

A. COMMAND GROUP

B. SIZE OF UNIT(S) PARTICIPATING

C. TYPE OPERATION

D. AREA OF OPM (OUTLINE GENERAL AREA BY GRIDLINES, GIVING NORTHERN BOUNDARY FIRST, THEN EASTERN, SOUTHERN, AND WESTERN IN THAT ORDER)

E. TIME PERIOD WHICH OPM TO BE CONDUCTED (FIRST OR LAST HALF OF MONTH)

2. INTELLIGENCE: REF A AND CURRENT FIRST MARDIV ISUMS AND PERIPHERALS.

3. REF 3 PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR FIRST MARDIV SPT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

4. REFS C THROUGH E ESTAB POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR CONTROL, DISPOSITION, AND SAFEGUARDING OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND FOOD SUPPLIES AND FOR MINIMIZING NON-COMBATANT CASUALTIES. THESE REFS ARE TO BE REVIEWED AND REFINED TO ALL PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH REQUESTING ADJUSTING AND APPROVING SUPPORTING ARMS FIRE.

12
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMHUA 1925E SECRET

5. CONCEPT.

A. CONTINUE DEFENSE OF BASE AREAS, AIRFIELDS, AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES IN ASSIGNED AREAS.

B. EXPLOIT SUPERIOR MOBILITY AND FIRE POWER, EMPHASIZING PRINCIPLES OF MASS, SURPRISE AND ECONOMY OF FORCES.

C. ACCELERATE TEMPO OF OFFENSIVE OPNS UTILIZING MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN THE SHIFTING OF FORCES.

D. MAINTAIN BELENTLESS PRESSURE ON EN BASE AREAS AND LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS AND SYSTEMS, TO INCLUDE SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, AND OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS.

E. RETAIN INITIATIVE AGAINST COMMUNIST MAIN FORCES; CONCURRENTLY PREVENT GUERRILLA AND VC LOCAL FORCES FROM GAINING ACCESS TO POPULATION CENTERS.

F. EMPHASIZE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION WHILE MAINTAINING QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE.

G. INTENSIFY IMAGINATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPNS TO EXPLOIT REAL OR POTENTIAL FRICTIONS AMONG DIVERSE

PAGE 4 RUMHUA 1925E SECRET

OPERATIONAL UNITS ON BORDER AND BETWEEN EN FORCES AND POPULATION OF RVN.

H. PROVIDE VIGOROUS SUPPORT TO CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.

I. UTILIZE CHARACTERISTICALLY VERY GOOD WEATHER CONDITIONS IN RVN FOR COMBAT OPNS INVOLVING USE OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND HELICOPTERS AND TO IMPROVE AND EXTEND RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE OPNS.

9. GENERAL OPNS FOR JULY 1967 WILL BE PLANNED TO INCLUDE:

A. EMPLOYMENT OF ABC/S/TS. SLP'S WILL BE AVAILABLE TO FIRST HAND IN DURING JULY. RECOGNIZING THAT THIS FORCE IS UNIQUELY ORGANIZED FOR RAPID EMPLOYMENT IN SUPPORTING CURRENT OPNS OR IS CAPABLE OF SERVING AS A RESERVE ELEMENT, COMMANDERS ARE REQUESTED TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE SLP, PRIMARILY IN THE ROLE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPNS.

B. NEUTRALIZATION EN BASE AREAS IN PROXIMITY TO NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS, KEY POPULATION CENTERS, AND VITAL COMMUNICATIONS ARTERIES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMLA 1625E SECRET

C. PROVISION OF AREA SECURITY FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRES AND THE PREVENTION OF EN EXCURSIONS INTO AREAS UNDERGOING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, IN THIS CONNECTION, SUPPORT TO THE MAXIMUM FEASIBLE EXTENT ALL PHASES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

D. PROVISION FOR REACTION FORCES TO BE EMPLOYED IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK ON CAPS, DISTRICT/SUB SECTOR HQ, AND RD TNS.

E. OPENING, SECURING, UPGRADING/MAINTAINING AND USING SURFACE LOC'S WHICH WILL FACILITATE CURRENT AND PLANNED OPNS AND WHICH WILL SUBSEQUENTLY IMPROVE ECONOMIC POSTURE OF RVN.

F. PROVISION OF SECURITY FOR ENGINEER, CONSTRUCTION, AND OTHER FORCES TASKED WITH SURVEYS AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN ASSIGNED AREAS.

G. CONDUCT OF GOLDEN FLEECE AND COUNTY FAIR OPNS AS APPROPRIATE.

H. PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE AND INDIRECT SUPPORT TO GVN DURING ELECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PUBLISHED POLICY.

I. EMPHASIS ON AGGRESSIVE SMALL UNIT TACTICS

PAGE 6 RUMLA 1625E SECRET

ENPHASIZING TACTICAL SURPRISE, EXPAND SCOPE AND INCREASE NUMBER OF NIGHT OPERATIONAL CONTACT, ONCE MADE WITH THE EN, IS TO BE MAINTAINED BY AGGRESSIVE AND RELENTLESS PURSUIT.

J. SUPPORT OF THE CAC PROGRAM TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE LEADERSHIP AND CAPABILITIES OF EACH CAC UNIT AND TO ENSURE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.

K. INCREASED USE OF LONG RANGE PATROLS AND LONG RANGE COMBAT PATROLS.

L. EMPHASIS ON COORDINATION BETWEEN USING UNITS AND FIRST MAW TO ENSURE EFFICIENT USE OF OH-65 HELICOPTERS.

7. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE.

A. FIRST MAW

(1) RENDER MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO FIFTY-FIRST ARVN REGT IN CONDUCT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IAW REF 3.

(2) EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE BY RAPID REACTION OPNS IN AREA SOUTH OF TAOR.

(3) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN COASTAL

BT

SECRET

SECRET

RUHHLA 1626E 165072A
 ZNY 16507
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO FIRST MAR
 FIFTH MAR
 SEVENTH MAR
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 INFO FIRST RECON BN

6-3

BT
 S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 AREA SOUTH OF HOI AN.

(4) CONTINUE CLEARING / SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN TAOR.

B. FIFTH MAR

(1) CONTINUE OPNS WITH OBJECTIVE TO DESTROY EN FORCES AND RESOURCES IN VICINITY OF AND WITHIN EN BASE AREA 116 AND TO NEUTRALIZE THAT BASE AREA, WITH A MAJOR OPN PLANNED THAT AREA IN CONJUNCTION WITH SECOND BN, FIFTH MAR DURING FIRST HALF JULY.

(2) CONTINUE CLEARING OPNS AGAINST GUERRILLAS AND MAIN FORCE ELMS IN HIEP DUC VALLEY.

PAGE 2 RUHHLA 1626E S E C R E T

(3) CONTINUE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN OPERATING AREA.

C. SEVENTH MAR

(1) RENDER MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO FIFTY. FIRST ARVN REGT CONDUCT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IAW REF B.

(2) CONDUCT APPROPRIATE OPNS TO INCREASE INFLUENCE SOUTHWEST PORTION DAI LOC DISTRICT SEVENTH MAR SECTOR OF TAOR.

(3) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN HAPPY VALLEY AREA (WEST OF TAOR GENERALLY ALONG E-W GL 66) DURING LATTER HALF OF JULY.

(4) CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF AREA SOUTH OF SONG THU BON, INCLUDING LIKELY INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM WEST.

(5) CONTINUE CLEARING/SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN TAOR.

D. SECOND BN, FIFTH MAR

(1) CONTINUE TO INCREASE AREA OF INFLUENCE IN NONG SON AND ANTENNA VALLEY AREAS BY ACCELERATING PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES THAT AREA.

(2) CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF LIKELY INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM SOUTH AND SOUTH WEST

PAGE 3 RUHHLA 1626E S E C R E T

(3) CONDUCT S&D OPN OF APPROPRIATE SIZE IN SONG THU BON VALLEY SOUTH OF NONG SON.

(4) CONTINUE CLEARING/SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN TAOR, INCLUDING OPN IN CONJUNCTION WITH FIFTH MAR IN EN BASE AREA 116 IN LATTER HALF JULY.

GP-4


BT

SECRET

SECRET

	OIC
C	Don
DN	

PP RUAUBJG RUMHFL RUMNVH
 DE RUMILA 1785E 1670145
 ZNY SSSSS
 OP 160145Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/CG FIAM
 RUMHFL/CG FLC



RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMWH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
 RUMNVH/SA SECOND ARVN DIV
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)

BT

SECRET

CONCEPT OF OPN ADAIR (U)

- MISSION. COMMENCING 15 JUN 67 FIFTH MAR MINUS REIN CONDUCTS S&D OPN IN THANG BINH-QUE SON AREA BOUNDED ON EAST BY NAIL RTE ONE, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 28, ON WEST BY N-S GL 96 AND TAOR, AND ON NORTH BY SUOI CHO DUN FM VIC AT 99441E THROUGH BT010391 EASTWARD TO BRIDGE AT BT138408), THENCE TO BT175419, TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES OR FACILITIES THEREIN.
- CONCEPT. AT H-5 THIRD BN MINUS FIFTH MAR MOVES OVERLAND FM VIC HILL 29 TO AO. COMMENCING H-HOUR FIFTH MAR MINUS REIN

PAGE TWO RUMILA 1785E SECRET
 CONDUCTS S&D EAST OF QUE SON IN AREA OF HVY CONTACT OF
 OPNS UNION I AND UNION II.
 OPN MARKS INITIAL EMPLOYMENT ARMOR IN QUE SON AREA.

3. TASK ORGANIZATION

FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN)

CMD GRP

FIRST BN

CMD GRP

TWO COMPANIES

THIRD BN

CMD GRP

THREE COMPANIES

CO A(-), FIRST TK BN

DET FIRST ENGR BN

DET FIRST SP BN

4. D-DAY. 15 JUN 67

5. H-HOUR. TO BE DETERMINED.

6. EST DURATION. FIVE TO TEN DAYS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET



R	DIC
C	AM
907	

PP RJAUBJG RUMHFL RUMNVH
DE RUMHLA 1786E 1670147
FM SSSSS
160147Z JUN 67
FM 22 FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
INFO ZEN/CG FMAW
RUMHFL/CG FLC
RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
RUMNVH/SA GUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)
BT

G-3
COC

SECRET

CONCEPT OPN BROWN (U)
1. MISSION. COMMENCING ON OR ABOUT 13 JUN 67 FIRST MAR CONDUCTS BN
MINUS REIN S&D OPN IN COORD WITH ARVN FORCE IN AREA BOUNDED ON
NORTH BY SONG KY LAN, SONG DIEN BINH, SONG CAU LAU AND SONG
HOI AN BTWN COORDS AT 945544 AND BT 196569, AND SOUTH BY
SONG THU BON, SONG BA REN, ROAD BTWN BT 061510 AND BT 003519,
AND SONG BA REN TO AT 945544, TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES,
SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES THEREIN, OR IN ADJACENT AREAS IN COORDINATION
WITH UNIT CONCERNED.
2. CONCEPT AT H-HOUR D-DAY SECOND BN MINUS REIN ENTERS GO
NGE ISLAND FROM VIC AT 9554 AND ATTACKS EASTWARD.
SIMULTANEOUSLY ARVN FORCES CONDUCT DETAILED S&D OPN IN

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1786E SECRET

EASTERN PORTION OF AREA.
3. TASK ORGANIZATION
SECOND BN FIRST MAR (-) (REIN)
COMD GRP
CO G
CO C, FIRST BN FIRST MAR
DET, FIRST SP BN
DET, FIRST ENGR BN
1 PLT AMTRAC
1 PLT AT
ARVN FORCES

FOURTH BN FIFTY-FIRST REGIMENT
RANGER BN
2-4 APC TRP
D-DAY, H-HOUR, 180600H JUN 67. TENTATIVE
EST DURATION, FIVE DAYS.

BT

12
SECRET

SECRET

DE RUMMLA 1885E 161234Z
 ZNY 88888
 O 161234Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV FCIN
 TO CG III MAF
 INFO ELEVENTH MAF
 BT

SECRET

SECURITY OF MAJOR BRIDGES (U)

A. CG III MAF 051234Z JUN 67

1. IAW REF A FOL ADDITIONAL INFO SUBMITTED CONCERNING SECURITY OF MAJOR BRIDGES:

A. SONG CU DE (NAMO) BRIDGE

(1) TWO JEEP MOUNTED XENON SEARCHLIGHTS AND
 ONE TANK MOUNTED XENON SEARCHLIGHT IN SUE.

(2) FOR AN/PRS-1 (SID) INSTALLED ON LAND AND
 WATER.

(3) MP PERSONNEL NOW STATIONED AT BRIDGE FOR
 TRAFFIC CONTROL.

(4) BOAT REQUESTED. SHOULD BE AVAIL WITHIN
 SEVEN DAYS.

(5) STARLIGHT SCOPES NOT AVAILABLE.

PAGE TWO RUMMLA 1885E SECRET

(6) 1ST PERSONNEL NOW CONDUCTING REGULAR UN-
 SCHEDULED UNDERWATER INSPECTIONS.

B. HILL 55 BRIDGE: SOME FIELDS OF FIRE HAVE BEEN
 CLEARED; ADDITIONAL

BULLDOZER WORK HAS BEEN SCHEDULED.

C. OLD DAI LOC BRIDGE. NEW DAI LOC BRIDGE COMPLETED
 EARLY JUNE. ALTHOUGH APPROPRIATE SECURITY BEING MAINTAINED
 OLD DAI LOC BRIDGE, PRIORITY OF SECURITY EFFORT NOW DIRECTED
 TO NEW DAI LOC BRIDGE AS STATED PARA 1.D. BELOW.

D. NEW DAI LOC BRIDGE. CURRENT SECURITY MEASURES NOW
 BEING INTENSIFIED INCLUDE:

(1) ONE USMC SQD REIN OCCUPYING PSNS ON AND IN
 IMMEDIATE VIC OF BRIDGE DURING DAYLIGHT.

(2) TWO USMC SQDS REIN OCCUPYING PSNS ON AND IN
 IMMEDIATE VIC OF BRIDGE DURING NIGHT TIME.

(3) SIX HIGH INTENSITY LIGHTS POSITIONED UNDER BRIDGE
 AND THREE HIGH INTENSITY LIGHTS ON NORTH SIDE OF BRIDGE ARE
 USED FOR PERIODIC CHECKS OF AREA.

(4) 81MM MORTAR SUPPORT IS AVAILABLE FROM HILL 37 VIC
 COORD AT 018584 WITH ONE TUBE CONTINUOUSLY TRAINED ON BRIDGE

SECRET

10

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 18353 S E C R E T
POSITION.

(5) CLAYMORE MINES AND TRIP FLARES ARE POSITIONED STRATEGICALLY AROUND BRIDGE POSITION.

(6) DOUBLE APRON FENCE ENCOMPASSES NORTH SIDE OF BRIDGE.

(7) ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES PLANNED INCLUDE:

(A) AN/PSE-1 UNITS

(B) METASCOPES

(C) 50 FOOT TOWER TO BE CONSTRUCTED.

E. SONG THU FOM BRIDGE

(1) CURRENT SECURITY MEASURES:

(A) ONE REIN USMC PLAT OCCUPIES AND DEFENDS CONSTRUCTION SITE, CONDUCTS PATROLS AND AMBUSHES IN VICINITY.

(B) ONE FIFTY FOOT OBSERVATION TOWER 100 METERS FROM SITE.

(2) SECURITY MEASURES PLANNED FOR WHICH FEASIBILITY IS BEING INVESTIGATED.

(A) APPROPRIATE FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT.

(B) SUBMARINE NET.

(C) CLEARING OF FIELDS OF FIRE.

(D) SIX FOOT CYCLONE FENCE, AROUND INNER PERIMETER.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 18353 S E C R E T

(1) FREQUENT UNDERWATER INSPECTIONS.

(2) CONSTRUCTION OF SECOND 50 FOOT TOWER.

(3) KENNY SEARCHLIGHT

(4) FLOODLIGHTS FOR PILING ILLUMINATION.

(5) EIGHT 2X12 FLOATING PLATFORMS FOR SENTRIES.

(6) UNDERWATER LIGHTING.

(7) USE OF AN/PSE-1 (SIDE) ON LAND AND WATER.

(8) TWO BOATS FOR PATROL AND INSPECTION.


(9) BARBED WIRE AS APPROPRIATE.

GF-4

BT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



	OIC
C	Base
Am	

CC

DE RUMHLA 2044E 1590131
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 180131Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO FIRST RECON BN.
 INFO FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)

G-2

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

1. ON 15 JUNE AND EXTENDING INTO THE MORNING OF 16 JUNE TWO OF YOUR PATROLS OPERATING IN THE ELEPHANT VALLEY AREA EXHIBITED THE ULTIMATE IN TEAMWORK, PROMPT REPORTING AND EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS. THROUGH THEIR OUTSTANDING SKILL AND DEDICATION THEY ACCOUNTED FOR 63 CONFIRMED VC KILLS, 8 PROBABLE KILLS AND PINPOINTED VC MOVEMENT ROUTES. THESE PATROLS, AND THE MAXIMUM EFFORT IN SUPPORT OPERATION ARIZONA AND ADAIR IN ADDITION TO EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF APPROACHES TO THE TAOR, REFLECT THE COMPETENCY OF YOUR ORGANIZATION AND ARE PARTICULARLY COMMENDABLE. WELL DONE TO ALL
 MGEN ROBERTSON SENDS.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

(14)

SECRET

	OIC
	Assoc
NY	



CC

ZCZC MFE 165
 DE RUMHMF 1324 1690544
 ZNY SSSSS

P 130644Z JUN 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV
 C. THIRD MARDIV

G-2

TOR 180801
 6369 K

INFO CG FIRST MAF
 BT

SECRET

DEEP RECONNAISSANCE

1. WITH THE DEPARTURE OF PROJECT DELTA ON 14JUN THE AVENUES OF APPROACH FROM A SHAU VALLEY INTO THE DIVISION TAOR'S REMAIN UNCOVERED. UNTIL PROJECT DELTA RETURNS TO I CORPS IN MID-JULY IT IS DIRECTED THAT 1ST MARDIV CONDUCT CONTINUOUS DEEP RECONNAISSANCE IN THE THUONG DUC/HAPPY VALLEY AREAS WEST TO N-S GL YC35.

GP-4
 BT

CG III MAF P 180644Z JUN 67

COPY NO 14

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



PP RUMHFL RUMHVP
DE RUMHLA 2082E 1690933
ZNY SSSSS
P 180933Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/40 BN FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
INFO ZEN/CG I CORPS
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHFL/CG FLC
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
RUMHFL/CG SEVEN FOUR

B-3

CC

CO

	OIC
	Spic
	Walt

Posted to Board

BT
SECRET
SUBJ: FRAG O 73-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)
A. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)
B. THIRD MARDIV ADMINO 416-66 (NOTAL)
C. FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)

119

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2082E SECRET
D. FIRST MARDIV O P 22000.20 (COI) (NOTAL)
E. FIRST MARDIV O P 22000.2E (COI) (NOTAL)
1. ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SCHEDULED 21 AND 22 JUNE TO MOVE REAR
EQUIP THIRD MAR TO PHU BAI AND RETURN.
2. FOR CG III MAF
A. REQUEST PROVIDE THREE M36 TRUCKS AND SUITABLE
BRIDGING FOR CONVOYS.
B. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT
IN USE OF LOC'S
3. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV.
A. REQUEST PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOY
APPROX FORTY VEH ARRIVING PHU BAI 21 JUN AND BILLETING AND
MESSING FACILITIES FOR CONVOY PERSONNEL
B. REQUEST ORGANIZE CONVOY 22 JUNE AND PROVIDE SPT LESS
INF SCTY AND ENGR SPT.
C. THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CONVOY SCTY OF RIFLE PLAT
REIN W/ARTY FO, FAC, ENGR SPT, COMM VEH AND WRECKERS.
D. REQUEST PROVIDE RIFLE CO MINUS REIN AS CONVOY RE-
SERVE WHILE ROUGH RIDER IN THIRD MARDIV AREA OF RESPONSIB-
ILITY.

9E

1A

9E

16

UNCLASSIFIED


25

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE RUMMLA 2082E S E C R E T
 E. CHOP POINT BOUNDARY BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV.
 4. EXECUTION:
 A. SEVENTH MAR: REF A
 B. ELEVENTH MAR: REF A AS APPLICABLE
 C. ELEVENTH MT BN: REF A AS APPLICABLE
 D. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3.6
 REF A.
 E. COORD INST:
 (1) REFS A AND B AS APPLICABLE FOR CONVOYS DANANG
 TO PHU BAI ADMIN MOVEMENT.
 (2) CHECK POINTS: REFS B AND C
 (3) D DAY 4 HOUR
 (A) DANANG TO PHU BAI: 210900H JUN 67
 (B) PHU BAI TO DANANG: 220900H JUN 67 OR AS
 DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.
 (4) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS RE-
 QUIRE POSTPONEMENT, CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.
 (5) DIRLAINTH ALCON
 5. COMM ELECT
 A. REFS D AND E.

PAGE FOUR RUMMLA 2082E S E C R E T
 B. SEVENTH MAR: MONITOR THIRD MARDIV TAC 1, M-15,
 FREQ 2244 COMMENCING 0830 UNTIL CONVOY ARRIVES DESTINATION
 EACH DAY CONVOY SCHEDULED.
 GP-4
 BT

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DE RUMHLA 2121E 1591347
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 181347Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/CG FMAN
 ZEN/FIRST MAR
 ZEN/FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR

GZ

CC

K	OIC
C	Dir
DoV	

BT

SECRET

REPORT OF PLANNED OPNS FOR JULY 67 (U)

A. CG III MAF 133142Z JUN 67

1. BASED ON PLANNING GUIDANCE FURNISHED BY REF A THE
 POL REPORT OF PLANNED MAJOR OPNS FOR JULY IS SUBMITTED:

- A. (1) CALHOUN
- (2) FIRST MARDIV
- (3) TWO REGIMENTS COORDINATED WITH GVN FORCES.
- (4) S & D

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2121E SECRET

(5) BASE AREA 116 BOUNDED BY AT 994515 TO BT 119426
 TO BT 012395 TO AT 958359 TO AT 880499 TO AT 877453 TO
 AT 933500 TO AT 994515.

(6) FIRST HALF JULY.

B. (1) BOULDER

(2) SEVENTH MAR

(3) REGIMENT MINUS COORDINATED WITH ARVN/CIDG

(4) S & D

(5) HAPPY VALLEY AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W
 GL 72, ON EAST BY N-S GL ZC19, ON SOUTH BY TRACE OF
 SONG VU GIA-SONG CON, AND ON WEST BY N-S GL ZC07.

(6) LAST HALF JULY

C. (1) ALLEN

(2) FIRST MAR

(3) BN MINUS

(4) S & D

(5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 57, ON EAST
 BY N-S GL BT 13, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 51, AND ON WEST BY N-S
 GL BT 12.

(6) FIRST HALF JULY

14

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2121E S E C R E T

- D. (1) CLARK
 (2) FIRST MAR
 (3) BN MINUS
 (4) S & D
 (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 56, ON EAST
 BN N-S GL BT 97, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 52, AND ON WEST
 BY E-W GL BT 99.
 (6) LAST HALF OF JULY.
- E. (1) ELLIOT
 (2) FIRST MAR
 (3) BN MINUS
 (4) S & D
 (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BN E-W GL 62, ON EAST
 BN N-S GL BT 93 ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 58, AND ON WEST BY
 N-S GL AT 98.
 (6) FIRST HALF JULY
- F. (1) CAVALIER
 (2) SEVENTH MAR
 (3) BN MINUS
 (4) S & D

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2121E S E C R E T

- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 57, ON EAST
 BY N-S GL BT 92, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 48, AND ON WEST BY
 N-S GL AT 92.
 (6) FIRST HALF JULY
- G. (1) EMERY
 (2) SEVENTH MAR
 (3) BN MINUS
 (4) S & D
 (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 91, ON EAST
 BY N-S GL AT 92, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL AT 83, AND ON WEST
 BY N-S GL AT 87.
 (6) FIRST HALF JULY
- H. (1) GEM
 (2) SEVENTH MAR
 (3) BN MINUS
 (4) S & D
 (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 57, ON EAST BY
 N-S GL AT 91, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 51, AND ON WEST BY
 N-S GL AT 84.
 (6) FIRST HALF JULY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 2121E S E C R E T

1. (1) BOYD

(2) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

(3) BN MIN'S REIN

(4) S & D

(5) THAT PORTION OF NONG SON VALLEY BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 39, ON EAST BY N-S GL AT36, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 29, AND ON WEST BY N-S GL ZC20.

(6) LAST HALF JULY.

2. PRIORITY OF EFFORT WILL BE GIVEN TO EXECUTION OF OPNS CALHOUN AND BUTLER. REMAINDER OF OPNS WILL BE EXECUTED BASED ON CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND TACTICAL SITUATION.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUMHFL
 DE RUMHLA 2519E 1721851
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 211851Z JUN67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN *G 3*
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/CG FMAW
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 ZEN/ CTG SEVEN SIX POINT FIVE
 ZEN/ CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE
 ZEN/ FIRST MAR
 ZEN/FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 ZRN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST RECON BN

BT

SECRET


CONCEPT OPN CALHOUN (U)

A. CG III MAF 090548Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

B. CG III MAF 130142Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

C. III MAF INTEL EST 12-67 (BASE AREA 116) (UP DATE)
(NOTAL)

D. FIRST MARDIV OVERLAY (OPN CALHOUN) (PASEP)



	0

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2519E **SECRET**

TASK ORGANIZATION

FIRST MARDIV REIN - CONTROLLING HQ

PARTICIPATION UNITS:

FIRST MAR

2 BNS (-) (REIN)

FIFTH MAR

2 BNS (-) (REIN)

SPEC. LANDING FORCE (CTG 79.5)

SECOND BN FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN)

FIRST RECON BN (REIN)

ELEVENTH MAR (-) (REIN)

DIV RES(C) CO EACH FM FIFTH AND SEVENTH MAR AND SLF)

1. MISSION. IAW PARA 5. B REF A AND PARA 7. A (10) REF B,

COMMENCING O/A 25 JUNE FIRST MARDIV CONDUCTS DIVISION

MINUS REIN SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION INTO BASE AREA

116 AS DELINEATED BY ANNEX A TO REF C, TO DESTROY EN FORCES

THEREIN AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN LOGISTIC SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS
IN AREA.

2. CONCEPT.

SECRET

12

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2519E S E C R E T

A. FIRST RECON BN INSERTS RECON PATROLS INTO BASE AREA 116 ON D-1 FOLLOWING ARC LIGHT STRIKES. ON D-DAY MAIN INFANTRY FORCES COMMENCE DETAILED SEARCH AND DESTROY EFFORT FM LOW GROUND INTO BASE AREA 116, FINDING AND INVESTIGATING TRAILS, DRAWS AND RIDGELINES IN AREA TO DISCOVER EN FORCES, FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES. WITHIN CAPABILITY COMMANDERS WILL BE PREPARED TO INSERT INFANTRY ELMS TO CONDUCT S & D EFFORT DOWNWARD DEPENDENT ON TERRAIN AND EN SITUATION.

B. DIV COORDINATES FORCES INVOLVED. BOUNDARIES AND DIV OBJ AREAS IAW REF D. ZOA'S GENERALLY AS FOLLOWS; FIRST MAR TO NORTH OF THROUGH POINTS AT957500, BT 0044 AND BT070496; SLF TO EAST OF LINE THROUGH POINTS BT070496, BT0044 AND BT136408; FIFTH MAR TO SOUTH OF LINE THROUGH POINTS BT 136408, BT 0044 AND AT9236; AND SECOND BN FIFTH MAR TO WEST OF LINE THROUGH POINTS AT9236, BT0044 AND AT957500. SLF WILL CONDUCT S&D OF PAGODA VALLEY (VIC GRID SQUARES BT0444, BT0545 AND BT0646) AND SURROUNDING HIGH GROUND, AND SWEEP OF LARGE HILL MASS TO SOUTH AND EAST OF PAGODA VALLEY.

3. D-DAY H-HOUR. 250600H JUN 67.



4. EST DURATION. FIVE TO EIGHT DAYS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



DE RUMHLA 2548E 1730327
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 220327Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF

G-3

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

ADEQUACY OF PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRNG OF REPLACEMENTS IN M-16 RIFLES.

A. CG III MAF 182314Z JUN67

1. REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON SUBJ ADEQUACY.

2. INDIVID REPLACEMENT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE ADEQUATELY TRAINED IN FUNDAMENTALS OF M-16. REPLACEMENTS EXPRESS CONFIDENCE IN RIFLE.

3. SUGGESTED TRNG IMPROVEMENTS.

A. MORE L, D, A IN CARE & CLEANING

B. KNOWN DISTANCE FIRING PRIOR TO FIRING AT POP-UP TARGETS

C. EACH MAN SHOULD BE ISSUED M-16 UPON REPORTING TO

REPLACEMENT TRNG AND RETAIN SAME WPN DURING ALL TRNG.

GP-4

BT

1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

COC

PP RUM4VP
 DE RYNH LA 2597E 1751000
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 221009Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV WEIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/FIRST AMTRAC BN
 BT

S E C R E T

AMTRAC ASSETS

A. CG III MAF 151000Z JUN 67

B. CG THIRD MARDIV 131112Z JUN 67

1. FOL COMMENTS RESPOND TO REQUEST OF REF A CONCERNING IMPACT ON FIRST MARDIV OPNS IF REQUEST CONTAINED REF B APPROVED.
2. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT FIRST MARDIV RETAIN PRESENT AMTRAC ASSETS. DANANG TAOR REPLETE WITH MAJOR WATER BARRIERS USED BY VC AS INFILTRATION AND SUPPLY ROUTES. WATERWAYS SOUTHERN PORTION TAOR MAKE MOBILITY PARTICULARLY ARDUOUS. CONTINUING PERIODIC AND SPECIAL COMMITMENTS OF AMTRACS, INCLUDING ONE FULL PLAT COMMITTED ON FULL TIME BASIS TO TF OREGON. TOGETHER WITH NECESSARY EXTENSIVE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM HAS THINNED AMTRAC DENSITY TO CRITICAL LEVEL. LOSS OF ADDITIONAL PLATOON

PAGE TWO RUMH LA 2597E S E C R E T

WOULD AGGRAVATE SITUATION. FLOODING OF LARGE PORTIONS OF TAOR FOR THREE TO FIVE MONTHS DURING RAINY SEASON WILL NECESSITATE ADDITIONAL USE OF VEHICLES, FURTHER STRETCHING ASSETS.

3. CONSIDER PRESENT AMTRAC ASSETS AS MINIMUM AMOUNT REQUIRED TO CONTROL WATERWAYS AND SUPPORT CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE INVOLVING AIR BASE DEFENSE.


GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUAUBJG RUMHFL
 DE RUMHFLA 2745E 124118Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 23 1559Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV
 TO ZEN/CG FMAW
 RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN SIX FIVE
 ZEN/FIRST MAR
 ZEN/FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 ZEN/FIRST SP BN
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 RUMHFL/SUP BN FLC
 RUMHFL/FLSG BRAVO
 RUMHFL/DSA I CORPS
 RUMHFL/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
 RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN SIX FIVE
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)



K	OIC
	AVC

PAGE TWO RUMHFLA 2745E **SECRET**
 BT

SECRET SECTION I OF II

FRAG O 75-67 (OPN CALHOUN) (U)

A. MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS SERIES 7914

B. FIRST MARDIV OVERLAY (OPN CALHOUN) (PASEP)

C. III MAF INTEL EST 12-67 (BASE AREA 116) (UPDATE) (NOTAL)

D. DIV O 3487.1 (NOTAL)

E. DIV ADMIN O 301-65 (NOTAL)

F. DIV O P02003.20 (CECIS) (NOTAL)

G. CTG 79.5 COI (BEACON TORCH) (NOTAL)

TASK ORGANIZATION

FIRST MARDIV (-) (REIN)

FIRST MAR (-) (REIN)

---BN (2 CO'S)

---BN (3 CO'S)

FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN)

FIRST BN (2 CO'S)

THIRD BN (3 CO'S)

SPEC LANDING FORCE (CTG 79.5)

SECOND BN FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN)

2 CO'S

SECRET

35

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLE 27455 S E C R E T

FIRST RECON BN (RECON)

ELEVENTH MAR (RECON)

FIRST BN, SEVENTH MAR (RECON)

1. SITUATION

A. EN FORCES

- (1) CURRENT INTENSIVE AND PERIMETERS.
- (2) SPECIAL INTEL STUDY, MY SON (BASE AREA 115) AND VIC (TO BE ISSUED).

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

- (1) CG FNAV PROVIDES AIR SPT AS DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE

251300Z JUN 67.

- (2) CTG 76.5 CONTINUES TO SUPPORT SLF (CTG 79.5).

- (3) CTU 70.8.9 CONTINUES TO PROVIDE NGF SPT.

- (4) QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE CONDUCTS S & D CPNS IN ANTIENNA VALLEY AND SOUTHWESTERN PORTION BASE AREA 116 IN AREA BOUNDED BY LINE THROUGH COORDS AT 8541, AT 9541, AT 970405, AT 9732 AND AT 8632.

2. MISSION. COMMENCING 4-HOUR D-DAY FIRST MARDIV MINUS REIN CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN INTO BASE AREA 116 AS DELINEATED BY ANNEX A TO REF C, TO DESTROY EN FORCES THEREIN AND CAPTURE

PAGE FOUR RUMHLE 27455 S E C R E T

OR DESTROY EN LOGISTICS SPT INSTALLATIONS IN AREA.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. FIRST RECON BN INSERTS RECON PATROLS INTO BASE AREA 116 AT H-1 1/2 FOLLOWING ARC LIGHT STRIKES. AT 4-HOUR D-DAY MAIN INFANTRY FORCES COMMENCE DETAILED SEARCH AND DESTROY EFFORT FM LOW GROUND INTO DIV OBJECTIVES IN BASE AREA 116, INVESTIGATING TRAILS, DRAWS AND RIDGELINES IN AREA TO FIND EN FORCES, FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES. WITHIN CAPABILITY COMMANDERS WILL BE PREPARED TO INSERT INFANTRY ELMS ON HIGH GROUND IN DIV OPN AREAS TO CONDUCT S&D EFFORT DOWNWARD DEPENDENT ON TERRAIN AND EN SITUATION.

B. SLF

- (1) Z04 BOUNDED BY 8000 BA REN WEST FM BT 132512 TO BT 277496 TO BT 3044 TO BT 136406 TO BT 175412. LOD IS RAILROAD.

- (2) AT 4-HOUR D-DAY CROSS LOD (RAILROAD BTWN PTS BT 255483 AND BT 1744) TO WEST AND CONDUCT S&D OPN IN VIC PAGODA VALLEY (VIC GRID SQUARES BT 0045, BT 0545 AND BT 2444). SEARCH HIGH GROUND TO NORTH, WEST AND SOUTH OF PAGODA VALLEY FOR EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND ON ORDER SWEEP LARGE HILL MASS SOUTH AND EAST OF PAGODA VALLEY WITHIN Z04.

- (3) BE PREPARED AT H-HOUR TO ASSUME OPCON RECON ELMS IN Z04 ON ORDER.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMHQA 2745E S E C R E T

(4) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE ONE RIFLE CO TO DIV RESERVE,
C. FIRST MAR

(1) ZOA BOUNDED BY RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY FM AT 997548
TO AT 958502, SOUTH ALONG CAY KHE VINH TRINH TO AT 966490,
THENCE THROUGH BT 0044 TO BT 073496 AND EAST ALONG SONG BA RFI
TO BT 102512.

(2) COMMENCING 4-HOUR D-DAY CONDUCT S&D OPN INTO PORTION
OF OBJ 1 IN ZOA TO FIND AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES,
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT THEREIN. RAILROAD BTWN BT 003517 AND
BT 055483 IS LOD. FORCES REMAIN EAST OF LOD UNTIL 4-HOUR D-DAY.

(3) ASSUME OPCON TWO RIFLE COS FM SEVENTH MAR ON D-1
FOR EMPLOYMENT WITHIN TAOR.

(4) BE PREPARED AT 4-HOUR TO ASSUME OPCON OF RECON ELMS IN ZOA
ON ORDER.

D. FIFTH MAR

(1) ZOA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY LINE BTWN BT 175418, PT 136408,
BT 0044, AT 970425 AND AT 9732. LOD EXTENDS FM AT 9835 TO PT 0239
TO BT 082398, NORTH ALONG ROAD TO BT 102416. FORCES REMAIN SOUTH
OF LOD PRIOR TO 4-HOUR D-DAY.

(2) COMMENCING 4-HOUR D-DAY CONDUCT S&D OPN INTO VIC DIV

PAGE SIX RUMHQA 2745E S E C R E T

OBJ 2 TO DISCOVER AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES
AND EQUIP THEREIN.

(3) BE PREPARED AT 4-HOUR TO ASSUME OPCON RECON ELMS IN ZOA
ON ORDER.

(4) MAINTAIN ONE RIFLE CO IN REGTL RESERVE, TO BE
COMMITTED ONLY ON AUTHORITY THIS HQ.

E. SEVENTH MAR

(1) DESIGNATE BN OND BRP AND ONE RIFLE CO FM FIRST BN AS DIV
RESERVE.

(2) CHOP TWO RIFLE COS TO FIRST MAR FOR EMPLOYMENT WITHIN
TAOR, TO ARRIVE AREA DESIG BY FIRST MAR LNT 1000H D-1.

F. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

(1) ZOA BOUNDED ON EAST BY LINE THROUGH PIS AT 8541, AT 9541,
AT 970425, BT 0044 AND AT 958490, THENCE NORTH ALONG CAY
KHE VINH TRINH TO AT 985006, AND WEST ALONG NORMAL BOUNDARY. LOD
EXTENDS FM AT 9748 ALONG HIGH GROUND TO AT 935425. FORCES REMAIN
WEST OF LOD PRIOR TO 4-HOUR D-DAY.

(2) COMMENCING 4-HOUR D-DAY CONDUCT S&D OPN INTO VIC DIV
OBJ 3 TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIP
THEREIN.

ET

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUAUBJG RUMHFL RUMHVH
 DE RUMHLA 2746E 1741559
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 231559Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG F1AW
 RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 ZEN/FIRST MAR
 ZEN/FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 ZEN/FIRST SP BN
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 RUMHFL/SUP BN FLC
 RUMHFL/FLSG BRAVO
 RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS
 RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
 RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN SIX FIVE
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)

G-3

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2746E S E C R E T
BT

S E C R E T SECTION II OF II

BE PREPARED AT H-HOUR TO ASSUME OPCON RECON ELMS IN ZOA ON ORDER.
G. FIRST RECON BN

(1) AT H-1 1/2 INSERT PATROLS IN DIV OBJ 1 VIC GS AT 9946
AND BT 0146. BE PREPARED AT H-HOUR TO CHOP TO FIRST MAR ON ORDER.

(2) AT H-1 1/2 INSERT PATROL IN DIV OBJ 1 VIC GS BT 0144.

BE PREPARED AT H-HOUR TO CHOP TO SLF ON ORDER.

(3) AT H-1 1/2 INSERT PATROLS IN DIV OBJ 2 VIC GS BT 0144

AND AT 9841. BE PREPARED AT H-HOUR TO CHOP TO FIFTH MAR ON ORDER.

(4) AT H-1 1/2 INSERT PATROL IN DIV OBJ 3 GS AT 9841. BE PREPARED
AT H-HOUR TO CHOP TO SECOND BN FIFTH MAR ON ORDER.

(5) NLT D-1 PROVIDE LN TMS TO FIRST MAR, FIFTH MAR

SLF AND SECOND BN FIFTH MAR.

H. ELEVENTH MAR

(1) PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED.

(2) PROVIDE FC TMS TO QUANG DA SPEC ZONE FORCES CONDUCTING
OPNS COORDINATED WITH OPN CALHOUN.

I. FIRST ENGR BN. PROVIDE ENGR SPT AS REQUIRED.

J. FIRST SP BN. PROVIDE HST SPT AS REQUIRED.

K. COORD INSTRNS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2745E S E C R E T

- (1) DIRLAUTH ALCON.
 - (2) ALL ELMS CHOPPED IAW WITH ABOVE RETURN OPCON PARENT CMD UPON TERMINATION OPN UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED.
 - (3) D-DAY H-HOUR. 250800H JUN 67.
 - (4) EST DURATION. 5-8 DAYS.
 - (5) SUBMIT REPTS IAW REF D.
 - (6) SUBMIT PSYOP REQUIREMENTS TO G-5 (ISH 46/146) ASAP
 - (7) REFUGEE CONTROL COORDINATED BY G-5 (ISH 46/146).
- REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE TO THIS OFFICE ASAP.

(8) EEI'S PASEP,

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

ADMIN

- (1) FOR DIV UNITS. REF E.
- (2) INSTRUCTIONS FOR SLF
- (A) REPLACEMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED THROUGH SLF NORMAL ADMIN CHAINBM
- (B) CASUALTY EVACUATION AND REPORTING WILL BE THROUGH SLF NORMAL ADMIN CHAIN. PROVIDE INFO COPY OF ALL CASUALTY REPORTS TO CG FIRST MAR DIV FOR COORDINATION.

B. LOGISTICS.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2745E S E C R E T

- (1) CLASS I, III, IV, AND V.
- (A) FIFTH MAR (-) SUPPLIED FROM LSA TAM KY (PT-330216).
- (B) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR SUPPLIED FROM LSA AN MOA (AT 844455).
- (C) FIRST MAR SUPPLIED FROM LSA WHOSE LOCATION WILL BE DETERMINED BY CO FIRST MAR WITH CONCURRENCE CO SUP BN FLC.
- (D) SPECAIL LANDING FORCE SUPPLIED FROM FIRST MAR LSA.
- (E) ELEVENTH MAR SUPPLIED AS DIRECTED BY CO ELEVENTH MAR IN COORD WITH CO SUP BN.
- (2) CLASS II.
- (A) TROPICAL CLOTHING, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, BATTERIES AND SELECTED ITEMS FROM LSA.
- (B) T/E ITEMS BY MILSTRIP FROM NORMAL SOURCES.
- (3) STOCK LEVELS.
- (A) LSA IN SUPPORT FIRST MAR WILL BE LIMITED TO 3 DAYS CLASS I, III, AND V EXCEPT FOR SELECTED CLASS V ITEMS HAVING A LOW DAY/RATE IN WHICH CASE A 5 DAY LEVEL IS AUTHORIZED.
- (B) LSA TAM KY AND AN MOA AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 2745E S E C R E T

(A) SALVAGE AND EVACUATION.

REPORT TRACKED VEHICLE CASUALTIES THIS HQ ASAP.
EVACUATE ASAP.

(B) MAINTENANCE. THIRD ECHELON THROUGH APPROPRIATE LSA.

(5) FLC REQUESTED TO PROVIDE ALL LSA'S SECOND ECHELON SPARE PARTS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS AND MOTOR VEHICLES.

(6) SUBMIT TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS TO THIS HQ (ATTN: MTO OR AIR O AS APPROPRIATE) ASAP.

5. CMD AND COMM

A. COMM-ELEC

(1) COMM IAW REFS F AND G.

(2) DIV TAC NR 2, UNCOVERED, M-335 WILL BE ACTIVATED AT H-3 AS OVERLOAD AND ALTERNATE TO DIV TAC NR 1. UNITS GUARD AS REQUIRED.

(3) AUTOMATIC RETRANSMISSION (AUTOCAT) AVAILABLE ON REQUEST.

(A) SUBORDINATE UNITS GUARD ASSIGNED FREQ. UNIT REQ AUTOCAT SHIFT TO M-53, 3311 MCS TO CONDUCT RETRANSMISSION.

(B) CALL SIGN OF AUTOCAT AIRCRAFT TO BE PROMULGATED.

(4) MANOCAT

(A) UNITS GUARD ASSIGNED FREQ.

PAGE SIX RUMHLA 2745E S E C R E T

(B) MANOCAT AIRCRAFT CALL SIGN TO BE PROMULGATED.

B. COMMAND POSTS.

(1) REPORT CMD POST LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.

(2) DIV CMD POST OPENS AT 07 055700 241200Z JUN 67.
REQUEST ACTION ADDRES ACKNOWLEDGE.


GP-4

BT

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED



PP RUAUBJG
 DE RUMHLA 2800E 1750549
 ZNY CCCCC
 RUAUBJG -I-SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE

P 240649Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV REIN ADCON/OPCON

DRAFTER G-3
 RELEASER G-3

P 230158Z JUN 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO ZEN/III MAF
 INFO ZEN/CG SECOND BDE ROKMC
 RUMWH/DSEA I CORPS
 RUMWH/CO "C" FIFTH SEGP
 BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
 READINESS TO REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS OF POSSIBLE ENEMY EMPLOYMENT
 OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS

1. SINCE MARCH 1967, THERE HAVE BEEN THREE REPORTED INCIDENTS OF THE ENEMY'S USE OF AN IRRITANT GAS AGENT WITHIN I CTZ. THE AGENT HAS BEEN DELIVERED BY HAND GRENADE WHICH PRODUCES AN AEROSOL CLOUD COVERING APPROX 20 METERS AND IN ONE INSTANCE WAS ORANGE IN COLOR THIS MIST IRRITATES THE EYES AND NASAL PASSAGES, ALTHOUGH IT DISSIPATES RAPIDLY IN THE OPEN. SEVERAL SMALL CACHES CAPTURED RECENTLY CONTAINED CHICOM CHEMICAL GRENADES OF CS OR CN MIXTURE.
2. INCIDENTS OF THE ENEMY'S USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS HAVE BEEN ISOLATED TO DATE. HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY WILL EMPLOY IRRITANT GAS MORE FREQUENTLY AND IN GREATER QUANTITIES

PAGE TWO RUMWHF 1588 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
 IN THE FUTURE CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED. THE MOST LIKELY ENEMY TACTIC WOULD BE TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH GROUND ATTACK OF STATIC AND RELATIVELY ISOLATED FORWARD POSITIONS.

3. THEREFORE, ALL NECESSARY PROTECTIVE MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

GP-4
 BT

CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN P 230158Z JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

COC

CG RUAUBJG
 DE RUMHLA 2893E 175134.
 ZNY SSSSS

O 241347Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO RUAUBJG/CTG 79.5
 ZEN/FIRST MAR
 ZEN/FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST RECON BN

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAF

BT

SECRET

CHOP OF RECON ELMS OPN CALPOON (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 231959Z JUN 67

1. REF A APPLIES. RECON ELMS NOW SCHEDULED TO LAND DESIGNATED
 ZONES WITHIN DIV OBJECTIVES 1, 2, AND 3 AT FIRST LIGHT D-DAY

2. A. CTG 79.5

FIRST MAR

FIFTH MAR

SECOND BN FIFTH MAR: ASSUME OPCON RECON ELMS UPON THEIR
 LANDING YOUR ZONES OF ACTION.

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2893E SECRET

B. FIRST RECON BN: CHOP RECON ELMS UPON LANDING IN ZONES
 OF ACTION TO CTG 79.5, FIRST MAR, FIFTH MAR, AND SECOND BN FIFTH
 MAR, AS APPROPRIATE.


GP-4

BT


CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 241347Z JUN 67

SECRET

SECRET



COC



OO RUAUBJG RUMHFL RUMHVH
 DE RUMHLA 2939E 1760349
 ZNY SSSSS
 RUAUBJG-I-SEVENTY-NINE PT FIVE

O 250349Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAR
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 RUAUBJG/CTG 79.5
 RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPEC ZONE
 RUMHVH/SA SECOND ARVN DIV
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON

BT
 S E C R E T
 OPN ADAIR
 1. OPN ADAIR TERMINATED 242400H JUN 67.
 GP-4
 BT

DRAFTER G-3
 RELEASER G-3

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 250349Z JUN 67

15

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

○ PAGE 3 RUMSMA 1877E C O N F I D E N T I A L
A CAREFULLY DEVELOPED PHYSICAL LAYOUT WILL PREVENT OR MINIMIZE
LOSS IN THE EVENT THAT FIRE DOES RESULT, WHETHER FROM ENEMY
ACTION OR OTHER CAUSES.

5. (U) FLARE DROP ACTIVITY FOR ILLUMINATION AT NIGHT MUST
BE CONDUCTED WITH CARE AND MONITORED BY PERSONNEL AT LOGISTICS
INSTALLATIONS TO GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE FIRE HAZARD.

6. (U) RESULT OF THE SEMINAP ON BASE DEFENSE CONDUCTED
AT MACV ON 12 JUNE 1967 WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FOR CONSIDERATION BY ALL CONCERNED.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

CONFIDENTIAL

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on	



DE RUMI 318IE 1780 BT
ZNY 8888
P 2700Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV HANOI 3-3
TO CG 1st MAF
INFO MAF NAR

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCURRENCE: G-2, G-3,
ENGRO, & G-4

BT
S E C R E T
SPECIAL OPERATING AREA (SOA)

1. REQUEST SPECIAL OPERATING AREA FOR FIRST MARDIV UNTIL 30 SEPT 67 AS FOLLOWS:

THAT AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY TAOR, ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA TO BT 28343, ON SOUTH BY E-W Q. 25, AND ON WEST BY N-S Q. A, TO TAOR.

2. BY APPROVAL, REQUEST THAT GVN FORCES NOT FIRE SUPPORTING ARMS WEAPONS WITHOUT FIRST COORDINATING WITH FIRST MARDIV. QUANG DA PROVINCE AND ARVN DIVISION WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF MAJOR OPERATIONS IN AREA.

3. ABOVE AREA NECESSARY FOR DIVISION OPERATIONS ALONG NATIONAL RTE 19 IN QUE SON - THANG BINH - NUI LAC SON BASIN.

GP-4
BT


CG FIRST MARDIV P 2700Z JUN 67

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RUMHLA 3238E 1781.
0000
SUBJ: I SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
0232 JUN 67
1ST MARDIV REYN
1ST ADCON/OPCON
CG FIRST MAW



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COMM NOTE	
CORR COPY	
CORR BY	COMM CEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES IN EMPLOYING SUPPORTING ARMS HAVE BECOME COMMON PLACE THROUGHOUT THE DIVISION, AND HAVE RESULTED IN UNACCEPTABLE DELAYS IN ATTACKING TARGETS. TWO INCIDENTS OF THIS SORT OCCURRED DURING RECENT OPERATIONS.

COMMENCING AT 0915H ON D-DAY ALL ARTY FIRES THROUGHOUT THE OBJECTIVE AREA WERE WITHHELD FOR OVER 35 MINUTES TO ALLOW AND AIR STRIKE TO BE DOWN ON VC WITH WEAPONS; TWENTY MINUTES DELAY WAS ENCOUNTERED TO ALLOW ARTS TO MARK FRONT LINES AND FOR AIRCRAFT TO IDENTIFY THE TARGET, AND 15 MINUTES TO RUN THE STRIKE. NO UNIT RECEIVED ANY ARTY SUPPORT DURING THIS PERIOD ALTHOUGH THREE MISSIONS WERE REQUESTED.

AGAIN ON D-DAY, AO'S CALLED FOR FIRE, WITH INTENTION OF ATTACKING THE TARGET WITH ARTY UNTIL AIR WAS AVAILABLE. PREMATURE CHECK FIRES WERE GIVEN TO THE ARTY TERMINATING FIRES 20 MINUTES PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL AIR STRIKE. THIS DENIED THE GROUND UNIT INVOLVED ANY ARTY SUPPORT

THESE TWO RUMHLA 3238E **C O N F I D E N T I A L**
DURING THIS PERIOD.

TO PRECLUDE RECURRENCE OF SUCH INCIDENTS, THE FOLLOWING BASIC GUIDELINES ARE REITERATED:

1. TARGETS MUST BE ANALYZED TO DETERMINE THE BEST MEANS OF ATTACK. HOWEVER, ATTACKING TARGETS OF A FLEETING NATURE, SUCH AS A TROOP CONCENTRATION MUST NEVER BE DELAYED TO AWAIT A PARTICULAR SUPPORTING ARM. REPORTAINK FLEETING TARGETS MUST BE ENGAGED WITH THE FIRST AVAILABLE SUPPORTING ARM WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY CALLING FOR THE PRIMARY CHOICE.

2. IN MOST INSTANCES ARTY IS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. IF AIR IS REQUESTED, ENGAGE THE TARGET WITH ARTY AND COORDINATE THE AIR WITH ARTY WHEN THE AIRCRAFT ARE ACTUALLY ON STATION. DO NOT CHECK FIRE ON TARGETS PRIOR TO THE TIME THE AIRCRAFT ARE ORIENTED AND READY TO MAKE THEIR RUN. AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE ORBITED ABOVE THE TARGET AT A SAFE ALTITUDE OR OUTSIDE THE SAV-A-PLANE AREA. UNTIL ARTILLERY OR NAVAL GUNFIRE HAVE COMPLETED THEIR MISSION. DURING RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT AFTER COMPLETING A TARGET RUN, PROPERLY COORDINATED ARTY/NAVAL GUNFIRE CAN AGAIN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE TARGET UNTIL AIRCRAFT ARE POSITIONED TO MAKE ANOTHER RUN. BY DIRECTING AIRCRAFT TO ORBIT ABOVE THE MAXIMUM COORDINATE OF THE ARTY OR NAVAL GUNFIRE, OR OUTSIDE THE SAV-A-PLANE AREA, MAXIMUM USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS CAN BE OBTAINED, THEREBY AVOIDING SITUATIONS AS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED IN PAR 1. TOO OFTEN THE SITUATION IS REVERSED. CHECK FIRES ARE GIVEN PREMATURELY, ARTY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE

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(29)

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PAGE THREE RUMMA 3238E C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIFTED AFTER AIR IS ON STATION BUT NOT ORIENTED OR READY TO ATTACK THE TARGET, THIS LOSING VALUABLE TIME AND ALLOWING THE ENEMY TO TAKE COVER OR DISPERSE BEFORE THE AIRCRAFT CAN STRIKE.

ANOTHER COSTLY EXAMPLE OF POOR COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT CAN BE SEEN DAILY. THAT IS THE "BLANKET" CHECK FIRE GIVEN ARTY WHICH IN FACT IS NOT FIRING NEAR THE SITE OR ROUTE OF HELO RESUPPLY OR MED-EVAC MISSION. ON MANY OCCASIONS UNIT FSCC'S HAVE INNECESSARILY CHECKED ARTY OR NAVAL GUNFIRE IN THE MIDDLE OF MISSIONS, EVEN MISSIONS SUPPORTING TROOPS IN CONTACT, DENYING THE USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS ALTHOUGH NOT IMMEDIATELY EFFECTING THE SAFETY OF HELO OPERATIONS. THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR AS THE COMMANDER'S REP MUST CONTROL AND COORDINATE THE USE OF ALL SUPPORTING ARMS. ACTIONS TAKEN MUST BE IN REFLECTION OF THE COMMANDER'S PRIORITIES; E.G., RESUPPLY OR MED-EVAC MISSIONS OF ARTY/NGF SUPPORT. THE FSCC SHOULD COORDINATE HELO APPROACH AND RETIREMENT ROUTES SO AS TO AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH FIRE SUPPORT. LOW LEVEL HELO PILOTS EITHER MISUNDERSTAND OR DO NOT CONSIDER DIRECTIONS GIVEN BY THE BN FSCC AS TO APPROACH ROUTES AND REFUSE TO LAND UNLESS ALL ARTY FIRE IS LIFTED. INSTANCES SUCH AS THIS SHOULD BE REPORTED ASAP TO THE UNIT COMMANDER.

THE FSCC AT ALL LEVELS MUST FUNCTION AS A COORDINATING CENTER TO ALLOW MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE SUPPORT. ARTY, AIR, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE REPS MUST BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY/CONTACT/COORDINATION WITH ONE ANOTHER AND THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE TECHNIQUES OF ATTACK USED BY THE OTHER

PAGE FOUR RUMMA 3238E C O N F I D E N T I A L

MEMBER.

4. COMMANDERS WILL TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO ENSURE THE PROPER USE OF FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES AND WILL ENSURE CONSTANT SUPERVISION OF THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER.

GP 4

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COO

PP RUAUBJG
DE RUMMLA 3294E 1792521
ZNY SSSSS

P 280521Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON

INFO CG III MAF
CG FMAW
BT

DRARTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR OPNS 0
G-3 A
ORD 0
G-4 CCN 3294

SECRET

DUDS(U)
DIV BULLETIN 8025 OF 8JUN67 (NOTAL)
1. RECENT FREQUENT INCIDENTS INVOLVING VC USE OF DUD ORD-
NACE AS MINES HAVE CAUSED DEATH AND SERIOUS INJURY
TO MARINES AND HEAVY DAMAGE TO VALUABLE EQUIPMENT. VC RETURN
OUR AMMUNITION TO US AS MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS FORMED FROM ALL
SIZES AND SHAPES OF ORNANCE, FROM HAND GRENADES TO LARGE
CALIBER ARTILLERY SHELLS.

2. REF A OUTLINES PROPER PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING DUDS/
MALFUNCTIONS. COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH REF A,
INCLUDING CONSCIENTIOUS REPORTING OF SUSPECTED LOCATIONS
OF DUDS. APPROPRIATE ACTION WILL BE INITIATED TO DESTROY ALL
KNOWN DUDS, WHEN POSSIBLE.


GP-4
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 280521Z JUN 67

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SECRET

0000ZZ RUAUBJG RUMHFL RUMNVH RUMHFL
 DE RUMHLA 3318E 1790719
 ZNY SSSSS
 RUAUBJG-I-CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE



2 280719Z JUN 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 ZEN/FIRST MAR
 ZEN/FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST RECON BN

B/Olc

DRAFTER G-3
 RELEASER C/S
 CONCUR G-3A
 G-2
 CCN 3318

INFO ZEN/CG III MAP
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMHFL/FLSG BRAVO
 RUMHFL/SUP BN FLC
 RUMNVH/DSA I CORPS
 RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPEC ZONE
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV/OPCON

COU

BT

SECRET

FRAG 0 76-67 (CONTINUATION OPN CALHOUN)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 231559Z JUN 67 (FRAG 0 75-67)

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 3318E SECRET

1. SITUATION. THOROUGH SEARCH OF DIVISION OBJECTIVES AND LOWER SLOPES BASE AREA 116 PROCEEDING AS SCHEDULED REF A. ESTIMATE COMPLETION OF BASIC MISSION O/A D PLUS 4.

2. MISSION. UPON COMPLETION OF MISSION ASSIGNED REF A, ELMS INVOLVED OPN CALHOUN WITHDRAW FM OBJ AREA CONDUCTING OPNS TO OBTAIN MAX BENEFIT FM PRESENT PSNS AND EN SITUATION.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. O/A D PLUS 4 INF ELMS COMPLETE SEARCH AND DESTROY IN BASE AREA 116 AND CONDUCT TACTICAL MOVEMENT/SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS TO BASE CAMPS/ARG/AREAS AS DIRECTED HEREIN.

B. FIRST MAR. ON D PLUS 3 COMMENCE WITHDRAWAL FM PORTION DIV OBJ ONE IN ZOA, SEARCHING LOWER SLOPES AND OCCUPYING ASSEMBLY AREAS WEST OF RAILROAD. O/A D PLUS 4 COMMENCE S&D TO NORTHEAST ALONG AXIS OF RTE 537 TO NATL RTE ONE. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO CONTINUE S&D EAST OF RTE ONE, EITHER UNILATERALLY OR IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES AND SLF.

C. FIFTH MAR. CONTINUE S&D IN ZOA CONCENTRATING ONCCN 301 LOWER SLOPES. ON ORDER O/A D PLUS 4 COMMENCE SWEEP FM REF A AREA TO COMBAT BASE.

D. SPEC LANDING FORCE. ON ORDER O/A D PLUS 4 COMMENCE S&D OF

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 280719Z JUN 67 PAGE 2 OF 2

280719Z JUN

15

SECRET

SECRETPAGE 3 RUMHLA 3318E ~~S E C R E T~~

THROUGH HILL MASS CENTERED ON E-W GL 43. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO CROSS NATL RTE ONE AND CONDUCT S&D OPN TO COAST NORTH OF LINE FM BT253460 TO BT214438, THEN ALONG SOUTHSIDE OF ROAD TO INTERSECTION WITH NATL RTE ONE. OPN EAST OF NATL RTE ONE EITHER UNILATERAL OR IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES AND FIRST MAR. NORTHERN BOUNDARY TO BE PROMULGATED.

E. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR. UPON COMPLETION REF A MISSION IN ZOA, ON ORDER O/A D PLUS 4 COMMENCE WITHDRAWAL FM ZOA AND RETURN TO COMBAT BASE BY MOST APPROPRIATE MEANS.

F. FIRST RECON BN. ASSUME OPCON OF RECON ELMS IN AO AT TIME MUTUALLY AGREED UPON WITH FIRST MAR, FIFTH MAR, SLF AND SECOND BN FIFTH MAR, RESPECTIVELY AND RETURN TO NORMAL RECON EFFORT IN AREA, WITHDRAWING ELMS AS REQUIRED.

G. ELEVENTH MAR.

DIV RESERVE

FIRST ENGR BN

FIRST SP BN

NO CHANGE FM REF A.

H. COORD INSTRNS

(1) UNITS HOLDING OPCON RECON ELMS CHOP TO FIRST

PAGE 4 RUMHLA 3318E ~~S E C R E T~~

RECON BN AT MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME.

(2) ALL DATES SUBJ TO CHANGE BASED ON DEVELOPING CON EN SITUATION.

(3) INSTRNS ON COORD BETWEEN SLF, FIRST MAR AND ARVN FORCES EAST OF RTE ONE TO BE PASEP, AS REQUIRED.

(4) SUBMIT SPT REQUIREMENTS THIS HQ. ACTION ADDRES ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

SECRET

SECRETDE RUMHLA 3335E 1700801
ZNY SSSSSP 280801Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG III MAF
INFO CG FIRST MAWDRAFTER G-3
RELEASER C/S
CCN 3335
CONCUR ORD
G-4
G-2
AIROOPS
G-3 A**SECRET**

DUD AND ANTI-DISTURBANCE-FUZED ORDNANCE

1. RECENT FREQUENT INCIDENTS INVOLVING VC USE OF DUD ORDNANCE AS MINES HAVE CAUSED DEATH AND SERIOUS INJURY TO MARINES AND HEAVY DAMAGE TO VALUABLE EQUIPMENT.
2. FOR EXAMPLE, ON 12 JUNE AN AIRSTRIKE RESULTED IN ONE TWO THOUSAND POUND BOMB REPORTED AS DUD IN VICINITY AT 852516. IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETONATE THIS DUD ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER, ADDITIONAL AIR STRIKES RESULTED IN EIGHT ADDITIONAL 250 POUND DUDS IN SAME AREA. ON 25 JUNE AN LVT WAS HEAVILY DAMAGED AT AT820550 BY WHAT WAS REPORTEDLY A 250 POUND BOMB RIGGED AS MINE.
3. OTHER SIMILAR INCIDENTS CAN BE ASSOCIATED WITH VC RETURNING OUR AMMUNITION TO US AS MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS FORMED FROM ALL SIZES AND SHAPES OF ORDNANCE, FROM HAND GRENADES TO LARGE

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 3335E **SECRET**
CALIBER ARTILLERY SHELLS.

4. ADDITIONALLY, RECENT DISCOVERY OF ANTI-DISTURBANCE-FUZED ORDNANCE M83 "BUTTERFLY" BUMBLETS) IN TWO LOCATIONS WITHIN OPERATION CALHOUN OPERATING AREA IS A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN.
5. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WHENEVER POSSIBLE THIS COMMAND BE INFORMED OF AIR MISSIONS RESULTING IN DUDS AND / OR THE DELIVERY OF ANTI-DISTURBANCE-FUZED ORDNANCE.
6. ACCORDINGLY, FOR AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE BOUNDARY, ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON SOUTH BY QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI PROVINCE BOUNDARY AND ON WEST BY N-S Q. YC/YB70, REQUEST APPROX LOCATION OF ALL PAST DUDS OR ANTI-DISTURBANCE-FUZED AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE (SUCH AS M83 BUMBLETS) BY COORDINATES WITH FOLLOWING:
 - (1) TYPE OF ORDNANCE
 - (2) HOW FUZED
 - (3) DELIVERING AGENCY (USMC/RVNAF/USAF/USN)
 - (4) WHEN DELIVERED
7. REQUEST SIMILAR INFORMATION FOR FUTURE DELIVERIES AS THEY OCCUR.

GP-4
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 280801Z JUN 67

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SECRET

PP RUMHFL RUMHVH
DE RUMHLA 3435E 1800803
ZNY SSSSS

P 290803Z UN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVH/CG I CORPS
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/HQ BN
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST MI BN
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN

INFO ZEN/CRU LAI INSTAL COORD
RUMHFL/CG FLC
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/NINTH ENGR BN
BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: FRAG O 77-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)

A. CG III MAF 240040Z (NOTAL)

DRAFTER 3:0P
RELEASER G-3
CONCURRENCE

OPNS
G-3A
MYO
ENGR O
G-2
G-4
AIR O
CEO

col

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3435E S E C R E T

B. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)

C. FIRST MARDIV 272531Z MAR 67 (NOTAL)

D. FIRST MARDIV P02000.2C (CEOI)

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A ROUGH RICER CONVOYS SCHEDULED 3 JUL 67 TO MOVE I CORPS CARGO FROM DANANG TO TAM KY AND RETURN.

2. FOR CG III MAF: REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOC'S.

3. FOR CG I CORPS:

A. VEH AVAILAELE FOR LOADING 021300H JUL 67.

B. REQUEST ARRANGE FOR EXPEDITIOUS OFF-LOADING TAM KY TO PERMIT CONVOY TURN AROUND BY 031300H.

4. FOR CG FIRST MAW: REQUEST THREE M36 VEH REPORT SEVENTH ENGR BN 021300H JUL THENCE TO 1ST MI BN FOR STAGING AFTER COMPLETION LOADING.

5. EXECUTION:

A. FIFTH MAR:

(1) ASSUME OPCON CONVOY WHILE CONVOY SOUTH OF DANANG TAOR.

(2) PROVIDE RIFLE CO (-) REIN AS CONVOY RESERVE WHILE CONVOY SOUTH OF DANANG TAOR.

CG FIRST MARDIV

290803 JUN 67

PAGE 1 OF 2

14

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3435E S E C R E T

(3) PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOY APPROX 30 VEH, BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES IN EVENT CONVOY RUN TAM KY AREA.

B. FIRST MAR PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY REINFORCED WITH FAC'S AND FO'S AS REQUIRED.

C. ELEVENTH MAR: REF B.

D. FIRST MT BN; REF B.

E. FIRST ENGR BN: REF B.

F. COORD INST:

(1) REF B AS APPLICABLE, ADMIN MOVEMENT.

(2) CHECK POINTS: REF C.

(3) D-DAY H-HOUR

(A) DANANG TO TAM KY 030800H JUL 67.

(B) TAM KY TO DANANG 031300H JUN 67, OR AS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THIS HQ.

(4) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT, CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.

(5) DIRLAUTH ALCON

G. COMM-ELECT

A. IAW REF D EXCEPT AS MODIFIED.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 3435E S E C R E T

B. FIFTH MAR.

(1) GUARD M 714, 50.95 AND M 109 4424 KCS COMMENCING 030700H UNTIL CONVOY TERMINATES DANANG.

(2) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME NCS DUTIES M 714 AND M 109 AS DICTATED BY ENEMY SITUATION.

C. AIR COMM

(1) TACTICAL AIR REQUEST NET 1 (HF). M-11 2197.5

(2196) KCS.

(2) TACTICAL AIR REQUEST NET 4 (FM). (YELLOW) M-599 43.5 MCS.

(3) TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION NET 1 (UHF) (BLUE) M1223 283.3 MCS.


(4) TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION NET 2 (UHF). (ORANGE) M1208 252.7 MCS.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET



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DE RUMHLA 3546E 1810705
ZNY SSSSS

P 300705Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF

SECRET

OPTIMUM USE OF TANKS AND COMBAT VALUE OF ONTOS

A. CG III MAF 111341Z JUN 67

1. IAW REF A FOL COMMENTS TANKS AND ONTOS ARE SUBMITTED.
2. TANK

A. USE IN STATIC DEFENSE: EITHER FLAME OR GUN TANK EFFECTIVE IN ROLE OF STATIC DEFENSE, BUT USED IN SUCH ROLE ONLY WHEN TERRAIN, WEATHER, AND TACTICAL SITUATION PRECLUDES USE OF ITS MOBILITY, FLEXIBILITY, AND FIREPOWER. TANKS IN STATIC DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE MAXIMUM FIELDS OF FIRE, LIMITED AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE BY OBSTRUCTIONS LOCAL LISTENING POSTS, AND OTHER KNOWN FRIENDLY POSITIONS. TANKS MAY BE SPOTTED IN PERIMETER OR USED AS ELM OF REACTION FORCE. SEARCHLIGHT USED EFFECTIVELY IN VARIETY OF WAYS.

B. USE AS ELM OF TANK-INFANTRY REACTION FORCE: TANK PROVIDES RAPID MEANS OF CLOSING WITH ANY TREATED AREA, HAS EXCELLENT COMM FACILITIES, AND SHOCK EFFECT WHICH HAS IRREVITABLY CAUSED EN TO WITHDRAW. MOBILE LIGHT CAPABILITY HAS

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3546E SECRET
PROVED INVALUABLE IN THIS REGARD.

C. USE AS OFFENSIVE WPN WITH INFANTRY: THIS IS PRIMARY USE OF TANKS, AS ELM OF SWEEPING OR BLOCKING FORCE. WHILE CONDUCTING COUNTRY FAIR OR SURPRISE SWEEP, TANKS HAVE PROVIDED MEANS OF DEPLOYING SWEEPING AND BLOCKING ELMS SIMULTANEOUSLY. DURING MONSOONS, TRAFFICABILITY LIMITED MAINLY TO ROADS, BUT TANKS USED THEN FOR ROAD SWEEPS, CONVOY ESCORT, AND DIRECT FIRE SPT OF PATROLS THROUGH PADDIES.

D. USE AS FIRE BASE: USE AS SUCH IN FIRST MARDIV AO LIMITED, HOWEVER TANK HAS PROVEN EXCEPTIONALLY EFFECTIVE BY SETTING UP FIRE BASE TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF INFANTRY ACROSS NATURAL OBSTACLES AND EXTENSIVE OPEN PADDY AREAS.

E. THE MINE THREAT: FIFTY SEVEN MINES DETONATED BY TANKS SINCE 1 JAN 67; OF THESE, SEVENTEEN TANKS CONDITION CODED AND EVACUATED. INJURIES TO TANK CREWMEN LIGHT. INJURIES TO INFANTRY RIDING ON REAR ARMOR PLATE AND TURRET RELATIVELY MINOR. INFANTRY RIDING ON FRONT AND BENDERS INVARIABLY SUFFER MAJOR INJURIES. TWO FIRETEAMS CAN RIDE SAFELY ON REAR ARMOR PLATE AND TURRET. MINES USUALLY TNT BOX TYPE 15-60 POUNDS. DAMAGE

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 300705Z JUN 67

PAGE 1 OF 2

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UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3546E S E C R E T

USUALLY TO ROAD WHEELS, ARMS, HOUSING, AND TRACK BLOCKS. MAJORITY OF MINE INCIDENTS IN AREAS WHERE TRAFFIC CHANNELIZED BY NATURAL OBSTACLES, BUT MANY MINES HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN PLACED AT RANDOM IN AREAS OF HEAVY TRACKED VEHICLE ACTIVITY.

F. USE W/TPS - 21 AND XENON LIGHT: BECAUSE OF NECESSITY TO PLACE IN STATIC POSITION FOR SUCH EMPLOYMENT, TANKS FIRED INFREQUENTLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH TPS-21 AND XENON LIGHT; BUT WHEN USED HAVE PROVEN EFFECTIVE WITH TPS-21 PICKING UP TARGET, XENON LIGHT BEING BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO BEAR FOR TARGET IDENTIFICATION, AND TANK PROVIDING TIMELY FIRE ON TARGET.

G. EMPLOYMENT IN WET VS DRY SEASON:

(1) FROM FEB TO SEPT TRAFFICABILITY THROUGHOUT FIRST MARDIV AO FAIR TO VERY GOOD. DURING MONSOON SEASON, OCT THROUGH JAN, TRAFFICABILITY REDUCED TO ABOUT 13 PCT OF AO, EXCLUSIVE OF EXISTING ROAD NETWORK. TANKS WHEN CONFINED ONLY TO STATIC POSITIONS AND LIMITED MOVEMENT, EXCEPT IN SANDY AREA GENERALLY PARALLELING COAST LINE WHICH WILL SUPPORT YEAR ROUND TRACK VEHICLE OPERATIONS. TANKS EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM EXTENT IN DRY SEASON WITH MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AGGRA-

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 3546E S E C R E T

VATED BY DUSTY AND DIRTY ENVIRONMENT.

(2) SEASONAL TANK-EMPLOYMENT OVERLAY PASEP.

(NOTAL).

3. ONTOS.

A. ONTOS BY VIRTUE OF LIGHT ARMOR, MOBILITY, AND FIRE POWER IS FAR SUPERIOR TO GROUND AND MULE MOUNTED 105MM RE-COILLESS RIFLES AS A DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE WEAPON. IN FACT, ONTOS DURING MONSOON SEASON HAS SOME CHARACTERISTICS SUPERIOR TO TANKS SINCE IT IS ABLE TO TRAVERSE MORE ROADS AND PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT TO THE INFANTRY.

B. PRICE OF KEEPING ONTOS IN VIEW OF ITS POTENTIAL AS AN OFFENSIVE WEAPON COMPARED WITH TANKS IS SMALL BY COMPARISON IN BOTH "HARD SKILL" PERSONNEL, MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS. ADDED FIRE POWER TO THE INFANTRY UNITS IN FIELD IS WORTH PRICE.

C. DEADLINING THE ONTOS WOULD WASTE VALUABLE ASSET AND GREATLY REDUCE FIRE POWER OF INFANTRY DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. WE ARE PRESCUTLY TESTING ADVANTAGES OF .50 CAL MOUNT ON ONTOS.

D. MINES HAVE NOT HAMPERED ONTOS OPERATIONS TO ANY GREAT EXTENT. FIRST AT BATTALION HAS LOST ELEVEN ONTOS OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN MONTHS, DURING TRAVEL OVER 26,116 MILES OF TERRAIN.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

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19 RUMHFL
DE RUMHLA 3577E 1810951
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R/C
OK
BM
MW

P 300951Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG I CORPS
ZEN/CG FMAW
RUMHFL/CG FLC
ZEN/CHU LAI INSTAL COORD
ZEN/HQ BN
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/NINTH ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST MT BN

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCURRENCE G-4
MTO

RECEIVED
JUN 17 1967
20
or

COL
Cmd
Chowley

SECRET
CHANGE ONE TO FRAG O 77-67(ROUGH RIDER) (U)
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 290803Z JUN 67

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3577E SECRET

- 1. MODIFY REF A AS FOL:
- A. CHANGE PARA 1 TO READ: IN RESPONSE TO REF A, ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SCHEDULED 4 JUL 67 TO MOVE I CORPS CARGO FROM DANANG TO TAM KY, AND RETURN 5 JUL 67.
- B. CHANGE PARA 3.A. TO READ 031300H VICE 221300H.
- C. CHANGE PARA 3.B. TO READ 041300H VICE 031300H
- D. CHANGE PARA 4 TO READ 031300H VICE 021300H.
- E. CHANGE PARA 5.A.(3) TO READ: PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOY APPROX 30 VEH, BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES TAM KY AREA NIGHT OF 4 JULY.
- F. CHANGE PARA 5.F.(3)(A) TO READ 040800H VICE 030800H.
- G. CHANGE PARA 5.F.(3)(B) TO READ: TAM KY TO VIC HILL 63 050800H AND FM VIC HILL 63 TO DANANG WHEN OFF LOADING COMPLETE, OR AS DIR BY FIFTH MAR.
- H. CHANGE PARA 6.B.(1) TO READ 040700H VICE 032700H.

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CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

P 300951Z JUN 67

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RUMHLA 3579E 1810955
ZVY SSSSS
RUAUBJG-T-SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

P 300955Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO RUMHFL/CG FLC
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST MI BN

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCURRENCE G-4
G-2
MTO
G-3
GEO

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG FMAW
RUMHFL/FL SG BRAVO
ZEN/DSA I CORPS
RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
RUMHVH/SA SECOND ARVN DIV
ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON
BT

S E C R E T
ESTABLISHMENT OF REGTL BASE CAMP (U)
A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 290803Z JUN 67
B. DIVO P 02000.2C (CEOI)(NOTAL)
1. SITUATION
A. ENEMY. SEE CURRENT PERINTREP.

COL

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3579E **S E C R E T**

B. FRIENDLY. III MAF, QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE AND SECOND ARVN DIV CONTINUE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPNS IN QUANG NAM AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES.

MISSION. COMMENCING EARLY JULY FIRST MARDIV ESTABLISHES COMBAT BASE VIC HILL 63 (COORD BT 132453) IN ORDER TO SUPPORT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPNS SOUTHEASTERN QUANG NAM AND EASTERN QUANG TIN PROVINCES.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPN. OPN TO BE CONDUCTED TO PROVIDE FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN) ADEQUATE COMBAT BASE FM WHICH TO CONTINUE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPNS PRIOR TO AND DURING FORTHCOMING MONSOON SEASON.

B. FIFTH MAR

(1) COMMENCING EARLY JULY DEPLOY FORCES TO VIC HILL 63 TO ESTABLISH REGTL CP AND COMBAT BASE FOR ELMS FIFTH MAR AND SPTG ELMS.

(2) ESTABLISH SUBSIDIARY COMBAT BASE VIC QUE SON IN ADDITION TO BASE CITED ABOVE, AND MAINTAIN COMBAT BASE NUI LAC SON.

(3) DURING AND AFTER ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES CONTINUE

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 300955Z JUN 67 PAGE 1 OF 2

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3579E S E C R E T
 COUNTERINSURGENCY OPNS WITHIN AREA OF OPNS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE
 SECURITY FOR COMBAT BASE DEVELOPMENT OPN AND TO OPEN LOC'S.
 FOR PLANNING PURPOSES AO IS AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY ROAD
 BT 003519 EAST TO SONG BA REN, ALONG SONG BA REN TO SONG
 TRU BON TO SONG CUA DAI; ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA TO BT 200445
 TO BT 080250; ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 25; AND ON WEST BY N-S GL
 RT 96 AND TAOR TO BT 003519. FIRM AO WILL BE PROMULGATED WHEN
 APPROVED BY HIGHER HQ.

(4) PROVIDE SECURITY REQUIRED FOR DISPLACEMENT OF LSA
 AT TAM KY AND VIC HILL 63 O/A 5 JULY. REF A APPLIES.

(5) SUBMIT OPERATIONAL SPT REQUIREMENTS THIS HQ.

C. ELEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED.

D. COORD INSTRNS. DIRLAUTH AS REQUIRED WITH FIRST MANDIV
 UNITS, FLSG BRAVO, QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE AND SECOND ARVN DIV.

4. LOGISTICS

A. TO FLC. REQUEST DEPLOY LSA FM TAM KY TO VIC HILL 63
 ON 5 JULY 67. SECURITY AT TAM KY AND VIC HILL 63 PROVIDED BY
 FIFTH MAR.

B. FIFTH MAR

(1) IN COORD WITH FLC DETERMINE LSA SITE VIC HILL 63.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 3579E S E C R E T

(2) SUBMIT LOG SPT REQUIREMENTS THIS HQ FOR COORDINATION.

C. FIRST MT BN. REF A APPLIES. WHEN I CORPS CARGO OFF
 LOADED TAM KY REPORT OIC LSA TAM KY BY 041300H JULY 67 AND MAKE
 AVAILABLE 25 TRUCKS AND 12 TRAILERS FOR ON LOADING SUPPLIES
 FIFTH MAR/LSA ADMINISTRATIVE MOVE TO VIC HILL 63. CONVOY DE-
 PARTS TAM KY MORNING 5 JUL 67. WHEN OFF LOADING COMPLETED VIC
 HILL 63, RETURN TO DANANG.

5. COMM. REF B.


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PAGE 2 OF 2

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DE RUMBLA 3602E 1811213
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P 0810 27 JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG 1ST MAF
CLASSIFY MARINES

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RELEASED 1/73

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
LVTH-6 UTILIZATION

A. CG 1ST MAF 101520Z JUN 67

1. INFORMATION REQ REF A FOLLOWS. FORMAT PARA 4 IS FOLLOWING.
A. POSSIBLE USES.

- (1) DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT WHILE WATERBORNE.
- (2) DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT OF INFANTRY, ESPECIALLY IN AREAS INACCESSIBLE TO WHEELED AND NONAMPHIBIOUS TRACKED FIRE SUPPORT VEHICLES. BEEHIVE AMMUNITION HAS ENLARGED THE SCOPE OF THIS SUPPORT PHASE.
- (3) INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT REINFORCING FIRE OF CONVENTIONAL ARTILLERY.
- (4) INTERDICTION OF WATERWAYS. PROVIDES BOTH FIRE POWER AND MANEUVERABILITY.
- (5) A RIVER PATROL ASSAULT UNIT IN CONJUNCTION WITH LCM-8.

PAGE TWO RUMBLA 3602E C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. UTILIZATION.

DATE	NO. OF DAYS	NO. LVTH-6	OPN (NAMED)	SUPPORTED
14-20 APR 67	38	6	DECK HOUSE V	9TH REG
19-22 APR 67	3	2	(UNNAMED)	300
4-7 MAY 67	4	2	(UNNAMED)	300
4-7 MAY 67	4	2	(UNNAMED)	300
21-24 MAY 67	6	2	NEWCASTLE	200
26-17 APR 67	3	2	DIXIE	200
20-27 APR 67	6	4	GRAND	300 MAR
28-30 APR 67	4	2	(UNNAMED)	100
21-24 MAY 67	5	6	DUVAL	200
16-20 APR 67	6	2	ARIZONA	300

- (1) SUPPORTED UNITS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH RESULTS AND DESIRE TO EMPLOY LVTH-6 IN FUTURE OPERATIONS.
- (2) DURING DECKHOUSE V, LVTH-6 WAS USED IN ALL THREE BASIC FIRE SUPPORT ROLES.
- (3) DURING NEWCASTLE, VEHICLE PERFORMANCE WAS MAJOR FACTOR IN SUCCESS OF OPN. TWO VEHICLES CREDITED WITH 78 ENEMY KIA CONFIRMED. OVER-ALL RESULT WAS 111 KIA.
- (4) INITIAL REPORTS FROM ARIZONA INDICATE HIGHLY E

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FORMER TITLES: UNCLASSIFIED 3602E C O N F I D E N T I A L

VEHICLE USE.

C. PLANNED UTILIZATION.
THE LVTH6 WILL PROVIDE INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE IN OPERATIONS IN THE WATERWAY COMPLEX ALONG THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE ISI HARBOR LAOR.

IN WATERWAY CONTROL OPERATIONS THE LVTH6 WILL BE USED ESPECIALLY IN RIVER BLOCKADES AND WATER DENIAL ROLES.

FOR RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS.

D. 25 PERCENT

FLAT DRY OR SAND AREAS ARE MOST DESIRABLE FOR MANEUVERING. MOBILITY IN MUDDY TERRAIN IS MORE LIMITED. THE LVTH6 OPERATES MOST EFFICIENTLY DURING THE DRY SEASONS; HOWEVER, DURING THE WET SEASON A GREATER DEMAND IS CREATED FOR THEIR USE BECAUSE AREAS ARE FLOODED AND IMPASSABLE BY OTHER TYPES OF VEHICLES.

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ADJUTANT	1st Lt. R. E. SCHEFFMAN	Sep 67	Isharwood 7	
Asst Adjutant	Capt G. F. KUNTNER JR.	Dec 67	Isharwood 207	
Execo	CWO P. L. HILL	Dec 67	Isharwood 47	
Off/Execo/DAO	2d Lt J. E. WILKINSON	Aug 67	Isharwood 147	
Casualty	2d Lt J. A. DORRIS	Nov 67	Isharwood 107	
RPS Coordinator	2d Lt W. J. VAHE	Oct 67	Isharwood 507	
Awards	Maj J. C. HERBERT	Aug 67	Isharwood 607	
SAC Files	CWO R. A. ZIMMERMAN	Nov 67	Isharwood 507	
AIR OFFICER	Col F. G. LANG	Aug 67	Isharwood 14	934
Asst AirO	Maj S. P. REUCHE	Oct 67	Isharwood 14	
AMPHIBIAN TRACKER OFFICER	1st Lt R. L. RUFFORD	Jul 68	SLack 6	
ARTILLERY OFFICER	1st Lt O. HERRICKS	Jul 68	ASide 6	
BAIRD OFFICER	WO E. W. KEAYS	Sep 67	Auditor 55	
BARBER ADVISER	Capt T. E. JOYE	Nov 67	Auditor 401	
CHAPLAIN	Capt D. J. CASAZZA, USN	Aug 67	Isharwood 19	938
Asst Chaplain	Cdr R. H. KICKLICHER	Mar 68	Isharwood 19	
CLUBS OFFICER	Capt R. J. PLOCH	Aug 67	Isharwood 60	
COMM REE OFFICER	Sol E. P. CLAUDE	Oct 67	Isharwood 10	932
Asst Comm Reo Off	1st Lt H. O. GOWING	Jul 68	Isharwood 10	
Asst CMR/Reo	Maj F. L. BIRD	Aug 67	Isharwood 210	
Asst CMR/Plans/Opns	Maj J. E. BIRD JR.	Jul 67	Isharwood 110	
Day Comm Center Off	Capt T. R. O'DONNELL	Sep 67	Isharwood 111	
DaySvcsO	2d Lt S. E. VICENTE	Nov 67	Isharwood 69	
DEPTAL OFFICER	Capt T. J. PAPER, USN	Mar 68	Isharwood 40	931
Admin Officer	1st Lt R. E. REYNOLDS, USN	Jan 68	Isharwood 40	
DISBURSING OFFICER	Maj G. W. COLBURN	Mar 68	Isharwood 18	
Asst Disbursing Off	2d Lt J. HOFFNER	Sep 67	Isharwood 18	
EVOLUTION OFFICER	1st Lt D. G. SCHAAF	Feb 68	Isharwood 37	
EXPLANATION OFFICER	Maj R. PERROFF	Aug 67	Isharwood 39	
ENGINEER OFFICER	1st Lt O. A. MERRILL	Aug 67	Isharwood 15	939
Asst Eng-O	Maj G. O. HEMPHILL	Aug 67	Isharwood 115	
Base DevelopmentO	Capt V. C. WESSEL	Jun 68	Isharwood 15	
Engr EquipmentO			Isharwood 115	
EXCHANGE OFFICER	Capt C. E. LANG	Mar 68	Isharwood 44	
FOOD SERVICES OFFICER	WO J. J. LAGGIS	Jul 67	Isharwood 56	
INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER	Capt D. R. HEDSON	Sep 67	Isharwood 141	
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICER	Capt R. A. PATTERSON	Oct 67	Isharwood 446	
INSPECTOR	Col W. W. GRENZIS	Aug 67	Isharwood 32	
LEGAL OFFICER	1st Lt V. T. WENDELAND	Feb 68	Isharwood 17	
Asst Legal Officer	Maj W. M. SHUMWAY	Oct 67	Isharwood 117	
Chief Trial Counsel	Capt J. P. SHAWEN	Oct 67	Isharwood 117	
Chief Defense Counsel	Maj W. B. BRAYNE	Oct 67	Isharwood 317	
Law Specialist	1st Lt J. J. MARRIS, USN	Jun 68	Isharwood 217	
Claims/Legal Asst	Capt D. M. O'NEILL	Sep 67	Isharwood 317	
MOVIE TRAINING OFFICER	Maj L. V. RAYLON	Jan 68	Isharwood 35	
NAVAL QUARTER OFFICER	1st Lt R. A. WILSON, USN	Jan 68	Isharwood 86	
ORDNANCE OFFICER	Maj E. SCHO	Feb 68	Isharwood 8	

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COMMAND HIERARCHY
CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINANCE
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
1 JULY 1967

CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINANCE
 Aide-camp
 CHIEF OF STAFF
 Staff Secretary
 ASST CoFS, G-1
 ASST CoFS, G-2
 ASST CoFS, G-3
 ASST CoFS, G-4
 ASST CoFS, G-5

CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 1 JULY 1967

RDV OFFICE PHONE
 Aug68 Chu Lai 006
 Oct67 Chu Lai 013
 Aug67 Chu Lai 005
 Oct67 Chu Lai 078
 Nov67 Chu Lai 001
 Jul67 Chu Lai 002
 Aug67 Chu Lai 003
 Nov67 Chu Lai 004
 Nov67 Chu Lai 005

Gen F. G. LARUS
 1stLt J. H. KEAN
 LtCol J. L. ZORACK
 1stLt G. E. ORCHHELL
 Maj R. H. PEETTY
 Maj D. Z. BOYD
 LtCol E. B. ANDERSON
 Maj G. P. WILLIAMS
 Maj J. T. SMITH

E. R. Schuman
 E. R. SCHUMAN
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
 Division Adjutant

PHOTO OFFICER
 2dLt J. E. MEYER Aug67 Inherwood 341

POSTAL OFFICER
 2dLt W. REW Aug67 Masant 120

PROTOCOL OFFICER
 Maj T. W. HANCOCK Nov67 Inherwood 138

PROVOST MARSHAL
 Maj D. L. DIAMOND Jul67 Weave 6

REPRODUCTION OFFICER
 2dLt J. M. VERAULT Feb68 Inherwood 307

SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER
 Custodian Recreation Fund
 Maj J. E. FORDE Oct67 Inherwood 37
 2dLt W. E. BUSH Oct67 Inherwood 37

SUPPLY OFFICER
 Col P. J. DUPRE Oct67 Inherwood 21 939

SURGEON
 Admin Officer
 Capt R. W. JONES, USN Jul68 Inherwood 16 939
 1stLt A. N. KENDRICK, USN May68 Inherwood 16

TANK OFFICER
 1stCol R. M. TAYLOR Nov67 HSPV Age 6

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION (REIN)
 Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant
 CIO Sub Unit #1
 Col M. A. LEWIS Aug67 Asstator 6 934
 LtCol J. W. CLAYBORN Aug67 Auditor 2
 Maj W. F. FRAGO Sep67 Auditor 1
 Maj E. C. HALL Sep67 Auditor 2dLt

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MARINES
 Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant
 Col E. J. RADIGS Oct67 Blade 6 6
 LtCol V. D. BELL JR Aug67 Blade 5 5
 2dLt E. P. HAGAN Oct67 Blade 1

1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
 Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant
 LtCol G. E. PERRO Jan68 Bond 6 6
 Maj J. A. SPOFF Jul67 Bond 5 5
 1stLt B. E. FREEMAN Sep67 Bond 1

2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
 Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant
 LtCol M. M. BELLENT Aug67 Cedar Bird 6 6
 Maj G. F. FURCHORD Aug67 Cedar Bird 5 5
 WO J. L. THOMPSON Sep67 Cedar Bird 1

3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
 Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant
 LtCol R. C. RICE Oct67 Chalk 6 6
 Maj A. S. LAMBERT Oct67 Chalk 5 5
 2dLt V. B. BUNWELL Oct67 Chalk 1

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant
 Col B. BAITS Nov67 Select 6 6
 Maj R. J. ALGER Sep67 Select 5 5
 2dLt J. W. BERTON Dec67 Select 1

1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant
 LtCol P. L. HILGANTHER Oct67 Chime 6 6
 Maj J. P. WHITE Aug67 Chime 5 5
 WO J. E. PERRY Nov67 Chime 1

2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant
 LtCol M. C. JACKSON Aug67 Cassabopper 6 6
 Maj A. T. FISHER Oct67 Cassabopper 5 5
 2dLt J. J. HERRAUCK Jan68 Cassabopper 1

3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer
 Executive Officer
 Adjutant
 LtCol G. B. WEBSTER May68 Glove 6 6
 Maj B. R. CUMMINS Oct67 Glove 5 5
 2dLt W. M. GERTZ Dec67 Glove 1

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Col G. C. CROSSFIELD LtCol R. E. JOHNSON Capt D. R. MENCIE	Aug67 Sep67 Dec67	Bonnie Hero 6 Bonnie Hero 5 Bonnie Hero 1	6 5	1ST MEDICAL BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Cdr P. D. COOPER, USF Lcdr G. R. FRED, USF Lt R. C. BRICE, USF	Sep67 Apr68 Jan68	Callhoun 6 Callhoun 5 Callhoun 1	6 5
1ST BATTALION, 7TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol J. D. ROWLEY Maj D. A. WAGNER 2dLt R. P. UMBAN	Oct67 Jun68 Aug68	Booth 6 Booth 5 Booth 1	6 5	1ST MONK TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol K. M. BUSH Maj L. H. BRADAN 2dLt B. V. BRANSON	Nov67 Oct67 Sep67	Quonoh 6 Quonoh 5 Quonoh 1	6 5
2D BATTALION, 7TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol W. P. KIRKMAN Maj M. E. WACHOLAK JR. 2dLt D. A. MISH	Aug67 Sep67 Dec67	Dixie Dinner 6 Dixie Dinner 5 Dixie Dinner 1	6 5	1ST RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj B. G. LOWERY Maj G. R. JOHNSON 2dLt D. J. COLLINS	Aug67 Sep67 Aug67	Ironhand 6 Ironhand 5 Ironhand 1	6 5
3D BATTALION, 7TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol J. D. COUNSELLMAN Maj G. H. TURLIN 2dLt K. J. WILKERSON	Mar68 Nov67 Nov67	False 6 False 5 False 1	6 5	1ST SHORE PARTY BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Capt A. K. DIXON III	Nov67	Ironhand	6
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH MARINES Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol G. HENRIGGS LtCol W. FLASKERT 2dLt J. A. GRIFFITH	Jul68 Sep67 Aug67	Amigo 6 Amigo 5 Amigo 1	6 5	1ST TANK BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol R. H. JONES Maj P. L. STOFFELMAN 2dLt J. J. KOLIBA	Sep67 Jul68 Sep67	Consequence 6 Consequence 5 Consequence 1	6 5
1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj J. J. MARRON Maj D. H. JONES 1stLt R. A. HARDIE	Oct67 Aug67 Oct67	Month 6 Month 5 Month 1	6 5	3RD AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol R. M. TAYLOR Maj E. P. TRADER WO W. A. AKANOSKI	Nov67 Aug67 Nov67	Happy Age 6 Happy Age 5 Happy Age 1	6 5
2D BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol R. E. HUNTER Maj J. CLAWORTHY 2dLt A. A. BOROMICKI	Oct67 Sep67 Oct67	Provl 6 Provl 5 Provl 1	6 5	7TH COMMUNICATION BATTALION (CHU LAI) Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol E. L. SHUFORD Maj J. E. SMY 1stLt P. A. LAMBERT	Jul68 Nov67 Oct67	Slack 6 Slack 5 Slack 1	6 5
3RD BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj O. K. JOHNSON WO J. P. CUREL	Jun68 Oct67	Laugh 6 Laugh 5 Laugh 1	6 5	7TH ENGINEER BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol F. W. HARRIS III Maj L. E. RANSEY 2dLt J. R. MANNING	Aug67 Dec67 Sep67	Brogue 6 Brogue 5 Brogue 1	6 5
4TH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol G. M. LIVINGSTON Maj P. F. BIRAN 2dLt J. V. WELLS	Aug67 Jul67 Nov67	Flaid 6 Flaid 5 Flaid 1	6 5	9TH ENGINEER BATTALION (CHU LAI) Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol G. BARE Maj P. C. PALGE 2dLt J. R. HUDSON	Aug67 Nov67 Jan68	Barthkora 6 Barthkora 5 Barthkora 1	6 5
1ST AVTI TANK BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj P. S. GALLIGAN 2dLt M. L. ELL	May68 Aug67	Dance Card 6 Dance Card 5 Dance Card 1	6 5	11TH MONK TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj R. C. TASHJIAN Capt K. M. WILSON 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Oct67 Jan68 Jan68	Chester White 6 Chester White 5 Chester White 1	6 5
1ST INFANTRY COMPANY Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Capt T. J. PAPP, USF Lt (SG) R. E. REKES, USF	May68 Jan68	Inherwood 40 Inherwood 40	931	AMERICAN RED CROSS Field Director	W. F. HOFER	Oct67	Inherwood 162	6
1ST INFANTRY COMPANY Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj J. M. WENZELLE Maj E. J. TOMBERG 2dLt J. MONTON	Nov67 Feb68 Dec67	Big Buddy 6 Big Buddy 5 Big Buddy 1	6 5	PLEASE REPORT PRIOR TO 24 JULY 1967, ANY ERRORS, CHANGES AND/OR OMISSIONS, TO THE DIVISION ADJUTANT SECTION, ISHERWOOD 147.				
1ST HOSPITAL COMPANY Commanding Officer Admin Asst	Cdr C. H. LOWERY, MC, USF Lt C. L. HENSELEY, MC/S/USF	Feb68 Jan68	Chm Lst 251 Chm Lst 251						

E. J. Tomberg
E. J. TOMBERG
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
Division Adjutant