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
SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:tlc over  
5750 Ser: 00343-67 undated

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31  
July 1967

1. Forwarded.

  
M. C. DALBY  
By direction

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CG, 1stMarDiv

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
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HEADQUARTERS III MAF~~SECRET~~-NOFORN00282067FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:tlc 5750  
Ser: 00343-67 undatedFrom: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, PacificSubj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology  
for 1-31 July 1967

1. Forwarded.
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FRED HAYNES  
BY DIRECTOR

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

3:HIST:tlc.  
5750  
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
From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31 July 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: ✓(1) 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31 July 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

  
DONN E. ROBERTSON

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO, San Francisco, California, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
1 July to 31 July 1967

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

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## PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. (U) DESIGNATION

1st Marine Division (Rein)  
Assistant Division Commander

MajGen Donn J. ROBERTSON  
BGen F. C. LAHUE

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Chu Lai Installation Coordinator\*\*

BGen F. C. LAHUE

Headquarters Bn

Col W. A. LEITNER

1st Marines (Rein)

Col E. J. RADICS (To 11Jul67)

Col H. E. ING, JR. (Fr 12Jul67)

5th Marines (-)

Col S. DAVIS

7th Marines (Rein)

Col C. C. CROSSFIELD II

11th Marines (-)(Rein)

LtCol C. HENDRICKS (To 18Jul67)

Col E. W. PAYNE (Fr 19Jul67)

2nd Bn, 5th Marines

LtCol M. C. JACKSON (To 18Jul67)

LtCol G. C. MCNAUGHTON (Fr 19Jul67)

1st Recon Bn (-)(Rein)

Maj B. G. LOWERY (To 10Jul67)

LtCol B. C. SPINEMETZ (Fr 11Jul67)

1st Engr Bn (-)

Maj J. M. MCKENZIE

7th Engr Bn#

LtCol F. W. HARRIES III (To 29Jul67)

LtCol R. FUNDERBURK (Fr 30Jul67)

9th Engr Bn#

LtCol G. A. BABE

1st SP Bn (-)

LtCol E. H. JONES

1st MT Bn

LtCol K. M. BUSS

11th MT Bn

Maj R. C. TASHJIAN (To 6Jul67)

LtCol J. B. BROWN (Fr 7Jul67)

3rd AmTrac Bn (-)

LtCol R. L. SHUFORD

7th Comm Bn (-)

LtCol W. M. CLELLAND

1st AT Bn (-)

Maj P. S. GALLIGAN (To 20Jul67)

LtCol P. D. REISSNER (Fr 21Jul67)

1st Tank Bn (-)

LtCol R. M. TAYLOR

1st Med Bn

Cdr P. D. COOPER, MC, USN

1st Hospital Co

Cdr C. H. LOWERY, MC, USN

1st Dental Co (-)

Capt T. J. PAPE, DC, USN

# ADCON ONLY

\$ Assignment as CLIC was discontinued.

\* Subordinate to III MAF

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2. (U) LOCATION

1-31 July 1967; Danang, RVN

3. (U) STAFF OFFICERS

Chief of Staff	Col H. J. WOESSNER II
Deputy Chief of Staff	Col E.L. BALE, JR.
Staff Secretary	Capt F.A. WATERS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Col W.R. EARNEY
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	LtCol E.B. SIGMON (To 7Jul67)
	Col J.C. SHORT (Fr 8Jul67 - To 11Jul67)
	LtCol E.B. SIGMON (Fr 12Jul67)
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col H.E. ING (To 8Jul67)
	Col R.D. BOHN (Fr 9Jul67 - To 11Jul67)
	Col J.C. SHORT (Fr 12Jul67)
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col E.K. VICKERS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	LtCol R.F. PETERSON (To 11Jul67)
	Col E.J. RADICS (Fr 12Jul67)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Compt	Col R.S. ROBERTSON
Adjutant	LtCol E.R. SCHIFFMAN
Air Officer	Col F.C. LANG (To 22Jul67)
	Col H.J. FINN (Fr 23Jul67)
Artillery Officer	LtCol C. HENDRICKS (To 18Jul67)
	Col E.W. PAYNE (Fr 19Jul67)
Band Officer	WO E.W. ELFES
Chaplain	Capt D.J. CASAZZA, CHC, USN
Comm-Electronics Officer	Col E.P. CLAUDE
Dental Officer	Capt T.J. PAPE, USN
Disbursing Officer	Maj G.W. COLBURN
Division Clubs Officer	Capt R.J. PLACHY
Division Exchange Officer	Capt C.E. LAND
Embarkation Officer	Maj R. PETROFF
Engineer Officer	LtCol G.A. MERRILL (To 29Jul67)
	LtCol J.W. WILSON (Fr 30Jul67)
Field Historian	Maj H.T. KENNEDY
Food Services Officer	CWO J.T. WILLIAMS
Information Services Officer	Capt D.R. HUDSON
Inspector	Col S.S. HUGHES
Legal Officer	LtCol W.T. WESTMORELAND
Motor Transport Officer	Maj L.V. BARKLEY
Naval Gunfire Officer	LCdr R.A. WHITCOMB, USN
Ordnance Officer	Maj H. SOBOL
Photographic Officer	2ndLt J.E. MCKAY
Postal Officer	2ndLt W. NEW
Provost Marshal	Maj D.L. DIAMOND (To 27Jul67)
	Maj R.B. OBRIEN (Fr 28Jul67)
Reproduction Officer	2ndLt J.N. WHEATLEY
Special Services Officer	Maj J.E. FORDE

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Supply Officer  
Surgeon  
Tank Officer

Col. P. J. DUPRE  
Capt. R. W. JONES, USN  
LtCol R. M. TAYLOR

4. (U) AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>OFF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>USN</u>
	<u>ENL</u>		<u>ENL</u>
1145	22,945	139	1,245

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

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PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARYPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. (C) Replacement and Rotation of Personnel

a. Total of Marine replacements received and Marines rotated during July 1967 were:

Replacements:  
 Officer 212  
 Enlisted 2106

Rotation:  
 Officer 96  
 Enlisted 1564

b. There were 5 officers and 418 enlisted personnel medically evacuated. 1 officer and 62 enlisted personnel who were previously evacuated were returned to duty. 30 personnel departed on emergency leave/permanent change of station orders.

c. A total of 5 officers and 260 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour in RVN in conjunction with the 30 day free leave policy. 1 officer and 247 enlisted personnel departed on 30 day free leave during July 1967.

2. (C) Casualty and Graves Registration. The below casualties were sustained by units ADCON to the 1st Marine Division during July 1967.

	KIA	WIA	**DOW	MIA	CPT	OTHER	*NON-BATTLE		**TOTAL
							DEATH	INJURED	
USMC									
OFF	3	8							11
ENL	64	763	14				11	2	840
USN									
OFF									
ENL	5	19							24
TOTAL	72	790	14				11	2	875

\* Injuries which result in absence from duty for more than 24 hours.

\*\* DOW figures included in WIA totals and not in horizontal total.

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3. (C) Awards. During the period 1-31 July 1967, 379 award recommendations were processed and forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. In addition, 848 Purple Heart Medals were awarded. 136 Commanding General Certificates of Commendation were awarded during the period.

4. (C) Discipline, Law and Order. The following criminal investigations were reported. Nineteen cases are presently under investigation:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Larceny of Government Property	7
Larceny of Private Property	5
Vehicle Theft	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	16

Thirty-seven traffic violations were reported for the month of July 1967.

Two hundred and fifty-four offense reports were issued to violators as follows:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Wrongful Appropriation and Disposition of U. S. Property	2
Wrongful Appropriation of Government Vehicle	6
Weapons Violation	56
Homosexual Acts	1
Illegal Possession of Alcoholic Beverages	2
Curfew Violations	20
Off Limits	17
Missing Persons	2
Other	<u>148</u>
TOTAL	254

5. (C) Industrial Relations

a. Current utilization totals:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>
Headquarters Battalion	70	69
Headquarters, 1st Marines	16	16
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines	10	4
Headquarters, 5th Marines	10	0

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	8
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	0
Headquarters, 7th Marines	20	19
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	10	10
Headquarters, 11th Marines	60	55
3rd 8" Howitzer Battery	10	10
1st Antitank Battalion	24	22
1st Tank Battalion	18	12
3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion	18	17
7th Communication Battalion	25	21
1st Engineer Battalion	60	59
7th Engineer Battalion	88	78
9th Engineer Battalion	62	62
1st Hospital Company	14	8
1st Medical Battalion	32	31
1st Motor Transport Battalion	26	21
11th Motor Transport Battalion	33	32
1st Reconnaissance Battalion	11	11
1st Shore Party Battalion	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTAL	659	587

b. Seven employees attended the July Basic English Class at the Industrial Relations Training Department, Danang.

c. III MAF authorized 50 temporary employees to work for 5th Marines for two weeks.

6. (U) Personal and Morale Services

a. Chaplain. At the end of July the on-board strength of Chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division was as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Denomination</u>
15	Protestant
8	Catholic
<u>1</u>	Eastern Orthodox
TOTAL	24

The following services were conducted during the month:

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<u>Services</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number Attending</u>
Catholic Sunday Divine Services	94	3,363
Catholic Weekday Services	111	1,043
Latter Day Saints Lay Leader Services	9	53
Protestant Sunday Divine Services	168	3,749
Protestant Weekday Services	97	1,368
Protestant Bible Study	14	72
Memorial Services	24	2,535
Lectures/Vietnamese People and their Religion	36	1,134

b. Division Clubs. The gross income during July was \$293,646.92. 3 officers, 5 SNCO's and 7 enlisted personnel operated the 61 clubs and 8 battalion accounts. No additional clubs are planned.

c. Exchange System. Gross sales during the month of July were \$413,134.10. 2 officers and 49 enlisted personnel operated 13 stores and 3 mobile units within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's.

d. Division Band. The Division Band performed at 3 Marine military formations and 3 civic action functions.

e. Informational Services. During July the Informational Services Office produced 153 news releases and 3,973 Fleet Home Town News Releases. The ISO Radio-TV section produced 132 Fleet Home Town radio tapes and 9 feature interviews for release to major radio networks in the United States. Also a weekly five minute 1st Marine Division TV newscast was commenced 13 July on AFRTS Channel 11, Danang. The programs are presented each Thursday at 1955. A writer-photographer team also covered an Elders Conference, conducted by the 1st Engineer Battalion.

Writer-Photographer teams covered the following named operations:

Elliott	Stockton
Gem	Pecos

f. Postal

(1) The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this command has received and dispatched during July 1967:

<u>Total Received</u>	<u>Total Dispatched</u>	<u>Total Handled</u>
815,391	417,778	1,233,169

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(2) The following figures represent financial business transacted during July 1967:

U. S. Money Orders and Fees	\$797,340.25
Stamps, postage and insurance sales	\$32,144.00

(3) Twelve unit post offices were inspected and audited this period, as well as the audit of the main stamp stock retained by the Division Postal Chief.

g. Career Advisory. The following statistics represent reenlistment and extension of enlistment percentages for the month of July 1967:

(1) Reenlistment Percentages

a. First term	26.1%
b. Career	91.7%
c. Total	54.9%

(2) Extensions of enlistment executed

a. Career	16
b. Short term	21
c. Total	37

Thirty-two staff and career advisory visits were conducted during the month of July 1967.

h. Special Services. Personnel of the 1st Marine Division were entertained during the month of July 1967 by the appearance of the following shows and/or well known personalities:

12Jul67 - Mrs. Miller and the Good Guys - 1st Mar	
23Jul67 - Frank Fontaine Show	- 7th Mar & 1st Engr Bn

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ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN1. ENEMY

a.(C) Main Force. The known enemy Main Force units were relatively inactive throughout the month. There are indications that a Main Force unit has moved into the vicinity of Base Area 116. Possibly it was this unit which was responsible for some of the activity in the northeastern portion of the Que Son District. Reliable sources indicate a great deal of reconnaissance by Main Forces, but the majority of the Main Force units remained in the mountainous areas of Tien Phuoc. They are probably resupplying, retraining replacements, and attempting to avoid major combat.

b.(C) Local Force. Local Forces continued to direct efforts toward harassment of RD units, ARVN outposts and CAP units. Significant contacts believed to be attributed to these local force units were the attacks on F/2/5, Hoi An and D/1/5. In each case the attack occurred at night and appeared well coordinated. A Recon Team operating in Happy Valley surprised a 40-50 man enemy force and captured documents belonging to the 402nd Sapper Battalion. Reports continue to indicate that the R.20 and V.25 are to assume the mission of a Sapper Battalion.

2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a.(C) General. The weather was hot and humid. The second half of the month was generally cooler with overcast skies and occasional showers. The temperatures averaged 98 and 78 degrees respectively. The average humidity was 75%, and 4.26 inches of rain fell. The winds were variable at five to ten knots. Visibility averaged 8 miles. For the last half of the month, lunar illumination was reduced by overcast skies.

b.(C) Effects of the Weather. The weather had little or no effect on operations. Air support was unhindered except for very short periods during thundershowers.

c.(C) Effect of the Weather on Terrain. No change in the condition of the terrain during July, as it remained in the same dry state as June.

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION ACTIVITY1. ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

a.(U) Services and Support. During the period the unit provided general administrative services for the G-2 Section.

b.(C) Personnel. During the period the G-2 Section operated with an average of 98 percent of its assigned manning level of 29 Officers and 53 enlisted personnel.

c.(U) Logistics and Allowances. During the period approximately 10 percent of materials and supplies necessary for the operations of the Section and its attached teams were received as ordered. Typing desks were received during the period. There still is a need for chairs and filing cabinets.

d.(U) Training. Maximum effort was made to train personnel in their MOS as well as participation in general military subjects training at the Headquarters Company level.

2.(C) ACQUISITION UNIT: During the period the Unit continued to direct and supervise the intelligence collections and dissemination efforts. In an effort to enhance the Arc Light program a new proposed Division Order was written and is now being staffed. In order to maintain cognizance over routes of ingress and egress the unit now maintains a map showing all permanent OP's with sections of vision. In addition daily overlays are produced showing all daylight and night patrols.

On 25 July 1967, Major B. R. DUNCAN assumed the duties as Acquisition Officer.

a.(C) Photo Imagery Interpretation Unit: The PIIU continues to support the First Marine Division with vertical aerial photography, high and low altitude panoramic photography, photo mosaics, and various overlays associated with photo intelligence. During the period 38 missions were requested, 34 were received, one was cancelled and three are still pending.

b.(C) Air Observation Unit: During the month of July, Air Observers flew 319 sorties for 665.5 hours of Visual Reconnaissance in the Danang Area. In conjunction with normal VR flights, the following missions were performed: 19 photo, 97 artillery, 227 air strikes TAC(A) and 2 Naval gunfire. During the month of July, the AO Unit provided support for Operation ELLIOTT, GEM and PECOS, and STOCKTON.

c.(C) Interrogation-Translation Team (3rd ITT and 9th ITT): A total of 79 detainees were interrogated at the III MAF Collection Point of which 53 had Viet Cong association. Number of documents translated during the month of July totals 78. In addition, 413 detainees were screened at Battalion level.

d.(C) 1st Interpretation Team: During the period of July, the 1st IT

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translated 175 documents including awards, legal papers and claims. Interpreter usage covered 460 hours. WO-1 Robert R. FITZGERALD was assigned as Team Commander during July 1967.

e.(C) Combat Operations Center: COC-2 continues to serve as a focal point for the receipt of spot reports from 3rd ITT, tactical units, adjacent units and higher headquarters. Immediate intelligence requirements generated or suggested by reports are disseminated to collectors.

3.(C) PRODUCTION UNIT: The Basic Intelligence Section continues to maintain background and technical studies, and files on intelligence estimates, briefings, enemy units, spot reports, situation reports, climate, population, etc. This information is constantly being updated. Basic Intelligence also, continues to receive, evaluate and process captured enemy ordnance and material, and continues to store and disseminate maps for all divisional units. The following are among accomplishments during July:

- a.(C) Hiep Duc/Tien Phuoc Study.
- b.(C) SongThu Bon Valley Study.
- c.(C) Special Intelligence Estimates - Rocket Threat to Vital Base Areas, Danang.
- d.(C) Happy Valley Study.
- e.(C) Special Projects - display maps and charts prepared for Division use.
- f.(C) One (1) 3M Manufacturing Company Reader - Printer was obtained from CDEC, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, plus training of three personnel in its operation, maintenance, functioning, resupply, etc.
- g.(C) Captured VC movies were borrowed from MACVJ-2 for study.

4.(C) STAFF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT: During the period the unit provided routine administrative counterintelligence services to the Division Staff. The unit was supported by the 3rd CIT and the 7th CIT which became OPCON during the month. The unit processed 7 requests for Top Secret clearances, initiated 23 requests for security investigations, requested 6 ONI/HQMC files checks. The unit also presented 4 security lectures to incoming personnel, endorsed and forwarded five terminations of security clearances, processed 13 Marines in conjunction with reliability screening board, processed 12 requests for COFRAM access, forwarded 27 completed security clearances (NAC/BI), and processed the counterintelligence budget for FY69. The unit requested Civilian Clothing Authorization, processed and passed to Counterintelligence Teams daily SITREP requirements, and conducted counterintelligence inspections of Headquarters 11th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

1.(C) During July the division terminated two major operations started in June and conducted four other major search and destroy operations. Operation ELLIOT, a search and destroy operation conducted by the First Marines on the Go Noi Island complex ran for two days while later on in the month the First Battalion, Seventh Marines conducted Operation GEM in conjunction and coordination with Operation BINH QUANG 6 which was a search and destroy operation by elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment. Operations PECOS and STOCKTON were designed to destroy base areas and interdict possible rocket infiltration routes in Happy Valley and its eastward extensions into the western edge of the Rocket Belt. Operations and the controlling headquarters were as follows:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS</u>
BEACON TORCH	S1F (2d Bn, 3d Marines)
CALHOUN	First Marine Division
ELLIOT	First Marines
GEM	First Bn, Seventh Marines
PECOS	First Bn, Seventh Marines
STOCKTON	First Bn, Seventh Marines

2. (C) Normal patrolling and small unit activities by all units and extensive counter rocket measures and activities in the Rocket Belt occupied most division units during the month. All operations conducted by the division accounted for 445 VC KIA, 732 VC KIA (Probable), 9 PWS, 4 Returnees, 394 Detainees, 69 Weapons captured.

3. (C) Normal troop lift, reaction force, and resupply helicopters were provided by the First Marine Aircraft Wing and heavy use was made of the new CH 53 helicopter for resupply missions. Naval Gunfire ships fired a total of 43 missions in support of division units and operations.

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PLANS

1. (S) OpO 303-66 (Relief of CIDG Camps). Planning commenced on revising (updating) in early July. Expected publishing date is mid-August.
2. (S) OpO 90-67 (Counter Rocket Order). Planning was initiated upon completion of the Commander's Estimate on 21 July. The order provided for increased surveillance activities focused on enemy avenues of approach and in the rocket belt. Reaction procedures to rocket attacks were refined. The order was published 26 July. **Tab B**
3. (C) OpO 305-67 (Provisional Infantry Units). Revision to up-date was commenced 20 July. Expected publishing date is late August. Closely associated with this is a Provisional Rifle Company formed from elements of Tank Bn, Amtrac Bn and AT Bn, and included as a provision of OpO 90-67 above. This company is an interim measure to increase the division defensive posture for rocket attacks.
4. (S) OpO 301-67 (General Operations). Updating commenced early July. Publishing date is expected to be late August.
5. (S) OpO 91-67 (Waterway Control Order). Planning commenced upon completion of OpO 90-67 (Counter Rocket Order). This is in conjunction with defense against rocket attacks. The order will provide for maintaining positive control over waterways within the division TAOR and AO. Expected publishing date is early August.
6. (C) OpO 304-67 (Alert Forces). Revision and up-dating commenced late July. Expected publishing date is in August.
7. (C) OpO 302-67 (GOLDEN FLEECE). Revision in preparation for the fall 1967 harvest season commenced late July. Publishing date is not later than 20 August.
8. (S) OpO 104-67 (Election Operations). Initial planning commenced in late July for operations to be conducted during the period prior to and on National Election Day, 3 September. Operations are planned to keep the enemy off balance and minimize his capability to disrupt the general balloting. Estimated publishing date is 20 August.

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## TRAINING

1. (U) During the month nine officers and 195 enlisted Marines attended formal schools both out of and in country.
2. (U) PL6AL instruction was given to all units by Colonel E.I. BAILE, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Warrant Officer R.I. BAKER, Division Ordnance Office.
3. (U) PL6AL Limited Technical Inspection Teams visited all infantry Regiments. The teams were from Force Logistics Command.
4. (U) Ten men from the 9th Engr Battalion received instruction on the use of the Rough Terrain Forklift.
5. (U) Evaluation of the Stoner Weapons System continues with no major problem areas.
6. (U) Refresher training for division snipers was conducted utilizing a four day class schedule at the rifle range. Six classes were held with ten snipers attending each class.
7. (U) First Engineer Battalion conducted Land Mine Warfare School for 417 officers and men during the month of July.

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COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

1. (U) Two Combined Action Company Headquarters were activated. They have been designated CACO B Hq and CACO D Hq.
2. (C) Command of the CAPs in the Quang Nam sector passed to the Danang Provisional Combined Action Group Headquarters on 8 July 1967. Battalions in whose TACR CAPs are located continue to support CAPs with fire support, reaction forces, medevac support and combat assistance as required and requested. The battalions continue to provide CAPs with logistic support which includes Class I, Class II - Type 2, Class III and Class V items.
3. (U) Officers and enlisted were ordered TAD to III MAF for the Danang TACs, Chu Lai CAGs and the III MAF CAG School as indicated:

<u>Danang CAG</u>	<u>Chu Lai CAG</u>	<u>CAG School</u>
4 Off 47 Enl	5 Off 40 Enl	150 Enl

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. (U) The major logistical activity during this reporting period was directed towards the support of combat operations.
2. (U) During the reporting period, the Division Supply Officer conducted 14 supply inspection-instruction visits, and the G-4 Plans Officer conducted Materiel Readiness Inspections of 13 units. The Embarkation Officer conducted readiness inspections of 20 units, and all special staff officers conducted numerous informal staff visits and inspections.
3. (C) FLC Technical Assistance Team Visits to Units of this Command. The Technical Assistance Team commenced the second phase of the M-16 rifle technical assistance program on 10 July 1967. The team visited all infantry units of this Command and completed the training and supervision program on 20 July 1967. The team stated that the overall unit training has greatly improved. There was evidence that many of the problems that previously existed have been corrected through command supervised training. However, all units visited were urgently in need of cleaning gear, particularly bore and chamber brushes.
4. (C) M-16 Rifle Malfunctions. This Command has experienced 11 malfunctions with the M-16 rifle which rendered the weapons inoperable by causing severe damage to the receiver. No injuries were sustained in these incidents which occurred during July. All incidents have been reported to CMC.
5. (C) Ammunition controlled by Available Supply Rates (ASR). The following ammunition items are controlled by an available supply rate:

DODAC

1315-C222  
1330-G895  
1370-L312  
137 -L314

NOMENCLATURE

Cartridge 81mm High-Explosive  
Grenade Hand Illuminating  
Signal Illuminating Ground WSP  
Signal Illuminating Ground GSC

6. (U) During the reporting period 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions traveled 313,013 miles and transported 24,111 tons of cargo and 78,174 personnel.
7. (U) During the month motor transport hauled 535 tons of building material and 35,000 gallons of fuel from Danang to the An Hoa industrial complex.
8. (U) Total sealifts for the month of July of 1st Marine Division units was 273 personnel, 140 vehicles and 1408.8 S/T.

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9. (U) Total airlifts for the month of July of 1st Marine Division units was 105 personnel, 0 vehicles, 91.9 S/T and 7008 cubic feet.

10. (U) During the month, 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions conducted 20 Rough Rider convoys to move elements of the 5th Marines from Hill 29, and the LSA from Tam Ky to Hill 63, and subsequent resupply of the Hill 63 LSA.

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Civil Affairs/Civic Action

- 1.(U) On 18 July, the Commanding Officer, 1st Marines; the Quang Nam Province Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Tin; the Dien Ban District Chief, Captain Trung; and the Commanding Officer, 51st ARVN Regiment, attended the dedication of the Cooper Bridge conducted by the 7th Engineer Battalion.
- 2.(U) An elders' festival was held by 1st Engineer Battalion on 25 July 1967, and attended by 1200 Vietnamese; the village and hamlet chiefs, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines; Commanding Officer, 1st Engineer Battalion; Commanding Officer, 1st Antitank Battalion; and the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. Approximately as many Vietnamese attended as were expected.
- 3.(U) On 30 July, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, Chapel on Hill 51 near Que Son was dedicated at a ceremony attended by Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, and Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. The chapel was built entirely by Vietnamese working under a contract to the villagers of Que Son.
- 4.(U) The villagers of Hoa An, whose homes were destroyed by fire, received aid from Mobile Construction Battalion 4. In addition to technical assistance, enough cement (approximately 3 bags per house), lumber, and tin were provided. The Vietnamese have built 16 houses and have 2 more under construction.
- 5.(U) Second Battalion, 5th Marines, is providing materials to the villagers of Thanh My to replace 53 homes destroyed by fire. Thirty of the homes have been completed.
- 6.(U) In support of the Vietnamese Industrial Complex at An Hoa, 430 tons of building material and 35,000 gallons of fuel were hauled by Division vehicles from Danang to An Hoa.
- 7.(U) In support of CORDS operations, Division vehicles carried 19 tons of fertilizer, 1 ton of fish oil, 26½ tons of building material, 94 tons of foodstuffs.
- 8.(U) Projects underway in July consisted of 10 schools and 7 dispensaries. Other projects included the establishment of 10 wells, reconstruction of 1 bridge and 1 culvert, and the construction of a new dam at Ha Thanh.
- 9.(U) Assistance rendered in the Division TAOR during the month of July was as follows:

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SERVICES:

Medical treatments	27,984
Dental treatments	173
Medical Evacuations	147
English Language Training (hours)	91

COMMODITIES:

Rice (lbs)	300
Animal feed (garbage) lbs	48,756
Clothing (lbs)	737
Soap (bars)	1,998
Cement (bags)	329
Tin (sheets)	177
Lumber (truckloads)	30
Bricks	1,000
Nails (kilo)	5
Mason kits	10
Paint (gals)	150
Reinforcement bars	86
School kits	1,250
English books	30
Physical education kits	5
Boxes (105mm shell for desks and chairs)	500

Sequential listing of Events

18 July 1967 (U) - Dedication of the Cooper Bridge  
 25 July 1967 (U) - 1st Engineer Battalion Elders' Festival  
 30 July 1967 (U) - Dedication of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Chapel

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. (U) The division received four UH-5 250 watt ground loudspeaker systems. One will be issued to each regiment and the remaining one retained at the division PSYOP Office.
2. (U) Leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts were conducted in the area where Operation ARIZONA (vicinity AT 8752) had taken place in June. The same themes were used as had been used prior to that operations except for the "Marines Are Coming" theme. The purpose of this effort was to deceive the enemy as to the true location of Operation PECOS(vicinity ZC1166).

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COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS  
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

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1. (C) On 5 July 1967 Colonel CLAUDE attended a study panel at III MAF concerned with the AN/TRC-97. The purpose of the panel was to reassess the existing employment of Radio Relay Equipment AN/TRC-97. Units in attendance at this conference were 5th Communication Battalion, 1st Marine Division, 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 7th Communication Battalion. The report of the panel's finding was reported in CG III MAF ltr 10C/ped over 2000 of 9 July 1967.

2. (C) On 9 July 1967 LtCol COWING, Asst CEO, and Capt O'DONNELL attended III MAF Autodin Conference. The conference was attended by 1st Marine Division, 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Amphibious Forces, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Force Logistic Command. The purpose of the conference was to coordinate and update plans for the installation of Autodin Terminals within III MAF. It was also determined that operator training and maintenance will be by contract. The III MAF SpdLtr 10F/jjj over 2000 of 6 July 1967 validated the terminal requirements and will be updated monthly as required.

Ref: CG III MAF 061050Z Jul 67

3. (C) On 12 July 1967 the following augmentation of personnel and equipment was provided to the following units in support of Operation PECOS.

CommCo, HqBn: Provided a detachment of 8 radio operators (MOS 2531), 2 technicians (MOS 2861), 4 AN/PRC-25 complete with accessories, 4 MK-456 retransmission cables, 2 RC-292 antennas.

7thCommBn: Provided a detachment of 4 radio operators (MOS 2531), 2 AN/PRC-25 complete with accessories.

1stSPBn: Provided 2 AN/PRC-25 complete with accessories, 10 RC-292 antennas.

1stATBn: Provided 4 AN/PRC-25 complete with accessories, 2 MK-456 retransmission cables.

4. (U) On 22-27 July 1967 a pole line cable was installed for the 5th Marines Combat Base at Hill 63. The installation was coordinated through the Commanding Officer, 7th Communication Battalion and performed by a detachment of Radio Relay and Construction Company, 7th Communication Battalion. The installation included 24 forty foot poles, 7500 feet of integrated messenger cables, 6500 feet of 40 pair cable and 3500 feet 6m strand. The installation provides the required wireline service for linking supporting units to the 5th Marines Regimental Command Post.

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5. (C) On 24-25 July 1967 Major SCHEIDT and WO1 SGT IAKWILL represented the 1st Marine Division at the Communication-Electronics Maintenance Management Conference held at Headquarters, Force Logistic Command. Other units in attendance were III MAF, FLC, 3dFSR, 3dMarDiv, 1stMAW, 1stFSR, FLSG (ALFA), FLSG (BRAVO), 5thCommBn, and 7thCommBn. The purpose of the conference was to discuss methods of eliminating problems in the areas of Communication-Electronics Maintenance, supply support, customer service, maintenance float, introduction of new equipment, special allowances, and automated reporting. Specific action intended to be taken in these areas is contained in the Post Conference Report, due in early August.

Ref: FLC ltr 2/MI/skl over 2000 of 21 June 1967

6. (C) On 26 July 1967 LtCol COWING, AsstGEO; Major BISKOP, Commanding Officer of Communication Company, 7th Communication Battalion; Major HOPKINS, S-3 of 7th Communication Battalion; Capt SLOAN, Communications Officer, 5th Marines; Capt PATTERSON, Headquarters Commandant Task Force Xray; Lt MCGILTY, Asst Operations Officer for GEO, made a reconnaissance of Hill 29. The purpose of this reconnaissance was to select and plan for an internal command post installation for Task Force Xray.

7. (C) On 28 July 1967 Communication-Electronics Officer and Commanding Officer, 7th Communication Battalion made a liaison visit to 11th Motor Transport Battalion to reconnoiter area for possibility of relocating Radio Relay and Construction Company, 7th Communication Battalion to that area from Chu Lai. Area was found to be satisfactory and the move is scheduled for early August.

8. (C) On 30 July 1967 two (2) AN/FQC-59 teletype terminals arrived from 7th Communication Battalion. After a limited technical inspection and second echelon maintenance, the equipment will be installed in the Division Communication Center to facilitate the operation of torn-tape relay functions.

9. (C) The installation of the two AN/TTC-7 switchboards, replacement for existing MTC-1, was forstalled during July awaiting construction of the building to house the new telephone control. The installation of this equipment, which will result in a six operator position, 400 line capacity switchboard, is now planned for completion during September 1967.

10. (U) The 1st Marine Division intercomm system, which was formerly installed at Chu Lai, has been installed in the Division Command Bunker to provide service for the offices in the command complex. Service provides inter-communications for the Commanding General, Assistant Division Commander, Chief of Staff, Staff Secretary, Protocol Officer, Aides-de-Camp, and Sergeant Major.

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11. (U) During the period 1-31 July, Communication-Electronics Materiel Maintenance Inspections were conducted by the CEO Communication-Electronics Staff. A Communication-Electronics Materiel Maintenance Management report was submitted on the following units:

1. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
2. 1st Anti-Tank Battalion
3. Communication Company, Headquarters Battalion
4. 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion
5. 1st Engineer Battalion
6. 1st Tank Battalion
7. 7th Engineer Battalion
8. 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
9. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company
10. 1st Medical Battalion
11. Headquarters, 11th Marine Regiment
12. 11th Motor Transport Battalion
13. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment
14. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment
15. 1st Armored Amphibian Company
16. Headquarters, 7th Marine Regiment

12. (C) During the period 18-27 July 1967, the Division Communication Company provided a radio retransmission detachment consisting of one NCO and eight enlisted, to the 7th Marine Regiment for use on Operation PECOS. An aerial retransmission team was also made available for this operation.

13. (C) Two radio relay teams were deployed to forward units during July in support of Operation PECOS. The teams were provided to the 7th Marine Regiment at Hill 55 and the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines at Hill 41.

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PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT LEVELS

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. (U) The following distinguished visitors visited/toured the command during July 1967:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
3Jul67	MajGen Norman J. ANDERSON	CG, 1st MAW
6Jul67	Mr. Ben GILLEAS and Mr. Stuart FRENCH	Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate on Committee on Armed Services
15Jul67	RAdm Frank W. VANNOY, USN	COMPHIBGRU-1
17Jul67	VAdm Robert W. BROWN, USN	Surgeon General of the Navy
16-18Jul67	BGen Vernon A. WALTERS, USA	Defense Attache, Designate, Paris
21Jul67	MGen Willard PEARSON, USA	J-3, MACV

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ENEMY ACTIVITY

- 3 July (C) At 1150 an ARVN convoy enroute from Danang to Hue, was attacked by an enemy force (AT 8699) who employed small arms and mortars. By 1345, 17 vehicles had been destroyed and 17 damaged by enemy mortar fire. An AO observed the enemy looting the vehicles. Air support was called. At 2330 F/2/5, located at (AT 814383) came under a coordinated small arms fire and mortar attack. Sappers penetrated the position utilizing satchel charges, M-79's, grenades and flame throwers. Later, a body count revealed 39 enemy dead.
- 4 July (C) In conjunction with the attack on Nong Son, W Battery and the 3rd 8" Battery were attacked shortly after midnight. W Battery's position at (AT 815380) was penetrated by an unknown enemy force. One 4.2 inch mortar was destroyed and another damaged. The 3rd 8" Battery located at (AT 876472) received 40 rounds of mortar fire while attempting to provide fire support to F/2/5.
- 8 July (C) At 0240 the 5th Marines CP and H/2/11 located at (BT 233315) received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. An ARVN unit fired counter-battery fire and the enemy fire ceased. At approximately the same time (0245) that the 5th Marines were receiving mortar fire, a PF platoon security patrol at (AT 219 358) observed 24 VC and initiated fire. Enemy fire power and locations caused the patrol to estimate that they engaged at least 70 enemy.
- 9 July (C) At 1620, F/2/5 observed 8 Vietnamese carrying what appeared to be cannisters and wicker baskets. A squad was dispatched to search the area and approximately 12 tons of rice were found in a house at (AT 875475).
- 10 July (C) The 1st Tank Battalion located at (AT 975705) received 4 rounds of 81mm mortar fire at 2330H.
- 13 July (C) At 2330H, E/2/7 located at (AT 937867) received four 140mm rocket rounds; 3 rounds landed within the combat base, 1 round within the Esso plant area.
- 14 July (C) At 0145 the 5th Marines CP in the vicinity of (BT 234315) received 5-7 mortar rounds. At the same time approximately 2000 yards away, a PF ambush received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar and small arms fire from an estimated company.
- 15 July (C) At 0001 Hoi An came under mortar fire. This was followed by a ground attack on the prison which resulted in the release of 1000 prisoners. Approximately one half hour later, at 0025H, the Danang Air Base was hit by approximately 80, 122mm rocket rounds.

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24 July (C) At 0135 in the vicinity of (AT 9935) D/1/5, in a night defensive position, came under mortar, M-79, and small arms fire from an estimated company size force. During the attack, 3-5 VC penetrated the perimeter, but were quickly forced back. Artillery and mortars were fired on possible enemy routes of withdrawal.

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

- 1 July (S) CG III MAF directed major commands to emphasize battle damage assessment of Arc Light Strikes.  
Ref: CG III MAF 010548Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 1 July (C) Termination Operation CALHOUN effective 011200H.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 010603Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 1 July (S) Opcon SLF Bravo passed to CTG 76.5 effective 2400H.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 011545Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 2 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv requested from CG III MAF the return of 1st Recon Bn assets presently at Chu Lai.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 020637Z Jul 67
- 3 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for Operation ELLIOT.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030151Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 3 July (C) CG 1st MarDiv reemphasized certain principles to be employed against enemy attacks.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 060347Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 3 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Change Two to Frag Order 77-67 (Rough Rider).  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030729Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 3 July (C) CG 1st MarDiv directed major subordinate units to review security measures for Combined Action Platoons. This action necessitated by recent attacks on CAP units.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 032141Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 4 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv directed major subordinate units to submit written summaries of activities in support of III MAF Campaign Plan 1-67.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 040635Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 4 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 79-67 (Operation ELLIOT).  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 040947Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 4 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv requested from CG III MAF that amtrac assets be returned from Chu Lai so as not to reduce amphibious tractor support of infantry battalions within the TAOR.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 041327Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F

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- 4 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 78-67 (Redistribution of Amtrac Assets).  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 041329Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 6 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 80-67 (Seventh Marines Sweep Op).  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 060415Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 7 July (S) Termination Operation ELLIOT effective 062400H.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 070227Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 7 July (C) CG 1st MarDiv warned all units of the need for increased surveillance during the period 9-12 July.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 072336Z Jul 67  
Tab F
- 8 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv reemphasized individual responsibility concerning the Personal Response Program.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 083335Z Jul 67
- 10 July (C) CG 1st MarDiv directed major subordinate units to reemphasize fundamental tactics.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 100151Z Jul 67  
Tab F
- 10 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 82-67 directing Rough Rider convoy to Phu Bai on 12 July.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 101537Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 10 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for Operation GEM.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 101545Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 10 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv requested modification of the Special Operating Area and assignment of an ARVN Liaison Officer to CO Fifth Marines.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 102347Z Jul 67  
Tab F
- 11 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv directed all commanders to reevaluate their local liaison/clearing procedures for non-observed fires to provide positive protection of friendly civilians.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 110301Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F

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- 11 July (C) CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 82-67 (Rough Rider).  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 110545Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 11 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 83-67 directing Rough Rider Convoys between Tam Ky and Hill 63.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 111355Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 12 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the status and use of tank assets within the division.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 120505Z Jul 67  
Tab F
- 12 July (S) CG III MAF published his planning guidance for August 1967.  
Ref: CG III MAF 120836Z Jul 67
- 14 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 84-67 directing Rough Rider convoy to Hill 63 and return on 15 July.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 140103Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 14 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for Operation BOULDER.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 141239Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 15 July (C) CG 1st MarDiv submitted comments/recommendations concerning the Flame Fougasse to CG III MAF.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 151327Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 15 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv issued planning guidance for the concept of operations for period 20 July to 15 September 1967.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 151401Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 16 July (C) Termination Operation GEM effective 1800H.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 160341Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 16 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 85-67 directing augmentation of Operation BOULDER.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 161545Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 17 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 86-67 directing internal TACR boundary changes between Seventh Marines and 2nd Bn Fifth Marines.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 171309Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F

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- 17 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 87-67 directing Rough Rider convoy to Hill 63 on 19 Jul.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 171311Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 18 July (S) CG III MAF advised CG 1st MarDiv that TF OREGON operations in Chu Lai area preclude the reassignment of amtrac assets.  
Ref: CG III MAF 180630Z Jul 67.
- 18 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv requested from CG III MAF that Division recon assets at Chu Lai be returned for employment within the division zone of responsibility.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180347Z Jul 67.
- 18 July (C) CG 1st MarDiv requested from CG III MAF clarification of certain aspects of the Combined Action Program.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180715Z Jul 67.
- 18 July (S) Operation BOULDER changed to Operation PECOS effective this date.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180959Z Jul 67.  
Tab B
- 20 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 88-67 directing Rough Rider convoy to Hill 63 on 21 Jul.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 200015Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 20 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of planned operations for August.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 200725Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 20 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for Operation COCHISE.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 201025Z Jul 67.  
Tab B, Tab F
- 20 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 89-67 directing Rough Rider convoy between Danang and Hill 63.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 201435Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 21 July (U) CG 1st MarDiv congratulated the CO of Quang Da Special Zone on the successful completion of Operation BINH QUANG SIX.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 210127Z Jul 67  
Tab B, Tab F
- 24 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for Operation STOCKTON.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240230Z Jul 67.  
Tab B, Tab F

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- 24 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 92-67 directing Operation STOCKTON.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 241607Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 25 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv requested a review of special security tasks by CG III MAF.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250011Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 25 July (C) CG 1st MarDiv directed command attention to responsibility in ensuring all subordinates are well grounded in fundamental tactics and techniques.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250806Z Jul 67  
Tab B  
Tab F
- 26 July (C) CG 1st MarDiv advised units of the proper employment of tank assets.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260803Z Jul 67  
Tab B  
Tab F
- 26 July (C) Termination Operation PECOS effective 0700H  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 261818Z Jul 67  
Tab B  
Tab F
- 28 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv requested to CG III MAF that consideration be given to the possible employment of elements of Target Acquisition Battalions in the Rocket Belt.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 280928Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 28 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for Operation PIKE.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 280929Z Jul 67  
Tab B  
Tab F
- 28 July (C) Termination Operation STOCKTON effective 1200H  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 282237Z Jul 67  
Tab B  
Tab F
- 30 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 96-67 directing minor internal boundary changes.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 300431Z Jul 67  
Tab B
- 30 July (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 94-67 directing Operation PIKE.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 301515Z Jul 67  
Tab B

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COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

1 July (C) CAP D-1 perimeter defense received small arms fire resulting in one USMC WIA (MINOR). Returned small arms fire and searched but no evidence of enemy casualties found.

(Sitrep 459) (Tab C)

2 July (C) CAP B 3-3 received small arms fire and grenades. Returned small arms fire. Searched area and found one VC KIA.

(Sitrep 461) (Tab C)

5 July (C) CAP B-4 received small arms fire resulting in one USMC WIA (MINOR). Returned small arms fire, requested reaction force. Tanks with reinforced squad dispatched. Tank fired four rounds 90mm. Searched area, found no evidence of enemy casualties. Interrogation of VN revealed that eight enemy entered hamlet passing out propaganda leaflets.

(Sitrep 463) (Tab C)

6 July (C) CAP D-2 CP heard small arms fire. Dispatched squad, searched area and found one PF WIA. PF was returning from leave. One PF WIA (MED EVAC).

(Sitrep 464) (Tab C)

7 July (C) CAP D-6 squad combat patrol received one grenade resulting in one USN WIA (MINOR). Returned small arms fire. Searched area, found no evidence of enemy casualties.

(Sitrep 465) (Tab C)

8 July (C) Command of Combined Action Platoons in Quang Nam Sector passed at 0800H to the Danang Provisional Combined Action Group Headquarters.

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

- 12 July(U) 11th Motor Transport Battalion conducted a Rough Rider convoy from Danang to Phu Bai and returned to Danang the same day. New vehicles for the 3rd Marine Division were delivered to Phu Bai loaded with cargo from Force Logistics Command. This was the first time that a 1st Marine Division Rough Rider was able to move from Danang to Phu Bai and return the same day.
- 14 July(C) During the early morning hours 1st Motor Transport Battalion was staging a convoy at Hill 29 when the staging area came under mortar attack resulting in three USMC WIA and nine trucks with minor damage.
- 20 July(U) Colonels DUPRE and VICKERS attended the FMFPac Logistics Conference held on Okinawa.
- 26 July(C) The USS POPE delivered 407 personnel to the 1st Marine Division as replacements.

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## PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

## 1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-31 July 1967.

- 1 Jul (U) 7 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted on themes of: "Chieu Hoi," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Don't Harbor VC" and "Write To Your Relatives and Friends in the VC/NVA About Chieu Hoi."

Marine patrols hand distributed 1,180 leaflets. Themes were: "Marines Are Friends," "Chieu Hoi" and "Report VC Activity."

- 2 Jul (U) 6 hours and 10 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes used were: "Ultimate Defeat of VC," "Chieu Hoi" and "News."

Marine patrols distributed 1,610 leaflets with themes of: "Report VC Activity," "Mine Rewards," "Free South" newspapers and "Safe Conduct Passes."

- 3 Jul (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 2,058,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "The GVN is Winning the War," "Chieu Hoi," "Mine and Booby Trap Rewards," "GVN Provides a Better Life" and "VC Steal From the People."

3 hours and 10 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted using the "Chieu Hoi" theme.

1,265 leaflets and posters were distributed with themes of: "Health and Sanitation," "Marines Are Friends of Civilians," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Chieu Hoi" and "Flag of Peace, Flag of Death."

1 hour of ground broadcast was conducted using the "Chieu Hoi" theme.

- 4 Jul (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 164,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

300,000 special, post-operation CALHOUN leaflets were dropped.

30 minutes of aerial broadcast was conducted using "Rewards" themes.

30 minutes of special tape was broadcast. Themes were: "Marines Respect Vietnamese Homes and Rice Paddies."

- 5 Jul (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 272,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Warning to Villagers Who Travel This Road," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1 hour and 5 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "VC Mines Kill Innocent Civilians" and "Mine Rewards."

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15 minutes of ground broadcast was conducted. The theme employed was "Chieu Hoi."

Marine patrols hand distributed 1,150 leaflets with themes of: "Marines Are Your Friends," "Chieu Hoi" and "Weapons Rewards."

4 movies were shown to 600 civilians for 1 hour and 30 minutes.

6 Jul (U) 2 hours and 35 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted on the "National Reconciliation" theme.

2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 328,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Truth vs Lies," "Rewards" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

4 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," and "Rewards for Mines."

Marine patrols distributed 1,460 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Exploitation of VC Destruction," "Health and Sanitation" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

7 Jul (U) 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 318,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Mine Rewards," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

4 hours and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "National Reconciliation," "Report VC/NVA Activities," "Mine Rewards," "You Are Deceived by Your Leaders" and "Show of Strength."

Marine patrols distributed 1,585 leaflets. Themes were: "GVN Helps Vietnamese people," "Power of GVN," "Flag Pledges," "Rewards," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Chieu Hoi."

200 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

8 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 342,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "VC Mines Kill Civilians" and "Mine Rewards."

Marine patrols distributed 350 "Rural Life" magazines, 2,235 leaflets. Themes were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Allied Power," "Flag of Peace, Flag of Death," "Pledge of Allegiance," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1 hour and 50 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "VC Mines Kill Civilians," "Mines Rewards" and "National Reconciliation" were conducted.

3 hours of ground broadcasts were conducted on "Chieu Hoi" and the use of "Safe Conduct Passes."

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9 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 660,000 leaflets were made. Themes were: "Mine Rewards," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Marine patrols distributed 1,194 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Don't Run From Marines," "VC Come Home, Rally to Family," "How to Rally to GVN," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Health and Sanitation."

3 hours of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Weapons Rewards," "Chieu Hoi," "Don't Run From Marines" and "National Reconciliation."

15 minutes of ground broadcast was conducted. Theme was: "Chieu Hoi."

10 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 470,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Mine Rewards," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "VC Mines Kill Civilians."

2 hours of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "National Reconciliation" and "Mine Rewards."

11 Jul (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 875,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Mine Rewards," "GVN is Winning the War," and "Don't Harbor VC."

2 hours and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "National Reconciliation," "Mine Rewards" and "Don't Harbor VC."

Marine patrols hand distributed 2,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Mine Rewards," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

12 Jul (U) 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,066,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi," "Health and Sanitation," "Mine Rewards" and "Help ARVN and U.S. Forces Make Roads Safe to Travel."

3 hours and 50 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes used were: "National Reconciliation," "Don't Harbor VC," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Chieu Hoi."

50 minutes of ground broadcast was conducted using the themes of "Chieu Hoi" and "Appeal to Use MEDCAP."

Marine patrols hand distributed 4,671 leaflets. Themes were: "How to Rally to the GVN," "Allied Overwhelming Power," "NVA Returnee," "Appeal to VC to Reject Their Red Chinese Masters" and "Chieu Hoi."

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2 hours of movies were shown to 550 villagers, 200 of whom were adults. Themes were: "A Vietnamese Mother's Heart" and "Song at Night."

- 13 Jul (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 828,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi," "Mine Rewards" and "Health."

2 hours of ground broadcasts were conducted. Theme was: "Chieu Hoi."

Marine patrols distributed 4,300 leaflets. Themes were: "Sanitation and Health," "Rewards for Mines" and "Chieu Hoi."

- 14 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 4,300 leaflets. Themes were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi," "Health and Sanitation," "Mine Rewards" and "Lack of Food."

3 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes were: "Dont Harbor VC," "Chieu Hoi" and "VC Hardships."

1 hour of ground broadcast was conducted using "Chieu Hoi" theme.

Marine patrols distributed 1,750 leaflets. Themes were: "GVN Helps Vietnamese People," "Chieu Hoi" and "Health."

- 15 Jul (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 930,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Mine Rewards," "National Reconciliation" and "VC Endanger Lives by Firing at Helicopters."

Marine patrols distributed 300 leaflets. Theme was "Health."

4 hours of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "National Reconciliation" and "VC Hardships."

- 16 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 525,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Mine Rewards" and "Chieu Hoi."

3 hours and 55 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "National Reconciliation," "Mine Rewards" and "VC Endanger Lives By Firing at Helicopters."

1 hour and 30 minutes of ground broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Instructions Not to Run From Marines."

Marine patrols distributed 1,150 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "How to Rally to the GVN" and "Flag of Peace, Flag of Death."

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- 17 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 287,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Death vs Family," "GVN Helps the Vietnamese People," and "Chieu Hoi."
- 4 hours of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Report VC Activity," "Harrassment" and "Surrender."
- 3 hours of film were shown at Nui Kim Son. Titles were: "Dependable Hands," "This is Our Country," "Children at Play" and "School at Rinco Santo."
- 18 Jul (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 605,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi," "ARVN/Allied Overwhelming Power," "Encourage Civilians to Leave VC Areas" and "Explanation of U.S. and Allied Forces Purpose In Vietnam."
- 3 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Report VC/NVA Activity" and "Harrassment."
- Marine patrols distributed 1,530 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Sanitation" and "Safe Conduct Passes."
- 19 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 370,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Rally," "VC Come Home," "Marines Are Friends," "Health and Sanitation" and "Flag of Death."
- 4 hours of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Leave VC Controlled Areas," "National Reconciliation" and "Chieu Hoi."
- Marine patrols distributed 1,866 leaflets. Themes were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Health" and "Flag of Peace, Flag of Death."
- 20 Jul (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 550,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Rewards."
- 5 hours and 10 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted using the themes of "Where is My Father?" "Harrassment" and "National Reconciliation."
- 21 Jul (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,031,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Mine Rewards," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."
- 3 hours of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Marines Are Friends," "Rally," "ARVN/Allied Power" and "Mine Rewards."

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- 22 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 415,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Weapons Reward," "Mine Rewards," "Chieu Hoi" and "Support GVN and FVMAF."

Marine patrols distributed 7,000 special leaflets exploiting a mining incident. "Health" leaflets were also distributed.

1 hour and 50 minutes of ground broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Mine Rewards."

- 23 Jul (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,300,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Description of a Liberation Area," "Death vs Family," "Road to Freedom" and "Chieu Hoi."

Marine patrols distributed 2,180 leaflets. Themes were: "How to Rally to GVN," "Flag of Death," "VC Forced Labor" and "Rewards."

1 hour and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Mine Rewards" and "National Reconciliation."

- 24 Jul (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 156,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "VC Mines Kill Innocent Vietnamese" and "Report VC Activity."

Marine patrols distributed 21,100 leaflets. Themes were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Report on VC Activity," "Chieu Hoi" and "Rewards for Weapons."

2 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Rewards for Mines," "VC Hardships" and "Harrassment."

3 hours of ground broadcasts were conducted. Theme was "Chieu Hoi."

- 25 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 215,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi" and "Mine Rewards."

Marine patrols distributed 1,600 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1 hour and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "National Reconciliation" and "VC Mines Kill Innocent Civilians."

10 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "GVN Wants Peace."

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26 Jul (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 275,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "VC Mines Kill Civilians" and "Marines Have Come in Peace."

Marine patrols distributed 1,800 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

A Cultural Drama Team performed for an audience of 250 people.

3 hours of movies were shown.

1 hour and 55 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted using themes of "National Reconciliation" and "Your Family Is In Danger."

27 Jul (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 240,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "VC Mines Kill Innocent Civilians."

Marine patrols hand distributed 900 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Marines are Friends" and "Health and Sanitation."

2 hours of ground broadcasts were conducted using the theme of "Chieu Hoi."

35 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made using the themes of "Mine Rewards" and "National Reconciliation."

28 Jul (u) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 670,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "VC Mines Kill Innocent Civilians."

Marine patrols distributed 550 leaflets. Themes were: "Rewards" and "Reject Chinese Masters."

20 minutes of aerial broadcast was made using the theme of "Mines Reward."

29 Jul (u) 7 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,873,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Why Marines Are In Vietnam" and "Report on VC Activity."

Marine patrols distributed 500 "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1 hour and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Mine Rewards" and "Local VC Tax Structure."

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30 Jul (U) Marine patrols distributed 2,800 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Health and Sanitation."

3 hours and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted using the themes of "Rewards for Mines" and "National Reconciliation."

4 hours of movies were shown to an audience of 300 people.

31 Jul (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,415,000 leaflets. Themes were "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi" and "Where Are Your Comrades?"

3 hours and 35 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes were: "A Vietnamese Girl Stepped on a Mine," "National Reconciliation," "Mine Rewards" and "Fear of Death."

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SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF  
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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- 1 July 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 1st Hospital Company, Chu Lai, was conducted by WO RHYNARD.  
 Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967
- 2 July 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 7thCommBn, Chu Lai, was conducted by WO RHYNARD.  
 Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967
- 3 July 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 9th EngrBn, Chu Lai, was conducted by WO RHYNARD.  
 Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967
- 3 July 1967 (U) Major F. L. BIROU was appointed to the Board of Officers to review Classified material.  
 Ref: GEO ltr 10/HCC/tre dtd 3 July 1967
- 4 July 1967 (U) LtCol COWING and MGySgt MAXWELL made a staff visit to 2ndBn, 5th Marines
- 5 July 1967 (U) Col CLAUDE attended an AN/TRC-97 Conference conducted by III MAF  
 Ref: CG III MAF ltr 10C/ped over 2000 of 9 July 1967
- 6 July 1967 (U) Major BIROU and MGySgt MAXWELL made a staff visit to Headquarters, 7th Marines
- 7 July 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 1stATBn conducted by Major BIROU and MGySgt MAXWELL  
 Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967
- 8 July 1967 (U) LtCol COWING, Lt NEEDLES, and GySgt WOLFORD made a staff visit to 5th Marine Regiment
- 9 July 1967 (U) III MAF Autodin Conference attended by LtCol COWING and Capt O'DONNELL  
 Ref: III MAF 061050Z JUL67
- 10 July 1967 (U) Capt NEYMAN, Executive Officer, Communication Company, attended I Corps Cable Conference as GEO representative
- 10 July 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of CommCo, HqBn, conducted by Major BIROU and MGySgt MAXWELL

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14 July 1967 (U) Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967  
 Materiel Management Inspection of 1stEngrBn, conducted by Lt VIGIERE.

14 July 1967 (C) Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967  
 Col CLAUDE attended Area Communication Conference at III MAF.

17 July 1967 (U) Ref: CG III MAF 011156Z JUL67  
 Materiel Management Inspection of 3dAMTracBn conducted by Major BIROU and Major SCHNEIDER.

18 July 1967 (U) Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967  
 Materiel Management Inspection of 1stTkBn conducted by Major BIROU and Major SCHNEIDER.

19 July 1967 (U) Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967  
 Materiel Management Inspection of the 7thEngrBn conducted by Major BIRCU and Major SCHNEIDER.

19 July 1967 (U) Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967  
 LtCol CLELLAND visited GEO to coordinate cable installation for 5th Marines Command Post.

20 July 1967 (U) Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967  
 Materiel Management Inspection of the 1stReconBn and 1stForceReconBn conducted by Major BIROU and Major SCHNEIDER.

22 July 1967 (U) Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967  
 Materiel Management Inspection of the Medical Battalion conducted by Major BIRCU and Major SCHNEIDER.

24-25 July 1967 (C) Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967  
 Communication-Electronics Materiel Maintenance Management Conference at Headquarters, FLC, attended by GEO personnel.

25 July 1967 (U) Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967  
 Materiel Management Inspection of 11th MFBn conducted by Lt WILLIAMS.

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26 July 1967 (U)

Recon of Hill 29 by team from CMO for purpose of selecting and planning Command Post for Task Force Xray.

26 July 1967 (U)

Materiel Management Inspection of 3rdBn, 7th Marines conducted by Major BIROU and Major SCHNEIDER.

Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967

27 July 1967 (U)

Materiel Management Inspection for 2ndBn, 7th Marines conducted by Major SCHNEIDER.

Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967

28 July 1967 (U)

Materiel Management Inspection of 1st Armored Amphibian Company conducted by Major SCHNEIDER.

Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967

30 July 1967 (C)

Two AN/FCG-59 arrived from Chu Lai for installation in the Division Communication Center.

31 July 1967 (U)

Materiel Management Inspection of HqCo, 7th Marines conducted by Major SCHNEIDER.

Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967

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PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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PART IVSUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

✓ Tab A	First MarDiv PERINTREPS, #1-50, 13, 14, 15, 16-67
✓ Tab B	Operational Documents, #1-50
✓ Tab C	Situation Reports
✓ Tab D	Photographs and News Releases
✓ Tab E	Command Directory <i>Filed w/ Cmdr Chron</i>
✓ Tab F	G-3 Journal for July 1967
✓ Tab G	Hq Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab H	First Marines Command Chronology
✓ Tab I	Fifth Marines Command Chronology
✓ Tab J	Seventh Marines Command Chronology
✓ Tab K	Eleventh Marines Command Chronology
✓ Tab L	First Recon Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab M	First Antitank Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab N	First Tank Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab O	Third Amtrac Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab P	First Engr Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab Q	First Motor Transport Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab R	Eleventh Motor Transport Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab S	First Shore Party Command Chronology
✓ Tab T	First Medical Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab U	Seventh Comm Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab V	Seventh Engr Bn Command Chronology
✓ Tab W	Ninth Engr Bn Command Chronology

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OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR &amp; DTG</u>
1 ✓ Arc Light BDA	CG III MAF 010548Z Jul 67 (S)
2 ✓ Op CALHOUN	CG 1st MarDiv 010603Z Jul 67 (C)
3 ✓ Opcon SIF Bravo	CG 1st MarDiv 011545Z Jul 67 (S)
4 ✓ Concept Op ELLIOT	CG 1st MarDiv 030151Z Jul 67 (S)
5 ✓ Ch Two to Frag O 77-67	CG 1st MarDiv 030729Z Jul 67 (S)
6 ✓ Attacks on CAC Units	CG 1st MarDiv 032147Z Jul 67 (C)
7 ✓ CAP Platoons	CG III MAF 040230Z Jul 67 (C)
8 ✓ III MAF Campaign Plan 1-67	CG 1st MarDiv 040635Z Jul 67 (S)
9 ✓ Frag O 79-67	CG 1st MarDiv 040947Z Jul 67 (S)
10 ✓ Amtrac Assets	CG 1st MarDiv 041327Z Jul 67 (S)
11 ✓ Frag O 78-67	CG 1st MarDiv 041329Z Jul 67 (S)
12 ✓ Enemy Attacks	CG 1st MarDiv 060347Z Jul 67 (S)
13 ✓ Frag O 80-67	CG 1st MarDiv 060415Z Jul 67 (S)
14 ✓ Op ELLIOT	CG 1st MarDiv 070227Z Jul 67 (S)
15 ✓ Frag O 82-67	CG 1st MarDiv 101537Z Jul 67 (S)
16 ✓ Op GEM	CG 1st MarDiv 101545Z Jul 67 (S)
17 ✓ Clearance Procedures	CG 1st MarDiv 110301Z Jul 67 (S)
18 ✓ Ch One Frag O 82-67	CG 1st MarDiv 110545Z Jul 67 (C)
19 ✓ Frag O 83-67	CG 1st MarDiv 111355Z Jul 67 (S)
20 ✓ Frag O 84-67	CG 1st MarDiv 140103Z Jul 67 (S)
21 ✓ Op BOULDER	CG 1st MarDiv 141239Z Jul 67 (S)
22 ✓ Flame Fougasse	CG 1st MarDiv 151327Z Jul 67 (C)
23 ✓ Concept of Ops	CG 1st MarDiv 151401Z Jul 67 (S)
24 ✓ Op GEM	CG 1st MarDiv 160341Z Jul 67 (C)
25 ✓ Frag O 85-67	CG 1st MarDiv 161545Z Jul 67 (S)
26 ✓ Frag O 86-67	CG 1st MarDiv 171309Z Jul 67 (S)
27 ✓ Frag O 87-67	CG 1st MarDiv 171311Z Jul 67 (S)
28 ✓ Recon Assets	CG 1st MarDiv 180347Z Jul 67 (S)
29 ✓ Op BOULDER	CG 1st MarDiv 180959Z Jul 67 (S)
30 ✓ Frag O 88-67	CG 1st MarDiv 200015Z Jul 67 (S)
31 ✓ Ops for August 67	CG 1st MarDiv 200725Z Jul 67 (S)
32 ✓ Concept Op COCHISE	CG 1st MarDiv 201025Z Jul 67 (S)
33 ✓ Frag O 89-67	CG 1st MarDiv 201435Z Jul 67 (S)
34 ✓ Op Binh Quang 6	CG 1st MarDiv 210127Z Jul 67 (U)
35 ✓ Boundary Shift	CG 1st MarDiv 222253Z Jul 67 (S)
36 ✓ Concept Op Stockton	CG 1st MarDiv 240230Z Jul 67 (S)
37 ✓ Boundary Shift	CG 1st MarDiv 241401Z Jul 67 (S)
38 ✓ Frag O 92-67	CG 1st MarDiv 241607Z Jul 67 (S)
39 ✓ Security Tasks	CG 1st MarDiv 250011Z Jul 67 (S)
40 ✓ Fundamental Tactics	CG 1st MarDiv 250800Z Jul 67 (C)
41 ✓ Tank Employment	CG 1st MarDiv 260803Z Jul 67 (C)
42 ✓ Termination Op PECOS	CG 1st MarDiv 261818Z Jul 67 (C)
43 ✓ Target Acquisition Bn	CG 1st MarDiv 280928Z Jul 67 (S)
44 ✓ Concept Op PIKE	CG 1st MarDiv 280929Z Jul 67 (S)
45 ✓ Termination Op STOCKTON	CG 1st MarDiv 282237Z Jul 67 (C)
46 ✓ Frag O 96-67	CG 1st MarDiv 300431Z Jul 67 (S)
47 ✓ Frag O 94-67	CG 1st MarDiv 301515Z Jul 67 (S)

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OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR &amp; DTG</u>
48 ✓ Op Order 90-67	CG 1st MarDiv 260800H Jul 67 (S)
49 ✓ Special Intelligence Estimate, <i>ROCKET THREAT</i>	CG 1st MarDiv 210800H Jul 67 (S)
50 ✓ Commanders Estimate	CG 1st MarDiv 210800H Jul 67 (S)
51 ✓ A/ARPT O'NEILLIOT	CG 1 <sup>st</sup> MarDiv 31 July 1967 (S)

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# 1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), F MF



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PERINTREP NO. 13-67

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF  
AND RVNAF

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1st Marine Division (Rein)  
 Danang, Republic of Vietnam  
 151800 July 1967

PERINTREF No. 13-67

Period Covered: 030600H to 100600H July 1967

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L 7014

1. Mission. The 1st Marine Division conducts unilateral offensive operations within the Danang TAOR; conducts offensive and reconnaissance operations in the Reconnaissance Zone (RZ), after coordinating with CG, 2nd ARVN Division or commander Quang Da Special Zone as appropriate; conducts reconnaissance within the Thuong Duc TACH after coordinating with CO Co C 5th SFGA; supports the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned areas of responsibility; on approval CG III MAF in coordination with CG 2nd ARVN Division (Quang Tin Province) and commander Quang Da Special Zone conducts offensive operations outside the assigned TAOR, RZ, and area of operations; participates in defense of vital base areas, airfields and facilities at Danang in coordination with CO Air Base Defense Battalion; participates in defense of other designated US or GVN vital installations; prepares on 12 hour notice to provide one reinforced battalion and thereafter, the remainder of one reinforced regiment for employment anywhere in RVN.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Weather and Terrain

(a) Weather. The skies were slightly overcast. The clouds were scattered and broken cumulus. Air support was unhindered. The average maximum and minimum temperatures were 99 and 79 degrees respectively. Winds were variable. See Annex B for weather forecast.

(b) Terrain. The terrain continues to be dry allowing maximum movement by both sides. The approaching rainy season will bring a flooding of rice paddies and other low land areas hindering all forms of movement.

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength, Composition, Disposition. Annex A, this FERINTREF.

(2) Availability of Reinforcements

(a) FW Phan Chen De stated that when he infiltrated into Quang Ngai in April 1967, his unit, "the 270th AA Unit," traveled with an unidentified regiment for four days. When the unit to which De belonged reached Quang Nam

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Province the unidentified regiment traveled east. A member of the U/I regiment told De that they carried weapons "of the same type previously used to attack Danang".

(b) In addition to the infiltration of personnel and units there is a possibility that the 1st Regiment could be moved north from Central Quang Ngai.

(3) Movements and Activities

(a) Recon reported that in the 5th Marines area (vic AT 8924) there was heavy enemy daylight activity on the 4th, 5th and 6th and then on the nights of 7 and 8 July they reported heavy river traffic. (Vic AT 8126-8623). On the 8th the 5th Marines CF at (BT 233315) received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Five minutes later a platoon security patrol observed 24 VC at a bridge (vicinity BT 219358). They engaged the force which was later estimated to be 70 men. ARVN forces reported 2 other attacks in the vicinity of Highway #1 occurring at approximately the same time (072200, 080000). One at (BT 074556) on the 10th RD Team CF and the other on the RD Team itself at (BT 095528). At (BT 012343) on the 8th C/1/5 discovered a tunnel complex 1000 meters long and large enough for an average sized man to walk through. This is the area where the 5th Marines were engaged in a day long battle against a dug in force on 2 June. Long range recon patrol Pottery was unable to be inserted at (YC 985338) on the 9th due to intense enemy small arms fire.

(b) There was increased enemy activity in the southwestern portion of the TACR. F/2/5 located at Nong Son (AT 814383) was attacked by 100-150 enemy at 2230 on the 3rd. The enemy used satchel charges, flame throwers, M-79's, grenades and mortars in their attack. Shortly thereafter (0300 on the 4th) W/2/11 located at (AT 815380) and the 3rd 8" Howitzer Battery located at (AT 876472) were also brought under attack. This was probably an attempt to neutralize any support they may have given to F/2/5. The following sequence of events may give some explanation of the enemy forces involved:

1. The 402nd Sapper Battalion is believed to have relocated itself in the vicinity of (AT 8060) in early June.
2. The Quang Da Provincial unit moved to (AT 9851) on 18 June.
3. On 24 June Recon reported a large number of enemy moving from north to south in the vicinity of (AT 7954).

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4. A rallier stated that in September 1966 the 402nd Sapper BN had established a base area in the vicinity of (ZC 1535).

It is possible that the 402nd in conjunction with the R.20th could have conducted the attacks on F/2/5 and the artillery units.

(c) On 9 July F/2/5 observed eight Vietnamese carrying what appeared to be cannisters and wicker baskets in the vicinity of (AT 875475). A squad was dispatched to search the area and they discovered approximately 12 tons of rice.

(d) Throughout the week AO's controlled airstrikes on new/improved enemy bunkers and trenches in Happy Valley. Recon also continued reporting enemy activity in this area. Killer Kane was engaged by an estimated 20 enemy on the 5th and had to be extracted from the vicinity of (ZC 000681). Consulate was shot out of their LZ (YC 876608) on the 7th.

(e) Just to our north (AT 869990) an ARVN convoy was ambushed on the 3rd. Fifteen trucks were destroyed and 10 more damaged. Otherwise the heavy enemy activity in this section of the TAOR terminated as abruptly as it began. However, low level agent reports do continue to report company and battalion sized units in this area.

### 3. Enemy Capabilities

#### a. Attack Capabilities

- (1) Attack selected targets in up to regimental strength.
- (2) Conduct less than regimental size attacks and harass isolated friendly forces and installations.

b. Reinforcement Capability. Continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

#### c. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Capability

- (1) Conduct political indoctrination classes, commit acts of terrorism.
- (2) Interdict LOC's and sabotage friendly installations.

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4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. Capability 2.a.(1). The enemy, in the face of friendly supporting arms, does not have the capacity to launch regimental size attacks within the TAOR. Outside the TAOR two Main Force regiments are located along the Quang Nam/Quang Tin border. It is highly unlikely that the enemy will risk massing these forces in the face of our supporting arms capabilities. In addition both regiments suffered heavy casualties recently when friendly forces conducted operations in the area. However, a movement of friendly forces into the area would certainly increase the likelihood of a battle involving regimental size forces.

b. Capability 2.a.(2). In attacking an isolated unit or units with limited defense capabilities, the enemy is able to limit his commitment and still gain a victory for morale and propaganda purposes. The enemy focuses these attacks against CAC units, RD teams, and outposts. Enemy sapper units are organized to implement this type attack.

c. Capability 2.a.(3). The number and magnitude of attacks by fire appears to be greatly limited by the supply capabilities of enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's TAOR. Selected targets may be attacked from long range by rockets, but the majority of attacks will be close in (3000 meters) against small units. These attacks permit the enemy to attack with less risk of detection and less risk of loss.

d. Capability 2.b. The enemy is actively recruiting in SVN and receiving replacements from NVN, but he is experiencing increased problems in both areas. Captured documents indicate that one of the main factors affecting in-country recruitment is the success of the RD Program. RD teams are frequently named as one of the primary enemy targets. Infiltration of new units is possible, however, most infiltratees are used as replacements.

e. Capability 2.c.(1). This is the enemy's rebuttal to the RD Program and CAC units. In an effort to maintain control over the populace, the VC have and will use, political indoctrination, propaganda leaflets, and plays. Terrorism will be used as a last resort when these methods fail to achieve the desired effect.

f. Capability 2.c.(2) Acts of sabotage and interdiction of LOC's can be performed by small local units with a minimum of risk or expenditure of supplies, while enabling the enemy to obtain a moral and psychological victory. Consequently, the enemy can be expected to operate on company level and smaller in conducting this type activity in efforts to avoid detection.

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7th Marines	(15)
9th MAB	(4)
2nd Bn, 5th Marines	(2)
5th MarDiv	(2)
USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.	(2)
Task Forc Oregon	(15)
3rd CIT	(9)

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ANNEX A (STRENGTH, LOCATION, COMPOSITION) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREF NO. 11-67

Main Force

Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equip	Category
2nd NVA Div Hqs	200	AT 970200/ 5 Jul	BT 0819		C
RQ-20 Sig Bn	220	AT 9925 /17 Jan			C
RQ-24 Engr Bn	120	BT 1733 /21 Apr			C
3rd NVA Regt (Rein)1600		BT 075239/ 5 Jul	BT 1219		C
Hqs & Spt Unit*	300	BT 075239/ 5 Jul	BT 1219		C
1st Bn	450	BT 1349 /29 May			C
2nd Bn	425	BT 4975 / 5 Jun			C
3rd Bn	425	BT 1155 /10 Jun			C
21st NVA Regt(Rein)1800		BT 128198/ 5 Jul	BT 1930		C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300	BT 128198/ 5 Jul		5-82mm, 6-60mm mtr	C
1st Bn	505	BT 1527 /17 May		17-81mm mtr unk no 60mm mtr unk no 75mm RR 6-60mm mtr	C
2nd Bn	495	AT 9732 / 5 Jun		6-81mm mtr 3-ang 3-60mm mtr 2-81mm mtr 4-35mm mtr	C
3rd Bn	500	BT 1525 /17 May		3-57mm RR 3-60mm mtr 5-81mm mtr 4-57mm RR 4-30 cal mg	C
70th Indep Bn	425	BT 066467/ 5 Jul	BT 0723		

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Local Force

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Estimated Str</u>	<u>Reported Loc/Date</u>	<u>Accepted Loc</u>	<u>Arms &amp; Equipment</u>	<u>Category</u>
402nd Sapper Bn	342	AT 8060 / 4 Jul	AT 8060	3-81mm mtr 1-120mm mtr	C
R-20 Bn		AT 8550 / 4 Jul	AT 8651	1-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR 2-mg 5-BAR	C
V.25 Bn	521	BT 0054 / 4 Jul	BT 1952	2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
72nd Bn	300	BT 1821 / 7 Jun	BT 1620	4-60mm mtr 2-81mm mtr 3-57mm RR	C
Q.12 Co	80	BT 1956 / 4 Jul	BT 1856	6-1mg 1-60mm mtr 9-smg	C
Q.13 Co	120	BT 0352 / 4 Jul	BT 0454	1-60mm mtr 1-30 Cal Mg 9-AR	C
Q.14 Co	70	AT 8456 / 4 Jul	AT 8456	1-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 4-M-79	C
Q.15 Co	80	AT 9857 / 4 Jul	AT 0057	2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
Q.16 Co	120	AT 9564 / 4 Jul		3-1mg 2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 6-BAR	C

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Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
K-50 Co	70	BT 2224 / 9 Dec	AT 9830	1-57mm RR 1-60mm mtr	C
K-51 Co	70	BT 1747 / 2 Jun		3-30 cal mg 2-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
K-52 Co	150	BT 1611 / 4 Apr		5-mg 1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR	C
K-54 Co	130	BT 2022 / 5 May		2-3mg 1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR	C
K-55 Co	100	BT 3315 / 1 Jun		2-mg 1-60mm mtr	
706th Co	80	BT 3908 / 7 May		1-AA mg 2-30 cal mg	C
74th Co	50	BT 3611 / 9 May		1-AA mg 1-60mm mtr 1-60mm mtr	C
14th Co	90	BT 3910 / 10 May		1-30 cal mg 1-57mm RR 1-mg 1-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
2nd NVA Div	MR V	Agricultural Site #2, 620th Div, Nam Tu, Chi Lang	CG-BG Viet XO-BG Dao PO-BG Do	20,601GM 20915GM Tay An
3rd NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite #3, 64th Regt, 51st Regt, 31st Regt, 46th Regt, Factory #10	CO-LtCol Viet XO-Maj Tranh Anh Kien PO-Trong Thanh	
1st Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X1. CT3, Binh Minh	CO-Capt Thao	20825
2nd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X2, Binh Da	CO-Capt Nguyen Tiep	
3rd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	Binh Thien, Mao Chu, Nguyen Trai	CO-Capt Thau	
21st NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite 21, 2nd Regt, 36th Regt, Cong Truong 21, A-21	CO-Pham Kiet XO-Dang Cong Kiet FO-PO-Tien	
1st Bn	21st NVA Regt	Bach Ma	CO-Timh XO-Na	
2nd Bn	21st NVA Regt	11th Bn, 11th Workshop, An Chau	PO-Khoi CO-La XO-Oan FO-Tha	
3rd Bn	21st NVA Regt	22nd Bn, 135th Bn, Cong Thanh	CO-Dang Hung FO-Nguyen Co	1803/CH
RQ-20 Sig Bn	2nd NVA Div	33rd Bn, 75th Bn (?), Long Thanh		
RQ.24 Emgr Bn	2nd NVA Div	RQ-20/B Bn, GK, 30, RQ.20/A Bn, Ham Tu 2/c, GK-40	CO-Nguyen Ngoc Dong	

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
402nd Sapper Bn	Damang City	T.89	CO-Nguyen Van Tram XO-Sr. Lt. Thanh CO-Nguyen Van Lam	21395GN Dong Hai
R-20 Bn	Quang Nam (F)	Q.N. Independence Bn, Doc Lap Bn, Hai Cang 20 Lam Bn, 5th Bn	CO-Capt Thang XO-Tung PO-Khoa CO-Thang Can Cao XO-Danh PO-Thanh CO-Le Hien XO-Nguyen Chi Thien CO-Tran Van Cam XO-Nguyen Chi Thien PO-Vo Ca Son CO-Le Thanh CO-Nguyen Hy XO-Than Tu PO-Nguyen Ra CO-Nguyen Doa XO-Nguyen Nhuong	21443GM 2102 2105 2106
V-25 Bn	Quang Nam (F)			
72nd Bn	Quang Tin (F)	H-65, H-68		
Q.12 Co	Hoi An City	Hoi An Co, X-62 Co		
Q.13 Co	Duy Xuyen (D)	Duy Xuyen Co, H-52, 103rd Co, Than Lap Co		
Q.14 Co	Dai Loc (D)	Dai Loc Co, H-42 Co.		
Q.15 Co	Diem Ban (D)	Diem Ban Co, H-40 Co, H-55, 105th Bn, X-65		
Q.16 Co	Hoa Vang (D)	Hoa Vang Co, H-41, H-56, Q.16.B, 100 Co, Hoa hieu Co		
K.50 Co	Que Don (D)	Que Son Co, 105 Umit, A-7		

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LEN
K.51 Co	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh Co, A-10 F-14, D-21, 107	CO-Khoa XO-Nguyen Than FO-Anh Vu CO-Ngo	
K.52 Co	Tien Phuoc (D)	A-13 Co, D-22, V-13	XO-Khanh FO-Van CO-Cong XO-Toan FO-Tich CO-Nguyen Lien	
K.54 Co	Tam Ky (D)	A-16, C-73, V-12, N. Tam Ky		
K.55 Co	Tam Ky City	A-21, Co 75, V-15, Phi Po A-21 Bn, Flying Tiger 106th		
706th Co	Quang Tin (F)		CO-Nguyen Duy Nghia 2442GM XO-Hoanh FO-Phuong CO-Thanh XO-Tram Tien FO-Phuong CO-Pham XO-Ha Dong FO Khanh	
74th Co	Quang Tin (F)	V-74, V-20, 74th District Force Co		
14th Co	Ly Tim (D)	K-53, A-19, V-14		

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## ANNEX B (WEATHER FORECAST AND ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO 13-67

The weather for July will be characterized by clear nights and mornings, becoming partly cloudy to cloudy during the afternoon. Average temperature will generally range from a minimum of 80 degrees to a maximum of 100. From 0200H to 1200H clear skies are normal, and from 1200H to 0200H a minimum of 3,000 feet ceiling can be expected to the first layer of clouds.

Scattered rainshower and thunderstorms between 1500H and 1900H daily are the only significant weather phenomena to be expected during this period.

Flying weather will be excellent except during the rainy periods, when visibility drops to about a quarter mile and surface winds can be as high as 30 knots.

DATE	EMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	MOON PHASE	% ILLUM
JULY 10	0558	0621	1923	1946	0835	2148		06
11	0558	0621	1923	1946	0934	2232		13
12	0559	0622	1923	1946	1032	2313		21
13	0559	0622	1923	1946	1128	2353		31
14	0559	0623	1923	1946	1224	----	1ST QTR	42
15	0600	0623	1923	1946	1322	0033		54
16	0600	0624	1923	1946	1420	0115		65
17	0601	0624	1922	1945	1522	0200		76
18	0601	0624	1922	1945	1645	0250		85
19	0601	0624	1922	1945	1728	0345		92
20	0601	0624	1922	1945	1828	0444		97
21	0601	0624	1922	1945	1923	0545		99
22	0602	0625	1922	1945	2012	0645	FULL	100
23	0602	0625	1922	1945	2056	0742		98
24	0602	0625	1921	1944	2135	0837		94

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# 1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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PERINTREP NO. 14-67

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1st Marine Division (Rein)  
 Danang, Republic of Vietnam  
 250900H July 1967

PERINTREP No. 14-67

Period covered: 100600H to 170600H July 1967

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, AMS Series L 7014

1. Mission. The 1st Marine Division conducts unilateral offensive operations within the Danang TAOR; conducts offensive and reconnaissance operations in the Reconnaissance Zone (RZ), after coordinating with CG 2nd ARVN Division or Commander Quang Da Special Zone as appropriate; conducts reconnaissance operations within the Thuong Duc TAOR after coordination with Commanding Officer, Company C, 5th SFGA; supports the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned areas of responsibility; on approval CG III MAF in coordination with CG 2nd ARVN Division (Quang Tin Province) and Commander Quang Da Special Zone (Quang Tin Province); conducts offensive operations outside the assigned TAOR, RZ, and area of operations; participates in defense of vital base areas, airfields, and facilities at Danang in coordination with Commanding Officer Air Base Defense Battalion; participates in the defense of other designated U.S. or GVN vital installations; prepares on twelve hour notice to provide one reinforced battalion and thereafter, the remainder of one reinforced regiment for employment anywhere in RVN.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Military Geography

(a) The afternoon showers have caused some localized flooding; this along with the rebuilding of many paddy dikes in preparation for the rice growing season is adding to the problem of cross country movement. There have been no reports of any problem with the roads due to the afternoon showers.

(b) Partly cloudy skies and warm temperatures characterized the weather for this week. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 97 and 79 with an average humidity of 75%. Winds were variable at 6 knots. The cumulative rainfall of 3.77 resulted from afternoon showers. This type weather is expected to continue for the rest of the month with 8 more days of afternoon showers predicted.

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b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength, Location, Composition. Refer to Annex A, this PERINTREE.

(2) Availability of Reinforcements. It is likely that the enemy will continue to infiltrate personnel from NVN. The majority of the prisoners released from Hoi An Prison will no doubt return to their former hamlets and villages. This represents a significant manpower input available to irregular forces.

(3) Movements and Activities.

(a) The 1st Marines had a series of small arms fire and mining incidents in their TAOR. 1/1 discovered some fuses and blasting caps at (BT 1956). 3/1 had 10 grenades thrown into a platoon patrol base at (AT 9566) and encountered 15 enemy at (BT 0956).

(b) 3/5 engaged an estimated enemy platoon at (BT 2906) on 10 July. On the 11th, Recon spotted a total of 38 enemy in the same area (BT 0047). Several more sightings were made in the vicinity of Base Area 116 throughout the week. 1/5 had sporadic contact all week. On the 10th they came in contact with an estimated 15-20 VC at (AT 9929). The next day they pursued 10-12 enemy and discovered a tunnel 400 feet long at (BT 0134). On the 12th another tunnel 1,100 feet long was found at (BT0031). 1/5 directed fire on enemy positions reported to them by the Que Son District Headquarters. There was supposed to be 100 NVA at (AT 9937) and 2 companies of VC at (BT 1449). Secondary explosions resulted in both areas. The one at (BT 1449) resulted in smoke billowing 1500 feet high. Air strikes run by 2/5 on a suspected enemy position resulted in secondary explosions, 1 very large, at (AT 7831). That same day, the 11th, they received reports from the Duc Duc District Headquarters of a large enemy force at (AT 8550) and fired several rounds of artillery covering the area. The 5th Marine CP received 5-7 mortar rounds at (BT 234315). At the same time a FF unit protecting a refugee hamlet (BT 255299) was also hit with 15 rounds of 60mm mortar and small arms fire.

(c) On the 10th M/3/7 engaged an enemy platoon in the vicinity of (AT 8157). The next two days they had a few small arms and many mining incidents. The rocket attacks coming from the 7th Marines area were preceeded by nothing more than a few small arms fire and mining incidents. Then on the 13th, 2/7's CP and the Esso station were hit by 140mm rockets, and on the 15th DANANG Airfield was hit with 122mm rockets. On the 15, two nearly simultaneous attacks took place; the 122mm rocket attack on Danang Airfield and an attack on Hoi An. Additionally every friendly unit in the vicinity of the launching site was brought under mortar or small arms fire. Recently, a rallier stated that the attack on Hoi An had been planned for several months. Possibly it was coordinated with the attack on Danang and in addition to releasing over 1000 prisoners was intended to divert supporting arms from the launch sites. See Annex C (122mm Rocket attack on Danang Airfield)

(d) Operation Gem had no significant contacts. Reconnaissance teams spotted several groups of VC from the 13th-15th in the vicinity of (AT 8548).

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(4) Logistics. There is evidence to indicate that there are enemy installations located in the vicinity of (ZC 0567). Recon patrols have invariably contacted VC/NVA in this area and prisoners have reported that it contains a munitions factory and a sapper base area. A recent captive stated that a unit in the vicinity of the A Shau Valley is responsible for supplying all units in Quang Nam Province including the 3rd Regiment. An ARVN who was imprisoned in the vicinity of (YC 898635) escaped early this year and provided information which revealed that the 140mm rockets were brought into Quang Nam through Happy Valley. All of this points to the area (ZC 0567) as a possible intermediate supply/logistic base between the A Shau Valley and eastern Quang Nam Province.

(5) AO and Recon Sightings (10 or more men sightings)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Direction</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
(a) 10 VC	Southeast	120704	AT 912263
(b) 36 VC	East	121144	AT 9726
(c) 10 VC	Southwest	120920	AT 995475
(d) 18 VC	10 South, 8 East	130905	YC 983424
(e) 13 VC	Stationary	131045	AT 827506
(f) 50 VC	Northeast	141725	AT 807483
(g) 14 VC	Northeast	141805	AT 834509
(h) 18 VC	South	150705	AT 807518
(i) Possible training camp		101430	YC 853638

### 3. Enemy Capabilities

#### a. Attack Capabilities

- (1) Attack selected targets in up to regimental strength,
- (2) Conduct less than regimental size attacks and harass isolated friendly forces and installations.
- (3) Conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields, and logistics installations.

b. Reinforcement Capability. Continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment, while continuing to avoid contact.

#### c. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Capability

- (1) Conduct political indoctrination classes, commit acts of terrorism.
- (2) Interdict LOC's and sabotage friendly installations.

### 4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. Capability 3.a.(1). The enemy, in face of friendly supporting arms, does not have the capacity to launch regimental size attacks within the TAOR. Outside the TAOR two Main Force Regiments are located along the Quang Nam/Quang Tin Border. It is highly unlikely that the enemy will risk massing these

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forces in the face of our supporting arms capabilities. In addition both regiments suffered heavy casualties recently when friendly forces conducted operations in the area.

b. Capability 3.a.(2). By attacking an isolated unit or units with limited defense capabilities, the enemy is able to limit his commitment and still gain a victory for morale and propaganda purposes. The enemy has focused these attacks against CAT units, RD teams, and outposts. Enemy sapper units are well organized to implement this type attack. Also the likelihood of attacks by Main Force units increases as they continue to retrain and reorganize.

c. Capability 3.a.(3). The number and magnitude of attacks by fire appear to be limited by the supply capabilities of enemy forces. Therefore, it may be assumed that attacks such as the rocket attacks on the Danang Airfield are the culmination of long range supply plans. Certain targets have been attacked from long ranges by rockets, but the majority of attacks will continue to be close in (3000 meters) against small units. Attacks by fire permit the enemy to attack with less risk of detection and less risk of loss.

d. Capability 3.b. The enemy is actively recruiting in SVN and receiving replacements from NVN, but he is experiencing increased problems in both areas. The release of the prisoners from Hoi An may alleviate to an extent for a time local force and irregular in-country recruitment. Captured documents indicate that one of the main factors affecting in-country recruitment is the success of the RD Program. As a result RD teams have been frequently named as a primary enemy target. Infiltration of new units is possible, however, most infiltrators are used as replacements.

e. Capability 3.c.(1). The enemy is continuing to search for an effective counter measure for the RD program and CAT units. Even in the areas unaffected by these programs he must maintain control over the populace for at least passive support. To do this he has and will use, political indoctrination, propaganda leaflets, and plays. Terrorism will be used as a last resort when these methods fail to achieve the desired effects.


f. Capability 3.c.(2). Acts of sabotage and interdiction of LOC's can be performed by small local units with a minimum of risk or expenditure of supplies, while enabling the enemy to obtain a moral and psychological victory. Consequently, the enemy can be expected to operate on company level and smaller in conducting this type activity in efforts to avoid detection.

##### 5. Enemy Capabilities in Relative Probability of Adoption

a. Capability 3.c.(1). Conduct political indoctrination classes, and commit acts of terrorism.

b. Capability 3.c.(2). Interdict LOC's and sabotage friendly installations.

c. Capability 3.a.(3). Conduct attacks by fire on positions, units, airfields, and logistic installations.



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d. Capability 3.a.(2). Conduct less than regimental size attacks and harass isolated friendly forces and installations.

e. Capability 3.a.(1). Attack selected targets in up to regimental strength.

f. Capability 3.b. Continue increasing his strength in Quang Tin/Quang Nam Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment, while continuing to avoid contact.

*E. B. Sigmon*  
E. B. SIGMON

LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

- ANNEX: ✓ A. STRENGTH, LOCATION, COMPOSITION  
 ✓ B. ASTRONOMICAL DATA  
 ✓ C. 122MM ROCKET ATTACK ON DANANG AIRFIELD

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 "C" less 76, 84, 98, 100, 191; plus 80 (15)

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|          | SA, Quang Tin Sector                            | (1)  |
|          | SA, Quang Ngai Sector                           | (1)  |
|          | SA, QNSS Adv Grp, Hoi An                        | (1)  |
|          | FLC   | (1)  |
|          | MCB 1   | (1)  |
|          | MCB 4   | (1)  |
|          | MCB 58  | (1)  |
|          | CICV  | (1)  |
|          | 1st AIRCAV                                      | (1)  |
|          | 3rd MAW   | (2)  |
|          | 7th Marines                                     | (15) |
|          | 9th MAB   | (4)  |
|          | 2nd Bn, 5th Marines                             | (2)  |
|          | 5th MarDiv                                      | (2)  |
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|          | 1st Recon Bn                                    | (3)  |

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ANNEX A (STRENGTH, LOCATION, COMPOSITION) TO 1ST MAR DIV PERINTREF NO. 14-67

Main Force

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Estimated Str</u>	<u>Reported Loc./Date</u>	<u>Accepted Loc</u>	<u>Arms &amp; Equipment</u>	<u>Category</u>
2nd NVA Div Hqs	200	BT 0023 /16 Jul	BT 0121		C
RQ-20 Sig Bn	220	AT 9925 /17 Jan			C
RQ-24 Engr Bn	120	BT 1733 /21 Apr			C
3rd NVA Regt (Rein)	1600	BT 1030 /10 Jul	BT 1036		C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300	BT 075239 / 5 Jul	BT 1219		C
1st Bn	450	BT 1254 /23 Jun			C
2nd Bn	425	BT 1336 / 5 Jun			C
3rd Bn	425	BT 1236 /29 Jun			C
21st NVA Regt (Rein)	1800	BT 1505 /17 Jul	BT 1203		C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300	BT 1505 /17 Jul		5-82mm, 6-60mm mtr	C
1st Bn	505	BT 1527 /17 May		17-81mm mtr unk no 60mm mtr unk no 75mm RR	C
2nd Bn	495	BT 2520 /21 Jun		6-60mm mtr 6-81mm mtr 3-mg 3-60mm mtr 2-81mm mtr 4-35mm mtr 3-57mm RR 3-60mm mtr 4-57mm RR 5-81mm mtr 4-30 cal mg	C
3rd Bn	500	BT 1525 /17 May			C
70th Indep Bn	425	BT 066467 / 5 Jul	BT 2707		C

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Local Force

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Estimated Str.</u>	<u>Reported Loc/Date</u>	<u>Accepted Loc</u>	<u>Arms &amp; Equipment</u>	<u>Category</u>
402nd Sapper Bn	400	BT 1953 / 6 Jul	AT 8060	3--81mm mtr 1--120mm mtr	C
R-20 Bn	350	BT 2050 / 13 Jul	AT 8754	1--60mm mtr 1--57mm RR	C
V.25 Bn	400	BT 2054 / 7 Jun	BT 1453	2--mg 5--BAR 2--60mm mtr 1--81mm mtr	C
72nd Bn	400	BT 1251 / 11 Jul	BT 2014	1--57mm RR 4--60mm mtr 2--81mm mtr 3--57mm RR 6--1mg	C
Q.12 Co	120	BT 1756 / 14 Jul	BT 1857	1--60mm mtr	C
Q.13 Co	80	BT 0452 / 7 Jul	BT 0452	9--smg 1--60mm mtr 1--30 cal mg	C
Q.14 Co	80	AT 8156 / 11 Jul	AT 8156	9--AR 1--60mm mtr 1--81mm mtr	C
Q.15 Co	120	BT 0061 / 10 Jul	AT 9958	4--M-79 2--60mm mtr 1--81mm mtr 1--57mm RR	C
Q.16 Co	120	AT 9564 / 7 Jul		3--1mg 2--60mm mtr 1--81mm mtr 6--BAR	C

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UNIT	ESTIMATED STR	REPORTED LOC/DATE	ACCEPTED LOC	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	CATEGORY
K-50 Co	80	BT 2224 / 19 Dec	BT 0945	1-57mm RR 1-60mm mtr	C
K-51 Co	80	BT 1747 / 7 June	BT 1747	3-30 cal mg 2-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
K-52 Co	150	BT 2220 / 8 June		5-mg 1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR	C
K-54 Co	90	BT 2220 / 14 June	BT 2022	2-smg 1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR	C
K-55 Co	100	BT 2307 / 11 June		2-mg 1-60mm mtr 1-AA mg	C

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
2nd NVA Div	MR V	Agricultural Site #2, 620th Div, Nam Tu, Chi Lang	CC-BG Viet XC-BG Dao FO-BG Do	20,601GM 20915GM Tay An
3rd NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite #3, 64th Regt, 51st Regt, 31st Regt, 46th Regt, Factory #10	CO-LtCol Viet XO-Maj Tranh Anh Kien FO-Trong Thanh	20825
1st Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X1, CT3, Binh Minh	CO-Capt Thao	
2nd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X2, Binh Da	CO-Capt Nguyen Tiep	
3rd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	Binh Thien, Mao Chu, Nguyen Trai	CO-Capt Thau	
21st NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite 21, 2nd Regt, 36th Regt, Cong Truong 21, A-21 Bach Ma	CO-Fham Kiet XO-Dang Cong Kiet FO-Tien	
1st Bn	21st NVA Regt	11th Bn, 11th Workshop, An Chau	CO-Tinh XC-Ma FC-Khoi CO-La	
2nd Bn	21st NVA Regt	22nd Bn, 135th Bn, Cong Thanh	XO-Can CO-Dang Hung FO-Nguyen Co	1803/CH
3rd Bn	21st NVA Regt	33rd Bn, 75th Bn (?), Long Thanh		
RQ-20 Sig Bn	2nd NVA Div	RQ-20/A Bn, GK 30, Ham Tu, RQ-20/B Bn, 2/c, GK-40		
RQ-24 Engr Bn	2nd NVA Div	35th Bn, Phi Doi 209, Chu Song, Tiger Bn, 103, C-70, Cuu Long, Binh Gia Bn, Bong Trang, Truong Son 70	CO-Nguyen Ngoc Dong CO-Nguyen Duc Song XO-Sr. Captain Thua	1784HC20
70th Independent Bn				

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LEB
402nd Sapper Bn	Danang City	T.89	CO-Nguyen Van Tran XO-Sr. Lt. Thanh	21395GN Dong Hai
R-20 Bn	Quang Nam (F)	Quang Nam Independence Bn, Doc Lap Bn, Hai Cang 20	CO-Nguyen Van Lam	
V-25 Bn	Quang Nam (F)	Lam Bn, 5th Bn	CO-Capt Thang XO-Tung PO-Khoa	
72nd Bn	Quang Tin (F)	H-65, H-68	CO-Thang Can Cao XO-Danh PO-Thanh	21443GM
Q.12 Co	Hoi An City	Hoi An Co, X-62 Co	CO-Le Hien Nguyen Chi Thien	2102
Q.13 Co	Duy Xuyen (D)	Duy Xuyen Co, H-52, 103rd Co, Than Jap Co	CO-Tran Van Cam PO-Vo Ca Son	
Q.14 Co	Dai Loc (D)	Dai Loc Co, H-42 Co	CO-Le Thanh	
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban (D)	Dien Ban Co, H-40 Co, H-55, 105th Bn, X-65	CO-Nguyen Hy XO-Than Tu PO-Nguyen Ra	2105
Q.16 Co	Hoa Vang (D)	Hoa Vang Co, H-41, H-56, Q.16.B, 100 Co, Hoa Hieu Co	CO-Nguyen Doa XO-Nguyen Nhuong	2106
K.50 Co	Que Son (D)	Que Son Co, 105 Unit, A-7	CO-Nguyen Thang Tung	

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
K. 51 Co	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh Co, A-10 F-14, D-21, 107	CO- Khoa XO- Nguyen Than PO-Anh Vu CO- Ngo XO- Khanh PO- Van CO- Cong XO- Toan FO- Tich CO- Nguyen Lien	
K. 52 Co	Tien Phuoc (D)	A-13 Co, D-22, V-13		
K. 54 Co	Tam Ky (D)	A-16, C-73, V-12, N. Tam Ky		
K. 55 Co	Tam Ky City	A-21, Co 75, V-15, Phi Po A-21 Bn, Flying Tiger		

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## ANNEX B (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO 14-67

DATE	BMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	MOON PHASE	% ILLUM
July 17	0601	0624	1922	1945	1552	0200		76
18	0601	0624	1922	1945	1645	0250		85
19	0601	0624	1922	1945	1728	0345		92
20	0601	0624	1922	1945	1828	0444		97
21	0601	0624	1922	1945	1923	0545		99
22	0602	0625	1922	1945	2012	0645	FULL	100
23	0602	0625	1922	1945	2056	0742		98
24	0602	0625	1921	1944	2135	0837		94
25	0603	0626	1921	1944	2111	0927		88
26	0603	0626	1921	1944	2244	1016		81
27	0603	0626	1920	1943	2317	1103		73
28	0604	0627	1920	1943	2350	1149		64
29	0604	0627	1920	1943	---	1236	1ST QTR	55
30	0604	0627	1919	1942	0025	1324		45
31	0605	0628	1919	1942	0144	1509		36

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Annex C (122mm Rocket Attack On DANANG Airfield) to 1st MarDiv IERINTAF No 14-67

At 0025H on 15 July the DANANG Airfield was shelled with 122mm rockets. The rockets were fired from two general positions. One position (AT 923708) contained three sites approximately 150 meters apart with each site having firing points for six rockets. The other position (AT 926690) had three sites approximately 50-75 meters apart; once again each site contained firing points for six rockets. The three sites in the vicinity of (AT 926690) appeared to have been hastily prepared as they did not contain as many fighting holes or ammunition pits as the sites in the vicinity of (AT 923708).

MAC V reports that the 122mm rocket was designed to replace the 140mm rocket. It is an indirect fire weapon which employs an optical sight. Reports indicate that it is fired from a tube 122.4mm in diameter which is mounted on a tripod. It takes 2½ minutes to assemble for firing and 2 minutes for disassembly into component parts.

1. See page C-2 for a comparison of 122mm and 140mm rockets.
2. See page C-3 for a photo of a 122mm rocket.
3. See page C-4 for a photo of four 122mm rockets at rocket site.
4. See page C-5 for a photo of 122mm rocket fin assembly and electrical connection.
5. See page C-6 for a photo of rocket firing position.


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


	140MM	122MM
LENGTH	42.7 IN	76 IN
WEIGHT	90LB	102LB
MAX RANGE	10,000M	12,000M
STABILIZED	SPIN	FIN&SPIN
MOUNT	WOODEN PLANK	TRIPOD
EXPL FILLER	9 1/2 LB	20 LB
SIGHTING	NONE	OPTICAL
FILLER	TNT	TNT, RDX ALUM PDR

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0-3



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
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
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# 1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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1st Marine Division (Rein)  
 Danang, Republic of Vietnam  
 250900 July 1967

PERINTREP No. 15-67

Period Covered: 161200H to 231200H July 1967

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L 7014

1. Mission. The 1st Marine Division conducts unilateral offensive operations within the Danang TAOR; conducts offensive and reconnaissance operations in the Reconnaissance Zone (RZ), after coordinating with CG, 2nd ARVN Division or commander Quang Da Special Zone as appropriate; conducts reconnaissance within the Thuong Duc TAOR after coordinating with CO Co C 5th SFGA; supports the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned areas of responsibility; on approval CG III MAF in coordination with CG 2nd ARVN Division (Quang Tin Province) and commander Quang Da Special Zone conducts offensive operations outside the assigned TAOR, RZ, and area of operations; participates in defense of vital base areas, airfields and facilities at Danang in coordination with CO Air Base Defense Battalion; participates in defense of other designated US or GVN vital installations; prepares on 12 hour notice to provide one reinforced battalion and thereafter, the remainder of one reinforced regiment for employment anywhere in RVN.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Weather and Terrain

(a) Weather. Clear skies and warm temperatures characterized this reporting period. Air support was unhindered except for a short period on the afternoon of the 22nd. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 93 and 76 degrees respectively. The humidity averaged 72%. Lunar illumination ranged from 76% on the 17th to 100% on the 22nd.

In the coming week we can expect generally clear skies with some thunder shower activity in the afternoons. The Danang weather tower predicts that these showers will last well into the night as contrasted by the short periods of rain we have experienced. The lunar illumination for the coming week will be decreasing from 94% tonight to 36% on the 31st.

(b) Terrain. The terrain continues to be dry allowing maximum movement by both sides.

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength, Composition, Disposition.

Annex A, this PERINTREP

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(2) Availability of Reinforcements

(a) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present strength in the 1st Marine Division's Area of Responsibility by the relocation of the 1st VC Regiment, by infiltration from NVN, and by in-country recruitment. The releasing of the prisoners from Hoi An should alleviate some of the in-country recruiting problems.

(3) Movements and Activities

(a) The 1st Marines were plagued by a large number of mines, booby traps and incidents involving harassing small arms fire. As an example, on the 18th a squad from H/2/1 discovered eleven M-26 grenades rigged as mines in the vicinity of (BT 0460).

(b) Indications are that a Main Force unit has moved into the vicinity of Base Area 116. On the 16th, the 5th Marines reported seeing several groups of the enemy, one as large as 50 men, in the vicinity of (BT 0646). On the 17th, 3/5 engaged a force wearing helmets and other equipment indicative of a Main Force unit, at (BT 097472). Air and artillery were called, resulting in 16 KIA (C) and 30 KIA (F). The next day, 20 more VC were engaged in the same vicinity. This type of activity continued all week with the majority of VC initiated incidents coming in late afternoon. AC's also reported extensive enemy activity in the area. Possibly the unit responsible for this increased activity is the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment. Gallier Doan Can stated that the 3rd Battalion was to become subordinate to the Quang Da Provincial Committee. This is not likely, but since the 3rd Battalion did operate in conjunction with local forces in this area in February and March of this year, it may be doing so again.

(c) 1/5 has had several small contacts, all within a few thousand meters of each other in the vicinity of (BT 0032). On the 22nd, AC's spotted 25 VC at (AT 9827).

(d) 2/5 reported several suspected enemy concentrations in their area at (AT 885440) on the 17th, (AT 874499) and (AT 790357) on the 19th, (AT 802380) on the 21st. On the 21st, Recon patrol 10thary spotted 50 lights moving north at (AT 869416). A fire mission resulted in four secondary explosions. On the following night six more lights were spotted at (AT 8740). A fire mission resulted in 2 more secondary explosions.

(e) The Seventh Marines combat base at (AT 937687) received eight rounds of mortar fire at 0200 on the 18th, however the rounds landed outside the perimeter and there was no casualties. The rest of the incidents in the 7th Marines area consisted of harassing small arms fire and mining incidents. Of interest is the fact that nearly all of the incidents took place in the north-eastern corner of 3/7's TACR. Low level agent reports continue to indicate that there are new units in the mountains to the north and northwest of the 7th Marines area.

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(d) Operation Pecos continued with little contact. On the 22nd, Recon patrol Killer Kane made a significant discovery at (ZC 070677) when they surprised 40 VC. The VC ran, leaving clothing, weapons, rice and documents behind. The documents indicate that some of the VC surprised, belonged to the 402nd Sapper Bn.

(4) AO and Recon Sightings (10 or more men sightings)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Direction</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
(a) Mission aborted by sa fire		170815	AT 9737
(b) 15-20	SW	170900	BT 097445
(c) 40 VC	E	171610	AT 796489
(d) 25 VC	W	180700	ZC 205462
(e) Shot out of LZ (Classmate)		190820	ZC 194648
(f) 11 VC	SW	191500	BT 019396
(g) 10 VC	NE	191515	BT 995334
(h) 30-35 VC mvg twd ptl		191800	ZC 183652
(i) 22 VC	N	191830	AT 997368
(j) 15 VC	S	201745	AT 994340
(k) 10 VC Contact		210825	BT 065225
(l) 50 lights-4 secondary expl		212127	AT 864414

(5) Weakness in VC Reporting System

(a) Returnee De Xuan Chuyen stated that, under General Thanh, the VC system for determining U.S. and FVMAF casualties was to estimate the number of U.S. and FVMAF leaving the battlefield and subtract this number from the strength of a T/O unit, the resulting difference would be reported as the casualty figure. Possibly it was this reporting system which was responsible for the exaggerated claims of VC success.

3. Enemy Capabilities

a. To conduct acts of terrorism and harassment with emphasis on countering the Revolutionary Development Program, and to continue interdiction of LOC's with the objective of increasing VC control over population and denying the GVN/US/FVMAF use of water, rail, and highway.

b. To conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields and logistics installations.

c. To conduct less than regimental size attacks and harassment against isolated friendly forces and installations.

d. To attack selected targets in up to regimental strength.

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e. To continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

f. To evade friendly forces.

#### 4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. The enemy is continuing to search for an effective counter measure for the RD Program and CAT units. Even in areas unaffected by these programs he must maintain control over the populace for at least passive support. To do this he has and will use, political indoctrination, propaganda leaflets, and plays. Terrorism will be used as a last resort when these methods fail to achieve the desired effects. Acts of sabotage, harassment, and interdiction of LOC's can be performed by small local units with a minimum of risk or expenditure of supplies, while enabling the enemy to obtain a moral and psychological victory. Consequently the enemy can be expected to operate on company level and smaller in conducting this type activity in efforts to avoid detection.

b. The number and magnitude of attacks by fire are limited by the supply capabilities of the enemy forces. Attacks such as the rocket attacks on the DANANG Airfield are the culmination of long range supply plans as well as detailed reconnaissance work and will no doubt be reserved for vital fixed installations. Extensive activity in 3/7's area may be an indication of this required reconnaissance effort. The majority of the attacks by fire against our mobile elements will continue to be close in (3000 meters) utilizing mortars. These attacks will permit the enemy to attack with less risk of detection and less risk of loss.

c. By attacking an isolated unit or units with limited defense capabilities, the enemy is able to limit his commitment and still gain a victory for morale and propaganda purposes. The enemy has focused these attacks against CAT units, RD teams, and outposts. Enemy sapper units are well organized to implement this type of attack. Also the likelihood of attacks by Main Force units increases as they continue to retrain and reorganize.

d. The enemy is actively recruiting in SVN and receiving replacements from NVN, but he is experiencing increased problems in both areas. Captured documents indicate that one of the main factors affecting in-country recruitment is the success of the RD Program. As a result RD teams have been frequently named as a primary enemy target. Infiltration of new units is possible, however, most infiltrators are used as replacements.

e. The enemy, in the face of friendly supporting arms, does not have the capacity to launch regimental size attacks within the TACR. Outside the TACR, two Main Force regiments are located along the Quang Nam/Quang Tin border. It is highly unlikely that the enemy will risk massing these forces in the face of our supporting arms capabilities. In addition both regiments suffered heavy casualties recently when friendly forces conducted operations in the area.

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f. The enemy does not have the capacity to stand and fight in the face of friendly supporting arms. With the interjection of superior forces into enemy controlled areas he will attempt to evade. The hamlet guerrilla may vanish into the local population, where as the mobile battalion may be forced to seek refuge in the mountains. Friendly forces have experienced this type of activity in the past, most recently on Operation Calhoun, and will probably experience it on Operation Pecos.

### 5. Conclusions

a. The enemy will continue to conduct guerrilla and unconventional warfare throughout the TAOR with emphasis on the 1st Marines, 1/7 and 3/7 areas. Local Forces in the 5th Marines area will continue to interdict National Route #1 and harass friendly small units.

b. Very reliable reports indicate possible enemy reconnaissance activity on the western fringes of and within the vital area. This activity can be considered a possible prelude to an attack by fire on the vital area.

cks by fire on isolated friendly units and installations are possible during the coming week. Increased enemy sightings and agent reports reveal that the enemy may increase the frequency of his attacks by fire in the 5th Marines area.

d. The enemy will continue to attempt to increase his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

e. The enemy will continue to evade in the Operation Pecos area unless forced into an engagement. He will fight a delaying-type action in this should occur. Only if his supply/logistical bases are threatened will the enemy defend.

*E. B. Sigmon, Jr.*

E. B. SIGMON, JR.  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

#### ANNEX:

- ✓ A. Strength, Location, Composition
- ✓ B. Astronomical Data

DISTRIBUTION: "A" less 7, 12, 17-21, 37-67  
"C" less 76, 84, 98, 100, 191; plus 80 (15)

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1st MAW (8)  
2nd ROKMC (1)

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SA, Quang Tin Sector	(1)
SA, QNSS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
FLC	(1)
MCB 1	(1)
MCB 4	(1)
MCB 58	(1)
CICV	(1)
1st AIRCAV	(1)
3 MAW	(2)
1st Recon Bn	(1)
7th Marines	(15)
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ANNEX A (STRENGTH, LOCATION, COMPOSITION) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 15-67

Main Force

Unit	Estimated Str.	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
2nd NVA Div Hqs	200	AT 9624 / 23 Jul	BT 0121		C
RQ-20 Sig Bn	220	AT 9925 / 17 Jan			C
RQ-24 Engr Bn	120	BT 1733 / 21 Apr			C
3rd NVA Regt (Rein)	1600	AT 9720 / 23 Jul	BT 1036		C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300	AT 9720 / 23 Jul	BT L219		C
1st Bn	450	BT 1353 / 10 Jul			C
2nd Bn	425	BT 1442 / 22 Jul			C
3rd Bn	425	AT 8953 / 11 Jul			C
21st NVA Regt (Rein)	1800	BT 1505 / 22 Jul	BT L203		C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300	BT 1505 / 22 Jul		5-82, 6-60mm mtr	C
1st Bn	505	BT 1527 / 17 May		17-81mm mtr	C
2nd Bn	495	BT 2520 / 21 Jun		unk no 60mm mtr	C
3rd Bn	500	BT 1021 / 5 Jul		unk no 75mm RR	C
70th Indep Bn	425	BT 0454 / 17 Jul	BT 2707	6-60mm mtr	C
				6-81mm mtr	C
				3-7ng	C
				3-60mm mtr	C
				2-81mm mtr	C
				4-35mm mtr	C
				3-57mm RR	C
				3-60mm mtr	C
				4-57mm RR	C
				5-81mm mtr	C
				4-30cal mg	C

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Local Force

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Estimated Str</u>	<u>Reported Loc/Date</u>	<u>Accepted Loc</u>	<u>Arms &amp; Equipment</u>	<u>Category</u>
402nd Sapper Bn	400	ZC 0667 /22 Jul	AT 8060	3-81mm mtr 1-120mm mtr	C
R-20 Bn	400	AT 8654 /18 Jul	AT 8754	3-81mm mtr 3-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
V-25 Bn	400	BT 1853 /19 Jul	BT 1453	2-mg 5-BAR 3-60mm mtr 3-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
72nd Bn	400	BT 1530 /14 Jul	BT 2014	4-60mm mtr 2-81mm mtr 3-57mm RR	C
Q.12 Co	120	BT 1856 /20 Jul	BT 1857	6-ling 1-60mm mtr	C
Q.13 Co	80	BT 0652 /13 Jul	BT 0452	9-smg 1-60mm mtr 1-30 cal mg	C
Q.14 Co	80	AT 8652 /19 Jul	AT 8156	9-AR 1-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 4-M-79	C
Q.15 Co	120	BT 0459 /21 Jul	AT 9958	9-AR 2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
Q.16 Co	120	AT 9564 / 7 Jul		3-ling 2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 6-BAR	C

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UNIT	ESTIMATED STR	REPORTED IOC/DATE	ACCEPTED IOC	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	CATEGORY
K-50 Co	80	BT 2224 / 19 Dec	BT 0945	1-57mm RR 1-60mm mtr	C
K-51 Co	80	BT 1747 / 7 June	BT 1747	3-30 cal mg 2-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR 5-mg	C
K-52 Co	150	BT 2220 / 8 June		1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR 2-smg	C
K-54 Co	90	BT 2220 / 14 June	BT 2022	1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR 2-mg	C
K-55 Co	100	BT 2307 / 11 June		1-60mm mtr 1-AA mg	C

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personnelities	IBN
2nd NVA Div	MT V	Agricultural Site #2, 620th Div, Nam Tu, Chi Lang	CO-5G Viet AC-BG Dao IO-BG Do	20,601GM 20915GM Tay An
3rd NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite #3, 64th Regt, 51st Regt, 31st Regt, 46th Regt, Factory #10	CO-LtCol Viet XO-Maj Tranh Anh Kien IO-Trong Thanh	20825
1st Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X1, CT3, Binh Minh	CO-Capt Thao	
2nd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X2, Binh Da	CO-Capt Nguyen Tiep	
3rd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	Binh Thien, Mao Chu, Nguyen Trai	CO-Capt Thau	
21st NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite 21, 2nd Regt, 36th Regt, Cong Truong 21, A-21 Bach Ma	CO-Tham Kiet XO-Dang Cong Kiet IO-Tien	
1st Bn	21st NVA Regt	11th Bn, 11th Workshop, An Chau	CO-Tinh XO-MP	
2nd Bn	21st NVA Regt	22nd Bn, 135th Bn, Cong Thanh	IO-Khoi CO-La	
3rd Bn	21st NVA Regt	33rd Bn, 75th Bn (?), Long Thanh	XO-Can CO-Dang Hung IO-Nguyen Co	1803/CH
RQ-20 Sig Bn	2nd NVA Div	RQ-20/A Bn, GK 30, Ham Tu, RQ-20/B Bn, 2/c.		
RQ-24 Engr Bn	2nd NVA Div	GK-40		
70th Independent Bn		35th Bn, Phi Dei 209, Chu Song, Tiger Bn, 103, C-70, Cuu Long, Binh Gia Bn, Bong Trang, Truong Son 70	CO-Nguyen Ngoc Dong CO-Nguyen Duc Song XO-Sr. Captain Thua	1784HC20

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	IBN
402nd Sapper Battalion	Danang City	T.89	CO-Nguyen Van Tran AO-Sr, Lt. Thanh	21395GN Dong Hai
R-20 Bn	Quang Nam (I)	Quang Nam Independence Bn, Doc Lap Bn, Hai Gang 20	CO-Nguyen Van Lam	
V-25 Bn	Quang Nam (I)	Lam Bn, 5th Bn	CO-Capt Thang AO-Tung IC-Khoa	
72nd Bn	Quang Tin (I)	H-65, H-68	CO-Thang Can Cao XC-Danh IC-Thanh	21443GN
Q. 12 Co	Hoi An City	Hoi An Co, X-62 Co	CO-Le Hien Nguyen Chi Thien	2102
Q. 13 Co	Duy Xuyen (D)	Duy Xuyen Co, H-52, 103rd Co, Than Jap Co	CO-Fran Van Cam	
Q. 14 Co	Dai Loc (D)	Dai Loc Co, H-42 Co.	FC-Vo Ca Son	
Q. 15 Co	Dien Ban (D)	Dien Ban Co, H-40 Co, H-55, 105th Bn, X-65	CO-Le Thanh Hy XO-Than Tu FO-Nguyen Ra	2105
Q. 16 Co	Hoa Vang (D)	Hoa Vang Co, H-41, H-56, G.16.B, 100 Co, Hoa Hieu Co	CO-Nguyen Hoa XC-Nguyen Nhuong	2106
K. 50 Co	Que Son (D)	Que Son Co, 105 Unit, A-7	CO-Nguyen Thang Tung	

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
K. 51 Co	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh Co, A-10 F-14, D-21, 107	CO- Khoa XO- Nguyen Than FO-Anh Vu	
K. 52 Co	Tien Phuoc (D)	A-13 Co, D-22, V-13	CO- Ngo XO- Khanh FO- Van	
K. 54 Co	Tam Ky (D)	A-16, C-73, V-12, N. Tam Ky	CO- Cong XO- Toan FO- Tich	
K. 55 Co	Tam Ky City	A-21, Co 75, V-15, Phi Fo A-21 Bn, Flying Tiger	CO- Nguyen Lien	

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ANNEX B (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREF NO 15-67

DATE	BMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	MOON PHASE	% ILLUM
AUG 1	0605	0628	1918	1941	0213	1606	1ST QTR	27
2	0605	0628	1918	1941	0323	1703		19
3	0606	0629	1917	1940	0420	1759		11
4	0606	0629	1917	1940	0622	1942		02
5	0606	0629	1917	1940	0622	1942		02
6	0606	0629	1916	1939	0622	1942	NEW	00
7	0606	0629	1916	1939	0724	2028		01
8	0607	0630	1915	1938	0823	2111		05
9	0607	0630	1915	1938	0922	2151		11
10	0607	0630	1914	1937	1919	2232		19
11	0608	0631	1914	1937	1116	2314		29
12	0608	0631	1913	1936	2315	2358	1ST QTR	40
13	0608	0631	1913	1936	1316			52
14	0608	0631	1912	1935	1418	0046		63
15	0608	0631	1912	1935	1520	0139		73

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# 1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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1st Marine Division (Rein)  
 Danang, Republic of Vietnam  
 031200H August 1967

PERINTREF No. 16-67

Period covered: 231200H to 301200H July 1967

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L 7014

1. Mission. The 1st Marine Division conducts unilateral offensive operations within the DANANG TAOR; conducts offensive and reconnaissance operations in the Reconnaissance Zone (RZ), after coordinating with CG, 2nd ARVN Division or commander Quang Da Special Zone as appropriate; conducts reconnaissance within the Thuong Duc TAOR after coordinating with CO Co C 5th SFGA; supports the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned areas of responsibility; on approval CG III MAF, in coordination with CG 2nd ARVN Division (Quang Tin Province) and commander Quang Da Special Zone conducts offensive operations outside the assigned TAOR, RZ, and area of operations; participates in defense of vital base areas, airfields and facilities at DANANG in coordination with CO Air Base Defense Battalion; participates in defense of other designated US or GVN vital installations; prepares on 12 hour notice to provide one reinforced battalion and thereafter, the remainder of one reinforced regiment for employment anywhere in RVN.

## 2. Enemy Situation

### a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

#### (1) Climate and Weather

(a) The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 97 and 77 respectively with an average humidity of 70%. The skies were overcast; the clouds appeared in early morning and late afternoon. The wind was variable. Lunar illumination was predicted to be as high as 94%, it was considerably less due to the overcast skies. Weather forecast-See Annex B, this PERINTREF.

(b) Astronomical Data - See Annex B, this PERINTREF

### b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength, Composition, Disposition - See Annex A, this PERINTREF

(2) Availability of Reinforcements. The enemy is capable of reinforcing with the 1st VC Regiment, an unknown number of infiltrators from NVN and by in-country recruiting.

#### (3) Movements and Activities

(a) For the 1st Marines the week was one of constant harassment from small arms fire and mines. Nearly 30 mining incidents were reported.

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their TAOR, 18 of which resulted in USMC casualties. The mines were mostly M-26 grenades rigged as AP mines. However, on the 30th, at (BT 174564) a Marine detonated a 105mm and 106mm round rigged as an AP mine. Also on the 30th, a Marine detonated a 155mm round rigged as an AP mine (BT 178563), and at (BT 189589) a 105mm round was discovered. The only significant contact occurred when I/3/1 spotted an estimated 20 enemy. Four 81mm and five 60mm rounds, documents, and metal files were captured.

(b) The northern sector of the 5th Marines TAOR was active all week. On the 25th, L/3/5 took what appeared to be a VC squad under fire at (BT 185445), and while searching the area, they were fired upon by approximately 100 VC at (BT 195445). The next day an AO called air strikes on 20 VC at (BT 2246), and 16 more at (BT 1946). On the 27th 3/5 experienced some small arms fire from (BT 2239, 2339). Air strikes were conducted on a tunnel and bunker complex at (BT 1946). The 28th was relatively quiet and then on the 29th, 3/5 encountered 50 VC at (BT 1043). At (BT 2442) air strikes were conducted on VC unloading boxes from a boat.

(c) A usually reliable source indicated the presence of enemy forces to the west of hill 63 (BT 0843) and to the south and west of 1/5's CP. Sporadic contact was made within the Que Son area itself. Air strikes were called on 15 enemy (AT 9834) on the 24th. A few small arms incidents occurred on the 25th. On the 29th, an artillery mission was fired (BT 0428) resulting in 4 secondary explosions. Also, on the 29th, A/1/5 received fire from 15 to 20 VC (BT 0128) and 6 to 8 VC at (BT 0027). Eight more VC were taken under fire at (BT 0126). On the 30th, C/1/5 encountered an estimated 25-30 VC at (AT 996325).

(d) The tempo of enemy activity in 2/5's TAOR increased. A reliable source indicated the presence of enemy forces to the southwest and south of 2/5's area. Recon continued to make sightings in Antenna Valley and numerous contacts were made in the north and northeast sections of the TAOR. Some mining incidents occurred, mostly directed against vehicles. On the 25th, E/2/5 received heavy small arms fire from an estimated 15 to 20 enemy at (AT 9350). After repeated air strikes and small arms fire the enemy broke contact. F/2/5 observed 20 VC moving toward their combat base in this same area, at (AT 9253) on the 28th. At 1800 on the 29th, F/2/5 came under heavy small arms fire at (AT 9051). A reaction force was called, but the enemy broke contact. Numerous lights were spotted moving north from Antenna Valley again this week. Since 21 July, 147 lights have been reported moving northward on the hills surrounding Antenna Valley.

(e) Agent reports continued to indicate enemy activity to the north and west of the 7th Marines TAOR. Within the TAOR, however, only numerous small arms fire and mining incidents have been reported. On the 26th, G/2/7 discovered 8 VC bunkers reinforced with bamboo and steel at (AT 8883). At (AT 9082) a detainee led an M/3/7 patrol to 60,000 GVN piastres. On Operation Stockton, which took place within the 7th Marines area, 2 bodies were discovered

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at (AT 8567) and an enemy assembly area at (AT 8867). This position, discovered on the 28th, had sufficient fighting holes for a company and was set up with a 360 degree defensive perimeter. On the 29th, a squad combat patrol from A/1/7 came under small arms fire from enemy in concealed positions at (AT 9659). Several mining incidents were reported again on the 30th. M/3/7 reported discovering 2,000 pounds of rice at (AT 8056) on the 29th. Interrogation of a PW revealed that in the vicinity of (AT 9564) some 28 mines have been planted. These mines are supposedly planted in abandoned areas, near shade trees, and in the center of trails.

(f) On the 28th, in the vicinity of (ZC 130705) an Air Force AO reported sighting two wooden or concrete platforms, each approximately 4 feet by 12 feet. The two platforms were located side by side. He also observed a circular area of what he estimated to be crushed rock and with a diameter of 5 feet. This area was approximately 6 feet from the first two platforms. The AO was called away on another mission and could not return to the area until two hours later. At this time he observed that the platforms were either completely camouflaged or removed from the area. Recon patrols Killer Kane and Dreadful were inserted on the 29th in connection with the sightings just mentioned. Killer Kane was inserted at (ZC 2070) and Dreadful at (ZC 1271). At 1030 on the 29th Killer Kane observed 8 VC move down a trail within 20 feet of their position. Five of the enemy wore black pajamas and green utilities and carried rifles. The other three wore clean white clothing and were carrying heavy packs of rice. At 0830 the following morning, Killer Kane heard a force moving toward their position at (ZC 132709). The patrol initiated a fire fight against an estimated 40-50 enemy when the enemy moved within 10 feet of a member's position. The enemy appeared to be aggressive, well-trained and disciplined as they fired and maneuvered against the patrol. The VC wore utilities, helmets and web gear. Artillery and air strikes were called as the patrol was extracted under fire.

(4) Operational Capabilities To Launch Rockets

(a) The enemy retains his operational ability to launch 140mm and 122mm rockets. The recent sighting in Happy Valley indicates that possibly the enemy has the capability to launch rockets with greater range.

(5) AO and Recon Sightings (10 or more men sightings)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Direction</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
(a) 10 VC	N	231415	ZC 128654
(b) 10 Lights	SE to NW	232000	AT 905396
(c) 23 Lights	E to W	232300	AT 876399
(d) 10 Lights	S	282115	AT 936366
(e) 30-40 VC	In contact	300830	ZC 123709
(f) 15 VC	In open, near cave	300933	ZC 151661

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3. Enemy Capabilities

a. To conduct acts of terrorism and harassment with emphasis on countering the Revolutionary Development Program, and to continue interdiction of LOC's with the objective of increasing VC control over population and denying the GVN/US/FWMAF use of water, rail, and highway.

b. To conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields and logistics installations.

c. To conduct less than regimental size attacks and harassment against isolated friendly forces and installations.

d. To attack selected targets in up to regimental strength.

e. To continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. The enemy is continuing to search for an effective counter measure for the RD Program and CAT units. Even in areas unaffected by these programs he must maintain control over the populace for at least passive support. To do this he has and will use, political indoctrination, propaganda leaflets, and plays. Terrorism will be used as a last resort when these methods fail to achieve the desired effects. Acts of sabotage, harassment, and interdiction of LOC's can be performed by small local units with a minimum of risk or expenditure of supplies, while enabling the enemy to obtain a moral and psychological victory. Consequently the enemy can be expected to operate on company level and smaller in conducting this type activity in efforts to avoid detection.

b. Enemy attacks using indirect fire weapons were at a minimum this week. This, in conjunction with all the lights moving in the vicinity of Antenna Valley, is possibly an indication that the enemy is making preparations for future operations. Reliable intelligence sources indicated extensive enemy reconnaissance activity in the central and south central portions of the TAOR. This could be a prelude to increased enemy activity in this area.

c. Isolated units and units with limited defense capabilities continue to be priority targets for VC harassment activity. Revolutionary Development Teams, CAT units, and ARVN outposts are included in this category. With indications that the R.20 and V.25 Battalions are training to become sapper units, this type activity can be expected to increase.

d. Although reliable intelligence sources continue to provide information on enemy troop build-up just south of the Hoi An and Go Noi Island, the possibility of a regimental size attack in that area is highly improbable. Friendly ability to react to any massed formation is the greatest deterrent to this capability.

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e. Numerous enemy sightings and contacts in Happy Valley and movement in the area south of 2/5 and Antenna Valley indicate that the enemy probably, if not increasing his manpower, is improving/replenishing his supplies.

5. Conclusions

a. Guerrilla and unconventional warfare will continue throughout the TACR with ~~emphasis~~ the southeastern sector of the TACR.

b. Enemy reconnaissance in the south central and southeastern portions of the TACR indicate the enemy may intensify his aggressiveness in that area.

c. Attacks by fire just south of the TAOR and in the 2/5 area will probably increase with the suspected presence of Main Forces in the vicinity.

d. The enemy will continue to attempt to increase his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

*E. B. Sigmon, Jr.*

E. B. SIGMON, JR.  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEX:  A. Strength, Location and Composition of the Enemy  
 B. Astronomical Data

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Copy to:	III MAF	(5)
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	1st MAW	(8)
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	SA, Quang Tin	(1)
	SA, Quang Ngai	(1)
	SA, QNSS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
	FLC	(1)
	MCB 1	(1)
	MCB 7	(1)
	MCB 74	(1)
	MCB 133	(1)
	CICV	(1)
	1st Air Cav	(1)
	3rd MAW	(2)
	1st Marines	(15)
	5th Marines	(9)
	2nd Bn, 5th Marines	(6)

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3rd ITT	(5)
7th Marines	(15)
9th MAB	(4)
5th MarDiv	(2)
USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.	(2)
Task Force Oregon	(15)
3rd CIT	(9)
1st Recon Bn	(2)
7th CIT	(2)

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Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equip	Category
2nd NVA Div Hqs	200	AT 899231/26 Jul	AT 9923		C
RQ-20 Sig Bn	220	AT 9925 /17 Jan			C
RQ-24 Engr Bn	120	BT 1773 /21 Apr			C
3rd NVA Regt (Rein)	1600	AT 880248/24 Jul	AT 8824		C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300	AT 880248/24 Jul	AT 8824		C
1st Bn	450	BT 1323 /23 Jul			C
2nd Bn	425	BT 1341 /24 Jul			C
3rd Bn	425	BT 1361 /24 Jul			C
21st NVA Regt	1800	BT 1505 /22 Jul	BT 1505		C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300	BT 1505 /22 Jul	BT 1505	5-82mm, 6-60mm mtr	C
1st Bn	505	BT 1527 /17 May		17-81mm mtr	C
2nd Bn	495	BT 1612 /17 Jul		unk no 60mm mtr	C
3rd Bn	500	BT 1021 /11 Jul		unk no 75mm RR	C
70th Indep Bn	400	BT 1260 /25 Jul	BT 1622	6-60mm mtr	C
409th Sapper Bn	400	BT 1909 /29 Jul	BT 1909	6-81mm mtr	C
				3-mg	C
				3-60mm mtr	C
				2-81mm mtr	C
				3-57mm RR	C
				3-60mm mtr	C
				5-81mm mtr	C
				4-57mm RR	C
				4-30 cal Mg	C
				3-81mm mtr	C
				4-60mm mtr	C
				5-57mm RR	C
				5-mg	C
				3-81mm mtr	C
				4-60mm mtr	C
				3-57mm RR	C
				7-mg	C

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Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
402nd Sapper Bn	342	AT 8351 / 24 Jul	ZC 1364	3-81mm mtr	C
R-20 Bn	500	AT 8550 / 24 Jul	AT 8752	6-60mm mtr 3-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR 2-mg 3-81mm mtr 5-BAR 3-60mm mtr 3-81mm mtr	C
V.25 Bn	400	BT 0254 / 21 Jul	BT 1952	1-57mm RR 4-60mm mtr 2-81mm mtr 3-57mm RR 6-1mg 1-60mm mtr 9-smg 1-60mm mtr 1-30 Cal Mg	C
72nd Bn	300	BT 2220 / 5 Jul	BT 2223	9-AR 1-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 4-M-79 2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR 3-1mg 2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 6-BAR	C
Q-12 Co	80	BT 1856 / 25 Jul	BT 1856		C
Q-13 Co	120	BT 0964 / 27 Jul	BT 0454		C
Q-14 Co	70	AT 8059 / 28 Jul	AT 8456		C
Q-15 Co	80	BT 0260 / 28 Jul	BT 0057		C
Q-16 Co	120	BT 0253 / 28 Jul			C

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Local Force

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Estimated Str</u>	<u>Reported Loc/Date</u>	<u>Accepted Loc</u>	<u>Arms &amp; Equipment</u>	<u>Category</u>
K-50 Co	70	BT 1344 / 24 Jul	AT 9830	1-57mm RR 1-60mm mtr	C
K-51 Co	80	BT 1747 / 7 June		3-30 cal mg 2-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR 5-mg 1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR	C
K-52 Co	100	BT 2220 / 8 June		2-smg 1-60mm mg 2-57mm RR	C
K-54 Co	130	BT 3230 / 18 Jul		2-mg 1-60mm mtr	C
K-55 Co	100	BT 2207 / 11 June		1-AA mg 2-30 cal mg	C
706th Co	80	BT 3707 / 12 June		1-AA mg 1-60mm mtr 1-60mm mtr	C
74th Co	50	BT 3611 / 9 May		1-30 cal mg 1-57mm RR	C

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
2nd NVA Div	MR V	Agricultural Site #2, 620th Div, Ham Tu, Chi Lang, Hai Cang 20	CG-BG Viet XO-BG Dao FO-BG Do	20, 60LGM 20925 Tay An
3rd NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite #3, 64th Regt, 51st Regt, 31st Regt, 46th Regt, Factory #10, Quyet Thang Regt	CO-LtCol Viet XO-Maj Tranh Anh Kien FO-Trong Thanh	20.801 20.802 20.803
1st Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X1. CT3, Binh Minh	CO-Capt Thao	20825-20828GM
2nd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X2, Binh Da	CO-Capt Thanh	
3rd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	Binh Thien, Mao Chu, Nguyen Trai, X-3	CO-Nguyen Tiep	
21st NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite 2L, 2nd Regt, 36th Regt, Cong Truong 2L, A-21 Bach Ma	CO-Pham Kiet XO-Dang Cong Kiet FO-Tien	20756CN An Long 20769CN Nam Dong
1st Bn	21st NVA Regt	11th Bn, 11th Workshop, An Chau	CO-Tinh XO-Na	2007HG Bach Dang 2678GM An Long
2nd Bn	21st NVA Regt	22nd Bn, 135th Bn, Long Thanh, 72nd Bn	FO-Khoi CO-La XO-Oan FO-Tha	2019 Bach Dang
3rd Bn	21st NVA Regt	33rd Bn, 75th Bn(?) Long Thanh	CO-Dang Hung FO-Nguyen Co	3039HC Bach Dang
RQ-20 Sig Bn	2nd NVA Div	RQ-20/B Bn, GK 30, RQ.20/A Bn, Ham Tu GK-40	CO-Nguyen Ngoc Dong	1803/CH Hai Cang 20
RQ.24 Engr Bn	2nd NVA Div			

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LEN
402nd Sapper Bn	Danang City	T. 89, YH-9, Ten Lua (Flaming Arrow)	CO-Nguyen Van Tran	2L.391 - 2L.396
R-20 Bn	Quang Nam (F)	Q.N. Independence Bn, Doc Lap Bn, Hai Cang 20	XO-Sr. Lt. Thanh	GM Dong Hai
V-25 Bn	Quang Nam (F)	Viet Dung, Hung-Gia-Ray Lam Bn, 5th Bn	CO-Nguyen Van Lam	2L.342
72nd Bn	Quang Tin (F)	H-65, H-68, 305 GF, Hai Cang 50	CO-Capt Nguyen Thanh	A-4192 Anh Dung
Q.12 Co	Hoi An City	Hoi An Co, X-62 Co	XO-Tung	
Q.13 Co	Duy Xuyen (D)	Duy Xuyen Co, H-52, X-63 Co, 103rd Co, Than Lap Co, Q-13/B	FO-Khoa	21443GM
Q.14 Co	Dai Loc (D)	Dai Loc Co, H-42 Co, X-64 Co, Q.14/B	XO-Danh	25010
Q.15 Co	Dien Ban (D)	Dien Ban Co, H-40 Co, H-55, 105th Bn, S-65, Q-15/B	FO-Thanh	
Q.16 Co	Hoa Vang (D)	Hoa Vang Co, H-41, H-56, Q.16/B, 100 Co, Hoa Hieu Co	CO-Le Hien	2102
K.50 Co	Que Son (D)	Que Son Co, 105th Unit, A-7	XO-Nguyen Chi Thien	2103
			CO-Le Thanh	2104
			CO-Nguyen Hy	2105
			XO-Than Tu	
			FO-Nguyen Ra	
			CO-Nguyen Doa	2106
			XO-Nguyen Nhuong	
			CO-Nguyen Thang Tung	

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LEN
K. 51 Co	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh Co, A-10, F-14, D-21, 107	CO-Khoa XO-Nguyen Than PO-Anh Vu CO-Ngo XO-Khanh PO-Van CO-Dien XO-Toan PO-Tich CO-Cao Van Thanh	
K. 52 Co	Tien Phuoc (D)	A-13 Co, D-22, V-13		
K. 54 Co	Tam Ky (D)	A-16, C-73, V-12, N. Tam Ky		
K. 55 Co	Tam Ky City	A-21, Co 75, V-15, Phi Po A-21 Bn, Flying Tiger		
706th Co	Quang Tin (F)	106th	CO-Le Van Thanh XO-Hoanh FO-Phuong CO-Nguyen Tam XO-Nguyen Xuan Binh PO-Quyut	2440GM Ba Hanh
409th Sapper Bn	MR V	Cong Ty, D-68, X-409, Bach Son Worksite, X-20, 575 Bn, K5 Sapper Unit, Then Tan Son		20.141 GM 20.144 GM Bac Hien 1295 Bac Hien
70th Indep Bn		35th Bn, Phi Coi 2009, Chu Song, Truong Son 70, F-07, Inter-Mt-White Tiger Bn, 103, Binh Gia Bn	CO-Nguyen Van Hghai	1784 HC 20

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ANNEX B (ASTRONOMICAL DATA, WEATHER FORECAST) - 1ST MAE DIV PERINTREE NO. 16-67

DATE	EMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	ELECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	MOON PHASE	% ILLUM
AUG 1	0605	0628	1918	1941	0213	1606	1ST QTR	27
2	0605	0628	1918	1941	0323	1703		19
3	0606	0629	1917	1940	0420	1759		11
4	0606	0629	1917	1940	0622	1942		02
5	0606	0629	1917	1940	0622	1942		02
6	0606	0629	1916	1939	0622	1942	NEW	00
7	0606	0629	1916	1939	0724	2028		01
8	0607	0630	1915	1938	0823	2111		05
9	0607	0630	1915	1938	0922	2151		11
10	0607	0630	1914	1937	1919	2232		19
11	0608	0631	1914	1937	1116	2314		29
12	0608	0631	1913	1936	2315	2358	1ST QTR	40
13	0608	0631	1913	1936	1316	---		52
14	0608	0631	1912	1935	1418	0046		63
15	0608	0631	1912	1935	1520	0139		73


WEATHER FORECAST

The predicted weather for the week of 31 July-6 August should offer no restrictions to tactical plans. The temperature will average 97 and 75 degrees respectively. The humidity will average 70%. The skies will be overcast in the early mornings and late afternoon with the possibility of some afternoon showers. Predicted lunar illumination ranges from 36% on the 31st to 0% on the 6th of August, however, overcast skies will cause the actual illumination to be considerably less.

CONFIDENTIAL

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C	How
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RR RUMHVH  
 DE RUMMF 021 1823548  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 CLI -I- CG TF OREGON

R 010548Z JUL 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG TF OREGON  
 RUMHVH/I CORPS ADV GRP  
 RUMHVH/CO C FIFTH SECA  
 INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAF

G 3 TOR 011455  
 222

*CC*

BT  
 S E C R E T

ARC LIGHT PROGRAM BDA  
 A. FORCE/SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS ORDER 003120.1A  
 1. PARA 7D OF REF A STATES "THE MOST GLARING WEAKNESS IN EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARC LIGHT STRIKES IS LACK OF INFORMATION BASED ON GROUND FOLLOW-UP. THEREFORE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT INITIATING COMMANDS MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO ACCOMPLISH GROUND EXPLOITATION OF ARC LIGHT STRIKES WHERE LOCATION, TERRAIN AND TACTICAL SITUATION PERMIT."  
 2. IF GROUND EXPLOITATION NOT FEASIBLE, INITIATING COMMANDS ARE REQUESTED TO SCHEDULE AERIAL OBSERVATION OF THE TARGET AREA AS

PAGE TWO RUMMF 021 S E C R E T  
 SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER EACH STRIKE.  
 3. THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMELY BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF ARC LIGHT STRIKES CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED; THEREFORE EVERY CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO OBTAINING RESULTS OF STRIKES BY EITHER GROUND EXPLOITATION, AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OR BOTH.

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CG 111 MAF 010548 JULY 67

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TRANS TO RUMHNE VAMHVN RUMNVG RUMNVH

010000Z JUL 67 182300Z

FM RUMHNE

TO RUMHFL/CG FIVE SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

INFO RUMHFL/CG FIVE SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

INFO RUMHFL/CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

INFO RUMHFL/CG FIRST MARDIV/OPCON

INFO RUMHFL/CG III MAF

INFO RUMHFL/CG I MAF

RUMHFL/CG FIVE SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMHFL/CG FIVE SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMHFL/CG I CORPS

RUMHFL/CG I MAF

INFO RUMHFL/CG I MAF TERMINATED 011200Z JUL 67.

RUMHFL/CG I MAF

010000Z JUL 67

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CONFIDENTIAL

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**SECRET**

REF ID: A684 S E C R E T  
TUNEL. CONTACTS DURING JUN 67 INDICATE AO CONTAINS 30-50  
UNARMED AND AGGRESSIVE LOCAL GUERRILLAS. AO ALSO CONTAINS  
SEVERAL KNOWN ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION TRAVELLED BY LOCAL  
POLICE AND MAIN FORCE UNITS.

SP-4  
A

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
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RUMHFL RUMHVX  
 RUMHLA 0235 1840729  
 LSSSSS

P 030729Z JUL 67  
 CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 ZEN/CG III MAF  
 HFL/CG FLC  
 W/CG FIRST MAW  
 INVH/CG I CORPS  
 P/FIFTH MAR  
 N/FIRST MAR  
 D/FIRST MT BN  
 N/FIRST ENGR BN  
 N/ELEVENTH MAR

DRAFTER G-4  
 RELEASER G-4  
 CONCURRENCE:

MTD  
 C-2  
 C-3  
 S-RO  
 CEO  
 SNGRO



→ COG  
 → COUR

WFO RUMHFL/FLSG BRAVO  
 EN/SEVENTH ENGR BN → COUR.  
 EN/NINTH ENGR BN

SECRET

- CHANGE TWO TO FRAG O 77-67 (ROUGH RIDER)
- CG FIRST MARDIV MSG 290803Z JUNE 67
- CG FIRST MARDIV MSG 300951Z JUNE 67
- CG FIRST MARDIV MSG 300955Z JUNE 67

CHANGE TWO RUMHLA 0235 SECRET

IN ADDITION TO CHANGES LISTED REF B TO REF A FURTHER CHANGE  
 A AS FOLLOWS:

- A. CHANGE PAR 1 TO READ: RETURN 4 JULY 67 VICE 5 JULY 67.
- B. CHANGE PARA 5.A(3) TO READ: PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH  
 RIDER CONVOY APPROX 30 VEH, BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES IN  
 CONVOY RON TAM KY AREA.
- C. CHANGE PAR 5.F (3) (B) TO READ: TAM KY TO DANANG 041300H  
 67 OR AS OTHERWISE DIR BY THIS HQ.
- 2. FOR FORLOGCMD: REQ DELAY LSA DEPLOYMENT FROM TAM KY TO VIC  
 63 UNTIL LSA SITE AND INGRESS ROADS PREPARED.
- 3. FOR FIFTH MAR: ADVISE THIS HQ WHEN LSA SITE PREPARED. DIRECT  
 AUTH. REFER REF C.


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CG FIRST MARDIV P 030729Z JUL 67

30

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C C

DE RUMBLA 0292 1842147  
BY 00000

032147 JUL 67  
 1ST BN FIRST MAR DIV REIN  
 2ND BN FIRST MAR  
 3RD BN SEVENTH MAR  
 4TH BN SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
 5TH BN ELEVENTH MAR

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASES G-3

CONFIDENTIAL  
ATTACKS ON CAC UNITS(U)

RECENT INCIDENTS INVOLVING ATTACKS ON CAC UNITS ARE  
 INDICATIVE OF IMPORTANCE OF THESE ACTIVITIES TO THE ENEMY.  
 IT IS REQUESTED THAT ALL COMMANDERS REVIEW SECURITY MEASURES  
 FOR THEIR UNITS. REVIEW SHOULD INCLUDE CONTINGENCY PLANS  
 FOR SUPPORTING FIRES. PROVISIONS SHOULD BE MADE  
 TO REVOKE CAP'S ON TEMPORARY BASIS WHEN PERSONNEL STRENGTH IS  
 BELOW LEVEL REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE SECURITY.


1ST BN FIRST MAR DIV

P 032147Z JULY 67

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL



K	OIC
C	AME

RUMMF 232 1850234  
 NY CCOCC  
 040230Z JUL 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 CG FORLOGMCD  
 CG FIRST MP BN  
 BT

G 3 ADV AT TOR 040500  
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CONFIDENTIAL

COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS QUANG NAM SECTOR

1. COMMAND OF CAPS IN QUANG NAM SECTOR WILL PASS AT 020800Z JUL 67 TO THE DANANG PROVISIONAL COMBINED ACTION GROUP HEADQUARTERS. COMBINED ACTION COMPANY (CAC) HEADQUARTERS IN THE QUANG NAM SECTOR WILL PASS AT SAME TIME TO OPCON OF DANANG CAG.

2. MARINE BATTALIONS WILL PROVIDE TO CAPS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE TAORS FIRE SUPPORT, REACTION FORCES, MEDEVAC SUPPORT AND COMBAT ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED AND REQUESTED. THE CAP MARINE SQUAD LEADER AND/OR THE CAC CMDR WILL COORDINATE WITH THE PROXIMATE MARINE BATTALION COMMANDER THE FOREGOING AS WELL AS CAP PATROL/COMBAT/INTEL EFFORTS. THE MARINE CAP SQUAD LDR WILL PASS INTELLIGENCE INFO AS ACQUIRED TO THE PROXIMATE TACTICAL BATTALION.

3. THE MARINE ELEMENT OF A CAP WILL BE PROVIDED LOGISTIC SUPPORT BY

PAGE TWO RUMMF 323 CONFIDENTIAL

THE PROXIMATE MARINE BATTALION. THIS SUPPORT WILL INCLUDE ROUTINE SUPPLY AND RESUPPLY OF CLASS I, CLASS II-TYPE 2, CLASS III AND CLASS V ITEMS. SUPPLY ACTION FOR MAJOR ITEMS AND ITEMS FOR CAP CIVIC ACTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED VIA THE COMBINED ACTION CHAIN OF COMMAND: I.E. CAC HQTRS, CAG, III MAF.

4. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION LESS MAINTENANCE OF SRP'S AND UNIT DIARIES OF COMBINED ACTION PERSONNEL IN THE QUANG NAM SECTOR WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY THE DANANG CAG. UPON RECEIPT OF THE DANANG CAG RUC ONLY PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION FOR CA PERSONNEL IN THE QUANG NAM SECTOR WILL PASS TO THE DANANG CAG.

5. GRADUATES OF THE III MAF CAC SCHOOL CONDUCTED BY THE DANANG CAG WILL BE EARMARKED FOR SUBSEQUENT DUTY WITH A CAP AS REPLACEMENTS OF FOR CADRE IN ACTIVATION OF NEW CAPS.


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CG 111 MAF 040230 JULY 67

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DX 10 0334 1850635

7 JUL 67

040635Z JUL 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO FIRST MARINES

FIFTH MARINES

SEVENTH MARINES

SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES

NORTHERN SECTOR, DIV REAR AREA

SOUTHERN SECTOR, DIV REAR AREA

DRAFTE 3

RELEASED 6 3

SECRET

SYSTEM SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF III MAF

CAMPAIGN PLAN 1-67.

CG III MAF 03063Z PASEP

REF A SETS FORTH THE REQUIREMENT FOR SUBJECT SUMMARY.

ADDRES ARE REQUESTED TO SUBMIT SUMMARY FOR THEIR AREAS

BY 1 JULY 1967. SUMMARIES WILL COVER ONLY PARA 3C

SECTION 31 OF REF AND WILL BE IN FORMAT PRESCRIBED

BY PARA 4 OF REF A.

0334 SECRET

THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS ARE APPLICABLE:

1. DIRECT SUPPORT OF PROVISIONAL RD ACTIVITIES:

OPNS CONDUCTED BY UNITS, EITHER UNDER OPCON OF SECTOR

COMMANDER OR IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF SECTOR OPNS, TO EST-

ABLISH AND MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR SPECIFIED HAMLETS AND

VILLAGES IN WHICH RD ACTIVITIES ARE SCHEDULED, OR ARE IN

PROGRESS, IAW AN APPROVED PROVISIONAL RD PLAN. THESE

INCLUDE:

OPNS TO CLEAR VC/NVA MAIN ORCE UNITS AND

ORGANIZED GUERRILLA FORCES FROM SPECIFIC AREAS IN WHICH

IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON RD ACTIVITIES ARE SCHEDULED.

OPNS TO DESTROY VC GUERRILLA OR INFRAS-

TRUCTURE ELEMENTS WITHIN SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE RD ACTIVITIES

ARE IN PROGRESS OR WHERE IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON RD ACTIVITIES

ARE SCHEDULED. CORDON AND SEARCH OPNS, E.G. COUNTY FAIR,

APPLY TO RD ONLY WHEN CONDUCTED IN COORD WITH LOCAL

GOVT OFFICIALS IN HAMLETS SCHEDULED FOR RD ACTIVITIES.

OPNS IN CONJUNCTION WITH PROVINCIAL MILITARY

AND POLICE FORCES TO PROVIDE LOCAL SECURITY FOR POP-

ULATION AND GOVT CADRE OR OTHER GOVT ELEMENTS IN HAMLET

CG 1ST MAR DIV 040635 JULY 67 PAGE 1 OF 2

040635Z JUL

13

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PAGE 3 RUMMLA 0334 S E C R E T

AND VILLAGE AREAS WHERE RD ACTIVITIES ARE IN PROGRESS.

B. INDIRECT SUPPORT OF PROVISIAL RD ACTIVITIES:

OPNS TO PREVENT INCURSIONS OF VC/NVA MAIN FORCES INTO AREAS WHERE RD ACTIVITIES ARE IN PROGRESS, THESE INCLUDE ONLY THOSE OPNS CONDUCTED ADJACENT TO AREAS UNDERGOING RD AND AGAINST EN FORECES THAT POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO THESE AREAS.

C. RESOURCES CONTROL AND RESTORATION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC) OPNS TO BRING NATL RESOURCES, PRINCIPALLY RICE AND SALT, UNDER GOVT CONTROL; DENY THEM TO EN; AND SECURE VITAL ROAD, RAIL AND WATER LOC'S FOR FREE USE OF SVN. THESE INCLUDE:

1) OPNS TO PROTECT HARVESTS OF RICE, SALT, AND OTHER CROPS.

2) CHECKPOINT OPNS TO PROTECT AND CONTROL MOVEMENT OF GOODS ALONG LOCS.

3) OPNS TO ELIMINATE VC TAX COLLECTION POINTS.

4) OPNS TO OPEN AND SECURE ROAD, RAIL, AND WATER LOC'S.

5) OPNS TO ELIMINATE VC/NVA INTERDICTION OF

PAGE 4 RUMMLA 0334 S E C R E T

ROAD, RAIL, AND WATER LOC'S.

D. DEFENSE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CENTERS: OPNS TO CONDUCT ACTIVE DEFENSES OF THE NATL CAPITAL, REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL CAPITALS, DISTRICT TOWNS AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CENTERS. THESE OPNS DO NOT INCLUDE DEFENSE OF MILITARY AREAS AND INSTALLATIONS ETC, MILITARY AIR BASES AND LOGISTICAL COMPLEXES.

PAGE 2 OF 2

**SECRET**

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COC


10 040947Z JUL 67  
 1ST CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 1ST CG FIRST MAW  
 FIRST MARINES  
 SEVENTH MARINES  
 ELEVENTH MARINES  
 FIRST RECON BN  
 FIRST SP BN

DRIFTER G 3  
 RELEASER C OF S  
 CONCUR G 2  
 G 3

SECRET

- FRAG O 79-67 (OPN ELLIOT) (U)
1. COMMENCING 05 JUL 67 FIRST MAR CONDUCTS REGT MINUS REIN  
 2ND OPN IN SOUTHWEST PORTION SECTOR OF RESPONSIBILITY TO  
 CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES AND SUPPLIES IN AREA.
  2. EXECUTION
    - A. FIRST MAR
      - (1) CONCEPT OF OPN ELLIOT APPROVED, EXECUTE.
      - (2) RECEIVE BN CMD GRP AND TWO RIFLE CO'S REIN  
 IN SEVENTH MAR. TRANSFER OF OPCON 050420H JUL 67.
    - B. SEVENTH MAR. CHOP BN CMD GRP AND TWO RIFLE CO'S

PAGE TWO DKIU 0385 SECRET

- REF AS INDICATED ABOVE FOR EMPLOYMENT OPN ELLIOT.
- C. ELEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED.
  - D. FIRST RECON BN. PROVIDE SCUBA TM SPT AS REQUIRED.
  - E. FIRST SP BN. PROVIDE HST SPT AS REQUIRED.
  - F. CODED INSTRNS
    - (1) DURLAUGH ALCON
    - (2) EST DURATION. THREE DAYS
    - (3) ALL CHOPPED AND SPIG ELMS RETURN PARENT CMD
  - G. TERMINATION OPN UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED.
  - H. 1ST CG FMAW: REQUEST PROVIDE HELICOPTER GROUPS Y AND  
 MED EVAC DURING OPN AS REQUIRED.

GP-4  
BT

12

1ST MARDIV 040947 JULY 67

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SECRET

PP RUMHVP  
DE RUMHVA 0418 189130  
ZNY SBSSS

041800Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV TO HQ IN  
TO THIRD AMTRAC BN  
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

DRAFTER G 3  
REF PAPER C/R  
CONCUR C 1  
EMBO  
G-1

SECRET

FRAG 78-67 (REDISTRIBUTION OF AMTRAC ASSETS)

- A. CG III MAF 030330Z JUL 67.
- B. FOR O 4020.54
- 1. REF A DIRECTS TRANSFER AMTRAC PLAT TO THIRD MARDIV IN VIEW CURRENT REQUIREMENTS IN THIRD MARDIV AREA.
- 2. THIRD AMTRAC BN.
  - A. MOVE REMAINING PLAT FIRST AMTRAC BN TO COMA VIET BY 7 JULY 67. CHOP TO THIRD MARDIV ON ARRIVAL.
  - B. SUBMIT EMB REQ IAW FIG 4-2 REF B TO THIS HQ NLT 051300H. ADVISE ANY LOGISTICS PROBLEMS IN DIRECTED MOVE.

BT

31 MAR DIV 041700 JULY 67

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K	OIC
C	ADIC
MW	

DRAFTER C/S  
RELEASER CG

CL

060347Z JUL 67  
 060347Z JUL 67

ENEMY ATTACKS  
 FIRST MARDIV (OPCON) KEEP FOR ACTION, PASS TO NCOIC  
 ALL COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS UNDER YR OPCON  
 CG III MAF 240218Z JUL 67 (PASEP)

*Cmd  
Chenby*

THE ENEMY ATTACK ON NONG SON IS TYPICAL OF WHAT MAY  
 BE EXPECTED FROM THE VC AT ANY TIME: NAMELY, A WELL  
 PLANNED, WELL EXECUTED ATTACK WITH MORTARS, BANGALORE  
 MORTARS, SATCHEL CHARGES, M-79'S, RECOILLESS RIFLES,  
 FLAME THROWERS AND INFANTRY AGAINST AN OUTPOST, A  
 COMBAT BASE OR A COMBINED ACTION PLATOON. EVERY  
 POSITION MUST BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE SUCH AN ATTACK  
 AND TO DEFEAT IT IF IT OCCURS. THE FOLLOWING DEFENSIVE  
 PRINCIPLES AND MEASURES MUST BE IN EFFECT:  
 A. DEFENSIBLE TERRAIN - TERRAIN SHOULD BE

B. TWO RUNWAYS 0581 S...  
 SELECTED TO AFFORD OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE  
 OVER AVENUES OF ENEMY APPROACH. WHERE APPROPRIATE,  
 OBSERVATION MUST BE IMPROVED BY USE OF TOWERS;  
 WHERE NECESSARY, FIELDS OF FIRE MUST BE CLEARED.  
 C. SECURITY - AIR OBSERVERS, PATROLS, OUTPOSTS,  
 OBSERVATION POSTS, TWO MAN LISTENING POSTS, SEISMIC  
 ALARM DEVICES (SID'S), SURVEILLANCE RADARS, INFRARED  
 NIGHT VISION DEVICES, TRIP FLARES, SEARCH  
 LIGHTS, AND OTHER ILLUMINATION MEANS SHOULD ALL BE  
 USED AS AVAILABLE TO ENHANCE SECURITY. OUTPOSTS, OBSERVATION AND  
 LISTENING POSTS MUST NOT FOLLOW SET PATTERNS; THEY MUST  
 HAVE COMMUNICATIONS. THE BASIC REQUIREMENT IS A HIGH  
 DEGREE OF ALERTNESS AND READINESS WITHIN THE POSITION  
 ITSELF IN ORDER TO AVOID SURPRISE.  
 D. OBSTACLES - AVENUES OF APPROACH SHOULD BE  
 COVERED BY ADEQUATE OBSTACLES SUCH AS MINES AND/OR  
 DOUBLE APRON WIRE LAID WHERE THEY CAN BE OBSERVED  
 AND COVERED BY DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS.  
 WHENEVER POSSIBLE, WIRE MUST BE BEYOND HAND GRENADE  
 RANGE FROM DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.

37

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PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 0581 ~~SECRET~~  
 2. PROTECTIVE FIRES - AVENUES OF APPROACH MUST  
 BE COVERED BY INTERLOCKING BANDS OF FINAL DEFENSIVE  
 FIRING FROM MUTUALLY SUPPORTING POSITIONS. FIRING  
 SEQUENCES MUST BE LOW ENOUGH TO PERMIT GRAZING FIRE  
 AND WIDE ENOUGH TO COVER WIDE FIELDS OF FIRE. FINAL  
 PROTECTIVE FIRES OF ARTILLERY AND MORTARS MUST BE  
 REGISTERED AND IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE AROUND AND  
 WITHIN THE POSITION. PREARRANGED PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS  
 WILL BE USED TO CALL FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRES IN CASE  
 OF COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE. CLAYMORE MINES, FOGASSES,  
 FLAMETHROWERS AND OTHER SPECIAL WEAPONS SHOULD BE  
 USED, AS APPROPRIATE.

3. COVER AND CONCEALMENT - IN ADDITION TO NATURAL  
 COVER AND CONCEALMENT, BUNKERS AND FIELD FORTIFICATIONS  
 MUST BE ADEQUATE TO WITHSTAND AN ENEMY ARTILLERY  
 BARRAGE OR MORTAR BARRAGE FOLLOWED BY AN INFANTRY  
 ATTACK. ENTRANCES WILL BE LARGE ENOUGH TO ALLOW  
 RAPID ENTRY AND EGRESS. POSITIONS MUST BE MUTUALLY  
 SUPPORTING, HAVE ALTERNATE LOCATIONS AND BE IN DEPTH.  
 IF POSITIONS ARE ON HIGH GROUND, BE DEEP TO PROVIDE

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 0581 ~~SECRET~~  
 4. AMBUSH SILHOUETTE: ON LOW GROUND, MONSOON RAINS  
 MAY REQUIRE AN ELEVATED POSITION. A COMMAND BUNKER  
 TO INCLUDE COMMUNICATIONS GEAR SHOULD BE CENTRALLY  
 LOCATED, WELL WITHIN THE PERIMETER. WHERE FEASIBLE,  
 ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE LOCATED IN A SEPARATE  
 POSITION. QUARTERS AND OTHER COMMON USE FACILITIES  
 WILL ALSO BE LOCATED INSIDE, NOT ON THE PERIMETER, AND  
 BE BARRICADED IN ALL CASES.

5. RESERVE/COUNTERATTACK - IF OBSTACLES ARE  
 BREACHED AND THE POSITION IS PENETRATED, THERE MUST  
 BE A RESERVE UNIT AND COUNTERATTACK PLAN READY TO  
 REVERSE AND DESTROY THE ATTACKER WITH MAXIMUM FORCE  
 AND FIRE POWER AVAILABLE.

6. IN ADDITION TO THE TYPE OF ATTACK DESCRIBED ABOVE,  
 THERE IS ANOTHER BY WHICH THE ENEMY COULD CAUSE DAMAGE  
 OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE EFFORT HE WOULD EXPEND;  
 NAMELY, A ROCKET/MORTAR ATTACK AGAINST THE DANANG  
 AIRFIELD.

7. UNIT COMMANDERS WILL REEXAMINE DEFENSE PLANS AND  
 INSURE THAT THEIR UNITS ARE PREPARED TO COPE WITH

PAGE 2 OF 3

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
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THREE FIVE RUMHLA 0581 [REDACTED]  
 FURTHER TYPE OF ATTACK DESCRIBED ABOVE. IN THE CASE  
 OF THE ROCKET/MORTAR ATTACK, INSURE THAT NIGHT PATROLS  
 AND AMBUSHES ARE TARGETED AGAINST THE ROCKET LAUNCHING  
 AREA - 17 THOUSAND METERS FROM THE AIRFIELD AND  
 AGAINST LIKELY MORTAR SITES. INSURE THAT OP'S AND  
 COMMUNICATIONS ARE ALERT AND FUNCTIONING, THAT  
 ARTILLERY FIRES ARE READY FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY  
 AND THAT GROUND REACTION IS ALERT AND RESPONSIVE.

PAGE 3 OF 3

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06 000415Z JUL 67  
FM 1ST MAR DIV REIN  
TO 7TH MAR

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER C/S

CC

06 000415Z JUL 67  
FM 1ST MAR DIV REIN  
TO 7TH MAR

BT

A. OP FIRST MARDIV REIN 040947Z JUL 67 (FRAG 0 79-67)  
FRAG 0 80-67 (SEVENTH MAR SWEEP OPN)

1. SITUATION. IN SITUATION DICTATES SWEEP OF AREA SOUTH  
OF 6000 THU BOM IN SEVENTH MAR SECTOR OF RESPONSIBILITY.

2. PLAN  
a. CONCEPT. COMMENCING 6 JUL 67 SEVENTH MAR CONDUCTS  
BN MINS REIN SWEEP OPN IN SEVENTH MAR AREA SOUTH AND EAST  
OF 6000 THU BOM.

b. 0107 MAR. REF 061200H JUL CHOP BN CMD GRP AND TWO  
BPLT BPS PROVIDED BY SEVENTH MAR FOR OPN ELLIOT SAN REF

3. SEVENTH MAR.

4. 0107 MAR. REF 061200H JUL RESUME OPON BN CMD GRP AND TWO  
BPLT BPS IN FIRST MAR.

5. CONDUCT SWEEP IN SOUTHERN PORTION  
OF SEVENTH MAR SOR TO LOCATE AND DESTROY EN FORCES

6. SATELATION OF OPN INTO SOR OF SECOND BN FIFTH  
MAR DEPENDENT ON EN SITUATION AND NECESSARY  
ACTION OF SECOND BN FIFTH MAR.

- 7. COMBAT INSTANS.
- 8. 3-DAY DURATION. 061200H JUL 67.
- 9. TENTATIVE DURATION. 06-67 JUL 67.
- 10. AIRLIFT.

BT

06 000415Z JUL 67

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**SECRET**



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<i>C</i>	<i>ABC</i>
<i>M</i>	

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14-00000 0701 1880227  
14-00000

070227Z JUL 67  
 1ST MAR DIV REIN  
 1ST MAR  
 1ST MAR  
 1ST MAR  
 1ST MAR  
 1ST MAR / OPCON

DRAFTER: G-3 OP  
RELEASER: G-3


~~██████████~~  
C. W. ELLIOT CIP  
C. W. ELLIOT TERMINATED 062400H JUL 67.

1ST MAR DIV 070227Z JUL 67

~~**SECRET**~~

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~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED



OO RUMHFL RUMHVH RUMHVP  
DE RUMHLA 1109 1911537  
ZNY SSSSS

O 101537Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMHFL/CG FLC  
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN  
ZEN/FIRST MT BN  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN  
ZEN/FIRST MED BN

Retain  
in WO  
Box

DEPARTMENT	3
RELEASE	4-6-3
C	

INFO RUMHVH/CG I CORPS  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN  
BT

- FRA G O 82-67 (ROUGH RIDER)(U)
- A. CG III MAF 100726Z JUL 67
- B. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)
- C. THIRD MARDIV ADMINO 416-66 (NOTAL)

- PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1109 ~~SECRET~~
- D. FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN67 (NOTAL)
  - E. FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C (COI)(NOTAL)
  - F. THIRD MARDIV P2000.2E (COI)(NOTAL)
  - 1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SCHEDULED 12 JULY TO MOVE 63 THIRD MARDIV VEH FROM DANANG TO PHU BAI AND TO RETURN CONTROL ELEMENT TO DANANG.
  - 2. FOR CG III MAF
    - A. REQUEST H&S CO III MAF AND FIFTH COMM BN DRIVERS REPORT TO 11TH MT BN BY 111300H JULY.
    - B. REQUEST PROVIDE THREE M36 VEH AND SUITABLE BRIDGING FOR CONVOYS.
    - C. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOC'S.
  - 3. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV
    - A. REQUEST 35 MT OPERATORS AND TWO SNCO'S IAW REF A REPORT TO ELEVENTH MT BN BY 111600H JULY.
    - B. REQUEST ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND PROVIDE RIFLES CO MINUS REIN AS CONVOY RESERVE WHILE ROUGH RIDER IN THIRD MARDIV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.
    - C. THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CONVOY SCTY OF RIFLE FLAT REIN W/ARTY

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN O 101537Z JUL 67 PAGE 1 OF 3

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
14  
(15)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

- PAGE 3 RUMHLA 1109 ~~SECRET~~  
 FO AND FAC, AND ENGR SPT, COMM VEH AND WRECKERS.  
 D. REQUEST ARRANGE FOR RETURN OF 98 PERSONNEL BY AIR AFTER  
 CONVOY ARRIVAL 12 JULY IF CONVOY REQUIRES ROC PHU BAI.  
 E. REQUEST PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOY APPROX  
 THIRTY VEH ARRIVING PHU BAI 12 JULY, AND BILLETING AND MESSING  
 FACILITIES FOR CONVOY PERSONNEL IN EVENT RON REQUIRED.  
 F. CHOP POPNT: BOUNDARY BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV.  
 4. FOR CG FMAW: REQUEST 11 DRIVERS IAW REF A REPORT TO ELEVENTH  
 MT BN BY 111300H JULY.  
 5. FOR FLC: REQUEST MAKE AVAILABLE 13 DRIVERS IAW REF A TO ELE-  
 VENTH MT BN BY 111400H JULY AT YOUR CP. THIS HQ WILL MAKE ADD-  
 ITIONAL DRIVERS AVAILABLE YOUR CP BY 111400H TO ASSIST IN VEH  
 PREP.  
 6. EXECUTION  
 A. SEVENTH MAR  
 (1) PROVIDE ONE RIFLE PLAT REIN WITH MED PERSONNEL,  
 FAC'S, AND FO'S IAW REF B.  
 (2) ASSIGN ONE RIFLE CO REIN AS CONVOY RESERVE IAW  
 REF B. WHILE CONVOY IS WITHIN FIRST MARDIV TAOR.  
 B. ELEVENTH MAR

PAGE 2 OF 3

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PAGE 4 RUMHLA 1109 S E C R E T

- (1) PROVIDE 25 DRIVERS TO ELEVENTH MT BN BY 111300H JUL.
- 2) PROVIDE ARTILLERY SUPPORT AS REQUIRED BY REF 3.
- C. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUMZ MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3.G REF 3.
- D. FOR FIRST MT BN: PROVIDE 20 DRIVERS TO REPORT ELEVENTH MT BN BY 111300H JULY.
- F. ELEVENTH MT BN:
- 1) REF B AS APPLICABLE.
- 2) IN ADDITION TO DRIVERS FOR CONVOY CONTROL ELEMENT, PROVIDE 15 DRIVERS FOR THIRD MARDIV VEH.
- G. COORD INST:
- 1) REFS B AND C AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS DANANG TO PHU BAI.
- 2) CHECK POINTS: REFS C AND C.
- (3) D-DAY H-HOUR
- (A) DANANG TO PHU BAI: 120630H JULY 67.
- (B) PHU BAI TO DANANG: 121300H JULY 67 OR AS DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.


PAGE 5 RUMHLA 1109 S E C R E T

- (4) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT, CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.
- (5) DIRLAUTH ALCON.
7. COMM ELECT
- A. REFS E AND F.
- B. SEVENTH MAR: MONITOR THIRD MARDIV TAC 1, M-15 FREQ 2244 COMMENCING 120600H JULY UNTIL CONVOY RETURNS DANANG.
- GP-4
- BT


PAGE 3 OF 3

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COC



00 RUMHVV RUMNVH  
DE RUMHLA 1111 19115479  
ZNY SSSSS

0 101545Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN  
ZEN/THIRD MAC BN  
RUMNVH/DSA I CORPS  
RUMHVV/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER G-3

BT

S E C R E T

CONCEPT OPN GEM

1. MISSION. COMMENCING 12 JULY SEVENTH MAR CONDUCTS EN (-)  
(REIN) SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES IN  
AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG VU GIA, ON EAST BY SONG THU BON, ON  
SOUTH BY E-W GL 45 AND ON WEST BY N-S GL ZC21, TO CAPTURE OR  
DESTROY EN FORCES, FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES THEREIN.

2. CONCEPT

A. PHASE ONE. COMMENCING D-DAY ONE EN (-) (REIN) SEVENTH  
MAR ESTABLISHES BLOCKING PSNS NORTH BANK OF SONG VU GIA BTWN N-S

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1111 S E C R E T

GL'S AT 81 AND AT 90. ARVN TASK FORCE BRAVO IS LIFTED BY USMC  
AMTRACS INTO NORTHEAST CORNER OF AO AND ATKS NORTHWEST. BOUNDARY  
ON LEFT IS LINE FR AT877513 TO AT856558. ARVN TASK FORCE ALFA  
ENTERS AO BY APC'S VIC AT 870508 AND ATKS NORTHWEST. BOUNDARY ON  
LEFT IS LINE FR AT 865500 TO AT820547.

B. PHASE TWO. COMMENCING D PLUS 3 BN (-) (REIN) SEVENTH MAR  
HEL LIFTED TO BLOCKING PSNS GENERALLY ALONG LINE FR AT 8050 TO  
AT8046 TO AT8346. ARVN TASK FORCES ALFA AND BRAVO CONDUCT S&D  
OPN SOUTHWEST FM PHASE ONE PSNS TO USMC BN. ALL FORCES WITHDRAW  
FM AO EASTWARD TO AN HOA O/A D PLUS 5.

3. TASK ORGANIZATION

USMC: THIRD BN (-) (REIN) SEVENTH MAR (THREE CO'S)

ARVN: (OPM BINH QUANH 6)

CMD GRP QUANG DA SPEC ZONE

TASK FORCE ALPHA

1ST BN 51ST REGT

2/4 APC TRP

EN GR PLAT

TASK FORCE BRAVO

37TH RGR BN

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

0 101545Z JUL 67

PAGE 1 OF 2

COPIES

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1111 SE C R E T  
 39TH RGR BN  
 ENGR PLAT  
 RESERVE: 4TH BN 51ST REGT  
 USMC AUGMENTATION  
 TWO PLATS (-) THIRD AMTRAC BN  
 LN TM AND TWO FO TMS ELEVENTH MAR

4. D-DAY H-HOUR: 121400H JUN 67.

5. EST DURATION: 6 DAYS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

SECRET

SECRET

DE RUMMA 1120 1020301-

201 88885

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO FIRST MAR  
SEVENTH MAR  
EIGHTH MAR  
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
FIRST TK BN

DRAFTER 6-5

RELEASEN COMMAND M...

SECRET

CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR NOT-OBSERVED FIRE  
SUPPORT

ANNEX 1 (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO OPERATION ORDER 301-67  
THE PROVISIONS OF REF (A) ARE REEMPHASIZED. PAR 1 APPLIES  
PAR 2 (D), (E), (F), (1), (2), PAR 3 C (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6)  
AND (7) ARE ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT.

RECENT BACKLASH REPORTS RESULTING FROM UNOBSERVED FIRES AND  
SUPPORT STRINGS HAVE DEMANDED MY PERSONAL INVESTIGATION.  
CLEARANCE PROCEDURES, SUCH BACKLASH REPORTS STRICTLY INDICATE  
CIRCUMSTANCES ARE BEING GRANTED WHICH ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE

DE RUMMA 1120 SECRET

MEASURES MUST BE EMPLOYED TO PROTECT INNOCENT CIVILIANS FROM  
HARM BY THE USE OF UNOBSERVED SUPPORTING ARMS. THESE STRINGS  
IN ALL COMMANDS ARE DIRECTED TO RE-EVALUATE THEIR LOCAL  
LIAISON/CLEARING PROCEDURES WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, CIVILIAN  
AND MILITARY. WITH REGARD TO THE POSITIVE PROTECTION OF FRIENDLY  
POTENTIALLY FRIENDLY CIVILIANS,

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

1103017 JUL 67

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(17)

CONFIDENTIAL

COO



OO RUMHFL RUMHVH RUMHVP  
DE RUMHLA 1147 1920545  
ZNY CCCCC

O 110545Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
ZEN/CG III MAF  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/CG FMAW  
RUMHFL/CG FLC  
RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS  
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN  
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN  
ZEN/FIRST MT BN  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN  
ZEN/FIRST MED BN

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASES G-3  
CONCUR CEO

K	CS
C	W
M	

CC


BT  
CONFIDENTIAL  
CH 1 TO FRAG O 82-67 (ROUGH RIDER)(U)  
A. CG FIRST MARDIV 101537Z JUL 67  
B. CG THIRD MARDIV 060115Z JUL 67  
MAKE FOL CHANGES TO REF A:

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1147 CONFIDENTIAL  
A. INSERT PARA 6.E TO READ AS FOL:  
E. FIRST MED BN; PROVIDE 5 DRIVERS TO REPORT  
ELEVENTH MT BN BY 111300H JUL.  
B. PARA 7.B SUBSTITUTE M-756 RPT M756 FOR M-15.  
FREQ REMAINS SAME. REF B ASSIGNS NEW M-DESIGNATOR FOR  
SOME THIRD MARDIV FREQS. UTILIZE REF B AS REQUIRED WHEN OPERATING  
THIRD MARDIV NETS.

GP-4  
BT  
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 110545Z JUL 67

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COC

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
CG III MAF  
CG FLC  
FIFTH MAR  
ELEVENTH MAR  
FIRST ENGR BN  
FIRST SP BN  
FIRST MT BN  
INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAR  
RUMVH/DSA I CORPS  
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN

DRAFTER  
RELEASED  
CONCUR  
CG  
OPSC  
CG

	DIC
C	AME
DM	

CC

- FRAG O 83-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)
- A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 307955Z JUN67 (NOTAL)
- B. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN O 301-66 (NOTAL)
- C. FIRST MARDIV 270531Z MAY67 (NOTAL)
- D. FIRST MARDIV P02000.2C (CEOI) (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1203

1. IN SUPPORT OF REQUIREMENTS LISTED REF A ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SCHEDULED COMMENCING 13JUL 67 TO MOVE ELEMENTS FIFTH MAR MINUS REIN AND LSA FROM HILL 29 AND TAM KY TO VICINITY HILL 63 OVER PERIOD APPROX SEVEN DAYS.
2. FOR CG III MAF
  - A. REQUEST PROVIDE THREE M36 VEH AND SUITABLE BRIDGING FOR CONVOYS.
  - B. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOC'S.
3. FOR CG FLC: THIS HQ WILL PROVIDE VEH FOR RELOCATION OF TAM KY LSA APPROX 16JUL 67.
4. EXECUTION:
  - A. FIFTH MAR
    - (1) ASSUME OPCON CONVOY WHILE CONVOY OPERATING SOUTH OF DANANG TAOR.
    - (2) PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY AND RESERVE IAW PARA 3.1.1. OF REF B. CONVOY SECURITY TO INCLUDE MED PERSONNEL, FAC'S AND FO'S.
    - (3) COMMENCING 13JUL WHEN CONVOY ENTERS YOUR AOR, OF MAXIME AND COORDINATE ADDITIONAL ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS AS REQUIRED FOR THE RELOCATION OF FIFTH MAR MINUS REIN AND TAM KY LSA BY UTILIZATION

13

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 111355Z JUL 67 COPY NR PAGE 1 OF 2

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1203 [REDACTED]  
 CONVOY TASK ELEMENT PLACED UNDER YOUR OPCON. ORGANIZE ROUGH  
 RIDER FOR RETURN TO DANANG TAOR UPON COMPLETION OF RELOCATION.  
 B. ELEVENTH MAR: PROVIDE ARTILLERY SUPPORT IAW PAR 3.E.  
 REF B.  
 C. FIRST MT BN: PROVIDE CONVOY ELEMENT IAW PARA 3.F. REF B  
 TO CONSIST OF 25 M35A2C WITH 20 M105 VEH, REIN WITH DETS FIRST  
 AND SEVENTH ENGR BNS AND CONTROL ANF SERVICE VEH AS REQUIRED.  
 FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUM MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3.G. REF B.  
 FIRST SP BN: PROVIDE MHE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.  
 F. COORD INST:  
 (1) REF 3 AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS DANANG TO  
 CHU LAI.  
 (2) CHECK POINTS: REF C.  
 (3) D-DAY H-HOUR:  
 (A) DANANG TO HILL 63: 130800H JUL 67.  
 (B) BETWEEN HILL 63, HILL 29 AND TAM KY: AS DIRECTED  
 BY CO FIFTH MAR.  
 (C) HILL 63 TO DANANG: AS DIRECTED BY CO FIFTH MAR.  
 (4) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS REQUI RE  
 POSTPONEMENT, CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1203 [REDACTED]  
 ) DIRLAUTH ALCON.  
 5. COMM-ELECT  
 A. REF D.  
 B. FIRST MAR  
 FIFTH MAR  
 COMMENCING 130645H JUL MONITOR DIV CONVOY CONTROL NET  
 40.7 MC M-547.  
 C. COMM CO HQ BN: COMMENCING 130645H JUL MONITOR FOL NETS:  
 (1) DIV CONVOY CONTROL 40.7MC M-547.  
 (2) DIV SPECIAL PURPOSE (FM), 40.95MC M-714.  
 (3) DIV SPECIAL PURPOSE (HF) 3404KC M-79.  
 D. COMM SECURITY AIDS IAW REF D.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

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
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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1462 [REDACTED]  
 (2) CHECK POINTS: REF B.  
 3) D-DAY H-HOUR:  
 (A) DANANG TO HILL 63: 150800H JUL 67.  
 (B) HILL 63 TO DANANG 151230H JUL 67.  
 (4) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS REQUIRE  
 POSTPONEMENT, CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.  
 (5) DIRLAUTH ALCON.  
 4. COMM-ELECT  
 A. REF C, AS APPLICABLE DANANG TO CHU LAI.  
 B. FIRST MARINES  
 FIFTH MAR  
 COMMENCING 150645H JUL MONITOR DIV CONVOY CONTROL NET  
 FREQ 40.7 MC M-547.  
 C. COMM CO HQ BN: COMMENCING 150645H JULY MONITOR FOL NETS:  
 (1) DV CONVOY CONTROL 40.7MC M-547.  
 (2) DIV SPECIAL PURPOSE (FM) 50.96 MC M-714.  
 3) DIV SPECIAL PURPOSE (HF) 3404 KC M-79.  
 D. COMM SECURITY AIDS IAW REF C.  
 GP-4  
 BT

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	OIC
	Avic
DW	

CO  
CC

RUMHL  
 RUMHLA 1546 1951239  
 1539Z JUL 67  
 1ST MARDIV REIN  
 1ST CG III MAF  
 1ST CG FMAW  
 1ST CG FLC  
 7TH SEVENTH MAR  
 11TH ELEVENTH MAR  
 1ST FIRST RECON

RELEASED  
 CONCUR

G-5  
 C/S  
 G-2  
 G-4  
 AIRO  
 FSCC  
 G-3

SECRET

CONCEPT OPN BOULDER  
 MISSION. COMMENCING O/A 23JUL67 SEVENTH MAR CONDUCTS BN MINUS  
 RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE INTO HAPPY VALLEY IN FIRST MARDIV RZ  
 ALONG AXIS E-W GL ZC66 TO ESTABLISH FORWARD COMBAT BASE, CONDUCT  
 CHECK AND DESTROY OPN IN AREA, RECONNOITERING TO LIMIT OF SPTG  
 LIABILITY, AND (PREVENTING EN EMPLOYMENT OF VALLEY AS AVENUE OF  
 APPROACH FOR ATK ON DANANG.)  
 CONCEPT. PRIOR TO D-DAY FIRST MARDIV INCREASES RECON AND  
 SEARCHING EFFORT IN HAPPY VALLEY. ARTY ASSET REPOSITIONED TO  
 OPN. COMMENCING D-DAY ONE BN (-)(REIN) SEVENTH MAR

RUMHLA 1546 SECRET  
 REPOSITIONED TO VIC ZC1566 AND ESTABLISHES FORWARD COMBAT BASE. ONE  
 BATTERY INSERTED AND BN CONDUCTS DELIBERATE SEARCH AND DESTROY  
 EFFORT TO LOCATE AND DESTROY EN FORCES, FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES IN  
 AREA. RECON BN ELMS CONDUCT ACTIVE RECON EFFORT WESTWARD IN  
 AREA AND ADJACENT AREA TO LIMIT OF ARTY FAN. NO SUPPORTING  
 RECON, MANEUVER OR RECONNAISSANCE WILL BE CONDUCTED WEST OF N-S  
 LINE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FIRST MARDIV.  
 DUE TO USE OF TERRAIN, ENTRY AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCE AND LOG SPT  
 EFFORT ENTIRELY BY HELICOPTER AND WILL REQUIRE MORE EXTENSIVE USE  
 OF HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING SPT THAN NORMAL FOR OPN THIS SIZE.  
 ORGANIZATION  
 1ST BN (-)(REIN)  
 1ST 7TH COMM BN  
 1ST COMM CO, HQ BN  
 1ST BN (-)(REIN), 7TH MAR  
 THREE CO'S  
 1ST BN (-)(REIN), 2D BN, 7TH MAR  
 1ST PLAT, 1ST C, 1ST NGR BN  
 1ST SP BN (HST)  
 1ST RECON BN

15

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

THREE RUMHLA 1546 S E C R E T  
 BN (-)(REIN), 11TH MAR  
 BTRY G (DS)  
 ARTY GROUPMENT (GS)(REIN)  
 BTRY K (-)(REIN), 4TH BN, 11TH MAR  
 PLAT, 3D 155GUN BTRY  
 DAY: 20JUL67. H-HOUR: TBA  
 DURATION: 5-7 DAYS.

PAGE 2 OF 2

SECRET

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DRA. 101 4-5  
ST. 100 10-3  
CONFIDENTIAL: DEC  
G-4  
ORDS

CONFIDENTIAL: SECRET JUNE 67  
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED JAN 67 A  
SOME USE APPEARS FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE FOR USE AS  
TRENCH WEAPON. NO OFFENSIVE USE ANTICIPATED.  
IMPLEMENTATION CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITH AVAILABLE MATERIALS BUT  
WILL PROBABLY RESULT IN SOME INCREASE IN USAGE FACTOR OF  
SOME MATERIALS.

155 CARTRIDGE,  
FUEL THICKENER,  
MATERIALS, EG-6, DETONATING CORD, BLASTING



THESE ITEMS ARE SMALL AND CAN BE USED OVER LONG PERIODS,  
AND OCCASIONALLY, THIS WILL PROVIDE GOOD PSYCHOLOGICAL  
EFFECTS IN FIELDS OF FIRE AND HAVE TRAINING VALUE.

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NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PROPER EMPLOYMENT  
WITHIN AVAILABLE RESOURCES AVAILABLE WITHIN  
THE AREA.  
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BE MADE

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CC

COC

XVJ

DE RUMHLA 1672 1961401  
ZNY SSSSS

O 151401Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO FIRST MAR  
FIFTH MAR  
SEVENTH MAR  
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER C/S  
CONCUR G-2A  
G-3A  
G-2  
G-3

INFO CG III MAF  
FIRST RECON BN  
ELEVENTH MAR  
BT

SECRET

CONCEPT OF OPNS FOR PERIOD 20JUL - 15SEP67

A. CG III MAF 080548Z JUL 67

B. CG III MAF 120836Z JUL 67

C. FIRST MARDIV OPLAN 301-67

1. IAW REFS A AND B FOL PLANNING GUIDANCE ISSUED TO IMPLEMENT  
MSNS ASSIGNED BY REF C FOR PERIOD 20JUL- 15SEP67:

A. FIRST MAR

SEVENTH MAR

CONDUCT RECON AND PATROLS OPNS WITHIN ROCKET BELT TO

PAGE TWO RUMHAL 1672 SECRET

DENY EN ACCESS TO FIRING PSNS AGAINST VITAL BASE AREA.

B. FIFTH MAR. CONDUCT OPNS

IN THANG BINH - TAM KY - UE SON AREA

AND BASE AREA 116 WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO ACTIVE DEFENSE OF RD  
PRIORITY AREA.

C. SECOND BVP/FIFTH MAR. MAINTAIN PRESENT OPNS IN DEFENSE  
OF AN HOA INDUSTRIAL AREA.

D. COORD INSTRNS.

(1) CONDUCT RECON AND SURVEILLANCE OPNS IN AVENUES OF  
APPROACH TO DANANG VITAL BASE AREA.

(2) PROVIDE SPT FOR DEFENSE OF PROVINCE/DISTRICT CAPITALS,  
RD TEAMS AND COMBINED ACTION UNITS BY SPTG FIRES, HIGHLY  
RESPONSIVE REACTION FORCES, SATURATION PATROLLING AND SMALL UNIT  
OPNS.

2. FOL MAJOR OPNS PLANNED FOR PERIOD SHOWN IN PROBABLE SEQUENCE:

AREA DURATION PLANNING HQ FORCES  
HAPPY VALLEY 5-7 DAYS 7TH MAR

INF BN  
RECON ELMS  
2 ENS (1ST MARDIV),  
SLF, ARVN

THANG BINH-HIEP 21-30 DAYS 1S MARDIV  
DUC-TAM KY

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 151401Z JUL 67 PAGE 1 OF 2 COPY NR#

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(23)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMLA 1672 S E C R E T

TRIANGLE

SOUTH WEST OF 12-14 DAYS 1ST MAR 2 BNS (1ST MARDIV),

HOA/NONG SON SLE, ARVN

5. REPTS OF BN OR LARGER OPNS DESIRED WITHIN OR IN VIC OF ACTION  
 ADDEE SORS TO BE SUBMITTED THIS HQ NLT 181200Z H JUL67. FORMAT  
 FOR EACH BN OR LARGER OPN:

A. CMD GRP

B. SIZE OF UNIT(S) PARTICIPATING

C. TYPE OPN

D. AREE OF OPN (OUTLINE GENERAL AREA BY GRIDLINES, GIVING  
 NORTMERN BOUNDARY FIRST, THEN EASTERN, SOUTHERN AND WESTERN IN  
 THAT ORDER).

E. TIME DURING WHICH OPN TO BE CONDUCTED (FIRST OR LAST  
 OF MONTH)

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

SECRET

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*cbl*

01 RUMHFL RUMVH  
 02 RUMHFLA 1688 1970341  
 03 000000

04 150341Z JUL 67  
 05 CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 06 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR

DRAFTER: G-30P  
 RELEASER: G-3  
 CONCUR: OPSP  
 G-2

07 ZEN/CG III MAF  
 08 EN/CG FIRST MAW  
 09 RUMHFL/CG FLC  
 10 RUMH/DSA I CORPS  
 11 RUMH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE  
 12 EN/FIRST MARDIV GPCON


C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 OP GEN, TERMINATION OF  
 13 OPN GEN TERMINATED 151800H JUL 67

CG FIRST MARDIV 160341Z JUL 67

CONFIDENTIAL

(24)

SECRET



*K* *OIC*  
*W* *Avu*

OO RUMHFL  
DE RUMHLA 1766 19715 45  
ZNY SSSSS

O 161545Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/CG FMAW  
RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSR  
ZEN/FIRST MAR  
ZEN/FIFTH MAR  
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN  
ZEN/HQ BN  
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN  
ZEN/FIRST SP BN  
ZEN/SEVENTH COMM BN

DRAFTED: 3-3  
RELEASER: G-3  
CONCURRENCE: G-2, G-4, DIVAIFG

*CC*

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)  
BT

SECRET

FRAG O 85-67 (AUGMENTATION OPN BOULDER) (U)  
A. CO SEVENTH MAR LTR 3/LAP/BLP OVER 3000 OF 13 JUL 67  
1. COMMENCING O/A 20 JUL 67 SEVENTH MAR CONDUCTS BN MINUS REIN

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1766 SECRET  
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE INTO HAPPY VALLEY ALONG AXIS E-W GL ZCSG  
IN FIRST MARDIV RZ TO ESTABLISH FORWARD COMBAT BASE, CONDUCT S&D  
OPN IN AREA, RECONNOITERING TO LIMIT OF SPTG CAPABILITY, AND  
PREVENTING EN EMPLOYMENT OF VALLEY AS AVENUE OF APPROACH FOR ATK  
ON DAGANG.

2. EXECUTION

A. SEVENTH MAR

- (1) CONCEPT OPN BOULDER CONTAINED REF A APPROVED. EXECUTE.
- (2) RECEIVE AND EMPLOY ONE RIFLE CO EACH FM FIRST MAR AND FIFTH MAR IAW PARA 2, H. (1) BELOW.

B. ELEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT.

C. FIRST RECON BN. CHOP SIX RECON PLATS TO SEVENTH MAR AT MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME FOR PARTICIPATION OPN BOULDER.

D. HQ BN. PROVIDE COMM AND NP SPT

E. FIRST ENGR BN. PROVIDE ENGR SPT.

F. FIRST SP BN. PROVIDE HST SPT.

G. SEVENTH COMM BN. PROVIDE COMM SPT.

H. COORD INSTRNS

(1) FIRST MAR

FIFTH MAR

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

O 161545Z JUL 67 PAGE 1 OF 2

CCP#

*16*

SECRET

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1766 S E C R E T  
 CHOP ONE RIFLE CO TO SEVENTH MAR FOR EMPLOYMENT  
 WITHIN TAOR, TO ARRIVE AREA DESIG BY SEVENTH MAR MLT 1120H L-1.  
 (2) 1ST MARDIV UNITS PROVIDE SPT AS SPECIFIED AT PLANNING  
 CONFERENCES 9 AND 13 JULY.  
 (3) DIRLAUTH ALCON  
 (4) EST DURATION 5-7 DAYS.  
 (5) ALL CHOPPED AND SPTG ELMS RETURN PARENT CMD ON  
 TERMINATION OPN UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED.  
 3. FOR CG FMAW. REQUEST PREPLANNED HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING CPT AS  
 ARRANGED AT PLANNING CONFERENCES 9 AND 13 JULY 67 AND AS SPECIFIED  
 IN AIR REQUEST SUBMITTED SEPARATELY.  
 4. FOR CG FLC. REQUEST EOD TM SPT AS REQUIRED.  
 REQUEST LSA BE ESTABLISHED VICINITY SEVENTH MAR CP  
 AS ARRANGED AT PLANNING COFERENCES 9 - 13 JULY 67.  
 GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

**SECRET**

SECRET



COCC

K	
	OIC
	AM

CC

CG RUMHPL  
 CG RUMHLA 1833 1931329  
 ZNY 88333

0 171309Z JUL 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

DRAFTER G-3  
 RELEASER G-3

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG FMAW  
 RUMHPL/CG FLC  
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON

SECRET

FRAGO 36-67 (BOUNDARY CHANGE)

1. PRESENT BDRY SEVENTH MARINES AND SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES  
 FROM AT 855490 TO BT 024518 ADJUSTED NORTH TO FOLLOW TRACE SOUTH  
 BANK OF SONG THU BON. NEW EAST WEST LIMITING POINTS AT 915531  
 AND AT 973563.

2. SEVENTH MAR RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR RIVER AND BRIDGE.  
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES RESPONSIBLE FOR SOUTHERN LAND APPROACHES  
 TO BRIDGE.

3. CHANGE EFFECTIVE 181400H AND REMAINS IN EFFECT UNTIL  
 FURTHER NOTICE.

4. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

OP-4

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

171309Z JUL 67 COPY NR# 17

SECRET

SECRET

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COC

OO RUMHFL RUMHVH  
DE RUMHLA 1884 1981311  
ZNY SSSSS

0 171311Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
ZEN/FIRST MAR  
ZEN/FIFTH MAR  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/HQ BN  
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN  
ZEN/FIRST MT BN  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER G-3  
CONCUR G-4  
CEO  
G-2  
MTO

K	DIC
C	Doc
M	

OO RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS  
ZEN/G FIRST MAW  
RUMHFL/CG FLC  
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN

- FRAG 0 87-67 ROUGH RIDER (U)
- A. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)
- B. FIRST MARDIV 270531Z MAR 67 (NOTAL)
- C. FIRST MARDIV P020002.C (CEGI)(NOTAL)

CC

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1884  
1. ROUGH RIDER CONVOY SCHEDULED 19 JUL 67 TO MOVE FIFTH MAR MATERIAL FROM DANANG TO HILL 63 AND RETURN DANANG.

- FOR CG III MAF
- A. REQUEST PROVIDE THREE M36 E/H AND SUITABLE BRIDGING FOR CONVOYS.
- B. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITITES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOC'S.
- 3. EXECUTION:
  - A. FIRST MAR: PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY IAW PARA 3.D OF REF A, CONSISTING OF ONE PLT REIN WITH MED PERSONNEL, FAC AND FO.
  - B. FIFTH MAR:
    - (1) PROVIDE RIFLE CO(-)(REIN) AS CONVOY RESERVE WHILE CONVOY SOUTH OF DANANG TAOR IAW PARA 3.D. OF REF A.
    - (2) COORDINATE AND EXPEDITE VEH OFFLOAD.
    - (3) OPCON OF ROUGHRIDER TO REMAIN WITH THIS HQ.
  - C. ELEVENTH MAR: PROVIDE ARTILLERY SUPPORT IAW PARA 3.E. REF A.
  - D. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3.G. REF A.
  - E. FIRST MT BN: PROVIDE EIGHT VEH TO ELEVENTH MT BN

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 171311Z

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**SECRET****UNCLASSIFIED**PAGE THREE RUMMLA 1884 ~~SECRET~~

FOR CONVOY DANANG TO HILL 63.

F. ELEVENTH MT BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3.F REF A.

G. COORD INST:

(1) REF A. AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS DANANG TO CHU LAI.

(2) CHECK POINTS: REF B.

(3) D-DAY H-HOUR:

(A) DANANG TO HILL 63: 190730H JULY 67.

(B) HILL 63 TO DANANG 191100H JULY 67.

(4) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS RE-  
QUIRE POSTPONEMENT, CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.

(5) DIRLAUTH ALON:

A. COMM-ELECT.

A. REF C. AS APPLICABLE DANANG TO CHU LAI.

B. FIRST AND FIFTH MAR: COMMENCING 190630H JULY

MONITOR DIV CONVOY CONTROL NET FREQ 40.7 MC M-547.

C. COMM CO HQ BN: COMMENCING 190630 JULY MONITOR FOL

DAYS:

(1) DIV CONVOY CONTROL 40.7 MC M-547.

PAGE FOUR RUMMLA 1884 ~~SECRET~~

(2) DIV SPECIAL PURPOSE (HF) 4424 KC M109.

D. COMM SECURITY AIDS IAW REF C.

GF-4

BT


PAGE 2 OF 2

**UNCLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

K	OC
C	Asic
M	



CC

DE RUMHLA 1910 1990347  
ZNY SSSSS

O 180347Z JUL 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG III MAF

DRAFTER: G-3  
RELEASER: C/S  
CONCURRENCE: G-3  
G-2

BT  
SECRET

RECON ASSETS (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 020637Z JUL 67

B. CG III MAF 170732Z JUL 67

1. REF A REQUESTED FIRST RECON BN ASSETS PRESENTLY AT CHU LAI BE RETURNED TO PARENT UNIT DANANG FOR EMPLOYMENT WITHIN DIV ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY.

2. RKT ATK ON DANANG AIR BASE 15 JUL 67 EMPHASIZES REQUIREMENT NOT ONLY FOR INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES WITHIN RANGE OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS BUT MAXIMUM EFFORT IN ROUTES OF INGRESS AND EGRESS TO SUCH DANANGER AREAS. FULL UTILIZATION ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES CONSIDERED VITAL.

3. IN LIGHT OF ABOVE SITUATION AND REF B, REQUEST PLANNING GUIDANCE EARLIEST ON AVAILABILITY RECON ASSETS SUBJ REF A.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN O 180347Z JUL 67

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15

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SECRET

K	OIC
C	Boe
mm	



CC

OO RUMHFL  
 DE RUMHFLA 1953 19909 9  
 ZNY SSSSS

0 180959Z JUL 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG FNAW  
 RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSR  
 TEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON

DRAFTER: G-2  
 RELEASER: G-2  
 CONCURRENCE: OPNS

SECRET

NAME CHANGE OPN BOULDER

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 141239Z JUL 67
- B. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 161545Z JUL 67

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, CHANGE NAME OPN BOULDER TO OPN PECOS RPT PECOS.  
 2. REFLECT CHANGE IN REFS A AND B AND RELATED DGCS AS REQUIRED.

GP-4  
 BT

14

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

0 180959Z JUL 67

COPY

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUMLA 2117 2010215  
INFO ZEN/CG FMAW

020015Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
RUMHFL/CG LC  
ZEN/FIRST MAR  
ZEN/FIFTH MAR  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/HQ BN  
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN  
ZEN/ELEVENTH IT BN  
INFO ZEN/CG FMAW  
RUMHFL/DSA I CORPS  
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN  
BT

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER G-3  
CONCURRENCE M10  
SENS 3

COC

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~~SECRET~~  
PARC O 38-67 ROUGH RIDER (U)  
A. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 321-66 (NOTAL)  
B. CG FIRST MARDIV 270312Z MAR 67 (NOTAL)  
C. FIRST MARDIV PARC O 2000.20 (CEQD) (NOTAL)  
1. ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SCHEDULED 21 JUL 67 TO MOVE THIRD BN FIELD  
WAR ADMIN REAR AND USA SUPPLIES FROM DANANG TO HILL 63 AND RETURN

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2117 ~~SECRET~~  
DANANG.

- 2. FOR CG III MAF:
- a. REQUEST PROVIDE THREE M36 VEH AND SUITABLE BRIDGING FOR CONVOYS.
- b. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOG'S.
- 3. FOR CG FLC: REQUEST PROVIDE VEHs FOR MOVEMENT OF USA SUPPLIES. VEHs PROVIDED TO BE SERIALIZED INTO CONVOY PROVIDED THIS HQ.
- 4. EXECUTION:
- a. FIRST MAR: PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY IAW PARA 3.D OF REF A, CONSISTING OF ONE FLT REIN WITH MED PERSONNEL, FAC, AND FC.
- b. FIFTH MAR:
  - (1) PROVIDE RIFLE CO (-) (REIN) AS CONVOY RESERVE WHILE CONVOY SOUTH OF CHECKPOINT 22 IAW PARA 3.D. OF REF A.
  - (2) COORDINATE AND EXPEDITE VEH OFFLOAD.
  - (3) GIVE MINIMUM ONE HOUR NOTICE TO THIS HQ ETD CONVOY FROM HILL 63 OVER SP NET M129.
- c. ELEVENTH MAR: PROVIDE ARTY SUPPORT IAW PARA 3.E REF A.
- d. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3.G. REF A.

FIRST MARDIV REIN O 200015Z JUL 67 PAGE 1 OF 2

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2117 ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
 E. ELEVENTH MT BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 7, F. REF A.  
 F. COORD INST:  
 (1) REF A AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS DANANG TO CHU LAI.  
 (2) OPCON CONVOY TO REMAIN WITH THIS HQ.  
 (3) AIR SUPPORT FM HILL 63 TO DANANG TO BE ARRANGED BY THIS HQ.  
 (4) CHECK POINTS: REF B.  
 (5) D-DAY H-HOUR:  
 (A) DANANG TO HILL 63: 210800H JUL 67.  
 (B) HILL 63 TO DANANG: 21 JUL AT TIME SPECIFIED BY CO FIFTH MAR.  
 (6) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT, CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOR DAY.  
 (7) DIRLAUH ALCON.  
 G. COMM ELECT:  
 A. REF C. AS APPLICABLE DANANG TO CHU LAI.  
 B. FIRST MAR  
 FIFTH MAR  
 COMM CO HQ BN  
 (1) COMMENCING 210700H JUL 67 MONITOR DIV CONVOY CONTROL

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2117 ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
 NET FREQ 40.7MM M-547.  
 (2) COMMENCING 210700 GUARD DIV SPECIAL PURPOSE (HF)  
 425KC M-109.  
 C. COMM SECURITY AID IAW REF C.  
 GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2


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200725Z

R	OIC
C	Bo
M	

DRAFTER: G-3  
 RELEASER: COMMANDING GENERAL  
 CONCUR: G-2  
 C/S



COC

CC

2162 2010725  
 120836Z JUL 67

- TO: 1. FIRST MARDIV REIN
- 2. THIRD MAF
- 3. 1ST MAW
- 4. 1ST FLC
- 5. 1ST MAR
- 6. 7TH MAR
- 7. 9TH MAR
- 8. 2ND BN 5TH MAR
- 9. 1ST RECON BN
- 10. 11TH MAR
- 11. 1ST MT BN
- 12. 1ST MT BN
- 13. 1ST SP BN
- 14. 1ST COMM BN

SECRET

REPORT OF PLANNED OPNS FOR AUGUST 67  
 120836Z JUL 67  
 BASED ON PLANNING GUIDANCE FURNISHED BY REF A, FOL REPT OF  
 MAJOR OPNS FOR AUG IS SUBMITTED.

2162 SECRET

- (1) COCHISE
- (2) FIRST MARDIV
- (3) TWO BNS, SLF, AND ARVN FORCES TO BE DESIGNATED.
- (4) S&D
- (5) THANG BINH-HIEP DUC-TAM KY TRANGLE
- (6) FIRST HALF AUGUST
- (7) BOYD
- (8) FIRST MAR
- (9) TWO BNS MINUS, SLF AND ARVN FORCES TO BE DESIGNATED.
- (10) S&D
- (11) SONG THU BON VALLEY SOUTH OF NONG SON (AREA BOUNDED  
 NORTH BY E-W GL 40, ON SOUTH BY E-W  
 24, AND ON WEST BY N-S GL ZC16.
- (12) LAST HALF AUGUST
- (13) STOCKTON
- (14) SEVENTH MAR
- (15) BN MINUS
- (16) S&D
- (17) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL AT 74, ON EAST  
 1-3 GL AT 89, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL AT 64 AND ON WEST BY 1-3 GL

SECRET

**SECRET**

THREE RUMHLA 2162 S E C R E T

(10) LAST HALF AUGUST

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE OPNS AND INCREASED EMPHASIS ON RECON  
 OPNS W/IN ROCKET BELT, FOL OPNS WILL BE IMPL-  
 ED, DEPENDENT ON EN SITUATION AND FORCES AVAILABLE.

(11) PIKE

(12) FIRST MAR

(13) REGT MINU

(14) S3D

(15) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL BT57, ON  
 SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON SOUTH BY LINE FM BT 262446 TO  
 BT 26, AND ON WEST BY LINE FM BT222406 TO BT 1648 AND N-S

(16) TO BE DETERMINED.

(17) TOLEDO

(18) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

(19) BC MINUS

(20) S2D

(21) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 54, ON EAST BY  
 BT 00, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 50 AND ON WEST BY N-S GL

FOUR RUMHLA 2162 S E C R E T

(22) TO BE DETERMINED.

PAGE TWO OF TWO PAGES

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PP RUMHFL  
 DE RUMHLA 2103 2011029  
 NY SSSSS

201025Z JUL 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
 INFO ZEN/CG FMAW  
 RUMHFL/CG FLC

DRAFTER: G-3 OP  
 RELEASER: CG  
 CONCUR: G-2  
 G-2  
 G-5  
 G-6  
 G/S

**SECRET**

CONCEPT OPN COCHISE

1. MISSION. COMMENCING O/A 1AUG67 1STMARDIV IN COORDINATION WITH TG 79.5 AND ARVN, CONDUCTS COORDINATED MULTI-PHASE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN HILL MASS SOUTH OF THANG BINH-QUE SON VALLEY GENERALLY BTWN E-W GL'S 19 AND 29 WITH EMPHASIS ON VIC HIEP DUC, TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES IN AREA.

2. CONCEPT. DEPENDENT OF FORCES AVAILABLE AND EN SITUATION.

3. COCHISE AND COUNTERPART OPERATIONS CONSIST OF FOL PHASES:

A. PHASE ONE

(1) CONCEPT. FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN) WITH SIX CO'S. IN COORD WITH ARVN TASK FORCE (ASSUMED AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES) ENTER HILL MASS SOUTH OF THANG BINH-QUE SON VALLEY

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2103 **SECRET**

GENERALLY BETWEEN BT0222 AND BT0226, AND SWEEP EASTWARD TO COASTAL FLAIN.

(2) MISSION. TO ATTACK AND DESTROY EN FORCES IN AREA, REDUCING EN OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY, TO PERMIT SUBSEQUENT FRIENDLY OPNS VIC HIEP DUC.

B. PHASE TWO

(1) CONCEPT. ON ORDER (ABOUT D PLUS ONE), SLF LANDS VIC BT1435 NS 831 (NORTH OF TAM KY), AND EXPLOITS EFFECT OF PHASE ONE ABOVE BY BLOCKING/OFFENSIVE OPNS WEST OF RAILROAD. CONCURRENTLY ADDITIONAL ARVN FORCES ATTACK NW FROM TAM KY TO VIC BT2128. DEPENDENT ON TACTICAL SITUATION, SLF BLI CHOPPED TO 1STMARDIV WHILE SLF CONTINUES ADMIN AND HELO SPT FM VIC TAM KY AND SHIPS TO ARG.

(2) MISSION. TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN WEST OF RAILROAD, AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES IN AREA AS RESULT

OF PHASE ONE ABOVE.

C. PHASE THREE

(1) CONCEPT. ON TERMINATION PHASES ONE AND TWO, FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN) CONSISTING OF BLY FROM SLF AND ONE BN OF FOUR CO'S CONDUCTS DELIBERATE SEARCH IN GENERAL AREA SOUTHWEST OF AND INCLUDING HIEP DUC, BOUNDED ON NORTH BY

CG 1ST MARDIV 201025Z JUL 67 PAGE 4 OF 6

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2103 S E C R E T

HIEP DUC, ON EAST BY SONG TRAM, ON SOUTH BY E-W R  
AND ON WEST BY R-S , 87.USMC FORCES HELILIFTED INTO VALLEY NORTHEAST OF HIEP DUC,  
DURATION OF SEARCH TENTATIVELY FIVE TO SEVEN DAYS.(2) MISSION, TO SEARCH OUT AND DESTROY HQ OF SECOND  
NVA DIV WITH RELATED SPT FORCES AND FACILITIES IN AREA.

## D. PHASE FOUR

(1) AS AREA OF SEARCH EXECUTED IN PHASE THREE BECOMES  
SUFFICIENTLY SMALL, USMC FORCES CONDUCT SEARCH AND SWEEP  
OPERATIONS ALONG VALLEY FROM HIEP DUC THROUGH NUI TAC SON TO  
GUE SON.(2) MISSION, TO ATTACK AND DESTROY EN FORCES IN AREA,  
TO OPEN ROAD FROM HIEP DUC TO GUE SON, AND TO PROVIDE CONTROL  
OF AND SECURITY FOR REFUGEES SEEKING SHELTER.

## E. FORCES REQUIRED (TENTATIVE)

1ST MARDIV

FIFTH MAR(-) (REIN)

BN (-) (REIN) FIFTH MAR (THREE CO'S)

BN (-) (REIN) FIFTH MAR (THREE CO'S)

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2103 S E C R E T

SLF HQ

BT

BT

MAXIMUM AVAILABLE ELEMENTS - SECOND ARVN DIVISION

## 4. SCHEDULE (TENTATIVE)

A. D-DAY: 1 AUGUST

B. EST DURATION: 16-21 DAYS

## 5. LIAISON VISIT BY ADC TO C.O., 2D ARVN DIV

INDICATED DESIRE OF LATTER TO HAVE ARVN  
TROOPS PARTICIPATE IN COCHISE, POSSIBLE  
CONFLICT MAY ARISE DUE TO TENTATIVELYPLANNED OPERATIONS BY TF OREGON FOR  
WHICH OREGON INTENDS TO REQUEST ARVN PARTICIPATION.

GP-4

BT

2 OF 2

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

RR RUMHFL RUMHVN  
 DE RUMHFLA 2243 2011435  
 RR 55555

P 201135Z JUL 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO GEN/CG III MAF  
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD  
 GEN/FIRST MAR  
 GEN/FORTH MAR  
 GEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
 GEN/7TH BR  
 GEN/FIRST BDE BN  
 GEN/FIRST RT BN  
 GEN/ELEVENTH RT BN  
 GEN/RUMHVR/DSA I CORPS  
 GEN/CG FIRST MAR  
 GEN/SEVENTH BGR BN

DRAFTER: G-3 OP  
 RELEASER: G-3  
 CONCUR: OP50  
 G-4  
 MTO  
 CEO

E C R E T

MSG O 89-67 ROUGH RIDER (U)

1. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADVING 301-65 (NOTAL)
2. FIRST MARDIV 270551Z MAR 67 (NOTAL)
3. FIRST MARDIV P 22430.20 (CGOI) (NOTAL)



PAGE TWO RUMHFLA 2243 5 E C R E T

THIS ORDER SUPPORTS ALL ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SAED TO SUPPORT  
 FORTH MOVEMENT FORTH MAR MATERIAL AND LSA SUPPLIES FROM DANANG

1. HILL 65 AND RETURN DANANG.
2. FOR CG III MAF
3. REQUEST PROVIDE THREE ASS VEH AND SUITABLE BRIDGING FOR EACH  
 CONVOY SAED.
4. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF  
 LOG'S.
5. DETAILS OF SPECIFIC CONVOYS SAED WILL BE PASSED SEPARATELY.
6. FOR CG FOSLOGCMD
7. REQUEST ADVISE THIS MSG (11V MTO) VEH SAED FOR SERIALIZATION  
 FORTH MOVEMENT.
8. DETAILS OF SPECIFIC REQ WILL BE PASSED SEPARATELY.
9. EXECUTION
10. FIRST MAR: WHEN DIRECTED PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY IAW PAR  
 3.0 OF REF A, CONSISTING OF ONE PLT REIN WITH MED PERS, FAC AND FO.
11. FORTH MAR:
12. WHEN DIRECTED PROVIDE RIFLE CO MINUS REIN AS CONVOY  
 RESERVE WHILE CONVOY SOUTH OF DANANG IAW PARA 5.0 OF REF A.
13. COORDINATE AND EXPEDITE VEH O

**SECRET**





PP RUMHVH  
DE RUMHLA 2261 2020127  
ZNY EEEEE

P 210127Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO RUMHVH/QUANG DA SPEC ZONE

DRAFTER: G-30P  
RELEASER: CG  
CONCUR: G-3  
C/S

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS  
RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPEC ZONE

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

OPN BINH QUANG 6

1. YOUR SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF COORDINATED MULTI-BATTALION  
OPN IN DAI LOC-DUC DUC DISTRICT MARKS NOTEWORTHY ADVANCE IN  
CAUSE OF GVN AND FREE WORLD EFFORT. LARGE NUMBER OF ENEMY  
KILLED AND CAPTURED DURING OPN BINH QUANG 6 DEMONSTRATES  
EFFECTIVE PLANNING AND LEADERSHIP. 1594 REFUGEES AND 5 CHIEF  
BOI'S ARE FIRM PROOF OF GROWING GVN INFLUENCE AND ENEMY DEMORAL  
IZATION IN AREA ONCE CONSIDERED ENEMY STRONGHOLD.

2. YOUR FINE EXECUTION OF THIS CHALLENGING OPN IS TYPICAL OF  
SPIRIT AND PROFESSIONALISM YOU HAVE CONSISTENTLY DISPLAYED IN  
OUR JOINT OPNS. YOUR COMRADES IN ARMS IN FIRST MARDIV CON-  
GRATULATE YOU ON THIS WELL-EARNED SUCCESS. WE LOOK FORWARD

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2261 UNCLAS E F T O



TO CONTINUED SHOULDER-TO-SHOULDER EFFORT BENEFICIAL TO BOTH  
OUR FORCES AND CAUSE WE SERVE.

GENERAL ROBERTSON SENDS.

BT

CG 1ST MARDIV 210127Z JUL 67

SECRET



CC

LA RUMBLE 2445 2032253  
ZUL 09055  
P 222253Z JUL 67  
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO HQ AIR MAP

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER CG  
CONCURRENCE C/S

SECRET  
BOUNDARY SHIFT BETWEEN AIR BASE DEFENSE BN AND 1ST MARDIV  
IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE 1ST MARDIV  
AND THE AIR BASE DEFENSE BN ZONE BE ADJUSTED TO THE  
WEST BANK OF THE SONG CAU DO; WEST COORD AT993704 TO  
WEST COORD BT493723.  
CONFERENCE AT THIS HQTRS 20JULY WITH REPRESENTATIVES  
FROM NSA, AIR BASE DEFENSE BN AND 1ST MARINES CON-  
SIDER BOUNDARY SHIFT FEASIBLE. NSA EXPECTS DELIVERY OF ADDITIONAL  
MIL. COAST IN AUGUST AND REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED THEIR AVAIL-  
ABILITY FOR SUPPORT OF UNIT CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY  
OF THE WATERWAY

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

P 222253Z JUL 67

COPY#

17


SECRET

SECRET

2570 20 0830  
2570 20 0830

REF 240230Z JUL 67  
TO ZEN/1ST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/CG III MAF

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER C/S



K	OIC
C	JOA
JOA	

ZEN/2ND MAF  
RUMHRL/CG FLC  
ZEN/FIRST MAR  
ZEN/FIFTH MAR  
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
BT

SECRET

CONCEPT OPN STOCKTON

1. MISSION. SEVENTH MAR (-) (REIN) CONDUCTS 2 DAY SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL76, ON EAST BY N-S GL94, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL63, AND ON WEST BY N-S GL82 TO INVESTIGATE ROUTES OF INGRESS TO ROCKET BELT AND TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES ENCOUNTERED.

2. CONCEPT. ON NIGHT D-1 CO K 3/7 (OPCON 1/7) MOVES COVERTLY INTO BLOCKING PSNS VIC AT 890712 AT 917663. 1/7 HELILIFTS THREE RIFLE COS TO LZ TIGER VIC AT 847718, LION VIC AT 848684 AND PANTHER VIC AT 860652. AFTER SECURING LZ'S AND LINKING UP WITH BLOCKING FORCE

PAGE TWO RUMHRLA 2570 SECRET

1/7 CONDUCTS DETAILED S&D OPNS WITH ASSAULT COS AND RECON PATROLS TO S.E., EAST AND N.E. FINAL LINK UP OF FORCES VIC HILL 12 (A1924694).

3. TASK ORGANIZATION

- 1ST BN (-) (REIN), 7TH MAR
- 1ST BN (-), 7TH MAR
- THREE CO'S
- CO H (REIN), 2D BN, 7TH MAR
- CO K (-), 3RD BN, 7TH MAR
- CO C (-), 1ST RECON BN
- PLAT, CO C, 1ST ENGR BN
- DET, 1ST SP BN (HST)
- DET, HQ BN
- DET HQ CO, 7TH MAR
- 3RD BN (-) (REIN), 11TH MAR (GS)
- 2D PLAT, 1ST ARMD AMPHIB TRACTOR CO
- PLAT, BTRY M, 4TH BN, 11TH MAR
- PLAT, 3D 8" HOW BTRY, 11TH MAR

4. D-DAY, L-HOUR: 270800H JUL 67

5. EST DURATION: 2DAYS.

CG FIRST MARDIV 240230Z JULY 67

15  
SECRET

SECRET

B-3

04  
47

VV MFL 174  
PP R0SMA RUMVH RUMSBB  
DE RUMMF 1704 2051410  
ZNY SSSSS

P 241410Z JUL 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
ZEN/FIRST MP BN

ADV RT *C6C*

G-3 TOR:241954Z  
CCN:8098

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
ZEN/CG FMFPAC  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
RUMVH/CG I CORPS  
ZEN/COMNAVSEPACT DNG  
ZEN/CG FORLOGCMD  
RUMSBB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
RUMVH/DSA I CORPS  
BT

SECRET

BOUNDARY SHIFT FIRST MARDIV AND FIRST MP BN  
A. CG FIRST MARDIV 222532Z JUL 67 (NOTAL)  
REQ CONT REF A APPROVED. SHIFT BOUNDARY FIRST MARDIV/AIR BASE DEF  
BN TO SOUTH BANK OF SONG CAU DO, WEST COORD (AT 999704) TO EAST  
COORD: (BT 060723).

GP-4  
BT


CG III MAF COPY NR# \_\_\_\_\_

241410Z JUL 67

SECRET



**SECRET**



*COC*

<i>K</i>	<i>OLC</i>
<i>C</i>	<i>APIC</i>
<i>RM</i>	

*CC*

REF ID: A62 2562 2060011

032700Z JUL 67  
 FM CDR 1ST MARDIVREIN  
 TO CDR 111 MAF

DRAFTER G-3  
 RELEASER COMMANDING GENERAL  
 CONCUR G-3  
 C/S

- SUBJECT: TASKING AND RELATIONSHIPS (U)  
 032700Z MAR 67  
 121024Z APR 67  
 291012Z APR 67  
 031456Z MAY 67  
 292016Z JUN 67  
 061314Z JUL 67

THIS COMMAND CONDUCTS SECURITY MISSIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
 DIRECTIVES AND PUBLISHED LOI'S.  
 IN VIEW OF SPECIAL SECURITY TASKS NOW BEING ACCOMPLISHED;  
 SECURITY OF LAAM UNITS VIC HAI VAN PASS AND HILL 327, ESSO  
 AND SEA ANCHOR AND VEDETTE PATROL, THERE ARE SOME  
 REFERENCES CAN BE FOUND.  
 THAT SPECIAL SECURITY TASKS NOW ASSIGNED THIS  
 COMMAND BE UPDATED TO PROVIDE BASIS FOR COMPLETE REVIEW AND  
 IN OBTAINING OPTIMUM BENEFIT FM AVAILABLE TROOP

*4*

1ST MARDIVREIN

COPY NR#

250011Z JUL 67

**SECRET**

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO RUMRLA 2712 C O N F I D E N T I A L

LEADERSHIP ENDEAVORS. DEMANDS GREATER EFFORT AND BETTER RESULT IN OUR TRAINING AND

1. REF A CALLED ATTENTION TO RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDERS TO ENSURE THAT SUBORDINATES ARE WELL GROUNDED IN FUNDAMENTALS. THIS IS THE NEVER ENDING RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMAND AT ALL LEVELS. IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF A COMMANDER TO MEET THIS RESPONSIBILITY IS INEXORABLY SUMMED UP IN TERMS OF HUMAN LIVES. TWO RECENT SERIOUS INCIDENTS

2. IN ONE CASE A COMPANY WAS ATTACKED IN A NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITION BY AN ESTIMATED SIMILAR SIZE ENEMY FORCE SUPPORTED BY MORTARS. THE RESULTS OF THIS ENCOUNTER WERE DISPROPORTIONATELY IN FAVOR OF THE ENEMY.

3. IN ANOTHER, EVEN MORE OBVIOUS INSTANCE, 90MM GUN FIRE FROM A TANK WAS EMPLOYED AGAINST SNIPER FIRE IN AN AREA INHABITED BY CIVILIANS AND SUBJECT TO OUR PRESUMED MILITARY DOMINATION. AS A RESULT ONE GIRL AGED EIGHT YEARS WAS KILLED, AND A WOMAN 45, A GIRL 12 AND A BOY 4 WERE ALL WOUNDED. THE UNPROFESSIONAL AND FUNDAMENTALLY UNSOUND EMPLOYMENT OF THE WEAPON CONCERNED DID NOT SAVE LIVES. INDEED, THE INCIDENT MAY VERY PROBABLY CAUSE THE LOSS OF MANY MORE MARINE LIVES BY THE INEVITABLE ALIENATION OF THE PEOPLE WHOM IT IS OUR MISSION TO PROTECT AND SEPERATE FROM THE REAL ENEMY WE FACE. THE TASK IS DIFFICULT, DEMANDING AND NEVER ENDING. THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A FINAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF COMMAND BUT BETTER RESULTS ARE ABSOLUTELY MANDATORY. THE MARINE DIVISION HAS BEEN, ABOVE ALL ELSE, NOTED FOR

PAGE THREE RUMRLA 2712 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

(40)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
FIRST MARDIV REIN  
SECOND MARDIV REIN  
THIRD MARDIV REIN  
FOURTH MARDIV REIN  
FIFTH MARDIV REIN  
SIXTH MARDIV REIN  
SEVENTH MARDIV REIN  
EIGHTH MARDIV REIN  
NINTH MARDIV REIN  
TENTH MARDIV REIN  
ELEVENTH MARDIV REIN  
TWELFTH MARDIV REIN

UNCLASSIFIED  
21  
DRAFTER  
RELEASER  
CONCUR

G-3  
COMMANDING GENERAL  
G-4  
ENGTG  
ORDG  
C/S  
ADC

R OIC  
C  
CC

COC

CONFIDENTIAL  
TANK EMPLOYMENT

- 1. RECENT REPORTS OF TANK EMPLOYMENT INDICATE INSTANCES OF MISUSE OF THIS WEAPON, LACK OF IMAGINATION AND FAILURE TO EMPHASIZE TECHNIQUES PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE TO RVN COUNTERINSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT.
- 2. WITH RESPECT TO EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS, DO:
  - A. USE TANKS TO PATROL LOC AT RANDOM TIMES TO DISCOURAGE ENEMY ATTEMPTS AND TO FREE OTHER FORCES FOR EMPLOYMENT

PAGE TWO RUMLA 2818 C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 3. USE TANKS TO PROVIDE INCREASED FIREPOWER AND QUICK REACTION SHOCK ACTION IN CONVOY SECURITY DETACHMENTS.
- 4. USE TANKS IN SUPPORT OF REACTION FORCES WHERE TRAFFIC-ABILITY PERMITS.
- 5. USE TANKS AGAINST CONSOLIDATED ENEMY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WHEREVER POSSIBLE.
- 6. USE TANKS IN THE CONDUCT OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND FEINTS.
- 7. ON ONE RECENT OCCASION AN OBSERVED ENEMY RUNNING FROM A GOOD POSITION BECAUSE TANKS WERE APPROACHING THE AREA.
- 8. USE TANKS TO RECON LARGE AREAS BY BOTH FIRE AND MOVEMENT.
- 9. USE TANKS AGAINST HARD TARGETS WHERE HEAVY FIRE POWER AND CLOSE ACCURACY ARE REQUIRED.
- 10. DO NOT, REPEAT NOT, EMPLOY TANKS:
  - A. TO CLEAR MINE FIELDS BY DETONATION. LOSS OF TANKS, EVEN IF ONLY TEMPORARY, CAN CAUSE LARGER PERSONNEL LOSSES THAN EMPLOYMENT OF OTHER, MORE SUITABLE, MEANS OF MINE CLEARANCE.
  - B. AS A GOMM SNIPERS RIFLE.
  - C. IN FRIENDLY OR PACIFIED AREAS WHERE PROPERTY OF INNOCENT LIVES ARE UNDOUBTLY HAZARDED.

PAGE THREE RUMLA 2818 C O N F I D E N T I A L



- D. AS A PERSONNEL CARRIER.
- E. AS THE POINT OF PATROL OR CONVOY.
- F. WITHOUT INFANTRY COVER.
- G. COMMANDERS WILL EMPHASIZE VALUE OF PROPER TANK EMPLOYMENT AND IMPORTANCE TO SUPPORTED UNIT. HABITUAL USE OF CAREFUL MINE CLEARANCE PROCEDURES ARE INDICATED FOR ALL TRACKED VEHICLES.

GP-4  
31

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

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CONFIDENTIAL



COL

OO RUMHFL RUMHVH  
DE RUMHFLA 2862 2071818  
ZNY CCCCC

O 261818Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
TO SEVENTH MAR

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER G-3

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
ZEN/CG FMAW  
RUMHFL/CG FLC  
RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS  
RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE  
FIRST MARDIV OPCON

BT  
CONFIDENTIAL  
PECOS TERMINATION OF (U)  
1. TERMINATE OPN PECOS 270733H JUL 67.

GP-4  
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV 261818Z JULY 67

CONFIDENTIAL

(42)

SECRET

DE RUMMA 3068 2030928  
ZNY 55555  
P 280922Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO CG III MAF

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER C/S  
CONCUR G-2  
G3  
G-4

SECRET

TARGET ACQUISITION BATTALIONS (U)

1. COMUSMACV 210955Z JUL 67

2. REQUEST CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT ELEMENTS OF FATAR WITHIN FIRST DIV ROCKET BELT ZONE. THIS CAPABILITY WOULD SERVE TO IMPROVE AND REFINE THE COUNTER ROCKET PROGRAM OF THIS DIVISION.

3. COUNTER ROCKET PROGRAM IF UNSUCCESSFUL AT PREVENTION, DEMANDS EARLIEST DETECTION OF POSITIONS AND IMMEDIATE REACTION. IT APPEARS THAT THE FATAR UNIT IS IDEALLY SUITED IN THIS RESPECT TO ENHANCE OUR ACQUISITION CAPABILITY.

4. REQUEST ELEM OF THE FLASH RANGING AND COUNTERMORTAR RADAR FLT OF FATAR BE CONSIDERED FOR USE IN THE ROCKET BELT

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 280928Z JULY 67

SECRET (43)

**SECRET**

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K	OC
M	OC

PP RUMHFL  
DE RUMHLA 3069  
ZNY SSSSS

P 280929Z JUL 67	DRAFTER	G-3
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN	RELEASER	C/S
TO ZEN/CG III MAF	CONCUR	G-2
INFO ZEN/CG FMAW		G-4
RUMHFL/CG FLC		G-5
ZEN/FIRST MAR		
ZEN/FIFTH MAR		
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR		
BT		

COC CC

CONCEPT OPN PIKE

- MISSION. FIRST MARINES (-) (REIN) SUPPORTED BY TANKS AND LVT'S CONDUCTS FOUR DAY SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG THU BON, ON EAST BY THE COASTLINE, ON THE SOUTH BY E-W GL 40, ON THE WEST BY SONG LY LY TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES ENCOUNTERED.
  - CONCEPT. FIRST MARINES ATKS WITH ONE BN, MOVING INTO BLOCKING PSNS NIGHT D-1 VIC BT 158517 - BT 158527; BT 162497 - BT 162507; AND BT 170489 - 184478. ONE BN SPTD BY LVIS MONG HAN RIVER VIC BT 211472, ATKS TO SOUTH ON A S/D OPN. ONE CO REIN MOVES FROM DIEN BAN TO VIC BT 2247 AND ESTABLISHES BLOCKING PSN BY H&S. 11TH MARINES IN SPT.
  - FORCES INVOLVED.
    - 1ST MARINES (-) (REIN)
    - DET, HQ CO, 1ST MARINES
    - 1 BN (-) 1ST MARINES
    - THREE CO'S
    - 1 PLT LVT'S
    - 1 BN (-) 5TH MARINES
    - THREE CO'S
    - 1 PLT TANKS
    - 1 D/S BTRY 175 (6 GUNS)
    - 1 D/S BTRY 195 (4 GUNS)
    - 1 PLT 155 GUN (SP) (2 GUNS)
    - 1 PLT 155 GUN (SP) (2 GUNS)
    - 1 PLT 155 GUN (SP) (2 GUNS)
    - 1 PLT 8" GUN (SP)
  - D-DAY: ON OR ABOUT 2 AUG 67
  - EST DURATION: 4 DAYS.
- GP-4  
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV 280929Z JULY 67

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12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

NY NHFL  
DEKUMHLA 3105 2092237  
NY CCCCC

P 282237Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
ZEN/CG FNAW  
COMFEL/CG FLC  
ZENT/IR-SEVENTH DIV OPCOM  
BT

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER G-3

STOCKTON (U)  
CONTINUE OPN STOCKTON 291200H JUL 67

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(15)

SECRET

*BR*  
*51*

PP RUMHEL  
DE RUMHLA 3240 2110431  
ZNY SSSSS

P 300431Z JUL 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON

DRAFTER G-3  
RELEASER G-3

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
ZEN/CG FMAW  
RUMHEL/CG FLC

BT

SECRET

FRAG 0 95-67 (BOUNDARY CHANGE) (U)

1. FOR BDRY CHANGES IN FIRST MAR SOR EFFECTIVE 271200H JUL 67:

A. BTWN FIRST AND THIRD BNS: LINE FM BT114650 TO BT103630,  
ALONG NORTHWEST BANK SONG HA XAU TO BT093633, BT084628  
(NORTH EDGE OF POND), BT071618, BT066618 AND BT058613.

B. BTWN SECOND AND THIRD BNS: LINE FM SOUTH BANK SONG  
VINH DIEN AT BT032648 THROUGH BT034643 AND BT042643, TERMINATING ON  
NORTH BANK OF SONG VINH DIEN AT BT043649, AREA TO  
NORTHEAST OF LINE IS IN THIRD BN SOR.

GP-4

BT

*35*

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

P 300431Z JUL 67

COPY#

SECRET (46)



SECRET

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
 260800H July 1967

Operation Order 90-67

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6540 I, II; 6541 II; 6640 III, IV; 6641 III; 6640 I, II; 6641 II.
- (b) III MAF Letter of Instruction 4-67  
 (c) III MAF Opn Order 308-66  
 (d) 1st MarDiv Operation Order 301-67  
 (e) Division Order 3120.19 (Counter Rocket Program)  
 (f) 1st MarDiv Operation Order 91-67 (Waterway Control) (to be issued)  
 (g) CG 1st MarDiv Msg 190411Z Jul67  
 (h) 1st MarDiv Administrative Order 301-67  
 (i) 1st MarDiv CEOI P02000.2C

S & C FILES  
 HEADQUARTERS  
 1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

67 2989

Copy 191 of 200 copies

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Current Monthly Task Organization Report.

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) References (b), (c) and (d)

(2) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing conducts aerial counter-insurgency operations against enemy of GVN in I CTZ; provides fixed and rotary wing tactical units for all weather support of III MAF Ground Forces; and participates in air defense of I CTZ as directed by higher authority.

(a) Rotary and fixed wing tactical units provide airborne surveillance of the rocket belt and the approach routes thereto.

(b) Flare ships remain on station during hours of darkness, providing illumination on call.

(3) 1st MF Bn, Air Base Defense Battalion for III MAF, provides ground security for III MAF zone of Danang Complex. Ref (c).

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

SECRET

- c. Attachments and Detachments. Current monthly Task Organization Report.

## 2. MISSION

First Marine Division, participating in the defense of the Danang vital area, denies the enemy access to the rocket belt, thereby denying him the capability of delivering rocket fire into the Danang vital area; establishes, and maintains, the means and the system to fix and destroy enemy rocket forces that may gain access to the rocket belt.

## 3. EXECUTION

### a. Concept of Operations

- (1) The 1st Marine Division (Rein) defends the vital area of the Danang Complex with three infantry regiments, reinforced, together with supporting arms, to include air and naval gunfire, with an optimum effort toward preventing, detecting, attacking and destroying hostile rocket positions.
- (2) Two reinforced infantry regiments are positioned astride the rocket belt, with battalions oriented toward main enemy avenues of approach from the Northwest, West and South. See Annex B. Vigorous surveillance is maintained within the rocket belt using all forms of patrol activity supplemented by mechanical surveillance means as appropriate.
- (3) Supporting fires are coordinated with all surveillance activities, to include searchlights and CF's. Counter rocket fire is capable of immediate and accurate response.
- (4) Air, artillery, and organic infantry battalion supporting arms are principal reaction means. Each infantry unit in vicinity of the rocket belt maintains a reaction force, day and night, to exploit the attack by fire on enemy positions, and to block possible enemy escape routes. Reaction forces use all means of mobility available to facilitate this reaction; helicopters, LVT's, motor transport and armor.
- (5) Naval Gunfire, as available, is employed to supplement counter rocket fire.

SECRET

SECRET

b. 1st Marines (Rein)

- (1) Establish forces within assigned TAOR so that emphasis is on rocket belt, area south of rocket belt and coastal area. Annex A (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Shift northern boundary on Song Cau Do to south bank, AT999704 to BT060723. Retain control of bridge AT998705.
- (3) Maintain surveillance with concentration of effort on enemy main avenues of approach, and subsidiary routes into the rocket belt in TAOR.
- (4) Establish high density patrol and surveillance activity within the rocket belt. Provide for complete coverage of the rocket belt in TAOR with all requisite security elements.
- (5) Maintain positive control, day and night, of major waterways within TAOR. Coordinate with GVN authorities within TAOR.
- (6) Be prepared to provide an immediate reaction force for employment in TAOR for the purpose of destroying hostile rocket forces, and capable of blocking possible enemy escape routes using all available means of mobility.

c. 7th Marines (Rein)

- (1) Establish forces within assigned TAOR with one battalion assigned responsibility for each main enemy avenue of approach. Annex A (Operations Overlay) and Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Maintain surveillance with concentration of effort on enemy main avenues of approach and subsidiary routes into rocket belt in TAOR.
- (3) Establish high density patrol and surveillance activity to provide for complete coverage of that portion of rocket belt in TAOR.
- (4) Maintain positive control, day and night, of major waterways within TAOR. Coordinate with GVN authorities within TAOR.
- (5) Be prepared to provide an immediate reaction force for employment in TAOR for the purpose of destroying hostile rocket forces, and to block possible enemy escape routes.

SECRET

SECRET

- d. 5th Marines (-) (Rein). Continue operations in presently assigned area of operations.
- e. 2nd Bn, 5th Marines (-) (Rein). Continue operations in presently assigned TAOR.
- f. 11th Marines (-) (Rein)/Northern Defense Sector Command
  - (1) 11th Marines (-) (Rein)
    - (a) Annex C (Supporting Arms)
    - (b) Reference (e) (Division Counter Rocket Program)
    - (c) Coordinate surveillance of OP's and use of searchlights.
    - (d) Coordinate counter rocket fire efforts throughout the rocket belt.
  - (2) Northern Defense Sector Command. Be prepared to provide close in support within the 8,000 meter radii, in zone.
- g. 1st Tank Bn (-)/Southern Defense Sector Command
  - (1) Be prepared to provide close in support within the 8,000 meter radii, in zone.
  - (2) Be prepared to provide an immediate reaction force as required. See Annex D.
- h. 1st Reconnaissance Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (1) Annex B (Intelligence)
  - (2) Provide reconnaissance coverage in, and adjacent to, enemy main avenues of approach and subsidiary routes leading into the Division TAOR. Emphasis on areas outside the TAOR.
- i. 1st Engineer Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (1) General Support
  - (2) Be prepared to provide construction and improvements for displacement of units as required by this order.
- j. 3d AmTrac Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (1) General Support

SECRET

SECRET

- (2) Be prepared to provide amphibian tractors, as required, for employment in control of waterways.
- (3) Be prepared to provide an immediate reaction force as required. Annex D.

k. 1st Motor Transport Bn (-) (Rein)/11th MT Bn

- (1) General Support.
- (2) Be prepared to provide transportation as required for displacement of forces in this order.

l. 1st AT Bn (-)

- (1) General Support.
- (2) Be prepared to provide an immediate reaction force as required. Annex D.

m. 1st SP Bn (-) (Rein)/7th Comm Bn (-)/1st Med Bn (-) (Rein)/3d Dental Co (-). No change.

n. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Execute provisions of this order commencing 291200H July 67.
- (2) Annex C (Supporting Arms).
- (3) Reference (d) (1stMarDiv OpO 301-67).
- (4) Reference (e) (Division Counter Rocket Program).
- (5) Reference (f) (1stMarDiv OpO 91-67, Waterway Control) (To be issued).
- (6) Submit patrol plans to this headquarters by 1800 daily. These plans will reflect surveillance activity for 24 hours commencing at 0600 the following day. Reference (g) for format.
- (7) Execute patrol plans as submitted. Prior approval required from this headquarters before exception to patrol plan permitted. If emergency requires immediate change to plan, notify this headquarters of nature of emergency and action taken.
- (8) Aerial observers provide reconnaissance coverage over the rocket belt and beyond the rocket belt, with emphasis on the enemy main avenues of approach, and subsidiary routes. Coverage provided on a 24 hours basis. Annex B (Intelligence).

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- (9) Units make maximum use of SID's, AN/TPS-21's, Starlight Scopes, illumination, and any other mechanical means or device that will assist with surveillance activity within the rocket belt.
- (10) The vital area of the Danang Complex is centered on two points: AT998763 and BT007737.
- (11) The rocket belt is defined as that area that falls within the 8,000 to 12,000 meter radii of these two points.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Administrative Order 301-67 (to be issued).

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Reference (i) (Division CECI P02000.2C).


b. Command Posts

- (1) 1st Bn, 7th Marines new command post to be located at AT945700. Date and time of the 1/7 CP shift will be announced by this headquarters.
- (2) All other unit command posts; no change.

c. Axis of Communications. Future command post shifts are not anticipated in connection with the prosecution of this order.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

## ANNEXES:

- A - Operation Overlay
- B - Intelligence (to be issued)
- C - Supporting Arms
- D - Provisional Rifle Company
- E - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex E (Distribution) to Operation Plan 90-67

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
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ANNEX C (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 90-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Ref (a) to basic order  
 (b) 1stMarDiv OpO 301-67  
 (c) DivO 3910.19

Time Zone: H

Task Organization Annex: Current Monthly Task Organization Report

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Annex B (Intelligence) current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Basic Order

2. MISSION

To interdict and harrass the rocket belt and routes of ingress and egress, to prevent, detect, attack by fire and destroy enemy rockets and rocket positions.

3. EXECUTION

a. Artillery. Appendix 1 (Artillery).

b. Fire Support Coordination. Appendix 2 (Fire Support Coordination), Ref (a) and (c).

c. Naval Gunfire Support

(1) NGF support ships assigned to the Division will be utilized by sending precleared fire missions on known/identified rocket positions.

(2) Missions will be assigned only after the range probable error has been checked for safety of friendly installations.

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- d. Air Support. Annex G (Air Support) to ref (b).
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Admin Order 301-67 (to be issued).
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS. Annex I to ref (b).

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## APPENDIXES

- 1 - Artillery  
2 - Fire Support Coordination

DISTRIBUTION: Annex L (Distribution) to Operation Order 90-67

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
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APPENDIX 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Supporting Arms) to Operation  
 Order 90-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Ref (a) to Basic Order  
 (b) Firing Chart: Grid Sheet Scale 1:25,000  
 (c) 1stMarDiv OpO 301-67  
 (d) DivO 3910.19

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. Basic Order
2. MISSION. Annex C to Basic Order
3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Artillery Employment

- (1) The Artillery Regiment will in coordination with the TAOR Commanders seek to prevent enemy use of the Rocket Belt area and access to it by conducting a continuous and dynamic interdiction program within the Rocket Belt and throughout primary avenues of approach to the belt.
- (2) The Artillery Regiment will establish the means to detect and acquire enemy rocket positions by employing and coordinating aerial and ground observation, searchlights using visible and infra-red light, and available electronic and sound target acquisition devices.
- (3) The Artillery Regiment will attack all suspected/detected enemy rocket sites with full spectrum of calibers of artillery within range to disrupt attacks and destroy enemy forces involved.

b. Headquarters, 11th Marines

- (1) Establish/maintain primary OP's throughout Rocket Belt as indicated in TAB A. Coordinate/integrate OP's established by subordinate artillery units.
- (2) Recommend locations for supplemental OP's to be established by Infantry/Sector Commanders within the Rocket Belt.

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- (3) Establish/maintain the Artillery Counter Rocket Control Center.
- (4) Coordinate use of searchlights located on primary OP's.
- (5) Establish/maintain continuous complete electronic and sound acquisition coverage of the rocket belt as equipment becomes available.
- (6) Plan GS Counter Rocket interdiction fires in support of Division Counter Rocket Program.

c. 1st, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines

- (1) Establish primary OP's within the Rocket Belt as indicated in TAB A.
- (2) Assist infantry commanders in selecting, establishing, orienting supplemental OP's within respective TAOR's.
- (3) DS 1st and 7th Marines respectively. Zone of Fire 1st and 7th Marines AOR.
- (4) Be prepared to attack targets outside primary Zone of Fire within range of weapons.
- (5) Establish communications with supplementary OP's established by supported Infantry/Sector Commander.
- (6) Establish Counter Rocket Control Center.
- (7) Institute counter rocket training program to include counter rocket drills as directed.
- (8) Assist supported/Infantry/Sector Commander in implementing coordinated Counter Rocket Interdiction Plan.

d. 4th Battalion, 11th Marines

- (1) Establish/maintain primary OP's as indicated in TAB A.
- (2) GS/REIN 1/11 and 3/11.

e. 3d 8" Howitzer Battery (SP)

- (1) Establish/maintain OP as indicated in TAB A.
- (2) GS/REIN 1/11, 3/11, E/2/11, 2/11.

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f. 3d 155 Gun Battery (SP)

- (1) Establish/maintain OP as indicated in TAB A.
- (2) GS/REIN 1/11, 3/11, E/2/11, 2/11.

g. 1st Armd Amph Co (-)

- (1) Establish/maintain OP as indicated in TAB A.
- (2) GS 1st MarDiv.

h. Battery G (-) 29th Artillery

- (1) GS 1st MarDiv

i. Coordinating Instructions


- (1) OP operations/reporting procedures/responsibilities. TAB A.
- (2) Counter Rocket Control Centers.  
Operations/Procedures/Responsibilities. TAB A.
- (3) Rules of engagement. APPENDIX 2 to Annex C.
- (4) Clearance Procedures. APPENDIX 2 to Annex C.
- (5) OP's with searchlights collocated. Coordinate employment  
against rocket firing.
- (6) Counter Battery policy. Active.
- (7) Firing Chart. Reference (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Administrative Order 301-67 (to be issued).

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

- a. Annex L to reference c.
- b. Counter Rocket Control Centers. Report when established.

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TAB A - Counter Rocket Observation/Control

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APPENDIX 2 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex C (Supporting Arms)  
 to Operation Order 90-67

Ref: (a) 1stMarDiv OpO 301-67  
 (b) DivO 3910.19

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. Basic Order.
2. MISSION. Annex C (Supporting Arms).
3. EXECUTION
  - a. Concept. Fire Support Coordination will be in accordance with Annex D to ref (a), except as modified below in accordance with ref (b).
  - b. Coordinating Instructions
    - (1) Rules of Engagement. Annex I to ref (a) except as modified by ref (b) and listed herein in accordance with ref (b).
    - (2) Hostile Rocket sites may be attacked by artillery when:
      - (a) Clearance is received from Commander of area from which the fire attack is being launched, or when;
      - (b) The hostile site is located by direct and positive observation, or when;
      - (c) A reliable three (3) ray intersection is achieved from azimuth reported by established observation posts.
      - (d) Under conditions specified in 3 b (2) (b) and (c) above, artillery response may be initiated by the Artillery Commander concerned prior to receipt of clearance.
      - (e) Artillery Commanders who initiate fire will report area of impact to the area commander normally responsible for clearance of fires as soon as possible.

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- (3) Targets will not be attacked by Naval Gunfire without positive approval by appropriate FSCC.
- (4) Targets will not be attacked by Air without positive approval by appropriate FSCC except as modified below:
  - (a) Air may attack hostile rocket sites without prior clearance when positive identification of the hostile site is established or when the rocket site is in the act of launching (firing) the rockets.
- (5) Artillery will have the primary attack priority. Aircraft will be directed to hold, and no cease fire will be imposed on artillery firing at rocket sites to allow for air strikes. Strikes may be made without imposing a cease fire on artillery at the pilots' discretion.
- (6) Artillery fire on active rocket sites will be stopped at the direction of the Division Commander or his immediate representative.

#### 4. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

- a. Air strikes on active rocket sites may be made without imposing a cease fire on the reacting artillery units when the criteria listed in 3 b (4) (a) are met.
- b. Artillery fire on rocket sites will be stopped to permit air strikes only at the direction of the Division Commander or his immediate representative.
- c. When directed by the Division Commander or his immediate representative, normal Aircraft safety procedures as listed in Annex D to ref (a) will be effected.

#### 5. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

- a. Safety will be normal except as modified in 3 b (2) (b) and (c) above.

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- b. Artillery Counter fires will be lifted when the cognizant Ground Commander of the area involved reports that he is ready to move a reaction force into the effected area. This action will be reported to the Division Commander by the artillery commander.

6. COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

- a. Annex L (Comm-Electronic) to Ref (a).

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 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
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TAB A (COUNTER-ROCKET OBSERVATION/CONTROL) to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Supporting Arms) to Div OpO 90-67

1. Counter-Rocket Observation Posts

- a. Headquarters, 11th Marines will establish/maintain Primary Counter Rocket OPs at the following locations:

<u>OP</u>	<u>GRID</u>	<u>SECTOR</u>	<u>REPORT TO</u>
FALCON	AT 932781	5100 to 0900	11th Mar FDC Pri
EAGLE	AT 932761	2400 to 4200	-do-
CONDOR	AT 941743	0900 to 2100	-do-
HAWK	AT 973737	1000 to 4200	-do-

- b. 1st Battalion, 3rd Battalion, 4th Battalion, 3rd 8" Howitzer Battery, and 3rd 155mm Gun Battery will:

- (1) Establish/maintain Primary Counter-Rocket OPs at the following locations:

<u>OP</u>	<u>GRID</u>	<u>SECTOR</u>
COVETOUS	AT 996722	1600 to 4800
MARBLE MT	BT 075710	2500 to 4800
CROWS NEST	BT 068704	2500 to 4800
MONTH	AT 987675	6400 Mils
LOU	AT 934663	6400 Mils
GOLF	AT 966613	6400 Mils
BEECHNUT	AT 921799	6400 Mils
LAUGH	AT 988651	6400 Mils
PLAID (Hill 190)	AT 894822	6400 Mils

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- (2) The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines will report all sightings from OP's MARBLE MOUNTAIN, CROWS NEST, and MONTH to the 11th Marines FDC. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines will report all sightings from OP's COVETOUS, LOU, GOLF, and LAUGH to 11th Marines FDC. The 3rd 8" Howitzer Battery and 3rd 155mm Gun Battery will report all sightings from OP BEECHNUT to the 11th Marines FDC. All reports will be submitted by the most expeditious means.

c. Northern and Southern Sector Defense Commands will:

- (1) Establish primary Counter-Rocket OP's at the following locations:

<u>OP</u>	<u>GRID</u>
Tank NR 1	AT 939793
Tank NR 2	AT 974703
Tank NR 3	AT 964789
Headquarters Bn OP#1	AT 959745
11th Motor Transport Bn LP	AT 936766
7th Engineer Bn Bunker #17	AT 951778
1st Recon Bn OP	AT 968745
1st FSR Bunker #14	AT 936801

- (2) In coordination with CG, III MAF, establish primary Counter-Rocket OP's at the following locations:

CAP Tower (CAP E-1)	AT 959767
CAP Tower (CAP E-2)	AT 938823

- (3) The Northern and Southern Sector Defense Commands, report sightings from above to the 11th Marines FDC by the most expeditious method.

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(4) Observation posts will have the following missions assigned:

(a) To perform continuous (24 hour) visual reconnaissance of sections assigned and to report all sightings of unusual activity, with specific attention to the rocket belt. Any sighting will be reported by the most rapid means available in the following format:


- (1) OP Identification
- (2) Direction to Target
- (3) Estimated Distance to Target
- (4) Target Description
- (5) Time of Observation

(b) Report any deviations from normal activity as they occur regarding weather, road/river traffic, field activity, surveillance.

2. Counter Rocket Control Centers

- a. The 11th Marines Counter Rocket Control Center will be established at the 11th Marines FDC. All reports received at the Battalion Counter Rocket Center will be forwarded by the most rapid means to the 11th Marines Center.
- b. Where possible, coordinates of the location of rocket firing positions will be sent. When only one sighting ray is available, it will be sent using the format in 1 c (4) (a) above.

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ANNEX D (Provisional Rifle Company) to Operation Order 90-67

Ref: (a) III MAF LOI 4-67  
 (b) 1st MarDiv OpOrder 301-67  
 (c) 1st MarDiv GEOI P02000.2C

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

Provisional Company

1st Platoon

2d Platoon

3d Platoon

Capt (Tank Battalion)

Lt (Tank Battalion)

Lt (Antitank Battalion)

Lt (Amphibian Tractor Bn)

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. Ref (a) (III MAF LOI 4-67) and ref (b) (1st MarDiv OpOrder 301-67).

2. MISSION

Be prepared, on order, to participate in defense of Danang vital area inside 8,000 meter radii. Be prepared to reinforce infantry units as required.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. The Provisional Rifle Company provides a unit capable of defending or reinforcing an area for a period not to exceed five days. The company deploys, on call, from its assigned area, in transportation provided by Division Headquarters no later than four hours after notification of activation for operations.

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- b. 1st Tank Bn (-)/1st AT Bn (-)/3d AmTrac Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (1) Provide personnel indicated Appendix 1 (Personnel for Provisional Rifle Company).
  - (2) Provide equipment as indicated Appendix 2 (Equipment for Provisional Rifle Company).
  - (3) Conduct training required to indoctrinate troops and insure sound knowledge of basic infantry tasks employed RVN.
- c. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) CO, Provisional Company will receive mission and order from this headquarters.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Appendix 1 (Personnel for Provisional Rifle Company).
- b. Appendix 2 (Equipment for Provisional Rifle Company).
- c. Division Ordnance Officer provides LAAW and M79 weapons.
- d. Division CEO provides AN/PRC-25 radios.
- e. Division Headquarters provides transportation.
- f. **Uniform** and equipment.
  - (1) Normal combat uniform, RVN.
  - (2) One (1) Unit of Fire.
  - (3) Four (4) Meals, Combat, Individual.

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## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS--ELECTRONICS

- a. Ref (c) (Division CE01, PO2000.2C).
- b. Frequencies will be assigned upon activation of the company.

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## APPENDICES:

- 1 - Personnel for Provisional Rifle Company
- 2 - Equipment for Provisional Rifle Company

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APPENDIX 1 (Personnel for Provisional Rifle Company) to ANNEX D (Provisional Rifle Company) to Operation Order 90-67.

## PERSONNEL FOR PROVISIONAL COMPANY

<u>Title</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Provided by</u>
<u>Company Headquarters</u> (2 Officers - 3 Enl)		
Company Commander	Capt	Tank Battalion
Executive Officer	Lt	Amphibian Tractor Bn
First Sergeant	FSgt-GySgt	Tank Bn
Gunnery Sergeant	GySgt-SSgt	"
Messenger	Pvt	"
<u>1st Platoon</u> (1 Officer 34 Enl)		
Platoon Headquarters		
Platoon Commander	Lt	Tank Bn
Platoon Sergeant	SSgt	"
Platoon Guide	Sgt/Cpl	"
Corpsman	HM	"
Messenger	Pvt	"
3-Rifle squads (10 men each squad) as available		

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2nd Platoon

(1 Officer 34 Enl)

Platoon Headquarters

Platoon Commander	Lt	Anti tank Bn
Platoon Sergeant	SSgt	"
Platoon Guide	Sgt/Cpl	"
Corpsman	HM	"
Messenger	Pvt	"

3-Rifle squads (10 men each squad) as available

3rd Platoon

(1 Officer 34 Enl)

Platoon Headquarters

Platoon Commander	Lt	Amphibian Tractor Bn
Platoon Sergeant	SSgt	"
Platoon Guide	Sgt/Cpl	"
Corpsman	HM	"
Messenger	Pvt	"

3-Rifle squads (10 each squad) as available

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APPENDIX 2 (Equipment for Provisional Rifle Company) to ANNEX D  
 (Provisional Rifle Company) to Operation Order 90-67.

## EQUIPMENT FOR PROVISIONAL COMPANY

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>
LAAW	6	Division Ordnance Officer
M14 Rifle	One per man less those armed with M14 (modified)	Units providing personnel
36 M14 Rifle (Modified)	36 (4 per squad)	12 Amphibian Tractor Battalion 12 Antitank Battalion 12 Tank Battalion
Pistol Cal. .45 M1911A1	One per Officer/ SNCO/Corpsman	Units providing personnel
M60 Machine Gun w/tripod or Machine Gun Light M1919A4	6	2 Tank Battalion 4 Amphibian Tractor Battalion
M79 Grenade Launcher	6	Division Ordnance Officer
Radio AN/PRC-25	4	CEO

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Annex E (Distribution) to Operation Order 90-67

Ref: (a) Div Order 5605.1\_\_

Time Zone: H

1. Distribution of this order is as follows:

CMC (Code A03H)	2	CG FLC/FSR	5
CMCS	2	CTG 70.8	2
CINCPAC	2	CTU 70.8.9	2
CINCPACFLT	2	NCC	1
CG FMFPAC	2	NAVSPACT	1
CG FMFEAC (Fwd)	1	CO I CORPS ADV GRP	4
COMUSMACV	5	NCR 30	15
COMSEVENTHFLT	2	CTG 115.1	2
CG III MAF	10	2d Bn, 5th Mar	5
CG 3d MARDIV	3	11th MT Bn	2
CG 1st MAW	20	Det, 3d Dental Co	1

E-1,2,3,4,8,10,12,14,15,16,21,23,26,27,32,34,35,39,46,65,(1);84,  
 86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,95,97,98,101,102,(2);85(6);7a,68,72,76,80,  
 (10).

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1st Marine Division (Rein)  
Danang, Republic of Vietnam  
210800H July 1967

Special Intelligence Estimate - Rocket Threat to Vital Base Areas, Danang

Ref: (a) Map 1:50,000, Series L 7014, Sheets 6641 I, II, III, IV; 6541 II; and 6540 I.

1. Mission. The First Marine Division participates in defense of vital base areas, airfields and facilities at DANANG in coordination with Commanding Officer Air Base Defense Battalion. For purposes of this estimate vital base areas have been defined as areas lying within the outer arc depicted at Annex A.

## 2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Hereinafter, the areas from which rockets could be fired at the DANANG complex are considered to be bounded by a "rocket belt" swung on radii of 12,000 meters from either end of DANANG airfield. The area within this belt circumscribing DANANG airfield is generally heavily populated, flat and currently being tilled. This type of terrain extends several thousand meters to the south of the rocket belt but the northern and western fringes of the belt lie at the foot of the mountains.

### (1) Military Geography

#### (a) Topography

##### 1. Existing Situation (See Annex A)

a. There are three principal land routes available to the enemy into eastern Quang Nam Province from the western highlands. These routes are "Elephant Valley" in the northern sector of the TAOR, "Happy Valley", the one most heavily used, in the western sector of the TAOR, and the Song Vu Gia Valley which leads into the southern sector of the TAOR.

b. When the enemy reaches the mouths of the valleys which brings him onto the eastern lowlands, he can move with relative ease in any direction. Moving out of "Elephant Valley", the enemy is abruptly confronted by open, flat rice paddies where cover and concealment are minimal. Moving east from "Happy Valley", there is a transitional geographic feature of rolling plains and foothills interspersed with forest and grassland which provides cover and concealment for movement. The Song Vu Gia Valley also runs into a flat area which provides little or no cover and concealment. This area must be traversed before the DANANG complex will be within range. Informator obtained from an ARVN who was held prisoner by the VC in the vicinity of VC 898635 revealed that the 140mm rockets which were fired at the Danang Airbase in February were brought in through "Happy Valley". This appears to be the most probable route of ingress.

c. The terrain in the lowlands is relatively easy to negotiate. It consists of cultivated rice paddies, rolling plains, and a few low hills. Some of the paddies are irrigated and remain inundated year round.

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2. Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The study of the rocket sites used in the 15 July attack on DANANG Airfield revealed that the firing points were in groups of six with six such groups (total of 36 positions/sites) clustered in areas 100 meters wide and 50 meters long. If there were no suitable area of that size available each tube could be used to fire several rounds thereby allowing maximum coverage of the target from a small area. There are, however, an innumerable number of areas fitting this description within the rocket belt. The positions used were located in close proximity to friendly hamlets and/or friendly military units; possibly to negate counterbattery fire. Mask clearance appears to have been no problem; clear lines of fire undercut in the trees and the firing angle of between 30 and 42 degrees allows the 122mm projectile to clear any of the low hills east of the mountains. In short, any area suitable as a mortar, firing position could be used as a 122mm rocket firing site.

(b) Hydrography. In the east the vital base areas are delineated by the South China Sea. The beaches extend within the First Marine Division Area approximately 7.5 kilometers in the north and 6 kilometers in the south. All portions of these beaches are suitable landing sites within the vital base areas. The characteristics of these beaches are such as to permit landing during all seasons of the year.

(c) Weather. There has been little rain from February to the present so all the rocket attacks including the one on the 15th of July have occurred during the dry season. Since the rocket is electrically detonated heavy rains could affect its employment and it can be assumed that flooding either from rains or from irrigation will deny some potentially good firing sites to the enemy. Light conditions don't appear to have had much effect on a planned rocket attack:

1. 27 February - 92%
2. 15 March - 19%
3. 16 May - 37%
4. 13 July - 65%
5. 15 July - 54%

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Movements and Activities (See Annex A)

(a) Vital areas in and around the DANANG complex have received rocket attacks on 5 occasions in the last 6 months. The first 4 attacks employed 140mm rockets and occurred as follows:

1. 27 February AT 965693, AT 965696.
2. 15 March AT959767.
3. 16 May AT858854.

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4. 13 July AT 852851.

(b) These attacks were relatively unsuccessful when compared with the attack at 0025 on 15 July. This attack employed the 122mm rocket, marking the first time it has been employed in the LAMANG area.

(c) The 122mm rockets were fired from 6 locations: AT 922710, AT 923708, AT 924708, AT 927685, AT 928689 and AT 929688. Each location contained 6 sites for launchers for a total of 36 sites used.

(2) Operational Capabilities to Launch Rockets. The first rockets (140mm) were infiltrated into Quang Nam Province in January and February 1967. Subsequently a PCW, Phang Chen De, reported that during infiltration into Quang Ngai in April 1967 his unit traveled with an unidentified regiment for 4 days. When they reached Quang Nam the unidentified regiment traveled east. A member of that regiment told De that the weapons the regiment was carrying were of the same type previously used to attack LAMANG. Thus, the enemy's operational capability to launch rockets may be as large as a regiment plus another unit of battalion size.

(3) Technical Characteristics of Equipment.

(a) Characteristics of the Weapon. Reportedly the 122mm rocket was designed as a replacement for the 140mm rocket and thus is assumed to exceed the 140mm rocket in all aspects. Accordingly, only the technical characteristics of the 122mm rocket are discussed hereinafter:

1. The 122mm rocket is a fin and spin stabilized weapon with a minimum range of 2,000 meters and maximum range of 12,000 meters. It is an indirect fire weapon which uses an optical sight. Overall length is 76" and it weighs between 100 and 120lbs. Its bursting radius is 170 meters.

2. The weapon is electrically detonated and uses simple household type wiring and connectors.

3. The weapon is credited with being prepared and ready for firing within 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  minutes, and being disassembled for displacement within 2 minutes.

4. It is assumed that the weapon launcher is a tube type, approximately 7 feet in length and fired from a tripod.

5. The launcher has a reload capability.

6. It is further assumed that the launcher is of light weight construction.

(b) Organization of Position Areas

1. Rocket positions utilized on the incident of the attack of 15 July 1967 had the following characteristics:

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a. Rockets were positioned in groups (platoons) of six, with 3 such groups (comprising a battery) clustered in near proximity of approximately a 100 meter front and a 50 meter depth.

b. The positions used were located in three lines, in close proximity to hamlets, and/or to friendly military units. It is assumed that this choice of position was meant to prevent counter fire.

c. Mass appears to be no problem. There is evidence that tree limbs were cut to clear the line of fire. The angle of firing (elevation) appears to be between 30-40°.

d. A small stake of approximately 12 inches in length appears to be used for initial orientation of launcher for direction. A series of shallow slit trenches approximately 6 feet in length were cut next to the launcher with the long axis parallel to the direction of fire. These are assumed to be shelters for personnel during firing. After firing, a back blast area starts about 2 feet to the rear of the launcher and extends in fan shape about 5 to 6 feet. Ignition of the rocket motor does not leave a clear black scar or residue.

e. Viet Cong made maximum use of natural vegetation for camouflage and flash dissipation.

2. In summary, any position generally suitable for light artillery or heavy mortars is considered more than adequate for a 122mm rocket launcher.

(c) Most likely areas of employment

1. It is considered that the most effective range is between 9 and 2,000 meters.

2. The mortar-like characteristics of the weapon make few areas unlikely in position selection. Its high trajectory permits firing from defilade, built-up areas, defiles and areas of heavy vegetation as well as high ground, forward and reverse slopes. While river lines offer easy routes of approach and egress this does not dictate that positions will be on or near the river line.

3. Proximity of Popular Force outposts, CAP areas or Marine defensive positions appear to offer little deterrent to the Viet Cong in positioning their firing units. The rocket attack of the morning of 15 July 1967 revealed that one launch site located within a small hamlet was within 250 meters of a PF station at district Hq, and within 500 meters of a rifle company CP. This site was approximately 2,000 meters from the river. Another launch site was near the river line within 400 meters of a CAP unit and about 400 meters from a village.

4. Therefore it is concluded that any area included within areas circumscribed by radii of 9,000 and 12,000 meters offer the most probable firing sites.

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### 3. Enemy Capabilities (See Annex A)

- a. The enemy can attack the vital base areas with rockets at the time of his choosing from the northern sector of the vital areas using Elephant Valley as the route of approach.
- b. The enemy can attack the vital base areas with rockets at a time of his choosing from the western sector of the vital areas using Happy Valley as the route of approach.
- c. The enemy can attack the vital base areas with rockets at a time of his choosing from the southern sector of the vital areas using Song Vu Gia Valley as the route of approach.
- d. The enemy can attack the vital base areas with rockets at a time of his choosing from the eastern sector of the vital base areas, using as a place of entry, landing sites along the beaches within the vital base areas.

### 4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

- a. Capability No. 1, attack from the north would require the enemy to travel the most restricted and difficult land route into the vital base areas. Further, suitable firing areas in the north are restricted relative to the western and southern sectors of the vital base areas. On the other hand the enemy has demonstrated his ability to follow this course of action by launching two previous attacks from this sector.
- b. Capability No. 2, attack from the west offers the enemy the most direct and suitable route of approach from North Vietnam to the vital base areas. Further, it offers concealed close-in approaches of firing sites and a wide range of such sites. The enemy has demonstrated his ability to follow this course of action by launching three previous attacks from this area; the latest employing the 122mm rocket.
- c. Capability No. 3, attack from the south presents the enemy with the most difficult close in approach to the vital base areas due to troop depth and population density in this sector. However, the enemy has demonstrated his ability in the past to fire 120mm mortars from this sector, a feat which presents about the same array of problems as would be present in emplacing and firing rockets from this sector.
- d. Capability No. 4, attack from the east presents the enemy with the greatest number of technical problems; e.g., amphibious landing and withdrawal, in approaching the vital base areas. Further, off shore patrolling by Swift Boats and a defended coast line make this course of action even more difficult of execution. Nevertheless the enemy has demonstrated in the past his capability for landing from the sea with a small party; conducting an attack and withdrawing by sea.

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## 5. Conclusion

It is concluded from the foregoing that the enemy probable courses of actions in attacking the vital base areas by rockets in the order of probability are; (a) an attack from the west; (b) an attack from the north; (c) an attack from the south and (d) an attack from the east. It is further concluded that anti-rocket defenses against an attack from the west or north would be greatly enhanced by extending active defenses as far into the western mountains of Hieu Duc District as friendly resources will permit, consistent with a dense close-in defense of the vital base areas.

E. B. Sigmon Jr. — J

E. B. SIGMON JR.  
LtCol USMC

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX-A (DANANG vital Base Areas)  
ANNEX-B (Technical Characteristics of the Weapon)

GROUP-4  
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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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ANNEX B--Technical Characteristics of the Weapon

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Caliber   | 122.4mm  |
| 2. Length (Round)  | 76 inches  |
| 3. Weight (Round)  | 105 pounds                                       |
| 4. Length (Launcher)   | 7'3"   |
| 5. Weight (Launcher)   | 55 pounds  |
| 6. Maximum Range   | 12,000 meters                                    |
| 7. Minimum Range   | 2,000 meters                                     |
| 8. Maximum Elevation   | 42 degrees                                       |
| 9. Minimum Elevation   | 10 degrees                                       |
| 10. Type and quantity of explosive   | TNT, RDX and alum pdr,<br>total weight 20 pounds |
| 11. Mount  | tripod   |
| 12. Sighting device  | optical  |
| 13. Stabilization  | Spin and fin                                     |
| 14. The barrel is sheet iron tube with rings to support it and one cross<br>at each end of the barrel for fire adjustment purposes. There are riflings<br>for 1/4 of the bore to stabilize the projectile. A mount for the aiming<br>sight is a triangular device to facilitate loading and to store the<br>batteries. |  |

On the left is the "retainer" with a threefold purpose:

1. Secure the projectile
2. Extract the projectile
3. Boost the power of the projectile

B-1

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to vital base areas, Danang).

c. Own Courses of Action.

(1) Course of Action #1:

Retain current disposition of forces, to include supporting arms, and orient surveillance and reaction forces to the rocket belt and toward the main enemy avenues of approach to the rocket belt.

(2) Course of Action #2:

Shift internal boundaries of the 7th Mar TAOR (See Annex A- Opn Overlay) by aligning the 7th Marines so that one battalion can focus its efforts on each of the enemy's main avenues of approach; that is THONG DUC, Happy Valley and Elephant Valley.

(3) Course of Action #3:

The same as course of action #2. In addition, orient the 1st Marines main effort toward the rocket belt and to the southern portion of their present TAOR.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

a. Enemy Course of Action #1

(1) Own Course of Action #1: Our forces are spread too thin to effectively deny enemy the capability of entering rocket belt from this avenue of approach. 2/7 has large area, plus the responsibility of covering two of the enemy's main avenues of approach.

(2) Own Course of Action #2: Permits 2/7 to focus attention on main avenue of approach, providing depth as well as increased density. A smaller lateral area of responsibility, coupled with an orientation along the long axis of the enemy's access route, greatly reduces the effectiveness of this enemy course of action.

(3) Own Course of Action #3: This has the same effect as does own course of action #2.

b. Enemy Course of Action #2

(1) Own Course of Action #1: Our forces are spread too thin to effectively deny enemy the capability of entering rocket belt from this avenue of approach. 2/7 has large area, plus the responsibility of covering two of the enemy's main avenues of approach.

(2) Own Course of Action #2: This permits 1/7 to focus on one enemy main avenue of approach in depth. Enemy's effectiveness in infiltrating through Happy Valley would be reduced.

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(3) Own Course of Action #3: This has the same effect as does own course of action #2.

c. Enemy Course of Action #3

(1) Own Course of Action #1: 3/7 has a large TAOR, but has an advantage over the other battalions in that it has to cover only one main avenue of approach. Further, 1/7 and 2/5 provide close, adjacent surveillance on one flank. This is an effective posture.

(2) Own Course of Action #2: 3/7 still has sole responsibility to cover this route of the enemy's approach, but it is improved in that the area north of a major ridge has been assigned to 1/7. Also, the north boundary of the TAOR coinciding with a province boundary facilitates coordination and intelligence acquisition.

(3) Own Course of Action #3: This has the same effect as does own course of action #2, except that additional surveillance is afforded against an enemy approach from the south. Shifting the 1st Marines emphasis to the south enhances our capability to detect any movement from the south and southwest.

d. Enemy Course of Action #4. All courses of action are affected equally if the enemy attempts infiltration from the sea. Other friendly forces will coordinate with 1stMarDiv in denying the enemy this capability.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION

a. Course of Action #1

(1) Advantages:

(a) Forces need not be redeployed great distances. Assumption of this tactical posture can be assumed in a minimum of time.

(b) Battalion boundaries remain the same. Bn CP's likely need not displace.

(c) Units will be operating in the areas with which they are familiar. Familiarity with patrol routes and trafficability will facilitate operations.

(d) Relationships with village chiefs and agents will not be disrupted by shifting of units.

(2) Disadvantages

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(a) Enemy has successfully penetrated to rocket belt three times in recent months. Current dispositions of forces, even with orientation into specific areas, may be continuing with the same mistakes.

(b) The responsibility for the enemy's main avenues of approach is not judiciously distributed among our forces. 2/7 for example, has responsibility for an unreasonable amount of area, to include two main enemy avenues of approach.

(c) Current disposition of forces does not offer the optimum tactical orientation on key terrain.... in this case the three main enemy avenues of approach.

b. Course of Action #2

(1) Advantages

(a) Boundary adjustment affects only the 7th Marines.

(b) Areas of responsibility changing hands would be minimal.

(c) Tactical alignment would be sound. Each enemy main avenue of approach would be the responsibility of a battalion, solely oriented on that avenue of approach. Control and coordination would be facilitated.

(d) The shift of one battalion TAOR boundary to coincide with a political boundary is an asset regarding intelligence acquisition and obtaining civilian cooperation.

(2) Disadvantages

(a) A battalion displacement (1/7) is required.

c. Course of Action #3

(1) Advantages

(a) Tactical alignment would be sound. 7th and 1st Marines would be efficiently oriented to deny enemy access to the rocket belt. 7th Marines with a battalion on each of the main enemy avenues of approach and the 1st Marines focused on enemy possible (although improbable) approach routes.

(b) Battalion boundary (3/7 and 2/7) coinciding with political boundary is a facilitating factor for both battalions.

(2) Disadvantages

(a) Alignment of forces would require the greatest shifting of forces of any course of action. Assumption of desired posture would be delayed, although 10 day minimum can still be met.

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## 5. DECISION

a. Course of Action #3 is selected as the one offering the greatest possibility of successful accomplishment of the mission.

b. 1st Marine Division (Rein) will defend the vital areas of the Danang Complex, without delay, with three infantry regiments, together with supporting arms to include air and naval gunfire; with all units in assigned sectors of responsibility within the Division TAOR; with an optimum effort on prevention, detection, attack and destruction of hostile rocket positions.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



H. J. WOESSNER  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

ANNEX

## A. OPERATION OVERLAY

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
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FIRST BATTALION 1ST MARINE DIVISION (1ST MARDIV) over 3400, Ser: 00323-67  
dat 9 Aug 67

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
(Attn: MACJ-343)

Subj: Combat After Action Report; Operation ELLIOT

1. Forwarded.

FRED HAYNES  
BY DIRECTION

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMI

67 3204/12<sup>1</sup> END

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PFO, San Francisco, California 94402

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Stamping  
SAC  
Dist: 0023-07  
9 AUG 1967

LS1

SECRET — Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat After Action Report; Operation ELLIOT

Ref: (a) MACV DLR No 335-8  
(b) FMFPasO 300.4

Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.

2. Operations of this nature are necessary to confirm or deny intelligence reports. Although characterized by very light contact, Operation ELLIOT did confirm that the area has been used by the enemy. The operation was considered a success in that it further served to keep the enemy off balance.

H. J. WOESSNER  
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Marines (Rein)  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

3/10/g1e  
3480  
31 Jul 67  
SER#0075-67

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation ELLIOT)

MARINES SAC CONTROL NO. 0075-67

Ref: (a) 1st Marines Frag-Order 56-67

Copy 7 of 12 Copies

1. Code Name: Operation ELLIOT (Search and Destroy Operation)
2. Dates of Operation: 050600H July 67 to 062400H July 67.
3. Location: Area bounded on North by E-W GL 62, on East by line from BF 028620 to BF 028617, South along SUOI CO CA to BF 012568, on the South by RT 14 and on the West by the N-S GL 97.

4. Command Headquarters:

1st Marines

Colonel RADICS

1st Battalion, 1st Marines

Lieutenant Colonel PETRO

2nd Battalion, 1st Marines

Lieutenant Colonel HEWLETT

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Lieutenant Colonel ROWLEY

1st Battalion, 11th Marines D/S

Major MARION

Company A (-), 1st Shore Party

Captain BOTELHO

Company A (-), 1st Engineers

Captain ITCHKAWICH

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HEADQUARTERS

1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMP

67 3074

5. Task Organization:

1st Marines (-) (Rein)

Colonel RADICS

Copy 7 of 8

1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-)

Lieutenant Colonel TITTO

1st H&S Company

Company A, 1st Battalion

Company B, 1st Battalion

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2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) Lieutenant Colonel HEWLETT

Det H&S Company

Company E, 2nd Battalion

Company H, 2nd Battalion

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Lieutenant Colonel ROWLEY

Det H&S Company

Company A, 1st Battalion

Company D, 1st Battalion

6. Supporting Forces:

a. Marine Helicopters (1st Marine Aircraft Wing)

(1) Helicopter requirements were kept at a minimum, and no assault forces were landed by air. The bulk of helicopter requirements were for the resupply of units in the field.

(2) The lack of helicopters was overcome by close liaison with the Division TACP and the Division "Working Birds" were used to fill the gaps in the 1st Marines requirements.

b. Marine Fixed Wing Support:

(1) There were no requests for fixed wing aircraft and none were employed.

(2) Observer aircraft were employed during the operation to make visual reconnaissance of suspected enemy assembly areas.

c. Artillery:

(1) 1st Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support of 1st Marines. There were a total of 14 artillery missions fired in support of Operation ELLIOT. A breakdown of ammunition expended is as follows:

	HE	WP	ILLUM	SMOKE
105MM	138	35	1	6

(2) "A" and "B" Batteries supported Operation ELLIOT from their primary positions within the TRO. Two LVT H-6's were attached to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines for direct fire support.

d. Naval Gunfire: There was no naval gunfire used during Operation ELLIOT.

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e. Company A (-), 1st Shore Party Battalion: Provided one HST per Company and for each Battalion Command Group and was prepared to provide additional support as required.

f. Company A (-), 1st Engineers Battalion: Provided engineer support teams to accompany each Company and Battalion Command Group and was prepared to provide additional support as required.

## 7. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Forces Anticipated In Objective Area: Based on sightings and contacts by Marine Units prior to the operation, it was estimated that the objective area contained approximately 30-50 guerrillas. There were also numerous low-level intelligence reports of units up to company size within the objective area.

### b. Enemy Forces Actually Encountered In The Objective Area:

(1) Sporadic small contacts confirmed that no companies or large size units operated within the objective area and that the agent reports were grossly exaggerated. The absence of enemy forces could be attributed to the defection of VO NGOC AN on the 3rd of July, two days prior to the commencement of Operation ELLIOT. VO NGOC AN partially confirmed the estimate of VC forces when he stated he was a member of a 12 man squad that normally operated in the area covered by Operation ELLIOT. VO NGOC AN also stated that the TAOR boundary between 1st Marines and 7th Marines was a commonly used infiltration route into the DA NANG TAOR.

(2) Mines and Booby Traps. During Operation ELLIOT 28 mines were discovered and destroyed by friendly forces. Seven mines were detonated resulting in 7 USMC WIA's.

(3) Caves and Tunnels. Four man-made caves and one bunker were discovered and destroyed by friendly forces. None of the caves contained any personnel or equipment but did indicate signs of recent occupancy.

### c. Terrain:

(1) Cover and Concealment. During Operation ELLIOT built up ~~areas~~ hedgerows and cultivated areas offered good concealment. Limited cover was provided by topographical variations and built up areas.

(2) Critical Terrain Features. None.

(3) Observation and Fields of Fire. Fields of fire were good and were only restricted by hedgerows and built-up areas.

(4) Obstacles. Natural obstacles were non-existent in the operation area, however, hamlets tended to channelize troop movements.

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(5) Avenues of Approach. The main avenue of approach into the objective area was along the western side of the TAOR boundary between 1st and 7th Marines, this was confirmed as a commonly used infiltration route for both guerrillas and Main Force units by the rallier, VO NGOC AN.

8. Mission: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conduct search and destroy operation in area bounded on North by E-W GL 62, on East by a line from BT 028620 to BT 028617 South along the SUOI CO CA to BT 012568, on the South by Route 14 and on the West by N-S GL 97, to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies and facilities in the area of operation and to interdict enemy routes of communications.

9. Concept of Operations: 1st Marines at H-Hour D-Day 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conducts S&D Operations with three Battalion (-). One Battalion attacks from the West and establishes blocking positions on the 1st Marines-7th Marines common boundary. Simultaneously two Battalions cross the LOD on Eastern flank of the Area of Operation and attack Westward to the Railroad Tracks. A systematic S&D of the Area of Operation is then conducted.

a. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein): At H-Hour cross Route 14 and sweeps Northwest conducting a Search and Destroy operation in its ZOA, bounded on the South by Route 14, the SUOI CO CA on the East and existing Battalion Boundaries on North and West.

b. 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein): At H-Hour cross N-S GL 017 and E-W GL 62 and sweep west in a Search and Destroy operation in its ZOA bounded on the East by a line from BT 028620 to BT 028617 on the North by the E-W GL 62 and on the South and West by existing Battalion boundaries.

c. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein): At H-Hour enter DUC KY peninsula from the North and sweep East to the 1st Marines-7th Marines common boundary and establish contact with 2nd Battalion. Simultaneously enter the area of operation from the vicinity of CAM VAN (3) AT 973587 and sweep East toward the 1st Marines-7th Marines common boundary and establish contact with 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

10. Execution:

a. 03 July 1645H Concept of Operations for Operation ELLIOT was submitted to 1st Marine Division for approval.

b. 04 July 1967

(1) 0947H, Received approval from 1st Marine Division on the Concept of Operations for Operation ELLIOT.

(2) 1100H, Briefing held at 1st Marines CP with all units on the proposed Concept of Operations.

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c. 05 July 1967

- (1) 400H, Open 1st Battalion, 7th Marines passed to 1st Marines.
- (2) 0600H, All units crossed LOD to commence Operation ELLIOT.
- (3) 0715H, Company E-2-1, vicinity AT 995617, found 1 Zulu-10 type mine and 1 unknown type mine. Both mines disarmed and forwarded to the Battalion CP.
- (4) 0805H, Company A-1-7, vicinity AT 978606, apprehended 1 VN male with ID card. Kit Carson Scout identified Detainee as a member of a local VC platoon. Detainee forwarded to Battalion CP.
- (5) 1025H, Company A-1-7, vicinity AT 977796, Marine detonated unknown type mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA MedEvac.
- (6) 1115H, Company A-1-1, vicinity BT 007595, found reinforced bunker 2'X6'X5'. Bunker constructed with false floor and reinforced with bamboo. Also discovered a tunnel leading to another exit approximately 8 meters from the bunker. Searched bunker and found 1 poncho, 1 flashlight, 1 first aid kit and 1 cooking stove. Gear forwarded to Battalion CP and bunker destroyed with C-4.
- (7) 1440H, Company H-2-1, vicinity AT 989600, patrol member detonated 2 81MM rounds rigged as a mine resulting in 4 USMC WIA MedEvacs.
- (8) 1500H, Company D-1-7, vicinity AT 987609, patrol found one cave approximately 3'X3'X12' with bamboo and brush concealment. Destroyed cave with C-4.
- (9) 1545H, Company H-2-1, vicinity AT 993598, patrol member detonated an M-26 grenade rigged as a mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA MedEvac.
- (10) 1640H, Company G-1-1, vicinity AT 989588, patrol member detonated an M-26 grenade rigged as a mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA MedEvac. Area searched and found another M-26 grenade rigged as a mine. Mine blown by engineers.
- (11) 2025H, Company A-1-1, vicinity AT 999579, while moving to PPB spotted a light in a house and observed 3 VC near house. Unit received 10 rounds small arms fire. Patrol opened fire with small arms fire and M-79s. Searched area found 2 M-26 grenades and a first aid kit.
- (12) 2145H, Company A-1-1, vicinity BT 006585, while moving into PPB received approximately 100 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 4 VC resulting in 1 USMC KIA. Returned small arms and 81MM mortars. Searched area but found no evidence of VC casualties.

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d. 06 July 1967

(1) 1200H, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines returned operational control to 7th Marines.

(2) 1330H, Company H-2-1, vicinity AT 9859, 9959, 9860 with rallyer discovered 3 anti-personnel mines, 1 round 81MM, 1 M-79, 3 ChiCom grenades, 1 M-26 grenade and (1) 60MM mortar round all rigged as mines. All mines destroyed with C-4.

11. Results:

- a. USMC KIA - 1
- b. KIT CALSON KIA - 0
- c. USMC WIA - 7
- d. USMC MIA - 0
- e. VC KIA (Conf) - 0
- f. VC KIA (Prob) - 0
- g. Detainee - 1
- h. POW - 0
- i. Friendly Equipment Losses. None.
- j. Captured Enemy Equipment.
 

(2) M-26 Grenades	(1) Poncho
(1) Bag Medical Supplies	(1) Flashlight
(2) First Aid Kits	Assorted Documents

12. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: Supply support for the field elements was provided by parent organizations. Combat loads carried by the companies were sufficient to meet all requirements. Resupply in the field was accomplished by LVT's and Otters, however, in instances where time or terrain was a limiting factor helicopters were utilized. Helicopter support Teams (HST's) were provided for each company. Resupply requests were transmitted via the HST logistics net to Battalion rear.

b. Maintenance: Due to the short duration of the operation, no maintenance problems were encountered.

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c. Casualty Treatment and Medical Evacuation: All battle casualties were evacuated directly to division-level medical facilities. After treatment all troops with minor injuries were returned to their parent organization for further care.

d. Transportation: Due to the Operational Area being within the 1st Marines TAOR no transportation was required for the movement of troops.

e. Communications: Operation ELLIOT was controlled from the Regimental CP because of its close proximity to the Operations Area. All circuitry was reliable and no communications problems were encountered during the operations.

13. Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs Support:

a. Psychological Warfare: There were no psychological warfare activities carried on during Operation ELLIOT but on 08 July the after action activities related to ELLIOT saw the use of a leaflet drop and both aerial and ground broadcasts in the Operation area. The tapes used for the broadcast were made by a rallier from the QUANG DUNG Hamlet, VO HUOC AN.

b. Civil Affairs: None.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: A diver team from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was employed during the second day of operations.

15. Commanders Analysis: During Operation ELLIOT, no significant contact was made or casualties inflicted upon the enemy. Because of this, it was not a resounding success. It did confirm however, that the operations area, specifically the common boundary between 1st and 7th Marines, is a commonly used infiltration route into the DA NANG TAOR. It also confirmed that the area is heavily mined and booby trapped to hamper our efforts to patrol and block this Avenue of Approach.

*R. O. RITTS*

R. O. RITTS

Executive Officer

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ADMIRAL	LtCol E. R. SCHLEFMAN	Sep67	Ishewood 7	
Asst Adjutant	Capt G. F. KRETTNER JR.	Dec67	Ishewood 207	
Bravo	CWO P. L. HOLL	Dec67	Ishewood 47	
Chiefs/ALO	2dLt J. E. TYLER	Aug67	Ishewood 147	
Comptroller	2dLt J. A. JAMES	Nov67	Ishewood 107	
Ops Custodian	2dLt W. J. KAHE	Oct67	Ishewood 507	
Awards/Sec	Maj J. G. HERBERT	Aug67	Ishewood 607	
SAC Files	CWO N. A. ZIMMERMAN	Nov67	Ishewood 507	
AIR OFFICER	Col F. C. LANG	Aug67	Ishewood 14	934
Asst AirC	Maj S. P. HARTNER	Oct67	Ishewood 14	
AMPHIBIAN REACTOR OFFICER	LtCol R. L. SHEPARD	Jul68	Steel 6	
ARTILLERY OFFICER	LtCol C. HENRICKS	Jul68	Amigo 6	
BAND OFFICER	WO E. W. ELFS	Sep67	Auditor 55	
CAREER ADVISER	Capt T. R. DOVE	Nov67	Auditor 401	
CHAPLAIN	Capt D. J. CASAZZA, USN	Aug67	Ishewood 19	938
Asst Chaplain	Cdr E. H. KIRKLIGHTER	Mar68	Ishewood 19	
COCS OFFICER	Capt R. J. PLACH	Aug67	Ishewood 60	
COMM ELEC OFFICER	Col E. P. CLAUDE	Oct67	Ishewood 10	932
Asst Comm Elec Off	LtCol H. O. COWING	Jul68	Ishewood 10	
Asst CWO/Elec	Maj R. I. BIRCH	Aug67	Ishewood 210	
Asst CWO/Pres/Quar	Maj J. H. BIRD JR.	Jul67	Ishewood 110	
Day Comm Center Off	Capt T. R. O'DONNELL	Sep67	Ishewood 111	
Days/cont	2dLt S. E. VIGNERE	Nov67	Ishewood 69	
DENTAL OFFICER	Capt T. J. PAPER, USN	May68	Ishewood 40	931
Admin Officer	Lt(JG) R. E. REYSEN, USN	Jan68	Ishewood 40	
DISBURSING OFFICER	Maj G. W. COLAIREN	Mar68	Ishewood 18	
Asst Disbursing Off	2dLt J. ROSSIA	Sep67	Ishewood 18	
EXERCISE OFFICER	1stLt D. G. SCHAAF	Feb68	Ishewood 37	
EXERCISEMENT OFFICER	Maj R. PETROFF	Aug67	Ishewood 39	
ENGINEER OFFICER	LtCol G. A. MERRILL	Aug67	Ishewood 15	939
Asst EngrC	Maj C. O. NEWTON	Aug67	Ishewood 115	
Base Development	Capt V. C. WASSSEL	Jun68	Ishewood 15	
Regt Equipment			Ishewood 115	
EXCHANGE OFFICER	Capt C. E. LAY	Mar68	Ishewood 44	
FOOD SERVICES OFFICER	WO J. J. LAGGIS	Jul67	Ishewood 56	
INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER	Capt D. R. HUDSON	Sep67	Ishewood 141	
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICER	Capt R. A. PATTERSON	Oct67	Ishewood 446	
INSPECTOR	Col W. V. CURTIS	Aug67	Ishewood 32	
LEGAL OFFICER	LtCol W. F. WESTMORELAND	Feb68	Ishewood 17	
Asst Legal Officer	Maj W. M. THIRMAN	Oct67	Ishewood 117	
Chief Trial Counsel	Capt J. P. SHANNON	Oct67	Ishewood 117	
Chief Defense Counsel	Maj W. B. IRAPHER	Oct67	Ishewood 317	
Law Specialist	Lt J. J. MARTENS, USN	Jun68	Ishewood 217	
Claims/Legal Asst	Capt D. M. COSTANTINO	Sep67	Ishewood 317	
MOVIE TRANSPORT OFFICER	Maj L. V. BARKLEY	Jan68	Ishewood 35	
NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER	LtMr R. A. WEITCOMB, USN	Jan68	Ishewood 26	
ORDNANCE OFFICER	Maj H. SEBCE	Feb68	Ishewood 8	

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COMMAND DIRECTOR  
CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR  
CHU LAI, VIETNAM  
1 JULY 1967

CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR  
Aide-de-Camp  
CHIEF OF STAFF  
Staff Secretary  
ASST CoFS, G-1  
ASST CoFS, G-2  
ASST CoFS, G-3  
ASST CoFS, G-4  
ASST CoFS, G-5

RED OFFICE PHONE  
Aug66 Chu Lai 006  
Oct67 Chu Lai 013  
Aug67 Chu Lai 005  
Oct67 Chu Lai 038  
Nov67 Chu Lai 001  
Jul67 Chu Lai 002  
Aug67 Chu Lai 003  
Nov67 Chu Lai 004  
Nov67 Chu Lai 005

*E. R. Schuffman*  
E. R. SCHUFFMAN  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve  
Division Adjutant

PHOTO OFFICER  
POSTAL OFFICER  
PROTOCOL OFFICER  
PROVOST MARSHAL  
REPRODUCTION OFFICER  
SERIAL SERVICES OFFICER  
Custodian Recreation Fund  
SUPPLY OFFICER  
SURGEON  
Admin Officer  
BANK OFFICER  
HEADQUARTERS BATTALION (REIN)

2dLt J. E. MEYER  
2dLt W. NEW  
Maj T. W. HARGROVE  
Maj D. I. DILAMOND  
2dLt J. M. WHEATLEY  
Maj J. E. FORDE  
2dLt W. E. SMITH  
Col P. J. DIERKE  
Capt R. W. JONES, USN  
1dCdr A. K. KENDRICK, USN  
1dCol R. M. TAYLOR  
Col W. A. MEYER  
1dCol J. W. CLAYBORNE  
Maj W. F. FLAHO  
Maj R. C. HALL  
Col R. J. RADIGS  
1dCol V. D. BELL JR  
2dLt H. F. HAGAN  
1dCol G. B. PERRO  
Maj J. A. SPOTT  
1stLt B. R. FREEMAN  
1dCol M. M. HEMLETT  
Maj G. E. FINGBERG  
WO J. L. THOMPSON  
1dCol R. C. RICE  
Maj A. S. LAUREY  
2dLt V. E. BUNNELL  
Col S. DAVIS  
Maj R. J. ALGER  
2dLt J. W. HORTON  
1dCol P. L. HILGARTNER  
Maj J. P. WHITE  
WO J. E. PERRY  
1dCol M. C. JACKSON  
Maj A. E. FISHER  
2dLt J. J. HORNBACK  
1dCol C. B. WEBSTER  
Maj B. R. CUMMINS  
2dLt W. M. GORTZ

Commanding Officer  
Executive Officer  
Adjutant  
CIC Sub Unit #1  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MARINES  
Commanding Officer  
Executive Officer  
Adjutant  
2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES  
Commanding Officer  
Executive Officer  
Adjutant  
3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES  
Commanding Officer  
Executive Officer  
Adjutant  
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES  
Commanding Officer  
Executive Officer  
Adjutant  
1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES  
Commanding Officer  
Executive Officer  
Adjutant  
2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES  
Commanding Officer  
Executive Officer  
Adjutant  
3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINES  
Commanding Officer  
Executive Officer  
Adjutant

Aug67 Isherwood 341  
Aug67 Moment 120  
Nov67 Isherwood 138  
Jul67 Wesve 6  
Feb68 Isherwood 307  
Oct67 Isherwood 37  
Oct67 Isherwood 37  
Oct67 Isherwood 21  
Jul68 Isherwood 16  
May68 Isherwood 16  
May67 Hapvy Ags 6  
Aug67 Auditor 6  
Aug67 Auditor 5  
Sep67 Auditor 1  
Sep67 Auditor 2du  
Oct67 Blade 6  
Aug67 Blade 5  
Oct67 Blade 1  
Jan68 Bound 6  
Jul67 Bound 5  
Oct67 Bound 1  
Aug67 Cedar Bird 6  
Aug67 Cedar Bird 5  
Sep67 Cedar Bird 1  
Oct67 Chuck 6  
Oct67 Chuck 5  
Oct67 Chuck 1  
Nov67 Select 6  
Sep67 Select 5  
Dec67 Select 1  
Oct67 China 6  
Aug67 China 5  
Nov67 China 1  
Aug67 Grasshopper 6  
Oct67 Grasshopper 5  
Jan68 Grasshopper 1  
May68 Glove 6  
Oct67 Glove 5  
Dec67 Glove 1

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Col C. C. CROSSFIELD LtCol R. B. JOHNSON Capt D. R. MURKIE	Aug67 Bonnie Hero 6 Sep67 Bonnie Hero 5 Dec67 Bonnie Hero 1	6 5	1ST MEDICAL BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Cdr P. D. COOPER, USN LtCol G. R. FORD, USN Lt R. G. GRICE, USN	Sep67 Galhoun 6 Apr68 Galhoun 5 Jan68 Galhoun 1	6 5
1ST BATTALION, 7TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol J. D. ROWLEY Maj D. A. WAGNER 2dLt J. E. CHERAN	Oct67 Booth 6 Jun68 Booth 5 Aug68 Booth 1	6 5	1ST ENGINEER BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol K. M. BUSH Maj K. H. BEAGAN 2dLt B. V. BRANSON	Nov67 Quench 6 Oct67 Quench 5 Sep67 Quench 1	6 5
2D BATTALION, 7TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol W. P. KLOTZMAN Maj H. E. WARRICK JR. 2dLt D. A. MOEN	Aug67 Dixie Dinner 6 Sep67 Dixie Dinner 5 Dec67 Dixie Dinner 1	6 5	1ST RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj B. G. LOWERY Maj G. R. JOHNSON 2dLt D. J. COLLINS	Aug67 Ironhand 6 Sep67 Ironhand 5 Aug67 Ironhand 1	6 5
3RD BATTALION, 7TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol J. D. OUNSELMAN Maj G. H. TURLEY 2dLt K. J. WILKINSON	Mar68 False 6 Nov67 False 5 Nov67 False 1	6 5	1ST SHORE PARTY BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol E. H. JONES Maj P. L. STOFFELSEN 2dLt J. J. KOLLIA	Sep67 Consequence 6 Jul68 Consequence 5 Sep67 Consequence 1	6 5
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol C. HENRICKS LtCol M. FLASBETH 2dLt J. A. BRIDWELL	Jul68 Anigo 6 Sep67 Anigo 5 Aug67 Anigo 1	6 5	1ST BASK BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol R. M. DAVIOR Maj S. P. TRADER WO W. A. AKASHOBI	Nov67 Happy Age 6 Aug67 Happy Age 5 Nov67 Happy Age 1	6 5
1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj J. J. HARRON Maj D. H. JONES 1stLt R. A. HARDIE	Oct67 Month 6 Aug67 Month 5 Oct67 Month 1	6 5	3RD AUSTRALIAN TRACOR BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol R. L. SHUPARD Maj J. B. SWB 1stLt P. A. LAMBERT	Jul68 Sleek 6 Sep67 Sleek 5 Oct67 Sleek 1	6 5
2D BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol R. E. HUNTER Maj J. CLATWORTHY 2dLt A. A. BOROWICKI	Oct67 Prowl 6 Sep67 Prowl 5 Oct67 Prowl 1	6 5	7TH COMMUNICATION BATTALION (CHU LAI) Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol W. M. OIBELAND Maj E. A. HUELLMANN 2dLt S. G. LADA	Dec67 Chu Lai 286 Jul67 Chu Lai 206 Dec67 Chu Lai 206	6 5
3RD BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj G. K. JOHNSON WO J. P. CUBLEE	Jun68 Laugh 6 Oct67 Laugh 1	6 5	7TH ENGINEER BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol P. W. HARRIS III Maj L. H. RANNEY 2dLt J. R. MARLING	Aug67 Eragua 6 Dec67 Eragua 5 Sep67 Eragua 1	6 5
4TH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol G. M. LIVINGSTON Maj P. P. BIRAN 2dLt J. W. WELLS	Aug67 Field 6 Jul67 Field 5 Nov67 Field 1	6 5	9TH ENGINEER BATTALION (CHU LAI) Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol G. BARE Maj P. C. PAYCE 2dLt J. R. HUDSON	Aug67 Earthworm 6 Nov67 Earthworm 5 Jan68 Earthworm 1	6 5
1ST AVTI BASK BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj P. S. GALLIGAN 2dLt M. L. ELL	May68 Dance Card 6 Dance Card 5 Aug67 Dance Card 1	6 5	11TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj R. C. TAYLOR Capt E. M. HILSON 2dLt R. O. BLANCHARD	Oct67 Chester White 6 Jan68 Chester White 5 Jan68 Chester White 1	6 5
1ST DESPAL COMPANY Admin Asst	Capt T. J. PAPE, USN Lt (S) R. E. REYSEN, USN	May68 Isberwood 40 Jan68 Isberwood 40	931	AMERICAN RED CROSS Field Director	W. F. HOYER	Oct67 Isberwood 162	
1ST ENGINEER BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj J. M. MCKENZIE Maj E. J. THOMSEND 2dLt J. MORTON	Nov67 Big Buddy 6 Feb68 Big Buddy 5 Dec67 Big Buddy 1	6 5				
1ST HOSPITAL COMPANY Commanding Officer Admin Asst	Cdr C. R. LOWERY, MC, USN Lt C. L. HENSLEY MS/USN	Chu Lai 251 Jan68 Chu Lai 251					

PLEASE REPORT PRIOR TO 24 JULY 1967, ANY ERRORS, CHANGES AND/OR OMISSIONS, TO THE DIVISION ADJUTANT SECTION, ISBERWOOD 147.

*E. H. Schirffman*  
E. H. SCHIRFFMAN  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve  
Division Adjutant