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Aug 1976

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

3RD MARINE DIVISION

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History and Museums in accordance with the  
provisions of E.O. 12958-1, Sec 1.5  
10770 P942 of 19 October 1971  
E.O. 12958-1  
3/3/77  
Signature/Date

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3D MARINE DIV S&C FILE  
BT# 607068

# 3D MARINE DIVISION

## FMF (-) (REIN)



VAND

# COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

for the month of

AUG 1961

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 3d MarDiv ltr 3/PDL/glp over  
3480/2 Ser: 003A27068 of 16Oct68

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for Period 1-31 August 1968 (U)

1. Forwarded.

2. The following documents, listed as supporting documents to the  
subject chronology, were not included in the materials forwarded to  
this headquarters:

- a. Division SitReps 5-8, 11-18, 23, 27 and 30.
- b. Tabs A, B, C, D and E to 9th Marines command chronology.
- c. 2d Battalion, 26th Marines command chronology. *ATTACH TO 9TH MAR*
- d. Tabs A-F to 3d Battalion, 26th Marines command chronology.
- e. 1st Marines command chronology *with MarDiv*

3. By copy hereof, Commanding General, 3d Marine Division is  
requested to provide the missing documents.


W. E. DEEDS  
By direction

Copy to:  
CG, III MAF  
CG, 3d MarDiv

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No of copies to be made of this document

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PI ST ENDORSEMENT on C 3d arDiv ltr 3/PDL/glp over 3480/2  
Seruo: 003A27068 dtd 16Oct68

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 August 1968 (U)

1. Forwarded.

MARION C. DALBY  
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), **FMF**  
 FPO Sa Francisco 96602

3/PDL/glp  
 3480/2  
 SerNo: 003A27068  
 3 Oct 1968

**[REDACTED]** (unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed)

**From:** Commanding General  
**To:** Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
**Via:** (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
 (2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

**Subj:** Command Chronology for period 1-31 August 1968 (U)

**Ref:** a) MCO 5750.2  
 b) **FMFPACO** 5750.8

**Encls** (1) 3d Marine Division (Rein), **FMF** Command Chronology  
 for August 1968 (U)

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),  
 enclosure (1) is submitted.

R. G. DAVIS

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Copy 1 of 2 copies

**HEADQUARTERS**  
3d Marine Division (Rein), **FMF**  
FPO San Francisco 96602

**COMMAND CHRONOLOGY**

1 August 1968 to 31 August 1968

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**DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTa 12-YEARS**

**ENCLOSURE (1)**

PART I

## ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Commanding General, 3d MarDiv (Rein)	MGen R. G. DAVIS	1-31 Aug
Assistant Division Commander (CG TF HOTEL)	BGen C. W. HOFFMAN	1-21 Aug
Assistant Division Commander (CG TF HOTEL)	BGen W. C. CHIP	22-31 Aug
Assistant Division Commander	BGen F. E. GARRETSON	26-31 Aug

## SUBORDINATE UNITS

3d Marine Regiment	Col R. L. MICHAEL JR.	1-31 Aug
4th Marine Regiment	Col E. J. MILLER	1-31 Aug
9th Marine Regiment	Col R. H. BARROW	1-31 Aug
12th Marine Regiment	Col P. J. MULRONEY	1-31 Aug
26th Marine Regiment	Col B. F. MYERS Col C. W. HUNTER	1-11 Aug 12-31 Aug
1stBn, 3d Marines	LtCol C. V. JARMAN LtCol R. B. TWOHEY	1-9 Aug 10-31 Aug
3dBn, 3d Marines	LtCol W. H. BATES	1-31 Aug
1stBn, 4th Marines	LtCol T. H. GALBRAITH	1-31 Aug
2dBn, 4th Marines	LtCol L. A. RANN	1-31 Aug
3dBn, 4th Marines	LtCol F. L. BOURNE JR.	1-31 Aug
1stBn, 9th Marines	LtCol F. X. COLLETON	1-31 Aug
2dBn, 9th Marines	LtCol F. S. KNIGHT	1-31 Aug
3dBn, 9th Marines	LtCol E. J. LE MONTAC VEHE	1-31 Aug
1stBn, 12th Marines	Major D. J. CAPINAS	1-10 Aug

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	<b>LtCol E. L. WHISMAN</b>	11-31 Aug
<b>2dBn, 12th Marines</b>	<b>LtCol R. D. DUNWELL</b> <b>LtCol J. SOOPPA JR.</b>	<b>1-5 Aug</b> <b>6-31 Aug</b>
<b>3dBn, 12th Marines</b>	<b>LtCol E. D. FOXWORTH JR.</b>	1-31 Aug
<b>4thBn, 12th Marines</b>	Major <b>B. F. STWEART</b>	1-31 Aug
<b>1stBn, 26th Marines</b>	Major <b>W. T. COOK</b>	1-31 Aug
<b>2dBn, 26th Marines</b>	<b>LtCol T. OWENS</b> <b>LtCol W. F. SPARKS</b>	<b>1-13 Aug</b> <b>14-31 Aug</b>
<b>3dBn, 26th Marines</b>	Major <b>R. R. BLAIR</b> <b>LtCol J. W. P. ROBERTSON</b>	1-3 Aug 4-31 Aug
Hq Bn	<b>LtCol E. A. DEPTULA</b> Major <b>G. F. KURT</b>	1-14 Aug 15-31 Aug
<b>1st Amtrac Bn</b>	<b>LtCol G. F. MEYERS</b>	1-31 Aug
<b>3d Engr Bn</b>	Major <b>R. S. KROLAK</b>	1-31 Aug
<b>3d MED Bn</b>	<b>CDR B. K. SLEMMONS</b>	1-31 Aug
<b>3d MT Bn</b>	Major <b>B. W. ADAMS</b>	1-31 Aug
<b>3d Recon Bn</b>	<b>LtCol D. R. BERG</b>	<b>1-31 Aug</b>
<b>3d SP Bn</b>	<b>LtCol R. A. SULIK</b>	1-31 Aug
<b>3d Tank Bn</b>	Major <b>C. J. SAMUELSEN</b> <b>LtCol G. E. HAYWARD</b>	1-16 Aug 17-31 Aug
<b>9th MT Bn</b>	Major <b>R. KULAK</b>	1-31 Aug
<b>11th Engr Bn</b>	<b>LtCol V. A. PERRY</b> <b>LtCol R. C. EVANS</b>	<b>1-3 Aug</b> 4-31 Aug
<b>1st 8" HOW Battery</b>	Major <b>F. I. CAPIN</b> Capt <b>P. L. TOWNSEND</b>	1-15 Aug 16-31 Aug
<b>3d Dental Company</b>	Capt <b>T. D. STEPHENSON</b>	<b>1-31 Aug</b>
<b>1st Searchlight Battery</b>	Capt <b>W. K. LAW</b>	1-31 Aug

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5th 155 GUN Battery	Major <b>E. B. BEALL</b>	1-6 Aug
	Capt <b>T. W. STEELE</b>	7-8 Aug
	Major <b>W. M. STEPHENS</b>	9-31 Aug
1st Marine Regiment	Col <b>R. T. DWYER JR.</b>	1-14 Aug
1stBn, 13th Marines	Col <b>R. G. LAUFFER</b>	15-31 A
	LtCol <b>A. NOVAK</b>	1-31 Aug

## 2. LOCATION

1-31 August - Dong Ha, Republic of Vietnam

## 3. STAFF OFFICERS

Chief of Staff	Col <b>J. E. LO PRETE</b>	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Col <b>L. R. DAZE</b>	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Col <b>M. SPARK</b>	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col <b>P. D. LAFOND</b>	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col <b>E. E. CAMPORINI</b>	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	LtCol <b>R. B. THOMPSON</b>	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller	LtCol <b>H. E. WOLD</b>	1-4 Aug
	LtCol <b>E. W. BAILEY</b>	5-31 Aug
Division Inspector	Col <b>H. MAYER</b>	1-31 Aug

## 4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	USMC		USN	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>INL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
3d Marine Division (-) (Rein)	1400	26,296	171	1453
3d Marine Regiment	16	195	2	3
4th Marine Regiment	16	198	2	3
9th Marine Regiment	19	197	1	4

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USMC

12th Marine Regiment	25	226	9	5
26th Marine Regiment	16	212	1	4
<b>1stBn, 3d Marine</b>	34	1049	2	49
<b>3dBn, 3d Marines</b>	33	1009	2	55
1stBn, 4th Marines	37	1092	2	61
<b>2dBn, 4th Marines</b>	37	1005	2	65
3dBn, 4th Marines	33	1037	2	52
<b>1stBn, 9th Marines</b>	38	1038	2	51
<b>2dBn, 9th Marines</b>	36	1056	2	57
<b>3dBn, 9th Marines</b>	34	<b>1073</b>	2	46
<b>1stBn, 12th Marines</b>	50	587	2	16
<b>2dBn, 12th Marines</b>	41	629	1	12
<b>3dBn, 12th Marines</b>	45	689	2	17
<b>4thBn, 12th Marines</b>	<b>23</b>	447	<b>0</b>	9
<b>1stBn, 26th Marines</b>	34	1033	2	55
<b>2dBn, 26th Marines</b>	55	1485	8	74
<b>3dBn, 26th Marines</b>	<b>31</b>	1107	2	56
Hq Bn	252	1053	9	28
<b>1st Amtrao Bn</b>	24	765	2	25
3d Engr Bn	27	770	2	13
<b>3d MED Bn</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>133</b>	67	324
3d MT Bn	14	373	<b>0</b>	7

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		<u>ENL</u>		<u>ENL</u>
3d Recon Bn	31	681	1	48
3d <b>SF Bn</b>	20	460	2	21
3d Tank Bn	<b>38</b>	<i>690</i>	1	19
9th <b>MT Bn</b>	20	<b>391</b>	2	8
<b>11th Engr Bn</b>	39	969	4	26
<b>1st</b> 8" HOW Battery	8	180	0	5
3d Dental Company	0	<b>33</b>	25	44
<b>1st Searchlight Battery</b>		95	<b>0</b>	2
5th 155 GUN Battery	10	<b>190</b>	<b>0</b>	4
<b>1st Marine Regiment</b>	<b>109</b>	3247	<b>10</b>	169
<b>1stBn, 13th Marines</b>	49	842	<b>3</b>	16

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**PART II**  
**NARRATIVE SUMMARY**  
**PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION**

1. Personnel Administration

a. During the month of August 1968, 270 officers and **2,748** enlisted personnel joined the Division. One hundred and twenty-three officers and **1,10** enlisted personnel were transferred by normal rotation. Thirteen officers and **691** enlisted personnel were transferred by service records while sick due to being MEDEVAC. Transfers within WESTPAC command included 22 officers and 30 enlisted.

b. Awards. Awards recommendations submitted to FMFPac included four **Navy Cross** Medals, **45** Silver Star Medals, 16 Legion of Merit Medals, two Navy and Marine Corps **Medals**, 171 **Bronze** Star Medals, 11 Air Medals, 123 Navy Commendation **Medals** and 55 Navy Achievement Medals. **Awards** returned approved from FMFPac included one Navy Cross Medal, **41** Silver Star **Medals**, five Legion of Merit Medals, five Navy and Marine Corps **Medals**, 170 **Bronze** Star Medals, **141** Navy **Commendation** Medals, and **74** Navy Achievement Medals. **Additionally 1,145** Purple Heart Medals were awarded.

c. Casualties. Casualties during the month were 76 KIA, 571 WIA, 13 DOW, 12 NHD, 21 NHL.

d. Congressional Interest Cases. One hundred and seventy-seven new cases were received, **143** cases completed, **60** cases pending and **26** cases were readdressed to other **commands**.

e. Welfare Reports. One hundred and thirteen welfare reports were completed, four hardship discharges were forwarded to CMC for decision, one unsuitable discharge disapproved, six unsuitable discharges approved and one misconduct discharge was disapproved.

f. Administrative Assistance Team. During the month over 90 hours were spent assisting **separate** units by visits to their unit or unit members visiting this office, approximately 3,500 unit diaries and **110** monthly personnel rosters were screened.

g. Reproduction. The Reproduction Section at Quang Tri **received 361 job** requests **totalling 698,980** printed copies. The Sub-Section at Dong Ha received **126 job** requests totalling **454,846** printed copies.

h. Industrial Relations. IRO continued to relieve Marines in non-combat billets by providing a continuous supply of filled sandbags. Marines have been relieved in the Army-Air Force Exchange by initiating the utilization of three civilian women to aid in stocking counters and hopefully to take over the tasks of cashier. Marines have also been relieved in the Exchange Warehouse and Clubs Warehouse in Dong Ha by **civilian** personnel.

2. **Exchange Services**

a. Sales for the month of August 1968 totaled **\$692,819.25**. The monthly inventory **totalled \$1,047,863.77**.

b. The exchange received 951 pallets of **general** merchandise, soda and electronic equipment from the Danang Depot.

c. A new Exchange Annex is now open at 3d Medical Battalion **at Quang Tri**.

d. The Exchange Officer attended the **III MAF** Exchange Council meeting on 13 August and 29 August. Discussed was the allocation of **"JAKOR"** merchandise from the **Army-Air** Force Exchange Depot at Danang. The meeting resulted in an increased allocation for the 3d Marine Division Exchange, to be based on sales.

3. **Information Services**

a. During the month 3,055 written FHRN **releases** and 196 tape recorded FHTN radio interviews were prepared and forwarded to Fleet Home Town News Center, **Great Lakes, Illinois**. In addition 86 **sync/soun** motion pictures interviews **were** forwarded to CMC. A total of 106 news and feature **articles** were also prepared and forwarded to **CIB, III MAF** for release and further dissemination.

b. The ISO Radio/TV section produced and forwarded to CMC 16 tape recorded radio features and five sync/sound motion picture features.

c. ISO personnel provided support (briefings, escorts, transportation, and billeting) to 50 civilian news media representatives who visited this Division's **TACR**.

d. ISO's combat artist forwarded to **CMC** 76 pieces of combat art, including water color, pen, pencil and **charcoal** sketches, as the Division's contribution to the Marine Corps Combat Art Program.

• **Special Services**

a. Under the "Criti-Pak" program the following items were **issued**: three **criti-paks**, 1,000 writing kits and 1,000 **paperbacked** books.

b. Under the free beer and soda program 316 cases of beer and 195 cases of soda were issued.

c. During the month the Education Section administered **214** High School GED and **43** College **(CCT-GE)** tests.

d. The Dong Ha MARS station transmitted 1,179 messages and phone patches, of these there were **243** no answer or busy phone patches. One hundred and twenty-six messages and phone patches were received.

Or 28 August a contract for the construction of an amphitheater at Quang Tri Combat Base was signed with the Le Thi Mai Construction Company, Hue. Construction will commence on 6 September and should be completed in about two weeks.

#### 5. Division Band

a. During the month of August the Division Band played at ten different occasions. Change of command ceremonies were played for 3d Medical Battalion, MAG-39, Headquarters Battalion, MCB-7, and 3d Shore Party Battalion. Two People to People concerts were played in Quang Tri City. An anniversary celebration was played for the Quang Tri Hospital. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines were serenaded upon returning from the field. The Division Band Combo played for the Quang Tri City hospital.

#### 6. Division Postal

a. The following figures represent poundage of U. S. Mail received and dispatched during the month of August:

<u>AREA</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>DISPATCHED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri/Dong Ha	649,724	226,594	876,3

b. Fourteen Unit Post Offices continue to furnish all phases of postal services to all units of this Division. Currently Unit Post Offices are located at Dong Ha, Ca Lu, Camp Carroll, Phu Bai and Quang Tri. Mobile money order units were made available to organizations in the field when requested.

#### 7. Provost Marshal

a. The patrols on Highway #1 have been increased. The 1st of the 5th established two joint patrols and an ARVN MP began accompanying the Highway Patrol to aid in control of ARVN vehicles. Also an MP has been assigned to ride with the Division Roadmaster at Quang Tri Combat Base. Two joint Marine and Army Military Police patrols have been established to patrol between Dong Ha and Cam Lo.

b. A total of 633 traffic citations were issued during the month of August. Three hundred and eighty-nine were moving traffic violations. Vehicles impounded for exceeding the posted 10 mile per hour speed limit were 131. A total of twelve vehicle accidents were investigated. Two deaths and four injuries were reported, the consolidated property damage was \$4,335.00. Seventy-three military police reports were initiated.

c. During the month 51 persons were detained and processed as follows:

Prisoners of War	-	17
Civil Defendents	-	2
Innocent Civilians	-	19
Returnees	-	2
Unclassified	-	<u>11</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>51</b>

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d. Liaison was made with the **504th Military Police Company, 16th Military Police Group** in regard to **prisoner chasing**. The **504th MP Company** will chase the majority of the prisoner **from 18th Surgical Hospital and 3d Medical Battalion facilities to III MAF Brig** in Danang.

e. A raid was conducted by military police and National Policeman in the Dong Ha vicinity and Highway #1 south **from** Dong Ha. The major **items** confiscated were **cigarettes, liquor, and sundry packages**.

8. Career Advisory

a. The following **reenlistment** results were obtained during the month of August:

First Term	Career	Total
------------	--------	-------

b. The following are the statistics for the period 2 August through 29 August for the Division Out-of-Country R&R **Program**:

<u>Usa</u>	Usage	Percentage
1928		93.2%

9. Legal

a. During the month of August the office of the Staff Judge Advocate tried two General Courts-Martial cases and reviewed 25 Special and 20 Summary Courts-Martial. Ten teams were provided to serve as Defense and **Government** Counsel and Investigating Officers in Article 32 investigations. Nine teams were provided to battalions within the Division to serve as **trial and defense counsel** for Special Courts-Martial cases. Three **battalion legal offices** were inspected.

b. The legal **assistance** officer handled 88 cases during the month of August.

## DIVISION CHAPLAIN

## A. PERSONNEL

The month of August ended with a total of 29 chaplains **aboard**. Of these Chaplain ZANDSTRA, 2nd Bn, 26th Marines is **SLF**, ADCON/OPCON to 9th **MAB**. Chaplain BERG, **1st** Bn, 26th Marines and Chaplain **HENSLEY**, 3rd Bn, 26th Marines are **OPCON** to the **1st** Marine Division. Chaplain RUTHERFORD is ADCON/OPCON to the **1st** Marine Division.

The following chaplains reported for duty during the month of August and were assigned to designated units of the 3d Marine Division:

CDR M. J. **DOERMANN**, **CHC**, USN, 449271/4100, assigned on 2 August to **HQ** Bn, 3d Mar Div.  
 LT R. **HENSLEY**, **CHC**, USNR, **724373/4105**, assigned on 2 August to 3d Bn, 26th Marines.  
 LT J. D. **ALLEN**, **CHC**, USNR, 673823/4105, assigned on 3 August to 3d Bn, 9th Marines.  
 LT J. A. ZANDSTRA, **CHC**, USNR, **700528/4105**, assigned on 3 August to 2nd Bn, 26th Marines.  
 LT G. B. **HUMMER**, **CHC**, USNR, **721472/4105**, assigned on 23 August to 3d Tank Bn.  
 LCDR V. E. BERG, **CHC**, USN, **634505/4100**, assigned on 24 August to **1st** Bn, 26th Marines.

On 4 August CDR H. E. **PHILLIPS**, **CHC**, USN, 618007/4100 was rotated to a new assignment in CONUS.

The following reassignments were made during the month of August:

Chaplain FOUNTAIN, 3d Bn, 9th Marines to 3d Recon Bn on 8 August  
 Chaplain **HAMPTON**, 3d Bn, 26th Marines to 3d Shore Party Bn on 9 August  
 Chaplain BROCK, **"D"** Med to **11th** Eng Bn on 16 August

## B. DIVINE SERVICES

3d Marine Division chaplains conducted **285** Sunday Divine Services during the month of August with an attendance of 7,659. Weekday services numbered **305** with a total attendance of 4,941.

14 Memorial services were held with an attendance of 672.

Chaplain BRESLAU, USA, provided Jewish coverage in the Quang Tri/Dong Ha areas.

Latter Day Saints services were conducted weekly by lay leaders in **Quang** Tri and Dong Ha.

### C. OPERATIONS

During August chaplains participated in the following operations:

LANCASTER:	Chaplains BLACK, HUBBLE, BOND, <b>WEAVER, FRANKLIN,</b> FOUNTAIN, ALLEN, MIGNONE, <b>BEDINGFIELD</b>
SCOTLAND II:	Chaplains BLACK, HUBBLE, BOND, WEAVER, FRANKLIN, FOUNTAIN, ALLEN, <b>MIGNONE,</b> <b>BEDINGFIELD, TURNER,</b> WILLARD
KENTUCKY:	Chaplains FRANKLIN, MIGNONE, ALLEN, WEAVER
NAPOLEON/SALINE:	Chaplains <b>MCAULIFFE,</b> ZANDSTRA


The Division Chaplain, usually in company of the Division Commander, visited chaplains of the Division during the operations listed above.

### D. RELATED ACTIVITIES

1. The Division Chaplain held 3 weekly chaplains' meetings at Quang Tri with a total of **41** chaplains attending.

2. On 6 August a Day of Retreat for chaplains was arranged at Quang Tri by the Division Chaplain. Chaplain **BORECZKY,** Assistant Division Chaplain, conducted the conferences. Nineteen chaplains attended.

#### 3. Civic Action

- a) Leadership lectures on indigenous religions were given by chaplains on 19 occasions with 414 attending.
- b) A donation of **\$250.00** from each Chapel **Fund** was made to Thich Tinh Binh, Head Buddhist Bonze of the Quang Tri Province, to be used for the poor and needy.
- c) A donation of \$1 **250.00** from the Protestant Chapel **Fund** and **\$750.00** from the Catholic Chapel **Fund** was made to the new **M3d** Division Children's **Hospital.** 

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## PRODUCTION BRANCH

1. **Sub-units** of the **Production Branch, Plans and Estimates**, OOB and TIO, continued to provide **intelligence** to units attached to the 3d Marine Division. Changes in personnel were **made** as follows:

**LtCol J. M. ROE** (Production **Officer**) rotated to **CONUS**  
**Lt R. A. SERGO** (OOB Officer) **reassigned** to 3d **Recon** Battalion  
**Lt M. P. GALASKY** (Plans and Estimates Officer) reassigned as OOB  
 Officer  
**Captain R. A. MARTIN** joined from **CONUS** and assigned as **Production**  
 Officer  
**WO J. F. GUENTHER** joined from **CONUS** and assigned as Plans and  
 Estimates Officer

2. **Plans and Estimates Unit:** During the month of August this section prepared **PERINTREP 14-68** and **Hand-outs** and "**Packages**" consisting of OOB, **Roads and Trails** Overlays, **HLZ** Overlays and **Enem** Installations List for **dissemination** to **regiments** and battalions to assist in planning and conducting operations. A weather study for the Northeast **monsoon** was prepared and distributed to all units of the 3d Marine Division. **This** weather study **included** a **month by month** statistical presentation of average **temperature**, rainfall, and **trafficability** as well as a list of helpful hints for the individual marine. In addition a checklist for **enemy** body search team was prepared and distributed to all **units**.

3. **Order of Battle Section:** **he** Order of Battle Section continued to produce tactical intelligence for the 3d Marine Division **AO** and other areas of interest. Intelligence information was **disseminated** via the Daily Intelligence **Summary**, nightly intelligence **briefings**, weekly briefings to the Chief of Staff and to Advisory **Team Fbur**, Quang Tri Sector. In addition, a weekly OOB update was **disseminated** to subordinate, higher and adjacent Headquarters. Special **briefings** were presented to Major General **DRAKE**, Deputy **CG XXIV** Corps; **BGen POTTS**, **G-2 USARPAC** and subordinate **units** of the division desiring data on specific areas of interest.

4. **Target Intelligence Unit:** Maintained statistical overlays of **Emerging Targets**, **AA** & Secondary Explosions, **Anti-Rocket**, and **Arc** Light, locations. Data was disseminated to adjacent, subordinate, and higher headquarters. 1550 new targets were added to the **enem** installations list during **August**. **These** targets were located throughout the Division **AO** and adjacent areas of interest. **hirty-two** **Arc** Light Strikes were nominated by 3d Marine Division and of these 19 were struck, mainly north of and in the DMZ and in the **Nui Tia** Phong area west of the Rockpile.

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## COLLECTIONS BRANCH

1. During **August** 1968, the Collections Branch received, processed and disseminated 614 agent reports from the following agencies: *525th Military Intelligence Group*; Provincial Reconnaissance Unit; Census Grievance Center; National Police Special **Branch**; 7th Counterintelligence Team and 15th Counterintelligence **Team**; In addition, **numerous** intelligence inputs were received from **Military Advisory Command**, Vietnam; III **Marine Amphibious Force**; **XXIV Corps**; **Commander**, U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam; **1st Marine Division**; **1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)**; **101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)**; **Combined Materiel Exploitation Center**; I Corps **Advisory Group**; **Task Force Hotel**; **Task Force Clearwater**; **3d Reconnaissance Battalion**; and regiments and separate battalions of the **3d Marine Division**. **The number** of detainee reports received by Collection during **August** totaled 237, of which 88 were captured in August and 149 were detainees captured prior to August. There were eight detainees and one **Chieu Hoi** captured by the 3d Marine Division during August.

2. The **Airborne Personnel Detector (Sniffer)** was employed on nine missions during **August**. **The APD pilot** was briefed by the **Collections Officer** prior to each mission and subsequently debriefed. The extremely indicative and timely **information** obtained was **disseminated** to Division units, the Division Fire Support Coordination Center, and G-2 Productions Branch.

3. During **August**, Collections Branch gave an orientation brief on war trophies for **Force Logistics Support Group Bravo**. The Brief consisted of identification, registration and various methods of transporting war trophies back to CONUS. Hand-outs were prepared and distributed to **those** attending the brief in order to assist **them** in identifying and handling all war trophies.

4\* **The Collections Branch** continued maintaining **liaison** with **Quang Tri City** throughout the month of **August** through **First Lieutenant W. A. BROWN**, the G-2 Representative in **Quang Tri**.

5. **Aerial Observer Unit.**

a. During August 1968, the Division **Aerial Observers** flew 478 missions for a total of 1151.1 flight hours. **The AO's directed 456 airstrikes**, 84 artillery, eight **NGF** and **11** photo missions. **Enemy losses** included: 68 confirmed kills, 339 **bunkers** destroyed, 19 structures destroyed, ten artillery **pieces** destroyed or damaged, 95 secondary fires or explosions, and over 700 meters of trench line destroyed.



b. During **August**, First Lieutenant Fred **TOMASELLO** was **wounded** in action and **med-evaced** to CONUS. There were two additions to the section: First Lieutenant Elmer L. **THOMAS** joining on 3 August and First Lieutenant David L. **COMBS** on 20 August.

6. Photo **Imagery** Interpretation Unit. During August 1968, the PIIU submitted 17 aerial reconnaissance requests to **XXIV** Corps of which 13 were completed, two were cancelled and two are pending. PIIU received 36 **sets** of aerial photo **prints** during **August**, of which 33 were distributed to appropriate **units** of the 3d Marine Division. Three were held for basic coverage of the 3d Marine Division **TAOR**. In addition, PIIU received 357 photo imagery interpretation reports, all of which were distributed to division **units**.

7. **Counterintelligence Teams.**


a. 7th **Counterintelligence** Team. During **August**, the 7th Counterintelligence Team continued to **support** the division and **continued** to provide **counterintelligence** coverage of **Trieu Phong**, **Mai Linh**, and **Hai Lang Districts** of **Quang Tri** Province. The 7th CIT provided the 3d Marine Division with 33 **Counterintelligence** Information Reports and 14 **Spot Reports**.

b. **15th Counterintelligence** Team. During August, the 15th Counterintelligence Team **continued** to support the division and **continued** source operations in northern **Quang Tri** Province. The team submitted 74 **Counterintelligence** Information Reports and five **Spot Reports**. In addition, the team **continued** to maintain liaison with **Vietnamese** Government Officials, and **American Advisors** in **Quang Tri** Province, as well as the **1st** Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (**Mechanized**). During **August**, Warrant Officer R. S. COLLINS was reassigned to 2d Counterintelligence Team, Camp **Lejeune**, North Carolina.

8. **Interrogator-Translator Teams.**

a. 7th **Interrogator-Translator** Team. During August 1968, the 7th ITT provided support for Operations **Kentucky**, **Lancaster II**, **Napoleon/Saline**, **Scotland II**, **urniture** and **Proud Hunter**. Direct support was provided for the 9th Marines and **Task Force Hotel**. The team processed 25 detainees of which the following classification was **made**; four **NVA PW's**, three **VC PW's**, one **Returnee**, and 17 **Innocent Civilians**.

b. **15th Interrogator-Translator** Team. During **August** 1968, the **15th** ITT **continued** to provide support to the 3d Marine Division, the 26th Marines, and the 18th Surgical Hospital. Team **members** participated in operations **Napoleon/Saline** and **Lancaster II**. During August, the team processed seven **detainees**, all being **PW/NVA**.



c. 17th Interrogator-Translator Team. During August 1968, the 17th ITT continued to provide support to Headquarters, 3d Marine Division, 4th Marines, 26th Marines, XXIV Corps and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Team members participated in operations Scotland II and Lancaster II. A total of 28 interrogation reports were submitted to the division.

#### 9. Interpreter Teams.

a. 3d Interpreter Team. During August 1968, the 3d IT continued to operate the Division Document Translation Center. The Document Translation Center processed 56 batches of captured documents from which a total of 808 documents were screened, summarized or fully translated. In addition, a total of 30 friendly documents were processed resulting in 40 pages of translation.

b. 9th Interpreter Team. During August 1968, the 9th IT continued to provide direct support to Task Force Hotel. The team also supported operations Lancaster II and Scotland II. Captain CORE, the team commander rotated to CONUS during the month.

c. 11th Interpreter Team. During the month of August, the 11th IT continued to provide support to G-3 Psyops, 3d Marine Division by operating the Kit Carson School and the Division G-5 by supervising Vietnamese Nationals employed by G-5.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

1. During the month of August 1968 the following personnel were transferred:

LtCol J. M. ROE	Assistant G-2/Production Officer
1stLt J. R. MATKOWSKI	Admin Officer
1stLt D. M. WHITING	COC Watch Officer
1stLt J. C. MCKENNA	ASO
1stLt R. A. SERGO	OOB Officer
1stLt F. DMASELLO	AO (MED-Evac)
WO R. S. COJ S	SCI Officer
SSgt J. E. BAKER	Productions
SSgt L. A. WU	OOB Analyst
SSgt F. H. DALTON	OOB Analyst (Med-Evac)
Sgt C. A. KLUMPP	SCI
Cpl R. ELDRIDGE	Target Intelligence Man

2. During the month of August, the following personnel were joined:

LtCol J. S. KYLE	Assistant G-2
Capt R. A. MARTIN	Production Officer

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1stLt D.D. COMBS

1stLt E. L. THOMAS

1stLt D. M. TELEP

1stLt H. D. ~~DEKINS~~

WO R. M. CONLEY

WO J. F. GUENTHER

Gysgt R. C. KUNSAITIS

SSgt D. I. DIEFFENBACHER

LCpl R. L. BOLDUC

PFC W. STRAIGHT

AO

AO

COC Watch Officer

SCI Officer (TAD from 7th CIT)

ASO

Plans and Estimates Officer

TAD to 15th ITT

OOB Analyst

Collections

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(1) ENCLOSURE

EMPTY LOSSES FOR USE

OPERATION	KIA	DEF	PW (MVA)	PW (VC)	AMT (MVA)	AMT (VC)	JIV DEF	JIV IAC	IAC	USAC	JPL
NAVALON/SALINE	199	15	0	0	0	0	0	5	7	1	8
KENTUCKY	234	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	52	7	39
LAVU STR	201	13	3	0	0	0	0	0	65	12	77
SCOTLAND	60	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	32	11	43
TOTALS	694	39	6	0	0	0	0	5	156	31	187

## GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION

## 1. ORGANIZATIONs

- a. Strength of the section remains at the manning level.

## Personnel Losses

ONNOLLY, A.M. Cpl 2288092/2511 Rotated CONUS 25 Aug 68

## Projected Losses

HUDSON, J. E. Maj 076400/0302/  
0210/0805 Flight Date 14 Sept 68  
COLLINS, J.L. GySgt 1492432/0369 Flight Date 5 Sept 68  
WELLS, C.J. Sgt 2312280/5931 Flight Date 26 Sept 68  
RAGAN S L.A. Cpl 2099529/0311 Flight Date 26 Sept 68

## Personnel Gains

HIGGS, Donald J. GySgt 1176544/0239 Joined 9 Aug 68

## 2. ADMINISTRATION:

a. A conference to discuss the accountability and positive control procedures for handling **DUEL** BLADE equipment was held 27 August. All unit accountable officers were present as were representatives of G-4, Ordnance, and Supply of the Division Staff. Also in attendance were **representatives** of **III MAF** and FLSG Bravo. At the meeting guidance was promulgated on procedures to be followed as a prelude to a Division Order on this subject.

b. The revised **DEFILE** Plan was prepared and submitted to higher headquarters on 12 August.

c. The final evaluation of MITHRAS **FIREWATCH** was submitted to **III MAF** on 30 August.

## 3. TRAININGs

a. Two periods of **formal** instruction were presented during the reporting period. A **short** course on PPS-5 and PPS-6 radar was conducted 24-25 August for 12 personnel of the First Brigade of the Fifth Infantry Division (**Mechanized**). The **normal** eight **day** Ground Surveillance Equipment Operators Course convened at 0800 26 August with thirteen students including four from First Brigade Fifth Infantry Division (**Mechanized**) in **tendance**.

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b. Three demonstrations of Ground Surveillance Equipment were presented during the period: One at Task Force Hotel for the Commanding General and Staff; one to Commanding Officer and staff of Third Shore Party at Quang Tri, and one to the Commanding Officer and staff of the First Marines at Dong Ha.

c. A contact team was sent to LZ Shepherd for PSR-1 demonstration for Commanding Officers, Second and Third Battalions, Fourth Marines.

d. On 4 August, a training team instructed personnel on Hill 950 on use of the PSR-1, MICROTALÉ, and HANDSIDS. Two HANDSIDS were emplaced and a readout station established at Hill 950. (XD 8445)

e. On 14 August the Maintenance Officer and two enlisted instructors went to Ocean View (XD 2965) to emplace an IID and PSR-1. IID would not function where installed and was removed.

f. 21 August a training team revisited Hill 950 and replaced two A type MICROTALÉs.

g. A two man training team spent 48 hours at Con Thien instructing personnel of First Brigade Fifth Infantry Division (Mechanized) on operation of the MICROTALÉ readout station.

##### 5. LIAISON:

a. During the reporting period the following liaison visits were conducted by personnel of the Third Marine Division Ground Surveillance Section:

(1) Ground Surveillance Officer and Assistant visited III MAF on 6 August to discuss the revision of the DEFILE Plan.

(2) Maintenance Officer and one enlisted went to Ca Lu to discuss a plan for utilizing IGLOO WHITE sensors with Commanding Officer and staff of Fourth Marines.

(3) Ground Surveillance Officer and Assistant went to Con Thien to observe a test by HAVE FEAR. Test was postponed due to weather.

(4) On 30-31 August, the Ground Surveillance Officer visited III MAF to discuss the line sensor program, final evaluation of the MITHRA F TCHC project, and other pertinent matters concerning sensors.

b. Visits by representatives of other Headquarters and distinguished guests:

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[REDACTED]

(1) On 9 August LtCol **COPINSKI** and LtCol **CRAVENS** from XXIV Corps visited the Ground Surveillance Section to discuss rewriting of the **DEFIE** Plan.

(2) On 13 August Dr. **K.B. FCHILLI**, Senior Science Advisor, LtCol **CESAR** and LtCol **BANKS** U.S. Army visited Con Thien to observe the **HAVE FEAR** and **FIREWATCH** operations. On the 14th of August, the above mentioned personnel were given a briefing on Third Marine Division Ground Surveillance procedures.

(3) On 22 August, Executive Officer and S-4 from the First Brigade Fifth Infantry Division visited to discuss **DUEL BLADE** equipment and training of operators. Also on 22 August, Commanding Officer and S-3 of First Amtrac Battalion visited to discuss 972 equipment.

(4) On 23 August Lieutenant **BOIINGE** from FLSG Bravo visited to discuss **DUEL BLADE** equipment, particularly proper accounting procedures for dedicated **DUEL BLADE** equipment.

(5) On 27 August Dr. **GUNTHER** (GS-15 Equiv) from Air Force Weapons Laboratory, **Kirtland AFB**, New Mexico was accompanied to A-4 to observe the **HAVE FEAR** operations. Improved technical equipment was installed.

#### 5. EQUIPMENT:

During the reporting period the following special projects were undertaken.

(1) On 17 August, a U.S. Air Force Man Pack Radar Team of 13 personnel was established at Con Thien with the mission of tracking **UFC's** reported to be operating in the vicinity of the DMZ.

(2) The 1 kilowatt Xenon Searchlight which was used in conjunction with the **HAVE FEAR** project. (July Command Chronology) was returned to **CONUS** for repair. Searchlights that are compatible with **MOD**, have been requested through research and development channels as a **SPEED** requirement.

(3) On 30 August **HAVE FEAR** terminated operations at Con Thien.

#### 6. COLLECTIONS AND REPORTING:

a. **AN/TPS-25**: All three radars were inoperational during the reporting period.

b. **MITHRAS FIREWATCH**: During the month of August 141 targets were acquired, of which 43 were fired on.

c. **AN/PPS-5** and **AN/PPS-6s** Five targets were acquired. All five were

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fired upon. **Emphasis** is placed on a report of 50 to 100 troops and vehicles on 6 August. Artillery was fired and a TPQ strike was also run on this target with unobserved results.

d. AN/TVS-4 **NODs**: 11 Observations were made with the NOD. All were fired upon with **unknown** results.

e. AN/PVS-2 **Starlight Scope**: **Four** observations were made by the Starlight **scope**. Arty missions were fired on one report and small **arms** and M-79 were used on two others with unknown results.

f. **MSS-3 Searchlight Vehicles**: There were no reported targets acquired by the MSS-3 searchlight vehicles during the reporting period.

g. **HANDSID**: During period **20-26** August **MICROTALE** station on Hill 950 identified 54 targets, 51 were fired upon.

h. **IGLOO WHITE SENSORS**: Approximately 500 **Spotlight** Reports (including **Terminal** Reports) were received by division units during the month. **Approximately** 50 fire missions were fired in immediate response. **Numerous** other missions were fired in areas of high sensor activations as H&I fire and **preparatory** fires for operations in the vicinity of the **sensor** strings.

## OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL The month of August was characterized by heavy pressure being placed on the enemy in the central and eastern portions of the Division AO. The enemy for his part positioned himself in the central DMZ threatening the Camp Carroll - Rockpile area as well as Cam Lo District. Attacks made by the 3d Marines and 9th Marines in Lancaster into the Mutters ridge complex north of Camp Carroll, stopped the enemy threat as he turned back to the heavily fortified area northwest of the Rockpile. In the east in mid-month Co A, 3d Tank Battalion supporting a 2d ARVN Regiment operations into the DMZ killed 140 NVA in a single day engagement. Later a 1st Marines cordon operation in Leatherneck Square netted 65 NVA killed. Marine and U.S. Army tanks supporting a 2/1 foray into the DMZ above Con Thien killed 53. All told, during the month enemy losses of 694 confirmed killed, four prisoners taken and over two hundred weapons captured served to slow the enemy considerably in any planned rapid advance.

The 1st Marines with 1/1 and 2/1 as well as their supporting elements deployed from the Division AO late in August to return to the 1st Marine Division in Danang. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry (Mech) USA came under operational control of the Division late in the month and assumed responsibility for the Kentucky and Napoleon/Saline Operations.

2. NAPOLEON/SALINE. Operations by the 1st Marines and 1st Amtrac Battalion continued through the month characterized by several brief sharp clashes and a foray into the DMZ by a Marine tank company in support of the 2d ARVN Regiment. The first significant contact occurred on the 2d when several squads of NVA attacked the forward naval gunfire observation post, Oceanview. Supported by Marine tanks, amtracs and naval gunfire the enemy was driven off leaving 8 NVA dead on the field while one Marine was killed. Later the same day, a platoon of NVA spotted in the same area was taken under fire by artillery and naval gunfire which resulted in two additional kills.

On 9 August, BLT 2/26 completed embarkation at Cua Viet on Special Landing Force shipping for amphibious training prior to being assigned for operations. Later in the month the SLF assumed control of a portion of the Napoleon/Saline AO from 19 to 22 August.

On 15 August, Co A, 3d Tank Battalion supported an ARVN 2d Regiment attack into the DMZ above A-1. In a day long engagement which saw the friendly forces drive to the Ben Hai river, the Marine tankers were credited with 140 NVA KIA confirmed, with no casualties of their own. Two tanks were damaged by mines.

The Amtrac Battalion assumed control of the Napoleon/Saline AO under the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Mech on 26 August. Co C, 3d Tank Battalion, a platoon of Ontos and an Amphibian Howitzer platoon remained after the redeployment of the 1st Marines to Danang.

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Casualties for the month were:

FR KIA	16	EN KIA(C)	199
WIA(E)	111	POW	1
WIA(M)	20	IWC	47
		CSWC	4

5. KENTUCKY. During the first 20 days of August contact in this AO was limited to minor squad size encounters. On the 20th, 2/1 made a helicopter assault into the DMZ northwest of Con Thien to search for indications of enemy helicopter activities reported in that area. The assault was preceded by an extensive artillery and air preparation and only one small contact developed with 1 NVA KIA resulting. Marine and U.S. Army tanks supporting 2/1 from hill 56 at the southern edge of the DMZ, engaged a company of NVA, killing 18.

On 25 August, a recon team developed a contact in the eastern portion of Leatherneck Square. D/1/1 was rapidly inserted to exploit the contact and acquired contact immediately. B/1/1, already in the square, moved early the following morning to block enemy escape to the northwest. 3/9 and then 1/3 were helo lifted in to cordon the enemy force. Elements of the 1st Bde 5th Infantry tanks and mechanized infantry helped close the cordon. Extensive artillery fires were used to reduce the enemy force and when 1/1 searched the area on the 27th, a total of 55 NVA dead and large quantities of web equipment were found. In addition, 18 individual and 13 crew served weapons were captured.

On 27 August, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved to Dong Ha and Quang Tri with their supporting units in preparation for movement to Danang.

Soon after the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Mech assumed control of the Kentucky AO, at noon on the 26th, another large contact was developed by them. Co D, 1st Battalion 11th Infantry, operating north of Con Thien, discovered a new bunker complex one kilometer north of their base. In a 7 hour battle which saw extensive use of artillery, air and tanks, the company killed 65 NVA and captured 19 individual weapons with friendly losses of 2 killed and 24 wounded, six of whom were treated and returned to duty.

Casualties for the month were:

FR KIA	18	EN KIA(C)	234
WIA(E)	105	IWC	52
WIA(M)	102	CSWC	17

4. OPERATION LANCASTER. Operation Lancaster continued throughout the month with no significant contacts occurring in the first two weeks. On the 15th, F/2/3 engaged an estimated 2 Co's of NVA northwest of Cam Lo with minor casualties, while netting 4 NVA KIA(C), 10 IWC and 2 CSWC. On 16

CLOSURE (1)

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**August, Co's B, C & D 1/** commencea **helolifts** into the area or **F/2/3's** contact and soon engaged the enemy. Friendly casualties for the day were 4 KIA, 72 **WIA(E)**. Enemy casualties were 10 NVA KIA(C). On 17 August, the 9th Marines moved into the Lancaster A0 from the east to push elements of the NVA 64th Regiment away from Cam Lo. On 19 August **M/3/9** engaged an NVA **Co** in a 4 hour contact resulting in 3 Marines killed, 14 wounded, 38 NVA KIA(C), 2 POW's, 6 **IWC** and 2 **CSWC**. During the remainder of the month, there were sporadic **small** unit contacts with minor casualties suffered by friendly units.

Casualties for the month were.

FR KIA	43	EN KIA(C)	201
WIA(E)	205	POW	3
WIA(M)	21	IWC	55
		CSWC	12

5. SCOTLAND. In operation Scotland contacts were infrequent and of small scale throughout August. The month began with the 4th Marines operating principally out of Fire Support Bases Shepherd and Cates, and the 9th Marines operating out of Ca Lu and Vandegrift Combat Base with some forays into the Qua and Ba Long Valleys. Forces scheduled to conduct major operations in the Ba Long and Da Krong valleys were diverted to Lancaster to exploit 3d Marines contacts northwest of Cam Lo.

The 16th of August marked changes in the Scotland forces as FSB Holcomb on the northern edge of the Ba Long Valley was closed down and the 9th Marines began consolidating at Vandegrift Combat base to prepare for operations in the Lancaster II area. 4th Marines continued extensive patrolling operations over the central Scotland AO with 1st Bn 4th Marines assuming principal responsibility for operations in the immediate areas of Vandegrift Combat Base and Ca Lu. 2d Bn 4th Marines operated out of FSB Cates and 3d Bn 4th Marines operated out of FSB Shepherd.

Toward the latter part of the month, the 2d Bn 9th Marines shifted operations to Lancaster II, and 3d Bn 4th Marines began preparations for future operations in the northern portion of Scotland.

Casualties for the month were.

FR KIA	23	NVA KIA(C)	60
WIA(E)	168	POW	0
WIA(M)	13	IWC	32
		CSWC	11

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY - PERIOD COVERED - 1 - 31 AUGUST 1968

## TRAINING

A. FORMAL SCHOOLS. Division units utilized formal schools as indicated during the period to supplement on-the-job training and locally conducted training as follows;

## 1. IN-COUNTRY SCHOOLS

SCHOOL	OFF	ENL
VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE		
MACCORDS ADVISOR ORIENTATION	3	
PERSONAL RESPONSE	30	1504
RECONDO		11
REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS	5	
KY 28/38 MAINT TRAINING		4
BASIC ORGANIC SUPPLY ACCOUNTING	3	10
AN/PES-6 GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR	2	14
CABLE SPLICERS		1
SMCO LEADERSHIP INDOCTRINATION		19
MOTION PICTURE OPERATOR		7

## 2. OUT OF COUNTRY SCHOOL

SCHOOL	OFF	ENL
INFANTRY WEAPONS REPAIR		16
BASIC AMMO TECH		16
SCUBA	2	10
EMBARKATION		12
NCO LEADERSHIP		42
COM SEC/CRYPTO		4
CAREER ADVISORY		6
AO EJECTION SEAT & PRESSURIZATION TRAINING	3	
SPECIAL WEAPONS TRAINING	4	9

B. INFORMAL SCHOOLS. On-the-job training and contact team instruction continued to be the primary means of accomplishment of technical training within the Division. Contact instruction teams included: M16 Rifle Contact Team, Personal Response Contact Team, and the Mobile Training Contact Team (assisting 1st ARVN Division).

C. KIT CARSON SCOUT SCHOOL. A formal school is conducted by this Command for Kit Carson Scouts to train former VC as scouts for use within this Command. This school is conducted on a continuing basis.

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. During the month August the Psychological Operations objectives were:

- a. Support Chieu Hoi Program.
- b. Exploit VC/NVA battlefield losses.
- c. Lower VC/NVA morale.
- d. Reduce mining and booby trap incidents.
- e. Induce reporting VC activity.
- f. Discredit VC/NVA.
- g. Instill good health habits in the people.
- h. Encourage support of GVN.
- i. Support rewards program.

2. Psychological Operations supported all named operations and Regimental TAOR's. The DMZ and area above Thon Son Lam were also targeted regularly.

3. The following leaflets by type were delivered by aerial leaflet drops:

<u>Type</u>	No. of Leaflets
a. Chieu Hoi	14,368,400
b. NVA	17,055,000
c. Rewards	6,884,000
d. Others	2,196,000

4. There were 43 hours and 55 minutes of aerial broadcasts covering the same basic themes in the same general areas as the leaflet drops.

5. There were 241 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcast in support of the 4th Marines, 9th Marines, 3d Marines and Task Force Hotel in Quang Tri Province. General themes

were: Vietnamese music, MEDCAP instructions, Surrender, Support GVN, Good Health, and Mine and General WeapOns reward.

6. There were 11 movies shown for 7 hours. Theme used was: Pro GVN.

7. There were 400 **posters** and Free South **newspapers** distributed in Quang Tri Province.

8. Forty-six **VC/NVA** rallied **through** the Chieu Hoi Program in Quang Tri Province.

9. There are 73 Kit Carson Scouts employed by the Division. 3rd **Marine** Division scouts participated on 235 patrols this month and discovered 50 mines and booby traps.

10. The Quang Tri Armed Propaganda Teams were deployed throughout the 3rd Marine Division AO with CAG units and 2nd ARVN's. The **APT's** are being used to conduct face to face propaganda, identify VC, gather intelligence information, and security for Quang Tri City.

11. This month **ground** broadcast teams have been on four operations with 3d Marines and **4th** Marines.

12. The NVA campaign was supported with NVA oriented leaflet drops throughout Quang Tri Province. In addition, Rally and Surrender Appeals and Safe Conduct Passes were air dropped on known NVA locations and infiltration routes.



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COMBAT AIR SUPPORT  
AUGUST 1968

## 1. Significant Events

a. During this period, fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft flew a total of 2,752 sorties expending **5,880.2-tons** of ordnance in support of the Third Marine Division in its area of operations. Out of 26,734 sorties, **47,523** passengers were transported by helicopter along with 6,774.0-tons of cargo being delivered.

b. Of the above totals, 1,017 fixed-wing sorties delivered **2,492.5-tons** of ordnance on selected targets in the Dong Ha and demilitarized zone area in support of Operations EENTUCKY, LANCASTER II and NAPOLEON/SALINE. Rotary-wing aircraft in these same areas transported **11,483** passengers and 1,533.63-tons of cargo in support of the same operations.

c. Operation SCOTLAND II in the Vandegrift Combat Base area was supported by 1,237 fixed-wing fighter and attack sorties. These sorties delivered 3,102.5-tons of ordnance on selected targets within this area of operation. Helicopters lifted **34,583** passengers and **5,871.74-tons** of cargo and supplies to fire support bases and outpost positions in the western portion of the Third Marine Division area of operations.

d. Two-hundred-and-ten (210) **B-52** ARC LIGHT aircraft struck thirty-five (35) targets with 5,250-tons of ordnance being expended in support of the Third Marine Division.

2. New Developments. None.

3. Problem Areas. None.

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## FILE SUPP

## NATION

## 1. COMMAND EMPHASIS:

a. This month again there was continuing stress on improving the accuracy and timeliness of supporting ground operations with supporting arms.

b. Exploitation of Arc Light strikes by ground operation near and through the target rectangles was accomplished by 2 ground operations this month. One was in the Scotland A0 while the second was in the DMZ area north of Con Thien. There are still some areas in need of refinement when employing this type of support, i.e. time required to obtain necessary targets and obtaining complete and accurate BDA's.

## 2. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

## a. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	AUGUST	<u>JULY-AUG</u>
ARC LIGHT (tons)	4,050	4,050	6,600	5,250	-20%
AIR (tons)	7,244	7,089	8,979	5,595	-3
ARTY (rds)	319,035	197,700	223,137	225,442	+ 1
NGF (rds)	52,785	32,258	47,950	27,249	-44%

## b. DISTRIBUTION OF FIRES

(1) The decrease in supporting arms expenditures this month was due to the decrease in enemy activity in the Division A0.

(2) 39% of all missions reported to FSIC were observed. This includes air, artillery, and NGF missions less night defensive fires.

(3) Though NGF had a 44% decrease in ammo expenditure from July, it was a 270% increase over their August 1967 expenditure. 86% of their expenditure was in and north of the DM while 43% of their expenditure was observed. The decrease in ammo expenditure is due to the fact that only one destroyer was on station as NGFS during most of the month.

(4) 55% of **the Arc** Light tonage was in support of the two ground operations; the one in the Scotland AO and the other in the **DMZ** north of Con Thien.

(5) A total of 82 enemy artillery pieces were **destroyed** or damaged by all supporting arms this month; 54% claimed by artillery, 34% by air, and 12 by **NGF**.

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## COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

## SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

## 1. Command Post Communications

a. Forward elements of the Headquarters, **1st** Brigade, 5th Division (Mechanized) relocated to Dong Ha as the Brigade assumed responsibility for the Kentucky and Napoleon/Saline AO's. Initial circuit requirements for the Brigade forward CP at Dong Ha have been fulfilled using Brigade organic equipment and existing facilities. Personnel of the Brigade began operating one Radio Relay link between C-3 and Dong Ha. Division personnel are operating other links to Con Thien, C-2 and **Qua** Viet in the Brigades' Areas of Responsibility.

b. Installation of **AUTOSEVOCOM** was completed during August. Various agencies of **STRATCOM** conducted inspections and acceptance tests on the equipment and installation. Additional tests are scheduled pending final systems inspection and certification for operation.

## 2. New Equipment

a. Additional dial telephone service was extended to units at Dong Ha using the dial telephone system, TCC-28. Units cutover to dial service during August were: FLSG-B, **th** Motor Transport Bn, **11th** Engineer Battalion, 1st Battalion 4th Artillery and **108th** Artillery Group.

b. Operational evaluation of the PRC-77/KY-38 continued during the month with excellent results. Appropriate reports have been forwarded to Headquarters III MAF.

## 3. Functional Areas

a. **Communication Center.** Near capacity operations continued with the Communication Center processing 65,291 messages during August.

b. **Wire.** Wire construction continued throughout the base as the wire platoon assumed responsibility for all internal cable at Dong Ha. New distribution systems were installed for subscribers to the TCC-28. A new **10 X 24** bunker was completed in the CP area to house the main frame and provide shelter for a permanent frame watch and trouble shooter.

c. **Radio Relay.** Radio Relay operations include:

(1) MRC-62                      4 links

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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- (2) TRC-27            3 links
- (3) TRC-97            3 links

d. **Maintenance.** Radio Relay continued to experience high deadline in AN/TRC-27 and components. Generators continue to be problem items due to high usage; deadlines exist with the **PU-301 PE-75** and **PU-278**. Two **MRC-62** were received from the FY-68 R&E Program.

## LOGISTICS

**I. Significant Events****a. General**

(1) On 29 August 1968, Colonels CAMPORINI, GOGGIN, G-4, and EUBANKS, Supply, attended the monthly logistics conference held by Force Logistics Command at Danang.

(2) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 and the Special Staff Sections under the cognizance of the G-4 made over 150 staff visits to Division units.

(3) During the Commanding General's Technical inspections, the G-4, Motor Transport, Engineer, Embarkation, Supply, and Ordnance Officers inspected the 3d Motor Transport Battalion, Headquarters Battalion, and 1st Battalion, 9th Marines during the month of August.

(4) Lieutenant Colonel B. K. PETERSON was assigned to the Division Supply Section to be the relief for F. J. Mc DONALD as the Assistant Division Supply Officer.

(5) The 3d Medical Battalion opened the Quang Tri Hospital on 16 August 1968.

(6) Colonel William F. GOGGIN was assigned to the Division G-4 Section to be the relief of Colonel E. E. CAMPORINI. Further, Majors HARRIS and SMALDONE were assigned to the Division G-4.

(7) Headquarters Company, 4th Marines supply office and warehouse were destroyed by enemy artillery fire on 26 August 1968. All supplies in storage were destroyed. Expedited Supply action has been taken to reconstitute these losses.

**b. Combat Damage.** During the month of August the following major items of equipment sustained combat damage:

TYPE EQUI	NT	SER NO	CAUSE	DISPOSITION
LVTE-1		106003	Mine	Repairs in Progress
M48A3		202115	Mine	Repairs in Progress
M48A3		202128	RPG	Destroyed
M48A3		202142	RPG	Destroyed
M48A3		202005	Submerged	Destroyed
M48A3		202043	Submerged	Destroyed
M48A3		202063	Mine	Repairs in Progress
M48A3		209226	Mine	Repairs in Progress
M48A3		202076	Artillery	Destroyed

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c. Truck **Convoys**. During the month of **August**:

(1) The 9th Motor Transport Battalion drove **35,727** miles transporting **19,212** personnel and 13,970 short tons of cargo.

(2) The 3d Motor Transport Battalion drove **31,469** miles transporting **23,500** personnel and **2,263** short tons of **cargo**.

(3) Fifty resupply convoys were initiated in the 3d Marine Division's A0 with an average of 36 vehicles, transporting 118 personnel and 231 short tons of cargo.

d. **Embarkation**

(1) On 1 August 1968: 3d Medical Battalion moved from Phu Bai to Quang Tri via **C-130**. **BLT 2/4** commenced offloading.

(2) On 5 August 1968: Offload of **BLT 2/4** completed. **Commenced** embarking **BLT 2/26** at Dong Ha ramp.

(3) On 9 August 1968: Completed **embarking** **BLT 2/26**.

(4) On 17 August 1968: **K/4/13** was transported to Phu Bai by **LCU/YFU** and trucks.

(5) On 20 August 1968: **2/1** was moved from Dong Ha to Mai Thi by **LCM-8's**.

(6) On 23 August 1968: Commenced moving the **1st** Marine Regiment from Quang Tri/Dong Ha to Danang by land, sea, and air.

(7) On 24 August 1968: The 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery (USA) was transported from Dong Ha to Cua Viet by YFU.

(8) On 25 August 1968: **"C"** Company, 3d Tank Battalion was moved from Dong Ha to Mai Thi via **LCM-8's**.

(9) On 2 August 1968: Completed the moved of the **1st** Marine Regiment to Danang.

(10) On 30 August 1968: 180 **personnel** of the **1st** Brigade, 5th Infantry (MECH) **USA**, was relocated from Dong Ha to Cua Viet by **LCM-8's**.

Sea lifts:	Danang to Dong Ha -	<b>173 LCU/YFU</b>	<b>29,629.7 S/T</b>
		<b>18 LST's</b>	<b>12,397.2 S/T</b>
		<b>39 Fuel barges</b>	<b>9,360.0 S/T</b>
			<b>51,386.9 S/T</b>

Air lifts:	Danang to Dong Ha via	<b>C-130&amp;C-123</b>	<b>1,470.1 S/T</b>
	Danang to Quang Tri via	<b>C-130&amp;C-123</b>	<b>4.0 S/T</b>
			<b>1,604.1 S/T</b>

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e. Food Services. During the month of August 1968 the 3d Marine Division Food Services Program consisted of 45 operational messes supported by 361 personnel, OF 33. Of the total messes in operation, 21 are semi-permanent field messes housed in TFSC structures and the remaining 24 are temporary field messes. Subsistence support provided Army, Navy and Marine Corps personnel of this command averaged 37,500 rations daily. Approximately 33% of the total rations fed daily consisted of Meal, Combat, Individual and approximately 67% were subsisted on Expeditionary Force Menu. The Expeditionary Force Menu is based on MCO F10110.17, Chapter 4, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Menu (Tropic) and both perishable and non-perishable components are utilized. The Meal, Combat, Individual with appropriate supplements, is utilized only where operational requirements preclude serving Expeditionary Force Menu.

f. Supply. The overall supply support received by the 3d Marine Division was satisfactory, nevertheless, some items became or continued to be critical. Critical/Short supply items are discussed in paragraph 2.

## 2. Problem Areas

### a. General

(1) The most significant supply problem in the Division is the lack of receipt of T/E shortages in a timely manner. This lack of response in particular the Engineering items, has caused the 3d and 11th Engineer Battalions and the 3d Shore Party Battalion to be in a degraded CREQP status.

(2) The lack of 2nd Echelon repair/component parts continues to cause a high deadline rate in tracked vehicles and motor transport items.

(3) Shortages in clothing, that is, socks, lightweight jungle utilities, and utility covers was experienced by Division units.

(4) T/E deficiencies in typewriters, coupled with a high deadline rate has a demeaning effect on the administration capabilities of Division units.

(5) Gas masks all sizes, continues to be critical throughout the Division.

(6) The shortage of starters for the M274A2 (MULE), has created an unacceptable deadline rate in infantry battalions.

b. Services. The turn around for laundry continues to improve, however, at times, the time frame is excessive due to the deadline of laundry unit.

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Division units have been tasked to issue one set of dry jungle utilities a day to troops, therefore, laundry facilities must be increased in the Division's AO. The receipt of ice at Quang Tri and Vandegrift Combat Bases has been marginal.

d. The shortage of 2nd Echelon repair/component parts, in addition to the high deadline rate in field maintenance facilities is the most acute maintenance problem confronting the Division. The time frame in which items of equipment are returned from field maintenance facilities, to the user is not responsive enough to meet the requirements of this Division.

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## DIVISION ENGINEER

1. The 3d Marine Division received engineer support from one Division and one Force Engineer Battalion and two Naval Mobile Construction Battalions during the month of August. Maintenance and utilities support was also provided by CBMU-301 at Dong Ha, Quang Tri, Cua Viet and Vandegrift Combat Bases. Map coordinates below are taken from MAP: Vietnam, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6442IV, 6442III, 6442II, and 6342I. Major engineer projects included:

a. Maintenance/Upgrading of Route #1. Route #1 remained open to traffic within the Division AO during August. Asphalt laying between Dong Ha and Quang Tri is anticipated to begin during September.

b. Maintenance/Upgrading of Route #9. The 1 CE-7 continued to maintain Route #9 between Dong Ha and Vandegrift Combat Base. The road was straightened in several places with much filling and cutting accomplished. Upgrade was continued with portions of the road widened and much crushed rock added to build up the subject grade. The estimated completion date for the upgrading remains 1 October 1968.

c. Maintenance of Route #561. The 11th Engineer Battalion continued to maintain Route #561 during the month.

d. Bridges and Culverts. Bridge rebuilding where necessary will be completed in September on Route #9 for monsoons and anticipated traffic increase. Construction of abutments for N-6 bridge at YD130674 (C-2 washout) is 75% complete.

## 2. Sequential Listing of Events

- a. 3 August - Additional LZ at LZ Cate was completed (XL927437)  
Additional LZ at LZ Shepherd was completed (XL934410)  
Additional LZ at Vandegrift Combat Base for 4th Marines was completed (XL985 )
- b. 6 August - LZ on Dong Ha Mountain was completed (YD018594)
- c. 19 August - Commenced construction at Fire Support Base LeJeune (XL960536)
- d. 31 August - Commenced construction at Fire Support Base Sandy (XL912563)

## 3. Engineer Vehicles Damaged Due to Enemy Action. None.

## 4. Military Construction

- a. Completed one (1) 40'x28' wooden helipad at the Rockpile.

b. Four (4) ASP berms completed at Vandegrift Combat Base by 11th Engineers.

c. Bunker construction of various sizes continued by 11th Engineers.

d. Pre-fab enclosed head construction continues.

e. Limited miscellaneous construction and road repairs were completed at Quang Tri Combat Base by 3d Engineers.

## 5. Base Development

a. Construction in the Division AO, with a few exceptions, was limited to ~~NER~~ construction of heads, showers, messhalls and troop billets.

b. DHCB: Renovation of the Dong Ha ASP is about 50% complete. Two perimeter observation towers were erected.

c. QTCB: The first increment of the ASP and the second increment of the 3d Med Bn Surgical Facility were completed. Work started on the access road to Camp Red Devil (1st Bde, 5th Inf Div).

d. Vandegrift FOB: Perimeter clearing operations continued, the new ASF is about 80% complete, and the medical bunkers were completed. Due to lack of assets for living bunkers, construction was started on strongbacks for the Vandegrift/Ca Lu area.

## 6. Combat Operations

a. Total number of minesweeps conducted visual/deliberate - 590.

b. Total meters covered on minesweeps visual/deliberate route #1 50,000 meters; Route #9-350,000 meters; other 1,502,500 meters.

### c. Mines and Booby Traps Destroyed

2 - 100 lb bomb	29 - 155mm
9 - 250 lb bomb	12 - 17mm
9 - 500 lb bomb	38 - ChiCom Claymore
212 - M-79	2 - ChiCom 60mm
8 - 57mm	766 - ChiCom TNT
704 - 60mm	1 - ChiCom AT Mine
24 - 61mm	386 - ChiCom Grenade
40 - 75mm	10 - ChiCom Home Made Bn
79 - 81mm	11 - ChiCom N/Elec Caps
1242 - 82mm	15 - 3.5 Rockets
115 - 105mm	2 - AP Mines
4 - 106mm	4 - AT Mines
42 - 107 Rocket	46 - 60mm Fuzes
12 - 120mm	3 - 60mm detonators
1 - 122 Rocket	216 - M-26
28 - 140mm Rocket	8 - M-18

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(1)

11 - 2.75 Rockets	26 - Flares
7 - Pineapple Grenades	420 - 92mm Fuzes
2 - CS Grenades	11 - 82mm Boosters
96 - 82mm Detonaters	48 - 8 <sup>2</sup> m Firing device
20 - AK-47 Mags	2 - Russian AT Mines
2 - 4.2mm	13 cans - 82mm Boosters
6 - 9' Rockets	2 - 8" Howitzer
4 - 8" Rockets	14 - LAAW's
177 - RPG	500 - 82mm rds
134 - M-72	9 - DH-10 Cl ymore
18 - Rifle Grenade	1 - NVA Dir Mine
1 - 251b Strip Charge	1 - 201b French line

d. Tunnels destroyed. 3

e. Enemy Facilities Destroyed

630 bunkers of various sizes  
 3 wells  
 1 - 30' bridge  
 3 spider holes

f. Engineers in Combat Support Role

(1) Shore Party Battalion operated LZ's at Cao Doi, Vandegrift, Dong Ha and provided HST support to 9th Marines, 3d Marines, 4th Marines and 12th Marines. Security for the LCU ramp at Dong Ha.

(2) Combat Engineer Support furnished:

3d Engineer Battalion:  
 1st Plt, Co "A" - Support of 26th Mar oper Houston AO  
 2d Plt, Co "A" - Support of 4th Mar, Vandegrift Combat Base  
 3d Plt, Co "A" - Support of 4th Lar, Ca Lu  
 1st Sqd, 3d Plt, Co "A" - Support of 2/4 at LZ Cates TSB  
 1st Plt, Co "B" - Support of 1/3 at Rockpile  
 2d Plt, Co "B" - Support of 3d Mar Rear, Camp Carroll  
 3d Lt, Co "B" - Support of 3/3 oper Lancaster II AO  
 1st Plt, Co "C" - Support of 1/9 TAOR  
 2d Plt, Co "C" - Support of 2/9 TAOR  
 3d Plt, Co "C" - Support of 3/9 TAOR

g. Water Production

Location	<u>Potable</u>	Non-Potable
Quang Tri	5,155,000	613,700
Dong Ha	170,000	18,000
Big John	87,000	

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Cua Viet	285,600	
C-4	28,800	
Ca Lu	596,000	
C-2 Bridge	194,500	
A-3	98,000	
Camp Carroll	412,500	30,000
Rockpile	119,500	301,500
Vandegrift	635,000	70,000
LZ Cates	28,000	
<b>TOTAL 3d Engr Bn</b>	<b>7,869,900</b>	<b>1,033,200</b>
<b>TOTAL 11th Engr Bn DGH</b>	<b>3,949,980</b>	<b>2,392,900</b>

7. **Duel Blade.** Primary effort during August involved installation of hardened fighting bunkers at the A and C sites. Progress to date is as follows:

SITE	NUMBER PROGRAMMED	NUMBER IN PROGRESS		REMARKS
A-1 (ARVN)	77	63	0	
A-2 (ARVN)	100	19	0	
C-1 (ARVN)	200	0	135	132 Have chain link installed
A-3 (USA)	66	0	66	18 have chain link installed
A-4 (USA)	85	0	85	32 have chain link installed
C-2 (USA)	105	0	105	
C-3 (USA)	71	0	0	
C-4 (USA/USMC)	75	0	0	
Ca Lu (USMC)	130	0	0	
Camp Carroll(USMC)	80	0	0	
Thon Son Lam(USMC)	1265	0	0	
Vandegrift	108	0	0	Bunker movement to site has commenced

Second generation (armco plate steel arch concrete end walled) bunkers began arriving in country. First Bde, Fifth Inf Div (Mech) assumed responsibilities for Duel Blade sites A-3, A-4, C-2, C-3 and C-4 (C-4 with 1st AmTracs). The Ca Lu site remained under USMC control along with "planned" Duel Blade sites Camp Carroll, Thon Son Lam and Vandegrift.

Two basic plans were submitted to higher headquarters (1) installation of linear obstacle and A-5 on five days notice (2) upgrading of all existing Duel Blade sites plus Camp Carroll, Thon Son Lam and Vandegrift to second generation full Duel Blade status by or new



manning/policy concepts. Two briefings were held explaining this Divisions plans to higher headquarters.

The tower at A-2 was completed. A well at A-2 was sunk by MCB-7 and drilling is taking place at A-4 with a rig at A-1.

Problems incurred during the month include halting of chain link fence installation until the exact position of fighting bunkers is determined by higher headquarters. Fighting bunkers have been flooding due to the large entrance way water-proofing areas. The need exists for more sandbags/culvert/revetment material to reduce entrance way areas and or equipment trenchers for drainage ditches. Longer pickets are needed to increase the chain link usage capability (fences so low to ground that must shoot through not under them). Second generation living and functional bunker design must have entrances similar to the first generation to prevent monsoon flooding. If the bunker remains as designed to date the same problems will result as are now occurring with present second generation fighting bunkers. Due to enemy incoming and general inaccessibility of sites, A-3 and A-1 had experienced some fighting bunker material shortages through pilfering and combat loss.

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**ASSTP/ED**

CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. Revolutionary Development

a. Pacification progress continued uninterrupted in Quang Tri Province during the month of August, as evidenced by a high rate of rallies under the Chieu Hoi Program. RF/PF Forces improved markedly under the guidance of MAT Teams and CAP Units, and conducted daily operations against VC/NVA in all districts. Significant progress was made in improving Self-Defense Forces in all districts. An increase in operations against the VC infrastructure resulted in 73 VC killed, captured or neutralized.

b. RD activities continued at the pace set in July. To expedite economic revival of the countryside, a meeting was held between PSA and selected CORDS staff members and Vietnamese and Chinese businessmen from Quang Tri City. Problems discussed were how to stimulate free enterprise into organizing small business and industries. A 4-T training program for local leaders was held in August to stimulate interest in the 4-T program. Established 4-T clubs were revitalized and showed promise of expansion. Other RD activities included the construction of several hamlet schools, and the repair of 31 schools damaged by war, the construction of 3 maternity dispensaries, a MILPHAP-sponsored program to upgrade local medicine, and the near completion of two large irrigation systems which will serve some 15,000 people.

c. A continuous problem has been the maintenance of the efficiency rating of the RD Cadre program. The disciplinary campaign began by the RD Chief in July resulted in improved morale and esprit de corps in August. Reduction of the attrition rate is a major goal. All RD groups continue to remain in the New Life Hamlets at night.

2. Division Civil Affairs Activities

a. Agriculture

(1) Vegetable project in Cua Valley. The 1st AA Platoon assisted the Provincial Agriculture Advisor and the Refugee Agriculture Advisor for I Corps in establishing a vegetable project for the Brou in Cua Valley. Seed and fertilizer for 500 families were delivered during August. The Brou were trained in efficient vegetable techniques. Vegetable crops, including sweet potatoes, corn, cabbage and beans will provide a more diverse and nutritious diet for the Brou.

(2) **Brou Assistance.** Eleven water buffalo and seven head of cattle were purchased by G-5 from 26th Marines' **TARP** Funds donated for the Brou. This livestock was presented to Brou leaders in the Cua Valley by **G-5** on 17 August 1968. In addition, 2,000 pairs of thongs, sent by the people of Phoenix, Arizona, were presented at the same time. **G-5** furnished 160,000 \$VN to buy 176 sheets of plywood to finish the new Brou Dispensary in the Cua **Valley**.

b. **Scholarship Program.** A second draft of the scholarship survey is being prepared by the **1st** AA Platoon to include information on primary and secondary schools.

c. **Personal Response Program.**

(1) Two Personal Response Courses were held during August. The 17th Personal Response Course held on 3 August 1968 consisted of **5<sup>1</sup>** hours of instruction to 5 **SNCOs** and 24 **NCOs**. The 18th Personal **Response** Course, held on 15-16 August 1968, **included** a tour of Quang **Tri** City and consisted of **9<sup>1</sup>** hours of instruction; 12 officers, **including** 2 field grade, and 17 **SNCOs** attended this Course. A Cultural Drama Team presentation was held on 3 August 1968 for students of the PR Course in conjunction with personnel of Headquarters Battalion. 225 members of Headquarters Battalion as well as students of the 17th PR Course enjoyed the show.

(2) A total of 22 hours of field instruction was presented by the Personal Response **SNCO** during the month of August to the **1st** Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech); **4th** CAG; **1st** Bn, **1st** Marines; "D" Med and the **SNCO** Leadership School. A total of 15 officers, 16 **SNCOs** and 1,442 enlisted attended these presentations.

d. **MedCaps/DentCaps.** A total of 10,198 **VN** civilians were treated by 3d Marine Division units at MedCaps and Dent-Caps during the month of August.

e. **High Tea for Buddhist Bonze.** On 8 August 1968, the Commanding General hosted a tea for the Buddhist Leader of Quang **Tri** Province, the Venerable Thich Thien Binh. The Commanding General presented to the Venerable, 59,000 \$VN from the Chapel Funds to assist Buddhist Refugees and a personal gift of a Polaroid camera and film. In addition, **G-5** delivered 3 truck loads of scrap lumber between **4-15** August to the Venerable to be used to aid 300 Buddhist refugees in Cam Lo District.

f. Mid-Autumn Festival. This Children's Festival will be celebrated 5-7 October. G-5 has requisitioned 40,000 toys and favors from III MAF. Coordination is being made with Province and District officials on planned celebrations. A Division Bulletin to give 3d Marine Division units guidance for participating in these celebrations has been prepared.

g. Sai Hamlet. On 10 August 1968, G-5 provided 150 engineer stakes to PMO for transport to Sai Hamlet. The engineer stakes are to improve the hamlet's defenses. The residents of Sai Hamlet have provided the 3d Marine Division PMO with valuable intelligence in the past.

### 3. Civic Action Projects

a. 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital (Dong Ha Facility). On 1 September 1968, the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital (Dong Ha Facility) was formally dedicated and opened in ceremonies at Dong Ha. Portions of the "D" Med facility were converted to use as a temporary children's hospital until completion of the permanent facility at Quang Tri Combat Base in the Spring of 1969. The Children's Hospital at Dong Ha is now fully functional, with a Vietnamese staff of twenty personnel, including nine nurses. By 7 September the hospital had eleven children patients, and had treated a total of 89 out-patients in 7 days.

b. Dong Ha City Hospital. The repairs by the Vietnamese contractor on G-5's initial 70,500 \$VN contract have been completed. A second contract of over 75,000 \$VN for the next phase of repairs and renovation has been negotiated. Medical officers at DHCB are setting up a schedule of visits by doctors to insure that at least one doctor is present at the hospital to treat patients each day of the week. MCB-7 is presently installing a large capacity water pump, plumbing and electrical wiring for the hospital.

c. Children's Clinic. The Engineering Officer, 8th AA Platoon, has drawn up a detailed blueprint plan and Bill of Materials for the clinic. The plan is presently being evaluated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 prior to submission to the Quang Tri Province Chief for approval by the GVN.

d. Repair Projects. G-5 is contracting for various types of substantial repairs and refurbishments at Bo De Buddhist School, Nai Linh Dispensary and Trieu Phong high School. In addition, G-5 has provided wages for refugee workers to repair a water front in Trieu Phong District and a fish

Enclosure (1)  
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pond in Mai Linh District.

e. Cua Viet School. Engineers from CBMU-301 completed a detailed blueprint and Bill of Materials for the proposed school. CORDS has been asked for materials they can furnish. Other materials will be purchased with AIK Funds. The project is being supervised locally by the **S-5**, 1st Am Trac Bn.

f. **Dong Ha Trash Project.** Base Coordinator, **DHCB**, has asked G-5 to check into the feasibility of trash removal from DHCB trash dump by a VN contractor. The contractor would remove all trash from the dump at no cost to the Marine Corps and, with the profit from his contract obtained by selling reusable items of trash, collect trash throughout Dong Ha City as a free public service. A VN contractor was contacted through the **Dong Ha District Chief** and is extremely eager to obtain such a contract under the terms specified by 3d Marine Division. The details of the proposed contract are being prepared by **G-5** for presentation to the DHCB Base Coordinator.



COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1968

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DIVISION SUR

1. PERSONNEL

- a. Division **Surgeon:** CAPT G. E. WIRE, Jr., MC, USN
- b. Medical Administrative Officers CDR J. W. GUINN, MSC USN
- c. Medical Officers on board at months **end** 65
  - (1) General Duty Medical Officers
  - (2) Specialist Medical Officers 33
- d. Medical Officers detached and joined
  - (1) Detached
  - (2) Joined
  - (3) TAD Under Treatment
- e. Medical Service Corps Officers on board at months **end** 1
  - (1) Detached 0
  - (2) Joined
- f. Navy Nurse Corps **Officers** on board at months end -  
(None were detached or joined.)
- g. Chaplain **Corps** Officers on board at months end 27
  - (1) Detached 6
  - (2) Joined
- h. Other Naval Officers on board at **months end** 12
  - (1) Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers 11
  - (2) Judge Advocate General Officers 1

- i. Hospital Corpsmen on **board** at months end 1
- |   |  |            |
|---|--|------------|
| (1) Detached                                |  | <u>85</u>  |
| (2) Joined                                  |  | <u>127</u> |
| (3) Minimum/maximum on board strength       |  | 1066/1101  |
| (4) Casualties                              |  |            |
| (a) KIA                                     |  |            |
| (b) WIA & evacuated out of RVN              |  | <u>21</u>  |
| (c) Twice wounded & evacuated<br>out of RVN |  | -          |
| (d) No Hospital Corpsmen are MIA or DOW.    |  |            |

**Note:** It has been noted that previous months figures pertaining to on board strengths for Medical Officers and Chaplain Corps Officers have been inaccurate. The above figures denote the true on board counts.

2. ADMINISTRATION:

- a. The Division Surgeon, CAPT G. E. WIRE, MC USN **was** promoted to his present rank effective 2 August 1968.
- b. The 3d Medical Battalion Hospital at Quang Tri was opened and became operational at 0800, 16 August 1968.

3. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE/SANITATION:

Malaria discipline surveys indicate a greater command interest in malaria discipline, however the number of patients who do not take their chemoprophylaxis regularly has not changed appreciably (5-50%) over previous percentages. More units now use the roster to control ingestion, and insect repellent is being used with slightly greater frequency. The Preventive Medicine Section now conducts all malaria and FUO interviews of patients admitted through 3d Medical Battalion except for those who are Med-Evaced out as soon as they arrive. The highland areas continue to be the principal locale for malaria infection with units operating in the "bush" being hardest hit.

During environmental sanitation surveys, more emphasis has been placed on drainage problems because of the approaching monsoon. No significant food-borne illness epidemics occurred.

The program for PPD testing of indigenous employees was reinstated. Thus far approximately 20-25% have been read as positive. After the initial 400-500 are completed, the (+) will be x-rayed.

## 4. DISEASE:

a. Third Marine Division personnel admitted to the Sick List by the Division Psychiatrist with a psychiatric diagnosis were 19. A total of 160 patients were seen, 4 were evacuated, 103 were returned to duty, 18 were recommended for administrative discharges, and 4 remain on the sick list.

b. A total of 81 cases of illness classified under the category of venereal disease were reported in the 3d Marine Division during the month of August. There were 12 cases of gonorrhea, cases of non-specific urethritis, no cases of chancroid or syphilis.

c. There were 103 cases of confirmed malaria.

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## NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The 3d Dental Company provides dental support throughout the TAOR of the 3d Marine Division to the personnel of the division. In addition it provides prosthetic dental treatment to navy personnel of the MCB units in the TAOR. A dental facility has been constructed and is operational with the 3d Medical Battalion Hospital at Quang Tri Combat Base. Both company oral surgeons have been assigned to this facility. The company once again has a cleft lip/palate capability to aid in the civic action program. A major dental facility is to be constructed in the Quang Tri Battalions rear area when adequate electric power is made available. Dental prosthetic care is provided at the Quang Tri CP clinic and the "D" Medical Company facility at Dong Ha Combat Base. The bunkered dental facility at Cam Lo Hill was disestablished on 25 August when the AO was taken over by U. S. Army elements. Company personnel are available to provide assistance in the care of mass casualties. Assistance to Graves Registration is provided in identification of the dead. The M DCAP/ T-CAP civic action program continues to expand in scope, with programs in the Qua Viet, Dai Hao, Dong Ha, Quang Tri and Cam Lo areas. The dental personnel at "D" Medical Company will provide support to the new Marine Memorial Children's Hospital at Dong Ha.

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## PART III

## SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 1 Aug C/1/1 at 184711 patrol found 2 NVA bodies in bomb crater. Results: 2 NVA KIA(C)  
Journal entry # 46
- 2 Aug BLT 2/26 assumed OPCON of B/1/1 from 12th Marines  
BLT 2/26 assumed OPCON of J/1/12 from 12th Marines  
12th Marines assumed OPCON of 5th Bn 4th Arty Mech from 1st Bn 5th Bde (Mech)  
1st Marines assumed OPCON of A/1/3 from T F HOTEL  
3d Recon 3 assumed OPCON of Co A 3d Recon 3n from 1st Marines  
3d Recon assumed OPCON of 3d Force Recon Co from FTI
- 3 Aug 1st Marines assumed OPCON of 2/9 (-) from T F HOTEL
- 4 Aug E/2/9 at 188663 made contact with 4 NVA; after contact found 3 NVA/KIA(C) and 1 ChiCom radio. Results: 3 NVA/KIA(C)  
Journal entry # 64 & 83
- 5 Aug H/2/9 at 180643 found 1 NVA/KIA(C); body approx 1 month old. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)  
Journal entry # 68  
H/2/9 at 189655 found 1 NVA/KIA(C). Body approx 1 month old. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)  
Journal entry # 85

UNCLASSIFIED

F/2/9 at 173675 observed 30 NVA.  
Engaged NVA with SAF, Arty, mortars  
and air strikes; Enemy broke contact.  
Results: 11 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 113 & 62

6 Aug 1/1 at 175720 observed fire msn on NVA in  
open. Observed NVA body lying in field.  
Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 83

7 Aug 3d Recon team at XD 975564 observed 4  
NVA/VC in a tree line; called fire msn.  
Results: 1 NVA/VC KIA(C)

Journal entry # 115

8 Aug Div A0 at 130743 ran 2 Air strikes on  
assembly area, fired 1 Arty mission, 2  
bunkers destroyed, 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 54

G/2/1 at 256671 found remains of 1 NVA  
body. 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 78

G/2/1 at 264688 found one fresh grave,  
1 NVA/KIA(C) in grave.

Journal entry # 83

9 Aug I/3/3 at 079638 found 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 94

I/3/3 at 087613 found 3 NVA/KIA(C) killed  
by Arty.

Journal entry # 95

10 Aug Div A0 at 147682 ran air strike on bunker  
complex. Results: 4 VC/NVA KIA(C)

Journal entry - 47

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

12 Aug C/1/4 at 923483 spotted 1 NVA in open; Fired on NVA with SAFF; Recon by fire of area. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 56

Recon team at 940611 made contact with small NVA force. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry - 63

F/2/9 at 965508 called Arty on 1 NVA crossing stream. 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 67

13 Aug Div A0 at 161775 observed 3 NVA crossing Ben Hai; called for 3 Huey gunships. Results: 3 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 56

14 Aug Recon team at 078638 observed 2 NVA walking down trail. Made contact with NVA. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 104

15 Aug 1st Marines assumed OPCON of 1/9 (-) from T F HOTEL

2d Marines assumed OPCON of A/1/3 from 1st Marines

H/2/3 at 077623 received enemy fire from north; engaged enemy with heavy SAFF and AAF; Results: 15 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 39

I/3/4 at 891376 observed 3 NVA at 892370; 8 NVA at 892374; engaged enemy with small arms and Arty. Results: 3 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 49

H/2/3 at 088618 spotted NVA heading down slope of objective; opened fire on enemy; enemy returned fire. Results: 15 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 51

UNCLASSIFIED

16 Aug 1/3/3 at 092599 found 2 dead NVA.  
2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 68

**I/3/3** at 092671 found 3 NVA bodies  
killed by *arty.* 3 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 105

1/3 at 047635 received unk no. 60mm  
mortar fire from **enemy psn.** 1/3  
called in Arty, air and utilized  
organic wpns; **Results:** 10 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 108

17 Aug 1/3/4 at 196376 1 NVA killed by  
Arty. **1 NVA/KIA(C)**

Journal entry # 33

**I/3/4** at **996375** discovered 1 NVA body  
killed by artillery. **1 NVA/KIA(C)**

Journal entry # 55

18 Aug 3/9 at 052648 found 2 graves with  
markers, 2 bodies in **each.** 4 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 53

**D/1/3** at 054626 spotted NVA in open;  
called Arty, air and 81mm mission.  
**Results:** 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 62

**I/3/3** at 090622 **spotted** plt size  
NVA ambush; fired **60mm** and Arty.  
**Results:** 3 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 91

19 Aug **1st** Marines assumed **OPCON** of Co's  
G and H of "A" Cmd GP from 2/9

**D/1/3** at 054626 made contact with plt  
size NVA force; also spotted several  
NVA in open. **Results** 2 **NVA/KIA(C)**

Journal entry # 9

UNCLASSIFIED

Recon team 1C1 at 928608 made contact with 3 NVA; called in Gunships.  
2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 14

F/2/1 at 110745 spotted 2 NVA with packs; Unit opened up with small arms and automatic weapons. Results: 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 58

3/9 at 058668 made contact with est Co size NVA unit; contact lasted 4 hours. Results; 38 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 105

B/1/3 at 040628 found 12 fresh graves; dug up graves, found 1 body in each; results: 12 NVA/KIA (C)

Journal entry # 119

20 Aug

T F HOTEL assumed OPCON of 2/9 Cmd Gp Co's G, H and F from 1st Marines

M/3/9 at 056668 while sweeping area found 1 NVA body. 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 68

H/6/2/9 at 144733 made contact with 2 squads to a Plt; received small arms, automatic weapons fire; RPG's, mortars and 130mm Arty. Called in Air, Arty and tanks. Results: 20 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 85

21 Aug

M/3/3 at M 979589 made contact with est squad of NVA; received fire with organic weapons. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 44

1/3 at 037654 found 2 graves. Dug up graves, found 2 NVA in uniform.  
2 NVA/KIA (C)

Journal entry # 63

55

ENCLOSURE (1)

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22 Aug

1st Marines assumed OPCON of Co B  
1st Bn, 11th Inf (USA) from 1st BDE  
5th Inf

Recon team 1-2 at XD 924533 observed  
15 NVA; team initiated SAF on enemy.  
Results: 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 74

I/3/9 at 047677 found 1 dead NVA in  
bunker complex, along with numerous  
weapons, rice and documents.  
1 NVA/KIA

Journal entry # 53

23 Aug

L/3/4 at 883351 found 1 NVA body.  
No gear or documents on body.  
Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 75

24 Aug

K/3/4 at 002370 patrol stopped when  
they observed a bundle of fresh cut  
grass; at that time enemy ambush  
opened up 50 meters in front; est  
squad size ambush. Reported 5 NVA  
moving SE. Pulled back and called Arty  
mission. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 42

Div A0 at YD 191755 ran 1 Air Strike  
on bunker complex and NVA. Results:  
6 bunkers destroyed, 2 NVA/KBA(C)

Journal entry # 83

25 Aug

1st Marines assumed OPCON of 3/9 (-)  
from T F HOTEL

1st Marines assumed OPCON of 1/9  
from 3d Marines

Div A0 at YD 192695 ran 2 Air Strikes  
and 3 Huey Gunships on NV in treeline.  
Results: 1 sec expl & 2 NVA/KBA(C)

56

ENCLOS (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

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26 Aug

At YD 192692 Div A0 ran 1 Air Strike on NVA in treeline. Results: 1 NVA/KBA(C) Total Results: 3 NVA/KBA(C)

Journal entry # 86

C/1/1 at 192700 attempted to pass thru CORDON; fired S/A, M-79 and 60mm mortars. Results: 6 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 22

C/1/1 at 192700 12 NVA attempted to break thru CORDON using S/A & gren. Returned S/A, M-79 and 60mm mortar. Results: 4 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 35

1/1 at 116700 OP-2 spotted approx 15 NVA in open; fired 2 rds WP & 44 firecracker 105mm rds. Results: 5 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 42

D/3/9 at 195695 after recon by fire unit search area & found 2 NVA/KIA(C) Will bring equip in. Continue search of area; captured 10 82mm mortar rds, 1 RPG & 1 50 cal machine gun. Results: 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 61

C/1/1 at 193700 at approx 260115H 6-10 NVA were taken under fire; later increase to 15 NVA; lost sight and broke contact. At 260935H two squads sent to search area. Found 13 NVA/KIA(C), 6 IWC, 1 CSJC, 2 AK-50 2 AK-47, 2 SKS, 1 B-40 launcher, 33 gren, large supply of ammo, sleeping gear, cooking equip and large supply of rice. Results: 13 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 62

57

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Div **AO** at XD 856464 estimated 5 to 10 NVA observed from hill 3 1015 Ran 2 Air strikes. 1 large secondary fire. Appears to be rocket mortars as fire was white phosphorus type smoke. At **JD855464** ran 1 Air **Strike** on suspected mortar position. Negative BDA. At XD 835430, supplies left on road. 1 large box **3'x3'x3'**, numerous small ones in area. Fired 1 Arty mission. Adjusted onto target, turned mission over to **F/2/3**. **Results:** 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 67

**F/2/4** at 844455 observed 2 NVA moving into treeline; **AD** ran FW. **Results:** 2NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 76

A/1/4 at 881362 while moving onto **obj 3** found 1 NVA body estimated 3 weeks old, 2 **ChiCom** grenades; **buried** body & dest ChiComs. **Results:** 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 89

**I/3/9** at 095695 found 1/7.62 **HMG**, 3 RPD Machine Guns & 4 AK-47. All dest by FW, also found 1 NVA body. **Results:** 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 122

27 Aug

T F HOTEL assumed OPCON of 3/9 (-) from 1st BDE 5th Inf

3d Marines assumed OPCON of **K/3/9** from 1st BDE 5th Inf

1/4 at **887355-887346-878348-888357-875353-878356-880355** heard rounds being **dropped** into tubes; impact 400m to E.; these were followed by 2 rounds SAF & 2 rounds **RPG** landing inside wire; observed groups of 2-5 NVA. Counter mortar msn, 105 & 155mor Arty were fired on **enemy pans**. Also ran FW. **Results:** 9 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 7

58

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ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~

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28 Aug

T **F HOTEL** assumed **OPCON** of **K/3/9**  
from **3d Marines**

3d Marines assumed **OPCON** of **1/3 (-)**  
from **1st** of the 5th Inf

3d Marines assumed **OPCON** of **2/26**  
from **XXIV Corps**

**L/3/3** at 971600 **position** made contact  
**with** I NVA, killed same; continued  
search & found 2 RPG-2 and 7 rounds.  
**Results:** 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 89

29 Aug

**1st** ACD assumed **OPCON** of **A/1/9** AirCav  
from **3d Marine Division**

30 Aug

**M/5/5** at 965608 made contact with 6  
NVA; took under fire with small arms.  
**Results:** 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 31

3d **Recon** at 961579 had 8 contacts with  
enemy resulting in 8 NVA/KIA(C), Arty  
fired 326 rounds resulting in 4 KIA(C),  
Air dest caves & killed 2 enemy. Caves  
large enough for tanks, many tunnels in  
area. **Total Results:** 14 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 56

31 Aug

Div **AO** at XD 243795 ran A/S on bunker  
complex; 2 structures dest, 8 bunkers  
dest & 1 wpns pan damaged. At YD  
270786 fired **NGF** on bunkers; 1 bunker  
dest. At following grids took heavy  
**SAF**, 239768-236764. **Results:**  
7 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 78

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~  
**SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS**

- /1. Division SitReps
- ✓2. Division Journal
- ✓3. Battle and Non Battle Casualties
- /4. VIP Visits
- Orders/Plans**
- ✓6. Photographs

CHRONOLOGY OF **SUPPORTING COMMANDS**

- ✓ 3d Marines Chronology
- 4th Marines Chronology
- ✓9th Marines Chronology
- ✓12th Marines Chronology
- ✓1stBn, 3d Marines Chronology
- ✓3dBn, 3d Marines Chronology
- ✓1stBn, 4th Marines Chronology
- /2dBn, 4th Marines Chronology
- ✓3dBn, 4th Marines Chronology
- ✓1stBn, 9th Marines Chronology
- dBn, 9th Marines Chronology
- ✓3dBn, 9th Marines Chronology
- 1stBn, 12th Marines Chronology
- /2dBn, 12th Marines Chronology
- ✓3dBn, 12th Marines Chronology

**ENCLOSURE (1)**  
**SECRET**

✓ 4thBn, 12th Marines Chronology  
 ✓ 1stBn, 26th Marines **Chronology**  
 ✓ 2d Bn, 26th Marines Chronology  
 3d Bn, 26th Marines Chronology  
 HqBn Chronology  
 1st Amtrac Bn Chronology  
 3d Engr Bn Chronology  
 3d MED Chronology  
 3d MT Bn Chronology  
 3d Recon Bn Chronology  
 ✓ 3d SP Bn Chronology  
 ✓ 3d Tank Bn Chronology  
 9th MT BN Chronology  
 11th Engr Bn Chronology (submitted direct to CMC)  
 ✓ 1st 8" HOW Battery Chronology  
 3d Dental Co Chronology  
 1st Searchlight Battery **Chronology**  
 ✓ 26th Marines **Chronology**  
 ✓ 1st Marines Chronology

----- 7 ----- 196.

BATTLE AND ~~MEMORANDA~~ CASUALTIES FOR ~~THE~~ MONTH ~~OF~~ AUGUST 1968

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) MAF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3040.3

(Date)

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	NON-HOSTILE			TOTAL	(WARB)
					WPH	WIS	DEATHS		
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN ENL	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

USN OFF	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	4075	30280	454	0	0	0	0	0

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	NON-HOSTILE			TOTAL	(WARB)
					WPH	WIS	DEATHS		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

† MARTEL PR MIA 0 KIA

C. R. YALE

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**3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF**  
**FFO San Francisco 96602**

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**HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT**

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, **2 August 1968**

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTL	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USMC NL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

**TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES**

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTL	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	1/2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	352	2157	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	352	2157	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( **ONE** )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, **2 August 1968**

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTL	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN NL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WA'S

**C. R. YALE**  
**Captain**  
**Adjutant**

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3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 3 AUG 196

	IA	WIA	W	MIA	CPTE	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIA)
USMC OFF	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	-	(3)
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	NON-HOSTILE						
USMC OFF	1			3	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0			0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0			0	0	0	0
TOTAL	1			3	0	0	0

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 3 AUG

	NON-HOSTILE						
USMC OFF	0			0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0			0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0			0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0			0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0		0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0		0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

G. R. YAI  
Captain

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2100 10,

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	(2)
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	(1)
TOTAL	3	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
TOTAL	3	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	17

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2100

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
VSA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. \* ...

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August  
(Date)

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 5 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							DEATHS	INJURED	
USMC OFF			16		0	0			
USMC ENL	3054		421		0				3475
USN OFF	2		0		0		0		
USN ENL				0	0	0			
TOTAL			154	15	0	3			

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( Non )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 5 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							DEATHS	INJURED	
USMC OFF			0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA O	0	000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. H. YALE  
Captain

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, ~~ADJUTANT~~

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	n	0	n	n		(3)
USMC ENL	0	3	n	n	0	n		1		(2)
USN OFF	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
USN ENL		.	n	1	n	0	1		0	0
TOTAL		4		0	n		2		7	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATH	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	17	1238	76		0	0	22		1463
USMC ENL		594	421	1	0	12	25		1153
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	49
USN ENL	190	1618	74	0	0	0	1	1270	3083
TOTAL	209	2037	151	1	0	12	283	1270	4678

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, ~~ADJUTANT~~ 168

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATH	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
USMC ENL	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
USN OFF				0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL				0		0	0		0	0
USA OFF	0	0		0	0	0	0		0	0
USA IL	0			0					0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. L. YALE  
Captain  
Adjutant

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 7 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	2			0	0	0	0	0	2	
USMC ENL	0			0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN OFF	0			0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN ENL	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	272	123	16	5	U	0	12	36	472
USMC ENL	3056	2708	41	5	U	0	350	191	6151
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	U	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	4028	2831	57	10	U	0	362	227	7278

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( Lt 2/ )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, August 1968

	WIA	DOW	MIA	REF	MT	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. R. YAL

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 8 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTI	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	* (WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJ.		
USMC OFF	0	0						0		
USMC ENL	0	4	0							
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0		0		
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0		0	0		
TOTAL	0	4	0	0	0	0		0	6	

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTI	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							DEATHS	INJURE	
USMC OFF	0	129	16	2	0	0	13	36	147
USMC ENL	0	27	42	15	0	13	350	1192	1326
USN OFF	0	7		0	0		0		
USN ENL	190	1448	1	0	0	0			1736
TOTAL	190	1674	59	17	0	13	363	1228	3326

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( )  
FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 8 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTI	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							DEATHS	INJURE	
USMC OFF	0						0	0	0
USMC L		4	0	0			0	0	4
USN OFF			0	0			0	0	0
USN ENL			0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF		0	0	0			0	0	0
USA ENL		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 9 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	*(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	(2)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	(2)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	*(WIAE)
USMC OFF	172	127	1A	13	0	0	13	10	345	13
USMC ENL	550	27015	424	15	0	13	550	1192	3450	13
USN OFF	2	31	1	0	0	0	0	0	34	0
USN ENL	190	8	14	0	0	0	21	43	274	4/10
TOTAL	402	27359	440	18	0	13	584	1245	3450	26

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( B1 C/1

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 9 August 1968

NON-HOSTILE

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	*(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	1	10	1	0	0	0	0	0	12	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
US OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
US ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 10 August 1968:

	KI	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	6	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	6	0

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	1/2	1239	1		0	0	1	36	1479
USMC ENL	0	2164	0		0	0	350	1192	3356
USN OFF		51			0	0	0	0	51
USN ENL		170		0	0	0	0	43	17
TOTAL		3044	4	18	0	13	381	1271	

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( None )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 10 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 15 6

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMCOFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USMC ENL	0	7	0	0		0		0		
USN OFF	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN ENL	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIE

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF			12m-	2	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL				0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	100			0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	107	7	0	2	0	0	0	0	116

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV 15 20

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, August 1954

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	(1)
USMC ENL	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2100 2 August 1966

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	* (WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURY		
USMC OFF					0	0	0	1		
USMC ENL					0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF			0		0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	19	0	0	0	0	0	1	20	(9)
TOTAL										

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							DEATHS	INJURY	
USMC OFF	27	27639	4	3	0	33	352	239	33292
USMC ENL	361	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN OFF	20	58	1		0	0	20	0	2787
USN ENL	0	3275	44		0	13	16	1272	36538
TOTAL									

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2100. 22 August 1966

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							DEATHS	INJURY	
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF			0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA AL									

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 13 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE			TOT	* (WIAE)
							DEATHS	I	R		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USMC ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	(1)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	(1)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOT
							DEATHS	INJURED	
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	3656	0	424	0	0	1	123	3804	
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	
TOTAL	4	76	4	0	0	1	123	3804	

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 13 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		
							DEATHS	INJURED	TOT
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 11 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF			0		0	0	0	0		T
USMC ENL			0	a	n			0	1	1
USN OFF	0		0	0	n	0	n	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	n	0	0			0	0	0	0
TOTAL	9	10	0	0			0	0	19	(6)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172		6	3	0	0	1	36	218
USMC ENL		49		9a	0		35	1793	1937
USN OFF		n		n	n		n	0	3
USN ENL		11		0	0	0	22	4	37
TOTAL	172	30386	119	0	0	11	387	1272	365

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 11 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA L	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	n	n

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 15 August 1968

	A	WIA	DOW	MIA	R	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(LIVE)
USMC OFF	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	2		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
TOTAL	2	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJ R	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1211	16	3	0	0	0	0	1390
USMC ENL		276			0	1			277
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190				0	0	22	43	212
TOTAL		0395	15	18	0	11	87	1272	3656

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( No )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 15 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(LIVE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 16 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	* (WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	1	0	9	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE	
							DEATHS	INJUR
USMC OFF	172	1243	16		0	0		
USMC ENL	366	2765			0	1	352	1193
USN OFF		37	0	0	0	0	0	
USN ENL	190	160	1	9	0	0		
TOTAL	4	151	18		0=6	13		

3334  
1729  
-71

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( None )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 15 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	* (WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USAOFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 17 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	*
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							DEATHS	INJURED	
USMC OFF	172	1243	16		0	0		36	
USMC ENL	300	210	424		0				934
USN OFF									2
USN ENL	190	146	4	0	0	0	22		
TOTAL	4024	3396	454	16	0	0	387	127	

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( None )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 17 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIA/F)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. R. YALE  
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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 19 August 1968

USM	OFF ENL	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTI	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	* (WIAE)
								DEATHS	INJUR		
		3	79	0	n	0	n	0	2	RR	2
	OF	0	2	0	n	0	n	0	0	0	0
			4	0	0	0	0	0	0		4
				0	03						(75)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTI	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURY	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1249	16	3	0	0			
USMC ENL	48	113	126	15	2	13		1200	3309
USN OFF		3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
USN ENL	190	1165	14	n	0	0		43	1721
TOTAL	400	2527	156	18	0	13	389	1287	3

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400 19 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTI	MPK	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURY	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	n	n	n	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

G. R. YALE

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 20 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	1		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	13	17	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	1		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	15	19	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	173	1250	21	3	0	0	1	1	14
USMC ENL	2681	2	427	15	0	13	351	1201	3345
USN OFF		37	n			0	n	0	37
USN ENL	191		11	0	0	0	22	43	17
TOTAL		X617	551R3		0%	1	38	190	

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 2 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPT	MJ	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	n	0	0	0	0	0	n	0	0	0
USMC L	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	n	0	0	0
USA OFF	n	n	0	1		a	p	n	0	0
USA ENL	n	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. R. YALIN  
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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 21 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	AE)
								INJURED			
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0			
USMC ENL	0		0	0	0	0	0	1			7
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
USN NL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	
TOTAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1		0	

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
								INJURED		
USMC OFF	173	1251	16	3	0		133			
USMC ENL	1	1700	107	1	n	1	3-1	1		
USN OFF	2		0	0	n	0	0			
USN ENL	191		14	0	n	0	22			
TOTAL			157	28	0	1	155			

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( None )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 21 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	P	TS	DEA	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIA/F)
								INJUR			
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0
USN ENL	1	1	0	0			1	0			0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 24 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	# (WIA R)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	2	12	1	0	0	0	1	0	16	(0)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	2	12	1	0	0	0	1	0	16	(0)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							D	I	
USMC OFF	173	1251	16	5	0	0	0	0	33
USMC ENL	2	2788	432	0	0	1	0	2	33
USN OFF	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	1	0	0	0	0	0	22	44	0
TOTAL	1059	30617	462	18	0	13	30	1204	0

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( None

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 24 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIA)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 25 A 1968

	A	WIA	W	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	(3)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	17	5	16	0	0	0	0	28	40
USMC ENL	0	2786	0	15	0	0	356	19	3374
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	191	0	0	0	0	0	0	44	277
TOTAL	4059	0	Jso	0	0	0	356	44	4777

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 25 Aug 1968

	K	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 26 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTI	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	"	(2)
USMC ENL	1	75	2	0	0	0	1	2		(17)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
USN IL	0	1	0	0	0	9	0	0		
TOTAL	1	80	2	0	0	0	1	2	86	

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CFTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	173	1258	1	3	0	0	11		1445
USMC ENL	369	27938	L 5	5	0	13%		-3akit3	31455
USN OFF	2		0	0	07	0		0	
USN ENL	191	1167	0h	0	0	0	22	10	
TOTAL	1060		1/5	8	0	11	391	128	

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( None )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 26 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTI	MIS	DEA	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC L	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. R. YALE

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 7 JAN 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CP	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	1	1	0	0	n	0	1	0	3	(1)
USMC ENL	3	33	n	n	0	n	0	0	0	(27)
USN OFF	0	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN IL	n	n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL			n	0	0	0	1	0	0	(28)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	174	259	14%	3	0	0	14	29	3	,5
USMC ENL	2627	2797	13%	15	0	0	0	126	0	
USN OFF	9	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
USN ENL	197	1167	11	0	0	0	22	11	1238	
TOTAL	1064	3 j7		18	0	0			72	.a86--36p78

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MTA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	n	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	n	n	n	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	n	0	0	0
USN NL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	n	0	0	n	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 28 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF		0	0		0		0			0
USMC ENL		0	0	0	0	0	0			0
USN OFF		0	0	0	0	0	0			0
USN ENL		0	0	0	0	0	0			0
TOTAL		0	0	0	0	0	0			0

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	1	1	1			0	1	28	31
USMC ENL								&a~"	260
USN OFF	107	1173	107	0		0	0		1387
USN ENL	2	37	0	0		0	0		39
TOTAL	111	1174	108	0		0	1	28	1369

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 28 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

WIA'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. R. YALE

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, . . .

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF										
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF			2	0	0	0	0	0	0	(2)
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL			2		0	0	0	0		

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF									
USMC ENL	2	2	20	3	0	-			
USN OFF	372	200	497	15	0	13			372
USN ENL	2E			0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	374	202	517	18	0	13	12	40	374

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400,

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MTA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF										
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
US OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. E. YALE  
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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 30 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF		2	0	0	0	0				
USMC ENL	0		1	0	0	0		0	2	(16)
USN OFF	0			0	0	0		0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	25	1	0	0	0	0	0	26	(16)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC N	372		430	15		1	3	12V	420	1
USN OFF	2		0	0		0	0		2	
USN ENL	191	147	14	18	0	0	22	414	17	
TOTAL	4091	108	468	18	0	1	322	120	4688	

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( No )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 30 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC OFF L	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WA'S

C. ALL

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 31 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	* (WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
USMC ENL	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	(10)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN NL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	0	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	(10)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							DEATHS	INJURED	
USMC OFF	174	1262	14		0	0	24	3	1507
USMC NL	3721		J23			1	3		3
USN OFF	2		0	0		0	0	0	2
USN ENL	191		14	0	0	0	2		17h
TOTAL	4088	3	468	18	0	13	392	1286	3711

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV ( )

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 1 Aug 1968

	KI	W	yW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF		0					0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0			0	0	0			0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. R. YALE  
Captain

Copy to:  
CG, III MAF (2)  
CG, 3dMarDiv  
G-1, 3dMarDiv (2)  
-3, 3dMarDiv  
Division Surgeon  
FILE

3D MARINE DIVISION VIP VISITS FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1968

**SECRET**

DRAFTER 138  
SEC STAFF SEC PHONE DHI 8  
CWO

A

JUL 68  
MARINE DIVISION

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: THIRD ARDIV  
INFO III MAF  
T.F. CLEARWATER  
FLSG BRAVO  
MAG-39

*h*  
**G-3**  
*Air COE*  
*film*  
*pac*

// **SECRET** //

1. CMC WILL VISIT THIRD MARDIV ON 7 AUGUST 1968. ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS:

RECEIVED  
25 JUL 1968

- 0845 ARR DONG HAA
- 0855 ENR LZ STUD
- 0910 - ARR LZ STUD VISIT TF HOTEL AND 4TH MAR
- 0940 ENR AND VISIT LZ CATES
- 1010 ENR AND VISIT OP 950
- 0930 ENR AND VISIT 9TH MAR (BALONG JUMP CP)
- 1105 - ENR AND VISIT 3D MAR
- 1140 ENR AND VISIT A-1
- 1200 ENR AND VISIT DIV CP FWD. WORKING LUNCH AT CG MESS AND DRIVE THROUGH FLSG-B MAINT AREA
- 1330 - ENR AND VISIT QUANG TRI (DIV CP REAR, AND 3D RECON BN) CO HQ BN PROVIDE VEHICLE TRANS FROM DIV CP REAR
- 1410 - ENR AND VISIT MAG-39 (VIA HELICOPTER)
- 1430 - DEPART QUANG TRI (MAG-39)

2. ORGANIZATIONS TO BE VISITED WILL PREPARE SCHEDULES AND SUBMIT TO THIS HQ ASAP. SCHEDULES FOR LZ STUD, LZ CATES, 9TH MAR, 3D MAR.

RECON BN AND MAG-39 WILL INCLUDE BRIEF PRESENTATION OF AWARDS CEREMONY. SIZE OF FORMATIONS WILL BE MINIMAL.

GP-4

CCN 0036

RELEASED BY W.C. Tolles TIM

STAND BY

**CONFIDENTIAL**



RRNAVY/ MPC6872VA 270

3D MARINE DIVISION

1770

ZNY CCCCC

RTTCZYUW RUMUGRA1800 1961136-CCCC--RUMHVP RUMHMB RUMHAW RUMH.A

RUMHIC RUMHVT.

ZNY CCCCC

R 141136Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH

RUMHMB/CG FIRST CAVDIV AM

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG

RUMHMB/CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRCAV GP

RUMH.A/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG

RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL

RUMHVT/CG DNG SPT CMD

RUMHMPA/CG FORLOGCMD DNG

RUMUFGA/COM THIRD NCB DNG

RUMUFGA/CNSA DNG

RUMHVI/DSA I CORPS DNG

RUMHPI/CO THREE SIX

RUMHPI/SIX TFW DNG

P 130705Z JUL 68 ZFF-6

FM COMUSMACV

TO CG III MAF

COMUSMACVIAF

CG PROV CORPS

CG I FFORCEV

CG II FFORCEV

SA IV CORPS

DSA III CORPS

DET 2<sup>nd</sup> 620TH TCS

II DASC

COMDR 65RD CSG

63RD BDO TUOC PLK

1ST SIG BDE

BT

**C O N F I D E N T I A L** 20213

SUBJ: MACV CALL WORD (U)

1. (C) GEN L.F. CHAPMANN CMC, WILL VISIT VIETNAM DURING THE PERIOD 3 AUG - 9 AUG 68. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY THROUGH 10 JUL 68. ALL REFERENCE TO THE ITINERARY OF GEN CHAPMANN WILL BE BY MACV CALL WORD

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 1800 **C O N F I D E N T I A L** NORTHWEST.



2. (U) DISSEMINATE TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AS NECESSARY. GP-4

BT 141136ZJUL

A-3/S

STAND 3014

141136  
**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**



NY CCCCC

3D MARINE DIVISION

NFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA  
 UMIMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV PHU BAI  
 UMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DANANG  
 UMIMB/C ONE ZERO ONE AIR CAV DIV GIA  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DANANG  
 RUMIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI  
 RUMHVT DNG SPT CMD DANANG  
 UMLMPA/CG FORLOGCMD DANANG  
 RUMUGRA/COM THIRD MFG DANANG  
 UMUGA/COMNAVSUPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVH/DSA ICORPS DANANG  
 RUMHPB/THREE SIX SIX TFW DANANG  
 P 090224Z JUL 68  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO CG III MA  
 COMUSMACVHAI  
 CGPROV CORPS  
 CG I FFORCEV  
 CG II FFORCEV  
 SA IV CORPS  
 DSA III CORPS  
 DET 2 6201H TCS  
 IN DASC  
 COMDR 65RD CSG  
 65RD BDO TUOC PLK  
 IN SIG BDE  
 BY

10/22/30 A

COC  
PIANS



file

**C O N F I D E N T I A L 19695**

SUBJ MACV CALL WORD (U)

1. (C) THE FOLLOWING NAMED DISTINGUISHED VISITORS WILL VISIT VIETNAM DURING THE PERIODS INDICATED, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UNTIL ONE DAY AFTER VISITORS DEPART FROM VIETNAM. ALL REFERENCE TO THEIR

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 1257 C O N F I D E N T I A -L  
ITINERARIES WILL BE BY THE FOLLOWING MACV CALL WORDS (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

NAME OF VISITOR	DATES OF VISIT	MACV CALL WORD MACV MONITOR OFF TELEPHONE NO SILVERSTICK LTC NESMITH 2021/2955 GRAND CPT PAHLAND 121/2955 ARY,
LTG J.K. LAGELLE DIR OF DCPG	22 JUL-26 JUL	
GEN. R.E. HAINES CINCUSARPAC DISIGNEE	24 AUG-27 AUG	


2. (U) DISSEMINATE

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3D MARINE DIVISION



706

COC  
PLANS

ZNY CCCCC  
P 240102Z JUN 68 ZYT-2  
FM ADMNO III MAF DNG  
TO RUMHLA/CG FORST MARDIV  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA  
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF DNG  
RUMPLMPA/CG FORLOGCMD DNG  
BT

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
CMC WESTPAC VISIT (U)  
A. CMC 221651Z JUN68 (PASEP)  
1. RLF 4 ANNOUNCED CMC TENTATIVE PLANS TO VISIT WESTPAC  
DURING AUGUST 1968 AND REQUESTED SPECIFIC TOPICS ON WHICH  
DISCUSSION IS ANTICIPATED WITH CMC DURING VISIT.  
2. THIS HQTRS WILL CONSOLIDATE ~~OTHER~~ TOPICS TO BE DISCUSS'D  
IMPERATIVE THAT TITLES OF SPECIFIC TOPICS BE SUBMITTED TO  
THIS HQTRS BY MSG TO ARRIVE NLT 261200H JUN68.

24 240102Z Jun

01 H-5/S

STA-100 02

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7 Jul - 4 Aug 1968 Subj: Task Force Hotel **Critique**, Lancaster II July Action  
 1252 Subj: Assignment of Heavy Cruisers NGFS to DMZ Area  
 3 151550Z Subj: Warning Order  
 4 170735Z Subj: Raid  
 5 191815Z Subj: DMZ Operation Update  
 6 200800Z Subj: Concept of Operations Western Kentucky AO  
 -7 231030Z **Subj:** Operation Order 27-68(Sparrow Hawk)  
 8 251715Z **Subj:** Update on Leatherneck Square Operations  
 9 260300Z Subj: Deployment of **1st** Marines to DaNang  
 10 260530Z Subj: AO Responsibility  
 11 26 Aug Subj: 3rd Marine Division Letters Subj: **Infantry** Company Operations  
 in Northern Quang **Tri** Province, W/15 **Encls**  
 12 30 Aug Subj: 3rd Marine Division Letter, Subj: **Infantry** Company Operations  
 in Northern Quang **Tri** Province  
 13 7 Aug Subj: Terrain Study of Scotland **II** AO  
 14 181200Z Subj: Proud Hunter SITREP #1  
 15 181400Z Subj: Proud Hunter SITREP #1 Addendum  
 16 190055Z Subj: Proud Hunter SITREP #2  
 17 191253 Subj: SITREP #7, Operation Proud Hunter

3D

DIVISION ORDERS/PLANS FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1968

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TASK FORCE**  
**OFFICE**

**HOTEL**

**LANCASTER JULY**

**ACTION**

**17 JULY 4 AUGUST**

**CRITIQUE**

CRITIQUE  
LANCASTER II "JULY ACTION"

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS  
BY

CG, TASK FORCE HOTEL

Today with your help we will **analyze** the Lancaster II "July Action" to determine what we did right and what we did wrong, what we did well and what we did poorly. **Predictably**, we will reflect both **extremes**.

Planning for the "July Action" **commenced** on 13 June when we received General DAVE warning order. Command **interest in** the area north and northwest of Camp Carroll was stimulated by persistent reports of **enemy** activity there, the most persuasive items being the reports of **reconnaissance teams**, which almost **invariably** made contacts. Further, we **knew** that the **enemy** had long enjoyed uncontested control over most of the **area**.

Early guidance told us that the necessary forces and resources to carry out the mission would be available during **July**. Thus, for want of a better **name**, we dubbed it the "July **Action**."

Forces available included two **Marine infantry** regiments - the 3d and 9th Marines, the customary artillery units from the 12th Marines, and the 2d ARVN Regiment.

We presented our Task Force concept here on 5 July and gained General DAVIS' approval.

We initially planned a 16 July D-Day, **following** on the heels of a series of arolights. But on 15 July we learned that our arolight targets were deficient in intelligence **justification** and had been **disproved**. **Later** our hopes were revived when PCV suggested we "**slip**" D-Day 24 hours in order to receive **10 arolights**. We postponed our **D-Day** to 17 July but received no **arolights** in our area of operations. Through heavy application of tactical air and artillery, we sought to make up for the missing **arolights**.

Our "July Action" scheme of maneuver was **one** of quick area **saturation**, placing forces at a variety of locations - including three battalions near the **DMZ** - with plans to upset the **enemy** quickly and decisively.

The 9th Marines' **zone** included a wide swath of piedmont from the **DMZ** to Route 9. The 3d Marines' **zone** embraced the **rugged** National Forest **Reserve** area including Dong Ha Mountains and Matters Ridge. The 2d ARVN Regiments **zone** lay west and northwest of the Rook Pile through a **maze** of valleys and sheer ridgelines.

The 9th Marines developed most of the **enemy** contact and accounted for most of the 311 NVA killed during the Lancaster July Action.

The 3d **Marines** opened a series of **LZs** in the nearly impenetrable jungle near the **DMZ**, along Mutter's Ridge and on the slopes of **Dong Ha** Mountain. **The** regiment also found the two phantom **75mm** pack **how-**itzers that had plagued Camp Carroll for nearly a year.

The **ARVN** Regiment proved that it could operate with equal competence in the mountains as it has in coastal areas. The unit functioned efficiently as a part of the Task Force Hotel team, covering their assigned area **carefully**. Here again we opened valuable **LZs** for **pro-**bable future use.

At the conclusion of the first phase of the "July Action" we turned our attention to one main corridor that remained to be searched: The upper Cam Lo River Valley. **Our** intelligence caused us to expect to find much enemy activity there. In a move notable for its speed and audacity, the 3d Marines established Fire Support Base Joan (6 **105mm** howitzers and 3 **155mm** howitzers), Fire Support Base Margo (6 **105mm** howitzers) and LZ Becky.

**All** three locations were operational in short order.

But the **enemy** chose to avoid contact and we therefore cannot point at statistics to prove the value of the effort. Nevertheless, in penetrating this corridor, we demonstrated our ability to do so, and we opened up a half **dozen new** sites for future LZs and FSBs. We regard this as an important fringe benefit of such **actions**.

The Lancaster July Action convinced us that, although we **knew** a lot about how to prepare **LZs** in difficult **terrain**, we still had much to learn. We ~~are also~~ <sup>are also</sup> improving our **techniques** and methods for selecting and developing **LZs** and **FSBs** in rugged **terrain**. We will say more about this during the course of our **critique**.

**Today's** speakers will include the Task Force Hotel **G-3, G-2, G-4**, Air Officer, Fire Support Coordinator, and **CEO**. Regimental **Commanders** of the 3d Marines, 9th Marines and 12th Marines will also make some **ob-**servations. I will be followed by Major DONOVAN, Task Force **G-3**.

## ASICRUJLI ACTION

On 11 June, CG Task Force Hotel received a concept of operations from CG 3d MarDiv to conduct a multi-regiment operation in the Lang Vei area. The forces available were: 30% Marines, 9th Marines, and two battalions of 2d ARVN Regt. The discussion that follows elaborates on planning, coordination, execution, and lessons learned.

Based on guidance received, two courses of action were developed. Each, a helo/ground attack was considered and zones of action depicted. The courses of action were passed on to the USMC Regiments for consideration. The 2d ARVN Regiment was occupied with another operation but was fully briefed and given an opportunity to develop its own theme later.

Additional guidance was received from CG 3d MarDiv and the north to south axis of advance was adopted as the primary course of action.

The scheme of maneuver was developed with regiments in helo/ground attack from the DMZ southward. One battalion sealed off the eastern boundary of the objective area by a series of blocking positions. Certain supportability factors needed detailed planning: Helicopter, logistics and artillery.

(1) Efficient use of all available helicopters was a major concern. Time tables were developed to provide for smooth assault and helo approach and retirement lanes were planned to expedite daily resupply traffic.

(2) Timely and sufficient resupply would result only by budgeting helicopters and planning tight control at the ISA.

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(3) Prime concern was the positioning of the artillery batteries so maximum fire support was available without impeding traffic.

Another important facet of our planning was frequent conferences. Several were conducted to gain mutual understanding by all participants. MAG-39 and other 1st Marine Air Wing representatives were active members on the majority of the conferences, and also visited almost daily to keep in close touch with the plans as they developed. Pilots and ground crew members made numerous visual reconnaissances of objective areas so each would be familiar with the terrain. Lt Colonel [redacted] and Lt Colonel [redacted] made 32 visits. 32 Marines made 28. The most difficult task was to prepare helicopter LZs in thick canopy. The 2d ARVN Regiment changed from a heliborne assault plan to ground attack because they could not find LZs. The 3d Marines also modified their plan because of difficulty in finding LZs.

(1) For helo assaults into air [redacted] [redacted] detail [redacted] was held by the Regiment, BN staff, VMO-6 and a squadron flight leader. These numbers made an over flight of proposed zones so all parties were agreed. Then there was a debrief after the VR. An important member, the Division AO, was not at first included but after one lesson was learned he was included in these coordination conferences.

(2) Attempts were made to incorporate 2d ARVN representatives to the various staff sections for coordination. Only one ARVN officer was available and he observed in the [redacted] (DASC) (SCJ)

427

9

YOK

Marines were odd numbered.

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## C. BATTALION

The Lancaster July Action commenced on 17 July 1968, D Day had been 16 July-extended 1 day for airlifts which never were received. Six Battalions attacked the northern position of Lancaster II AO on D-Day.

1. 3/9 was helilifted into LZ Sparrow YD 060660.
2. 2/9 was helilifted into LZ Wren YD 050650.
3. 1/9 walked into a blocking position vicinity YD 095650.
4. 1st and 3rd Battalions 2d ARVN moved by foot into vicinity YD 032537 and YD 052577.
5. 2/3 was helilifted into LZ Falcon YD 037641.

At 070745H, 3/9 completed their helilift into LZ Sparrow. K/3/9 at 1105H in the vicinity of YD 045656, made contact with an estimated NVA company. Initially they received heavy S/A fire and 45 rounds of 60mm mortar. They returned fire with organic weapons, artillery and called in air strikes. Other elements of 3/9 moved up and were engaged at 1115H; heavy contact continued until 1500H, then subsided. Results of the contact were 35 NVA/KIA, friendly losses were 7 KIA and 28 WIA (EVAC).

(1) B/1/9, vicinity of YD 090655, at 1410H, received 10 rounds of 82mm mortars resulting in 1 WIA (EVAC), the company commander. Then at 1722H, vicinity YD 090645, B/1/9 received 7 rounds of 82mm mortars resulting in 3 KIA and 6 WIA (EVAC).

(2) A/1/9, at 1420H, vicinity of YD 087650, received 4 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 3 WIA (EVAC) and 1 MIAMP.

Recon team (Alexander) acting as pathfinders for the 2d Bn 3rd Marines was dropped in LZ Falcon. At 1142H, at YD 035640 they made contact with an estimated 15-20 NVA and received S/A fire, grenades and mortars. Recon returned to LZ and had 4 WIA (EVAC). Air strikes by A-4's and F-4's from

MA 11 and 12 killed an additional 11 NVA. 2/3 continue with their  
 to land at LZ Falcon and were all in the LZ at 1500H. The  
 out to the west and at 1900H, E/2/3, vicinity YD 022639 received 20  
 of 60mm mortars resulting in 2 KIA. A hour for 2/3 had been delayed  
 to make extra preps.

The 2nd ARVN Regiment made no contact for the day.

D+1, 18 Jul Contacts were light for Third Marines and 1st  
 reported no contacts. At 1010H, 1/3 helilifted into LZ Gull since LZ Gull  
 since LZ Gull is not considered ready. An NVA FO was spotted  
 of G/2/3 at 1530H, vicinity of YD 024648, the NVA was killed  
 team with the comp. At 1735H, M/3/9 in the vicinity of YD 0456  
 60 lbs of TNT, five DH-10 mine and 13 NVA/KIA.

During the afternoon of 18 July, vicinity of XI 900550, 1st  
 2d ARVN, four many foxholes, enough for 1 NVA company and many  
 cigarette butts. The area appeared to have been occupied in the  
 days. 3rd Marine moved K/3/3 (rein) into LZ Cardinal at 1800H to get  
 foothold on further operations west.

No contact was reported for this day as the  
 continued search of their ZOA. 3/3 (-) was helilifted into LZ  
 0930H. At 191000H, F/2/9, at YD 054679, found 11 graves with  
 each. The bodies were badly decomposed. At 1230H, D/1/3, in Ue,  
 of YD 015616, found 1 NVA skeleton. Then at 1913H, L/3/9, in the vicinity  
 of YD 038649, found 8 graves with 2 NVA bodies in them. The bodies were  
 badly decomposed.

having a false bottom. Parts for a 75mm recoil howitzer:  
 mechanism, 2 batteries and 1 set of Russian  
 (8X30) w h as were found

At 191630H, K/3/9, at YD 14265 found another NVA body. By dark on D+2, distribution of forces was as shown on this acetate.

July At 201000H, vicinity of YD 027602, I/3/3 found two disassembled 75mm pack howitzers and 26 rounds. D/1/3 at 1200H, vicinity of YD 016613, found 1 SKS rifle and the remains of one NVA. H/2/3, vicinity of 005645, spotted 11 NVA in the open and fired an artillery mission resulting in 6 NVA/KIA. The lack of enough AO's was now very evident.

At 201130H, G/2/9 in the vicinity of YD 053687 engaged an estimated NVA company in bunkers. The lead platoon of G/2/9 made contact and was pinned down by an enemy force that maneuvered to the west and brought fire to bear on the platoon. Friendly and enemy forces were in such close proximity, supporting arms could not be used initially. The platoon pulled back and conducted artillery mission on A/S. Results at this time were 1 KIA, 2 MIA and 13 WIA (EVAC). At 1600H, a squad from O/2/9, moved up and recovered the two MIA's who were found to be KIA. A total of 32 NVA were KIA, 3 NVA/KIA by ground forces and total friendly losses were 3 KIA and 12 WIA (EVAC). At 0800H, I/3/9, vicinity of D 042655, found 3 NVA bodies who had been killed by S/A and shrapnel 3 to 4 days before. At 1530H, A/1/9 at YD 070653, received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar resulting in 1 KIA and 1 WIA (EVAC), both Kit Carson Scouts.

July Elements of 2/9 at 13:00, vicinity of YD 052685, received 6 rounds of 82mm mortar resulting in 1 KIA and 9 WIA (EVAC). At 1440H, F/2/9 spotted 35 NVA at YD 055689 moving west. They engaged them with S/A, 81mm, artillery fire and A/S. Results were 3 NVA/KIA and 10 killed by artillery fire. This contact prompted the Regimental Commander to ask for a mission to enter the DMZ area to pursue the NVA. This request

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was forwarded by CG TF Hotel and CG 3d MarDiv. Higher authority was advised of Division Commander's intention to enter DMZ, south of Ben Hai and for less than 48 hours, if the situation so dictated. The occasion to enter the DMZ did not persist. At 0735H, K/3/9, at YD 038659, found 2 NVA bodies 4-5 days old. Other elements from 2/9, at 1050H in the vicinity of YDD 060675, found 4 NVA killed by S/A, 3 AK-47's, 2 gas masks, 15 chico grenades and assorted 782 gear and documents. L/3/9 at YD 038648 found 10 120mm mortar rounds and at Y 033649, they found 52 122mm rocket rounds. I/9 in the vicinity of YD 063668 found 20 rounds of 107mm rockets. G/2/9 at YD 054686, found one NVA/KIA by S/A.

D+5, 2 July. At 221110H, F/2/9, vicinity of YD 059688, while searching the area of contact of 21 July found 5 NVA/KIA, ten weapons, 52 packs, 41 gas masks, 30 canteens, an assorted 782 gear. By dark on D+5, disposition of friendly forces as shown on this acetate.

D+6, 21 July. During the day, 2/9 helilifted into LZ Carol, YD 056619. I/3/9 helilifted into LZ Red YD 081606, both landings were unopposed. At 1730H, I/9 vicinity of 051642, captured one wounded NVA. There was no contact in the 3rd Marines AO.

2, 24 July. There was no contact reported. At 1150H, I/3/9, at YD 089612 found 19 grave approximately 24 hours old with one NVA in each. Then at 1215H, K11 found 1 NVA helmet, 1 basket of rice, 3 RPG rounds, 260 rounds 82mm, 25 rounds of 60mm and 3 DH-10 mines. E/2/9, at YD 052625, found 96 graves approximately 2.4 months old, containing one body each. The graves were marked with aluminum signs. At 1500H, K/3/9, at YD 079623, had 5 Marines WIA (EVAC) and 1 WIANE from a surprise explosive device.

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**L/3/9** had a Marine detonate a surprise explosive device at XD 080597 resulting in 2 WIA (EVAC). 1/9 helilifted to VC to relieve 1/4 of security of VCB and Ca Lu so that 1/4 could prepare for Canton II. Six 105 howitzers were helilifted into FSB Joan.

**1 2 July.** There were no significant events in the objective area 2/3 helilifted to Thon Son Lam. And 2d ARVN Regt ended their part of Lancaster Jul Action by helilifting into assigned objectives in the Canton II Action which 4th Marines already had underway.

**26** There were no significant developments as the units continue to search their AO's. By dark on D+9, disposition of friendly forces was as shown on this acetate.

**D+10, 27 July** No contact was reported, the action was highlighted by helilifts of 1/3 and two companies of 3/3 into LZ's Becky, XD 858614 and LZ Margo XD 901609 in the northwestern portion of the Cam Lo River Valley. Six flights of F/W prepped LZ Becky and 4 flights of F/W prepped LZ Margo. Both landings were unopposed. The 9th Marines continued to find many abandoned fortified areas.

**D+11, 28 July.** At 0711H, two Marines from 3/3 were WIA (EVAC) when they detonated a surprise explosive device vicinity of XD 900610. Then at 1400, a patrol from L/3/3, in the vicinity of XD 900615, detonated one U.S. type M-14 mine resulting in 3 WIA (EVAC). 2/9 displaced to Quang Tri for the S. E. Program. At 1845H, C/1/12 was lifted into FSB Marco

**D+12, 29 July.** Two Marines from A/1/3 at 0300H, in the vicinity XD 854614 were WIA when they exchanged fire with one NVA outside the perimeter. L/3/3 had one Marine detonate a U.S. type AP mine resulting in 1 WIA (EVAC). 3/9 displaced to VCB and participated in the S.U.R.E F

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**D+13. 31 July.** There were no significant events as the 3rd Marines continued to search their Zone of Action.

**D+14, 31 July 1/9** completed search operations and was helilifted to VCB. Ninth Marines were phased out of the Lancaster July Action on this date to prepare for the Ba Long operation.

**D+17, 1 August, D+18. August.** There were no significant events on either of these dates.

**D+19, 3 August.** Lancaster July Action came to close when opoon of 3rd Marines was passed to CG 3d MarDiv.

The cumulative casualties and equipment/supplies captured or destroyed are as shown on this chart.

KIA	26	KIA	311
WIA (EVAC)	136	POW	1
WIANE	22	DET	1

Captured items included: 18 individual weapons, 7 crew served weapons, 1084 bunkers destroyed, 1377 arty/rocket/mortar rounds captured/destroyed, 5138 small arms rounds, captured/destroyed, 6,350 pounds of rice captured, 30 lines or booby traps, 199 grenades, 2,260 pounds of explosive. Of special interest were two 75mm pack bombs which had plagued Camp Carroll for some time. The 2d ARVN Regiment had no casualties or contact in the Lancaster July Action.

**PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED LESSON LEARNED**

1. Our most essential lesson learned came early in this operation. Initially the Division AO's, who act as FAC (A), were not included in HLZ briefings and planning. This caused confusion in prepping a selected HLZ as AO's were not sure of exact locations. It is most difficult to relate

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grid coordinates to terrain that is seared by craters, heavily vegetated and spider webbed by small streams not shown on the map. A wrong area was proposed and consequently 2/3 had to land in a 9th Marines HLZ requiring boundary changes. Solution: In planning a helicopter assault, the following CO's or representatives must be present: Bn Cdr, helicopter Squadron Cdr, Division A0, gunship flight leader and Regimental CO. After briefing the scheme of maneuver, all parties make a VR picking the exact ground and then relate it to the map. In this way, each representative can point out problems that must be solved. The infantry commander states whether it is his tactical desires. The helicopter flight commander can be sure he has proper landing and departure clearances. The Division A0 can recommend the amount of A/S required and finally the gunships are aware of how to lead transport helicopters to the HLZ.

2. Do not plan on elements of two different regiments landing in HLZ's in close proximity to each other or near Regimental boundaries. The fire support problem will persist as flight patterns or artillery missions mask the other units during the critical phase of helo assault. If HLZ are hard to find, first locate suitable HLZ's, then make the boundaries.

3. When operating near the DMZ, a code word should be designated if a Bn/Regt commander anticipates the need to enter the DMZ. In this way, requests can be passed by uncovered means to gain approval.

4. Marines can and have blasted HLZ and artillery positions out of canopied forests considered unsuitable. Tremendous air ordnance was required to start the zone and a big field engineer task was needed to clear the trees and make it usable. A close coordination with the 1st MAW greatly

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helped in **fast development** of **these zones**. **These techniques** have already been **applied** to Canton II **and** **B<sub>1</sub> Long**. This **concludes G-3 comments**.

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## UNITS EMPLOYED

## 3D MARINES (REIN)

1ST BN 3D MARINES

2ND BN 3D MARINES

3D BN 3D MARINES

3D BN 12TH MARINES (REIN)

## 9TH MARINES

1ST BN 9TH MARINES

2ND BN 9TH MARINES

3D BN 9TH MARINES

2ND BN 12TH MARINES

PLT APO'S FROM 2ND ARVN

## 2ND ARVN REGIMENT

1ST BN 2ND ARVN

3D BN 2ND ARVN

D/S ARTILLERY BATTERY

## G/S ARTILLERY

4TH BN 12TH MARINES

BRAVO PLATOON 1ST 8" HOW. BTRY.

1ST 155 PROVISIONAL GUN BTRY (-) (2

155 GUNS; 2 8" HOWITZERS)

BRAVO BATTERY, 2ND BATTALION, 94TH FIELD ARTY.

## DIVISION APO'S

VMO-6

MAG 39 - 36

MAG 11, 12, AND 13

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## II. INTELLIGENCE

. The area of operation encompassed terrain utilized by the enemy for over a year with minimum friendly interference. He was therefore able to construct and maintain elaborate base areas to support transient infiltration groups and operational combat units. The most recent occupants of the area were major elements of the 320th NVA Division 164th Artillery Regiment, and the 27th Independent Regiment.

ly in the planning for this action, it was concluded that timely coordination of the collection effort and positive dissemination of was indispensable to its success. Therefore, additional emphasis was placed on those facets by endeavoring to establish daily contact liaison between the Task Force Hotel G-2 Sta and the units participating in the action. In addition, a daily special intelligence summary covering only the area of the action was disseminated, summary which accentuated that day's collected information in that area. These two means of dissemination proved to be the keys to the successes enjoyed by the intelligence effort.

B. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

1. In support of the Lancaster II July Action, the following intelligence sources were utilized:

- a. Aerial photography
- b. Infra-red (Airborne)

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- c. Aerial observation.
- d. Sensor devices.
- e. Prisoners of war.
- f. Captured documents and equipment
- g. Ground reconnaissance.

2. Aerial photography.

a. Vertical photographic coverage was provided each regiment for pre-D-day planning. In addition, forward-firing oblique photography of pre-selected landing zones was provided prior to D-day.

b. During the action, ten additional photographic missions were flown in the AO with immediate supplementary readouts provided to the Task Force regiments. These readouts were valuable in their identification of the locations of enemy facilities and fortifications.

c. On three of four occasions, photography of that area immediately forward of occupied phase lines was attempted. Each of these three missions had to be aborted, however, because ground troops were in contact and it was inadvisable to effect check fires. The fourth attempt succeeded by prohibiting the firing of VT-fused shells.

3. Infra-red (Airborne). Infra-red (Airborne) was employed to assess enemy strengths and dispositions and therefore to provide targeting information. During the course of the action, ten infra-red reports were received, interpreted, and exploited.

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4. Aerial observation. Aerial reconnaissance was conducted from UH1E, OH1E and T44F aircraft. The aircraft provided extensive reconnaissance both of the AO and of the enemy artillery belt north of the DMZ. Air assets were employed for HUZ selection, surveillance, and target acquisition. Briefs and debriefs of crews of fixed-wing aircraft were completed over the DASC communications nets, a system which proved to be adequate under the circumstances. Rotary wing aircraft were briefed and debriefed daily at VCB. These contact briefs were supplemented by passing developing intelligence information and requests over the DASC nets to the aircraft while they were on station.

5. Sensor devices. Use was made of previously-emplaced sensors in the upper Cam Lo River Valley for target acquisition and for estimating the enemy's use of this terrain corridor. Three additional sensor strings of three sensors each were employed by reconnaissance teams in the northeast corner of the AO. These devices were monitored on the 15th of July and the information provided was exploited by artillery fire. Because the devices became hypersensitive, however, further readouts were not made.

6. Prisoners of war.

a. Interrogation support was provided by attaching one interrogation-translation subteam to each operating regiment. One additional subteam was located at VCB.

b. Only one prisoner was captured during the action, and therefore the true potential of the Task Force PW exploi-

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tation capability was not realized.

7. Captured documents and equipment. The action resulted in the capture of significant amounts of enemy equipment and munitions. Included in the captures were two 75mm pack howitzers and 255 surface-to-surface rockets. Documents captured were of minimal number but those captured substantiated the use of the AO by the 27th Independent Regiment and the 320th NVA Division.

8. Ground Reconnaissance. 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company and 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion were called upon to execute 39 patrols in support of the action. These patrols did not restrict themselves to the classic surveillance mission historically associated with reconnaissance units, but also assumed missions involving pathfinding, stay-behind, recon screen, and the covert emplacement of sensor devices.

During the planning phase it was estimated that a sizeable force occupied the northeast corner of the AO, and that this area was serving as a principle enemy north-south access route. In order to confirm this estimate and provide a pre-D-day and post-D-day monitoring capability of the three trails, three sensor insertion missions were scheduled.

pl. of 1st of July  
 (vic YD0065 and YD065). A 3rd team walked to their sensor placement site (vic YD0665) from C-2 on 12 July. The center team of the three sighted the enemy during sensor emplacement and drew heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire (including

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.50 cal. machine gun fire on extraction). The other two teams observed positive indications of enemy use of their respective areas. Notwithstanding the possibility of enemy interdiction, all sensor devices were emplaced and the team extracted without sustaining any friendly casualties.

b. At 170930 July, reconnaissance team "Alexander" was inserted into LZ Falcon (vic YD 035640) to act as pathfinder for a helicopter landing by 2/3. Contact was made with an estimated 15 - 20 NVA. As a result of the discovery of the enemy's presence, the landing was delayed so that additional preparation fires could be placed on the enemy positions. The assault landing was carried out without friendly casualties, although a number of helicopters did receive ground fire.

c. In order to provide surveillance and a fire direction capability to the rear of friendly forces as they moved south, two reconnaissance teams were inserted (vic YD057665 and YD041662) on 21 July. Recon teams remained in this area until 25 July. During that time, they made four sightings of enemy troops moving south, and conducted fire missions to break up enemy formations.

d. Two recon teams were inserted on 18 July to act as a screening force for engineers during the construction of LZL Cardinal (vic XD939611). One team was emplaced to the north, the other to the south of the zone. During the evening of 18 July, recon team "Bulldozer" (the southernmost team) detected enemy soldiers moving toward them. The team directed

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supporting **arms** on **these formations**, and no **further interference** resulted that evening. A **search** of **the** area the morning of the 19th revealed **blood trails** and bits of black **pyjamas**. During this **incident** and **thereafter**, work continued uninterrupted on LZ **Cardinal**.

C. DISSEMINATION, In order to ensure the timely **exploitation** of **intelligent information**, the following means were employed in addition to those previously **discussed**:

1. Daily **INTSUM's** were sent electrically and by special **courier\***.
2. Spot reports were transmitted by land line and by radio.
3. Daily **formal** briefings were presented to the **Commanding General**, Task Force **Hotel** and **his staff**.
4. **As requested**, **special briefings** were presented to **other interested parties**.

. LESSONS LEARNED

1. Photographic needs should be expressed **as** early as possible in **the** **planning stage** to ensure delivery on a timely **basis**.
2. Prisoners of war and documents are of inestimable value and the **lack** of them during an operation deprives **all units** of needed **information**. A concerted effort must be made by **all units** to obtain these **sources**.
3. **Timely dissemination** of **information** is at least as important **as** any other phase of the **intelligence cycle**. The **transmission duplication** of this information is desirable to

a using unit.

..tkV

### III LOGISTICS

#### A HELICOPTER RESUPPLY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

The goal of the logistics system during the Lancaster II (July) action, was to provide the required supplies to the units at the time and place requested.

#### STATISTICS FOR LANCASTER II JULY

Total lift 1,721  
 CH46 1,361  
 CH53 350  
 Most lifts per day 146 on 22 July  
 Average CH46 lifts per day 75.5  
 Average CH53 lifts per day 19.4  
 Total weight 5,362,18 lbs  
 Average weight per day 297,899 lbs  
 Most weight one day, 65,000 lbs on 24 July

This in no way taxed the LSA which has the capability to handle in excess of 500,000 lbs daily.

During this action, 16 different units both Infantry and Artillery, were resupplied by helicopter from the LSA at Vandegrift Combat Base. The helicopter resupply effort was time oriented to provide supplies when requested by the unit. The coordination necessary to accomplish this type resupply is complicated but must be done to allow ground commanders to complete tactical moves as planned,

During the first three days of the operation a lack of coordination, late establishment of priorities and slow reaction to potential problem areas caused reduced helicopter resupply support, particularly the return of nets this was caused by an incomplete schedule, helicopters arriving late for the resupply mission and communication difficulties. By D+3 these

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~~problems were~~ essentially solved.

As the operation progressed techniques were developed which resulted in the establishment of a **Logistics** Operation center at the **LSA** which materially improved Logistic Support to units in the **field**. An SOP to **standardize** procedures at the **LOC** was prepared and a draft copy is **attached**. The **SOP** provides for the greatest degree of **flexibility** in logistic support by **coordinating** unit representatives in the **LOC**, supply **status** at **LSU**, the Shore Party **operating** the **LSA** and **aircraft** support available to the **logistic** mission.

It is recommended that in future **operations** an **LOC** be established at the **LSA** and that it function in accordance **with** the proposed SOP.

#### **B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/LESSONS LEARNED.**

Problems such as police of **LZs**, **inadequate** preparation of **LZs** and radio **net** discipline are of a continuing nature and require constant command attention. **These** areas created **some** concern but were kept within manageable **proportions**.

On several **occasions** communication between **helicopters** and helicopter support **teams** was difficult to establish.

It is recommended **that** battalion **representatives** at the **LSA** contact units to notify **HSTs** that **aircraft** are enroute and to be prepared to **contact** the **aircraft**. Additionally the **LOC** prepares a daily pilot **information** sheet which **con-**tains LZ coordinates, name, frequency and call **signs** for the days resupply **operations**. This typed paper is handed to each pilot on his first **mission** of the day at the **LSA**. The tower radio operator is then able to inform pilots of their **destin-**ation by **coordinates**, call sign and frequency simply by sayi

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the line number of the unit to which the lift is going. As an example if a load of MCI is programmed for a certain battalion, He might say to the pilot "one load of Class I for line 6". The pilot looks at his paper and easily identifies his destination.

Although the Task Force Hotel Communication Officer will address this subject in greater detail the importance of designating a regimental LZ common net cannot be over emphasized. Each regiment must have its own LZ common net and the LSA must have a separate net to control aircraft in the LSA.

As previously stated our goal is to provide the required supplies to the unit in the field at the time and place requested. It is realized that units cannot forecast all of their needs but the large number of late afternoon add-on requests caused considerable difficulties as the sun went down. The LOC will maintain the flexibility to respond to these requirements but the greater the lead time for resupply the smoother the system will work. However, there was no deadline imposed on units for add-on requests. Requests were accepted as late as 1800 for delivery that day. As a result there were no emergency resupply requests during Lancaster II July which testifies to the flexibility of the LOC concept.

It is recommended that units estimate and plan logistic resupply requirements to minimize late add on requests

It is interesting to note that toward the end of the operation most units were receiving hot chow, cold milk and cold

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drink daily. Some of these desirable items were delivered even though we had the added logistics load of the 4th Marines on Canton II overlapping with Lancaster II.

A shortage of water cans initially caused minor resupply problems. Division G-4 made 10,000 plastic water containers available at Vandegrift Combat Base. These containers materially improved the ability to resupply units with water in a timely manner.

It is recommended that units requisition sufficient water cans to maintain their authorized allowance. That plastic water containers of the 2½ gallon and 6 gallon type be available as a substitute item.

We must be prepared to utilize resupply means other than helicopters. In one instance two companies of first battalion Ninth Marines were resupplied by APC towing Army ammo trailers. These trailers are of sturdier construction than ours with a lower and heavier suspension system giving them more stability for rough terrain. They can be towed by any heavy prime mover in our inventory including tank 6X6 trucks or dozers. Future planning must consider all methods of resupply.

Three separate and distinct types of resupply were encountered during this action. The first type required resupply to battalions moving from night defensive positions to objectives which were reached in the late afternoon. This operation required early morning resupply and retrieval of nets to enable the battalion to move on schedule. When the objective was secured and an LZ prepared the late afternoon resupply was commenced. During the period these operations were conducted, helicopter requirements were greatest in the early morning and late afternoon; reduced during midday. Figure 1 illustrates helicopter requirements to support a battalion on the move for a normal days operation. Note that the battalions have scheduled resupply for 0700 - 0900 and 1500 - 1600. It should also be noted that this operation was conducted during extremely hot weather.

The second situation provided resupply to units that developed a base of operations containing an LZ. During these operations helicopter resupply leveled out, resulting in a continuous resupply schedule throughout the day. Presently these units established OP's in terrain that required small unit resupply, resulting in as many as seven different LZ locations.

The third situation was the initial supply of a fire support base, 18-23 CH53 lifts were required. Daily resupply to the artillery positions averaged seven CH53 lifts.

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Based on statistics accumulated during the July action the following planning factors have been developed which apply when aircraft operate in less than a 10 mile turn around distance.

1. A battalion on the move requires an average of 10 CH46 lifts per day. These lifts must be scheduled early in the morning and late in the afternoon so as not to adversely effect the tactical situation. It requires two CH46 aircraft per battalion to accomplish this resupply.

2. Units that utilize a fixed LZ for a period of time require an average of 8 CH46 lifts per day delivered at any time. Two CH46's can deliver this cargo in approximate one hour

3. Fire support bases require 18-23 CH53 lifts the first day and an average of seven CH53 lifts per day thereafter. Each aircraft has the capability of delivering four lifts per hour.

## ENGINEER.

## A. CONSTRUCTION OF FIRE SUPPORT BASE

During the period of 17 July to 3 August 1968, two fire support bases were built. FSB Joan and FSB Margot

FSB Joan was built in a small valley where vegetation consisted mainly of tall grass and bush. The Engineer effort was provided by Bravo Co, 3d Engineer Bn. A D-5

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**Dozer** was sent by Task Force **Hotel** to do the necessary **excavation**. Because of the light vegetation, the **engineering** effort went **smoothly** and the base was constructed easily in two **days**. For a fire direction center Task Force **Hotel** supplied an **8X8** foot prefabricated **bunker**.

**RSB Margo** was built in **rolling** hill terrain with **gun positions** at the base and **sides** of a hill. The vegetation consisted mainly of bamboo and grass on the site with trees **around** the **position**. The engineer effort was provided by **Bravo Co, 3d Engineer Bn.** All gun positions and **ammo** pits were dug by hand using **demolitions (C-4)** to loosen the **earth**. The only trees cut were those masking the fire **of** the **guns**. The position was **completed** in 24 **hours** using **38** engineers, hand tools and **demolitions**. There were no major engineer problems encountered during the **construction**.

Throughout the **A0** many landing **zones** were cut by **infantry** battalions. Task Force **Hotel** sent a team of **engineers** to the **1st** and **3d** Battalions of the **2nd ARVN** Regiment to construct landing **zones** for a troop **lift**. At **these zones** some **difficulty** was **encountered** with the **size** of the trees and the density of the **forest**. All work was done with **demolitions** and hand **tools**. Each zone was completed in **24 hours**.

#### **B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED**

The major problem encountered at the **ARVN landing zones** was the **size** and hardness of the trees which had to be blown. **More demolitions** than estimated had to be employed for **effectiveness**. Difficulty in **securing** the **charges** to the trees was

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


met because of the **solidness** and shape of the TNT blocks and the lack of **binding** material. This was **remedied** by taking strips of green bamboo and using them to secure **charges**. **4**, strip charges would have been more **effective because of their** cohesive sides and the rapidity with which they can be employed.

### C. LESSONS **LEARNED**

When clearing trees in a **dense forest area** engineers should **carry** enough string, rope or other suitable **binding** material to **aid** in setting **demolitions**, especially when using **TNT**. When estimating **demolitions** for the **larger trees common** to the Lancaster AO, special **consideration** should be given to the type and hardness of the wood to be **blown**.

25

Figure 1



LANCASTER I JULY ACTION  
III AIR

A. GEN A

1. The main characteristic of this operation from the standpoint of air was the requirement for close coordination and planning between air and ground. This requirement was met in that numerous meetings, briefings, and joint planning conferences were held with appropriate representatives

1. Fixed Wing air support was adequate and responsive altho the single management concept has reduced its flexibility. "Add on" air must come from the hot pad and this of course limits the choice of ordnance.

2. A brief summary of fixed wing operations is as follows: A total of 781 close air support sorties were flown in support of Lancaster July Action covering 10 assault landings, and expending 1109 tons of ordnance. TPO operations both day and night totaled 167 sorties expending 395 tons of ordnance. The following BDA is reported:

KBA	67
Secondary explosions	21
Fires	12
bunkers	104
Caves	1
Rocket sites	62
Structures	11
AA positions	1
Fighting holes	12
Mortar positions	
Road cuts	1
Trench line	475 meters

3. The greatest single limiting factor in Lancaster July Action from an air standpoint was the shortage of observation aircraft. The reason for this shortage was aircraft availability. This problem can only be rectified by the acquisition of adequate spare parts and replacement aircraft.

4. Task Force Hotel had requested a substantial series of arolight missions prior to D-day. These requests however, were denied. Fortunately through experience gained during a previous operation Robin North and South, the Scheme of Maneuver in Lancaster July was not tied to the arolight. Consequently, by substituting organic supporting ground and hot pad air, adverse effects from not receiving planned arolight were minimized.

5. One noteworthy problem with regard to fixed wing air is the requirement to submit requests by 1200 on the day prior. This places an unrealistic handicap on the ground commander, particularly during a highly

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mobile operation that requires instant reaction. In many case plans are not even finalized until very late in the day.

### C. HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

1. By and large the helicopter side of the picture worked very well. As previously mentioned by the G.4, helicopters conducted over 1700 lifts transporting more than 4.8 million pounds of supplies and equipment. The daily average of cargo transported during Lancaster July was 268,000 lbs. It is significant to note that simultaneously with supporting Lancaster July involving of course the 3rd, 9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment, Task Force Hotel also supported the 4th Marines, Canton II, and two fire support bases.

2. The most important factor in the success of this operation was the technique of asset management used by Task Force Hotel. All assets were controlled and dispatched at the Task Force level.

1. Lessons were learned throughout the operation. The most significant was the need for a CH-46 and UH1E gun medevac package, assigned to and controlled by the Task Force in support of the operation. During the first days of Lancaster July a request was received for the evacuation of an emergency case and several priorities. Unfortunately because of battle damage there were no available aircraft for this mission under the Task Force's control. The request was forwarded to Dong Ha in accordance with standing procedures. The regular medevac package had just been dispatched on another medevac and the result was a substantial delay of over 3 hours and 40 minutes. Steps were taken immediately to acquire and position a medevac package at VCB. This procedure commenced the following day.

2. The concept of a roving gun package was another lesson learned. This provides for two airborne M1 Gun ships in the Task Force Hotel area to be used as required. It eliminates the need to "chain" a section of guns to a specific mission which might not require their services all of the time. This gun package is always in communication with the DASC and may be dispatched by the DASC upon the authority of CG Task Force Hotel or his designated representative.

3. The establishment of a ZIPPO Team is a major step toward addressing the problem of landing zone preparation. We saw the need for it in Lancaster July. It has since been developed, and proved to be very valuable in the initial phases of Scotland II Bravo. The ZIPPO (zone Improvement/Preparation Projects) consist of one helicopter assault flight leader, one UH1E pilot qualified as a TAC(A), one O-1 pilot and one A.O., the senior member being assigned as ZIPPO. The purpose of the team is to proceed as an integral package to brief with the supported unit. The ZIPPO is qualified to represent air with regard to the selection.

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evaluation, preparation and/or improvement of potential landing zones and fire support basis. It is identified as a team and will be assigned to a unit or area as appropriate throughout the completion of the assigned task to include the heliborne assault if such is the case. This concept provides for continuity throughout the duration of the mission.

#### E. COMMENTS

1. Maximum utilization is an essential factor in asset management. This requires that aircraft "deadhead" time be kept to a minimum. This can be achieved by coordination through the logistical channels wherein return loads (empty water cans etc.) are programmed to coincide with incoming resupply.
  2. The problem of reduced production as a result of aircraft availability and/or weather is ever present. While this problem cannot be accurately predicted it can however be anticipated and plans made accordingly. A seemingly vigorous and adequate resupply program can suddenly grind to a sickening halt as a result of poor weather or lack of aircraft. To lessen the impact, all units should assign strict priorities to each load with the idea that possibly three or four loads may be the sum total received. The Task Force G-4 has initiated a "wave" or "round robin" supply cycle to allow each unit to get at least one load prior to starting the second wave. This is flexible to respond realistically to the overall needs of the deployed unit.
1. It is desirable for aircraft to be able to check in with one control agency and receive complete instructions and clearances. This however, is not always possible due to unexpected communication failures and delays. The DASC is an air control agency that comes under the direction of the Commanding General, 1st MAW. As such, it is governed in its operations by certain regulations. This agency did however, deviate from its normal procedures with regard to low and slow flying aircraft during Lancaster July. This deviation permitted the handing off of helicopters and O-1's to the Regimental FSCC's for clearance control with regard to savaplanes.
  2. There were still instances wherein flights failed to RIO with the FSCC. This results in complete inability on the part of the DASC to maintain an account of aircraft under their control. It is recommended that without exception all flights RIO with the controlling DASC. In cases where direct communications is not possible due to terrain etc, reports should be relayed. Additionally the DASC must be informed whenever the posture of the flight changes.

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## V ARTILLERY/FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

A. Artillery Support. Fires provided by Direct Support and General Support Artillery were considered to be highly satisfactory. Artillery units were able to support the scheme of maneuver adequately from the positions utilized. No major problems were experienced.

B. Counterbattery and Countermortar Requirements. Ground units reported incoming artillery on only one occasion. Counterbattery fires were delivered on the suspected hostile artillery position under observation of an aerial observer.

Active enemy mortar positions were successfully engaged by organic mortars and direct support artillery.

The employment of extensive artillery suppression fires (Pre-emptive) during the operation may have contributed significantly to the enemy's failure to employ his artillery to a greater degree. It is again, the case of our not being able to evaluate our efforts through this type of artillery suppression. The fact that the enemy did not shoot more indicates that the plan may have been successful.

C. Fire Support Coordination

1. General. The employment of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft in great numbers, combined with the requirement for extensive artillery fires raised anticipations that the fire support coordination during the Lancaster July Action would be a continuing problem.

In an effort to minimize the coordination problems, several conferences were held with the participating ground units, aerial observers, and helicopter transport units.

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Through these detailed discussions, methods were decided upon which were considered to best alleviate the coordination problems. It is felt that these conferences were extremely beneficial.

2. Air/Artillery. Lancaster July Action showed a marked increase in the successful simultaneous attack of targets by air and artillery. Additionally, with exceptions, check fires were considered to be minimal throughout the operation. Contributing factors were considered to be the detailed coordination effected at regiment and battalion level and the effective control of attack aircraft by the ground units through airborne controllers.

The coordination of artillery and rotary wing aircraft showed a marked improvement over previous operations of this magnitude. The standard doctrine of helicopter approach and retirement lanes and restrictive fire plans was utilized. As agreed upon by the the commanders of the infantry units, artillery units, and helicopter transport units, a plan was developed.

This provided for a continuous and smooth flow of helicopters with relative safety while the artillery units maintained the required support to the maneuver elements.

Additionally, the approach and retirement lanes gave a vital assist to DASC and regimental ELO's in the control of resupply and medevac aircraft.

An overall factor which contributed to air/artillery coordination was the co-location of the Task Force FSCC and DASC. The co-location significantly reduced time delays and enabled the FSCC and DASC to better understand each other's procedures and inherent problems.

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One incident that received previous discussion was related to the close proximity of 3d and 9th Marine units and dubious unit locations in difficult terrain during the initial stages of the operation. This was solved through re-orientation of attack aircraft flight patterns and increased distance between the concerned units.

3. Coordination with the 2D ARVN Regiment. Coordination of artillery fire and air support with the 2d ARVN Regiment produced no problems that warrant discussion.

D. Communications. FSCC communications proved to be unsatisfactory too frequently. This occurred in spite of continued efforts by Task Force Communication personnel.

When total FSCC communication failures occur it is necessary that the regiments be prepared to assume lateral coordination and clearance responsibilities. Additionally, the regiments must have cognizance or control of all aircraft operating in the regiment's zone of action to allow the total coordinating process to continue.

Prior to commencement of the Lancaster July Action, measures were taken to provide the regiments with lateral coordination and clearance authority and control of aircraft operating within the regiments' zone of action.

This system proved to be highly efficient and permitted uninterrupted air and artillery support to the maneuvering units during communications breakdowns at the Task Force level.

#### 4. Lessons Learned

1. In large scale operations, approach and retirement lanes and restrictive fire plans positively reduce coordination problems.

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2. Coordination of artillery and air is enhanced through the co-location of the FACC and DASC.

3. Regiments must have cognizance or control of all aircraft operating in support of the regiment to allow a flexible coordination system.

## V. COMMUNICATIONS

## A.

In an effort to apply those **communications** lessons learned ~~from~~ previous **operations**, the following three radio **nets** were **established**, in addition to **normal tactical** radio **nets**.

(1) A Landing Zone **Common** net was assigned to each of the regiments

(2) A Helicopter Assault **Frequency** was assigned to each of the **regiments**.

(3) A **Logistical Support** area **common frequency** was assigned to the **LSA** so that **all** helicopters know what **frequency** to contact the **LSA** on. The purpose of three (3) nets is to spread out all **traff** to **helicopters** and keep nets **uncluttered**.

Communications from Vandegrift **Combat Base** is a challenge due to the terrain that surrounds the base. As a **step** to **correcting** the problem of broadcasting out of the valley, a **twenty-five** (25) **pair cable** has been **installed** from the top of Signal Hill, to the main **command bunker** of the Task **Force**. On this cable is **carried** both VHF and **UHF** radio traffic plus radio relay. Both air and ground **portions** of the Task **Force** are **currently** **employing** this **cable** facility.

## B. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

1. **P** ~~ro~~ **blem**. It became apparent just prior to the **commencement** of the **Lancaster** July Action that the air nets were not as **efficient** as could be.

**Solution**. A Task Force **Tactical** Air Request net was **initiated** by the Task Force FSCC. Stations on this **net** were the Task **Force** FSCC, the 3rd Marines FSCC, and the 9th **Marines** FSCC.

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This **net** was **used** in lieu of the Task Force monitoring the TACP net of **each** of the **regiments**.

2. **Problem.** Due to an **unusually high percentage** of down time on **radio** relay, the Task Force Tactical **net** became **overcrowded** with **various** types of traffic which needed to **passed**.

**Solution.** To **overcome** this **overcrowding**, additional equipment was **obtained** by the Task Force, so that in **future operations**, if for any reason radio relay goes down, or becomes **overcrowded**, all **necessary traffic** can be passed on a **circuit** that parallels the Task Fore **tactical net**. To **accomplish** this the Task Force will activate **both** its **primary** and **alternate frequencies** on the Task Force **tactical net**.

DECLASSIFIED

**FINAL COMMENTS**  
**CG, TASK FORCE HOTEL**

I would like to comment briefly on three **topics**: **fire support coordination, logistics** and preparation of LZs and Fire Support Bases.

With respect to **fire support coordination**, we created a **noteworthy** problem by **using** an LZ close to the boundary between the Marine **regiments**. While I have some dandy alibis **that explain** how we got ourselves into this difficult **situation**, I will resist the temptation to make excuses and **observe** that, **having created** an **awkward** fire support coordination situation, we **unscrambled** our mess rapidly. With this **one** sour note, the remainder of our fire support coordination **was** sweet **harmony**. We **maintained** this **harmony** while moving 4.8 million pounds of supplies in 1711 helicopter **sorties**, while **executing** **10 battalion-size helicopter** assaults while delivering 10,000 tons of bombs **and rockets** in 781 close air support **sorties**, and while firing **48,809** rounds of artillery. And all this **activity** occurred in an area of about five by eleven nautical miles.

Next, **logistics**: Describing the "July Action" supply **operations** tells an important but incomplete story of the logistics effort at Vandegrift Combat Base. For while supplies **flowed** by helicopter to the 3d Marines, 9th Marines, and 2d ARVN Regiment, **they** also continued to flow -- on a **slightly** reduced **scale** - to the **4th Marines** and to the two big **firebases** at Cato and Shepherd. I make this point to **emphasize** the capability at Vandegrift of **our Logistics** Operations Center to **manage** and our LSA to **handle** the **logistic** support of **10 or 12** deployed infantry battalions and **associated** artillery. The 34 Marine **Division** has a tremendous **asset** in Vandegrift Combat Base. We have **not** **seriously** strained its **capability** **over** when moving over half a million pounds per **day**.

Finally on preparation of **LZs** and Fire Support **Bases**: the "July Action" **taught** us that, with effort and energy properly focused on a selected **location**, we can prepare **LZs**, build **FSB's**, virtually anywhere. The tougher the **terrain**, the more vital the systematic application of resources. But we now reject the notion that there are areas too difficult to conquer.

When we **commenced** our "July Action" **planning**, our **experience** with **LZ's** in the target area ranged from unimpressive to **undetectable**. Today we claim intimate **knowledge** of a **substantial** number (**OVERLAY** of LZ's and FSB's). Without **fanfare**, we now **can** launch combat forces at many points throughout the **area**.

Our **action** also reminded the **enemy** that he has no safe havens **and**, in destroying **many** of his bunkers and  **caches**, we complicated his buildup in the **area**. Most **important**, perhaps, our pioneering greatly facilitated our return **whenever** we **choose**.

DRAFT COPY

HEADQUARTERS

Task Force Hotel

3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Vandegrift Combat Base

REF: Standing Operating Procedures for Task Force Hotel  
Logistic Operation Center

Task Force Hotel  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Combat Base

T/F/H C  
10/1/64

TASK FORCE HOTEL ORDER PH400.1

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedures for Task Force Hotel  
Logistic Operation Center

Encl: (1) Locator Sheet

1. **Purpose.** To establish procedures which will provide for the timely resupply of units from Vandegrift Combat Base.
2. **Background.** The Task Force Hotel Logistic Operation Center provides a coordination center where units being resupplied from Vandegrift Combat Base may maintain their logistic Resupply Sections. Facilities for units to install both radio and telephone communications are available. Task Force Hotel maintains a watch officer in the LOC who has communications available to co-ordinate the activities of unit S-4 representatives, Task Force Hotel Air Officer, Shore Party, LST, and Division G-4 representatives at Vandegrift Combat Base.

**Action.** Units under the operational control of Task Force Hotel will comply with the instruction contained here-in for re-supply from Vandegrift Combat Base.

**Recommendations.** Comments and recommendations for improvement of this Order are invited.

**Certification.** Reviewed and approved this date.

DISTRIBUTION:

M. C. DALBY

Chief of Staff

## RECORD OF CHANGES

Log completed change action as indicated.

<u>Change</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Date of</u> <u>Change</u>	<u>Date</u> <u>Received</u>	<u>Date</u> <u>Entered</u>	<u>Signature of person</u> <u>Entering change</u>
--------------------------------	---------------------------------	--------------------------------	-------------------------------	--

LOGA      STOR'

Subj: Standin\_ Operating Procedures for Task Force Hotel Log-  
istic Operation *center*.

Location:

(Indicate the - (s) of the copy(ies) of this  
publication)

Enclosure (1)

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## APPENDIX A

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## SECTION I

101. ~~GENERAL~~. Units under the operational control of Task Force Hotel must be prepared to utilize helicopter resupply while engaged in field operations. The Task Force Hotel Logistic Operations Center functions as a co-ordination point for unit logistic representatives, aircraft allocation, supply status and logistic support area capabilities. In order to implement effective helicopter supply, it is essential that each unit have a complete knowledge of the procedures outlined in this SOP.

## 102. RESPONSIBILITY.

1. It is the responsibility of the unit commander to ensure that requests for routine helicopter resupply are forwarded to the Task Force Hotel G-4 in the LOC by 1600 the day prior to the resupply requirements.

2. The Task Force Hotel G-4 represents the Commanding General in all matters relating to Helicopter resupply. This includes coordination and liaison with the Air Officer, BSU, the Shore Party Company operating the LSA, and unit logistic representatives. The G-4 will advise the Air Officer of lift requirements and recommend the number and types of aircraft to be employed in the following days resupply operations.

## Shy PION II

201. OPERATIONS CENTER. The Logistic Operations Center (LOC) is located at the Logistic Support area at Vandegrift Combat Base. Task Force G-4 will maintain a watch officer at the LOC to coordinate copter resupply of units under the operational control of Task Force Hotel.

4. COMMUNICATIONS. Task Force Hotel will maintain a radio net linking the LOC with Vandegrift DASC and the Air Operations Center. An additional radio net with LSA tower, transmitted to the LOC via speaker will enable battalion representatives to advise battalions that aircraft are enroute to their respective LZ's. Trunk lines will be available to LSA and Hotel switchboards (units must provide instruments for lines within the LOC). A "no line" will be available between the LOG and LSA tower for coordinating instructions.

203. REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION S-4 REPRESENTATIVES. Each regimental and battalion being supplied from Vandegrift LSA must maintain an S-4 representative in the LOC to co-ordinate resupply between the LSA and battalions in the field. Adequate communication between representatives and battalions in the field is mandatory. Each representative must monitor his net in order to ascertain and disseminate the following information:

- (1) LZ condition (Clear, ready to receive aircraft).
- (2) SF on net and correct frequency.
- (3) Correct coordinates, call sign and frequency of LZ HST. Notify battalion that supplies are enroute to LZ.

**4. PRIORITIES.**

Priority Resupply will be established and governed by the following:

a. **Emergency Resupply:** Requires immediate delivery without which the mission can not be accomplished and loss of life would probably result. The request must be approved by the regimental commander, in the case of separate battalions by the battalion commander, or by the regimental commander exercising operational control.

b. **Priority resupply:** The LOC watch officer will schedule priority resupply as soon as possible consistent with other resupply schedules.

c. **Routine resupply:** Resupply requests for the next day will be scheduled and dispatched as requested consistent with aircraft availability, emergency and priority requests and weather conditions.

1. Requests will be submitted to the LOC watch officer no later than 1600 on the day prior to the date of the requested resupply, utilizing the format contained in appendix A, figure 1.

2. The frequencies, call signs and coordinates submitted must be correct to reduce delay in resupply delivery. Frequencies must not exceed 51.90 MHz. Frequencies for air ground communication must be in .1 MHz steps. For example the frequency 56.95 is not compatible with current aircraft radios.

3. Emergency or priority resupply requests may be submitted at any time utilizing the add-on request format contained in appendix A, figure 2.

3. When cargo has been staged, netted and slung, unit representatives will submit an illustrated listing of lifts in the format contained in appendix A figure 3.

4. Cancellations will be accepted at anytime. Cargo that has been staged prior to cancellation should be promptly removed from the LSA.

#### 204. STAGING CARGO.

1. Supplies being helicopter lifted from the LSA must be in areas designated by the (Shore Party) Officer in charge of operations at least four hours prior to scheduled supply. In the case of lifts scheduled prior to 200, supplies will be staged in nets and/or cabled before 2200 on the day prior to the scheduled lift. Water cans, containers and supplies returned to the LSA from battalion positions will be removed from the LSA ramp as expeditiously as possible to eliminate the possibility of injury to personnel or damage to air-

2. Units requesting helicopter lifts from positions other than a designated LSA will be responsible for the timely staging, netting and slinging of cargo from such positions.

3. All nets, slings, and cables will be promptly returned to the LSA to insure continuity of operations.

4. 6. lifts will not exceed 2,400lbs. CH53 lifts will exceed 8,000lbs

207. **LSA/SHORE PARTY.**

1. The Shore Party company commander is responsible for the operation of the **LSA**.

2. The **LSA** is divided into pad A and B. Each pad has eight staging lanes which will be assigned to units resupplying from the LSA. The layout of Vandegrift LSA is illustrated in appendix A figure 4.

3. Unit representatives will avoid contacting shore party personnel in the **LSA tower**. Requests concerning lifts will be submitted to the LOC watch officer.

4. The shore party Landing Zone OIC at the **LSA** is responsible for inspection of loads in nets and slings and will advise battalion representatives of **discrepancies**.

208. **MONITORING.**

1. The LOC will **monitor**, by radio, operations at the **LSA** and will forward information to the LSA tower concerning emergency, **priority, add-ons** or changes in daily scheduled **lifts**.

2. The G-4 will provide, daily, to the **LSA** a consolidated **schedule** of **resuppl.** lifts in the **format** contained in appendix A figure 5.

3. The LOC will maintain a status board displaying the following information:

- a. Aircraft availability
- b. Cargo staged
- c. Cargo netted and/or slung
- d. Lifts **completed/lifts remaining**

This information will be obtained from the shore party low tower radio net monitored in the LOC.

4. The LOC will provide daily to pilots flagged for the resupply mission a sheet showing LZ coordinates, call sign, frequency. This facilitates passing destination information to aircraft without compromise. A sample format is illustrated in appendix A figure 6.

209. INCOMPLETE MISSIONS. Any mission that cannot be completed due to non-availability of aircraft or below minimum flight conditions will be rescheduled by the LOC.

## SECTION III

## 301. GENERAL

1. In planning for helicopter resupply missions, unit commanders should take into consideration the possibility that once the resupply mission commences, the mission may be stopped and the aircraft diverted should a higher precedence emergency arise. In addition, full consideration should be given to the below listed factors:

- a. Loss of lift capability during hot weather.
- b. Vulnerability of the helicopter to ground fire ~~and the immediate surrounding~~ landing zone and the immediate surrounding
- c. Possibility of having to wave off a helicopter from the landing zone to preclude its loss to enemy ground fire.

## SECTION IV

401. CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT. Unit S-4 sections in the field should determine the logistic requirements and request them to unit S-4 representatives at LSA Vandegrift Combat Base by 1500 daily. Unit representatives at Vandegrift Combat Base may draw Class I, III, IV and V supplies at Vandegrift Combat Base. Class II must be drawn at Long Ha and transported to Vandegrift Combat Base by vehicle or mule. 3d Marine Division G-4 Forward at Vandegrift Combat Base, will assist unit S-4 representatives with motor trucks, pack animals, etc. to move supplies from LSA to the USA.

Shore Party personnel at the LSA will designate staging areas and provide news, signals and cables for cargo lifting. Helicopter resupply requests and staging reports are outlined in Section II of this SOP and should be submitted to the Air Force Hotel G-4 watch officer at the LSA.



Figure 2: Format of Add On/Cancellation request

ADD ON REQUEST

DATE

UNIT      CALL SIGN      COORDINATES      FREQUENCY

TIME REQUESTED      TIME READY      TIME LIFTED

ROUTINE      PRIORITY      EMERGENCY

REASON FOR REQUEST


DATE

UNIT

CALL SIGN

FREQ

LT

TIME REQUESTED

TIME READY

TIME INFO

TIME COMPLETED

(LOCATION)


(PRIORITY)

(LOCATION)

(PRIORITY)

ADD ON REQUEST

POWER



A 9

FIGURE 4

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OUTGOING</u>	<u>RETURN</u>	<u>CHARGE</u>
0700				
0800				
0900				
1000				
1100				
1200				
1300				
1400				
1500				
1600				
1700				

53 LIFTS

Figure 5: Format of daily scheduled lifts

Ac-5

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

<u>LINE #</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT CALL SIGN</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
---------------	-------------	-----------------------	------------------	--------------------	-----------------

Figure 6: Format of pilots daily LR call sign/frequency information sheet.

DRAFTER 323001, MUDN 10/11  
 SEC ABC LIGHT PH 3D MARDIV 323  
 CWO

CCN

PRIORITY 071252 Z AUGUST 68

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV DGH  
 TO: CG PROV CORPS V PHE  
 INFO: CG III MAF DNG  
 CTU 70.8.9  
 CTG 70.8

//C O N F I D E N T I A L //

SUBJ: ASSIGNMENT OF HEAVY CRUISER NGFS TO DMZ AREA

1. DURING THE PAST WEEK A SHARP INCREASE HAS OCCURRED IN FREQUENCY AND INTENSITY OF ATTACKS BY ARTILLERY FIRE AGAINST THE CUA VIET PORT FACILITIES AND DUEL BLADE POSITIONS IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ. THESE ATTACKS TOGETHER WITH STRONG INDICATIONS OF A MAJOR OFFENSIVE TO BE LAUNCHED FROM THE DMZ AREA, MAKE IT IMPERATIVE THAT A RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE COUNTERBATTERY CAPABILITY BE MAINTAINED IN THE DMZ AREA. ADDITIONALLY, THE FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM TO "OPN THOR" OF DETECTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE NVA ARTILLERY CAPABILITY HAS BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL TO DATE RESULTING IN SEVERAL ARTILLERY WEAPONS DESTROYED AND/OR DAMAGED. HEAVY CALIBER ARTILLERY AND NGF GUNS, HAVE PLAYED A DOMINANT ROLE IN ACHIEVING THIS SUCCESS.
2. THE DEPARTURE OF THE USS BOSTON, FROM THIS AREA ON 4 AUG 68 WITHOUT REPLACEMENT BY A SIMILAR HEAVY CALIBER NAVAL GUN CAPABILITY HAS CREATED A GAP IN THE COUNTERBATTERY POSTURE IN THE DMZ AREA. ALTHOUGH A 5"/54 DESTROYER WAS ASSIGNED AS A REPLACEMENT FOR THE CRUISER, IT DOES NOT POSSESS THE LONGER RANGE AND DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT OF THE HEAVY CALIBER NAVAL GUN.
3. ACCORDINGLY IT IS REQUESTED THAT A CA/CAG BE ASSIGNED AS A NGFS IN SUPPORT OF 3D MARDIV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-4

REFRASED BY

07

17


52

**SECRET**

CHAPTER 17/810  
SEC G-3 PHONE DIV 163

H 151550 ZAUG68

PRO: CG THIRD MARDIV 3D MARINE DIVISION  
TO: CG 4TH MAF 1ST MAF IN  
NINTH MARINES  
TWELFTH MARINES  
THIRD TANK BN



**SHOVE**  
CHIEF  
G-7 W.O.  
G-2 W.O.  
ECPO

~~SECRET~~  
ARNING ORDER  
RING GUIDANCE

SIGNS OF RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE EASTERN DMZ REGION PARTICULARLY NORTH OF CON THIEN, TTAVE INCLUDED THE REPEATED SIGHTING OF LOW SLOW MOVING LIGHTS DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS WHICH COULD WELL MANATE FROM ENEMY HELICOPTERS O VTOL AIRCRAFT THE ENEMY MIGHT WELL BE USING AIRCRAFT TO RESUPPLY FORWARD POSITIONS WITH HIGH PRIORITY CARGO SUCH AS AMMUNITION MEDICAL SUPPLIES OR CONDUCTING MED EVACS AFTER OUR TECH OF VITAL INTEREST TO THIS DIVISION IT THE GATHERING OF ON THE SPOT INTELLIGENCE IN THE AREAS IN WHICH QUENT SIGHTING OF LIGHTS INDICATE POSSIBLE ENEMY LZ'S. NO LESS IMPORTANT IS TH DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY ORCES ARTILLERY AND SUPPLIES WHICH MIGHT BE FOUND IN THE AREA.

CONCEPT: TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SHOOK ACTION FROM AT LEAST 6 ARC LIGHT STRIKES WITHIN THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE AREA, CENTERED ON YD 1174. A HELICOPTER FORCE OF BATTALION STREN. WITH LANDS IMMEDIATELY IN THE VICINITY, TO SEARCH OUT PROBABLE ENEMY LA DT-3 SITES AND EVIDENCE OF HELICOPTERS; TO DETERMINE WHAT PER EL SUPPLIES OR EQUIPMENT ARE OCATED NEARBY; TO EXPLOIT PLANNED ARC LIGHT STRIKES; TO TAKE PRISONERS IF POSSIBLE. ANT TO DESTROY ENEMY AND EQUIPMENT

**SECRET**

151550 Aug 68



**SECRET**

1. ACTION.

~~Aug-86-27-8~~

CON 1 MARINES

~~TALION TO CO 3TH~~

157  
 A 1ST MARINES: PREPARE PLANS TO EXECUTE HELIBORNE ASSAULT INTO OBJECTIVE AREA TO DETERMINE NATURE ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AREA, ENEMY INTENTIONS, TAKE PRISONERS AND TO DESTROY ENEMY (CES/AND) EQUIPMENT.

12TH MARINES: DISPLACE TRADITIONAL D/S BATTERIES TO SUPPORT 9TH MARINES OPERATIONS IN DMZ. DISPLACE OR MAINTAIN IN FORWARD POSITIONS AVAILABLE 8" HOWITZERS TO PROVIDE NECESSARY PRECISION D STRUCTION/COUNTERBATTERY FIRES IN SUPPORT OF 9TH MARINES. PRIORITY OF 8" FIRES TO MANEUVERING LINES 9TH MARINES.

31 WA BN: PROVIDE M48 GUN TANKS SUPPORT TO 9TH MARINES ON REQUEST FROM VANTAGE POSITIONS WHICH CAN BE REACHED THROUGH TRAFFICABLE TERRAIN.

3 RELIEFING/PLANNING STAPP AVAILABLE TO ASSIST 9TH MARINES IF DESIRED.

10

REL BY

-0%N

PAGE CF, 3 PAGES

**SECRET**

SECRET



3D MARINE DIVISION



SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF  
G-3 W.O.  
G-2 W.O.  
DCPO  
APO  
ACTION

*Handwritten signatures and initials*  
Kentucky

*FOR 140806/PCV/243*

VV HVP 243  
ZZ RUMHVP  
RUMLBPA 016 2300737  
ZNY SSSSS  
Z 0 170735Z AUG 68  
FM CG XXIV CORPS PNB  
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DNG  
RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGN  
INFO RUMLBPR/CTF CLEARWATER CVT

SECRET AVII-GCO 05136  
SUBJ: RAID

REF: CG 3D MAR DIV MSG DTG 161750Z AUG 68 (NOTAL) (S)  
PART I FOR ALL.

1. (S) CONFIRMING CONVERSATION BETWEEN CG III MAF AND CG XXIV CORPS AT 171440H AUG 68, PLAN OUTLINED IN PARA 4, REF MSG, IS APPROVED.

PART II FOR CG III MAF

2. (S) REQUEST OPCON OF BLT 2/2GBE PASSED IMMEDIATELY TO CG 3D MAR DIV TO RELIEVE 2/1 MARINES IN NAPOLEON/SALINE AO.

3. (C) REQUEST DIRLAUTH BETWEEN CTG 76.4/79.4 AND CG 3D MAR DIV.  
PART III FOR CG 3D MAR DIV.

4. (S) CONFIRMING FONECON BETWEEN COL GORDON, XXIV CORPS, AND LTC OWENS, 3D MAR DIV, AT 171450H AUG 68, PROCEED WITH PLAN OUTLINED

**FLASH**

170735Z AUG A-C 2/COC

PAGE TWO RUMLBPA 016S E C R E T  
IN PARA 4, REF MSG

170735Z Aug 68

SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL**

30 MARINE DIVISION  
 FM 30 MAR 68  
 080000  
 1815Z AUGUST 68

30 MARINE DIVISION

FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
 TO USMC/XXIV CORPS CCC  
 PASS TO CG XXIV CORPS  
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

DMZ OPN UPDATE

AT 0855H B/1/ W/ USMC AND USA TANK UNITS

MOVED INTO PSN AT HILL 56 YD 141732

IN ORDER TO SUP THE OPN OF

2/1 IN A HELO ASSAULT INTO THE

DMZ TO CONFIRM A DENY THE PESSURE OF

EN HELO ACT Y THERE AT . ARCLIGHTS

WERE DELIVERED IN SUP OF OPN

W/ BEING DELIVERED ON 18 AUG

AN 5 ON 19 AUG. THE LAST ACRLIGHT WAS

DELIVERED 90322H AND 2/1 LIFTED INTO THE

INSERTION LZ'S AT 0904. WITH THE TOTAL

LIFT BEING COMPLETD AT 0917. A TOTAL

OF 20 CH-46 AIRCRAFT WERE USED TO CONDUCT

THE TOOP LIFT. INITIAL LIFTS RECD AWW

FIRE SOUTH OF DMZ AT 0910H

2/1 CONSOLIDATED INPSN AT INITIAL

LZ AND PREPARED TO JUMP OF TO SEIZE

THREE SITS OF OBJ. TWO HVQ WERE

SPTD W/PACKS BUT NO WPNS. TEY

WEE TAKEN UNDER FIRE AND KILLED AS THE

SAME TIME 10 PARTIALLY DESTID BUNKER

WERE LOC. SUBSEQ ONE CASE 140MM RKTS WERE DISCOV

THE OVERHEAD COVERED BY 2° OF DIRT.

FM 15H TO 1115H B/1/ AND THE MAIN

ELE IN THE 56 AREA WERE SUBJECTED

TO CONTINUOUS LIGHT CONTACT 360 DEGREES AROUND

THEIR LOC. CONCUNENTLY AT 1022H AN AO

SPTD ANESTM 40 NVA WEST OF THE

INSERTION LZ. AIR STRIKES WERE CONDUCTED

ON THESE TGS.

AT 1135H B/1/1STD TO RECD ARTY

AND MORT FIRE SUSTAINING 1 KIA DD 10

WIA FIVE OF WHOI WERE EVAC. AT 1140

2/1 COMMENCED MVT TO THEIR OBJ

AT 1730H AN F4 CONDUCTING CAS MSNS WAS HIT BY AA FIRE FM 172738 AND C

CRASHED AT 108729 PILOT AND CREW RECD SAFELY.

DURING THE PERIOD OMVT THRUUGHT

THE SERIOES OF OBJ 2/1 UNCOUNTED NO.

FM 12RS AND SECURED EACH

OF OBJ IN SUCESSION.

LOADS FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT -

HE GENERAL AREA.

Y TO THEWES AND

718157 Aug 68  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

## 3D MARINE DIVISION

CO'S AND A COMMAND GRP WERE HELO  
 LIFTED INTO L'S IN THE 0970 GRID SQ  
 IN AN ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF ANY EN ATTEMPT  
 TO LEAVE THE AREA OF SIGHTINGS. AT 1630 2/9  
 RECD 7 RND OF 75MM PAKC HOW  
 2/NEG CAS  
 AT 1740H 2/1 COMMENCED EXTRA ACTION  
 OPNS AND AT THIS TIME INITIAL FOR CH-46'S  
 INTO LZ RECD HITS FT CLAYMORE MINES  
 D 82MM MORT RND RIGGED AS MINES. ONE  
 CH46 WAS DESTROYED THE OTHER ATTACKS INITIALLY  
 DAMAGED MANAGED TO EXTRACT FM THE LZ.  
 THREWERE 3 CREWMEMBERS AND 1  
 MARINE INFANTRY MAN KILLED AS THE CRASH SITE,  
 AND 2 PILOTS WOUNDED. W/ NVA  
 KIA CNF DURING CONTACTS IN THE LZ AREA.  
 EXTRACTION OPNS CONT UNTIL  
 CAS G AND H WERE LIFTED OUT TO A-4.  
 AS THAT TIME EXTRA ACTION OPNS LIMITED  
 DUE TO FADING LIGHT. COS E AND F AND THE  
 CMG RRP 2/1 HAVE CONSOLIDATED  
 IN THE VIC OF LX 3 EXTRACTION D143753  
 FOR THE NIGHT TO MOVE OUT FM THE DPZ BY  
 FOOT MARCH AT FIRST LIGHT 20 AUG.  
 INITIAL DEBRIEF OF UNITS EXTRACTED  
 MED THAT EXTENSIVE FRONT DAMAGE WAS  
 OBS IN RELATION TO TERRAIN WITH NO OBSERVABLE  
 KBA DUE TO ARCLIGHTS AN ACTIONALLY REPORT INDIACATE  
 THAT THERE ARE MANY POTENTIAL LZ SITES THROUGHOUT  
 THE AREA BUT NO EVIDENCE OF CURRENT OR  
 PAST USE BY AIRCRAFT.  
 THE FOLL RECAPITULATION OF  
 CAS RELECTS LATEST SPO REPORT  
 INFO AND DEBRIEF OF PARTICIPATING  
 FM ALL UNIT COMMANDERS AND REFLECT ONLY.  
 THE DMZ OPN AND SUP FORCES.  
 NR 5 KIA, 13 MED, 11 WIA MINOR  
 NEMY  
 2 KIA.  
 ORDNANCE CAPTURED  
 105 140MM RKT  
 UPON COMPLETION OF EXTRACTION OPNS ON 20 AUG  
 AND COMP DEBRIEF OF UNIT COMMANDERS AND  
 BN COMMANDER AND COMPLETE FINAL UPDATE  
 WILL BE SUBMITTED.  
 GP-4

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECRET**

DRAFTER 3/JAD  
SE G-3 PHONE RW 180

344668 DIVISION

**NOV 68**

OR CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

CCPO

ACTION

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: FIRST BDE FIFT INF DIV (MECH)  
 INFO THIRD MARDIV

*f.* SECRET//

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WESTERN KENTUCKY AO

1. CONCEPT: 1ST BDE TH INF (MECH) CONDUCTS A HELICOPTER-BORNE AND MECHANIZED ATTACK INTO WESTERN KENTUCKY AO WITH ONE INPANTRY BN AND ONE MECHANIZED BN SUPPORTED BY TANKS TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, TO TAKE PRISONERS, AND TO GAIN INTELLIGENCE OF ENEMY DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH.


2. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

- A. SUBMIT DETAILED PLAN FOR CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN WESTERN KENTUCKY AO BY 2 SEP 1968.
- B. PLAN FOR RELIEF OF FORCES TO BE COMMITTED, BY MARINE UNITS
- C. OPERATION TO BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD 5 TO 10 SEPTEMBER, EXPECTED DURATION DAY.
- D. LANDING ZONES IN OBJ AREA:

- (1) LZ LARK 058677
- (2) LZ WREN 062663
- (3) LZ FLORIDA 0676E
- (4) LZ SPARROW 0506 8

- E. DIVISION OBJECTIVES: CHARLIE  
 FOXTROT  
 OSCAR  
 BRAVO

058666  
 0476  
 043646 (HILL 208)  
 G-0263-0264 (NVA BASE (CAMP))




  
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F. SUBMIT HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS FOR TROOPLIFT  
AND RESUPPLY FOR THREE DAY OPERATION AND HELICOPTER EX-  
TRACTION.

G. LIMIT VR TO MINIMUM REQUIRED FOR LZ SELECTION, TO  
AVOID TELEGRAPHING OPERATION.

H. MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS.

CCL

  
**SECRET**  
**m**

**SECRET**



3D MARINE DIVISION

3D/3EM/413  
3P PHONE 2413

2 AUG 68

- TO: 3D MARINE DIVISION
- FROM: 3D MARINE DIVISION
- INFO: 3D MARINE DIVISION
- 3D MARINE DIVISION

SECRET

OPERATIONS ORDER 27-68 (SPARROW LAWK)

BASE: VIETNAM, AMS SERIES 17014, SHEETS 6342 I, II, III, 5042 I, II, III AND IV 1:50,000

3D MARINE DIVISION

3D MARINE DIVISION (COI)

USMC OPERATIONS FORCES SUBSEQUENTLY ASSIGNED

DEFINITION

A. BRANCH FORCES. CORRELATE INTENSUMS AND PERIPHERALS.

B. SINGLELY FORCES.

(1) XXIV CORPS VIETNAM CONDUCTS COMBAT OPERATIONS

IN FOREIGN PORTION OF ICTZ IN CONJUNCTION WITH  
X CORPS AND OTHER FVMAF.

(2) 3D MARINE DIVISION PROVIDES TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, TACTICAL

AIRFIELD AND PSYOPS IN ICTZ.

(3) 1ST MAW PROVIDES AIR CONTROL, AIRFIELD OPERATIONS

PARACHUTE, HELICOPTER AND ROTARY WING SUPPORT.

23 10 30 2 Aug

A-3 (12 copies)

2/100/4-1

*B*

**SECRET**



**SECRET****3D MARINE DIVISION**

**C E OF OPERATIONS. THE SPARROW HAWK PROVIDES AN IMMEDIATE REACTION FORCE OF A REINFORCED PLATOON CAPABLE OF LANDING BY HELICOPTER TO EXPLOIT CONTACTS WITH ENEMY FORCES, TO INFORM UNITS IN CONTACT WITH OR THREATENED BY ENEMY FORCES OR TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR KEY INSTALLATIONS OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT.**

**NAPOLEON/SALINE, KENTUCKY, LANCASTER AND SCOTLAND AO**

**(1) MAINTAIN ONE REINFORCED RIFLE PLATOON ON 30 MINUTE ALERT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS AND ON 1 HOUR STANDBY DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS. PARA 3.0.(5) (SPARROW HAWK PROC (XII).)**

**(2) UPON COMMITMENT OF THE SPARROW HAWK FORCE, IMMEDIATELY REINSTITUTE THE SPARROW HAWK.**

**(3) MAINTAIN TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE MOVEMENT OF SPARROW HAWK TO THE HELICOPTER LANDING**

**C. MOVT. TRANSPORT BATTALION.**

**(1) PROVIDE THREE TRUCKS, 2 1/2 T, 6X6, WHEN REQUIRED, TO EACH INFANTRY REGIMENT AND DESIGNATED INFANTRY BATTALION, IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO MOVE THE SPARROW HAWK TO THE HELICOPTER**

**(2) ON ORDER, PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TRANSPORTATION TO MOVE**

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.



- (1) SPARROW HAWK IS DESIGNATED AS A DESIGNATED RIFLE PLATOON REINFORCED CAPABLE OF RESPONDING ON SHORT NOTICE TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DESIGNATED INSTALLATIONS OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT, OR REINFORCE UNITS IN CONFLICT OR THREATENED BY ENEMY FORCES. IT WILL BE COMPOSED OF THE FOLLOWING:
- (A) ONE FULL STRENGTH RIFLE PLATOON.
  - (B) ONE MACHINE GUN SQUAD.
  - (C) ONE ARTILLERY FO TEAM.
  - (D) ONE FAC TEAM.
  - (E) ONE ENGINEER TEAM, WITH DEMOLITION CAPABILITIES, WHEN AVAILABLE.
  - (F) THE FORCE WILL CONSIST OF AT LEAST 50 AND NOT MORE THAN 60 MEN.
- (2) THIS ORDER IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT AND CANCELED. 3D MAR DIV OPC 2-67.
- (3) THE SENIOR OFFICER PRESENT IN THE 3D MAR DIV COC WILL IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF A REQUEST FOR SPARROW HAWK TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION IN THE SEQUENCE SHOWN:
- (A) ORDER THE HELICOPTERS IN SUPPORT OF SPARROW HAWK TO BE LAUNCHED.
  - (B) NOTIFY THE A/C OF S, G-3 OR HIS ASSISTANT WHO WILL OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR COMMITMENT FROM

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

THE COMMANDING GENERAL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE,  
 THE DIRECTOR, 3d MARINE DIVISION, WILL COMMIT THE SPARROW HAWK UNIT  
 AS MADE BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, OR THE A/C OF  
 H, G-3, LZ BEAT ORDER.

- (C) ALERT BROOD UNIT OF SPARROW HAWK AND PROVIDE  
 THOSE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION AS  
 AVAILABLE FOR EXECUTING SPARROW HAWK  
 OPERATION.
- (D) PASS TO MAC-19 AND 1ST MAU THROUGH DA 104
- (1) BROOD UNIT DISBAND AND NUMBER OF  
 PERSONNEL TO BE HELICOPTER LIFTED.
  - (2) GRID COORDINATES AND LZ RADIO FREQUENCY  
 PICK UP.
  - (3) ESTIMATE OF TIME TROOPS WILL BE REACHED.
- (4) THE REMAINING ELEMENTS OF SPARROW HAWK WILL BE  
 COMMANDED BY AN OFFICER.
- (5) THE SPARROW HAWK UNIT COMMANDER WILL BE BRIEFED  
 BY THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. PRIOR TO  
 LAUNCH THE SPARROW HAWK COMMANDER WILL BRIEF  
 THE HELICOPTER FLIGHT LEADER AT A SITE DESIGNATED  
 BY THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. THE BRIEFING  
 WILL INCLUDE:
- (A) LANDING ZONE COORDINATES AND DESCRIPTION OF  
 LANDING ZONE IF AVAILABLE.
  - (B) ESTIMATE OF LANDING ZONE WEATHER AT SEA.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

- (C) ESTIMATE OF ~~REQUIREMENT~~ FOR
- (1) <sup>3D</sup> LANDING <sup>MISSION</sup> ZONE PREP.
  - (2) GUNSHIP ESCORT.
  - (3) PIXED WING SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.
    1. CAS (DAY/NIGHT).
    2. FLARE SHIP SUPPORT.
    3. SPOOKY/SUPER SPOOKY REQUIREMENT.
  - (D) RECOMMENDATIONS ON HELLO APPROACH AND RETIRE-  
MENT ROUTE.
- (6) IN THE EVENT THAT THE SPARROW HAWK BACK UP FORCE IS ALSO LAUNCHED, IT WILL CONSIST OF?
- (A) RIFLE PLATOONS.
  - (B) ~~SEE~~ MACHINE GUN SQUAD *AS REQUIRED*
  - (C) A CONTROL GROUP CONSISTING OF A COMPANY HEADQUARTERS ( ) .
  - (D) IF THIS FORCE DOES NOT UTILIZE ALL AVAILABLE HELICOPTER LIFT CAPABILITY, THE COMPANY COMMANDER MAY INCLUDE SUCH REINFORCING ELEMENTS, EQUIPMENT AND/OR SUPPLIES AS HE DEEMS APPROPRIATE UP TO THE FULL HELICOPTER LIFT CAPABILITY.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SEE REFERENCE (B).

**SECRET**

**SECRET****5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS**

3D MARINE DIVISION

**A. COMMUNICATIONS.**

- (1) REFERENCE (0).
  - (2) PRIOR TO LAUNCHING, THE SPARROW HAWK COMMANDER AND THE HELICOPTER FLIGHT LEADER WILL BE BRIEFED ON FREQUENCIES AND CALL SIGNS TO BE GUARDED ENROUTE TO AND AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA, AS WELL AS THE CALL SIGNS OF ALL UNITS IN THE AO.
  - (3) WHEN OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF A RECONNAISSANCE TEAM, THE SPARROW HAWK FORCE WILL UTILIZE THE RECONNAISSANCE UNIT PRIMARY NET.
- (1) THE SPARROW HAWK COMMANDER WILL BE DESIGNATED BY THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. THE SPARROW HAWK COMMANDER OR THE SUPPORTED UNIT COMMANDER, WHICHEVER IS SENIOR, WILL ASSUME OVERALL COMMAND IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA.
  - (2) WHEN EMPLOYMENT OF SPARROW HAWK IS APPROVED, THE FORCE WILL BE CONTROLLED AND SUPPORTED BY THE COMMANDER OF THE AO IN WHICH IT IS COMMITTED. THE AO COMMANDER IS AUTHORIZED TO TERMINATE THE EMPLOYMENT UPON COMPLETION OF THE MISSION OR AT HIS DISCRETION.

i,4



REL BY

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**



DE DIV AND NR 180

3D MARINE DIVISION

////////////////////FLASH HANDLE AS FAST AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE  
//

*Kentucky*

ZZ UUNSEA UUNSEM  
DE UUMHVP 2020 2331715  
ZNY CCCCC  
XXIV CORPS -T- III MAF COG  
\*\*\*\*\*ZZZZZ 251715Z AUG 68  
FM THIRD MARDIV COG  
TO UUNSEM/XXIV CORPS  
INFO UUNSEA/III MAF COG  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UPDATE ON LEATHERNECK SQUARE OPNS - 251620H - 252420H AUG 68.  
WITH THE LIFT OF 1/3 INTO AN LZ JUST SOUTH OF A-3 AT 1620H,  
THE MAJOR UNIT'S WERE IN PLACE FORMING A CORDON AROUND  
THE ENEMY UNIT CENTERED ON YD 195695. 1/3 MOVED SOUTH TO  
VIC YD 162710 TO YD 187105. 0/1/1 REMAINED ON THE N.E. CORNER OF  
CORDON VIC 195695. BACKED UP BY ONE RIFLE COMPANY OF THE 3D  
ARVN REGT.

ON THE EAST THE 3RD BN 9TH MARINES ALONG ALZ BLOCKS BRENCHED  
TO HWY 1 AND THE SAND DUNES BACKED UP ARVN POSITIONS AT  
TO THE SOUTH OF THE ENEMY ARE A/1/1, A/1/61 (MECH), A/1/77  
ARMOR AND D/1/1 WHICH WAS THE INITIAL EXPLOITATION FORCE  
ON THE EVENING OF THE 24TH. THE 1ST OF THE 5TH UNIT  
STRETCH ALONG THE SOUTH AND PARTIALLY UP THE WEST  
OF THE TRAP ALONG THE 16 GRID LINE WHERE B/1/1 WHICH  
MOVED RAPIDLY OVERLAND THIS MORNING FROM NIGHT POSITIONS  
THE WESTERN ANCHOR. ARTY FIRED ARE PLOTTED TO FILL AREAS NOT  
PHYSICALLY COVERED BY TROOPS.

UNTIL MIDNIGHT THE ENEMY HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT  
TO BREAK THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN BLOCKING FORCES WAS STALLED  
MORTS AND ARTY FIRING BY THE MARINES AND THE ARMY UNITS.  
NO ADDITIONAL CAS HAVE BEEN LISTED SINCE MY 251620H AUG 68  
GP-4  
BT

251715Z Aug 68  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECRET**

DRAFTED 3/P  
SEC 0-3 PHONE DIV 103  
CWO



IMMEDIATE *260300* 26 AUG 68

30 MARINE DIVISION

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
CG XXIV CORPS  
CG III MAF  
FIRST MARDIV  
THIRD MARDIV

**SHOVE CJC**

CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION *Kentucky*



REDEPLOYMENT OF FIRST MARINES TO DANANG

- A. CG III MAF 200016Z AUG 68
- B. CG THIRD MARDIV 231202Z AUG 68

1. REF A<sup>7</sup> PRESCRIBES<sup>7</sup> PHASING OF 1ST MARINES FROM PHU THIEP MARDIV AO TO DANANG. REF B IS THE THIRD MARDIV'S REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF REF A.

2. REF B SCHEDULED THE REDEPLOYMENT OF HQ 1ST MARINES ON 26 AUGUST AND THE MOVEMENT OF 1/1 TO BEGIN FROM QUANG TRI AIRFIELD 270800H. CHANGE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE NAPOLEON/SALINE AND KENTUCKY AO'S FROM 1ST MARINES TO 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) WAS SCHEDULED FOR 261200H.

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT ENEMY CONTACT BEGAN LATE AFTERNOON 24 AUGUST WHEN A RECON TEAM REQUESTED SPARROW HAWK INSERTION IN THE LEATHERNECK SQUARE AREA VIC YD 182682.

THIS INITIAL CONTACT INCREASED IN INTENSITY ON THE MORNING OF 25 AUGUST. BY PM 25 AUGUST FIRENDLY CASUALTIES WERE 10 KIA, 60 WIA, AND 3 HELICOPTERS DOWNED. AT THIS TIME THREE BATTALIONS 1/1, <sup>1/3</sup>, AND 3/9(-) ARE CLOSING A CORDON AROUND THE ENEMY FORCES, EST TO BE OF AT LEAST BN STRENGTH. FORCE IS

SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) AND AN ARVN UNIT. 1/1 IS TOTALLY COMMITTED AND THE FIRST MARINES ARE CONTROLLING THE OPERATION.

*260* **SECRET** *Aug 68*

**SECRET**



30 MARINE DIVISION

PREMATURE EXTRAGIO

OF 1/1 AND THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS WOULD JEOPARDIZE  
THE POTENTIAL SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION.

IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT THE DEPARTURE

OF 1/1 AND THE 1ST MARINES HQS BE DELAYED

OPTEL 271300HAUG  
GFC

CCR 1966

REL BY J. N. Sanford

G-3

STAND 4

**SECRET**

**SECRET**



3D MARI DIVISION

<b>SHOVE COC</b>	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCPO	
DRAFTER	<i>[Signature]</i>
SEC <u>G-3</u>	PHONE <u>DEV COC 180</u>
CWO	

~~MINUS ACTION~~

IMMEDIATE *26*

Z AUG 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: FIRST MARINES  
 FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV MECH  
 INFO: CC YTV CORPS  
 CG III MAF  
 THIRD MARDIV  
 (MINUS ACTION ADDRES)

*Wing Sal  
Karlentz*

//SECRET//

AO RESPONSIBILITY.)

- EFFECTIVE 261200 CG THIRD MARDIV RELIEVES FIRST MARINES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR NAPOLDON/SALINE AND KENTUCKY AO'S AND AT SAME DTG ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY TO FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH).

GP-4

CON

RELEASED BY

*G - 4/2/cc [Signature]*

*260 - Aug 68*

*79*

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

3P/JEN/rml  
 26 Aug 68

From: Commanding General  
 To: Third Marine Division

Subj: Infantry Company Operations in Northern Quang Tri  
 Province

Ref: (a) CG 3d MarDiv 220525Z May 68 (Continuity file)

1. Background.

a. The mobile posture of the 3d Marine Division has resulted in sustained pressure on enemy forces, has fragmented enemy units of significant size and may have influenced the enemy to avoid concentrating large units within reach of the Division's combat power. Therefore, enemy forces remaining within the Division AO present suitable targets for company size operations providing instructions disseminated by reference (a) are followed and these operations are executed with aggressiveness and imagination.

b. The size of the Division AO relative to the forces available preclude the density of coverage desired if all operations are battalion size or larger. Numerous coordinated infantry company operations will increase coverage to an acceptable level. Thereby denying the enemy sanctuary anywhere in the AO that can be reached by company patrols working under the protection of supporting arms. These patrols will also discourage him from developing extensive logistic bases and resupply caches close to his areas of operation.

Any tactic which denies the enemy sanctuary-physical or psychological for rest, resupply and security, will enhance the effectiveness of future operations by the Division.

## 2. Policy.

a. Regimental and battalion commanders will orient their thinking and staff planning toward infantry company operations to find and fix enemy forces within their AO's. Even though an operation is planned at the battalion level, it need not necessarily be executed by the battalion as a single unit. Companies should be given specific objectives within a portion of the battalion AO and encouraged and permitted to operate independently within established guidelines.

b. Night operations by company sized forces will be emphasized.

c. Company operations will be supported by all available supporting arms. Plans will include provisions for immediate reinforcement when a significant contact is made.

d. Ground surveillance will be supplemented by aerial, sensor, and other surveillance means to locate and evaluate targets for company operations.

## 3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. Infantry companies will conduct extensive patrols to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary within the Division AO, and to find and fix his forces for destruction by supporting arms and reinforcing elements.

b. Infantry Regiment will:

(1) Develop and implement plans which allow the battalions to utilize company patrol operations in their area of operations.

(2) Provide for rehabilitation of the battalions during the monsoon season.

(3) Designate reaction forces prepared to exploit, by fire and maneuver, contact developed by company operations.

c. Infantry Battalion: Develop and implement plans for company patrol operations in areas of operation. These plans should provide for;

(1) Operation of two or more companies within mutual supporting reinforcing distances of each other.

(2) Immediate reaction plans that reflect the current terrain and weather. Operation plans developed for response in the Leatherneck square area are not going to be meaningful during the monsoon in the Da Krong Valley.

(3) Assignment of operating areas oriented to terrain rather than to grid lines, and offering two or more prospective company patrol bases to allow for frequent shifts to new bases.

(4) The immediate commitment of reinforcing and supporting forces to fix and annihilate the enemy when found.

(5) The use of all available intelligence gathering agencies and equipment to select areas suitable for company operations.

(6) Regular rotation of companies from the field during the monsoon season.

(7) Alternate fire support plans not dependent upon CAS when weather restricts or prohibits fixed wing or helo support.

(8) Reinforcement of companies with 81mm Mort and 106mm RR when logistically and physically feasible.

d. Rifle Companies. Listed below are tactics that have proven successful for companies in the past. This list is not all inclusive. Since the majority of contacts in the Division AO involve NVA forces, these tactics are oriented toward those forces.

(1) Patrol Bases.

(a) Patrol bases should be selected to provide for:

1. Optimum support of patrols by weapons organic/attached to or in support of the company.
2. Minimum avenues of approach for enemy forces.
3. Minimum areas masked to friendly supporting fires.

(b) Patrol bases should be approached and occupied as unobtrusively as possible; if company travels by helo, initial in the LZ the Co should clear the LZ quickly, keep well dispersed, and move to the base by preplanned routes. If the company travels by foot, base should be occupied during reduced visibility whenever possible.

(c) Troops must dig in and defensive <sup>c.</sup> ~~for~~s must be registered immediately upon occupation of the patrol base. Leaders must be alert to prevent personnel from taking time out to eat or rest until the position is developed for protection of personnel.

(d) Adequate positions ~~can~~ be prepared quickly if each Marine carries 15-20 empty sandbags to the base camp.

(e) Indiscriminate booby trapping avenues of approach will not normally be effective, as this tactic tends to cause more casualties among ~~subsequent~~ friendly patrols than among the NVA. Taut-wire trip flares can, however, be highly effective.

(f) The NVA will seldom give advance warning of attack, and will usually attack at night. Indicators are registration of mortars during daylight hours and the approach of sappers ~~after~~ dark. Enemy operating near the patrol base should be taken under fire by indirect fire weapon, preferably by those not physically located with the company. ~~Direct~~ fire weapons should be employed only to repel assaults or to engage hard targets where time or the ~~enemy's~~ proximity will not allow use of indirect fire weapons.

(g) Companies should shift patrol bases frequently and preferably during periods of reduced visibility to avoid attacks by fire.

## (2) Patrols.

(a) Patrols must have the capability to call for and adjust supporting fires, both artillery and air.

(b) Scout dogs and/or Kit Carson Scouts should be utilized whenever available.

(c) Patrols should be assigned limited objectives, and should remain within supporting/reinforcing distances of the patrol base. A detailed search of a small area travelling cross-country is usually both safer and more productive than a cursory search of a large area. Use of trails and natural avenues of approach should be avoided whenever possible.

(d) The emplacement of taut-wire trip flares by patrols along avenues of approach remote from or not observable by personnel manning night positions at the patrol base will enhance the security of the base by impeding or giving early warning of enemy approach. These flares can also serve to trigger "remote" ambushes; e.g. a command detonated claymore mine covering the trip flare, or a trip flare emplaced at a pre-registered 106mm rifle impact point.

## (3) Movement to contact.

(a) Companies and platoons should move in two or more mutually supporting columns. Well travelled trails should be avoided, especially in draws, unless the force using them is preceded by an alert advance party.

(b) As the company or platoon advances, supporting arms should be registered at frequent intervals, normally 500 meters in front of and on the flanks of the patrol. Marking rounds are useful as navigation rounds.

(c) When ~~maneuvering~~ toward a suspected enemy position, an approach from the upwind side will allow effective use of RCA and smoke.

(d) Small groups (2-5) of NVA observed fleeing in advance of a maneuvering unit normally should not be physically pursued, as NVA forces frequently used this tactic to lure small units into the killing zones of ambushes. Pursuit by accurate, well aimed small arms fire will accomplish desired results.

(e) Reconnaissance by fire should be employed whenever the presence of the enemy is suspected.

#### (4) Contact.

(a) Companies, platoons will conduct operations to find and fix the enemy, but will not close with or physically assault heavily defended, fixed positions prior to detailed preparation fire of the objective.

(b) When contact is made all available means, fire support and blocking forces, will be brought to bear to fix the enemy and seal off avenues of escape.

(c) The unit commander will make an immediate estimate of the enemy force and inform the next higher echelon as to location, size and disposition of the enemy. This information will be used to introduce additional cordon forces and alert appropriate additional supporting arms agencies.



(d) Selective insertion of mobile forces into defensible terrain that disrupts enemy movement often causes the enemy to attack. If the position is properly prepared and supporting arms fully exploited, this becomes the most desirable type.

(e) Units should be ready to mark friendly and enemy positions just prior to arrival of close air support. Means available include front line panels, colored smoke and white phosphorus projectiles.

(f) When the location and extent of the enemy position is established and the cordon is in position, the initial assault of a fixed position will be accomplished by a massive, coordinated application of appropriate supporting arms. Helo gunships should be employed against enemy personnel in the open; however, these gunships have little effect on bunkers. Unnecessary use of helo gunships invariably result in an unacceptable cessation of artillery fires.

(g) Upon completion of the assault by fire, infantry units will follow up with a methodical search and destroy operation with the objectives of destroying/capturing enemy positions, material and personnel.

(h) Indications of an enemy capability to offer a determined defense will be justification for repetition of an assault by fire.



(5) Logistics.

(a) **Medevac/emergency** resupply landing **zones** should be established so as to provide cover from enemy fire for helicopters as well as providing for minimum interference with supporting arms fire. Supporting artillery and fixed wing resupply helicopters are in the area. Provisions should be made **to** fix the enemy with organic weapons **M-79's**, LAAWS, 106mm recoilless rifles, automatic weapons until artillery fire is resumed.

(b) Alternate methods of supply and resupply, and transport of troops must be planned when weather prohibits use of helicopters. Otters and armored personnel carriers (APC) have been used with excellent success. Prior planning will insure availability of these items.

(c) To support the mobile company a detailed and coordinated logistical support plan must be worked **into** a normal daily resupply effort. Each company operating **from** the battalion will have to be specific in the amount and item **needed**. To transport these supplies of limited amount, the H-34 or another of the smaller helicopters can be used for resupply when available. The distribution point will in most cases be at the battalion operating base. The prime **consideration** in this logistic effort has to be to give the company what it needs, where it needs, and at the time it needs it.

R.G. DAVIS

Major General  
U.S. Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION: "A"  
Copy to; Task Force Hotel (3)

10A/HMO/tjb  
3000  
10 August 1968

**From:** **Communication-Electronics** Officer  
To: Commanding General (ATTNs **G-3** Admin)

**Subj:** Infantry Company Operations

Refs (a) CG ltr **3/WAK/slp** over 3000 dtd 5Aug68.

1. In accordance with reference (a) a Negative Report is submitted on the **subject**.

LAURENCE H. WOODS



## Action Brief

**Problem:** Discussion comments per Commanding General's **note.**

**Discussion:** For each of the question **marks** on the mat there is a general discussion on the enclosed **paper.** The exceptions to this is the question marks for para **3.** d. (3) (c) page **5.** and 3.d. **(4) (I)**page 6. Both of these subparagraph have been changed to clarify the meaning.

**Recommendations:** That the suggested answers be reviewed for **comments.**

J. E. MEAD

MAJOR USMC

- Para. 3.b.(2) "Provide for rehabilitation of ~~battalions...~~"  
Change this ~~sentence~~ to read "Provide assistance as necessary for rehabilitation of the battalions during the monsoon season."
- Para 3.c.(1) "Operations of two or more companies with\* mutually supporting/ reinforcing distance..." The point here is to have the companies patrol their assigned areas so that if necessary a company could be reinforced by another company within a short period of time.
- Para. 3.c.(6) "Regular rotation of companies from the field during the monsoon." This is in effect what is being done presently. The emphasis here is to ensure that the rotation occurs with some degree of prior planning.
- \*Para. 3.d.(2) (c) Add new paragraph.
- Para. 3.d.(3) (a) "Companies and platoons should move in two or more mutually supporting columns. . ." Too many times companies have a tendency to move overland by a single trail with little, if any, flank security. Unless a word of caution is given the advance party and measures taken to keep them alert on trails disaster can readily take over a tactical column.
- Para. 3.d.(3) (c) Change para to read  
"When maneuvering toward a suspected enemy position an approach down wind towards the enemy will allow effective use of RCA and smoke."
- Para. 3.d.(4) (f) Change the last two sentences to read  
"Helo gunships should be employed against enemy personnel in the open. Tanks and direct fire support weapons should be employed against bunkers and dugged in positions. A proper balance between all supporting arms will permit continuous fire support without an unacceptable cessation of fire."
- Para. 3.d.(2) (c) "Use of trails and nature avenues of approach should be avoided whenever possible." The enemy recognizes that it is only human nature to take the easiest route. Thus he is most likely to set his booby traps, ambushes and fields of fire along trails and natural avenues of approach.

HEADQUARTERS  
Task Force Hotel  
Vandegrift Combat Base

*Plans*  
3/RLJ/tas  
3000  
22 August 1968

From: Commanding General, Task Force Hotel  
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Attn G-3)  
Subj: Infantry Company Tactics

Ref: (a) CG 3rd MarDiv ltr 3/WAK/glp over 3000 of 5 August 1968.

1. In response to ref (a), the following comments are submitted for your consideration. These comments reflect opinions of officers who have had experience in the field working under this concept.

a. Para 1 (b). Patrol bases should be occupied at dusk or at night. If a unit remains in a patrol base during the day it should be moved in the evening even if it is only 300 meters.

b. Para 1 (c). LP's should be placed well forward of a selected position prior to digging in. This provides security while the company is working. When registering night defensive fires, attempt to fire additional artillery in the general area so positions will not be disclosed.

c. Para 1 (d). It is not advisable to carry sand bags to the field. Troops have enough to carry and added weight should be food or ammunition. Lives are saved by digging in, not constructing on top of the ground.

d. Para 1 (f). If the NVA is going to make a concerted attack on a position he will normally prep the area with mortars/rockets/artillery. He follows right behind the prep with his ground attack.

e. Para 2 (d). When employing claymores with trip flares, they must be kept under observation and fire. The NVA is very adept in disarming or rotating the claymores. It is very doubtful that 106 RR will be employed in this concept. They restrict movement of the infantry as they are normally mounted on mules. They are very hard to manpack.

f. 3 (d). To pursue small groups of NVA, a good technique is to fire mortars and/or artillery into the nearest tree lines or about 100-500 meters down a trail. If the NVA is attempting to lead a unit into an ambush it is normally located in these areas.

g. 5 (a). Sufficient supplies should be carried for three (3) days except in emergencies. Time is wasted by daily resupply and positions or movement are given away by daily resupply.

2. A variety of terrain faces units in 3rd MarDiv. These principles should act as a guideline but certain freedoms should be granted to the Battalion Commanders so he can make decisions based on terrain and situation.

By direction

*do not agree - 10 sand bags per man take care of gun pack etc*

## HEADQUARTERS

4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FIF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

/RWA/clp  
3100  
21 Aug 1968

**From:** Commanding Officer  
**To:** Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), F (Attn: G-3 Admin)

**Subj:** Infantry Company Operations

**Ref:** (a) CG 3dMarDiv ltr 3/WAK/glp over 3000 of 5Aug68

1. Reference (a) requested **recommendations** and comments concerning the **Infantry** Company Operations Draft. In addition to the comments contained herein, each Battalion of the **Fourth** Marines will **reply separately**.

2. This Regiment has maintained a **mobile posture** in the Scotland II AO since June and has **employed many** of the **principles outlined** in the Draft. Third Battalion, Fourth Marines has almost continuously maintained three **Company** Operating Bases on a mobile, frequently displacing, rotating basis. Second **Battalion**, Fourth Marines has established **company** bases on key terrain throughout the area of primary **interest**. First Battalion, Fourth **Marines** made **excellent** use of the **concept** during the **CANTON I** and **CANTON II** actions.

3. The Draft as written is generally satisfactory. The following **con-**  
**structive** comments are **offered**:

a. **Para 1(b)**. Companies can not operate "anywhere in the **AO**". The fan of existing artillery has created areas of primary interest where the majority of **COB's** are established. To operate "anywhere in the **AO**" requires additional **FSB's** and operations of Battalion size and larger.

b. **Para 2(c)** and **Para 3(b)(1)(a)**. **Reinforcement** plans and optimum distances **between** companies demand more amplification than "immediate" and "mutual supporting". Terrain, **weather**, mode of transportation available, reserve forces designated, and many other factors influence reinforcement plans. Reinforcement in Leatherneck Square in the summer and in the Dakrong Valley in the **monsoon** are quite different issues.

c. **Para 3(1)(c)**. Leaders must expedite development of the defensive position. Food and rest **may** help rather than retard this effort.

d. **Para (c)(4)(b)**. Blocking forces are of questionable value in canopy - **Area** and rugged terrain. Maximum use of supporting arms to seal avenues of escape - **Area** is an especially sound tactic. Selective insertion of mobile forces into **Area** defensible terrain that disrupts **enemy** movement often causes the **enemy** to attack. If the position is properly prepared and supporting arms fully **ex-** **Area** ploited, this becomes the most desirable type contact to inflict maximum losses on the **enemy**. However, to push against a block is often a futile waste of two **Area** ✓

forces. Hamme and anvil tactics have proven generally non-productive.

4. It is also recommended that the tone of the Policy Paper be slightly modified to allow the Battalion Commander to retain the prerogative of change in employment of hi companies. The present paragraph 3(b) is not consistent with the policy as stated in 2(a).

• W. AUSTIN  
By direction

HEADQUARTERS  
 9th Marines  
 3rd Marine Division (Rein), **FMF**  
 FPO San Francisco, 96602

**3/RDW:jjm**  
 3000  
 18 Aug 68

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (**Rein**), **FMF**  
 (Attn: G-3)  
 Subj: Infantry Company Operations

Ref: (a) CG, Third Mar Div Draft of Proposed Policy Paper,  
 Infantry Company Operations in Northern Quang  
 Tri Province.

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following comments  
 are submitted.

a. General

(1) The policy paper relates primarily to the coastal plain/marginal  **piedmont area**. This type of activity can be conducted in jungle/mountainous type terrain but with different  **problems**. It is considered these differences should be  **addressed**.

b. Execution

(1)  **Paragraph** 3 of Ref (a) is directive in nature while this paper is designed as policy/guide document.

(2)  **Paragraph** 3 of Ref (a) excludes the Infantry battalion and should exclude Regiment as  **well**. The paper should not  **task**.

c. Patrol bases

(1) The paper continuously stresses the need for foot mobility and rapid movement while speaking about the various uses for the 106mm  **recoilless** rifle. These points are inconsistent.

(2) Patrol bases must provide clear fields of fire with good  **visibility** a minimum of hand grenade range from the proposed defensive positions.

(3) Close proximity to good water supply - minimize resupply  **problems**.

3000  
18 Aug 68

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

(4) Do not receive resupply or medevac aircraft in an LZ within the defensive **perimeter**. The securing of an LZ outside the perimeter is more difficult but when located within the range of NVA artillery the deception is worth the extra security effort.

(5) Select a difficult area for an enemy **FO** to pinpoint and adjust fire. **i.e.** an area surrounded by trees which prevent an FO from observing the impact of his **rounds**.

(6) Maximum utilization of claymores. Carry at least one per fire **team**. One trip flare per man. One **60mm** round per man. One machete per man.

(7) **Maximum utilization** of starlight scopes. Mandatory practice of good noise and light discipline.

d. Patrols

(1) Patrols use **regimental** snipers to maximum.

(2) Scout dogs are effective only when walking point.

(3) Where possible don't burden the patrol leader with an inflexible time schedule. **Patience**, a virtue of the enemy, must be practiced.

(4) Drop off units during patrol. Good employment for Regimental snipers or insert method for reconnaissance teams.

(5) Utilize Task Organized Killer Team patrols to find and fix **enemy**. Company should be able to field two such patrols and then react when contact established. Suggested TO. 14 men

1. Team ldr (Lt/SSgt)

2. Radio Op

3. FO (Arty or 81)

4. Radio Op

5. **TACP** Op

6. **MG** Team (2 men)

7. **Fire Team (4 men)**

8. Snipers (2 men)

9. Corpsman

e. Movement to Contact

(1) Be careful not to allow your prep fires to indicate the intended patrol route. Use **preps** not on programmed **route** to vary pattern.

(2) When utilizing WP in determining unit location don't develop pattern of shooting your next objective. Shoot to the flanks and resect for patrols exact **location**.

(3) Never turn down an AO. He is invaluable in guiding your **movement** and alerting you to the enemies location and maneuvers.

3000  
18 Aug 68

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

f. Contact

(1) During the assault by fire phase ensure good coverage of the enemies flanks and rear to prevent his disengaging or reinforcing.

(2) Enemy along the DMZ has frequently during heavy contacts immediately attempted to flank the Marine unit. Protect your flanks with artillery or gunships.

(3) Company **commanders** must keep battalion **informed** however, battalion must shoulder the load of developing the formal reports during the period of **contact**.

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET  
y direction

**3d Marines**  
**3d Marine Division (Reinf) FMF**  
 FPO San Francisco **96602**

**3/KEF/row**  
 3000  
 18 Aug 1968

From: **Commanding Officer**  
 To: **Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Reinf) FMF**

Subj: **Infantry Company Operations**

Ref: (a) **CG, 3d Mar Div ltr 3/WAK/glp, 3000 of 5 Aug 1968.**

**1.** The following comments are submitted concerning enclosure (1) to reference (a).

a. Recommend that the title be changed from "Infantry Company Operations" to "Rifle Company Operations".

b. Change para 3b to 30, "Infantry **Battalion.**"

c. Add as a new para 3b:

**"3b Infantry Regiment**

(1) Develop and implement plans which allow the battalions to utilize company patrol operations in their area of operations.

(2) Provide for rehabilitation of the battalions during the monsoon season.

(3) Designate reaction forces prepared to exploit, by fire and maneuver, contact developed by company operations."

d. Add para **5c** as follows:

"The use of 5-day Long Range Rations (**LRR**) would greatly reduce the need for helicopter resupply. During the monsoon season there is normally sufficient water available to make ~~the~~ <sup>dis</sup> use of **LRR practicable.** Sufficient stocks should be obtained to support the many rifle company operations. With an adequate natural water supply, the use of **LRR** would significantly reduce the amount and frequency of **resupply** required by helicopter."

R. L. MICHAEL JR.

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Battalion, 4th Marines  
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force  
c/o FP0, San Francisco, 96602

3/CWM/rkj  
3000  
17 August 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

**Subj:** Infantry Company Operations

**Ref:** (a) CG, 3d MarDiv **ltr 3/WAK/glp** over 3000 dated **5**  
August 1968

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following comment is submitted:

- (a) Carrying 20 sandbags per man was found to be highly advantageous in that it was sufficient to construct an efficient fighting hole rather than p de **just** minimum cover.

F. L. BOURNE, JR.

Copy to: 4th Marines

*Sept  
IC ops file*

HEADQUARTERS  
 11th Engineer Battalion  
 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

3/RM/gmj  
 3100  
 17 Aug 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF, FPO San  
 Francisco 96602 (ACofS G-3 Admin)

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

Ref: (a) CG, 3rd MarDiv Ltr 3/WAK/gly over 3000 of 5 Aug 1968.

1. Reference (a) outlines the proposed policy for the employment of Infantry Companies within the Division's AO, and requests comments to include recommended additions or deletions.

2. The policy set forth in reference (a) outlines aggressive offensive action based on sound tactical decisions. The implementation of company size operations should deny the enemy vital staging and rest centers that he now inhabits. Continuous widespread small unit operations will keep the enemy off balance and on the defensive. This command is in full support of the implementation of the proposed policies and recommends no changes or deletions.

*V. A. Perry*  
 V. A. PERRY

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), **FMF**  
FPO San Francisco 96602

**1/JCM/jks**  
**3000**

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, **G-1**

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, **G-3**

Subj: Infantry ~~Company~~ Operations

Ref: (a) CG, 3dMarDiv ltr **3/WAK/glp** over 3000 of 5 Aug 1968; Same **subj**  
(b) MCO **P5215.1C**

Encl: (1) Listing of Administrative Errors

1. Reference (a) has been reviewed and appears to contain **information** and guidance which is relatively permanent in nature insofar as this Division is concerned. Reference (b) specifically provides that written **communications** of a directive nature shall be published as an Order or Bulletin in The Marine Corps Directives System and it is therefore **recommended** that reference (b) be redrafted as a Division Order.

2. Reference (a) contains **numerous** clerical and administrative errors which should be corrected prior to **promulgation** as a Division Order. Enclosure (1) lists such errors.

L. R. DAZE

## Listing of Administrative Errors

1. Page 1, on the "**From:**" line, delete "3d Marine Division".
2. Page 1, reference line, enter "(a)" between "**Ref:**" and "**CG**".
3. Page 2, paragraph 3a, the sentence "Infantry **companies.....** reinforcing elements." should be moved up 2 lines. The format of paragraph 3c is correct and should be followed in paragraph 3a.
4. Page 2, paragraph **3a**, line 3, de-struc-tion, incorrect hyphenation.
5. Page 2, paragraph 3b and **3b(1)** should be **combined**. Further paragraph (a) thru (g) will **become** (1) thru (7) respectively.
6. Page 5, paragraph **3c(4)(g)**, line 2, repetition is misspelled.
7. Signature Section. Since this is a policy paper it should be signed by the **Commanding** General as "**By** direction" is not authorized for matters of policy.
8. Spaces are missing between the following words  
Paragraph **3b(1)(c)**, line 2, annihilate the  
Paragraph 3c(3)(d), line 1, NVA observed.
9. Distribution "C" gives each battalion 1 copy yet the subject is Infantry **Company** Operation. Recommend Distribution be changed to "A".

ENCLOSURE (1)

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMW  
APO San Francisco 96602

48/EWB/jaw  
3000  
15 Aug 1968

~~From:~~ Assistant chief of ~~staff~~ Comptroller  
**To:** Assistant chief of staff, G-3 (Admin)

**Sub j:** **Infantry company** Operations

**Ref:** (a) ~~cc~~ 3d Mar Div Itr **3/WAK/glp** over 3000 of  
5 Aug 1968

**1.** In accordance with the request contained in reference  
**(a)**, a negative report is hereby submitted.

  
J. H. GRIFFITH

HEADQUARTERS  
9th Motor Transport Battalion  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
APO San Francisco 96102

RL:lw  
3000  
13 May 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Attn: G-3 admin)

Subj: Infantry Company operations

Ref: (a) CC 3d Mar Div ltr 3/14K/SLP 3000 of 3 May 68

1. In compliance with reference (a), a negative report is submitted.



T. BASKWICH  
By direction

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Engineer Battalion  
3d Marine Division (REIN) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/LBW/j...  
11 August 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (REIN) FM (ATTN 0-3 Admin)

Subj Infantry Company Operation

Ref: (a) I 3d MarDiv tr 3/WAK/glj OWR 300 dtd 5 Au 1968

1. In accordance with reference (a), a negative report is submitted.

By direction

4A War ✓  
Mar ✓

1401  
---

SA [unclear]  
11th Eng ✓  
3d MT ✓  
MI 1 ✓  
SA 5 ✓  
3d Med  
R)

eg  
Reply 9

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

AWFG/vc  
3000  
11 AUG 1968

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4  
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Admin)

Subj: **Infantry** Company **Operations** (Logistics Paragraph)

Ref: (a) GGr 3/WAK/glp over 3000 dtd 5Aug<sup>68</sup> Subj: Infantry Company Operations

1. In accordance with ref (a) the following recommendation is made.
2. Change paragraph 3.c.(5) to read as follows:

"(5) Logistics.

(a) The present concept of operations will require the company commander to be more detailed and specific when requesting resupply. In most cases, resupply will be by **helicopter**. Battalions will be responsible for overall supervision of the company resupply, i.e., drawing supplies from the supply point and staging them by company at the appropriate sling out point.

(b) Prior planning and timely requests will eliminate most logistics problems. In their request for resupply a unit will provide for the recovery of nets, slings, and water cans so as to facilitate effective future resupply.

(c) Alternate methods of resupply medevac and transportation of troops must be planned contingent upon weather conditions. In the past when weather prevented the use of helicopters, Otters were used with excellent results. Prior planning will insure the availability of such items.

(d) Company commanders should be aware of the composition and the availability of the 'OnCall Airdrop Packages' listed in Annex Q, Appendix 7 to LOI 1-67. These packages are available on six (6) hour notice, should no other resupply method be available.

*L'his annex is ulj .*

SL,f

WAIDD .CA M  
By direction

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
FPO San Francisco 96602

*1/1/68*  
*[Signature]*  
3/WAK/glp  
3000  
5 Aug 1968

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
To: Distribution List  
Subj: Infantry Compa. Operations  
Encl (1) Draft of Proposed Policy Paper, Infantry Company  
Operations in Northern Quang Tri Province

1. Enclosure (1) is being routed for review and comment prior to publication as a Division Policy Paper.

2. Addressees are requested to forward comments to include recommended additions and deletions to G-3 (Admin) by 20 August 1968.

3. Negative reports are requested.

V. G. S. J. J.  
P. D. LAPOND  
By direction

DISTRIBUTION "C"  
Copy to: Task Force Hotel (3)

HEADQUARTERS  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

3/WAK/ier  
 4 Aug 1968

**From:** Commanding General, 3d Marine Division  
**To:** 3d Marine Division

**Subj:** Infantry Company Operations in northern Quang Tri  
 Province (Draft) --

**Ref:** CG 3d MarDiv 220525Z May 68 (Continuity file)

1. Background.

a. The mobile posture of the 3d Marine Division has resulted in sustained pressure on enemy forces, has fragmented enemy units of significant size, and may have influenced the enemy to avoid concentrating large units within reach of the Division's combat power. Therefore, enemy forces remaining within the Division AO present suitable targets for company size operations providing instructions disseminated by reference (a) are followed and these operations are executed with aggressiveness and imagination.

b. The size of the Division AO relative to the forces available preclude the density of coverage desired if all operations are battalion size or larger. Numerous coordinated infantry company operations will increase coverage to an acceptable level and thereby deny the enemy sanctuary anywhere in the AO, as well as discouraging him from developing extensive logistic bases and resupply caches close to his areas of operation. Any tactic which denies the enemy sanctuary-physical or psychological-for rest, resupply and security, will enhance the effectiveness of future operations by the Division.

2. Policy.

a. Regimental and battalion commanders will orient their thinking and staff planning toward infantry company operations to find and fix enemy forces within their AO's. Even though an operation is planned at the battalion level, it need not necessarily be executed by the battalion as a single unit. Companies should be given specific objectives within a portion of the battalion AO and encouraged and permitted to operate independently within established guidelines.

b. Night operations by company sized forces will be emphasized.

ENCLOSURE (1)

c. **Company** operations will be **supported** by all available **supporting** arms. Plans will include provisions for **immediate** reinforcement when a significant contact is **made**.

d. Ground surveillance will be supplemented by aerial, sensor, and other surveillance means to locate and evaluate targets for company operations.

### 3. Execution.

#### a. Concept of Operations.

Infantry companies will conduct extensive patrols to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary within the Division AO, and to find and fix his forces for destruction by supporting arms and reinforcing elements.

#### b. Infantry Regiments.

(1) Develop and implement **plans** for company patrol **operations** in areas of operation. These plans should provide for:

(a) **Operation** of two or more companies within mutual **supporting/reinforcing** distance of each other.

(b) **Assignment** of operating areas oriented to terrain rather than to grid lines, and offering two or more **prospective company** patrol bases to allow for frequent shifts to new **bases**.

(c) The **immediate** **reinforcing** and **supporting** forces to **fix and annihilate** **enemy** when found.

(d) The use of all **available intelligence** gathering agencies and equipment to select areas suitable for company operations.

(e) **Regular rotation** of **companies** from the field during the monsoon **season**.

(f) **Alternate fire** **support plans** not dependent upon CAS when weather restricts or **prohibits** fixed wing or helo **support**.

(g) **Reinforcement** of companies with **81mm** Mort and 106mm RR when logistically **feasible**.

c. **Rifle Companies**. Listed below are tactics that have proven successful for companies in the past. The list is not all inclusive. Since the majority of contacts in the Division AO involve NVA forces, these tactics are oriented toward these forces.

## (1) Patrol Bases.

(a) Patrol bases should be selected to provide for:

1 Optimum support of patrols by weapons organic/attached to or in support of the company.

2. Minimum avenues of approach for enemy forces.

3 Minimum areas masked to friendly supporting fires.

(b) Patrol bases should be approached and occupied as unobtrusively as possible; if company travels by helo, initial LZ should be some distance from patrol base. On touchdowns in the LZ the Co should clear the LZ quickly, keep well dispersed and move to the base by preplanned routes. If the company travels by foot, base should be occupied during reduced visibility whenever possible.

(c) Troops must dig in and defensive fires must be registered immediately upon occupation of the patrol base. Leaders must be alert to prevent personnel from taking time out to eat or rest until the position is developed for protection of personnel.

(d) Adequate positions can be prepared more quickly if each Marine carries 5-10 empty sandbags to the base camp.

(e) Indiscriminate booby trapping avenues of approach will not normally be effective, as this tactic tends to cause more casualties among subsequent friendly patrols than among the NVA. Taut-wire trip flares can, however, be highly effective.

(f) The NVA will seldom give advance warning of attack, and will usually attack at night. Indicators are registration of contacts during daylight hours. Approach of sappers after dark. Enemy operating near the patrol base should be taken under fire by indirect fire weapon, preferably by those not physically located with the company. Direct fire weapons should be employed only to repel assaults or to engage hard targets where time or the enemy's proximity will not allow use of indirect fire weapons.

(g) Companies should shift patrol bases frequently and preferably during periods of reduced visibility to avoid attacks by fire.

(2) Patrols.

(a) Patrols must have the capability to call for and adjust supporting fires, both artillery and air.

(b) Scout dogs and/or Kit Carson Scouts should be utilized whenever available.

(c) Patrols should be assigned limited objectives, and should remain within supporting/reinforcing distance of the patrol base. A detailed search of a small area travelling cross-country is usually both safer and more productive than a cursory search of a large area. Use of trails and natural avenues of approach should be avoided whenever possible.

(d) The emplacement of taut-wire trip flares by patrols along avenues of approach remote from or not observable by personnel manning night positions at the patrol base will enhance the security of the base by impeding or giving early warning of enemy approach. These flares can also serve to trigger "remote" ambushes; e.g. a command detonated claymore mine covering the trip flare, or a trip flare emplaced at a pre-registered 10<sup>6</sup>mm rifle impact point.

(3) Movement to contact.

(a) Companies and platoons should move in two or more mutually supporting columns. Well travelled trails should be avoided, especially in draws, unless the force using them preceded by an alert advance party.

(b) As the company or platoon advances, supporting arms should be registered at frequent intervals, normally 500 meters in front of and on the flanks of the patrol. Marking rounds are useful as navigation rounds.

(c) When maneuvering toward a suspected enemy position, an approach from the upwind side will allow effective use of RCA and smoke.

(d) Small groups (2-5) of NVA observed fleeing in advance of a maneuvering unit normally should not be physically nursued, as NVA forces frequently use this tactic to lure small units into the killing zones or ambushes. Pursuit by accurate, well aimed small arms fire will accomplish desired results.

(e) Reconnaissance by fire should be employed whenever the presence of the enemy is suspected.

## (4) Contact.

(a) Companies/platoons will conduct operations to find and fix the enemy, but will not close with or physically assault heavily defended, fixed positions prior to detailed prenaration of the objective.

(b) When contact is made all available means, fire support and blocking forces, will be brought to bear to fix the enemy and seal off all avenues of escape.

(c) The unit commander will make an immediate estimate of the enemy force and inform the next higher echelon as to location, size and disposition of the enemy. This information will be used to introduce additional cordon forces and alert appropriate additional supporting arms agencies.

(d) Units should be ready to mark friendly and enemy positions just prior to arrival of close air support. Means available include front line panels, colored smoke and white phosphorus projectiles.

(e) When the location and extent of the enemy position is established and the cordon is in position, the initial assault of a fixed position will be accomplished by a massive, coordinated application of appropriate supporting arms. Helo gunships should be employed against enemy personnel in the open; however these gunships have little effect in bunkers. Unnecessary use of helo gunships invariably result in an unacceptable cessation of artillery fires.

(f) Upon completion of the assault by fire, infantry units will follow on with a methodical search and destroy operation with the objectives of destroying/capturing enemy positions and material and personnel.

(g) Indications of an enemy capability to offer a determined defense will be justification for repetition of an assault by fire.

## (5) Logistics.

(a) Medevac/emergency resupply landing zones should be established so as to provide cover from enemy fire for helicopters as well as providing for minimum interference with supporting arms fire. Supporting artillery and fixed wing aircraft will normally be masked and restricted while medevac/resupply helicopters are in the area. Provisions should be made to fix the enemy with organic weapons - M-79's, LAAWS, 106mm recoilless rifles, automatic weapons until artillery fire is resumed.


(b) Alternate methods of supply and resupply, and transport of troops **must** be planned when weather prohibits use of helicopters. Otters and armored personnel carriers (APC) have been used with excellent **success**. Prior planning will insure availability of these items.

P. D. LAFOND  
By direction

DISTRIBUTION: **GN**  
Copy **to**: Task **Force** Hotel (3)



HEADQUARTERS  
3D MARINE DIVISION FMF



COMMANDING GENERAL'S MEMO

20 July 1968

FOR AC/S, G-3

SUBJ: Company Operations

1. As I recall, we had some general paper published about company level operations. In my field visits I find that battalion level operations mentality still exists in most instances.
2. Please design for publication a Division Policy paper which will further direct attention to company size operations.
3. Check out a draft with the Regimental Commanders prior to publication.

R. G. DAVIS

*WC*  
*JMK*  
~~24 Jul 1968~~

**From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3**  
**To: Operations Officer**  
**Plan Office**  
**Fire Support coordinator**

**1. This Section has been tasked to prepare a Policy Paper designated to direct commanders attention to company size operations.**

**2. A draft is enclosed for your comments to include recommended additions, deletions and change in format. The formalized Division level draft will be routed to regimental commanders for review before publication.**

**W. A. JORMAN**  
**By direction**

*24 Jul 68*  
*Any Comments*

**From** Commanding General  
**To:** Third Marine Division

**Subj:** Company Size Operations

**Ref:** (a) CG 3d MarDiv 220525Z May68

1. **Background.**

a. **The mobile** posture and sustained pressure on enemy forces have **fragmented** known **enemy** units of significant **size,,** and may have **influenced** the enemy to not **concentrate** **large** units within reach of the Division's **capability.** It follows **then,** that enemy forces remaining within the Division A0 present **suitable** targets for **company size** operations provided instructions disseminated by **reference** (a) are followed and expanded with **imagination** and aggressive **execution.**

b. **Geographic** parameters of the Division A0 and **forces** available **preclude the** density of coverage desired if all operations conducted are battalion **size** and **larger. Numerous,** coordinated company **size operations will, however,** increase the degree of coverage to an **acceptable level** and thereby deny the enemy a **sanctuary anywhere** within the Division A0. In turn, the **enemy** may be **less** prone to develop extensive **logistic** bases and resupply  **caches** in **close** proximity to his area of operations. Any **action** which denies the enemy a **sanctuary** for rest, **resupply, security** and **psychology** will **enhance** the **effectiveness** of future operations by the **Division.**

## 2. Polic

a. Regimental and battalion **commanders** will orient their thinking and staff planning to seek out and **maximize** opportunities for **company size** operations within their **AO's**.

**Particular** emphasis should be given to designation of **company objectives** for **attack immediately after touch** down in an **LZ** during **tactical** movements. **This** will **foster** rapid movement **out** of an area invariably subjected to enemy mortar and **rockets attack**.

b. Maximum **intelligence efforts** and **employment** of target acquisition devices to include **radar**, night and **daytime** observation **devices** and sensors will be **exercised** to **locate** and evaluate targets appropriate for **company operations**.

c. Night operations and small **unit** command, logistics and **tactical** responsibilities will be **emphasized**.

d. **Company** level operations will be **supported** by all **available** supporting **arms**. Planning will **include** provisions for immediate reinforcement when a significant contact **is made**.

## 3. Execution

a.a. Companies will conduct patrols and operations to find and fix enemy **forces**, but will not close with and **physically** assault heavily defended **fixed** positions prior to preparation by supporting arms.

b. **Once** an enemy position **is** located, the enemy will be **fixed**, **ground operations** will be **commenced** immediately, and

additional **forces** and supporting arms **w**ll be **committed** as expeditiously as possible to **reinforce** the **cordon effort**.

c. When the **cordon is** in position the initial **assault** of a fixed enemy position will be **accomplished** by a **massive, coordinated** application of all **available** supporting **arms**.

d. Upon **completion** of the assault by **fire**, infantry units will follow up with a **methodical search** and destroy operation to **finalize destruction/capture** of **enemy** positions material and **personnel**.

## HEADQUARTERS

3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3P/JEM/glp  
3000  
27 Aug 1968

From: ~~Commanding General~~  
To: ~~Third Marine Division~~ *DISTRIBUTION LIST*

Subj: Infantry Company Operations in northern Quang Tri Province

Ref: (a) CG 3d MarDiv msg 220525Z May68 (Continuity file)

1. **Background.**

a. The mobile posture of the 3d Marine Division has resulted in sustained pressure on enemy forces, has fragmented enemy units of significant size, and may have influenced the enemy to avoid concentrating large units within reach of the Division's combat power. Therefore, enemy forces remaining within the Division AO present suitable targets for company size operations, instructions disseminated by reference (a) are followed, and these operations are executed with aggressiveness and imagination.

b. The size of the Division AO, relative to the forces available, precludes the density of coverage desired if all operations battalion size or larger. Numerous, coordinated infantry company operations will increase coverage to an acceptable level and will deny the enemy sanctuary anywhere in the AO that can be reached by company patrols being under protection of supporting arms. These patrols will also discourage him from developing extensive logistic bases and

resupply caches close to his areas of **operation**. Any tactic which denies the enemy **sanctuary-physical** or psychological- for rest, resupply and security, will enhance the effectiveness of future operations by the **Division**.

## 2. Policy.

a. Regimental and battalion commanders will orient their thinking and staff planning toward infantry company operations to find and fix enemy forces within their AO's. **Even** though an operation is planned at the battalion level, it need not necessarily be executed by the battalion as a single unit. Companies should be given specific objectives within a portion of the battalion AO and <sup>permitted</sup> ~~discouraged~~ and <sup>encourage</sup> ~~permitted~~ to operate independently within established **guidelines**.

b. Night operations by company sized forces will be emphasized.

c. Company operations will be supported by all available supporting arms. Plans will include provisions for immediate reinforcement when a significant contact is **made**.

d. Ground surveillance will be supplemented by aerial, sensor, and other surveillance means to locate and evaluate targets for company operations.

## 3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. Infantry companies will conduct extensive patrols to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary within the Division AO, and to find and fix his forces for destruction by supporting arms and



reinforcing elements.

b. Infantry **Regiments** and **1st Bde will:**

(1) Develop and implement plans which allow the battalions to use **company** patrol operations in their area of **operations**.

(2) Provide for rehabilitation of the battalions during the monsoon season.

(3) Designate reaction forces prepared to exploit, by fire and maneuver, contact developed by company **operations**.

c. Infantry **Battalion<sup>s</sup>** Develop and implement plans for company patrol **operations**. These plans should **provide** for:

(1) Operations of two or more companies within **mutuallysupporting/reinforcing** distance of each **other**.

(2) Immediate reaction plans that reflect the current terrain and **weather**. (Operation plans developed for response in the **Leatherneck** Square area <sup>Will</sup> are not ~~going to~~ be meaningful during the monsoon in the Da Krong Valley)

(3) Assignment of operating areas oriented to terrain rather than to grid lines, and offering two or more prospective company patrol bases to allow for frequent shifts to new **bases**.

(4) The immediate **commitment** of reinforcing and supporting forces to fix and annihilate the enemy when found.

(5) The use of all available intelligence gathering agencies and equipment to select areas suitable for company **operations**.

(6) Regular rotation of companies from the field during the monsoon season.

(7) Alternate fire support **plans, not** dependent upon CAS when weather **restricts** or prohibits fixed wing or helo support.

(8) Reinforcement of companies with **81mm** mortars and 106mm RR's when logistically and physically **feasible.**

d. Rifle Companies. Listed below are tactics that have proven successful for companies in the past. This list is not all inclusive. Since the majority of contacts in the Division A0 involve NVA forces, these tactics are oriented toward those forces.

(1) Patrol Bases.

(a) Patrol bases should be selected to provide for:

**1.** Optimum support of patrols by weapons organic, attached to, or in support of the company.

**2.** Minimum avenues of approach for enemy **forces.**

**3.** Minimum areas masked to **friendly** supporting fires.

(b) Patrol bases should be approached and occupied as unobtrusively as possible; if company travels by helo, initial LZ should be some distance from patrol base. On touchdowns in the LZ the **co.** should clear the LZ quickly, <sup>air</sup>**well** dispersed, and move to the base **by** preplanned routes. If the company travels by foot, bases should be

occupied during reduced visibility whenever possible.

(c) Troops must dig in and defensive fires must be registered immediately upon occupation of the patrol base. Leaders must be alert to prevent personnel from taking time out to eat or rest until the position is developed for protection of **personnel**.

(d) Adequate positions can be prepared quickly if each Marine carries 15-20 empty sandbags to the base camp.

(e) Indiscriminate booby **trapping**,<sup>1</sup> avenues of approach will not normally be **effective**, as this tactic tends to cause more casualties among subsequent friendly patrols than among the **NVA**. Taut-wire trip flares can, however, be highly **effective**.

(f) The NVA will **seldom** give advance warning of attack and will usually attack at night. Indicators are registration of mortars during daylight hours and the approach of sappers after dark. **Enemy** operating near the patrol base should be taken under fire by indirect fire weapons, ~~by~~ <sup>by</sup> ~~those~~ <sup>by</sup> those not physically **located** with the company. Direct fire weapons should be employed only to repel assaults or to engage hard targets where time or the enemy's proximity will not allow use of indirect fire weapons.

(g) Companies **should** shift patrol bases frequently and ~~preferably~~ <sup>preferably</sup> during periods of reduced visibility to avoid attacks by fire.



(2) Patrols.

(a) Patrols must have the capability to call for and adjust supporting fires, both artillery and air.

(b) Scout dogs and/or Kit **Carson** Scouts should be used whenever available.

(c) Patrols should be assigned limited objectives, and should remain within supporting/reinforcing distances of the patrol base. A detailed search of a small area travelling cross-country is usually **both** safer and more productive than a cursory search of a large area. Use of trails and natural avenues of approach should be avoided whenever possible.

(d) The emplacement of taut-wire trip flares by patrols along avenues of approach remote from or not observable by personnel manning night positions **at** the patrol base will enhance the security of the **base** by **impeding** or giving early warning of enemy approach. These flares can also serve to **trigger** "remote" ambushes; e.g. a command detonated claymore mine covering the trip flare, or a trip detonated claymore mine covering the trip flare, or a trip flare emplaced at a **pre-registered** 106mm **rifle** impact point.

(3) Movement to contact.

(a) **Companies** and platoons should move in two or more mutually supporting columns. Well **travelled** trails should be avoided, especially in draws, unless the force using them is preceded by an alert advance party.



(b) As the company or platoon advances, supporting arms should be registered at frequent intervals, normally 500 meters in front of and on the flanks of the patrol. Marking rounds are useful as navigation rounds.

(c) When maneuvering toward a suspected enemy position, an approach from the up wind side will allow effective use of **RCA** and smoke.

(d) Small **groups** (2-5) of NVA observed fleeing in advance of a maneuvering unit normally should not be physically pursued, as NVA forces frequently used this tactic to lure small units into the killing zones of ambushes. Pursuit by accurate, well aimed small arms fire will accomplish desired results.

(e) Reconnaissance by fire should be employed whenever the presence of the enemy is suspected.

#### (4) Contact.

(a) **Companies** <sup>or</sup> **platoons** will conduct operations to find and fix the enemy, but will not close with or physically assault heavily defended, fixed positions prior to detailed **preparati** fires on the objective.

(b) When contact is made all available means, fire **support** and blocking forces, will be brought to bear to fix the enemy and seal off avenues of **escape**.

(c) The unit **commander** will make an immediate estimate of the enemy force and inform the next higher echelon as to location, size and disposition of the enemy. This information will be used to introduce additional cordon



forces and alert appropriate additional supporting arms agencies.

(d) Selective insertion of mobile forces into defensive terrain that disrupts enemy movement often causes the enemy to attack. If the position is properly prepared and supporting arms **fully exploited**, this becomes the most desirable **type.** /

(e) Units should be ready **to mark** friendly and enemy positions just **prior** to arrival of close air **support.** Means available include front line panels, colored smoke **and** white **phosphorus** projectiles.

(f) When the location and extent of the enemy position is established and the cordon is in position, the **initial** assault of a fixed position will be accomplished by a massive, **coordinated** application of appropriate supporting arms. **Helo** gunships should be employed against enemy personnel in the open; however, these gunships have little effect on bunkers. Indiscriminate use of helo gunships **invariably** results in an unacceptable cessation of artillery fires.

(g) Upon completion of the assault by fire, infantry units will follow up with a **methodical** search and destroy operation with the objective **destroying/capturing** enemy positions, materiel and personnel.

(h) Indications of an enemy capability to offer a determined defense will be justification for repetition of an assault by fire.

## (5) Logistics.

(a) Medevac/emergency resupply **landing** zones should be established so as to provide cover from enemy fire for **helicopters** as well as providing for minimum interference with supporting fires. Supporting artillery and **fixed** wing aircraft will normally be restricted while **medevac/resupply** helicopters are in the **area**.

Provisions should be made to **fix** the enemy with organic **weapons**, M-79's, LAAWS, 10<sup>6</sup>mm recoilless **rifles**, **automatic** weapons until artillery fire is resumed.

(b) Alternate methods of **supply**, resupply, and **transport** of troops must be planned when weather prohibits use of **helicopters**. Otters and armored personnel carriers (APO's) have been used with excellent results. Prior planning will insure availability of these **items**.

(c) To support the mobile company a detailed and coordinated **logistical** support plan must be worked into a normal daily resupply effort. Each company operating from the battalion will have to be specific in the <sup>required</sup> ~~items~~ <sup>items</sup> needed. To transport **plies** of limited quantity, the **I-34** - another of the **smaller helicopters** can be used for **resupply** when available. The distribution point will in most cases be at the battalion operating base. The prime consideration ~~if~~ this logistic effort is to give the company what **it** needs, where it is needed, and at the time it is needed.

3d MAR DIV S&C FILE  
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3 Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
NONHA, ANG TRI PROVINCE,  
VIETNAM  
Ser:  
7 August 1968

TERRAIN STUDY OF SCOTLAND II ACU

- Ref (a) 3d Mar Div 515 8-67 and 11-67
- (b) Maps: Vietnam AMS Series L7014, 1:50,000 Sheets 6342 II, III IV, LADS AMS Series L7015, 1:50,000, Sheets 6341 I and IV.

- 1. Helicopter Landing Zones overlay
- 2. Roads and Trails overlay
- 3. Trafficability overlay

1. General. Boundaries of the study area are indicated on Enclosure (1). The heart of the study area is the Khe Sanh Valley, which is surrounded on all sides by mountains varying in elevation from 457 meters, Xom Cham at XD 8541, to 1739 meters at XD 8354.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

a. Relief. The study area is mountainous and highly dissected by numerous perennial and intermittent streams. Khe Sanh Valley is located in the north central section. This valley is aligned on a northwest-southeast axis and joins the Quang Tri and Da Krong River Valleys at a common juncture at XD 9240. The Da Krong Valley runs in a meandering path toward the southeast and exits the study area at XD 9936. Relief is extremely rugged in the northern and eastern portions of the study area and progressively diminishes toward a rolling plateau with isolated areas of high relief in the southern corner of Vietnam. A sharply delineated scarp, which rises to an elevated tableland in LAOS, generally parallels the Vietnam border along the southwestern and southern boundaries of the study area. The majority of the slopes in the ACU are generally between 40 and 60 percent and are often 100 percent. The only regions characterized by gentle slopes are the northern-southern entrances of the Khe Sanh Valley; the immediate areas bordering Route 9 west of the former Combat Base, and elevated plains in the vicinity of XD 8420.

b. Drainage. Drainage runoff is into the Khe Sanh River which transports the entire Khe Sanh Valley drainage flow and exits the southeastern portion of the area at XD 9040. Drainage in the northeast is provided by the QUANG TRI River which flows into the Gulf of Tonkin. All other drainage flows into the X'e Pene River (XD 7833) which flows north and west on the VIETNAM-LAOS border before exiting the study area at XD 6937. The entire study area is interlaced with numerous perennial and intermittent streams. It is of significance that intermittent streams rapidly empty during dry periods. They retain water only for short periods.

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1. Population  
 a. Distribution  
 1) The population is concentrated in the vicinity of villages utilized for rice and "truck" crops. A small settlement is located in the southern portion of the Khe Sanh Valley at XD 8559. The settlement is an elephant or crocodile study area from XD 6646 to XD 2. In the study area, b, bo)6m, thickets and dense jungle are prevalent in the southern portion of the area.

(2) Mountains are covered by dense broadleaf evergreen forestation with interspersed areas of pine and deciduous trees. Tree height increases with elevation. Heights average 75 to 90 feet with some ranging to 150 feet. Canopy is generally continuous with more than 25 percent of the ground covered by 2 to 4 layers of canopy. Trees have shallow roots. Trunks are commonly straight and average 0.3 meters in diameter, increasing somewhat in higher elevations. Trees are commonly 2 to 3 meters apart. In inaccessible areas of heavy canopy, the sun rarely reaches the forest floor. In formerly cleared areas of shifting cultivation subsequently abandoned, extremely dense undergrowth is encountered; spiny rattans, full bushes, vines and briars are interwound around trees or between bushes making penetration difficult.

#### d. Surface Materials.

(1) Soils consist of sand, silt and clay mixtures. Surface soils are silty sand, silt and clay. Deep deposits of clayey soils are found on the broad alluvium plains of the river valleys. The soil is generally suited as fill.

(2) Rock. Base materials consist of granite, slate and quartzite rock in the mountains. These bed materials underlie relatively shallow soils on the upper slopes, but are progressively buried deeper under alluvium (clay, silt, sand, gravel, or similar detrital material deposited by running water) deposits in basins. Exposed rock is evidenced on the upper slopes and in drainage defiles.

#### e. Cultural Features.

(1) Currently, the local population is small and widely dispersed. Indigenous personnel are predominantly MONTAGNARDS of the BRU tribe.

(2) Village-type rural hamlets are located along National Route 9. The majority of these hamlets indicated on current maps are either abandoned or destroyed. New life hamlets were previously located in the vicinity of the former Special Forces Camp at LANG VAI (XD 7943) and the former KHI SAMI Combat Base (XD 840410).


### 3. Military Aspects of The Area.

#### a. Observation and Fields of Fire.

(1) Long range observation is poor throughout the area due to dense undergrowth and difficult highly dissected terrain; however personnel traversing Route 9 can be observed from many preselected vantage points. Short range observation is limited for the same reason.

(2) Fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons are seriously curtailed. High trajectory weapons have good fields of fire in the northern and eastern portions of the study area which decrease rapidly toward the mountains. Heavy canopy and steep slope can be expected to impair the effects obtained by support arms against targets in mountainous terrain.

b. Cover and Concealment. Excellent cover and concealment throughout most of the area limits the effectiveness of friendly surveillance. Excellent cover and concealment provides both friendly and enemy forces with covered approaches to attack positions.




a. **Obstacles.**

(1) Natural, Vegetation and relief in the area make it unsuitable for cross country movement by troops and vehicles except on existing roads, trails and natural corridors such as along stream and rivers.

4. Key Terrain.

- a. Hill 1739 at XD 831546
- b. Deng Pa Thien Hill 1371 at XD 814519
- c. Deng Tri Hill 1015 at XD 854454 (overlooking Khe Sanh)
- d. Hill 950 at XD 844456 (overlooking Khe Sanh)
- e. Hill 832 at XD 874447 (overlooking Khe Sanh)
- f. Hill 689 at XD 803409
- g. Hill 471 at XD 846394 (overlooking Khe Sanh)
- h. Hill 881S at XD 777438
- i. Hill 881N at XD 774458
- j. Hill 861 at XD 803443
- k. Hill 691 at XD 927443
- l. Hill 587 at XD 901359
- m. Hill 843 at XD 897328
- no Hill 663 at XD 828321
- o. Hill 527 at XD 789383
- p. Hill 728 at XD 730416
- q. Hill 632 at XD 828483
- r. Hill 926 at XD 755489

  
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