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3100.1
7 March 1966
06-66

94866

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Commanding Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company's ltr 3/JPF/jlc over 5750.1 dtd 3 March 1966, Ser. No. 06-66

From: Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF, (Attn: G-3)

Subj: Command Chronology

1. Forwarded.

R. R. Van Cleave
R. R. VAN CLEVE

1st Force Reconnaissance Co

UNCLASSIFIED



cc for... 1966

1ST FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

94866

126-66
3/JPF/jlc
5750.1
3 March 1966
06-66

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1
(b) CO, 3rd Recon Bn Msg #220100Z Jan 1966

- Encl:
- (1) - Command and Staff Billets
 - (2) - Patrol Report of 231100 Jan 1966 HATEFUL
 - (3) - Patrol Report of 311600 Jan 1966, PRINCESS I
 - (4) - Patrol Report of 031430 Feb 1966 " II
 - (5) - Patrol Report of 031000 Feb 1966, GALLEON I
 - (6) - Patrol Report of 021800 Feb 1966 " II
 - (7) - Patrol Report of 040800 Feb 1966, HATEFUL I
 - (8) - Patrol Report of 031400 Feb 1966 " S & E NO. 5586
 - (9) - Patrol Report of 041200 Feb 1966 PRINCESS III
 - (10) - Patrol Report of 050900 Feb 1966 GALLEON I
 - (11) - Patrol Report of 041130 Feb 1966 HATEFUL 4
 - (12) - Patrol Report of 061100 Feb 1966 PRINCESS 3
 - (13) - Patrol Report of 111000 Feb 1966 PRINCESS 4
 - (14) - Patrol Report of 110900 Feb 1966 HATEFUL 3
 - (15) - Patrol Report of 100900 Feb 1966 " 4
 - (16) - Patrol Report of 121230 Feb 1966, GALLEON 4
 - (17) - Patrol Report of 131100 Feb 1966, GALLEON 3
 - (18) - Patrol Report of 121200 Feb 1966, PRINCESS 3
 - (19) - Patrol Report of 151200 Feb 1966 GALLEON 1
 - (20) - Patrol Report of 151300 Feb 1966 " 2
 - (21) - Combat After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE)
 - (22) - Combat After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE II)

1ST FORCE RECON CO	
S & E NO. 5586	
PRINCESS 5076	
COPY 1 OF 6	

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted for the month of February 1966.

a. Organizational Data.

(1) Designation/Location.

(a) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-).

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30 Jan 1966

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- (b) Administration and logistical personnel -- DA NANG, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN).
 - (c) Command Group and Reconnaissance Platoons were relocated from U. S. Army Special Forces Camp BA TO, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), to DA NANG, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), on 16 February 1966.
 - (d) Command Group and Reconnaissance Platoons to TAM KY Province, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), for operation DOUBLE EAGLE II, on 21 February 1966.
 - (e) Command Group and Reconnaissance Platoons were relocated from TAM KY Province, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), to DA NANG, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), on 28 February 1966.
- (2) Period Covered. 200001 January to 282400 February 1966.
 - (3) Command and Staff Billets. See Enclosure (1).
 - (4) Average Monthly Strength. Ten (10) Officers, one hundred thirty-two (132) enlisted, and six (6) USN enlisted.
- b. Significant Events.
- (1) Personnel.
 - (a) On 22 January 1966, this unit had one (1) MIA.
 - (b) On 29 January 1966, this unit had one (1) KIA, and one (1) WIA.
 - (c) On 20 and 22 January 1966, this unit had (4) nonbattle casualties.
 - (d) One (1) Officer, eleven (11) enlisted, were joined from Detachment Force Recon Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, at DA NANG, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), on 28 February 1966.
 - (e) Five (5) enlisted were joined from Detachment Force Recon Team, 3rd Battalion 1st Marines, at DA NANG, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), on 22 February 1966.
 - (f) This unit has also joined seven (7) communicators during the month of February 1966.

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- (g) Due to all personnel joined, this units Readiness Category has changed to C1.
- (2) Administration. In accordance with reference (b), on 21 January 1966, this unit shifted to ADCON, Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, DA NANG, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN).
- (3) Intelligence. The S-2 section of this unit was relocated on 8 February 1966, to U. S. Army Special Forces Camp BA TO, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), to carry out all debriefing of patrols.
- (4) Training. The S-3 rear, carried out basic training for all newly attached personnel.
- (5) Command and Control. The 3rd Platoon was relocated from U. S. Army Special Forces Camp TRA BONG, to U. S. Army Special Forces Camp BA TO, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), on 25 January 1966.
- (6) Communications and Electronics.
- (a) From 10 January 1966 to 15 February 1966, this unit used both the AN/PRC-47 and the AN/TRC-75 for communications to the task force. The AN/TRC-75 was put on dead-line 75% of the time, because of lack of parts. The AN/PRC-47 was used for a back-up, and it's significant to mention that the performance of this set was exceptional compared to the radio set AN/TRC-75.
- (b) The units ability to perform the necessary preventive maintenance and repair of its communications equipment has changed to C1 due to the newly joined communicators.
- (7) Close Combat. The platoon Patrol Reports for patrols conducted from the U. S. Army Special Forces Camp at BA TO, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), are appended as enclosures (2) through (20) respectively, and the Combat After Action Report (Operations DOUBLE EAGLE), is appended as enclosure (21), (22).
- (8) Fire Support.
- (a) In support of all patrols at the U. S. Army Special Forces Camp BA TO, Republic of VIETNAM, (RVN), Hotel Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, fired 1,947 rounds on VC targets sighted by our patrols.

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- (b) Both Reconnaissance Teams and assigned F.O. Teams, called all fire missions on VC targets.

(9) Logistics.

- (a) AR-15's were utilized by this unit on Operation DOUBLE EAGLE II, and we found that ammunition and magazines were a problem to obtain.
- (b) The lack of timely resupply of jungle utilities and jungle boots has caused problems because of continuous inclement weather.
- (c) The lack of adequate motor transport parts is continuing to keep a large quantity of vehicles deadlined.
- (d) Showers were very much improved for this unit. On 22 February 1966, a 4,500 gallon water tank was installed.
- (e) The unit had this cantonment dedicated by General ENGLISH as Camp L. H. MERRELL on 21 February 1966.

W C Shaver
W. C. SHAVER

Final (1)

COMMAND AND STAFF BILLETS

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERNO/MOS</u>
Commanding Officer	Major	SHAYER, William C.	Captain	080180/0302
Executive Officer	Captain	SPENGLER, Henry P.	Captain	082488/0302
Operations Officer	Captain	FREITAS, John P.	CySgt	1059882/0369
Intelligence Officer	1stLt	KOCH, Gus A.	SSgt	1306806/0239
Supply Officer	1stLt	BEST, Sheldon J.	1stLt	088052/3002
Communications Officer	1stLt	GOENEY, Valgil L.	MSgt	1113771/2539
Platoon Commander 2nd Platoon	1stLt	LENKER, John C.	1stLt	087585/0302
Platoon Commander 3rd Platoon	1stLt	OWENS, Sammy L.	1stLt	085114/0302
Platoon Commander 4th Platoon	1stLt	PARKER, Richard F.	1stLt	085283/0302
Platoon Commander 5th Platoon	1stLt	PAULL, Jerome	1stLt	087885/0302

Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIALCopy of copies
1st Force Recon Co
DA NANG, RVN
231100H Jan 1966PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: Hateful

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: (2) Off (12) Enl (1) USN
2. MISSION: To conduct reconnaissance/surveillance operations in area bounded by grid lines BS 52 on the west, BS 55 on the east, BS 37 on the south, and BS 30 on the north.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 200645H January 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 221340H January 1966.
5. ROUTE: See overlay.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

1ST FORCE RECON CO S & C NO. 3566

COPY <u>1</u> OF <u>2</u>

TIMES

201600H	Grid squares BS 5136, 5236	Bells, gongs, other like noises, coming from valleys, continuing for several hours.
201700H	Vicinity BS 522363	Laughter and yelling: sounds like those of a party.
211430H	BS 521369	Four VC, wandered into our position, wearing black.
220730H	BS 523371	Heard drums in the distance from this position.
221015H	BS 524369	30 to 50 VC attacked patrol.

7. OTHER INFORMATION. One other man, LCpl SCHAEFERS, started out with patrol but hurt his foot about 1000 meters from Camp BA TO. He was recovered by patrol from this camp. He is included in paragraph 1. See Appendix for details of the VC encounters.

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: Friendly: 2 MIA (231200H), no KIA or WIA. VC: 7 - 9 KIA, several WIA.

CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale good; physical condition poor.

10. CONCLUSIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS: See paragraph (7) for opinions. No further conclusions or recommendations.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

R. F. PARKER JR.
1st Lt USMC

ENCLOSURE (2)

APPENDIX ASUMMARY OF EVENTS CONCERNING VC CONTACT
ON 21-22 JANUARY 1966

At about 211430H Hateful stopped at BS 521369, to await better visibility, since poor visibility (50 feet) made accurate movement of the hill-top impossible. About 211700H four VC, wearing black, approached the patrol base from the southeast, moving cross-country. They detected the rear position of the patrol base, without being detected themselves, and opened fire. They fired only two .30 cal rounds before they were scattered by M3A1 return fire. They ran screaming and yelling, with at least one probable WIA. Due to the heavy vegetation and terrain, the main body of the patrol was unable to see the action, and hearing all the firing and yelling, took off in the other direction. The patrol had been often briefed that VC initiated contact would be broken immediately. About 40 yards from the patrol base, PARKER assembled those near him, and immediately returned, on line, to the scene of the action. There they found OBERHAUS, who had remained after firing his M3A1. Lt. EGAN was missing. Teams were sent out to search for him, and his name yelled from the position. He was not found, nor were any tracks or signs of movement in another direction found. Conflicting reports by witnesses make it impossible to determine whether or not Lt. EGAN was wounded, or in which direction he might have moved. He did have his rifle with him and no subsequent firing was heard. The rally point was the USSF camp. Having searched the immediate area and waited until near darkness, the patrol departed at 1830H, and located themselves for the night several hundred yards from the incident. A patrol base was established about 1930H at BS 523372.

About 220745H, the patrol moved out to the northeast to continue the mission. Visibility remained the same and the patrol had to move by dead-reckoning, since it was too hazardous to remain. About 0900H, further movement to the north or east became impossible due to the severity of the grade. The patrol was forced to back-track, losing an hour and move to the southeast along the contour line, trying to locate a place to descend. Such a place was found, and the patrol was moving straight downhill, when attacked from the rear at BS 524369 about 1015H.


Upon contact, the patrol was in a dispersed column, moving straight down a steep incline. The attack was made by an estimated 30 to 50 VC/PAVN, who were observed to have been following Hateful's track. When, in tracking, the VC made contact with the patrol's rear point, they began the attack. Due to the vegetation and terrain, only those two men on the rear point, upon initial contact, saw or engaged the enemy. The remainder of the patrol immediately attempted to break contact by rapid downhill movement, through 6 to 8 foot elephant grass and brush. The two men on the rear fired about 70 rounds into the VC, killing at least 2 to 4, and wounding several. They then joined the rapid descent. The VC attacked initially with large numbers of grenades and automatic weapons (heavier than carbines, lighter than M3A1's). They pursued both physically and by fire, now using primarily semi-automatic .30 cal weapons at longer ranges. The entire descent was made under conditions of heavy attack, and was not a controlled movement. During this time the corpsman stopped, thinking that the rest had stopped, and found himself in the midst of the VC. He killed five, and probably six, and continued moving.

Seeking cover, concealment, and terrain without great disadvantages, Lt. PALMER led six other men to a position in heavy vegetation, high up in a draw, where they set up an ambush for anyone tracking them (about 1100H at BS 528368). The VC at this time were searching the entire area. About 1130 other men from the patrol came into the ambush, and linked up. Lt. PALMER then called in over 150 rounds of artillery on suspected and possible VC positions.

At 1223H, helicopters picked up three men who had linked-up at BS 529366. At 1325H, helicopters picked up the nine men at BS 529367. GRISSETT was the only man missing in this incident, and is still listed as MIA. He was the point for the patrol and was seen several times during the descent, in good condition and further down the hill than the rest. It is reasonable to assume that he escaped unharmed from this incident, and began his movement back to the USSF camp.

The VC were observed by five men to be wearing khaki uniforms, one man observing khaki rain-type hats and wrap-around leggings, another observing grey or darker khaki uniforms. From the attack, it is apparent that they were armed with sub-machineguns, semi-automatic .30 cal weapons, and a great number of hand grenades. They were aggressive and fairly well trained, and their morale appeared to be high.

It is reasonable to assume that the four VC involved in the incident on 21 January moved to inform a VC/PAVN unit they knew to be in the area. Due to vegetation, terrain, and weather, night movement by units in the area is virtually impossible. Thus the VC/PAVN unit appears to have been located no more than one hour's march from BS 521369, since this would allow day-break movement there, and subsequent tracking, to the sight of the attack.



Enclosure (1) to
Appendix A


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with enclosure.*

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PATROL OVERLAY FOR HATEFUL PATROL
FOR PERIOD OF 20 TO 22 JAN 1966

51



MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000,
Sheet 6755 III,
Series L701

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1st Foe Recon Co, 20 Jan - Feb 66
w/ Encl 2

1ST FORCE RECON CO S & C NO. 3600
COPY <u>1</u> OF <u>2</u>

Copy ___ of ___ copies
 1st Force Recon Co
 DA HANG, RVN
 311690H Jan 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: PRINHPHO 1.

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheets 6755 II, III, series L701.

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 1 Officer, 3 Enlisted.
2. MISSION: To set up observation post and observe activity in vicinity of TAN AN (1) and TAN AN (2), BS 6039, 6040.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 26 1830H January 1966.
4. TIME OF RECOVERY: 29 1500H January 1966.
5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - a. Road blocked by large poles dug into the road at 595385, 281005H.
 - b. 3 VC, moving west along road, 595385, black pajamas, 281020H, small arms.
 - c. 15 VC, moving west along road, 595385, dark uniforms, some with hats, 281040H, weapons undetermined.
 - d. 4 VC, moving west along road, 595385, dark uniforms, 281105H, pack and weapons undetermined.
 - e. 6 VC going north, crossing river, 591391, 281140H. Black pajamas, 2 with packs, weapons undetermined.
 - f. 3 VC, moving east, 597387, black pajamas, 281205H, carrying packs, weapons undetermined.
 - g. 3 VC, moving west along road, 595385, black pajamas, 281220H. Packs, weapons undetermined.
 - h. HLZ's at 592388 - 15-20 helos; 594396 - 10-15 helos; 600395 - 15-20 helos.
 - i. 9 VC, moving west along road, 595385, 3 wearing gray uniforms and rain hats, rest wearing black pajamas, 281510H, 3 carrying packs, 5 carrying small arms.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS,
 DOD DIR 5200.10

ENCL (3)

- j. 6 VC, moving west along road, 597387, black pajamas, one wearing construction type helmet, 290930H, small arms weapons.
- k. 2 VC, moving west along road, 597387, black pajamas, one wearing a floppy rain hat, 290940H, small arms.
- l. 2 VC, moving east on road, 598388, one black pajamas, other in bluish gray uniform with rain hat, 291035H, man in uniform wearing cartridge belt and small arms.
- m. 1 VC, moving east, 596386, bluish gray uniform, 291035H, small arms.
- n. 6 VC, attacking our observation post, 603378, black pajama bottoms and khaki shirts, 291210H, cartridge belts and small arms.
- [REDACTED]**

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6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH ENEMY:

Patrol was occupying its observation post at 603378. One man was in a tree and another was at the base of the tree. The other two men were about 20 yards away. The man in the tree saw six men about 50 feet from the tree coming toward the tree. He climbed down and the two men ran down to where the other two team members were. One man got on the radio and said we had been spotted and needed a helicopter pickup. The VC then opened fire and the team jumped into the bushes. The radio was left behind. At this time LCpl SOLOVSKOY was wounded in the left calf. The team moved to 598379 and was going to await the helicopters or until darkness and then move out. After waiting an hour, the VC opened up on the team again from about 10 feet away. This broke up the team. The initial burst killed LCpl DOWLING. LCpl SOLOVSKOY returned fire and killed two VC. By this time the helicopters were flying overhead. The remainder of the patrol was picked up in three different locations.

Friendly casualties: 1 KIA, 1 WIA. Enemy casualties: 2 KIA.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale good, 2 men have many scratches and bruises.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. VC patrol that attacked observation post either were moving through the area or had picked up the trail that the team had left.

J. C. LENKER
1stLt USMCR

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S & C NO. 8766

COPY 1 OF 2

Copy of copies
1st Force Recon Co
DA NANG, RVN
031430H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

PATROL DESIGNATION: PRIMNESS 2

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 II

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL:

GYSGT	JACQUES	Patrol Leader	Blisters (feet)
SGT	AKIOKA	Asst Patrol Ldr	Crouch irritation
CPL	LEWIS	Radioman	Blisters (feet)
PFC	BEAVERS	Scout	Good

2. MISSION: Conduct surveillance of VUC LEM Area, trails and in SONG NUOC XUOI River beed in vicinity of BS 654355.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 261830H January 1966.

4. TIME OF RETURN: 011520H February 1966.

5. OBSERVATIONS OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. 2 VC at 271030, BS 635314, walking north in black uniforms with packs and small arms undetermined.
- b. 2 VC at 271045H, BS 623314, setting in punji stakes on side of hill. One in black, one with maroon shorts and white top, packs, no arms.
- c. 4 VC at 281700H, (BS 638314, walking on rice paddy dike in black uniform carrying small arms undetermined.
- d. 1 VC at 281730H, BS 638314, walking on rice paddy dike in black uniform carrying carbine. Believed this man spotted us, then started beating on bamboo stick to signal other VC that we were in area.
- e. Lights and flares and noise of troops at 282430H, BS 653354. Flares were fired from ground and went off about 150 feet in air, lights were used on hilltops to signal other hills location undetermined.
- f. Combat Out Post at 291530H, BS 651327, noise of about 9 to 10 VC, was heard. This group also heard noise from our movement and started to yell. They did not fire.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.

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Encl (4)

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7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, excellent; condition, good.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The area that this patrol operated was a VC route and that all their movement was at night when they used flares to illuminate their trail, possibly to move mortars or equipment.
9. PATROL ROUTE: See overlay.
10. LOST GEAR: None.

M.J. JACQUES
GYSGT USMC

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1ST FORCE RECON CO S & C NO. <u>3866</u>
COPY <u>1</u> OF <u>2</u>

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1st Force Recon Co
DA NANG, RVN
031000H Feb 1966

PATROL REPORT

PATROL DESIGNATION. GALLEON 1

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 II, Series L701

1. COMPOSITION AND CONDITION:

LT	OWENS	Platoon Leader	Good
SGT	MAXWELL	Assistant Platoon Leader	Bad Feet (Arches)
LCPL	FULMER	Radioman	Good
LCPL	WILDE	Scout	Good

2. MISSION: Conduct surveillance of trail and stream network vicinity of BS 656320.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 261830H January 1966.

4. TIME OF RETURN: 021000H February 1966.

5. OBSERVATIONS OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. Eleven VC at 271238H, BS 616306, setting punji stakes and camouflaging punji pits. Three in khaki uniforms and packs, all had rifles, unknown types.
- b. Large pits dug along road between BS 622298 and BS 634296. Pits were 3 - 5 feet deep, 4 feet wide and 6 feet long, extending across road every 20 to 40 yards. Intermittently large punji stakes, 8" in diameter, and extending 3 to 5 feet above the ground, were observed between these pits.
- c. Fighting holes along road between BS 639294 and 644294. These holes were dug into road bank, camouflaged and faced the south. Fresh camouflage.
- d. Large punji stakes at BS 643294. 8" in diameter extending above ground 3 to 4 feet.
- e. Small punji pits, 1 foot deep by 1 foot wide, observed along trail and approaches to Hill 590, BS 651298, fresh camouflage.
- f. Old VC harbor site BS 652304. Delapidated huts with straw roofs blown away. No tracks observed.
- g. 5 VC black uniforms moving down stream at BS 656329, carrying packs and rifles. Time approximately 281430H.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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
~~SECRET~~ ~~AL~~
ENCL (5)

- h. 4 VCS working in rice paddy at BS 656320, wearing black PJ's. Time 231600H.
- i. Throughout the period 27 to 29 January 1966, heard voices vicinity of BS 654322. Subsequent to artillery firing in the immediate area on the evening of 29 January 1966, no voices or persons were observed.
- j. Two new villages not shown on map. One at BS 671309 and another at BS 668300.
6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: Negative contact.
7. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS: T
- a. That the area this patrol was directed to surveil is dense with VC and that the reason so few sightings were made was the result of the VC remaining and confining their activity to trails under the canopy once artillery fire was delivered within that area.
- b. That artillery be delivered on only extreme lucrative targets in order that OP sites may observe significant movement and activities.
8. PATROL ROUTE: See overlay.
9. MORALE AND CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, excellent; condition, good.
10. LOST GEAR: None.
11. EQUIPMENT USED BY PATROL: One AN/PRC-25 radio.


S.L. OWENS
1stLt USMC

Debriefers comments and recommendations: None.

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34

ret Ice Recon Co, 20 Jan - Feb 66
w/ Encl 5



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PATROL - ROUTE OVERLAY

MAP SHEET 6755 III


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PATROL DESIGNATION: GALLEON 2



1st Fco Recon Co, 20 Jan - Feb 66
w/ Ltnel 6

Overlay # 1
Patrol Route




Maps: Viet Nam 1:50,000
 Sheets G755 II & III
 Series L901

Base Recon B, 20 Jan - Feb 66
 w/ Encl 7

Overlay # 2

HLZs (numbers show number of H-34s)



40

0 18

0 24

9 0

0 6

0 6

9 0

0 9

18 0

63

6 0

6 0

26

Maps: Viet Nam

1:50,000

Sheets 6755 7 1/4

Series L201

1st Reccon Co, 20 Jan - Feb 66
w/ Encl 7

1ST FORCE RECON CO
S & C NO. 4000

040000 FEBRUARY 1966

~~4 February 1966~~COPY 1 OF 2

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: HATEFUL 1

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheets 6755 II, III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: (1) Off (3) Enl.
2. MISSION: Conduct surveillance of LANG DA village and trail network (GS 6124)
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 261850H January 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 021100H February 1966.
5. ROUTE: See Overlay #1.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN: See Overlay #2 for HLZ's.

272030H	BS 624292	Well used east-west trail going through saddle
272100H	BS 625283	Punji traps and stakes on hill and approaches. Long poles tied together, apparently an antenna, laying down
272230H	BS 623277	Flashlight signals, VC outpost
281600H	BS 625288	2 VC moving south on trail, wearing black
011000H	BS 615259	2 VC established OP, wearing undetermined uniforms and hats, carrying rifles and packs.
011130H	BS 614260	8 VC wearing black, carrying small arms, moving up hill.

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

- a. VC outpost apparently heard the patrol coming, and signaled it with two light flashes. The signal was repeated several times. Several hours later flashlights were observed in vicinity BS 627280. These were not signals. Possibly they were searching for patrol.
- b. The VC on the OP were not wearing black, but some sort of uniform. They found good concealment in a bush, but stood up every time they looked at something, mostly aircraft. They abandoned the post about 1300. In conjunction with the 8 man patrol, with which they appeared to exchange some words, they seemed possibly to be a march-outpost type position.

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ENCL (7)

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Satisfactory.
10. CONCLUSIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

R.F. PARKER JR.
1stLt USMC

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031400H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: HATEFUL 3

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 II, III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: (2) Off (3) Enl
2. MISSION: Conduct surveillance of trail network in vicinity BS 625290.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 271715H January 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 011520H February 1966.
5. ROUTE: (See overlay).
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

301505H BS 625284 Six (6) VC
7. OTHER INFORMATION:
 - a. 301505H, sighted 6 VC on Hill 763, BS 625284. Seemed to be working on trail setting punji stakes or booby traps. Called artillery in. VC moved off hill to southeast. Weapons not observed.
 - b. See overlay #2 for new trails.
 - c. Made physical contact with patrol GALLEON 2 at 311915H at BS 625297.
 - d. Communications were good throughout the patrol with one AN/TRC-25. Changed batteries on D-3.
 - e. Attached leaflet found at BS 625296.
 - f. Located punji stakes at BS 625298.
8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: One member suffered heat exhaustion. Rest of patrol in good condition. Morale, good.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
 - a. That patrols be advised when friendly patrols are in their area.

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That patrol leaders be given an aerial reconnaissance of area if it is the first time in the area.

J. T. DANN

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Additional comments and recommendations: none.

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041200H Feb 1966PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: PRIMNESS 4

MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: (1) Officer, (4) Enlisted.
2. MISSION: To conduct OP of valley between BS 650354 and BS 654373.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 020930H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 031600H February 1966.
5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - a. 2 possible VC heard near BS 686336 moving in a southerly direction at 021000H.
 - b. One tree-house observed overlooking trail in vicinity of BS 678344 at 1400H, possibly utilized by trail watchers.
 - c. A high pitched banging sound at 030645H, in vicinity of BS 681357, it may have been a signal.
 - d. Old guerilla base camp located at BS 681357, at 030800H. Punji stakes were located throughout the area. Most were in group of four, facing south down a hill at a 45° angle to the ground. The stakes appeared old but some had a reddish colored substance on their tips.
 - e. A trail running from BS 681358 to 674361, along the ridge line and marked with broken and cut branches. The branches were cut approximately 2½ feet off the ground. The trail markers appeared old and the trail did not appear that it had been used for the past 24 hours.
 - f. 7 VC were sighted moving west down trail at BS 674361 wearing black PJ's and carrying what appeared to be carbines at 031100H. The rear security in our perimeter opened fire when the enemy appeared to have seen us. The patrol regrouped and moved west toward the HLZ. A stream bed was entered at BS 663354 and followed to BS 654353. Four huts were spotted along the stream under the canopy. Two of them had fighting holes within 10 feet of them. The holes were 4½ feet deep and 3½ feet in diameter. No VC were observed in the area but the patrol was moving very rapidly to recovery point. The recovery was effected at 031525H, in vicinity of BS 654353.

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- g. An HLZ was located along ridge line between BS 681343 and 689360, to accommodate approximately 10 helicopters. Terminal guidance would be required due to high grass covering rocks and slopes.
- h. The canopy was approximately 40 feet and vegetation was prominent throughout area. Visibility was extremely limited due to vegetation. Terrain was steep but secondary growth was moderate.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY:

- a. The rear security knocked the first three VC over backwards with the initial burst from a carbine. The initial burst was fired from the sitting position expending approximately fifteen rounds. The remainder of the magazine was expended spraying area where remaining 4 VC dispersed.
- b. Light automatic small arms fire was received from the north and south side of the landing zone at BS 654353.
- c. There were no friendly casualties and it is estimated that the VC suffered two KIA's and two WIA's.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale was excellent. Physical condition was fair, 2/5 of the patrol have blistered and bone bruised feet, caused by rapid movement and wet feet.

8. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. The size of the patrol was satisfactory.
- b. Aerial photos of area should be made available if possible.
- c. The patrol report is very similar to the information contained in the debriefing report. Much effort and time is being duplicated increasing the administration burden of all concerned.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. The S-2 make an attempt to obtain aerial photos covering the objective areas from a VMJ squadron.
- b. The patrol report be confined to conclusions and recommendations.
- c. The person debriefing review all message traffic concerning the patrol.
- d. The patrol leader review debriefing report prior to submission by S-2.


c. The S-2 utilize the SALUTE format when compiling the debriefing report.

H.P. SPENGLER
1stLt USMC

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050900H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: GALLEON 3

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: (5) Enlisted.
2. MISSION: To conduct reconnaissance/surveillance operation in area of BS 665304.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 021000H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 031615H February 1966.
5. ROUTE: See overlay.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY:

031400H 3VC at BS 659289, Black PJ's, packs with rifles, walking in a southeasterly direction.

031500H Compromise by 15 or more VC. See appendix for details.
7. OTHER INFORMATION: None.
8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No friendly casualties, enemy casualties unknown.
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, good; physical condition, good.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: See appendix.

D. R. BLANKENSHIP
SGT USMC

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APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF EVENTS CONCERNING COMPROMISE BY VIET CONG.

At 031500H, GALLEON 3 was manning an OP at BS 658298. At this time, Corporal HUMBLE saw a VC dressed in black PJ's emerge from the elephant grass approximately 40 meters from our position. This man was not armed, and ducked down in the elephant grass at the same time Cpl HUMBLE spotted him. We are certain that this man had also seen Cpl HUMBLE. Cpl HUMBLE informed me of what had happened, and I instructed him to alert the patrol while I went to his OP point, which was approximately 5 meters away, to assess the situation further. At this time I observed six VC emerge from the tree line approximately 150 meters from our position. These men were dressed in green camouflage uniforms, bloused trousers, belts, packs, small arms, and some of them were wearing shiny green helmets while others had their helmets tied to their belts. Following the first six men was a man dressed in black shorts only and carrying a mortar barrell. This mortar barrell was real shiny in color and about the same size as our 81 mortar, but did not have rings on the outside of the barrell. I saw vague outlines behind this man in the trees. At this time the first six men were only 100 meters from us and advancing on our position. I then called for artillery support and after two rounds I adjusted and fired for effect. I adjusted the artillery as close to our position as possible without taking casualties from it ourselves. Our last two fire for effects, were only about 100 meters from our position and we were receiving shrapnel from them. When the artillery started coming in, the VC scattered in the tree line. Their casualties are unknown, but all of our fire for effects were in the right area.

At this time our artillery support ceased firing, after 33 rounds, and our helos were overhead for our pickup. We moved to our LZ, which was the same area where we had first spotted the VC. We marked the LZ with a yellow smoke and layed down a base of fire on the tree line to the southwest. The helos also straffed this area and at this time we moved into the open on our LZ. We started receiving small arms fire from the tree line. We made our pickup without sustaining any casualties. The helos received fire from three directions and just after we lifted off the LZ, a large explosion was observed near the LZ, possibly a mortar round.

APPENDIX B

CONCLUSIONS.

The first man spotted by us was acting as a guide for the VC.

The first six men were acting as point for a larger unit.

Laborers were being used to carry equipment.

VC involved were definitely hard core PAVN unit.

The VC split their forces after sighting us and were trying to envelope our position from two sides. The helos received fire from both sides of our position and also the front.

Our sighting and contact with the VC was a chance contact.

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w/ Encl 10

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041130H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: HATEFUL 4

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheets 6755 II, III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 1 Officer, 3 Enlisted, 1 USN
2. MISSION: To establish observation post vicinity BS 5727, call artillery fire missions, on targets of opportunity, and recommend employment of infantry.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 021000H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 031215H February 1966.
5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - A. Tree with two holes stuffed with rocks was sited at 593257. A man looked in one of the holes and saw that the tree was hollow and there appeared to be a light down inside the tree.
 - b. Through the area around 587263, the patrol could smell dead bodies and there appeared to be several hasty graves in the area.
 - c. The patrol was ambushed by an estimated 6 VC at 576263. The VC were not sighted at this time. They had automatic carbines and M-1's.
 - d. The patrol was recovered by helicopter at 580264. After liftoff, 5 VC were sighted, apparently trying to find the patrol prior to recovery, 580264, two were wearing khaki uniforms and three were wearing green uniforms, they were carrying small arms.
6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH ENEMY: The patrol was moving through very thick elephant grass and vines on its way to its designated observation post site on hill 324 at 576262. The patrol just moved out of the elephant grass and under the canopy that was on top of hill 324. The time was 021150H. The VC had evidently heard the patrol moving through the elephant grass and were waiting for them. After the initial burst of fire from the VC, the patrol returned fire and then moved back into the elephant grass. After moving approximately 300 meters, the patrol adjusted artillery fire on Hill 324 and awaited the helicopters. The helicopters arrived at 021215H. On lift off, the five VC were sighted. They were fired on from the helicopter.

There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties are unknown.

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7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, good; physical condition, good.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
 - a. The hollow three could possibly be a ventilation tube for an underground tunnel.
 - b. The VC on Hill 324, were possibly an outpost for a larger force which was in the valley to the north of Hill 324.

J. C. LENKER
1st Lt USMC

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061100H Feb 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: PRIMNESS 3

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL:

Team Leader	SSGT HALL
Team Members	WHITFIELD
	ROSSI
	RIGGS
	BACHTA

2. MISSION: Conduct ground reconnaissance of enemy movements and activity.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 021010H February 1966.

4. TIME OF RETURN: 051445H February 1966.

5. ROUTE: See overlay.

6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>OBSERVATION</u>
041400H	SW direction	Small arms fire
050030H	BS 615285	Trail in this area with fighting holes
051340H	BS 605298	Observed 15 VC on hill

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

- a. The patrol heard lots of small arms fire, from a SW direction. It was estimated to come from a distance of about 4000 meters. The patrol's location at this time was BS 626284.
- b. A trail was located in the underbrush at BS 615285. This trail had fighting holes on both sides. It appeared that this trail and the fighting holes, had not been used for some time.
- c. 15 VC's were observed on a hill at BS 612298, in two groups. At this time the VC's were 900 meters away. The VC spotted the patrol and moved along the ridgeline towards the patrol. The patrol took immediate evasive action. No weapons were fired. All VC were armed with Chinese Communist carbines, their uniform was khaki's and soft covers.

L

Some of the VC had on what appeared to be dark raincoats. All had cartridge belts, no packs.

d. Communications difficulty was encountered with a bad handset. It checked out good prior to the patrols departure.

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY:

a. Evasive action was taken immediately after being compromised. Helo pickup was requested and accomplished with no further incident.

9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Condition, good; morale, excellent

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Some type of system should be worked out, in case there is communications failure, so that some messages can be sent by keying the handset and understood by all.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TAKEN ON PATROL:

a. One AN/PRC-25.

b. One pair binoculars, 7X50.

K.R. HALL
SSGT USMC

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: None.

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111000H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: PRIMNESS 4

MAPS: VIETNAM; 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 II, Series L701

1. COMPOSITION OF PATROL: (1) Off (3) Enl
2. MISSION: Observe the objective area for enemy movement or concentrations.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 051830H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 101816H February 1966.
5. PATROL ROUTE: See overlay.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
060800H	BS 599242	2 punji traps
060800H	BS 599242	Trail marker
6 - 10 Feb	BA TO River Valley	Heard engine
071940H	BS 595238	Observed 15 people moving southwest
9 Feb	BS 568224	Observed 4 people

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

- a. The patrol was in process of moving from one location to the next, when the encounter with the punji traps occurred.
- b. The trail marker was on the same trail as the traps. A three-stick branch placed on top of the trail with the small branches resting on the ground and the apex or main branch, facing skyward.
- c. From the 6th of February on, until pickup by helos, the patrol heard what appeared to be the sounds of a generator or motor. The exact location of this sound could not be established, but it came from the general direction of the BA TO River Valley below the patrols location. The engine was definitely mobile and operating under different degrees of stress. The motor would race then appear to almost stall out as if going up and down hill.

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- d. On 071940H, the patrol observed 15 people at BS 596237, moving in a southwesterly direction down a trail. It was too dark then to observe the type of clothing and if they had weapons. All that could be seen was the outline of people.
- e. On the 9th of February, observed 4 people from a distance of 2,500 meters at BS 568224. Weapons and equipment unobserved.

- 8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.
- 9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Physical condition, fair to good; morale, excellent.
- 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
 - 1. A patrol should have at least 8 hours for preparation of a particular mission.
 - 2. Some type of foul weather jacket should be provided by the supply system for operations in this terrain.
 - 3. Extra oil and thong cases should be made available in the supply system for personnel not carrying the M-14.
 - 4. That only lug soled boots be worn on patrol.
- 11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TAKEN ON PATROL:
 - a. One AN/PRC-25 with 2 batteries.
 - b. One set of binoculars 7X50.

H. P. SPENGLER
CAPT USMC

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER: None.

G. A. KOCH
SSGT USMC

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110900H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: HATEFUL #3

MAP: VIETNAM; 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 II, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 1 Off 3 Enl
2. MISSION: Observe enemy activity and movement through the objective area.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 041830H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 091915H February 1966.
5. ROUTE: See overlay.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
071225H	BS 634239	Spotted 4 VC
081300H	BS 624265	Spotted 3 VC
091845H	BS 612269	2 VC followed the patrol
Map correction	619272 to 623274	New trail

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

- a. Map correction: A trail, approximately 2 feet wide, leading from BS 619272 to 623274. This trail can be observed from the air. Fresh punji stakes were placed on this trail pointing up hill.
 - b. On the evening of the 6th, the patrol came upon a hut. It was recently built and no trails were around this area. This hut is well concealed, and there were no people in this area. Its position is BS 634272.
 - c. On the 8th, the patrol heard one shot, while located at BS 623274. It came from 45°, 600 to 700 yards away.
8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTER WITH THE ENEMY: Friendly; no KIA, no WIA. Enemy; KIA unknown, WIA, unknown.
 9. CONDITION OF PATROL: None, excellent; condition, excellent.

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10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Patrols distance and travel time, should be left entirely up to the patrol leader.
- b. All movement should be made during the period of darkness. Compromise is more likely during the day.
- c. Camouflage uniforms should be mandatory in this area.
- d. Poncho liners would be of good use in the mountains.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TAKEN BY PATROL:

- a. One pair binoculars 7X50.
- b. One AN/ PRC-25 radio.

J. T. PAULL
1stLt USMC

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER: None.

NARRATIVE OF HATEFUL 3 PATROL

The patrol landed by helos at BS 611272, and moved into a south southeasterly direction for approximately 2,000 meters. At 042400H, the patrol set up a base camp. During this time the patrol observed bombing in the BA TO River Valley.

At 050100H, we received word to move east of grid line 62. We departed and at BS 616258, we set in for the night. At 050600H, at BS 615270, the patrol set up an OP and observed the valley to the southeast all day. No sightings were made. At 051930H, at BS 613268, the patrol set in. At the same time, we received word to remain in that valley and observe to the southeast. At 052100H, the patrol received word to move to objective "F". At BS 640274, we set in for the night.

At 060600H, we departed to BS 644274. No contact could be established with Punctuate 6 until 1830H, when we moved north east and then made contact. The patrol then moved to BS 624275, and set in for the night. That night we were informed by Punctuate 6, to resume mission to objective "H". At 070630H, we departed to BS 624274, and established an OP. That day the patrol spotted 4 VC at BS 634239, the time was 071225H. Weapons were unobserved, due to a distance of 3,000 meters. Artillery was called in, 15 rounds, no damage assessment. That night we moved to BS 624277 and set in for the night.

The next morning, the patrol moved to BS 619274 and established an OP. At 081300H, the patrol spotted 3 VC, 1,000 meters from the OP. At BS 624265, carrying packs. Two of the VC emerged from 2 huts that were close by. Weapons unknown, black PJ, no covers. We called in artillery fire, no damage assessment was made. At 081930H, the patrol moved to BS 616269, and set in for the night.

At 090615H, the patrol departed, moved to BS 615271, and set up an OP. No sightings were made.

At 091815H, the patrol moved to Hill 612269, and established defense for HLZ. At 091845H, the patrol observed 2 VC that appeared to have followed them. The patrol opened fire on the VC and they dispersed.

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100900H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: HATEFUL 4

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 II, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: (3) Enl (1) USN
2. MISSION: To observe VUC LIEM VALLEY of enemy movement and concentrations, plus possible HLZ for large troop landings.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 071900H.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 090830H.
5. ROUTE USED BY PATROL: (see overlay).
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
082130H	BS 662362	15 VC
082300H	BS 659365 to 654369	Map corrections
082300H	BS 662364	Hasty ambush site
	GS BS 6436	Large HLZ
090800H	BS 652368	Observed 2 VC

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

- a. At 082130H, the patrol heard and observed 15 VC at BS 662362, from a distance of 20 yards. All carried carbines with two bandoleers of ammunition hanging from their shoulders. They wore black PJ's with no covers. The patrol stayed under cover so no contact was made.
- b. Map Correction. A large used trail running from BS 659365 to 669358. This is a very prominent trail and cannot be observed from the air. The trail was about 5 feet wide with the canopy about 12 feet high. It has a rocky bottom and joined another trail at BS 654369.
- c. At 082300H, our patrol made contact with the VC. Two VC opened up, each with single shots. The scout and team leader of our patrol, both opened up at the same time with one M-79 round and 1 magazine from an automatic M-14, from about 20 meters. The team leader saw two VC fall backwards, dead, confirmed by him, and three possibly wounded. After the initial contact, the VC spread out and the patrol departed to find a more secure location for the night.

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After the patrol was in a fairly safe area, they heard the VC calling to each other and moving around. An hour later the VC had regrouped, split into three parts, and started a search for the patrol. They searched until about 090330H. Then they discontinued the search, but stayed in the general vicinity.

The patrol then called for a helo recovery at first light. Pickup was confirmed and since the HLZ was not secure, the patrol stayed where they were until the helos were overhead. Then they went down to the HLZ and marked it with yellow smoke.

One H-34 came in to make the pickup, BS 652368. As the helo landed, the patrol observed 2 VC emerge from the brush and fire on the helo. These VC were fired at with an AR - 15, and an M - 14 automatic. One VC was KIA and one WIA.

- d. All of the VUC LIEM VALLEY could be utilized for a HLZ. It would accommodate at least 50 helos.
8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: Friendly; none. Enemy; 3 KIA, 3 WIA, 1 possible WIA.
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, excellent; condition, good.
10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.
11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT USED BY PATROL:
 - a. One AN/PRC-25 radio.
 - b. One pair binoculars, 7X50.
 - c. One AR-15.
 - d. One M-79.

C. G. BLANTON
SGT USMC

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER: None.

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121230H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: GALLEON 4

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755II, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 5 Enl.
2. MISSION: To observe the objective area and provide surveillance of enemy movement and concentrations.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 071830H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 111830H February 1966.
5. ROUTE: See overlay.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

090800 to 111800H	GS BS 6423	Sounds of a motor.
091850H	BS 633258	1 VC
7. OTHER INFORMATION:
 - a. On the 9th of Feb, the patrol heard what appeared to be generator or motor sounds. The patrol location was BS 639244. It sounded like this noise came from the general vicinity of BS 6423, in the SONG DINH Valley. It was estimated that the sounds were not more than 1,000 yards away.
 - b. One VC was observed walking into a building at BS 633258. No weapons or equipment was noticed. He was dressed in Black Pajamas.
8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Physical condition, excellent; morale; excellent.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
 - a. That the same area is not used again, if the mission is to observe the SONG DINH River Valley, due to limited observation.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

Encl (16)

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TAKEN ON PATROL:

- a. 1 AN/PRC-25 radio with 3 batteries.
- b. 1 set binoculars 7X50.
- c. 1 yellow panel.

J. H. MARTIN
SGT USMC

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER: Item 7a. This patrol report. This sound was heard by a previous patrol. For further information see PRIMNESS 4 Patrol Report of 11 February 1966.

1ST FORCE RECON CO S & C CO. # 5068
COPY <u>1</u> OF <u>2</u>

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1st Force Recon Co
BA TO, RVN
131100H, February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: GALLEON 3

MAP: VIETNAM; 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 II, L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 4 Enl.
2. MISSION: Observe enemy movement and activity in the SONG NUOC XUOI and SONG NUOC DO Valleys.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 071830H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 121817H February 1966.
5. PATROL ROUTE: See overlay.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
080330H	BS 668318	Heard one shot fired.
081035H	BS 665325	Observed 4 people.
081130H	BS 664324	3 people walking.
081140H	BS 655331	12 people working.
091030H	BS 656325	Observed 1 man.
091130H	BS 658320	Observed 1 man.
112330H	BS 665315	Heard single shot fired.
121600H	BS 659317	2 people walking.
	BS 668317 to 659317	Map correction.

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

- a. The patrol heard a single shot, possibly from a M-1 rifle or a Russian Carbine, approximately 500 to 600 meters away from them.
- b. Observed 4 Montagnards emerge from a hut. They were carrying baskets, wearing black clothing, one had an axe.
- c. Observed 3 people walking over a dike. A spotter aircraft flew over and they hid on the side of the dike.
- d. Observed 12 people working in rice field. When spotter aircraft approached, they hid. no weapons observed, all had black clothing. One man discarded his outer clothing, underneath he had white clothing, it appeared to the patrol that this man was supervising the rest of the people.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR S200.10

ENCL (17)

- e. One appeared out from the brush momentarily, then walked back into the same place. No weapon observed, black PJ's.
- f. Observed one man walking, black shirt and shorts, carrying a basket on his back, no weapon.
- g. Heard a single shot which came from the trail listed as a map correction.
- h. Observed 2 people carrying baskets on their backs. No weapons, black clothing.
- i. Map correction: A large, well used, trail, approximately 6 feet wide, from BS 668317 to 659317. This trail connects one valley with the next. This trail can not be observed from the air, and the canopy is high enough to walk elephants.

- 8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.
- 9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Physical condition, good; morale, excellent.
- 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.
- 11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT USED BY PATROL:
 - a. One AN/PRC-25 radio with 3 batteries.
 - b. One pair binoculars 7X50.

D. R. BLANKENSHIP
SGT USMC

- 12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER: Item 7a and g: The shots heard by patrol could possibly have been signal shots fired by the VC.

NOTE: The patrol was at BS 665325 in an OP position when the patrol leader stated that high altitude bombing was conducted at BS 655313 at 081400H February 1966. It was estimated that the explosions were about 1,200 to 1,500 meters away. Some schrapnel was received in the patrols position. It is recommended that all future bombings and strafings must be coordinated with units that have patrols out in, or close to, a bomb area.

G. A. KOCH
SSGT USMC

1ST FORCE RECON CO S & C NO. 51 68
COPY 1 OF 2

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1st Force Recon Co
BA TO, RVN
121200H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: PRIMNESS 3

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheets 6755 II, III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 5 Enl.
2. MISSION: Surveillance of enemy movement and concentration in the objective area.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 101810H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 111830H February 1966.
5. ROUTE: See overlay.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
101830H BS 582241 Map correction
7. OTHER INFORMATION:
 - a. The patrol observed a small village 8 to 10 houses. No people were observed in this village.
8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Physical condition; excellent. Morale; excellent.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.
11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TAKEN ON PATROL:
 - a. 1 set binoculars 7X50.
 - b. 2 AR-15.
 - c. 1 AN/PRC-25 with 3 batteries.

K. R. HALL
SSGT USMC

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER: This patrol was extracted early due to future commitments.

1ST FORCE RECON CO S & C NO. 11-5200
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151200H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: GALLEON 1

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION: 1 Off and # enl.
2. MISSION: To observe enemy movement and activity in the SONG TRA NO River Valley, and their approaches.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 091830H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 150900H February 1966.
5. ROUTE: See overlay.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. 112030H	BS 522351	Observed lights in house
b. 112030H	BS 503347	Observed blinking light
c. 120800H	BS 522343	Possible VC OP
d. 150730H	BS 535331	VC OP
7. OTHER INFORMATION:
 - a. While in route, the patrol observed a light in the valley at BS 522351. Artillery was fired, no damage assessment.
 - b. At 112030H, the patrol observed a light in a form of a signal, BS 503347. Artillery was fired, no damage assessment.
 - c. At 120800H, the patrol came across what appeared to be a possible old VC OP at BS 522343. From this OP we had good observation into the valley due north.
 - d. At 150730H, in route back to base, the patrol came upon a second VC OP at BS 535331. From this OP we had excellent observation of Camp BA TO and all of the valley south.
 - e. Map correction: Trail, 2 feet wide, running from BS 535362 to 537350.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

ENCL (19)

- f. Map correction: Large cultivated area not shown on the map. See map correction enclosure. Also in this area were 13 huts; no activity was observed.
- g. At 131530H, the patrol monitored a conversation between helos and jet aircraft. The helo stated that he had received automatic weapons fire from Hill 829. Jet aircraft dropped two bombs on the hill.
8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Physical condition, fair; morale, good.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.
11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TAKEN BY PATROL:
- a. One pair of binoculars 7X50.
 - b. One AN/PRC-25 radio with 2 batteries.
12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER: None

S. L. OWENS
1stLt USMC

G. A. KOCH
SSgt USMC

1ST FORCE RECON CO S & C NO. 53 08
COPY <u>1</u> OF <u>2</u>

Copy of copies
 1st Force Recon Co.
 BA TO, RVN
 151300H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: GALLEON 2

MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6744 III, Series L701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 4 Enl.
2. MISSION: To observe enemy movements and activity in the SONG TRA NO and SONG BATO River Valleys.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 091830H February 1966.
4. TIME OF RETURN: 150930H February 1966.
5. ROUTE: See overlay.
6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - a. 112130H BS 523299 Heard sounds of possible VC activity.
7. OTHER INFORMATION:
 - a. On 112130H, the patrol was in an OP at BS 523299 when they heard what appeared to be the sounds of people walking through the brush cautiously from at least two sides. Artillery was called in. After the first six rounds were fired, the patrol moved to the low ground. More artillery was called. No damage assessment was made.
8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: Friendly casualty, none; enemy casualties, unknown.
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Physical condition, good; morale, excellent.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.
11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TAKEN ON PATROL:
 - a. One set binoculars 7X50.
 - b. One AN/PRC-25 with 3 batteries.

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
 DOD DIR 5200.10

J. B. SCHMIDT
 Sgt USMC

ENCL (20)

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PROVISIONAL RECON GROUP
 TASK FORCE DELTA
 3RD MARINE DIVISION, III MARINE Amphibious Force
 C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96601

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Task Force Delta

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE)

Ref: (a) Div Order 32L-65

Encl: (1) Operational Daily Summary
 (2) Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts
 (3) OI Overlay D-2 to D+5 (Phase I)
 (4) OI Overlay D+4 to D+13 (Phase II)
 (5) OI Overlay D+12 to D+18 (Phase III) & Patrol Route Overlay D-7 to D+18

1. Provisional Recon Group
2. 21 January 1966 - 16 February 1966
3. Quang Ngai Province: (E-W) BS 50 - BS 90
4. Command Headquarters: Headquarters Group, Recon Group Alfa
5. Reporting Officers: Commanding Officer, Co B(-)(Rein), 3rd Recon En -
 Captain COMPTON
 Commanding Officer, 1st Force Recon Co - Captain
 SHIVER
6. Task Organization: Co B(-)(Rein), 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
 1st Force Reconnaissance Company
 3rd Platoon, Co A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
 2nd Platoon, Co A, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
7. Supporting Forces

HHH 261
 HHH 362
 HHH 363
 HHH 364
 VHO 6

108th Aviation Company
 H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines
 H Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines
 H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
 3rd Marine Division Air Observers
 USS Topeka
 USS Berry

1ST FORCE RECON CO S & C NO. 478168
COPY <u>2</u> OF <u>2</u>

ENCL (21)

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36 tactical helicopter lifts
 13 emergency helicopter retractions
 20 artillery missions
 7 naval gunfire missions
 See Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts (Enclosure (2))

8. Intelligence: See Operational Daily Summary (Enclosure (1)) and Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts (Enclosure (2)).

9. Mission: To conduct ground reconnaissance in support of Task Force Delta on Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I in assigned T.A.O.R.

10. Concept: Provisional Reconnaissance Group, Task Force Delta was composed of Headquarters, Recon Group Alfa, Co B(-)(Rein), 3rd Reconnaissance Bn. and 1st Force Recon Company, FVF. Co B, 3rd Recon Bn, less one platoon, was reinforced with 2nd Platoon, Co A, 3rd Recon Bn and 3rd Platoon, Co A, 1st Recon Bn.

Operating strength of the group consisted of 8 Reconnaissance platoons and two control headquarters. Provisional Group Headquarters and Co B Headquarters were collocated with Task Force Delta C. and H&G-36 C, while Force Recon Co Headquarters was at BaTo. Generally, Force Recon elements operated in an area described by an 11,500 meter circle with its center at BaTo. Co B operated in the remainder of the T.A.O.R.

1st Force Recon Co began operations in support of Task Force Delta on D-7, 21 January 1966, searching with 2 platoon patrols for enemy units and installations reported by other intelligence gathering agencies. On D-2, six team patrols from the same unit were inserted by foot to establish observation posts into the areas east and north of BaTo. Force Recon Co continued operations with team observation posts around the BaTo area for the remainder of the operation.

On D+1 Co B began inserting team observation posts in the remainder of the T.A.O.R. Until the completion of the operation, teams from Co B provided continuous surveillance into various sectors of the T.A.O.R. Additionally, Co B conducted two platoon patrols in search of personnel who were missing in action; one prisoner-capture platoon patrol and two company prisoner-capture, area reconnaissance patrols. Excepting the initial patrols from BaTo, all entries and retractions were accomplished by helicopter.

11. Execution: The Provisional Recon Group employed 35 team size O's, 5 platoon patrols and 2 company patrols to accomplish its mission. The O's were employed in 3 fairly distinct phases (Enclosures 3, 4 & 5) from D-7 to D+18 as the operation progressed. Platoon and company patrols were employed in area reconnaissance missions and to capture prisoners (Enclosure (5)). See Operational Daily Summary (Enclosure (1)).

12. During the operation, 153 significant sightings were made totaling 919 VC and 400 VCS. 31 contacts were made resulting in 23 VC KIA and 14 VC WIA by small arms. In addition, 21 artillery and 7 naval gunfire missions were fired resulting in 19 VC KIA confirmed and 22 possible VC KIA and 2 81mm mortars destroyed. One VCC was captured. Patrols located and destroyed 5 tons of rice, 500 pounds of ~~rice~~ ^{rice}, 10 bolts of material and 60 gallons of kerosene in VC harbor sites. Many documents were captured and forwarded to G-2.

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Friendly casualties and losses:

2 USMC KIA
 2 USMC MIA
 5 USMC WIA
 2 AN/ARC-25 radios lost
 1 AN/ARC-10 radio lost
 2 M-14 rifles lost

13. Administrative matters: No problems encountered.

14. Special Techniques

a. Team Operations. Team (4-5 men) clandestine surveillance operations were used extensively, with 35 such elements being employed in the 28 days of reconnaissance operations during Double Eagle I. Maximum employment was 11 teams positioned and reporting at one time. Of these 35 teams, 11 were retracted prematurely because of compromise or contact; 3 were retracted because of communications failure. Teams made 140 sightings totaling 897 Viet Cong/NVA. 26 artillery and naval gunfire missions were called and adjusted from these observation posts, resulting in 19 confirmed VC/NVA killed, and 22 possibly killed. Teams, which inadvertently found themselves in contact, killed 10 Viet Cong/NVA and wounded 5 others. Friendly casualties were 2 KIA and 3 WIA. Considering that this operation marked the first time that the Force Reconnaissance Company had utilized this technique to any extent, the 19 OP's established by that unit did very well.

This technique requires helicopter entry, quick helicopter retraction capability and exceptionally well-trained reconnaissance personnel to be fully successful. Additionally, teams positioned in response to current order of battle information, on carefully selected OP's, produce more results than teams broadcast as a screen just to cover the map. This is directed reconnaissance as opposed to area screen or "shotgun" methods. Teams used as a part of a wide intelligence screen, specifically to the south of BaTo, had significantly fewer sightings than those placed in response to order of battle information on probable enemy escape routes.

Personnel used on team operations must be above average in intelligence, products of thorough training in team techniques and possess solid confidence in their own ability and complete faith in the ability of the command to react quickly enough to pull them out of difficult positions when they are encountered. If all precautions are taken, the target areas are wisely selected, and the command is capable of quick reinforcement or retraction in support of compromised teams, these operations can continue to be conducted with confidence and little cost. This cost seems to be far outweighed by the results achieved. This technique has been developed to a relatively high degree. Only the highlights are discussed above.

b. Platoon Operations. Five platoon patrols (15-25 men) were conducted during Double Eagle I. Missions were: two - search for MIA's, two - area reconnaissance, one - prisoner capture. Eight VC/NVA were killed and 3 were wounded. The only significant sightings reported by these patrols were the results of contacts. Three of these patrols, (the area reconnaissance and the prisoner capture), were retracted prematurely because of enemy contacts, which they could not handle. Two USMC MIA's resulted from these actions.

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It appears obvious that a platoon is too large to move clandestinely and too small to take care of itself if hit. The results do not justify frequent use of this technique. The circumstances must be determinate, however.

No squad patrols (7-10 men) were employed; however, it appears that the same objections apply to squads as to platoons.

c. Company Operations. Two company patrols were conducted on Double Eagle I. The mission of each was twofold: (1) area reconnaissance and (2) prisoner capture. Four enemy supply areas were discovered containing a total of: 5 tons of rice, 500 pounds of salt, 60 gallons of kerosene, 15 bolts of cloth, large quantities of uniforms and documents, and a small amount of medical supplies, including 20 vials of penicillin. One prisoner was captured. Two VC were killed and 3 were wounded. Friendly casualties were: 1 USMC WIA (slight).

The concept used for these operations was as follows: Two 14 man elements (each a platoon minus) were landed at two different zones 2000-3000 meters apart. They then moved over covered jungle routes to ambush sites. A larger 28 man element (1 platoon and a Company Command group) was then landed at the third point of the triangle (3000-4000 meters away) and patrolled toward the two ambushes. Upon closing the smaller elements, the entire force would counter-march most of the axis of advance used initially by the largest force, using two routes converging at a fourth landing zone for retraction.

With this concept, a 56 man (company (-)) element can completely cover a 7 grid square area in one day, being inserted early in the morning and retracted in the evening. As in team operations, this technique has been more highly developed than is indicated here. Again, results from these operations far outweighed costs and fully justify continuation of the method.

d. Sniper Utilization. Snipers were employed by attaching them to infantry units or placing them in ambushes designed for prisoner capture. On two successive days, 2 snipers were attached to Co B, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, and employed from concealed positions against enemy across a large river from the infantry operation. One man fired 6 rounds at 6 targets and killed 3 VC/NVA confirmed. The weapon was an M1-D. The other man fired 7 times at 7 targets and wounded one VC/NVA. The weapon was a Winchester, model 70. The range in all cases was 700-800 meters. However, relative evaluation of the shooters and condition of the weapons gives no basis for a comparison of effectiveness of the two types of rifles per se. The snipers used in the ambushes were not presented with a suitable target, so they did not fire.

Sniper utilization with team observation posts has been rejected in areas of heavy enemy concentration. The clandestine mission of the team and the necessity for having automatic fire power if close contact is made, makes snipers inappropriate for these missions.

e. Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support. Use of the reconnaissance team as a Forward Observer continues to prove satisfactory in all respects. 22 of the 24 artillery missions and all of the naval gunfire missions fired by the Reconnaissance elements on Double Eagle I were called and adjusted by team OF's. These accounted for 19 VC/NVA killed, confirmed and 24 killed, possibly plus two 81mm mortars possibly destroyed. Well over 1000 rounds were fired in these missions. Because of the size of targets fired on, it is safe to assume that many more casualties were inflicted but because of dense growth, poor continued visibility and lack of physical surveillance, no numbers can be calculated.

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Missions called were primarily offensive, on targets of opportunity; however, four defensive fire missions were called by compromised teams. In each case, contact was broken by the enemy when the first rounds fell.

Once cleared, all missions fired were timely and accurate, requiring a minimum of adjustments. Problems with quick clearance of missions were frequently encountered. Sightings reported by the teams were used as a basis for H&I fires throughout the operation.

f. Air Support

(1) Helicopter. Team insertions by helicopter were conducted right after dawn or just before dark. Morning insertions proved to be futile since the team's movement from the zone to the OP site proved impossible without compromise. Evening insertion allowed the team to move to its OP under cover of darkness and greatly aided the clandestine mission. Emergency extraction of compromised or in-contact teams is credited with saving the lives of members of several teams which had encountered superior enemy forces at close quarters. Armed UH1E's conducting fire suppression, strafing and rocketing runs allowed the teams to break contact and move to a helizone for retraction.

The pilots proved to be exceptionally well qualified in map reading and low level navigation. The Air Group efficiently followed requested time schedules, making detailed planning, including light conditions, possible. Additionally, the marginal helicopter zones into which insertions were made and from which retractions were effected, were professionally and courageously accepted by the pilots. Emergency requests for retraction were expeditiously handled by all air control agencies and in all cases, emergency retraction aircraft had lifted within 15 minutes of notification of their mission.

Helicopter insertion and retraction was made in all company operations and three of the platoon operations. These lifts were excellent. The technique of placing the Commanding Officer or Operations Officer of the Recon Group in one of the armed escort aircraft for insertions is highly effective. Decisions to go to alternate zones or abort the mission entirely because of a zone being hot can be made on the spot and executed immediately. This procedure should be continued.

(2) Fixed Wing. Although no fixed wing aircraft were utilized to cover extractions or insertions during Double Eagle I, they may be used, although not as effectively or as closely, as armed UH1E's. Without F.M. radio equipment, the situation on the ground must be relayed through a helicopter if firing runs are required. Fixed wing aircraft were used to bomb hot zones from which emergency retractions were effected. In one case, 39 250 pound bombs were dropped, beginning 15 minutes after retraction from a particularly enemy infested zone. Sightings reported by all Reconnaissance elements were daily used as targets for F4U-10 drops during the night.

g. Aerial Photography. Personal aerial reconnaissance by Recon elements before insertion is usually not available and rarely practical below the team leader level. To fill this deficiency, the complete aerial photos which were readily available in the Task Force G-2 were thoroughly exploited. Each and every member of all patrols was able to study the photos of his area of operation, along with his map, before entry. The photos were 1:5,000 in scale. This planning and briefing aid was the most important single improvement over previous Reconnaissance operations.

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h. Radio Communications. All communications with patrols were conducted on F.M.. 33 of the 35 teams were equipped with the AN/PRC-25 radio. The other two carried the AN/PRC-10 radio. Internal communication for company and platoon patrols was by AN/PRC-10/25. The PRC-25 continues to be the only acceptable radio for deep reconnaissance operations. Loud and clear communications were achieved on Double Eagle I at ranges up to 35,000 meters. Difficulties were experienced with the handset. When it becomes wet, it may lose either transmission or reception. Three teams were retracted because of these difficulties. One lost reception and two lost transmission. A heavy plastic material secured over the handset appears to completely alleviate this difficulty. Relay stations were used when elements were operating out of line of sight at great distances. Three positions were occupied solely for this purpose.

Communications between Group Headquarters at the Task Force CP and Force Recon Company Headquarters at BaTo were provided by A.M. using IRC-47 and TRC-75 equipment. This net was sporadic and of low quality being barely acceptable. Most of the difficulty was caused by the high concentration of similar equipment in the Task Force CP.

i. Coordination with Infantry Units. Although Reconnaissance elements were employed entirely in general support of the Task Force, circumstances frequently dictated close coordination with infantry battalions operating in the vicinity of the OP's. When infantry elements closed within 3000 meters of an OP position, the team was instructed to come up on the cognizant battalion tactical net and pass all sightings immediately to that station. Once each hour, the team returned to the Recon Report Net to pass a summary of the hour's activities. No artillery or naval gunfire missions were called by the OP unless the battalion requested them to do so. This procedure insured that the infantry elements did not fire into the OP position and provided the infantry commander with an additional source of enemy activity information to which he could immediately react.

j. Location of Reconnaissance Group Command Post. The contiguous location of the Provisional Reconnaissance Group Command Post to both Task Force "D" CP and the MAC-36 CP greatly facilitated planning, control and reaction. Facilities available in the CP area provided by both Task Force and MAC-36 eliminated all administrative and logistical problems. Helicopter operations were concurrently planned and executed with great ease and frequent face-to-face briefings in leisure. Debriefing of elements upon retraction was simplified with the results immediately available to Task Force Staff sections. The G-2 photo section was able to readily and quickly fulfill requests for prints of anticipated target areas. Time in reaction was cut significantly in every area from quick insertions of elements requested by the G-2 to emergency retraction of embattled teams. The Group CP location was excellent.


15. Commander's Analysis. Reconnaissance operations in support of Task Force "D" on Double Eagle I are considered to have been highly successful. The geography of the TACR provided excellent observation positions. Thousands of square meters, which help to make clandestine reconnaissance activities practical and possible were available. As the infantry operations gained in momentum, and changes were made from the original plans, locating reconnaissance elements ahead of or on the flanks of the infantry in specific areas became increasingly difficult.

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Some areas covered by observation became of little importance as operations changed directions, while other areas became vitally important where no reconnaissance elements were positioned. Lack of high helicopter priority on three occasions prevented timely insertions into imminent areas of infantry operations. Had this not occurred, even greater, more valuable support might have been furnished by reconnaissance elements. Although many sightings of the enemy were made and reported, some highly significant, the utilization of this information was frequently a little disappointing. The fleeting nature of the VC/NVA units makes some of this frustration unavoidable. The most difficult part of this war has previously been in finding the enemy. This has been at best partially solved by the effective use of ground reconnaissance. Perhaps our attention should now be directed to techniques and methods for fixing him until he can be destroyed. The Provisional Reconnaissance Group found and reported 918 enemy soldiers. The Task Force killed 312 Viet Cong/NVA.

16. Recommendations

- a. That the Reconnaissance Group continue in general support of Task Force "D" on future operations.
- b. That future Reconnaissance operations be confined to teams and companies.
- c. That co-locations of Task Force "D" CI and MAG-36 CI and Provisional Recon Group CI be continued.
- d. That more AN/PRC-25 radios be made available on a one-for-one basis of exchange for PRC-10 radios now in the T/E.
- e. That complete aerial photography coverage be made available for future operations as it was on Double Eagle I.


 JAMES L. COMPTON
 Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
 Commanding

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OPERATIONAL DAILY SUMMARY

- 21 Jan (D-7) One platoon size patrol operated vic BS 5236 (See Patrol Route Overlay, Enclosure (6)). 1 sighting of 4-6 VC was made; 1 contact was made, resulting in 1 USMC KIA.
- 22 Jan (D-6) Two platoon patrols were employed. 1 sighting of 30-50 VC was made; 1 contact resulting in 7 VC KIA and 1 USMC KIA was made.
- 23 Jan (D-5) One platoon patrol was employed. 1 sighting of 5 VC was made, and there was 1 contact, with no known casualties.
- 24 Jan (D-4) No active patrolling.
- 25 Jan (D-3) 1st Force Recon prepared to insert patrols to establish OP's.
- 26 Jan (D-2) 6 patrols operating to establish OP's (See OP Overlay, Enclosure (3)).
- 27 Jan (D-1) 6 OP's in operation. 4 sightings were made totaling 18 VC.
- 28 Jan (D-Day) 6 OP's in operation. 11 sightings totaling 53 VC were made. Significant movement to the West was noted in valley vic BS 5938.
- 29 Jan (D+1) 6 OP's were in operation. 7 sightings were made totaling 26 VC. Significant activity was again noted in valley vic BS 5938. 1 contact was made resulting in 2 VC KIA, 1 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIA (See Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts (Enclosure (2))). 2 artillery missions were fired with 6 possible VC KIA.
- 30 Jan (D+2) 8 OP's were in operation. 3 sightings totaling 15 VC were made. 1 artillery mission was fired, resulting in 6 possible VC KIA.
- 31 Jan (D+3) 9 OP's were in operation. 18 sightings were made totaling 106 VC and 300 VCS. Significant movement or activity was noted moving West across river vic BS 6147. 1 artillery mission was fired with unknown results.
- 1 Feb (D+4) 11 OP's were in operation; 23 sightings were made totaling 104 VC. 6 naval gunfire and 3 artillery missions were fired resulting in 19 VC KIA confirmed. One platoon size patrol was conducted vic BS 6038, and body of 1 USMC KIA was recovered. Significant movement to the Southwest was noted in valley vic BS 7931.
- 2 Feb (D+5) 10 OP's were in operation; 22 sightings totaling 58 VC were made. One platoon size patrol was conducted vic BS 5236, and a second platoon was inserted vic BS 7532 to commence prisoner snatch patrol. 1 contact was made with no known casualties, and 1 artillery mission was fired. Movement to the Southwest continued vic BS 7931.

Enclosure (1)

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- 3 Feb (D+6) 9 OP's were in operation; 17 sightings totaling 106 VC were made. 5 contacts were made resulting in 3 VC KIA, 4 VC WIA, and 1 USMC WIA. 2 artillery missions were fired. Sighting of possible PAVN elements was made vic BS 6529.
- 4 Feb (D+7) 8 OP's were in operation; 6 sightings were made totaling 49 VC. 3 contacts were made resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 USMC WIA. 1 naval gunfire mission was fired with excellent coverage of target. Significant movement Northwest vic BS 7732 was noted.
- 5 Feb (D+8) 4 OP's were in operation; 2 sightings were made totaling 15 VC. 2 contacts were made with no known casualties.
- 6 Feb (D+9) 4 OP's were maintained, but no sightings were made due to heavy fog and rain.
- 7 Feb (D+10) 3 OP's were in operation, and one company size patrol was conducted. 5 contacts were made resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 VC possible KIA, 3 VC WIA and 1 USMC WIA. 9 sightings were made totaling 60 VC. 2 artillery missions were fired.
- 8 Feb (D+11) 6 OP's were in operation; 7 sightings were made totaling 56 VC. 1 contact was made with no casualties, and 4 artillery missions were fired with unknown results.
- 9 Feb (D+12) 5 OP's were in operation, and one company patrol was conducted. 8 sightings totaling 36 VC were made, and 6 contacts were made resulting in 3 VC KIA, and 6 WIA. 1 POW captured.
- 10 Feb (D+13) 7 OP's in operation and 2 sniper teams were employed. 2 sightings were made of 8 VC. 2 contacts were made resulting in 3 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA.
- 11 Feb (D+14) 7 OP's were in operation. 2 sightings were made totaling 2 VC and 40 VCS. 1 contact was made with no casualties, and 3 artillery missions were called. Significant activity was noted of 30-40 VCS moving into hamlet near Task Force Delta Command Post.
- 12 Feb (D+15) 5 OP's were in operation and 5 sightings totaling 111 VC and 60 VCS were made. 1 contact was made and 1 artillery mission was fired resulting in possibly 10 VC and 2 81mm mortars destroyed. Hard-core or PAVN elements were located vic BS 5642.
- 13 Feb (D+16) 5 OP's were in operation and 4 sightings were made totaling 35 VC. 1 contact was made resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIA.
- 14 Feb (D+17) 2 OP's were maintained, no sightings were made.
- 15 Feb (D+18) All OP's were recovered.

Enclosure (1)

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CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF ALL SIGHTINGS AND CONFLICTS

211705H BS 521369 4-6 VC penetrated patrol base and fired small arms. 1 USMC MIL.

221015H BS 524369 30-50 VC attacked patrol with small arms, wearing khaki uniforms w/leggings and rain hats. 7 VC KIA, 1 USMC MIL. Artillery fired to cover withdrawal.

231105H BS 606375 5 VC fired on patrol. Appeared to wear khaki w/rain hats. No known casualties.

271030H BS 635314 2 men moving north, wearing black w/packs.

271045H BS 623314 2 men emplacing panji stakes, one in black, other in maroon shorts, w/packs.

271300H BS 649139 3 men moving down streambed, wearing black w/weapons.

271238H BS 616306 11 men setting panji stakes and camouflaging pits, 3 wearing khaki w/packs, all had rifles.

280825H BS 639294-
BS 644294 Observed panji stakes and fighting holes dug into roadbank facing south, recently camouflaged.

281005H BS 622298-
BS 634296 Observed roadblock consisting of large pits 3-5 feet deep every 20-40 yards.

281040H BS 595385 15 men moving west, wearing dark uniforms w/packs and weapons.

281105H BS 595385 4 men moving west, in dark utilities w/packs, undetermined weapons.

281140H BS 591391 6 men crossed river moving north, wearing black w/packs and weapons.

281205H BS 597387 3 men moving east, w/packs and undetermined weapons.

281220H BS 595385 3 men moving west, w/packs.

281430H BS 656329 5 men moving down streambed, wearing black w/packs and weapons.

281510H BS 595385 9 men moving west on road, three wearing grey uniforms and rain hats, 3 packs and 5 weapons.

281620H BS 596387 3 men moving west, wearing rain capes, 2 packs, 1 suitcase and 3 weapons.

281700H BS 638314 4 men walking on rice paddy dikes, wearing black w/weapons.

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281730H BS 638314 1 man moving in paddy, wearing black w/carbine. Possibly observed OP. Began beating on bamboo stick.

290930H BS 597387 6 men moving west, wearing black and 1 wearing construction-type helmet, w/weapons and 3 bicycles.

290940H BS 597387 2 men moving west, wearing black w/weapons.

291035H BS 596386 1 man moving east, wearing blue-grey uniform w/weapon.

291210H BS 602378 6 VC approached OP site from south and opened fire on team with M-1's and carbines. 1 USMC KIA. Team moved to BS 600380. Artillery fired while team withdrew to LZ.

291400H BS 599378 6 VC fired on team with automatic weapons and small arms from close range. VC wore black trousers and khaki shirts. 2 VC KIA, 1 USMC KIA. PRC-25 lost.

291535H BS 637313 1 man walking along paddy dike wearing black w/weapon.

291530H BS 651327 Encountered VC harbor site or OP during fog conditions and heard 9-10 VC yelling, but received no fire. Artillery fired w/6 possible KIA.

301305H BS 749395 4 men moving east on trail wearing black w/packs.

301315H BS 656328 5 men walking along river wearing black w/packs.

301505H BS 625284 6 men on Hill 763 setting panji stakes or booby traps. Artillery fired w/6 possible KIA.

311135H BS 652317 Fired artillery on possible VC harbor site. Number of VC undetermined. No surveillance.

311312H BS 635454 23 men in dispersed column moving northeast, appeared to come out of tunnel.

BS 634455 12 more men occupying position. Artillery unable to fire due to troop helilift.

BS 634455 9 boats moving north.

311345H BS 627426 5 men moving in woodline, wearing black w/3 rifles and 2 sacks.

311349H BS 617475 300 people milling around. No visible weapons.

311400H BS 751375 5 men moving east on trail wearing black w/3 cartridge belts and 1 rifle.

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311400H BS 628427 15 men in hamlet. 2 wearing khaki w/packs, rifles and 1 machine gun. Artillery unable to fire due to helilift.

311403H BS 617473 1 man moved from hedgerow to hut near river w/rifles.

311420H BS 746371 9 men came out of hut and moved southwest wearing black w/packs and cartridge belts.

BS 615476 4 men moving north on trail, wearing black w/packs and rifles.

311600H BS 670417 1 man and 1 boy running on trail wearing black w/1 rifle.

311602H BS 617475 2 men moving north on trail wearing camouflage utilities w/packs and rifles.

311650H BS 615470 7 men near river, 2 wearing camouflage utilities, no weapons or packs.

311700H BS 685354-
BS 653354 Observed signal light. Targeted for TFC-10.

311740H BS 618476 1 man walking west on woodline, black trousers and khaki shirt w/pack.

311830H BS 630428 10 men moved south to village at BS 628427 wearing black w/6 rifles.

311845H BS 632422 5 men crossing river wearing black w/2 rifles. Appears to be ferrying point.

311830H BS 748355 6 men moving east on trail, 5 wearing grey uniforms w/5 packs and 2 unidentifiable objects on shoulders.

311855H BS 604483-
BS 627440 AO checking 311349H sighting reports over 150 boats and about 300 people in area.

010815H BS 782322 Observed area 30 meters X 50 meters of freshly cut panji stakes.

010940H BS 788314 4 men moving south west, 1 wearing grey w/3 packs and 1 rifle.

010950H BS 614259 2 men appear to be manning OP wearing uniforms of unknown color. w/2 packs and 2 rifles.

011040H BS 614260 8 men walking up hill with weapons. Artillery fired with unknown results.

011053H BS 788310 2 men moving southwest on trail, wearing green utilities, camouflage covers and packs.

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011115H BS 780314 2 men moving southwest in paddy wearing black w/1 pack and 1 rifle.

011200H BS 788310 10 men stacking heavy packs in bushes, wearing black w/10 packs.

011200H BS 787310 6 men moving southwest on trail, 2 wearing blue w/ grey hats, packs and 2 rifles.

011210H BS 787310 3 men moving southwest on trail wearing green utilities w/green hats, 2 packs and 1 rifle.

011215H BS 788310 2 men stacking heavy packs in bushes, wearing black, w/2 packs.

011252H BS 788310 4 men moving south, wearing khaki uniforms with leggings, 1 helmet and 4 rifles. Naval gunfire fired on target. No surveillance.

011255H BS 790315 15 men moving north into group of huts, 6 wearing tan uniforms, others black, 6 rifles, 2 automatic weapons and 15 packs. 54 rounds of Naval gunfire fired on area, huts destroyed. 15 VC KIA.

011410H BS 750382 2 men walking north east on trail, wearing grey uniforms and covers, w/packs and rifles.

BS 793312 5 men moving south east on trail, 3 wearing utilities, w/4 packs and 2 rifles.

011420H BS 795332 4 men moving north east in paddy wearing black with 2 packs.

011455H BS 791314 5 men moving north east on trail wearing black w/ packs and weapons.

011505H BS 791314 2 men searching paddy where Naval gunfire landed 1 wearing white, w/1 rifle.

011530H BS 791314 3 men moving south west on trail, 1 wearing camouflage utilities, 1 in khaki and other in black, w/1 pack and 1 rifle.

011544H BS 791314 4 men moving north east on trail. 2 wearing tan and 1 camouflage utilities, w/4 packs and 2 rifles.

011606H BS 791314 1 man moving south west, w/ pack and rifle. 104 rounds of Naval gunfire fired on 5 areas of valley (3 harbor sites, group of huts and trail complex).

011755H BS 624428 6 men in woodline wearing black w/packs and 2 rifles. Artillery fired with good coverage of target.

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011835H BS 624428 4 men moved into huts wearing black, w/packs and rifles. Artillery fired and huts destroyed. 4 VC KIA.

011835H BS 755372 8 men moving east on trail, 1 wearing grey, w/5 packs and 1 weapon.

020845H BS 788322 1 man moving southeast in paddy wearing tan w/rifle.

020910H BS 747388 1 man moving north across paddy wearing grey w/pack.

021000H BS 787324 1 man moving east on trail wearing tan uniform w/pack and rifle.

021045H BS 739322 2 men walking north across paddy, wearing black w/packs and rifles.

BS 747388 2 men moving north across paddy wearing black, w/2 packs camouflaged with leaves.

021100H BS 593257 Observed air vent in hollow tree on side of hill. Light seen inside. Whole area smells of death and many recent graves.

BS 793325 2 men moving northwest on trail wearing black w/packs.

021105H BS 792324 3 men and 1 woman moving northwest on trail wearing black, w/2 packs.

021145H BS 787321 3 men in bushes wearing black w/rifles and cartridge belts.

021200H R: 53304 Observed VC harbor site for about 10 people. Recently used.

021330H BS 627429 3 people in bushes wearing black. w/1 pack.

021530H BS 748390 2 men and 1 boy walking south across rice paddy, wearing black with 3 packs.

021600H BS 788320 4 men running across paddies wearing tan uniforms w/4 packs.

021602H BS 745387 3 men moving east on trail, 1 wearing grey and 1 green, 3 packs and 2 cartridge belts.

021730H BS 625455 Observed 2 nd. Battalion 4th. Marine elements receiving mortar fire in LZ. Fired artillery mission against suspected mortar position.

021825H BS 788311 1 man walking southwest on trail wearing black w/pack.

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021838H BS 795307 4 men moving southeast on trail, 1 wearing khaki, w/2 packs and 2 rifles.

021844H BS 799296 8 men moving southwest in column wearing black, w/0 packs and 8 rifles.

021845H BS 742382 Team encountered unknown number of VC in landing zone and pursued VC by fire. Casualties unknown. 1 observed VC wore black.

021852H BS 794304 2 men placing panji stakes, 1 wearing khaki.

021940H BS 635434-
BS 636448 Observed signal lights. Areas targeted for TFC and H&I fires.

022000H BS 750375 10-15 men wearing grey uniforms live in hamlet, but do no work.

030744H BS 796307 12 men sitting or standing in paddy, wearing black w/1 pack.

030915H BS 799296 3 men crossing paddy wearing black, w/3 packs and 3 rifles.

030928H BS 799296 3 men moving southeast wearing black w/1 pack and 3 rifles.

030940H BS 798295 3 men moving southwest wearing black w/packs.

030949H BS 796313 8 men moving northwest on trail wearing black pajamas w/packs.

030956H BS 797292 3 men moving southwest on trail wearing black w/packs.

031015H BS 638446 Observed 2 WP and 3 HE mortar bursts. Sensing indicates mortars located at BS 650450 - 650438.

031100H BS 674361 7 VC wearing black engaged rear point of 5 man patrol. 2 VC KIA and 2 VC WIA. Team recovered 031525H.

031130H BS 809267 4 men moving northeast along streambed, 2 wearing khaki, 1 green, and 1 black w/packs, 1 Thompson SIG, 2 carbines, 1 M-1.

031150H BS 576262 6 VC ambushed team while moving through elephant grass. Fire returned and patrol withdrew and called artillery mission.

031205H BS 795308 2 men and 1 woman moving north on trail wearing black w/2 packs and 2 weapons.

Enclosure (2)

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031215H BS 580264 Team previously in contact received fire in LZ during recovery. 5 VC were observed wearing 2 khaki and 3 green uniforms, w/automatic carbines and K-1's.

031400H BS 659289 3 men moving southeast wearing black w/packs and rifles.

031500H BS 658298 15 VC moving toward OI wearing green camouflage utilities and helmets w/packs, rifles and 1 81mm mortar. Artillery fired right on target, unknown casualties. Helicopters received fire during recovery.

031926H BS 766323 Patrol ambushed 7 VC wearing camouflaged utilities w/rucksacks and weapons. 1 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA.

031930H BS 830253 Team got caught in middle of firefight between 20-30 VC and 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines. 1 USMC WIA as result of mortar round.

040700H BS 759323 Patrol being recovered received intense small arms fire in LZ.

041000H BS 806279 2 men moving east wearing black w/1 rifle and 1 pack.

041415H BS 777325 7 men moving north wearing black, w/4 rucksacks and 2 rifles.

041500H BS 774321 3 men moving south, 2 wearing grey shirts, w/1 rifle.

041530H BS 800280 Patrol encountered 2 VC wearing black w/1 carbine, resulting in 2 VC KIA. 5 additional VC were observed. Team withdrew and was recovered.

041840H BS 775325 30 men moving northwest wearing black w/packs and rifles. 67 rounds of naval gunfire covered target. Unable to observe casualties due to darkness.

051445H BS 605298 15 VC pursued patrol by fire. VC wore khaki and soft covers, and carried chinese carbines. Team withdrew and was recovered.

051815H BS 743273 Aborted insertion of team when helicopters received fire in LZ.

070920H BS 800298 Company patrol encountered 3 VC in black. 2 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA. Many documents captured indicating VC were economic and education cadre. 2 pistols captured.

071048H BS 805303 20 men moving in column wearing black. Artillery fired with excellent effect.

071257H BS 634241 5-10 men moving down streambed w/weapons.* Artillery fired, no surveillance.

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071452H BS 798296 3 VC encountered. 1 VC WIA. 1 shotgun captured. 1 USMC WIA.

BS 788278 Patrol ambushed 3 VC in green uniforms. 1 VC WIA.

BS 792281 Concealed village located. 4 tons of rice and 10 bolts of silk and blanket material destroyed.

071720H BS 804303 6 VC in trees ambushed patrol with hand grenades and 1 submachine gun. 2 VC KIA (possible).

071800H BS 810315 Company received intense fire in LZ during recovery.

071940H BS 595238 15 people moving southwest. Too dark for further observation.

081239H BS 624265 3 men manning OP wearing black w/packs. Artillery fired, casualties unknown.

081307H BS 624265 VC harbor site. Artillery fired, no surveillance.

081550H BS 500299 30 VC in harbor site. Artillery fired, no surveillance.

081700H BS 561221 2 men walking south wearing khaki w/rucksacks.

081815H BS 730328 6 men in trench, 2 wearing brown w/weapons. Area covered with 5 feet panji stakes.

082130H BS 662362 15 men were observed close to OP wearing black and no covers w/carbines and bandoliers of ammunition.

090800H- BS 6423 Heard noise of possible generator or motor.
111800H

090130H BS 666363 10-15 VC encountered team. Firefight with small arms ensued, resulting in 2 VC KIA, 3 VC WIA.

090800H BS 652365 2 VC fired on helicopters recovering team. VC wore black and had carbines. 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA.

091110H BS 795324 3 men moving southwest in paddy, 1 wearing blue shirt, w/1 pack.

091115H BS 783337 1 VC wearing blue and black w/shotgun encountered patrol. 1 VC WIA.

091145H BS 767318 6-10 VC fired on patrol. 1 VC WIA.

091300H BS 805325 1 man discovered OP and fled, wearing black w/pack.

091735H BS 779337 Captured wounded VC from contact at 091115H. 2 other VC in black fled.

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091845H BS 614268 Patrol awaiting recovery fired on 2 VC in black with unknown results.

10 Feb BS 5623 Between 6-10 February, noise of an engine was heard. Believed that the engine was mobile and moved. Engine would race as if under varying degrees of stress.

100900H BS 781322 2 men on Hill with OP moving east. Possibly observed OP.

101205H BS 784324 6 men watching and pointing at OP, 2 wearing khaki w/packs and weapons.

101700H BS 8241 Recon snipers working with Co E, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines killed 3 VC and wounded 1 VC.

110905H BS 837384 2 men moving west on trail carrying stretcher with body on it. Men wearing black.

111100H BS 605374 Team being inserted by helicopter received .50 cal. machine gun fire.

112030H BS 522351-
BS 503347 Observed lights, possible signals. 2 artillery missions fired, no surveillance.

111100H BS 853381 30-40 men acting suspiciously. 1 man has a rifle.

112125H BS 524298 Patrol heard noise of possibly 4 men near their position. Artillery fired, no surveillance.

120741H BS 841374 50-60 people crossed river after firefight. Co E, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines reacting to 111100H sighting of 40 men.

121830H BS 568427 4 men moving north towards team's position wearing green uniforms.

BS 556432 7 men moving south towards team's position, wearing green uniforms, with camouflaged packs and rifles.

BS 543424 20 men moving northeast towards team's position, wearing camouflaged green utilities, camouflaged helmets, w/khaki packs, weapons and 2 81mm mortars. Split into two groups with one emplacing mortars and others moving towards team. Artillery fired with 10 possible VC KIA and 2 mortars destroyed.

121845H BS 545424 Artillery adjustment round landed in woods. 80 men moved out northeast in column on each side of SUOI II river. Men wore green uniforms and covers, camouflaged with brush and weapons.

Enclosure (2)

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130745H BS 838372 8 men moving southeast and southwest across paddies wearing mixed khaki and black. Weapons hidden under arms.

130910H BS 528387 20 men moving south, wearing mixed grey and black uniforms, with packs. Weapons not distinguishable. Requested fire mission, not fired due to unpositive VC identification.

131015H BS 527406 5 men standing on trail, 2 wearing grey, possibly have weapons.

131525H BS 503415 Unknown number of VC got above team and rolled satchel charge down hill. An unknown number then began encircling team. Enroute to HLZ, firefight ensued resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WLI. Team's AN/TRC-25 radio was captured by VC.

Enclosure (2)

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PROVISIONAL RECON GROUP
 TASK FORCE DELTA
 3RD MARINE DIVISION, III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
 C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96601

3/JRG/rjn
 28 Feb 1966


From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Task Force Delta
 Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE II)
 Ref: (a) Combat After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE)
 (b) DivOpO 3214-65
 (c) Frag Order 169-66

Encl: (1) Operational Summary
 (2) Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts
 (3) OP and Patrol Route Overlay

1. Provisional Recon Group
2. 19 February - 27 February 1966
3. Quang Tin Province: (E-W) BT 00-20
(N-S) BT 17-30
4. Command Headquarters: Headquarters Group, Recon Group Alfa
5. Reporting Officers: Commanding Officer, CoB(-)(Rein), 3rd Recon Bn -
Captain COMPTON
Commanding Officer, 1st Force Recon Co -
Captain SILVER
6. Task Organization: Co C(-), 1st Recon Bn
1st Force Recon Co (-)
2nd Plt, Co A, 3rd Recon Bn
Headquarters Group, Recon Group Alfa
7. Supporting Forces:

HFM-261
 HFM-362
 HFM-363
 HFM-364
 VHO-6


H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines
 M Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines



ENCLOSURE (22)

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8. Intelligence: See Operational Daily Summary (Enclosure (1)) and Chronological listing of Sightings and Contacts (Enclosure (2)).
9. Mission: To conduct ground reconnaissance in support of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE II in assigned TROs.
10. Concept: No change.
11. Execution: 5 team size OP's and 2 company size patrols were employed to accomplish the mission.
12. Results: During the operation 29 sightings were made totaling 130 VC and 50 VCS. 7 contacts were made resulting in 2 VC KI. by small arms. 4 artillery missions were fired, resulting in 6 VC KI. (possible). 1000 pounds of rice was destroyed. No USMC casualties or losses.
13. Administrative Matters: No problems encountered.
14. Special Techniques: No special techniques.
15. Commander's Analysis: Reconnaissance operations in support of DOUBLE EAGLE II were only moderately successful. The primary reason for this was the restrictive size of the TRO and the high population density. Great difficulty was encountered in locating teams so as not to interfere with infantry operations or indicate future intentions to the enemy. Also, of the five teams employed, two were compromised by VC happening upon their positions and a third was compromised by VCS in the IZ upon insertion. Two other teams were unable to be inserted because all the available IZ's being hot or so heavily punji staked that helicopters couldn't land.
- A secondary reason for only moderate success was the weather. When it wasn't raining, there was such a heavy ground fog as to preclude observation for large portions of the day.
16. Recommendations:
- a. That the Reconnaissance Group continue in general support of Task Force Delta on future operations.
 - b. That reconnaissance elements be landed in areas prior to the commencement of infantry operations.



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OPERATIONAL DAILY SUMMARY

- 19 Feb (D-Day) 2 team size OP's in operation. 4 sightings were made totaling 6 VC, 1 contact. No casualties.
- 20 Feb (D+1) 2 team size OP's in operation. 7 sightings were made totaling 39 VC and 20 VCS. Infantry reaction platoon inserted to support OP.
- 21 Feb (D+2) 3 OP's in operation. 10 sightings were made totaling 36 VC and 30 VCS. 2 fire missions were called and 1 house destroyed and 6 VC possible KIA. Significant movement to the southeast was noted in valley at BT 2512. 1 team recovered due to compromise.
- 22 Feb (D+3) 2 OP's in operation. No sightings were made due to poor weather.
- 23 Feb (D+4) 2 OP's in operation. No sightings were made due to poor weather.
- 24 Feb (D+5) 2 OP's in operation. No sightings were made due to poor weather.
- 25 Feb (D+6) 2 OP's in operation and 2 company size patrols employed. 8 sightings were made totaling 49 VC. 6 contacts were made resulting in 2 VC KIA. 1000 pounds of rice was destroyed. 2 artillery missions were fired with no observed casualties.
- 26 Feb (D+7) All teams recovered. No sightings.

Enclosure (1)

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CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS

191815H BT 204128 Helicopters received fire from unknown number of VC, uniform and equipment unknown.

191820H BT 195118 LZ filled with tall punji stakes and helicopters unable to land.

191825H BT 193134 6 men observed hiding in bushes around LZ, uniform and equipment unknown.

191830H BT 1915 Observed men digging trenches across road. Trenches were 6'X5'X3' and were on alternate sides of road.

192005H BT 1922 Heard heavy automatic fire.

200940H BT 107215 4 men moving north on trail wearing grey-green utilities with small brim hats, no visible weapons.

200945H BT 167183 2 men spotted, one with weapon.

201015H BT 167183 4 men running west from 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines patrol, wearing khaki uniforms, with rifles.

201123H BT 157183 10 men moving east, carrying wounded man. Wearing black, one wearing blue, with 4 rifles.

201250H BT 167183 6 men moving east and south in groups of 2 and 4, wearing black with 2 weapons.

201435H BT 134209 13 men moving west and south towards OP, wearing green camouflaged uniforms, with packs and rifles. OP compromised. VC scared away by helicopters in area. Reaction platoon inserted to support OP.

201530H BT 133207 Observed 2 elephants moving east on ridge. No equipment or people with them.

201800H BT 239142 15-20 VCS were observed in area around LZ. No contact.

211045H BT 265123 3 men moving southeast across paddy wearing black, with 2 rifles and 1 large pack.

211050H BT 227115 3 men moving north across paddies, wearing black with 1 rifle.

211105H BT 246118 Observed many people carrying bundles into 3 houses.

211137H BT 246120 13 men moving southeast across paddies, 2 wearing khaki with bundles and 1 pack.

Enclosure (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

211209H BT 257127 9 men in column crossing paddy moving northwest and then turning southeast, wearing black, all with bundles. 2 carried something big, suspended from a pole, resembling a rifle box.

211310H BT 167197 10 men 100-150 meters from OP, wearing black and camouflaged with bushes, carrying weapons. Fire mission called, but ceased due to proximity of OP team. Team recovered by helicopter. UH1E's strafed and rocketed area.

211315H BT 254118 6 men going into house, wearing black with packs and rifles. Same house observed at 211105H.

211502H BT 131233 11 men in groups of 2 and 3 moving east and southeast with no equipment visible.

211705H BT 254118 Fire mission called on house with 6 VC. House destroyed. 2 VC KIA.

211730H BT 130226 Man sending smoke signals, wearing black, no visible equipment.

211737H BT 254118 Observed secondary explosion 10-15 meters south of house destroyed in earlier fire mission.

211845H BT 263133 1 man walking north on road, wearing black with pack and rifle.

212100H BT 254118 Fired 1705H mission again, using replot.

250730H BT 140195 12 men with weapons. Artillery fired with good coverage of target.

250800H BT 166257 2 VC fired 15 rounds of automatic fire on patrol. Fire returned and contact broken. No casualties.

250845H BT 063280 Observed small arms fire at helicopters. Artillery fired.

251100H BT 160250 Found 1000 pounds of rice, destroyed same.

251240H BT 072305 20 people wearing fire, wearing black, 6 with rifles. Fire caused by UH1E.

251300H BT 160124. 2 VC fired on patrol. Fire returned, contact broken.

251345H BT 169182 5 VC walked into ambush, wearing black with weapons. 2 VC KIA. 1 carbine captured. Observed 4 VC moving west at BT 167177. They fired on ambush with automatic carbines.

Enclosure (2)

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251434H BT 199193 Patrol received 5 rounds of small arms fire. Fire returned with unknown results. Contact broken.

251520H BT 195188 7 men running west, 1 wearing khaki. 6 with packs, man in khaki carrying rifle.

251600H BT 174178 1 VC fired 2 rounds at patrol. Fire returned, no casualties.

251715H BT 18417C Helicopters recovering Scat units received intense fire from automatic weapons in LZ, from all sides. Fire returned by troops in LZ and by UH1E gunships.

Enclosure (2)

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