

File

HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 3d Marines
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/JEW/ppm
5750
26 April 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Special Landing Force, USS Princeton,
(LPH-5) FPO San Francisco
Subj: Command Chronology, Special Landing Force, 2 January - 27
February 1966.
Ref: (a) MOO 5750.2

Encl: ✓(1) Command Chronology - Part I
(2) Supporting Documents - Part II - *NIK*
(1) A/O Rpt, DOUBLE EAGLE, 28 Feb - 21 Feb 66

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) and (2) are for-
warded herewith.

W. K. Horn
W. K. HORN

2nd BN, 3rd MAIR, S to C
CONTROL NO. 0079-66
COPY NO. 9 OF 15

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
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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY (PART I)1. Organizational Data:

- a. Designation: Battalion Landing Team, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines.
- b. Location: 2 January -- 8 January 66 -- USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 8 January -- 18 January 66 -- Cubi Point, Subic Bay, Phillipine Islands.
 18 January -- 29 January 66 -- USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 30 January -- 17 February 66 -- Quang Ngai Province, RVN, Operation Double Eagle, Phase I
 18 February 66 -- USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 19-26 February 66 -- Binh Dinh Province, RVN Operation Double Eagle, Phase II
 27 February 66 -- Da Nang, RVN
- c. Period Covered: 2 January 66 -- 27 February 66
- d. Commanders and Staff

Battalion CO	LtCol	W.K. HORN	USMC
Battalion XO	Major	C.L. HARRISON	USMC
CO H&S Co	Capt	F.J. KELLY	USMC
CO "E" Co	1stLt	R.E. SCHWARTZ	USMC
CO "F" Co	Capt	J.R. HARDIN	USMCR
CO "G" Co	Capt	R.L. WOODWARD	USMC
CO "H" Co	1stLt	F.X. EGAN	USMC
S-1	1stLt	B.B. CONATSER JR	USMC
S-2	Capt	J.T. GUGGINO	USMC
S-3	Major	A.J. CASTELLANA	USMCR
S-4	Capt	M.J. MULROONEY	USMC
CommO	Capt	A.D.N. BRECKENRIDGE	USMC
107mm Mortar Btry,			
3/12	1stLt	McKINNEY	USMC
Btry "B", 1/12	Capt	MOLSBEE	USMC
2ndPlt, Co "A",			
3rd AT Bn	1stLt	KINGSTON	USMC
2ndPlt, Co "A",			
3rd Tk Bn	1stLt	WARNER	USMC
2ndPlt, Co "A",			
3rd MP Bn	1stLt	GYORE	USMC
2ndPlt, Co "A",			
3rd Engr Bn	1stLt	WILSON	USMC
2ndPlt, Co "A",			
3rd Recon Bn	1stLt	McCASKILL	USMC
Det, 1st ForRecon			
Company	Capt	SPENGLER	USMC



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e. Average Monthly Strength.

USMC	
OFF	ENL
38	985

USN	
OFF	ENL
3	56

2. Sequential listing of significant events:

a. Personnel

(1) During the period a total of five (5) USMC officers were transferred. There were no enlisted transferred. During this period four (4) USMC Officers were joined.

(2) A total of five (5) personnel were granted emergency leave during this period.

(3) Total casualties for the period

(a) Non-battle injuries	76	39 returned to duty
(b) Non-battle deaths	2	
(c) WIA	51	14 returned to duty
(d) KIA	3	

b. Administration

During the period problems concerning administration were few. During the training at Subic Bay, Phillipine Islands, administration was carried on the company level. During Double Eagle, one (1) officer from the Battalion and an enlisted man from each company were sent ashore at Chu Lai with all record books and a Unit Diary capability for the Battalion. The largest problem was communication with the forward position of the Battalion. Upon returning to a permanent status the Battalion again reverted to company administration.

c. Intelligence

(1) During the planning phase of the operation much intelligence was received in regards to enemy strength, disposition and situation as found in Task Force Delta's OpO 1-66. However, this battalion, as TFD reserve, was not assigned an objective area until immediately before being committed. When committed initially, no specific intelligence information was available concerning the objective area.

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Enclosure (1)

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(2) Resistance encountered during Phase I was limited to engagements with local guerrilla forces. Main force units per se, were not encountered but in three instances individuals from main force units were engaged and/or captured.

(3) On 31 January, six (6) VCS were apprehended. Upon initial search one (1) was found to have a green uniform in a bag. He was sent to ITT at the BSA.

(4) Approximately four-six (4-6) VC in khaki uniforms with packs and related equipment were engaged on 2 February resulting in two (2) enemy KIA and one (1) WIA (WIA was seen being dragged away). Another was captured on 15 February in green uniform, black helmet, pack and U.S. .30 Caliber carbine. He was sent to ITT at the BSA.

(5) Estimates of forces expected to be encountered were once again found in Task Force Delta's OpO 1-66. The enemy was also expected to be able to reinforce within 12-24 hours with the following:

- (a) One (1) confirmed battalion
- (b) Three (3) probable battalions
- (c) One (1) confirmed company

(6) During this phase no main force units or individuals were encountered. Resistance once again was limited to harassing fire from guerrillas. In most instances, encounters were with and at the most five (5) guerrillas. Mines, booby traps, punji pits, stakes and tunnel systems were encountered extensively throughout both phases of the operation.

d. Training

(1) Shipboard training was conducted daily as space limitation permitted. The training syllabus for the afloat phase was designed so that each element would train in their respective field in addition to GMS pertaining to deployment in RVN.

(2) During the period of 8-18 January 1966, all letter companies conducted extensive small unit type training with emphasis on Guerrilla/Counter-Guerrilla Operations. All supporting arms and crew served weapons, organic to the BLT conducted a firex on Green Beach. Small arms marksmanship training for the purpose of FAM firing and zeroing of weapons was conducted for M-14 rifles and .45 caliber pistols.

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All machine gun personnel in the battalion fired their weapons on an improvised machine gun range at Cubi Point, that was set up by battalion S-3 personnel. Night training and Land Navigation were stressed at all levels. Maintenance of equipment and resupply of clothing and equipment was accomplished as concurrent training.

The climax of this training period was a two day counter-guerrilla operation utilizing Negrito guides..

Upon completion of back loading the BLT conducted a rehearsal landing on Green Beach in preparation for operation Hill Top III.

Operation Hill Top III was conducted in accordance with BLT OpO 2-66 attached as a supporting document. The After Action Report for this operation is appended hereto.

Final preparation for Operation Double Eagle was conducted during the period 25-27 January.

e. Special Operations

(1) BLT 2/3 participated in Operation Double Eagle in the Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Province, RVN. BLT 2/3 was designated Task Force Delta reserve by Task Force Delta's OpO 1-66.

(2) Sequential listing of events during this operation are as follows:

(a) 24 Jan 66. BLT 2/3 received Special Landing Force Operation Order 324-66 (Operation Double Eagle).

(b) 25 Jan 66. Preparations were made to issue Operation Order 324-66.

(c) 26 Jan 66. Commanding Officer, BLT 2/3 issued Operation Order 324-66 to subordinate units.

(d) 27 Jan 66. Preparations were made to execute Operation Order 324-66.

(e) 28 Jan 66. Transferred Companies "G" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) from the USS Montrose (APA-212) to the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8).

(f) 29 Jan 66. Received an order from CG, Task Force Delta, at 291450H to send one (1) company (Rein), by helicopter, to seize objective C. Co "E" (Rein) was made ready. The first wave lifted off at 291545H. 38 helicopters were used to lift the company into the area.

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Co "E" (Rein) was under OpCon of Task Force Delta. At 291650H a warning order from CTG 79.5 alerted one (1) rifle company to be on a one hour alert. Co "F" (Rein) was designated and began to issue ammo and supplies. At 291705H an order was received relaxing this units alert status. Objective C was secured by Co "E" (Rein) at 291900H. A warning was issued by CO, BLT 2/3 to the provisional Rifle Company.

(g) 30 Jan 66. The remainder of the BLT was lifted into the objective area commencing 301500H. 38 aircraft were used to complete the lift. (One (1) Marine was KIA by enemy sniper in LZ at GS BS 7172. CAS was provided by F-4's, F-8's and UH-1E's. Battalion CP was established at BS 723424 and companies "F", "G", "H" and elements of H&S established a 360 degree perimeter defense. Three squad (rein) ambushes were established during the night. Each platoon established two listening posts. Before dark, CG, Task Force Delta, visited the CP. The 81mm Mortar Plt (-) conducted registration firing. During the night there were three reports of incoming sniper fire. There were no casualties and no estimated VC casualties. UH-1E's flying cover for landing zone received fire from village in GS BS 7341. UH-1E's returned fire with M-60 MG and rockets. Results could not be determined by this battalion.

(h) 31 Jan 66. Received Frag Order from CTG 79.5 to conduct fan patrols up to 2000 meters to the front of the battalion perimeter. Five patrols were planned each to be of platoon (rein) size. A warning order and patrol order was issued to Co Cndrs and the patrols began preparations to depart. The five patrols departed at 310800H. Patrol A from Co "F" (Rein) returned after killing one (1) VC, finding rice and uniforms. Patrol B from 2nd Plt, Co "A", 3rd Recon Bn returned after capturing one (1) VC, four (4) VCS and finding twenty (20) bags of rice and nine (9) bicycles. Patrol C from Co "H" (Rein) found two-thousand (2000) pounds of rice. This patrol encountered ten (10) VC and a short fire fight ensued. They estimated killing one (1) VC and wounding two (2). There were two (2) friendly WIA's. Patrol D from Co "G" (Rein) received sniper fire from an unknown number of VC. Fire was returned. It was estimated that one (1) VC was killed and one (1) was wounded. Patrol E from Co "H" (Rein) returned with negative contact. CG, Task Force Delta, visited the CP and issued an oral frag order to attack on axis from present position to an objective at coordinates BS 650410, utilizing two reinforced rifle companies with Command Group Alpha. LOD to be crossed

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at 010730H. Companies "F" and "G" were issued warning orders and preparation was made to execute instructions by CG, Task Force Delta. H&S (-) and Co "H" (Rein) remained as security for "H" Btry, 3/11 who occupied an adjacent position. The Provisional Rifle Co formed from Btry "B", 1/12 lifted into this area to augment Co "H" (Rein) and the remainder of H&S (-) in the defense of this position. A message from CG, Task Force Delta detached 2nd Plt, Co "A", 3rd Recon Bn, and Det, Force Recon at 010800H. During the evening there were five (5) ambushes established, four (4) combat outposts and listening posts. No contacts were reported.

(i) 1 Feb 66. At 0730 the Bn (-) with Command Group Alpha began the attack and moved west to the objective area along the prescribed route. An AO and two (2) A-4's were on station throughout the move. There was no resistance met along the route. Three (3) heat casualties and two (2) non-battle casualties were evacuated. At the objective area a perimeter defense was established, CG, Task Force Delta visited the objective area and issued an oral order to continue on the attack at 020730H, to an objective at BS 652374. An order was issued to the Company Commanders and special preparations were made to execute it. There were no incidents during the night.

(j) 2 Feb 66. The move south to the Battalion objective area at BS 652374 began at 0730 with Co "G" (Rein) deployed as the lead element. One (1) VCS was apprehended on the trail and retained for interrogation. Bicycle repair parts, rope and kerosene were found in a cave in vicinity BS 654404. All items were destroyed. As the forward elements of Co "G" approached the objective area Command Group Alpha moved across the LOD. Co "G" (Rein) moved into the objective area and encountered an estimated force of ten (10) VC. Three (3) USMC WIA's were sustained by an initial burst of fire. During the fire fight two (2) VC were killed and one (1) VC wounded. 60mm mortars (provided by UH-1E's) were directed on the enemy who were driven off in a southeasterly direction. The Army UH-1E's conducted the necessary med-evac for the three (3) WIA's. The fire fight lasted about 30 minutes. Command Group Alpha and Co "F" (Rein) arrived and moved into the position without any further incidents. Battalion received CG, Task Force Delta Frag Order 17-66 to move along assigned route to return to BS 723424, Battalion rear. 1st Plt (Rein), Co "G" began to move at 022100H. The remainder of the Bn (-) followed at 022300H. The march through the jungle terrain was completed under the cover of darkness.

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(k) 3 Feb 66. At about 0730 as the column approached the objective, Co "F" (Rein), the columns rear element received fire from a sniper. Fire was returned. There were no casualties and no estimated number of VC killed. The rear element arrived at the objective area at 030900H. Battalion received Frag Order 22-66 to be helilifted into an objective area at BS 9226. At 031500H the lift of Co "F" (Rein), Co "H" (Rein) and Command Group Alpha began, 38 helicopters were used in the lift. During the lift fire was received in LZ Sparrow (Rear CP BS 723424), causing two (2) helos to go down and causing one (1) friendly KIA and three WIA's. There were two (2) VC estimated killed. As the helicopter approached the LZ in the objective, sporadic small arms fire was received. F-8's, F-4's, A-1's and UH-1E's flew CAS missions. There was one (1) friendly WIA and one (1) VC killed. Due to the fire in LZ Sparrow, the lift was not entirely completed until 031800H. The battalion established its CP at BS 917267 with Companies "F" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) in a perimeter defense. Ambushes and listening posts were established. No contact was reported during the night.

(l) 4 Feb 66. Company "F" (Rein) conducted search and destroy operations from GS 9126 south along route 1 to Thach By in GS 9221. Co "H" (Rein) moved out to conduct search and destroy missions south along the coast from GS 9226 to Thach By. Co "H" (Rein) encountered no VC but destroyed caves and tunnels. Co "F" (Rein) encountered ten (10) VC at BS 912252 and sustained one (1) WIA. Artillery and 81's were fired in support. The enemy was driven off in northern and southern directions. Command Group Alpha moved by LVTP's to BS 925218. At that point Co "H" (Rein) was moved from BS 927220 to BS 925218 by the LVTP's. The battalion established a defensive position at BS 922212 with Companies "F" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) in perimeter defense. Naval Gunfire, Artillery and 81mm Mortar preparations were fired in the surrounding hills. No incidents were reported during the night.

(m) 5 Feb 66. At 050600H Co "F" (Rein) moved south to conduct search and destroy operation of its assigned area along national highway No 1 to Chu'O'ng (2) in GS 9113. Co "H" (Rein) began its search and destroy mission at 050700H. South generally allong NS grid line 92 to Chu'O'ng (2). Command Group Alpha moved south along highway 1 at 0730. There were no contacts reported during the move. Battalion CP was established at BS 914139. Patrols were conducted with negative results

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and night ambushes established. Prior to moving into position, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines executed a linkup with a RVN Engineer Battalion from II Corps at BS 903-130.

(n) 6 Feb 66. Co "F" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) swept their assigned areas. No VC contacts were made but tunnels, an aid station, and rice caches were found. Tunnels and rice were destroyed. The aid station was in a culvert and contained old beds, used morphine syrettes, none of which were of any significant value. Ambushes were established. No contacts were reported. Liaison with special forces elements in II Corps area at BS 903-130.

(o) 7-8 Feb 66. Co "F" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) sent out plt (rein) patrols to sweep their assigned areas. A civic action team (doctor, corpsmen, S-3, S-2 and interpreters) and security element moved into village at BS 908136 and BS 903128 distributed soap, cigarettes, food and treated minor ailments. Patrols reported a noticeable lack of VC activity. On 8 February, an Army Captain from II Corps Civil Action Team brought a VC rallier to the Battalion CP. A patrol was conducted to confirm the information offered by the rallier. A cave with small cache of weapons was found at BS 901146, which contained one (1) Russian rifle and three (3) grenades. These were turned over to the U.S. Army advisor.

(p) 9 Feb 66. Co "F" and Co "H" sent out patrols to maintain security and to conduct search and destroy operations along route 1. Received oral Frag Order alerting the Battalion to prepare to assume mission of security for engineer unit working on route No 1, from II Corps Northern boundary to Thach By in GS 9221 to repair highway damaged by VC. Ambushes were established. No contact was reported.

(q) 10 Feb 66. At about 1200 a patrol from Co "H" received three (3) rounds of carbine fire while moving up hill 65 in BS 885160. One (1) VC was seen armed with a grenade. One (1) VC was killed, but the VC firing a carbine ~~escaped~~ to the North. A patrol from Co "F" picked up two (2) VCS at coordinates BS 915666. Both had safe conduct passes and were evacuated to ITT at BSA. A Civil Action Team passed out one (1) wood working kit, soap and fifty (50) lbs of rations while a medical team treated twenty-five (25) persons in the village located at coordinates BS 906139.

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(r) 11 Feb 66. A patrol from Co "H" located banners, gas mask filters, a carbine and .45 ammo in small amounts at BS 858198. The same patrol found paintings of american weapons on the wall of a hut at BS 854199. It appeared to be a VC training area. The building was destroyed by burning. The patrol received two (2) rounds of carbine fire at BS 857202 at about 1215. The area was searched and one (1) Vietnamese about 15 years old was found. No weapons was recovered but expended cartridges were found in the area. Vietnamese boy was detained as VCS, and evacuated to BSA. Two (2) VC in black uniforms and one (1) VC in khaki were seen running north from BS 855202. Patrol fired and two (2) were seen to fall. Search of area produced negative results. A patrol from Co "F" found four-hundred (400) pounds of rice, twenty (20) pounds of salt and two-hundred pounds of dried coconuts in a concealed hut at BS 852163. Items were evacuated by helicopter to BSA. A patrol from Co "F" found two (2) Vietnamese women and four (4) children drying medicine at BS 864169 about 1630. There was estimated to be one-hundred-twenty-five (125) assorted bottles of aspirin and other pill medicine. One (1) bottle of penicillin (sp), and one-hundred-fifty envelopes containing a white powder. The Battalion Medical Team treated approximately seventy-five persons at village in BS 907140.

(s) 12 Feb 66. 2d Battalion, 3d Marines assumed operational control of Companies "F" and "H" of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. A patrol from Co "F" found a map with sheet number 6754I in an abandoned hut at BS 878163. No markings on the map and no signs of friendly troops in area. The Battalion medical team treated twenty (20) persons in the village of Chu'O'ng (1) at BS 915140. Approximately fifty (50) pounds of rations were also distributed. Lt General Thi, I Corps Commander and party visited area to see improvements on route 1 in Battalion TAOR.

(t) 13 Feb 66. OpCon of Companies "F" and "H" of 2/4 and "H" 2/3 was chopped to 3/1 rear and 3/1 rear moved into BS 914139 to assume control of 2/3's TAOR. Co "E", Co "F" and Command Group Alpha were helilifted into a landing zone in GS BS 5644 at 1500. Lift was completed at 1600, the LZ and surrounding area was secured.

One (1) main force VC was captured about 1640 at BS 560-448. VC had U.S. carbine, ammo, pack and documents. He was sent to ITT at BSA. Battalion CP was established at BS 589436 with Co "E" in perimeter defense and Co "F" CP established at BS 552443.

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(u) 14 Feb 66. Co "E" and Co "F" searched the area within grid square BS 5542 to 5543 for suspected POW camp with negative results. Link up with 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was made at BS 559420. Received Frag Order 117-66, and prepared to execute withdrawal in coordination with 2d Battalion, 9th Marines.

(v) 15 Feb 66. Battalion (-) prepared to execute order 117-66. Companies "E", "F" and Command Group Alpha moved to GS BS 5639 and prepared for helilift to the LPH-8. lift off began at approximately 1200 with one (1) plt (rein) being helilifted to hill 163 at 849391 to provide security for the withdrawal of the BSA from the beach. The remainder of the battalion was helilifted to the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8).

(w) 19 Feb 66. Co "E" and Co "F" with Command Group Alpha were landed in LZ's Thrush and Swallow by 1110, in GS BT 1914. Co "E" and Co "F" conducted search and destroy missions in vicinity of LZ's. Command Group Alpha recovered ten (10) pounds of rice, in a cloth roll, several small VC entrenching tools, clothes and sleeping mats in a cave at BT 200143. Co "F" found a VCS crawling through rocks with a serious leg wound at BT 198145. He was evacuated to BSA at 1400. Co "F" had one (1) confirmed VC KIA in vicinity BT 203145. Also recovered were VC literature and propaganda at coordinates BT 203146. There were no friendly casualties. Co "F" located a VC arsenal in vicinity of BT 198143. They recovered seventeen (17) shotguns, four (4) MG (M-60) barrels, three M-1 barrels one (1) M-14 w/magazine, seven (7) sound power phones, five (5) rounds 2.75mm ammo, one-hundred (100) rounds .50 caliber ammo, eleven (11) rifles of unknown make, three (3) chinese hand grenades, four (4) 81mm mortar rounds, three-hundred (300) 7.62 rounds. At about 1650 Co "F" received nine (9) small arms fire from one (1) VC in vicinity of BT 201155. Fire was returned. VC pursued into hut. VC would not surrender so hut was burned. Three (3) secondary explosions and small arms detonations were witnessed. Co "F" killed a total of four (4) VC and wounded two (2) in vicinity BS 261155. The villagers indicated that one (1) VC company of approximately one-hundred-fifty (150) persons entered village in vicinity of LZ Thrush GS BT 1914 to collect rice taxes and other equipment in the area. They departed on the 16th of February and moved to the west. The VC have a caucasian advisor. The VC were armed with modern weapons believed to be Russian.

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(x) 20 Feb 66. At 0140 an ambush from Co "F" at BT 211-154 received four (4) 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire. An 81mm mortar concentration was fired with unknown results. Seven (7) marines were wounded and five (5) were evacuated. Co "F" destroyed tunnel complexes and seven (7) caves in GS BT 2116. One (1) confirmed wounded VC at BT 215155. Blood stains found following the air strike. Co "E" killed one (1) VC at BT 196155. VC was armed with a chi-com 7.62 K-50 sub-MG. Weapon and ammo captured. At 1000 the CP began moving to BT 218169. At 1130 Co "F" found a VC training area at BT 209152. They found numerous dummy grenades carved out of wood with wire for simulated spoon, one (1) VC gas mask and one (1) K-44 mine or rocket. All the items were evacuated to G-2 Task Force Delta. The Battalion Medical Officer activated a concussion mine attached to a bush approximately three (3) feet off the ground. He received leg wounds and the Battalion Commander received missile wounds in the face. Both were evacuated to the BSA at approximately 1330. The Battalion Commander returned to the CP at approximately 1830.

(y) 21 Feb 66. Companies "E", "F" and Command Group Alpha prepared for helilift from LZ located at BT 217168. Lift was delayed until 1600. Local fan patrols were conducted in GS BT 2116 until time for lift off. Three (3) wounded VN children were treated for missile wounds and were evacuated to BSA on TFD-6 aircraft. One (1) parent accompanied the children as guardian. Approximately thirty (30) lbs of rations were distributed to villagers at BT 215169. The battalion medical team treated twelve (12) children for skin sores at the same location. Lift of companies commenced at 1600. At 1630 the LZ came under small arms fire and received four (4) rounds of 60mm mortar rounds. Fire was returned with small arms and air cover by Army UH-1E's. No friendly casualties were received and no results of returned fire could be determined as all elements were lifted out. All elements were in LZ located in GS BT 0226 by 1730. Battalion CP was established at BT 033266 with Companies "E" and "F" in perimeter defense.

(z) 22 Feb 66. At 1000 Co "F" received fire from two (2) snipers at BT 036266 killing one (1) sniper, but no weapons were recovered. A cave was discovered during the engagement. It contained tools, VC flag, and VC supply list. All items except the supply list were destroyed. Co "F" destroyed four (4) houses in vicinity of 041262 by burning them. Secondary explosions believed to be grenades and small arms ammo were heard in each case.

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The villagers indicated that the area had been mined, but the VC had returned earlier and removed them. At 1000 Command Group Alpha came under small arms fire from an estimated four (4) VC snipers at BT 037265. Exchange of fire lasted approximately thirty (30) minutes. Flank security was established in the area of the sniper fire and no further incidents occurred. Battalion CP was established at BT 055274. Seven (7) males, three (3) females and six (6) Vietnamese children requested that our CP assist them in getting to Tam Ky. They had been forced to dig tunnels by the VC and were afraid they would eventually kill them. They were evacuated by the Re-supply helicopter to LSA. At 2230 Co "F" received one (1) WIA from VC grenade at 048266. WIA evacuated on Task Force Delta's helicopter.

(aa) 23 Feb 66. Co "F" and Co "E" conducted detailed search and clear operations in GS BT 0527, 0627, 0526 and 0626. No enemy contact. Battalion CP was established at BT 060252.

(bb) 24 Feb 66. Received Frag Order 144-66 at 0935 to continue search and clear operations. At 1445 we received twelve (12) WIA from mine explosion at 075240. Nine (9) personnel were evacuated by helicopter, those wounded by the VC mine, included was the Battalion S-3. Command Group Alpha, Co "E" and Co "F" proceeded to the new CP location at BT 080244. Co "F" encountered three (3) snipers who withdrew to the South. One (1) friendly WIA from panjii stake during pursuit. The mine was possibly an 81mm mortar due to the loudness of detonation and the twelve-fifteen (12-15) meter burst radius. All WIA's received fragmentation wounds.

(cc) 25 Feb 66. Command Group Alpha, Co "E" and Co "F" returned to BT 060252 and conducted search and destroy missions throughout the day. Co "F" received two (2) WIA at BT 076239 from faulty grenade that blew up in one (1) Marine's hand before he could throw it. They were in the process of blowing caves and booby trapped fences. Frag Order 153-66 was received directing us to be prepared to move to the USS Valley Forge by helicopter on 26 February 1966.

(dd) 26 Feb 66. Fog delayed helilift of Command Group Alpha, Co "E", Co "F" and Co "G" until 1130. The lift was completed at 1300 and CP was established aboard the

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The artillery batteries were used only for on-call missions. Most of the fire was pre-scheduled H&I fires.

DECLASSIFIED (2) Naval Gunfire

The USS Barry (DD 933), USS Topeka (CLG-8) and the USS Oklahoma City (CLG-5) were used for H&I fires when available. Naval Gunfire was used to destroy a village containing fifteen (15) known VC from which heavy small arms fire was received. This occurred while the battalion was at the air strip in GS BS 7243.

j. Logistics

(1) Supply

(a) This battalion assumed the duties as Special Landing Force on 2 January 1966. At that time, the battalion embarked aboard SLF shipping with all supplies (30 Day Mount-Out Block) except in communication spare parts and batteries. These items were received at NSB, Subic. Also received at Subic was a training allocation of ammunition.

(b) During the period 8-18 January 1966, this command conducted training and established an SLF camp at Subic Bay, PI. All class II and IV resupply remained aboard ship and classes I, III and V were issued to NSD, NS, Subic Bay, PI.

(c) During Exercise Hilltop on Mandaro PI., this command was supplied by helicopters out of assets aboard SLF shipping. No problems were encountered of a significant nature.

(d) During Operation Double Eagle this command was re-supplied from assets the BSA delivered by helicopter. There were only two (2) problems encountered i.e.,

1 Resupply of BA-451 on an exchange basis was inadequate because the BSA charger section did not have enough extra batteries in stock and could not charge an adequate number at one time.

2 The shortages of radios on an exchange basis was not satisfactory. The usage was greater than anticipated, especially on AN/PRC-10's and AN/PRC-25's.

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(2) Transportation

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(a) This command utilized Navy Trucks (4) while at Subic Bay (8-18 January). This augmentation was adequate for resupply and administrative runs.

(b) Troop movements above the platoon level were handled very efficiently utilizing Navy vehicles and the truck platoon attached from 3d MT Bn.

(3) Camp Facilities and Cantonments

(a) The basic camp facilities were ready for occupancy upon arrival at Subic. These facilities consisted of showers; heads and a shower unit. Storage space was limited, but satisfactory for a short duration. The office spaces were created under tentage and troop billeting was under shelter halves.

(4) Embarkation. Embarkation and debarkation of this command while SLF were satisfactory.

(5) Medical and Evacuation

	WIA	KIA	RETURN TO DUTY
(a) BATTLE	51	5	14
NON-BATTLE	76	2	39

(b) Support and service by U.S. Naval Hospital Cubi Point was excellent. The professionalism and spirit of the Battalion Doctors and corpsmen was outstanding during the entire phase while on SLF.

k. Air Defense. See Air Support paragraph 2.1.

l. Air Support. Both helicopter and fixed wing, were used extensively during the operation. The First Marine Aircraft Wing provided CAS and helo support for Task Force Delta. Helicopters were used numerous times to lift the battalion or sections of it to various LZ's in pursuit of the VC. CAS aircraft were used provided LZ preparatory fire along with the UH-1E helicopters. In addition they provided on-call close air support, med-evacs, artillery observers and psychological warfare missions. Close air support aircraft were used during almost every helilift for fire suppression. Helicopter resupply was used almost on a daily basis. Med-evacs, resupply and close air support was most effective and timely, in that respective order.

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m. Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs during this period was handled on the individual unit basis. BLT elements treated numerous personnel for minor skin sores. "C" rations were distributed and the Battalion Medical Team held sick call in areas of operation. Numerous refugees were evacuated to the Landing Support Area (Tam Ky). These Vietnamese civilians requested transportation to escape the VC controlled area.

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-16-

Enclosure (1)

NIF → COMMAND CHRONOLOGY (PART II)

1. BLT 2/3 OpO ²⁰¹ 205-65
2. BLT 2/3 OpO 2-66
- Added → 3. BLT 2/3 OpO 324-66 (s.c. 287909)
4. 1stMarDiv msg 180242Z of December 65
5. BLT 2/3 msg 200830Z of December 65
6. 1stMarDiv msg 210700Z of December 65
7. 1stMarDiv msg 240332Z of December 65
8. 1stMarDiv msg 270600Z of December 65
9. CTG 79.2 msg 272250Z of December 65
10. BLT 2/3 msg 310820Z of December 65
11. CTG 79.2 msg 030522Z of January 66
12. USS ValFor msg 290156Z of January 66
13. CTG 79.5 msg 291850Z of January 66
14. 3dMarDiv msg 211520Z of February 66
15. ComSeventhFlt msg 261108Z of February 66
16. 3dMarDiv msg 270540Z of February 66
17. BLT 2/3 msg 281015Z of February 66
18. BLT 2/3 msg 281016Z of February 66

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1 of 80

BLT 2/3


66

DOUBLE

EAGLE

99

2nd BN, 3rd MAR, S & C
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OPERATION ORDER

324-66

287 909

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EOD DIA 520010

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Enclosure (2) 5

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 BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Quang Ngai, Song Tra Khue, Quang Hien, Song Re, My Trang, Ba To, Bien Troung, Series L701, Sheets 6755 I, II, III, IV, 6756 II, III, Sheets 6855 III.

(b) RIT OpOrder 201-65

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

Task Organization - See Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 324-66

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 324-66
- (2) See Current INTSUMS

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Landing Force, commencing at H-Hour on D-Day lands over Blue Beach vicinity BS 844419 to seize beachhead and secure area suitable for BSA. Prepares to conduct search and destroy operations to Phase Line Orange; prepares to conduct search and destroy operations inland when directed when control has passed to Task Force Delta.
- (2) BLT 3/1 lands at H-Hour over Blue Beach by surface means seizes LF objective 1.
- (3) BLT 2/4 lands over Blue Beach, passes through BLT 3/1 and conducts operations in assigned zone of action to Phase Line Orange.
- (4) HMM 362 provides helicopter support for the Landing Force.
- (5) CG 1st MAW, provides CAS and helo-escort.

2. MISSION. BLT 2/3 as the Landing Force Reserve, prepares to conduct helicopter or surface landed operations as directed by Commander Landing Force or when Chop to Task Force Delta as directed by that headquarters. Prepares to conduct a tactical withdrawal.

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3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Annex G (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 324-66.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) D-Day - 28 January 1966

(2) H-Hour - 0700

(3) Annex E (Landing Plan)

(4) Annex D (Operations Overlay)

(5) Annex G (Air Support)

(6) Annex L (Rules of Engagement)

(7) Each squad have front line markers (Annex F (Comm-Elect))

(8) All units have unit identification panel markers.

(9) Code name Double Eagle

(10) Detailed missions to be issued by Frag Order.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. (Annex C (Logistics))

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. Annex F (Communication-Electronics)

b. Command Posts.

(1) Afloat

(a) CLF - APA 248

(b) BLT 2/3 - LPH-8

(2) Ashore.

(a) Units report CP locations and unit dispositions when established.

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Acknowledge Receipt

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN



C. L. HARRISON
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Annexes

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Concept of Operations
- D - Operations Overlay (to be issued)
- E - Landing Plan
- F - Communication-Electronics (to be issued seperately)
- G - Air Support
- H - Naval Gunfire Support
- I - Fire Support Coordination
- J - Logistics
- K - Withdrawal Plan
- L - Rules of Engagement
- M - Reports
- N - Personnel
- Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 324-66

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 324-66

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization

BLT 2/3 (TU 79.5.2)

2nd Bn 3rd Marines Lt Col HORN
 H&S Co (-)
 2nd Plt (-) (Rein) Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det, Coll and Clearing Plt, Co A, 3rd Med Bn
 Det, 1st Serv Bn
 Arty Ln Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Co E (Rein) Lt SCHWARTZ

Co E
 Det, H&S Co
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt
 FAC Tm #1
 Det, Med Plt
 Det, S-2 Scouts
 FO Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 1st Sqd, 2nd Plt, Co A, 3rd Eng Bn

Co F (Rein) Capt HARDIN

Co F
 Det, H&S Co
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 Det, S-2 Scouts
 FO Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Co G (Rein) Capt WOODWARD

Co G
 Det, H&S Co
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 FAC Tm #2
 Det, S-2 Scouts
 FO Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 3rd Sqd, 2nd Plt, Co A, 3rd Eng Bn
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

A-1

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107mm Mort Btry, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar
106mm RR Plt, H&S Co

Provisional Rifle Co

Btry B (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 2nd Plt (Rein), Co A, 3rd AT Bn
 2nd Plt (Rein), Co A, 3rd Tk Bn
 2nd Plt, (Rein), Co A, 3rd MF Bn
 Det, 1st SP Bn (-)

81mm Mortar Plt

Det, 1st Force Recon Co

2nd Plt (Rein) Co A, 3rd Recon Bn

BLT Reserve, Co H (Rein)

Co H

Det, H&S Co

FO Tm 81mm Mort Plt

Det, Med Plt

Det, S-2 Scouts

FO Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn 12th Mar

2nd Sqd, 2nd Plt, Co A, 3rd Eng Bn

Det, 1st SP Bn (H&S)

BLT 2/3

USS Valley Forge (IPH-8)
 260800H January 1966

Lt MCKINNEY

Lt HOLDEN

Capt MOLSBEE

Lt VERNON

Capt SPENGLER

Lt MCCASKILL

Lt EGAN

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

C. L. Harrison

C. L. HARRISON

Major, U. S. Marine Corps

Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 324-66

A-2

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701, Sheets 6756 II, III; 6755 I, II, III, IV;
 6855 III; 1:50,000
 (b) BnO 3800.1C

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

a. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate).

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI).

a. Determine strength, location, identification, composition, and organization of VC Main Force, PAVN, Regional and Local Forces in the objective area.

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.

a. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units.

(1) TG 79.5

(a) Provide current intelligence of the objective area.

(b) Provide aerial photography of HLZ's.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.

a. Captured Personnel. In accordance with reference (b).

b. Captured Documents. In accordance with reference (b).

c. Captured Material. In accordance with reference (b).

5. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

a. See reference (a).

b. Submit requests for photography to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2)

B-1

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~~SECRET (DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL ON D-DAY)~~

BLT 2/3
USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
251200H January 1966

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.


- a.. All personnel going ashore will be instructed in proper use of passwords and countersigns.
- b. See Appendix 2 (Sign and Countersign).

7. REPORTS.

a. Spot Reports

- (1) Intelligence of an urgent or critical nature will be forwarded by the fastest means available consistent with security to this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN



C. L. HARRISON
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (DISTRIBUTION to Operation Order 324-66)

B-2

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BMT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 251200H January 1966

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMSL 701, Vietnam, Sheets 6755 I, II, III, IV, 6855 III, 1:50,000

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. MISSION

- a. Conduct helicopter or surface-landed operations as directed by CLF or when CHOP to Task Force Delta as directed by that headquarters.
- b. Conduct search and destroy operations throughout the Task Force Delta area of operations.
- c. Provide provisional company for BSA security.
- d. Be prepared to conduct a tactical withdrawal.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather

(1) See Tab A (Climate, Astronomical, and Tidal Data)

(2) Existing Situation. January and February are part of the season of the cool and relatively dry northeastern monsoon. This period is the one of maximum cloudiness, infrequent periods of heavy precipitation, and prolonged periods of widespread fog and light rain with ceilings below 1000 feet and often below 500 feet (Crachin). Crachin usually occurs rapidly and lasts for periods of 2-5 days. Frequently clouds are 3000 to 5000 feet thick. The frequency of Crachin periods begins decreasing in January until it disappears by late April. Mean temperatures for the period average 73°F. with an absolute maximum of 95°F. Mean relative humidity is approximately 90 percent. Mean precipitation is 3.4 inches in January and 2.0 inches in February.

(3) Effects of Weather on Enemy Operations. Periods of low cloud cover and reduced visibility should assist the enemy in movement of their forces without detection by visual, or photographic reconnaissance. Reduced visibility, and the effects of weather on terrain, should have no serious effects on enemy operations.

(4) Effects of Weather on Friendly Operations. Occasional periods of low cloud cover and reduced visibility will limit the effectiveness of visual and/or photographic reconnaissance capabilities, helicopter operations, the conduct of aircraft strikes, and observed artillery missions. Extensive periods of light precipitation will restrict vehicular and limit most movement to foot troops. Periods of high humidity can be expected to

limit the physical endurance of troops.

b. Terrain

(1) Existing Situation

(a) The northern sector of the area is dominated by the SONG PHUSONG CAY BUA - SONG VE River complex which meanders throughout this entire sector. The SONG VE River bisects the entire area, flowing from southwest to northeast. Numerous diversion dams are located on the river between BS 620 555 to BS 685 597. The southeastern portion of the area is dominated by the SONG TRA CAU River complex. The southerly flowing SONG HOI AN-SONG CAU River generally parallels the beach, 3-4 kilometers inland, for a distance of about 15 kilometers. It is bridged in only two places, BS 763 510 and BS 786 473

(b) The southwestern sector is predominantly mountainous and is covered by dense tropical rain forests. The southern boundary is a mountain range which reaches a height of 755 meters. Several other peaks in the sector reach heights from 592 to 682 meters. The remaining portion of the area inland from the coast is lowlands covered by hedge-fringed fields and rice paddies. This portion and the majority of river bottom land throughout the entire area is heavily populated and built up. There are isolated hills, approximately 20, scattered throughout the lowland area. Their maximum heights are in the 75-150 meter range.

(c) Highway #1 generally parallels the coast throughout the area at varying distances, 10 kilometers in the north and less than 200 meters in the south. It has bridges in at least 28 locations along its route from QUANG NGAI (BS 650 730) to NUI DAU (BS 870 320). As of 19 December 1965, about 18 of these bridges had been destroyed. From south of NUI DAU to the southern boundary of the area the highway is impassable due to innumerable cuts, trenches and mounds.

(d) A railroad generally parallels the highway. In the northern portion it is about three kilometers west of the highway, but in the southern third of the area it is in close proximity to the highway and crosses under it at BS 889 274, over it at BS 909 267, and over it again at BS 917 169. The railroad has at least 38 bridges and overpasses throughout its route. As of 19 December 1965, approximately 20 of these bridges were out. Under the most ideal conditions, 120 days would be required to place the railroad into operable condition.

(e) Both Highway #1 and the railroad pass through numerous defiles in the area. Throughout the lowlands area there are numerous trails, many feeding into the highway. Another road system, with its associated trails, originates in the city of QUANG NGAI and runs to the south-southwest into the mountains and the SONG VE River Valley.

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(f) The QUANG NGAI Airfield is located at coordinates BS 610 720 at an elevation of 9 meters. The runway is 3360 feet long and 98 feet wide oriented 110° - 290° with 0° magnetic variation. The surface is laterite and is capable of almost unlimited extension. The field is capable of handling C-130 type aircraft, however, there are no navigational facilities or services by fixed installations. There are no approach obstructions and there is a short taxiway to an unsurfaced 335 foot by 1500 foot parking area south of the runway.

(2) Effects of Terrain on Enemy Operations. The terrain and natural concealment provided by the vegetation throughout the mountainous regions favor guerrilla tactics. The numerous bridges, overpasses, and files are likely locations for sabotage and ambushes. The scattered hills in the lowlands areas will afford limited cover and concealment. The numerous built-up areas, with their large populations, will provide both cover and concealment. But these, in turn, will limit observation and fields of fire. Movement of enemy troops units through the lowlands should be detectable by friendly observation means. The inland mountainous areas are more favorable for enemy operations.

(3) Effects of Terrain on Friendly Operations. The very rugged forested terrain will severely restrict movement, maneuver capabilities, helicopter operations, supporting arms and observation. The lowlands road net will not easily support heavy equipment without a considerable engineering effort. Numerous bridges in the area will require major repairs or rebuilding before they can be used. Cultivated and built-up areas will greatly restrict vehicular movements of large troops units. Target acquisition and subsequent destruction will pose serious limitations for fire support due to the high population density in the lowlands. The numerous built-up areas, tree lines, and paddy dikes will provide limited cover and concealment throughout the lowlands. These same features will also limit fields of fire and observation and tend to canalize troop movements.

(4) Helicopter Landing Zones. See Tab B (Helicopter Landing Zones)

c. Hydrography. See Tab C (Landing Beaches)

3. ENEMY SITUATION. See Tab D (Enemy Situation)

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Enumeration

(1) Attack any target within the area at any time with a force of up to one PAVN Regt, one VC Regt (-), two separate Bn's and seven separate Companies.

(2) Attack multiple targets within the area simultaneously or in a coordinated sequence at times and places of their own choosing with any combination of force derived from one PAVN Regt, one VC Regt (-), two separate Bn's and seven separate companies.

(3) Defend at a time and place of their choosing with a force of up to two regiments, two separate battalions and seven separate companies.

(4) Independently, or in conjunction with capabilities (1), (2), and (3) above, conduct extensive small-scale attacks, ambushes, harassment, terrorism, and sabotage within the area.

(5) Reinforce capabilities (1), (2), and (3) above with all or any part of two battalions and four separate companies within 12-24 hours after movement commences.

(6) Evade direct contact with superior US/ARVN forces and resort to small unit harassing attacks, ambushes, mining, and the use of booby traps, in an effort to inflict maximum casualties on US/ARVN forces and to decimate all units operating at extended distances from reinforcing elements.

(7) Reinforce any of the above with up to approximately 700 guerrillas currently located in the area.

(8) Infiltrate the area prior to or after commencement of operations.

b. Analysis and Discussion

(1) Capability (1). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: The current disposition of the enemy forces; the VC knowledge of the avenues of approach, routes of withdrawal and reinforcement, favorable and unfavorable terrain, river and stream fordings, and natural obstacles; the enemy knowledge of the local population; the enemy capability to keep targets under surveillance at close range; the VC control of most of the area and the availability of adequate areas for assemble of forces and preparation for an attack, to include gathering of pre-attack intelligence and the establishment of communications and logistics bases. The recent battalion-sized operation which the enemy has initiated against ARVN forces is an additional factor which favors this capability. Indications which militate against the adoption of this capability include: The reluctance of the enemy to mass forces for extended periods of time; The enemy's limited fire support capability; their inability to logistically support extensive offensive operations.

(2) Capability (2). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability include those set forth for capability (1) plus: The enemy knowledge that multiple attacks would complicate US/ARVN forces ability to provide adequate and timely supportings arms fire and reaction forces to areas under attack. Indications which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The problems the enemy would have in exercising command and control required by multiple attacks; the limited enemy logistic support capability.

B-1-4

(3) Capability (3). Indications which favor adoption of this capability are: The VC knowledge of the terrain; their capability to keep opposing units under surveillance; the enemy prerogative of selecting the battle area and the possibility that defense may be required to protect enemy headquarters and base areas. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability are: The reluctance of the VC to mass forces and stand and fight against US forces, except under conditions of his own choosing; the limited enemy supporting arms capability; and the enemy knowledge of US/ARVN mobility and fire support and reinforcement capabilities.

(4) Capability (4). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: The VC knowledge of the terrain, to include avenues of approach, routes of withdrawal and ambush sites; the VC knowledge of the local populace; the VC capability to keep targets under surveillance at close range; the availability of relatively secure bases from which to operate; the VC knowledge that actions of this nature tend to tie down sizeable friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions; and the VC knowledge that actions of this nature steadily wear down friendly forces. At present, there are no indications that militate against this against this capability.

(5) Capability (5). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: The forces capable of reinforcing are readily available; Most of the area is VC controlled, therefor providing relative freedom of movement. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability; the risk of detection and possible attack by air and artillery during movement; and the reluctance of the enemy to mass mass forces.

(6) Capability (6). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: This is a basic enemy tactic; provides the enemy with the capability of inflicting significant damage on the opposing force; under these conditions, the enemy is least vulnerable to the effects of supporting arms. There are no indication which militate against the adoption of this capability.

(7) Capability (7). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: The disposition of guerrilla forces; the guerrillas knowledge of the local terrain and population. There are no indications which militate against the adoption of the capability.

(8) Capability (8). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: The record of VC reaction to USMC/ARVN offensive operations; the adoption of this capability would conserve enemy strength for further operations against RVN forces and installations subsequent to the departure of USMC/ARVN forces; basic VC/PAVN tactics call for withdrawal when confronted by a superior force in areas not considered vital. Indications which militate against the adoption of this capability are: The enemy activities in II Corps area indicate that on occasion enemy forces, particularly PAVN, have been attempting to hold their position and in instances counterattacking when terrain is favorable.

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5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Probable Courses of Action

(1) Against friendly operations in the coastal plains area, the enemy would probably execute capability (4) and conduct small scale harassing attacks, ambushes, terrorism and sabotage.

(2) Against friendly attacks in the mountain areas and foothills, the enemy would probably execute capability (4) with particular emphasis on harassments, ambushes and the use of mortar fire, mines and booby traps. In the event however, vital installations are threatened, the enemy can be expected to execute capability (3), a strong defense.

(3) Should friendly forces attempt to penetrate an enemy vital area, they would probably execute capabilities (5) and (7) in an effort to divert friendly forces or to conduct counterattacks against friendly flanks and/or rear.

(4) Should friendly forces attack the enemy in other than vital bases areas, the enemy will most probably execute capability (6) and resort to small unit harassing attacks, ambushes, mining and the use of booby traps in an effort to inflict maximum casualties on friendly forces, or possibly capability (8), exfiltration in conjunction with the utilization of capability (6) or delaying tactic.

b. Vulnerabilities. Viet Cong forces, when concentrated, are vulnerable to air attacks and to counterattacks by friendly forces whose air mobility provides the means to rapidly bring superior forces to bear. The VC are also vulnerable to friendly artillery, and his base areas are vulnerable to air attacks. Moreover, they are vulnerable to sustained combat and aggressive pursuit, and will normally attempt to break contact when meeting a superior force, or when the circumstances of the engagement are not of their choosing.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

C. L. Harrison

C. L. HARRISON

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

TABS

- A - Astronomical and Tidal Data
- B - Helicopter Landing Zones
- C - Landing Beaches
- D - Enemy Situation

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Order 324-66

B-1-6

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BLT 2/3

USS Valley Forge (LPH-6)

250800H January 1966

TAB A (Climate, Astronomical, and Tidal Data) to Appendix 1
(intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation
Order 324-66

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA (based on BONG SON Weather Station).

	<u>Hour</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>
Mean Temp (°F)	0600	68	68
	1300	78	79
Mean Precip (in)		3.4	2.0
No Days w/Precip		13	6
Relative Humidity	0600	90%	91%
	1300	61%	60%
Wind Direction	0600	N	SW
	1300	NNE	NNE
Ceiling 1000 ft & VSBY 2 1/2 mi (% of time)	0600	68.1	73.4
	1300	98.1	97.5

2. ASTRONOMICAL DATA.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>
25Jan	New Moon	0947	2142	0718	1840
26Jan	"	1022	2227	0718	1841
27Jan	"	1056	2315	0718	1842
28Jan	"	1130	- -	0718	1842
29Jan	"	1204	0002	0718	1843
30Jan	1st Qtr	1243	0054	0718	1844
31Jan	"	1325	0145	0718	1844
1Feb	"	1415	0243	0717	1845
2Feb	"	1511	0345	0716	1845
3Feb	"	1614	0450	0716	1845
4Feb	"	1722	0554	0716	1846
5Feb	Full Moon	1831	0654	0716	1846
6Feb	"	1938	0751	0715	1846
7Feb	"	2041	0841	0715	1847
8Feb	"	2140	0927	0715	1847
9Feb	"	2239	1009	0715	1848
10Feb	"	2334	1050	0714	1848
11Feb	"	- -	1132	0714	1848
12Feb	Last Qtr	0030	1214	0714	1849
13Feb	"	0119	1257	0714	1849
14Feb	"	0221	1345	0713	1850
15Feb	"	0315	1431	0713	1850
16Feb	"	0409	1526	0713	1850
17Feb	"	0459	1618	0711	1850
18Feb	"	- -	- -	0711	1851
19Feb	"	- -	- -	0711	1851

B-1-A-1

5 814

<u>Date</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>
20Feb	New Moon	- -	- -	0710	1852
21Feb	"	- -	- -	0710	1852
22Feb	"	- -	- -	0709	1853
23Feb	"	0856	2112	0709	1853
24Feb	"	0930	2159	0708	1853
25Feb	"	1005	2248	0707	1854
26Feb	"	1041	2359	0706	1854
27Feb	"	1121	- -	0706	1854
28Feb	1st Quarter	1207	0033	0705	1854

3. TIDAL DATA - TAM QUAN (MEAN TIDE LEVEL - 4 FT.)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time of Hightide</u>	<u>Ht (ft)</u>	<u>Time of Lowtide</u>	<u>Ht (ft)</u>
25Jan	---	---	0832	2.4
26Jan	0014	5.9	0853	2.2
27Jan	0048	5.6	0908	2.6
28Jan	0125	5.2	0923	2.9
29Jan	1525	4.1	2016	3.7
	0209	4.7	0931	3.2
30Jan	1548	4.5	2211	3.6
	0309	4.2	0934	3.4
31Jan	1621	4.9	0023	3.3
	0459	3.7	0918	3.5
1Feb	1703	5.3	---	---
2Feb	1754	5.2	0215	2.2
3Feb	1849	5.6	0325	1.7
4Feb	1947	6.0	0420	1.2
5Feb	2044	6.2	0509	0.9
6Feb	2139	6.4	0555	0.7
7Feb	2233	6.4	0637	0.7
8Feb	2325	6.2	0718	0.9
9Feb	1348	3.0	0753	1.3
	---	---	1704	2.8
10Feb	0016	5.7	0822	1.7
	1400	3.3	1826	2.8
11Feb	0106	5.1	0844	2.2
	1400	3.3	1826	2.8
12Feb	0158	4.4	0856	2.6
	1451	4.1	2129	2.7
13Feb	0256	3.7	0855	2.8
	1529	4.5	2329	2.8
14Feb	0423	3.1	0823	2.9
	1614	4.8	---	---
15Feb	1708	5.1	0148	2.3
16Feb	1807	5.3	0323	1.9
17Feb	1907	5.4	0410	1.7
18Feb	2003	5.5	0500	1.5
19Feb	2053	5.6	0535	1.5
20Feb	2158	5.6	0606	1.5
	2239	5.6	0644	1.6

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Date	Time of Hightide	Ht (ft)	Time of Lowtide	Ht (ft)
21Feb	1303	3.0	0654	1.7
	2256	5.4	1516	2.9
22Feb	1250	3.1	0712	1.9
	2330	5.2	1628	2.9
23Feb	1255	3.3	0729	2.1
	0006	4.9	1726	2.8
24Feb	1307	3.6	0741	2.4
	----	----	1827	2.8
25Feb	0045	4.5	0749	2.6
	1324	3.9	1932	2.8
26Feb	0127	4.1	0754	2.8
	1348	4.2	2048	2.7
27Feb	0221	3.6	0749	3.0
	1419	4.6	2223	2.5
28Feb	0354	3.2	0721	3.1
	1500	4.9	0018	2.2
1Mar	1656	5.2	----	---
2Mar	1703	5.5	0158	1.8
3Mar	1818	5.8	0306	1.5
4Mar	1950	6.0	0400	1.2
5Mar	2056	6.1	0446	1.1
6Mar	2156	6.1	0505	1.2
	1152	3.1	0601	1.4
7Mar	2231	5.9	1530	2.8
	1158	3.4	0630	1.7
8Mar	2325	5.5	1646	2.6
	1214	3.8	0654	2.2
9Mar	----	---	1957	2.4
	0018	5.0	0712	2.6
10Mar	1237	4.2	1906	2.3

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

C. L. Harrison

C..L. HARRISON

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Order 324-66

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USS Valley Forge (APF-8)
2000H January 1966

1sLH
Tab B (Helicopter Landing Zones) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to
Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (c) Maps: AMS 1701, Vietnam, Sheets 6756 II, III; 6755 I, II, III, IV;
6853 III

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

HLZ #1

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 850340, and directly inland from NIS Beach #15.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Orientated SW by NW from the center of zone. Dam Nuoc Nam Lagoon lies about 500 meters westerly.
3. ELEVATION. Less than 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 11.75 km. by 6.6 km. Shape is irregular.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand, clay, and mud.
6. OBSTACLES. There are three hills within the landing zone; hill 56, (BS 846299), hill 70, (BS 856363), and hill 164 (BS 874325), which will obstruct low flying aircraft. Streams, rivers, and flooded rice paddies will hinder cross country movement.
7. SLOPE. Generally less than 1%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane, and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. Route #1 runs through and adjacent to the center of this zone. Many dry-weather and cart trails run throughout the area.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout the entire site. Limited cover is afforded by hill masses and other natural terrain features. Concealment is limited to wooded areas on hillsides and to groves of trees that line the streams.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Unobstructed from the east and north; obstructed from the west and south by mountains.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Wind speeds over 16 knots are rare. However, a wind speed briefly exceeding 50 knots occurring with a violent thunderstorm would not be unusual. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

HLZ #2

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 935230. The village of La Dan is in the HLZ zone.

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2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. The long axis of the zone is oriented in a north to south direction. Dan Lam Binh Lake is located on the right flank of the zone.
3. ELEVATION. 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 1900 meters by 1500 meters; shape is triangular.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and mud.
6. OBSTACLES. Hills enclose the landing area on all sides except from the east, and a small stream bisects the northern 1/3 of the zone.
7. SLOPE. Less than 1%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane, and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. Route #1 parallels this zone on the right flank.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout this zone. Limited cover is afforded by natural terrain features. Concealment is limited to wooded areas on hillsides, trees along streams, and buildings in this area.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Unobstructed from the SE and NE, but hill 93 on the peninsula directly east of the zone will obstruct low flying aircraft.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

HLZ #3

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 918213. Situated behind the north half of NIS Beach 17.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented east to west. Located about 1,000 meters WSW of the mouth of the Dan Nuco Man Lagoon.
3. ELEVATION. Less than 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. About 1,000 meters wide across center, and 1,200 meters long on the seaward side. Shape is trapezoid.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. Clumps of trees are scattered throughout zone.
7. SLOPE. Less than 1%.
8. LOCAL USE. Mainly rice fields.

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9. EXITS. Route #1 parallels this zone on the right flank.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout this zone. Limited cover is afforded by natural terrain features. Concealment is limited to wooded area on hillsides, trees along streams, and buildings in this area.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Unobstructed from the east; obstructed from all other directions.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from north November through January and from the southwest February through October.

HLZ #4

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 897205. About 1,200 meters directly inland from NIS Beach 17.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented east to west. About 1500 meters WSW of the village of Thach By.
3. ELEVATION. About 110 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. Averages 1700 meters in length, and 500 meters in width. Shape is irregular.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. A stream meanders through the zone, and rice fields are within and adjacent to the zone.
7. SLOPE. Less than 3%.
8. LOCAL USE. Rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. A native trail generally parallels the western end of the zone.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout the entire zone. Limited cover is afforded by nearby hills, and other natural terrain features. concealment is limited to wooded areas on hillsides and to the groves of trees that line the streams.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. The most favorable approach would be from the ESE over HLZ 5 and south of hill 203, however, an approach from the ENE could be made by flying over the Suci Lo Van River, but caution would have to be observed as hills 203 and 274 flank this approach.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

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HLZ #5

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 915195. Situated behind the southern half of NIS Beach 17.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented east to west. About 2 1/2 km. WSW of Dam Nuoc Man Lagoon.
3. ELEVATION. About 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. About 1300 meters long on all sides. Shape is triangular.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. One un-named stream bisects this zone. Flooded rice fields will also hinder movement.
7. SLOPE. Less than 3%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted in rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. Route #1 parallels this HLZ on the right flank.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout the entire site. Limited cover is afforded by hill masses and other natural terrain features. Concealment is limited to wooded areas on hillsides and groves of trees that line the streams.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Unobstructed from the east.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

HLZ #6

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 860190. Situated about 5 km. inland from NIS Beach 18.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. The long axis of the zone is orientated north to south. The city of Gia Bun is about 7 km. SW of the zone center.
3. ELEVATION. Overall average 15 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. Averages 3.5 by 1.5 km. Shape is irregular.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand, clay and mud.
6. OBSTACLES. Nearly level paddy-land with networks of earth dikes compartmented by small streams and canals. Clumps of trees scattered throughout zone.
7. SLOPE. Less than 3%.

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8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted in rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. Route #1 parallels this landing zone on the right. Many roads and trails bisect this area.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout the entire site. Limited cover is afforded by hill masses and other natural terrain features. Concealment is limited to wooded areas on hillsides and groves of trees line the streams.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Generally unobstructed from the east.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest from February through October.

HLZ #7

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 755380. About 11 km. inland from NIS Beach 15.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented northwest to southeast. The Song Tra Cau River extends across the northern end of the zone.
3. ELEVATION. Less than 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 6 by 3 km.; shape is irregular.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand, clay and mud.
6. OBSTACLES. Small villages are scattered throughout the zone. The largest located at coordinate BS 755381. Streams, rivers and flooded rice paddies will hinder cross country movement.
7. SLOPE. Generally less than 1%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. Route #1 is situated 3 km. east and there are many fair weather roads and cart trails throughout the area.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout the zone. Limited cover is afforded by the paddy dikes, scattered trees, and other natural terrain features. Concealment is limited to wooded areas on hill sides and groves of trees that line the streams.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Unobstructed from the east and north, but obstructed by low mountains from the southwest. A small hillock 150 meters high is situated just out of the zone to the east at BS 772394.

B-1-B-5

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12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest from February through October.

HLZ #8

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 587387.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented northwest to southeast. The Song Ve River bisects the zone in the north portion.
3. ELEVATION. Averages 20 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 2 by 1.5 km; shape is irregular.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. The Song Ve River restricts movement in the northern portion. A village in the southern portion and rice fields throughout present the only other apparent obstacles.
7. SLOPE. Less than 3%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. Hard surface highway across southeast end of zone exits zone to southwest toward Ba To and northeast toward Tan An.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout zone. Concealment is limited to buildings, and vegetation along river banks and around villages.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Hills restrict approach from all directions except east. Hills range from 800 meters to the west and 200 to 300 meters on the north and south.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest from February through October.

HLZ #9

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 603404
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented east to west from the center of the zone. The zone itself is located in the Song Ve River Valley.
3. ELEVATION. 20 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 1.5 km. square.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand, clay and mud.
6. OBSTACLES. Hills up to 416 meters in elevation surround the zone. Small

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villages are scattered throughout the zone and hedgerows bisect the area.

7. SLOPE. Generally less than 2%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. A fair weather dirt road extends north to south through the south-east portion of the zone. There are numerous trails throughout the area.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout the area. Cover is afforded by paddy dikes, trees and other natural features. Concealment is generally limited to the limited wooded areas.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. The best routes are from the north following the Song Ve River and from the east up the Song Tra Cau River Valley from Route #1.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest from February through October.

HLZ #10

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 635445.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented northwest to southeast. The Song Ve River runs through the northwest end of the zone.
3. ELEVATION. Averages 15 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 3 by 9 km. Oblong shaped.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. The Song Ve River limits movement in the northwest end of the zone. Meandering streams, trees along the river and stream banks and rice fields hinder cross country movement within the zone. Hills surround the area.
7. SLOPE. Generally less than 3%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. A fair weather road bisects the zone from southeast to northwest. A cart track exits the zone to the east.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout the zone. Limited cover is afforded by paddy dikes, trees and other natural features. Concealment is limited to the wooded mountain areas on either side of zone.

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11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. The most favorable approach route would be from the northwest or southeast.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are north, November through January and southwest, February through October.

HLZ #1.1

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 750500.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented northwest to southeast. The town of Van Ha (1) lies 2 km. northeast of the zones center.
3. ELEVATION. Averages 5 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 16 by 7 km; irregularly shaped.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. Rice paddies hinder cross country movement.
7. SLOPE. Negligible except in the extreme western portion where slope exceeds 4%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. Route #1 runs through the center of this zone. Many dry weather roads and cart trails exist throughout the area.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. The only cover and concealment that is readily available is supplied by the paddy dikes and canal banks.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Unobstructed from the north, east and south, but obstructed from the west by mountains.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are the north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

HLZ #1.2

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 609495.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented in a north south direction along the Song Ve River. Nui Coi Mountain is located 2.5 km. to the east.
3. ELEVATION. Approximately 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 4 by 1 km; irregularly shaped.

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5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. Local dwellings and vegetation within the zone and hill masses on the west and east boundaries.
7. SLOPE. Negligible.
8. LOCAL USE. Some cultivation of dry-crops and paddies.
9. EXITS. Generally channeled north and south (due to mountains) via cart trails following valley.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Some cover and concealment is afforded by paddy dikes and scattered vegetation.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Along the Song Ve River from the North and South.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from southwest, February through October.
NOTE: No photography available.

HLZ #13

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 685515.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented in an east west direction approximately 5 km. southwest of Quang Hien.
3. ELEVATION. Approximately 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 3.5 by 2 km; irregular shaped.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. Mountains to the south, west and northwest.
7. SLOPE. Generally less than 5%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. Generally channeled north and east via dry weather roads and cart trails.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. The only cover and concealment readily available is afforded by the paddy dikes, canal and stream banks.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Unobstructed from the east and north; obstructed from the south and west by mountains.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

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HLZ #14

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 617538.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented in a north south direction on the east bank of the Song Ve River, west of Nui Nhan Mountain.
3. ELEVATION. Approximately 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 3 by 1.5 km; oval shaped.
5. SURFACE MATERIALS. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. Built up areas and vegetation within the zone and mountains to the north, east and west.
7. SLOPE. Negligible.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane and dry-crops.
9. EXITS. Generally channeled northeast and south via cart track, the bridge over the Song Ve River, and a dry weather road.
(NOTE: Present condition of bridge unknown).
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Some cover and concealment is afforded by paddy dikes and local vegetation.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. From the northeast and from the south via the Song Ve River Valley.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and southwest, February through October.

HLZ #15

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 680550.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented in a semi-circle approximately 3 km northeast of Nui Nhan Mountain. The northwest edge of the zone is bounded by the Song Ve River.
3. ELEVATION. Approximately 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. Approximately 6.5 km in length and averaging 2 km in width, forming a semi-circle at the base of Nui Nhan Mountain.

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5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and Clay.
6. OBSTACLES. Local dwellings, small trees, and local vegetation within the zone, and Nui Nhan Mountain to the southwest of the Zone.
7. SLOPE. Generally less than 5%.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane, and dry crop.
9. EXITS. Generally channeled north and east, due to mountains, via dry weather roads and cart trails.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. The only cover and concealment readily available is along the paddy dikes, and canal and stream banks.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Unobstructed from the east and north, but obstructed from the west and south by mountains ranging up to 600 meters in elevation.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

HLZ #16

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 615560.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Oriented northeast to southwest along the Song Ve River, 3.9 km. northwest of Nui Nhan mountain.
3. ELEVATION. Approximately 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 1.2 Km by 2.2 km; irregular shaped.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. Houses and local vegetation within the zone, and mountains to the north, east and west.
7. SLOPE. Negligible.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane and dry crops.
9. EXITS. Generally channeled to the north via dry weather roads.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Cover and concealment is limited to paddy dikes and the vegetation along streams.

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11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. From the northeast and south, via the Song Ve River Valley.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest from February through October.

HLZ #17.

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 735600.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Centered 1 km northwest of hill 69 (Nui Cay BS 740040).
3. ELEVATION. Less than 10 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 6 km by 1 km; "U" shaped.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay and mud.
6. OBSTACLES. Streams and flooded paddies will hinder cross-country movement.
7. SLOPE. Negligible.
8. LOCAL USE. Mostly wet crops, with a few patches of dry crops near the edges of the zone.
9. EXITS. Route #1 is situated 3,000 meters west and can be reached via two trails. Trails exit the area to the north, south, east and west but roads within the zone are non-existent.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Generally poor throughout the zone. Cover is provided primarily by paddy dikes. Concealment is extremely limited in the zone but is available in the wooded areas that are located south, west and north of the zone.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Approaches in all directions are excellent.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest from February through October.

HLZ #18

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 670600.

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2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. HLZ #18 is oriented in an E-W direction bounded by the Song Tra Khuc River to the north, Nui Go Gai Mountain (BS 543679) to the west, Song Ve River to the south and the South China Sea to the east. The city of Quang Ngai is centered within the north boundary at BS 645727.
3. ELEVATION. Generally averages 10 meters in western portion to less than 5 meters in the eastern portion.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. 20 by 10 km; rectangular in shape.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. Local dwellings, vegetation and hill masses to the west and southwest.
7. SLOPE. Negligible.
8. LOCAL USE. Irrigated and planted with rice, sugar cane and dry-crops. Villages exist throughout area.
9. EXITS. Exit can be made cross country or via numerous trails and cart tracks to the west, via a reinforced concrete bridge over the Song Tra Khuc River to the north, and the bridge over the Song Ve River to the south (both bridges on National Route #1). Numerous trails and dry weather roads dissect the area and National Route #1 bisects zone from north to south. A dry weather road leads southwest through hill masses forming the border of the landing zone.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Fair throughout the zone. Faddy dikes, local vegetation along stream beds provide some cover and concealment. There is irregular terrain with scattered brush wood situated throughout the zone which provides excellent cover and concealment.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Generally unobstructed except from the west and southwest by mountains ranging in height up to 859 meters.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

HLZ #19

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 610740.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Zone consists of sand bar, oriented east to west along the Song Tra Khuc River.
3. ELEVATION. Approximately 5 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. This HLZ is broken into 3 individual sites all of which are irregular in shape. The sites are listed from west to east. Centered

B-1-B-13

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BS 592748, 1.5 km by 4 km; centered BS 610740, 1.4 km by .4 km; centered BS 633741, 2.5 km by .6 km.

5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand.
6. OBSTACLES. Small trees in zone.
7. SLOPE. Less than 1%.
8. LOCAL USE. None.
9. EXITS. Cross country or via trails and loose surface roads. National Route #1 bisects the zone in the center.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Almost non-existent.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Along the Song Tra Khuc River from the South China Sea.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from the north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

HLZ #20

1. LOCATION. Centered at BS 690740.
2. ORIENTATION AND LANDMARKS. Zone consists of sandbar, oriented east to west along the Song Tra Khuc River.
3. ELEVATION. Approximately 5 meters.
4. SIZE AND SHAPE. This HLZ is broken into 3 irregular sites. The sites are listed west to east; centered BS 661735, 3.5 by 1 km; centered BS 691740, 3.6 by .4 km; centered BS 713745, 2.7 by 1 km.
5. SURFACE MATERIAL. Sand and clay.
6. OBSTACLES. Dwellings and small trees.
7. SLOPE. Less than 1%.
8. LOCAL USE. A small portion is cultivated and the remainder is barren.
9. EXITS. Cross country or via trails and loose surface roads to the hard surfaced, coastal route, National Route #1.
10. COVER AND CONCEALMENT. Almost non-existent.
11. HELICOPTER ROUTES. Along the Song Tra Khuc River from the South China Sea.
12. PREVAILING WINDS. Winds over 16 knots are rare. Prevailing winds are from north, November through January and from the southwest, February through October.

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BLP 2/3

USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)

250800H January 1966

Tab C (Landing Beaches) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series L701, Sheets 6755 I, II, 6855 III, 6854 IV, 1:50,000

1. LANDING BEACHES

a. Blue Beach #1

- (1) Location. A part of NIS Beach #15. Center is located at BS 844419; left flank located at BS 845417 and right flank at BS 843421.
- (2) Length and Useable Length. 500 yards, all useable.
- (3) Widths. 100 to 300 yards at L.W.; 90 to 250 yards at H.W.
- (4) Gradients. 1 on 5 to 1 on 35 from L.W. to H.W.
1 on 5 to 1 on 10 at H.W. zone.
- (5) Approaches. Nearshore bottom consists of sand and has a mild to moderate gradient. There are no obstacles natural or man-made. Sandbars are located at BS 842427 (least depth 8 feet) and BS 839431 (least depth 11 feet).
- (6) Surf and Tidal Range. Surf 4 feet or greater can be expected 53 percent of the time in winter. Tides are chiefly diurnal, range 4.5 feet, tropic.
- (7) Material and Firmness. Sand; firm in wetted areas, soft where dry.
- (8) Terrain Immediately Behind the Beach. The backshore runs the entire length of the beach. It is approximately 300 yards wide with widely scattered scrub trees. The backshore is composed of soft sand and should support all types of tracked vehicles. Wheeled vehicles will require matting. The backshore gives way to a series of cultivated fields (dry crop) which are traversed by numerous ditches. These fields extend up to 800 yards into the hinterland and in turn give way to an area composed of firmly packed sand. It is used by the natives as a burial ground. The area beyond that is lowland covered by rice fields bordered by the SONG CAU River, approximately 2400 meters from the beach.

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

TAB D (Enemy Situation) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701, Sheets 6756 II, III, 6755 I, II, III, IV, 6855 III, 1:50,000

1. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION. Based on confirmed and probable units known to operate in QUANG NGAI Province and northern BINH DINH Province, the following is an estimate of the enemy locally available, and reinforcing forces.

a. Locally Available. The following forces can be employed in the MO DUC-DUC PHU area without significant delay:

(1) Disposition

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GENERAL LOCATION**</u>
18th PAVN Regt, 325th Div	vic BS 6346
7th Bn	Quang Ngai Province
8th Bn	Quang Ngai Province
9th Bn	Duc Phu District
2nd VC Regt (-)	vic BS 7040
93rd Bn	vic FC 6540
95th Bn	Mo Duc District
97th Bn	vic BS 7137
20th Bn (2nd VC Regt)	vic BS 2864
38th Bn (MF)	vic BS 6653
C-17 Co (LF)	vic BS 7055
T-20 Co (LF)	vic BS 5082
89B Co (LF)	vic BS 5863
96th Co (MF)	vic BS 5053
206th Co (LF)	vic BS 5770
C-212 Co (LF)	vic BS 6136
C-219 Co (LF)	vic BS 8125

(2) Strength.

1 PAVN Regt	2000 (est)
1 VC Regt	1680
*2 Bn's	850
7 Co's	730
	<u>5260</u> Total

* Includes 20th Bn (2nd VC Regt) operating independently.

** The locations listed are based on best known information but cannot be confirmed or considered precise. They represent the general center of areas in which elements of the units listed have been identified.

B-1-D-1

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- b. Reinforcements. The enemy has the following confirmed and probable units capable of reinforcing the locally available forces listed above within 12 to 24 hours after movement commences.

(1) Disposition.

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>GENERAL LOCATION</u>
52nd Bn (MF)	vic BS 7090
104th Bn (MF)	vic BS 6692
T-18 Co (LF)	vic BS 6887
T-19 Co (LF)	vic BS 5392
614th Co (LF)	vic BS 3065
Tra Bong Co (LF)	vic BS 3190

- (2) Strength. The following is an estimate of the strength of the enemy forces capable of reinforcing within the area covered by this estimate.

2 Bn's	650
4 Co's	380
	1030 Total

- c. Guerilla Forces. In addition to the locally available and reinforcing units listed above, the enemy has a guerilla force within QUANG NGAI Province currently estimated at 2100. Approximately 700 of these guerillas are available for employment within the MO DUC-DUC PHU area.
- d. Installations. The following installations have been reported as located within the MO DUC-DUC PHU area:

<u>UNIT/INSTALLATION</u>	<u>GENERAL LOCATION</u>
VC Training and Base Camp	vic BS 6038
VC Assembly area	vic BS 6435
Aid Station and Food Storage	BS 705461
Aid Station and Food Storage	BS 483592
Aid Station and Food Storage	BS 484603
Aid Station and Food Storage	BS 490582
POW Camp	BS 524625
POW Camp	BS 581474
Rice Storage Warehouses (7)	BS 537261
Unk Type Supply Dump	BS 544657

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

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Executive Officer

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BLT 2/3
USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
250800H January 1966

Annex C (Concept of Operation) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Quang Ngai, Song Tra Khue, Quang Hien, Song Re, My Trang, Ba To, Bien Troung, Series L701, Sheets 6755 I, II, III, IV, 6756 II, III, Sheets 6855 III.

Time Zone: Hanoi (-3)

1. GENERAL. Double Eagle is a combined operation involving amphibious forces of the 7th Fleet in conjunction with U. S. Marines from III MAF, U. S. Army Forces from Field Force Vietnam and RVNAF. It will be conducted in four phases. The first phase consists of an amphibious landing in southern Quang Ngai Province to secure a beachhead and provide an area for a beach area. Phase II after CHOP to Task Force Delta will consist of search and destroy operations to clear the beachhead area between Highway 1 and the Ocean. Phase III will consist of B-52 raids of suspect areas with the immediate follow up of search and destroy operations by helicopter landed forces from Quang Ngai and/or Landing Force aboard VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8). Phase IV will consist of a tactical withdrawal by all forces.

2. MISSION. Landing Force, commencing at H-Hour on D-Day land over Blue Beach vicinity BS 844419; to seize beachhead and secure area suitable for BSA. Prepare to conduct search and destroy operations to Phase Line Orange; prepare to conduct search and destroy operations inland when directed, when control has passed to Task Force Delta. BLT 2/3, prepares to conduct helicopter or surface landed operations when directed by CLF or when CHOP to Task Force Delta as directed by that headquarters. Prepares to conduct search and destroy operations throughout Task Force area of Operations. Prepares to conduct tactical withdrawal.

3. CONCEPT.

a. On D-Day, Landing Force (TG 79.5 (BLT 3/1)) conducts a surfaced landed assault in southern Quang Ngai Province.

b. Commencing at H-Hour, BLT 3/1 lands in LVTP's and LCM's on Blue Beach, seize Landing Force Objective 1 to provide suitable area for a BSA. Conducts search and destroy operations in zone to Phase Line Orange; on order CHOP to Task Force Delta prepared to conduct operations as directed by that headquarters.

c. On order BLT 2/4 lands and conducts search and destroy operations in zone to Phase Line Orange. CHOP to Task Force Delta on order.

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- d. IFR, BLT 2/3, on order lands by helicopter prepared to conduct operations as directed by CLF or when CHOP to Task Force Delta by that Headquarters.
- e. HMM 362 provides helicopter support as requested by CLF.
- f. Close air support operations will be conducted by VMA aircraft from 1st MAW at Chu Lai or Danang.
- g. A tactical withdrawal from HLZ's and landing beaches will be conducted on order.
- h. Riot Control Agents CS and CN are authorized. All means of dissemination may be employed to include B 159 air-dropped multiple source clusters. Downwind hazard to non-combatants will be minimized consistent with tactical requirements.

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C-2

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Annex E (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 324-66.

- Ref: (a) FMFM 6-3
 (b) FMFM 3-3
 (c) NWIP 22-6(a)

TIME ZONE: HOTEL (-8)

1. GENERAL.

This plan provides for:

- a. Helicopterborne landing of all rifle companies, provisional rifle platoon (107mm Mortar Battery), H&S Company (-) and selected BLT attachments in one or more designated landing zones.
- b. (Alternate Landing Plan. Combined helicopterborne and surface landing of the BLT. The helilifted force will be composed of two reinforced rifle companies and selected BLT attachments. The surface landed force will be composed of two reinforced rifle companies, detachment H&S Company and selected BLT attachments.
- c. Command Group ALPHA will be landed by LVTC and Command Group BRAVO by helicopter.

2. CONTROL MEASURES.

TACLOG will be stationed aboard USS Valley Forge (LPH-8).

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E-1

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Appendixes

- 1 - Helicopter Employment Assault Landing Table to Annex E (Landing Plan)
to Operation Order 324-66
- 2 - (Pre-D-Day transfer) to Annex E (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 324-66
- 3 - Alternate Landing Plan to Annex E (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 324-66

E-2

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BLT 2/3
USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
250800H January 1966

Appendix I (Helicopter employment and Assault Landing Table) to Annex E (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

WAVE	FLIGHT NO	NO/TYPE A/C	FROM (ORIGIN)	TO (LOAD)	DESTINATION	TROOP UNIT
1	1	4 UH34D	(ALL WAVES ORIGINATE AND LOAD FROM LPH-8)		TO BE ANNOUNCED	Co E (28)
	2	4 UH34D				"
	3	4 UH34D				"
	4	4 UH34D				"
2	1	4 UH34D				"
	2	4 UH34D				"
	3	4 UH34D				"
	4	4 UH34D				"
3	1	1 UH34D				Co E (5)
	1	3 UH34D				Co F (21)
	2	4 UH34D				Co F (28)
	3	4 UH34D				"
4	4	4 UH34D				"
	4	4 UH34D				"
	4	4 UH34D				"
	4	4 UH34D				"
5	4	1 UH34D				Co F (6)
	4	3 UH34D				81mm Mtr Plt (21)
	4	4 UH34D				81mm Mtr Plt (28)
	4	4 UH34D				"
						81mm Mtr Plt (6)

UH34D

E-1-1

~~SECRET~~ ON D-DAY

~~SECRET~~ (DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL ON D-DAY)

WAVE	FLIGHT NO	TYPE A/C	FROM (ORIGIN)	TO (LOAD)	DESTINATION (TO BE ANNOUNCED)	TROOP UNIT
6	3	UH34D	(ALL WAVES ORIGINATE AND LOAD FROM LFEH-8)			Co G (21)
	4	UH34D				Co G (28)
	1	UH34D				"
	2	UH34D				"
	3	UH34D				"
	4	UH34D				"
7	1	UH34D				Co G (28)
	2	UH34D				Co G (24)
	3	UH34D				Co H (28)
	4	UH34D				"
8	1	UH34D				"
	2	UH34D				"
	3	UH34D				"
	4	UH34D				"
9	1	UH34D				"
	2	UH34D				"
	3	UH34D				"
	4	UH34D				"
10	1	UH34D				Co H (9)
	2	UH34D				2nd Plt Co A, 3rd Recon (14)
	3	UH34D				2nd Plt Co A, 3rd Recon (11)
	4	UH34D				Det, Recon Plt, 1st Force Recon (11)
	5	UH34D				106 RR Plt (28)
	6	UH34D				106 RR Plt (16)
	7	UH34D				Prov Rifle Plt (7)
	8	UH34D				Prov Rifle Plt (28)
	9	UH34D				"
	10	UH34D				Prov Rifle Plt (4)
	11	UH34D				H&SCo (21)
	12	UH34D				Command Group A (28)
	13	UH34D				Command Group A (7)
	14	UH34D				Command Group B (28)

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E-1-2

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WAVE NO	FLIGHT NO./TYPE A/C	FROM (ORIGIN)	TO (LOAD)	DESTINATION TO BE ANNOUNCED	TROOP UNIT
	4 UH34D				"
	4 UH34D				"
	4 UH34D				"
	4 UH34D				"
	4 UH34D				"
	4 UH34D				"
	1 UH34D				H&S Co (6)
					Total E Co (Rein) (229)
					Total F Co (Rein) (195)
					Total G Co (Rein) (213)
					Total H Co (Rein) (205)
					Total 81mm Mtr Plt (83)
					Total 2d Plt Co A, 3d Recon (25)
					Total Det, Recon Plt, 1st Force (11)
					Total 106RR Rifle Plt (44)
					Total Prov. Rifle Plt (107mm Mtr Btry) (67)
					Total H&S Co (Rein) (Scheduled) (21)
					Total H&S Co (on Call) (202)
					Total Command Group A (35)
					Total Command Group B (28)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

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Executive Officer

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Appendix 2 (Pre-D-Day Transfers) to Annex E (Landing Plan) to
 Operation Order 324-66

	TIME	PERS	EQUIPMENT	FROM	TO	UNIT	REMARKS
BLT 2/3	TBA	213	Normal Combat	APA 212	LPH 8	Co G, (Rein)	
	TBA	205	-do-	APA 212	LPH 8	Co H, (Rein)	

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Appendix 3 (Alternate Landing Plan) to Annex E (Landing Plan to
 Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) none

Time Zone: Hotel

1. This appendix plans for the alternate landing of BLT 2/3

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

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TABS:

A - Helicopter Employment Assault Landing Table

B - Assault Schedule

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E-3-1

~~TOP SECRET (DOWN GRADEN)
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BLT 2/3
USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
250800H January 1966

Tab A (Helicopter Employment and Assault Table) to Appendix 3 (Alternate Landing Plan) to Annex E (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

WAVE NO	FLIGHT NO/TIME A/C	FROM (ORIGIN)	TO (LOAD)	DESIGNATION TO BE ANNOUNCED	TROOP UNIT
1	1	4 UH34D	(All waves		Co E (28)
	2	4 UH34D	originate and load		"
	3	4 UH34D	from (LPH-8)		"
	4	4 UH34D			"
	1	4 UH34D			"
	2	4 UH34D			"
	3	4 UH34D			"
	4	4 UH34D			"
	1	1 UH34D			Co E (5)
	1	3 UH34D			Co F (21)
	2	4 UH34D			Co F (28)
	3	4 UH34D			"
	4	4 UH34D			"
	1	4 UH34D			"
	2	4 UH34D			"
	3	4 UH34D			"
	4	1 UH34D			Co F (6)
	3	3 UH34D			Command Group B (21)
	4	1 UH34D			Command Group B (7)

TABLE F-3

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E-3-A-2

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Tab B (Assault Schedule) to Appendix 3 (Alternate Landing Plan) to
 Annex E (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

BEACH

WAVE	TIME	CRAFT/VEHICLE SERIAL	UNIT
1	H-Hour	10 LVTP-5	Co G
2	H + 10 min	10 LVTP-5	Co H

ON - CALL WAVES

Rept PCS at H + 10 min	1 LCM (6)	81mm Mortar Plt
-do-	1 LCM (6)	106mm RR Plt
-do-	1 LVTP-5	Floating Dump

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E-3 -B-1

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1 of 80

2nd FN, 3rd MAR, S & C

CONTROL NO. 006-66COPY NO. 1 OF 80

BLT 2/3

USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH 8)

250800H JANUARY 1966

Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 324-66

Time Zone: H (Z + 8), Z^m H - 8

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) The enemy has the capability to employ imitative deception to jam radio nets and to cut and tap wire lines.
- (2) the enemy can salvage and make use of all dry cell batteries which are discarded.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) U.S. Army forces will be operating to the south of the AOA.
- (2) Friendly indigenous forces will be operating throughout the AOA.
- (3) Command Posts: see operation overlay.
- (4) CTC 76.5 provides communication and cryptographic guard external of the objective area during operation.

2. MISSION. Communication elements of BLT 2/3 will establish, operate and maintain communications facilities to support any mission assigned to BLT 2/3 using only man-packed equipment.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. The communication elements of BLT 2/3 will establish, operate and maintain radio nets, limited wire and message center operation ashore so as to provide the commander with rapid and reliable communications with senior, subordinate and adjacent commands.

b. Communications Platoon, H&S Company, Radio.

- (1) Be prepared to operate radio nets in accordance with Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).
- (2) Guard CLM tactical nets 1&2 commencing H-60 until BLT 2/3 chops to Opcon TFD, using ships radios.

Message Center.

- (1) operate message center aboard LPH guarding for BLT 2/3 and HMM-362 throughout the operation.
- (2) Message center represent. ashore control distribution of KAA-60 and KAC-138 materiel.

Wire.

- (1) Operate switchboard in troop message center throughout the operation.
- (2) Lay wire to remote radios as required.
- (3) Lay wire for CP security as available.

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- c. BTRY B (rein) 1st Bn 12th MAR.
 (1) Be prepared to guard TFD conduct of fire net. Frequencies will be promulgated when available.
 (2) Provide internal radio communications for provisional rifle company.
- d. 107MM HOWTAR BTRY, 3rd BN, 12th MAR.
 (1) Be prepared to guard TFD conduct of fire net. Frequencies will be promulgated when available.
- e. 2nd PLT (rein), Co A, 3rd AT BN.
 (1) Be prepared on order to guard bn TAC net using PRC-10.
- f. 2nd PLT (rein), Co A, 3rd RECON BN.
 (1) Operate station at BN CP guarding TFD Recon net.
 (2) Recon teams be prepared to guard TFD Recon net.
- g. Detachment 3rd FSR, DET 1st SERV BN.
 (1) Maintenance detachment guard BN TAC net as required to coordinate 3rd echelon or above repair and evacuation of combat essential items.
- h. DET, RECON PLT, 1st FOR RECON CO.
 (1) Guard TFD Recon net.
- i. DET, 1st SP BN.
 (1) Be prepared to operate station at BN CP on TAC log net with USS Valley Forge.
 (2) Be prepared to switch to BSA logistics net.
- j. Coordinating Instructions.
 (1) Visual signals in accordance with appendix 1.
 (2) Call signs in accordance with appendix 2.
 (3) Radio circuits in accordance with appendix 3.
 (4) Frequencies for AN/PRC-6 radios will be as available and will be used on a non interference basis.
 (5) Air communications in accordance with annex G (Air Support)
 (6) Personnel assigned specific permanent type communications duties during the operation will not be included in provisional organizations.
 (7) All visual signals employed for air-ground coordination must be confirmed by voice radio communications. FM helicopter direction net will be available for use by infantry units. The helicopter common circuit will not be used by ground units.
 (8) Effective editions of KAA-60 and KAC-138 will be used for all authentication and coupling.
 (A) KAC-138 will not be used to couple coordinates of friendly front lines, enemy positions, or target locations.
 (B) The use of checkpoints and phase lines is encouraged to prevent the possible compromise of couple codes.

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~~SECRET~~

4. Administration and Logistics.

- a. See Annex J (LOGISTICS) to Op Order 324-66
- b. Sufficient batteries will be brought ashore to last a minimum of two days.
- c. Silver zinc battery charging will be accomplished aboard amphibious ships until such time as the BSA can assume this responsibility.
- d. Inoperable equipment will be returned to the BSA by the fastest available means in order to expedite evacuation and repair. All equipment means will be tagged to show unit and section and BN S-4 will be notified by message of serial. No of equipment which is evacuated directly from companies to BSA.
- e. All expended dry cell batteries will be returned to the BSA.

By Command of Lieutenant Colonel Horn

C.L. Harrison
 C.L. Harrison
 Major, U.S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

- 1-Visual Communications
- 2-Call Sign
- 3-Radio Plan

Distribution: Annex-Z (Distribution)

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BLP 2/3
 USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)
 250800H JANUARY 1966

Appendix 1 (Visual Communications) To Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 324-66

1. Smoke signals will be as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
SIGNAL, GROUND, YELLOW SMOKE, M64 OR GRENADE, RIFLE, YELLOW SMOKE OR GRENADE, HAND, YELLOW SMOKE M18	Marking of the friendly unit's position or of a secured area for an urgent or normal aircraft landing.
SIGNAL, GROUND, GREEN SMOKE M65 OR GRENADE, HAND, GREEN SMOKE M18 OR GRENADE, RIFLE, GREEN SMOKE	Please inform us of the enemy direction or position
GRENADE, RIFLE, RED SMOKE OR GRENADE, HAND, RED SMOKE (WHEN DROPPED BY A/C)	Marking of an enemy position
GRENADE, HAND, SMOKE, IN (WHITE) ANM 8	Request radio communications on an air-ground frequency

2. Illumination signals will be as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
SIGNAL, GROUND, RED STAR CLUSTER (ONE SIGNAL IS FIRED)	Encircled or attacked by enemy. Request support. (Type of support desired will be given by radio)
SIGNAL, GROUND, RED STAR CLUSTER (CONTINUOUS FIRING OF THREE OR MORE SIGNALS)	Request emergency illumination (radio liaison must be established)
SIGNAL GROUND, GREEN STAR, PARACHUTE	Request ammo resupply. (confirm type by radio)

F-1-1

~~SECRET~~TYPEMEANINGSIGNAL, GROUND, GREEN STAR
M125 (HAND HELD)

Request evacuation helo

SIGNAL, GROUND, WHITE STAR
ANM 41-A1

Radio breakdown

OR

SIGNAL, GROUND, WHITE STAR.
PARACHUTE, M127 (HAND HELD)SIGNAL, GROUND, WHITE STAR
CLUSTER (FIRE ON ONE SIGNAL)Request radio communication
on Air-Ground frequencySIGNAL, GROUND, WHITE STAR
CLUSTER (CONTINUOUS FIRING
OF THREE OR MORE SIGNALS)

Request cease firing illumination

SIGNAL, GROUND, RED STAR,
PARACHUTE M126 (HAND HELD)We are withdrawing from this
position

3. Panel signals will be as follows:

A. Vehicular identification

(1) Red panels will be used on odd dates.

(2) Yellow panels will be used on even dates.

B. Helicopter Landing Point Marking System.

a. All landing points will be marked using colored marking panels. The following colors are designated to the companies indicated.

ECHO	YELLOW
FOXTROT	RED
GOLF	GREEN
HOTEL	BLUE
H & S	WHITE

b. Prevailing wind direction will be shown by installing a short pole (approximately 3ft.) with streamers, flags or pennants of sufficient length to allow the pilot to see the local wind direction.

c. Marking of night landing points. The boundaries of all points used for night operations should be marked with three low intensity lights.

d. Care must be exercised in securing panels to the ground to prevent destruction of the display by helicopters.

~~SECRET~~
C. Front Line Marking

- (1) Yellow panels parallel to friendly front lines

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

C. L. Harrison

C.L. HARRISON
MAJOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) To Operation Order 324-66


F-1-3

~~S. P. O. R. T.~~
BLT 2/3
USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)
250800H January 1966

APPENDIX 2 (Call Signs) To Annex F (Communications-Electronics)
To Operation Order 324-66

1. VOICE RADIO CALL SIGNS. In accordance with TAB A.
2. SWITCHBOARD CALL SIGNS. In accordance with TAB B.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN



C. L. HARRISON
MAJOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

BLT 2/3
 USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)
 250800H : January 1966

TAB A (Voice Radio Call Signs) To Appendix 2 (Call Signs) To
 Annex F (Communication Electronics) To Operation Order 324-66

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VOICE CALL</u>
CG III MAF	FRANCHISE
CG THIRD MARDIV	MONROE
CG FIRST MAW	MOMENT
CG TASK FORCE DELTA	MURPHY
MARLNO I CORPS	FRANCHISE I
MARLNO II ARVN DIV	FRANCHISE II
BSA	RIPE PEACH
CLF (CTG 79.5)	HEARSAY
HMM-362	CLIPCLOP
2D BN 9TH MAR	PARKGREEN
2D BN 4TH MAR	SUDDENDEATH
BLT 3/1	COURTHOUSE
BLT 2/3	OLDFIELD
CO E	OLDFIELD ECHO
CO F	OLDFIELD FOXTROT
CO G	OLDFIELD GOLF
CO H	OLDFIELD HOTEL
BLT 81MM MORTARS	OLDFIELD WHISKEY
BLT TACP	OLDFIELD ONE FOUR
106MM RR PLT	OLDFIELD TANGO
FSCC	OLDFIELD BAILEY
B-BTRY 1/12	PERMISSION BRAVO
107MM HOWTAR BTRY 3/12	PAYABLE WHISKEY
2ND PLT CO A 3RD RECON BN	SCAT ALFA TWO
DET RECON PLT 1ST FORCE RECON	CHUCKLE
2ND PLT CO A 3RD ENG BN	TODAY ALFA TWO
MAINT DET FSR	OLDFIELD MIKE

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

C. L. Harrison
 C. L. HARRISON
 MAJOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) To Operation Order 324-66

F-2-A-1

BLT 2/3
 USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

TAB B (Switchboard Call Signs) To Appendix 2 (Call Signs) To
 Annex W (Communications-Electronics) To Operation Order 324-66

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>
CG III MAF	PARCHMENT
CG THIRD MARDIV	SHOVE
CG FIRST MAF	MOMENT
CG TASK FORCE DELTA	PINCHHITTER
CLF (CTG 79.5)	HEARSAY
BLT 3/1	CHUCK
BLT 2/3	SQUIRE
2ND BN, 4TH MAR	BENDIX
2nd BN, 9TH MAR	BLACKBOX
4TH MAR	AFTERGLOW
3RD SP BN	PANHANDLE

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

C. L. Harrison

C. L. HARRISON
 MAJOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) To Operation Order 324-66

F-2-B-1

ANNEX 3 (PARTIAL) TO ANNEX 2
 0 1/2 2/3 ADVANTAGE WEIGH 324-66

ANNEX 3
 US VALLEY FC CO (PH-6)
 250800H JAN 66

UNIT	TYPE	COORD	STATUS	REMARKS
111 WAF	0			
01F (79.5)	0			
Co 1st	X			
Co 2nd	X			
Co 3rd	X			
Co 4th	X			
Co 5th	X			
Co 6th	X			
Co 7th	X			
Co 8th	X			
Co 9th	X			
Co 10th	X			
Co 11th	X			
Co 12th	X			
Co 13th	X			
Co 14th	X			
Co 15th	X			
Co 16th	X			
Co 17th	X			
Co 18th	X			
Co 19th	X			
Co 20th	X			
Co 21st	X			
Co 22nd	X			
Co 23rd	X			
Co 24th	X			
Co 25th	X			
Co 26th	X			
Co 27th	X			
Co 28th	X			
Co 29th	X			
Co 30th	X			
Co 31st	X			
Co 32nd	X			
Co 33rd	X			
Co 34th	X			
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Co 38th	X			
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C.O. REGIMENT
 MAJOR US ARMY CORPS
 ENGINEER OFFICER

ANNEX 2

324-66

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division, (Rein), FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 March through 31 March 1966

Part I Organizational Data Sheet
Part II Significant Events
Part III Supporting Documents

PART I

1. Reporting Unit. 2d Battalion, 3d Marines
2. Command Post. DA NANG, RVN, Coordinates (AT 953723)
3. Period Covered. 1 March - 31 March 1966
4. Date of Submission. 3 April 1966
5. Average Monthly Strength

	USMC	USN
Officers	35	2
Enlisted	950	58

6. Commanding Officer. Lieutenant Colonel W.K. HORN
7. Principal Staff.

S-1	1 Mar - 14 Mar 66	1st Lt. B. B. CONASTER Jr.	USMC
	14 Mar - Present	1st Lt. J. D. QUINN	USMC
S-2		Capt J. T. GUGGINO	USMC
S-3		Major A. J. CASTELLANA	USMCR
S-4	1 Mar - 22 Mar 66	Capt M. J. MULROONEY	USMC
	22 Mar - 27 Mar 66	1st Lt. N. M. PEREIRA Jr.	USMC
	27 Mar - Present	Capt R. L. WOODWARD	USMC
Comm O		Capt A. D. N. BRECKRENDRIDGE	USMC
Supply O		1st Lt. M. J. BURNS	USMCR

8. Subordinate Units.

H&S Co		Capt A. H. GOMEZ	USMCR
Co "E"	1 Mar - 22 Mar 66	1st Lt. R. E. SCHWARTZ	USMCR
	22 Mar - Present	Capt M. J. MULROONEY	USMC
Co "F"		Capt J. R. HARDIN Jr.	USMCR
Co "G"	1 Mar - 27 Mar 66	Capt R. L. WOODWARD	USMC
	27 Mar - Present	Capt R. F. SHERIDAN	USMC
Co "H"		1st Lt. F. X. EGAN	USMC

**1st Platoon,
 Co "A", 3d Tk Bn 1 Mar - 16 Mar 66 1st Lt. G. ROSE USMC
 16 Mar - 31 Mar 66 2nd Lt. J.W. CUNNINGHAM USMC

**1st Platoon,
 Co "A", 3d AT Bn 1 Mar - 23 Mar 66 2nd Lt. R. F. MCALBER USMC
 3rd Platoon,
 Co "A", 3d AT Bn 23 Mar - 31 Mar 66 1st Lt. M. P. KINGSTON USMC

*16th Platoon, 768th Co, ARVN WO NGUYEN AN BIEN ARVN

9. Mission Assigned. 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines

a. Occupies and controls assigned TAOR: defends MLR in assigned TAOR (see attached Operations Overlay); provides security for the installations on HILL 327 (AT 971737) and HILL 268 (AT 969744); provides security force in conjunction with Popular Forces for the bridges at (AT 946699); conducts unilateral search and destroy operations in assigned TAOR; conducts aggressive combat/reconnaissance patrolling throughout assigned TAOR; and prepares to conduct combined and coordinated operations within or beyond the boundaries of the TAOR.

b. The battalion conducts all operations in such a manner as to gain the loyalty and cooperation of the people and create conditions which permit the people to pursue their normal routine in peace and security.

10. Background. Battalion landed in the Republic of South Vietnam at Da Nang on 28 February 1966 and relieved 1st Battalion, 1st Marines assuming operational control of assigned area on 1 March 1966. The preceding period, 21 January 1966 to 28 February 1966, the battalion was organized as a BLP, performing the mission as Special Landing Force aboard the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8), USS Montrose (APA-212) and USS Monticello (LSD-35). During this period the battalion participated in exercise HILLTOP III and operation DOUBLE EAGLE phases I and II. To accomplish the present assigned mission the battalion TAOR has been divided in company sectors of responsibilities with each company conducting aggressive patrolling, village sweeps and numerous ambushes in their assigned TAOR. The companies defend their portion of the MLR by employing observation posts, listening posts, road blocks and through occupation of prepared positions in critical areas.

* Under Operational control of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines.

** Direct Support

PART II

Significant Events

1. Personnel

a. Replacements. During this reporting period the battalion received the following personnel as replacements:

- (1) Officers 2
- (2) Enlisted 88
- (3) Enlisted (Navy) 1

b. Rotation. The following number of personnel were rotated to CONUS:

- (1) Officers - None
- (2) Enlisted - 74

c. Personnel lost through attrition other than rotation:

- (1) WIA - 31 USMC Enlisted - 2 ARVN
- (2) KIA - 6 USMC Enlisted
- (3) Humanitarian Transfer - None
- (4) Non-battle Injuries - 2 USMC Officers
6 USMC Enlisted

(5) Intra-Division/Regiment Transfers

(a) Division Transfers: During this reporting period 16 USMC Officers, 458 USMC Enlisted and 10 USN Enlisted were transferred within the Division. This large number of transfers was due to the dissolving of the BLT.

(b) Regimental Transfers: 13 USMC Enlisted were transferred to regiment and 13 USMC Enlisted joined from regiment.

d. R&R. This battalion had no personnel on R&R during this period as it was not eligible for quotas.

e. Special Services

(1) The reporting period has been utilized to improve the special services program. Distribution has been made to the rifle companies as well as H&S Company of all beer and soda we have received during the month. The method seems efficient in that every man seems to be getting his ration.

SECRET

(2) There has been limited use of athletic equipment during the period; however, we are presently working with the Civil Affairs Officer in evaluating the possibility of distributing some athletic equipment to certain villages in the TAOR.

(3) Distribution was made on the soft-back books received early in the reporting period.

2. Administration

a. Personnel Accounting. Non-receipt of consumable supplies for personnel accounting has seriously hampered company administration of the battalion. Companies have had to switch from the new system to the old system of personnel accounting.

b. Awards. There were no combat awards presented.

c. Promotions. The following were the promotions delivered during the period:

(1) To Captain	1
(2) To Sergeant Major	1
(3) To First Sergeant	2
(4) To Staff Sergeant	16
(5) To Sergeant	11
(6) To Corporal	15
(7) To Lance Corporal	80

The majority of the promotions to corporal and lance corporal were category II promotions granted by CG, 1st MarDiv which were not presented during Operation Double Eagle due to the tactical dispersal of the BIF.

d. Postal. Postal was considered a major problem due to dissolving the BIF.

e. Pay. Pay is up to date throughout the battalion.

f. Post Exchange. Mobile PX truck serviced the battalion command and front line companies on three separate occasions.

g. Legal and Discipline. The battalion has no summary or special courts-martial pending and none conducted. One Article 32 investigation was held on 29 March and one is pending. The following Article 15 punishments were awarded

Article 86	2	
Article 91	3	<u>Total NPT's</u>
Article 92	3	
Article 112	1	Company 10
Article 113	6	Battalion 5
Article 134	2	

3. Intelligence

a. Enemy Situation at Beginning of Period

(1) As of 1 March 1966, there were four companies, a protection platoon, a combat engineer platoon, and the Headquarters and Staff of the Doc Lap Main Force Battalion with a strength of 560 confirmed as located within the TAOR.

(2) In addition, the Hason Platoon (Guerrilla) with a strength of 30, was confirmed as operating within Hieu Duc District.

(3) Unconfirmed units within the TAOR consisted of the 23rd Battalion and the 108th Provisional Main Force Company. Strength of these units are unknown.

(4) Enemy activity was confined to mine warfare and harassing sniper fire, particularly during the night. The enemy was reluctant to engage friendly forces during daylight hours.

b. Enemy Initiated Incidents During the Period

- (1) 012120H - "A" Tks: Sniper fired six (6) to eight (8) rounds s/a fire at vehicles vicinity AT 954713.
- (2) 032350H - "G" Co: Two explosions believed to be 60mm Mortar or grenades vicinity AT 903719. Searched with negative results.
- (3) 041205H - "H" Co: Patrol found nine (9) 81mm mortar rounds placed in trees and on ground. Appeared to be emplaced for use as mines. Located vicinity AT 904682.
- (4) 041615H - "H" Co: Patrol activated mine vicinity AT 899701. Force of explosion indicated possible shape charge.
- (5) 042325H - "G" Co: Patrol encountered VCS vicinity AT 902709. Fired on man. Man appeared to be hit but ran into hamlet and escaped.
- (6) 050145H - "H" Co: Received incoming grenade vicinity AT 923-690.
- (7) 050845H - "E" Co: Possible VC OP spotted by tank scope on ridge line vicinity AT 920658. Two men with glasses spotted.

- (8) 060815H - "Engr": Discovered M-26 grenade booby trap concealed under c-ration can. Destroyed in place. Vicinity AT 926670.
- (9) 081815H - "G" Co: Patrol encountered electrically controlled mine. Finding of wire and battery indicated the mine was detonated electrically. Five (5) VC were observed moving away from the area. They were pursued, but escaped.
- (10) 092000H - "G" Co: Received s/a fire from vicinity AT 874704. Fire returned with unknown results.
- (11) 101300H - "H" Co: Found M-26 grenade attached to perimeter wire vicinity AT 924692. Destroyed in place.
- (12) 101530H - "H" Co: Located dummy mine vicinity AT 911685. Also signs indicating mined area. Searched area with negative results.
- (13) 112240H - "G" Co: Received incoming grenade at position vicinity AT 903719. No sighting of VC.
- (14) 130345H - "H" Co: Received incoming grenade vicinity AT 929683. No sighting of VC.
- (15) 132135H - "E" Co: Listening post vicinity AT 922674 received incoming grenade and four (4) to five (5) rounds carbine fire. Area searched with negative results.
- (16) 141140H - "H" Co: Patrol received six (6) 60mm mortar rounds vicinity AT 899703. Patrolled area with negative results.
- (17) 141940H - "E" Co: Received three (3) rounds carbine fire. Vicinity AT 917673.
- (18) 141955H - "E" Co: Received two (2) rounds carbine fire. Vicinity AT 917673.
- (19) 142252H - "E" Co: VC tripped flare vicinity AT 923672. Listening post fired and heard loud cry of pain. Second flare tripped. Received twelve (12) rounds carbine fire.
- (20) 150050H - "G" Co: Listening post received incoming grenade. No sighting of VC. Vicinity AT 906719.
- (21) 152140H - "E" Co: Listening post received grenade vicinity AT 920675. No visual sighting of VC.

- (22) 161140H - "G" Co: Patrol received eight (8) to ten (10) rounds s/a fire from vicinity AT 874703. Search of area negative.
- (23) 162100H - "G" Co: Received grenade. Observed VC near wire and took under fire. Results unknown. Vicinity AT 915714.
- (24) 162113H - "E" Co: Enemy movement observed vicinity AT 916675. Received nine (9) rounds s/a fire. Also received twelve (12) rounds s/a fire from AT 919677.
- (25) 162311H - "E" Co: 2d Platoon received five (5) grenades from from estimated three (3) VC. Returned fire with unknown results.
- (26) 170051H - 2/3 OP: Perimeter observed three (3) VC. VC fired eighteen (18) rounds carbine fire. Returned fire with unknown results. Vicinity AT 948722.
- (27) 170345H - "G" Co: 2d platoon perimeter received grenade. No VC sighting. Vicinity AT 915714.
- (28) 170740H - "H" Co: Patrol activated mine vicinity AT 908688. Mine was fragmentation grenade.
- (29) 171115H - "G" Co: Patrol found M-26 grenade mine and one (1) electrical mine with two (2) lbs C-4 vicinity AT 878690. Both mines destroyed in place.
- (30) 171950H - "F" Co: Patrol received eight (8) to ten (10) rounds sniper fire from vicinity AT 902609. Estimated two (2) snipers. No contact made.
- (31) 172110H - "H" Co: Company headquarters received fifteen (15) rounds s/a fire from vicinity AT 924691 from a estimated fifteen (15) VC. Returned with unknown results.
- (32) 172205H - "E" Co: Received twenty-five (25) rounds carbine fire from vicinity AT 917672. Area interdicted by fire with unknown results.
- (33) 180856H - "F" Co: Patrol received three (3) to four (4) rounds sniper fire from hamlet vicinity AT 928606. Search negative.
- (34) 181100H - "F" Co: Patrol received eight (8) to ten (10) rounds sniper fire from building vicinity AT 936607. Search negative.

- (35) 181200H - "Engr": Search team encountered electrically detonated mine at AT 941677. Wires were found running under road and into rice paddy.
- (36) 190830H - "G" Co: Patrol activated mine vicinity AT 887706. M-26 grenade with trip wire.
- (37) 191030H - "F" Co: Patrol received several rounds carbine and automatic weapons fire from estimated two (2) snipers. No contact with snipers. Vicinity AT 945653.
- (38) 211105H - "G" Co: Patrol activated mine vicinity AT 875714. M-26 grenade with trip wire.
- (39) 220915H - "G" Co: Patrol activated mine vicinity AT 874711. Mine believed to be M-26 grenade with trip wire.
- (40) 221325H - "G" Co: Patrol activated mine vicinity AT 896704. Mine activated by patrol member moving an overhanging bamboo pole. Mine was M-26 grenade attached to four (4) to five (5) lbs of TNT.
- (41) 222210H - "G" Co: Listening post observed three (3) VC vicinity AT 905719. VC threw one (1) grenade. VC taken under fire. One (1) man observed the VC fall and then get up and run.
- (42) 231635H - "H" Co: Patrol activated mine vicinity AT 899698. M-26 grenade with trip wire.
- (43) - "E" Co: Radio net received interference. Foreign language (not Vietnamese) was spoken except for call sign "ECHO 6 in English.
- (44) 241600H - "E" Co: Patrol apprehended one (1) VCS vicinity AT 925663. Suspect ran when patrol approached.
- (45) 241630H - "E" Co: Patrol apprehended one (1) VCS vicinity AT 924657. Suspect ran when patrol approached.
- (46) 251400H - "G" Co: Patrol apprehended one (1) VCS female. Her husband believed to be leader of political cadre of Giao Tri (3) Hamlet vicinity AT 886705.
- (47) 251630H - "E" Co: Reported Hamlet Chief and four (4) PF's from Hoa Cuong received one (1) round sniper fire from vicinity AT 946666. Marine escort returned fire with unknown results.
- (48) 251815H - "G" Co: Reported one (1) round sniper fire received in market place vicinity AT 906721. Two squads searched area and apprehended one (1) VCS who resisted.

- [REDACTED]
- (49) 261250H - "F" Co: Reported six (6) VC kidnapped H [REDACTED] District Official vicinity Pontoon Bridge vicinity AT 957685. VC moved toward Bo Ban (1) GS 9568. USMC and PF pursued but could not overtake.
- (50) 261455H - "H" Co: Patrol found M-26 grenade w/tripwire. Destroyed in place. Vicinity AT 921690.
- (51) 270207H - "E" Co: 1st platoon received one (1) believed to be 60mm mortar. Round detonated vicinity AT 921674 approximately forty (40) meters inside outer perimeter wire. Concussion was considered too great to be grenade.
- (52) 271030H - "G" Co: Patrol observed one (1) armed VC leaving hut vicinity AT 888704. Patrol pursued VC. Investigation of hut revealed six (6) females and two (2) children. Five (5) women apprehended as VCS. Two (2) women evacuated to IIT, three (3) women returned to district headquarters. Later classified as VCS.
- (53) 271120H - "E" Co: Patrol received thirty (30) rounds small arms fire from Phu Son (3) vicinity AT 949642. Returned fire but did not pursue. Enemy position was in 3/3 TAOR.
- (54) 0271240H - "G" Co: Patrol activated M-26 grenade with trip wire vicinity AT 885699. Two (2) USMC WIA.
- (55) 271500H - "G" Co: Patrol found M-26 grenade with trip wire vicinity AT 884706. Mine detonated in place.
- (56) 282210H - "L/12": Radio relay station received one (1) round sniper fire from vicinity AT 944749.
- (57) 282330H - "F" Co: 3d Platoon received two (2) incoming frag grenades vicinity AT 973737. Area illuminated and physically searched with negative results.
- (58) 291125H - "G" Co: Patrol discovered two (2) bows, six (6) booby trap stakes, wire, batteries and scrap metal in house vicinity AT 890707. Apprehended one (1) male VCS in area without ID card.
- (59) 291155H - Vietnamese child activated booby trap vicinity AT 903709. Child was killed.
- (60) 291225H - "G" Co: Civilians brought in Vietnamese child critically wounded by booby trap, vicinity unknown. Child evacuated.

- (61) 291640H - "F" Co: 3d platoon surprised six (6) VC in hamlet vicinity AT 876700. Taken under fire. One (1) VC KIA (body count), five (5) WIA (possible) (blood signs). Captured one (1) small machine gun, three (3) M-26 grenades, two (2) M-14 magazines. One (1) Vietnamese child wounded by VC and med-evaced.
- (62) 300800H - "E" Co: Patrol apprehended youth vicinity AT 930670. Taken to Hieu Duc District where evaluated as VC youth member. This is same boy captured on 16 March and sent to Quang Nam Special Sector.
- (63) 301030H - "G" Co: Patrol found M-26 grenade with trip wire on trail vicinity AT 899709. Destroyed in place.
- (64) 301125H - "G" Co: Patrol apprehended five (5) persons vicinity AT 902703 who ran from patrol. Another apprehended enroute to CP. All evaluated as ID card offenders and sent to Hieu Duc District Headquarters.
- (65) 301325H - "G" Co: Patrol activated mine vicinity AT 897723. Mine was placed in tree and detonated as patrol passed, injuring personnel with shrapnel wounds in back. Suspect possible directional mine or shape charge. Three (3) USMC WIA and one (1) ARVN WIA.
- (66) 311420H - "G" Co: Patrol apprehended twenty (20) year old female. Interrogation classified her as Non-VCS. Sent to District Headquarters as non-identification offender.
- (67) 311525H - "G" Co: Man was struck vicinity AT 914714 by spent M-14 round. Adjacent units and patrols deny firing at that time. Round inflicted minor wound due to very low velocity.
- (68) 311300H - "E" Co: Special patrol led to tunnel vicinity AT 996668 by VCC. Apprehended two females without identification cards. Females identified by hamlet chief and were evacuated to district headquarters as identification offenders. Tunnel measured one hundred-twenty (120) feet. It was destroyed with demolitions.

c. Summary of Enemy Casualties, Captured and Equipment Captured.

(1) Personnel:

VCC

VCS

WIA

KIA

33

8 (poss)

1

(2) Equipment:

M-26 Grenade
11

CHICOM Grenade
1

Explosives
2 lbs C-4

Mortar Rounds
9 81mm

Weapons
1 K-50 SMG

Other
2 M-14 magazines
2 Bows
6 Booby Trap Stakes
100 rounds 7.62 ammo

d. Significant Trends During Period

(1) Vietnamese nationals have informed USMC patrols that VC are noting routes taken by patrols and mining these routes in anticipation of their being used again.

(2) Civilians report that the VC are searching out USMC ambush sites to try and find lost grenades for mining operations.

(3) The VC are making more use of electrically detonated mines.

(4) There is evidence of the VC using shape charge mines. One (1) mine was attached to a tree at waist level. Personnel were knocked down forty (40) feet from the blast point and a two and one-half (2½) inch tree was severed in two.

(5) Numerous reports from nationals and district agents indicate VC units are moving eastward into Hoa Vang and Dien Ban Districts. Hieu Duc District reported that the 108th Provisional Main Force Company had moved from Hieu Duc to Hoa Vang District vicinity AT 970695.

(6) Reports from agents and one (1) VCC indicated the VC are recruiting children to infiltrate USMC positions to steal grenades.

e. Enemy Situation at End of Reporting Period

(1) As of 31 March 1966, confirmed units within the TACR consist of the R24 Company, Doo Lap Battalion; V16 Recon/Intelligence Company; Q14 Company (LF). These units have a total strength of 320.

(2) A report from the Hieu Duc District Headquarters indicates a guerrilla company vicinity AT 958719, AT 963724 and AT 967725 on 19 March.

(3) Also reported was a VC company vicinity AT 948675, about 300 meters east of 2/3 TACR.

(4) The VC continue to rely primarily on mines and booby traps. There were only three incidents involving mortars which leads to the assumption that the enemy has a limited number of mortars and/or ammunition.

ENCLOSURE (1)


4. Training

a. Objectives

(1) To increase the combat efficiency of personnel of this command and to familiarize personnel with the goals of the Vietnamese and American governments. The battalion training program for March was designed to cover as much instruction in subjects of current importance as operational commitments would permit.

b. Major Training Highlights

- (1) FAM firing of individual weapons conducted weekly.
- (2) FAM firing of crew served weapons including 60mm mortar, 81mm mortar conducted weekly.
- (3) VC mines and booby traps.
- (4) Stoner Weapons System.
- (5) Self and buddy aid.
- (6) Field sanitation and hygiene.
- (7) Care and maintenance of individual equipment.
- (8) Field Fortification.
- (9) Field radio operating procedures.
- (10) Combat Patrolling.
- (11) Ambush Techniques.
- (12) Code of Conduct.
- (13) Land Navigation.
- (14) Employment of Mines and Booby Traps.
- (15) Intelligence Gathering.
- (16) Night Firing of Individual Weapons.
- (17) Seismatic Intrusion Devices.

ENCLOSURE (1)

(18) Sniper Scope (infra-red).

(19) Laying of Protective Wire.

(20) Information Program:

(a) Why We're in Vietnam.

(b) Association With Vietnamese People

(c) Vietnamese Custom and Traditions

(d) Rules of Engagement

(e) Incidents Involving Vietnamese Nationals.

(f) Treatment of Captured Personnel

(g) Unauthorized possession and Use of Narcotic and Habit Forming Drugs.

(h) Missions, Objectives and Responsibilities of U.S. Forces in RVN.

(i) Religion in Vietnam.

(j) Possession of Privately Owned Firearms and Other Unauthorized Dangerous Weapons.

5. Special Operations

a. Amphibious Operations: None

b. Combined Operations: One (1) Company size operation.

c. Psychological Operations: None.

d. River Operations: None.

6. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and other Special Type Warfare.

a. This unit has not employed NBC weapons or special type warfare.

b. Each company has assigned one (1) officer and three (3) enlisted personnel as company NBC Officer and NBC NCO's. Each company has assigned by name, personnel to either a monitoring or decontamination team who are being trained on the company level.

c. Status of NBC equipment on hand is in good condition and maintained by Battalion Supply

ENCLOSURE (1)

7. Command and Control

a. Task Organization

- | | | |
|-----|--|--------------------------------|
| (1) | 2d Bn, 3d Marines | LtCol HORN |
| (2) | H&S Co
81mm Mortar Plt
106mm Rifle Plt | Capt GOMEZ |
| (3) | "E" Co | Lt SCHWARTZ
Capt MULROONEY |
| (4) | "F" Co | Capt HARDIN |
| (5) | "G" Co | Capt WOODWARD
Capt SHERIDAN |
| (6) | "H" Co | Lt EGAN |

Direct Support

- | | | |
|-----|---------------------------|---------------|
| (7) | 1st Plt, Co "A", 3d Tk Bn | Lt CUNNINGHAM |
| (8) | 1st Plt, Co "A", 3d AT Bn | Lt KINGSTON |
| (9) | B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar | Capt MOLSBEE |

b. Location of Command Post

- | | | |
|-----|---------------------------|-----------|
| (1) | 2d Bn, 3d Marines | AT 953723 |
| (2) | H&S Company | AT 953723 |
| (3) | "E" Company | AT 934664 |
| (4) | "F" Company | AT 953723 |
| (5) | "G" Company | AT 905719 |
| (6) | "H" Company | AT 924691 |
| (7) | 1st Plt, "A" Co, 3d Tk Bn | AT 953723 |
| (8) | 1st Plt, "A" Co, 3d AT Bn | AT 953723 |
| (9) | B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar | AT 921738 |

c. Attachments and Detachments: There were no attachments during this period. Company "E" was detached to Chu Lai during the period of 051000H to 071630H and were OPCON to 3d Bn, 1st Mar.

ENCLOSURE (1)

Company "E" (Rein), 2d Battalion, 3d Marines replaced Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines on 5 March 1966. "E" Company returned to the operational control of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines on 7 March 1966. 3d Platoon, "F" Company provided security for LAAM Btry, located on HILL 327, AT 971237.

d. Control. Control of the battalion is exercised through the Organizational T/E radio equipment. The addition of the AN/PRC-25 within the battalion has improved communications significantly. Further improvement is anticipated with the addition of more AN/PRC-25's which are programmed. Heretofore program areas encountered with the AN/PRC-10 have been eliminated with the arrival of AN/PRC-25 replacements. Wire and radio communications continue to be used equally to exercise control over the rifle companies.

e. Problem Areas. No significant problems exist in the area of command and control.

8. Communications-Electronics (CommO)

a. Wire. All lines between battalion and regiment were destroyed for a length of several hundred yards by brush fire and new wire had to be laid. Two causes of fire was apparent; the local ARVN appeared to be destroying dud rounds in the area and the local Vietnamese were burning old cut grass. Communications were maintained by radio relay and the lines were repaired. During the month considerable trouble has been experienced with the long local from battalion to "G" Company. The lines are subject to damage from both vehicles and enemy activity. Recently the damage has decreased because of overheading.

b. Radios. Three radio operators have been TAD for the entire month with the regimental group at Phu Bai. One (1) MRC-83 with two operators was attached to 1/3 for three days to support motorized movement to Phu Bai and 1 AN/PRC-47 is on loan to regiment.

c. The battalion received four (4) AN/PRC-25 radios which brings our total up to seven (7) plus two (2) AN/GRC-125's. A battalion radio school for company operators was initiated. Emphasis is being placed on care and maintenance of equipment and other operating procedures.

d. Maintenance Supply: The turnover of AN/PRC-6 and AN/PRC-10 radio sets through the technical shop has been high. Continued emphasis is being made on operator care and maintenance. At present we have one (1) AN/PRC-6 and three (3) AN/PRC-10 radios evacuated for third echelon maintenance. Turnover of radios to FLSG was:

AN/PRC-6 to FLSG-18, from FLSG-17

AN/PRC-10 to FLSG-10, from FLSG-7

Service support has been excellent. Main problem area is in procurement of 2nd echelon spare parts for radios AN/PRC-6 and AN/PRC-10. Twelve (12) AN/PRC-6 radios are declined for short tape antennas. Lack of tubes 5576 has declined both AN/PRC-6's and AN/PRC-10's. The battalion

ENCLOSURE (1)

CP electrical wiring was improved by the Sea Bees electricians. The generator being employed to power the system is a PU-482. A requisition has been submitted for a similar type generator. If this is obtained it will be able to increase the generator life by alternating the use of each generator on a twelve (12) or twenty-four (24) hour basis.

9. Glossa Combat

a. Operations Conducted

(1) Patrols

(a) 2d Battalion, 3d Marines has conducted 250 squad size day patrols, 338 squad size night patrols, 533 night ambushes, 713 listening posts and five (5) platoon size patrols that extended over a three (3) day period for each patrol.

(b) 2d Battalion, 3d Marines has conducted a total of eight (8) platoon size combat patrols and one company search and destroy operation.

(2) Operations: See attached After Action Report

b. Significant Events

(1) 1 March - The battalion assumed operational control of assigned TAOR from 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Company "E" found a M-26 grenade booby trapped in a C-ration can at (AT 943666). First Platoon "A" Company tanks received six (6) to eight (8) rounds fired at vehicles vicinity of (AT 954713). "H" Company spotted four (4) VC through scope on Ontos, fire 81mm mortar illumination and twenty-three (23) rounds from 30 calibre machine gun. Patrol checked area with negative results. During this period there was nine (9) squad day patrols, twelve (12) squad night patrols, five (5) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.

(2) 2 March - At 2045 one (1) VCS walked into "E" company squad ambush and was captured. VCS was turned over the next day to District Headquarters. Two Marines suspected of having malaria were evacuated "G" and "H" Companies by helicopter to C-med. On this date the battalion conducted nine (9) day squad patrols, twelve (12) night patrols, seven (7) ambushes and twenty-one (21) listening posts.

(3) 3 March - "G" Company observed two (2) VC at (AT 884723), approximately seventy (70) meters southwest of their position. Took VC under fire and search of area with negative results.

At 0630H as patrol from "E" Company approached village at (AT 916675) one (1) man ran out of house and into nearby bushes. Patrol pursued him and captured him as he was about to enter tunnel. Investigation of tunnel revealed a Chi Com Grenade, One (1) M-26 grenade, one (1) can of foreign C-ration and a bottle of medicine. Patrol checked house man originally occupied and discovered man sleeping. Man was apprehended. As the patrol emerged from the house another man was sighted at the entrance

of the aforementioned tunnel. Patrol then received twelve (12) rounds of small arms fire from one (1) VC at coordinates (AT 912676). VC broke contact when patrol pursued. "G" Company observed two (2) explosions believed to be 60mm mortar or grenade at vicinity of (AT 903719). Negative results when area was searched. There were a total of nine (9) squad day patrols, thirteen (13) squad night patrols, nine (9) ambushes and twenty-four (24) listening posts on this date.

- (4) 4 March - First Platoon "G" Company at 0155H fired three (3) rounds at suspected enemy movement southerly direction two-hundred (200) yards from their position (AT 917715). Area was thoroughly checked with no results. Patrol from "H" Company reported finding nine (9) 81mm mortar rounds hanging from trees and embedded in ground at (AT 907684). EOD personnel sent to location discovered that 81mm rounds were only canisters and tail fin sections. All rounds were inert and it was felt by EOD officer that inert canisters were laid out in that manner to harass patrols. A 155mm howitzer dud (WP) was also found when EOD team arrived and was detonated. Another "G" Company patrol at 041615H tripped a booby trap of unknown origin. Suspected that it was detonated by trip wire, however, no wire was found after detonation. Booby trap was apparently attached to tree. It was believed to have been a shape charge because the force of the explosion sheared off a two (2) and one (1) half inch tree, and shrapnel penetrated the flak jacket of the point man and knocked down a man forty (40) paces away. Two (2) Marines were evacuated, one (1) with head and chest wound, the other with wounds to lower part of body. At 042325H "G" Company patrol encountered VCS vicinity (AT 902709) and took under fire. Man appeared to be hit, but ran into hamlet and escaped. In addition, there were nine (9) squad day patrols, thirteen (13) squad night patrols, ten (10) ambushes and nineteen (19) listening posts.

(1) REFERENCE
NUMBER

24

- (5) 5 March - At 050830H "E" Company was moved to the Chu Lai area for purpose of supporting an operation. Seventy (70) men from H&S Company were organized into two (2) platoons and occupied "E" Companies position on the MIR. Engineer team discovered smoke type grenade under bridge at (AT 942682). Grenade was detonated by engineers. "H" Company CP (AT 923690) received one (1) incoming grenade at 050145H wounding one (1) man in the leg. Search of area revealed negative results. H&S Company squad patrolling in "E" Companies area discovered booby trapped M-26 grenade in a C-bation can, pin removed with knee high wire attached to grenade stretching across the trail. Booby trap was destroyed. During this day there were nine (9) squad day patrols, ten (10) squad night patrols, ten (10) ambushes and nineteen (19) listening posts.
- (6) 6 March - Unidentified Vietnamese female wounded by shrapnel in legs arm and stomach at 061925H was brought to the pontoon bridge at (AT 946700) from an unknown location south west of bridge. Source of shrapnel was unknown. Female was evacuated by helicopter. On this date the battalion conducted nine (9) squad day patrols, ten (10) squad night patrols, (10) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.
- (7) 7 March - "E" Company returned from Chu Lai and assumed original positions. H&S Company personnel returned to battalion Command Post. Patrol from "H" Company picked up four (4) VCS at (AT 908690), and turned them over to Vietnamese District Headquarters. During this period there was eight (8) squad day patrols, ten (10) squad night patrols, ten (10) ambushes and twenty-one (21) listening posts.
- (8) 8 March - First Platoon "G" Company departed at 080700H on a three (3) day patrol, into Hoi Vuc Valley. At 081815H an electrically detonated booby trap was detonated at (AT 869704) causing two (2) USMC WIA and one (1) ARVN WIA of the extended patrol, none were serious. At 081845H five (5) VC were spotted by the same patrol, at (AT 861700). Artillery concentrations, M-79 rounds were fired and patrol pursued until VC broke contact. Area was searched with negative results. There were eight (8) squad day patrols, nine (9) squad night patrols, sixteen (16) ambushes and twenty-one listening posts conducted by the battalion.

(1) REFERENCE
NUMBER

31

- (9) 9 March - "G" Company extended patrol continued sweeping area in Hoi Vuoc Valley. At 092000H they received eight (8) to (10) rounds small arms fire from vicinity (AT 882698). Darkness and heavy vegetation prohibited physical search and visual contact. Artillery was fired, results unknown. At 092215H received fifty (50) rounds small fire (believed to be carbine) from vicinity (AT 874704) - (AT 874706). Artillery missions fired and enemy firing ceased with results unknown. The battalion conducted a total of eight (8) squad day patrols, ten (10) squad night patrols, sixteen (16) ambushes and 19 listening posts.
- (10) 10 March - "G" Company platoon returned. A squad patrol from "G" Company fired on a VC running across road at coordinates (AT 892720) at 100105H. Search of area was made with negative results. "H" Company found M-26 grenade attached to perimeter wire at (AT 924692). The battalion conducted eight (8) squad day patrols, ten (10) squad night patrols, seventeen (17) ambushes and twenty-one (21) listening posts.
- (11) 11 March - "G" Company received one incoming hand grenade in their position at (AT 903719) resulting in one (1) WIA. Area was illuminated and a thorough search was conducted with negative results. WIA was not seriously wounded and evacuation was not required. During this period the battalion conducted nine (9) squad day patrols, nineteen (19) squad night patrols, twenty-five (25) ambushes and twenty-one (21) listening posts.
- (12) 12 March - Squad from "G" Company apprehended two (2) VCS in village Ning An (AT 906709). Both VCS were found to have false ID cards and were turned over to IIT. Listening post from "E" Company at (AT 922675) spotted movement close to their position and pulled back. Illumination was fired and fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men were spotted two-hundred (200) meters to the northwest. VC were taken under fire and squad size patrol pursued enemy but lost contact as the enemy broke up into individual groups. Operations on this date included nine (9) squad day patrols, ten (10) squad night patrols, thirty-six (36) ambushes and eighteen (18) listening posts.
- (13) 13 March - "E" Company listening post at (AT 922674) received incoming grenade and four (4) to five (5) rounds carbine fire. Area searched with negative results. There were eight (8) squad day patrols, eleven (11) squad night patrols, nineteen (19) ambushes and twenty (20) listening posts. "F" Company provided security for the Ann Margaret show.

- (14) 14 March - "H" Company patrol received six (6) 60mm mortar rounds vicinity of (AT 899703). Continued to patrol area with negative results. 1st Platoon "E" Company at (AT 922673) received sporadic carbine fire from vicinity (AT 917673), (AT 921677), (AT 920675) and (AT 925675) between 141940H and 142252H. Search and clear patrol was immediately dispatched where fire had been received. At about two hundred-fifty (250) meters out from platoon position patrol spotted men moving to the north west at a distance of three-hundred- (300) meters from their position. VC were immediately taken under fire and physically pursued. VC broke into two (2) groups and entered thick brush and hid. The area was interdicted with 60mm mortars, 3.5's and M-79's, small arms and illumination. In addition, there were eight (8) squad day patrols, twelve squad night patrols, nineteen (19) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.
- (15) 15 March - "E" Company listening post at (AT 920675) received grenade at 152140H. Listening post returned fire and pulled back to lines; area was illuminated and interdicted with M-79 and small arms fire. LP re-established in another position in fire team size and set up as ambush. Listening post at "G" Company (AT 905719) received hand grenade. Estimated one (1) VC made approach from southeast through hamlet and up ravine. Area interdicted with four (4) hand grenades, forty (40) rounds 7.62 and illuminated by 81mm mortar. Visual search conducted with negative evidence of the VC. Helicopter evacuated one (1) Marine with fragmentation wounds in left arm and hand. During this period there was eight (8) squad day patrols, twelve (12) squad night patrols, twenty-one (21) ambushes and twenty-four (24) listening posts.
- (16) 16 March - Village chief and local police went to "E" Company CP, and gave Company Commander information on a 14 year old boy name Do-Nho who had previously planted booby traps. Boy was apprehended and admitted being VC; he was sent to IIT. First Platoon "E" Company at (AT 922673) conducted local sweep of perimeter discovering two M-26 grenades about one-hundred (100) meters from position. One (1) grenade had spoon removed and other had pin pulled. Grenades blown in place. At 162100H one (1) VC was observed near wire in front of 2d Platoon, "G" Company position, (AT 915174). VC threw grenade, Marines returned with small arms fire, and threw one hand grenade. A patrol searched area with negative results. 2d Platoon "G" Company perimeter received five (5) incoming grenades from an estimated three (3) VC at 162311H.

Platoon immediately returned heavy volume of small arms fire, six (6) hand grenades, four (4) M-79 and 3.5 HE. Conducted rapid search and attack of area. Encountered heavy brush and found no signs of wounded or killed VC. Three (3) USMC wounded none seriously and no medical assistance was required. Listening post from First Platoon, Company "E" sighted movement at (AT 916675). LP took the movement under fire and received nine (9) rounds of small arms fire from (AT 916675) and twelve (12) rounds from (AT 916677). Individual VC spotted running into house at (AT 916675). Platoon immediately dispatched search and destroy squad to house and found a man and woman approximately fifty (50) years of age. Both were unhurt and retained for questioning by village chief. Third Platoon, "G" received small arms fire from (AT 874703). One (1) squad reinforced sent to search area. Negative results. Battalion conducted a total of nine (9) squad day patrols, twelve (12) squad night patrols, seventeen (17) squad ambushes and twenty-one (21) listening posts.

- (17) 17 March - The battalion CP at (AT 948722) perimeter security spotted estimated three (3) VC and took them under fire. VC returned carbine fire and then they retreated. Pursuit force dispatched and conducted search without finding VC dead or wounded. At 170345H 2d Platoon, "G" Company received one (1) incoming hand grenade. Platoon returned heavy volume of fire and sent reinforced fire team to search, kill or capture. Search unit unable to find trace of VC. "H" Company patrol sweeping village (AT 908688) had a man trip a mine causing wounds to legs and arms. Man evacuated and sweep continued. Patrol from "G" Company found one (1) electrically set mine with two (2) lbs of C-4 at (AT 878690) and one (1) grenade booby trapped at (AT 883697). Grenade and mine were detonated in place. First Platoon "F" Company patrol received eight (8) to ten (10) rounds from an estimated two (2) snipers vicinity (AT 907606). Patrol returned fire and searched area. "E" Company First Platoon position received twenty-five (25) rounds of carbine fire at 172205H. Starlight scope spotted two (2) VC at (AT 917672) and three (3) to five (5) men at (AT 920609). Platoon fired small arms, 60mm mortars, M-79 rounds and 3.5 rounds. The entire area was searched with negative results. During this period there was a total of nine (9) squad day patrols, thirteen (13) squad night patrols, twenty-three (23) ambushes and twenty listening posts.

- (18) 18 March - "F" Company patrol from first platoon received eight (8) to ten (10) rounds from sniper in building at (AT 936607). One (1) Marine was wounded in the arm and medical evacuation was effected. Searched and cleared area with negative results. Land mine detonated electrically by wire in vicinity of bridge at (AT 944677) killing a three (3) man USMC engineer team. An immediate sweep and search of the area was made capturing ten (10) VCS at (AT 945700) and sixty (60) VCS running south vicinity (AT 940640). All VCS were turned over to Hieu Duc District Headquarters. "H" Company CP received fifteen (15) rounds carbine fire at 182110H. Fifteen (15) men spotted in rice paddy and taken under fire with 60mm mortars, M-79's and small arms. Patrol searched area with negative results. During this period the battalion conducted nine (9) squad day patrols, twelve (12) squad night patrols, eighteen (18) ambushes and twenty (20) listening posts.
- (19) 19 March - At 190330H squad patrol from "G" Company activated land mine at (AT 899706) sustaining three (3) WIA. Mine was one (1) M-26 grenade with trip wire. Medical evacuation was effected and completed at 190400H. "F" Company squad patrol moving at (AT 942654), received several rounds of carbine fire and automatic weapons from estimated two (2) snipers at (AT 945654). Patrol returned fire and requested to move into 3d Battalion, 3d Marines TAOR where fire was originated. Patrol was instructed to remain in battalion TAOR and form blocking since "I" Company was involved in a fire fight with VC in vicinity (AT 955655). Two (2) Vietnamese men approached "G" Company squad patrol and pointed out two (2) women as being VC nurses and one (1) guerrialla at (AT 888701). Men requested to be evacuated to ITT along with VC so as not to be considered as informers by the local people. Patrol member from squad patrol first platoon, "G" Company encountered booby trapped gate. Grappling hook was attached to gate and the men backed off about thirty (30) meters assuming a prone position. Booby trap detonated and man was wounded in face. Medical evacuation effected. There were nine (9) squad day patrols, fourteen (14) squad night patrols, twenty (20) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.
- (20) 20 March - No significant events or contacts developed this day during which the battalion conducted nine (9) squad day patrols, twelve (12) squad night patrols, twenty (20) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.

- (21) 21 March - Squad patrol from 3d Platoon, "G" Company hit land mine at (AT 875714) wounding two (2) men. Helicopter medical evacuation effected on wounded personnel. Mine was apparently pull or trip grenade. Operations during this period included nine (9) squad day patrols, twelve (12) squad night patrols, twenty-one (21) ambushes and twenty (20) listening posts.
- (22) 22 March - Listening post at "G" Company OP position spotted and took under fire an estimated three (3) VC. Position received one (1) incoming hand grenade but no small arms. IP withdrew from position under cover of light small arms fire from the perimeter. Patrol sent to immediate area but no signs of VC were found. IP re-established in new location at (AT 220915). Patrol from "G" Company found mine believed to be M-26 grenade with trip wire at (AT 874711). Mine was activated. Another patrol from "G" Company activated mine in vicinity (AT 896704). Mine was M-26 grenade attached to four (4) to five (5) pounds of TNT on an overhanging bamboo pole. A Marine was wounded and a helicopter medical evacuation was effected. There were nine (9) squad day patrols, fifteen (15) squad night patrols, twenty four (24) ambushes and twenty-one (21) listening posts.
- (23) 23 March - Squad patrol from "H" Company had point man step on land mine wounding one (1) USMC in thigh and head. Mine was suspected to have been M-26 grenade with trip wire. "G" Company observed two (2) explosions at 2350H, two-hundred (200) meters north west of their OP. It was believed to have been 60mm mortars, grenades or detonated booby trap. Illuminated area for a visual check. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines were notified since it appeared to be in their TAOR. During this period the battalion conducted a total of nine (9) squad day patrols, fourteen (14) squad night patrols, twenty-five (25) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.
- (24) 24 March - Company search and destroy operation was conducted in Poi Vue Valley. (See Combat After Action Report, Part III, Supporting Documents). In addition, there were nine (9) squad day patrols, twelve (12) squad night patrols, twenty (20) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts during this period.
- (25) 25 March - There were no significant events in the battalion TAOR this date, although the battalion conducted nine (9) squad day patrols, fourteen (14) squad night patrols, twenty-four (24) ambushes and twenty-three listening posts.

- (26) 26 March -- Six (6) VC captured one (1) District Official near "H" Company squad position on Pontoon Bridge at 261250H. VC were suspected of taking official toward Bo Ban (AT 958658). Three (3) USMC and five (5) FF pursued. Official later escaped 262130H and returned to District Headquarters. "H" Company patrol found one (1) M-26 grenade with trip wire across trail at AT 921690. Patrol detonated grenade in place. 1st Platoon from "E" Company received one (1) incoming round from north east of position (AT 922677). Grenade landed between outer and inner strands of protective wire. Returned fire and conducted immediate pursuit without making contact or locating VC. Battalion employed nine (9) squad day patrols, fourteen (14) squad night patrols, twenty-five (25) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.
- (27) 27 March -- "E" Company's 1st Platoon (AT 921674) received one (1) round incoming believed to be 60mm mortar. Concussion occurred at north end of position approximately forty (40) meters inside outer wire; no movement or sound were heard prior to or after detonation. Patrol from "G" Company observed one (1) VC with weapon running out of hut at AT 888704 heading east. Took VC under fire and pursued with negative results. Five (5) women were found in hut and taken to IIT by S-2 for interrogation. During this period there were nine (9) squad day patrols, fourteen (14) squad night patrols, twenty-five (25) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.
- (28) 28 March -- "SPAR" report received indicating enemy activity at (AT 908600). Frag Order issued to "E" Company: "Send one (1) platoon (Rein) to (AT 908600), to depart 290700H for search and destroy mission upon enemy. Coordinating instructions: (1) Mission subject of "SPAR" report. (2) Submit preplanned artillery concentrations and check points to headquarters prior to 282400H." Battalion conducted six (6) squad day patrols, twelve (12) squad night patrols, twenty-one (21) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.
- (29) 29 March -- 3d Platoon, "E" Company carried out mission of checking out "SPAR" report and found negative enemy activity at objective area. Platoon from "E" Company conducting sweep of village (AT 876700) flushed out six (6) VC that were in village. As point man of point fire team came within thirty (30) meters of village six (6) VC with weapons suddenly ran out of the hut and disappeared into heavy vegetation adjacent to village.

Point immediately took VC under fire killing one (1). The point fire team and part of the 1st squad immediately pursued VC and a complete search of the area was conducted. One (1) VC body, one (1) Chi Com sub-machine gun, three (3) M-26 grenades, two (2) full M-14 magazines and sufficient blood traces were found indicating that all VC were wounded. Third Platoon, "F" Company received two (2) incoming grenades which blew up outside wire. Area illuminated and searched with negative results. Patrol from "G" Company found two (2) bows, six (6) sticks for setting booby traps, equipment for detonating electrical mines and one-thousand (1,000) pounds of rice in hut at (AT 890707). Helicopter assistance was requested to evacuate captured equipment and rice. In battalion TAOR there were conducted eight (8) squad day patrols, nineteen (19) ambushes and twenty-three (23) listening posts.

- (30) 30 March - 3d Platoon, "E" Company patrol apprehended one (1) VCS male on routine identification card check. ID card had faulty age; VCS was turned over to District Headquarters for verification. Squad patrol from "G" Company found M-26 grenade rigged as a booby trap on trail. Grenade was detonated with a grappling hook. Same patrol spotted five (5) VCS running at (AT 902703) when patrol approached. All VCS apprehended and evacuated to District Headquarters for identification. Squad patrol from 3d Platoon, "G" Company detonated booby trap as they were moving along trail causing injuries to three (3) USMC and one (1) ARVN. No one to the rear of the explosion received any shrapnel but two (2) men about fifteen (15) meters away were tossed about six (6) feet. Shrapnel passed through flak jackets and caused injuries to head, chests, arms and legs of the three (3) USMC wounded. Medical evacuation was effected by helicopter. Patrol conducted a search of the area for any further VC activity and pieces of booby trap. It was found that trail had been marked with a pile of rocks. In addition, the following were conducted: eight (8) squad day patrols, ten (10) squad night patrols, fourteen (14) ambushes and twenty-one listening posts.

(31) 31 March - At 2d Platoon (AT 914714), "G" Company position [REDACTED] one (1) M-14 spent projectile fired from long distance entered tent and hit man in leg causing slight wound in right leg above ankle. Spent projectile recovered and fire team searched immediate area to insure it did not originate close by. Wound very slight not requiring evacuation. Checked adjacent units and patrols concerning firing with negative results. During this period the battalion nine (9) squad day patrols, thirteen (13) squad night patrols, eighteen (18) ambushes and twenty-one (21) listening posts.

10. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination

a. Normal Fire Support was conducted throughout the period of 1-31 March.

b. Artillery units providing support for 2d Battalion, 3d Marines are A-1-12 and B-1-12.

c. Naval Gunfire Support - None

d. Type and number of missions delivered

Fire Missions - Three (3)

Practice Fire Missions - Fifteen (15)

Fire Missions by Concentration Number - Four (4)

H&I's - Two-thousand-seventy (2,070)

Prep-Fires - Twelve (12)

e. Ammunition expended by type - N/A

11. Logistics (S-4)a. Supply

(1) Supply point distribution by Company Trucks was effected daily with occasional helicopter resupply. Helicopters were used primarily to transport ammunition. One water-trailer from each company was filled daily in the Battalion CP area. Also, a tanker distributed gasoline to the CP.

(2) Daily runs to FLSG Maintenance were made for repair of Ordnance, Optics and Office Machines.

(3) Requisition were hand carried daily to the Fleet Stock Account. Priority O2 and walk-thru requisitions were cleared through Division Supply and G-4 prior to submission.

(4) Special Allowance for RVN:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>
Shotgun, 12 gauge	13	7
60mm Mortar	8	7
Radio Set ERC-25	8	7
Radio Set GRC-125 (vehicle mounted)	2	2
Seismic Intrusion Devices	20	20

b. Maintenance.

(1) The following was taken to FLSG General Supply Maintenance shops:

<u>WORK COMPLETED</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>PENDING</u>	<u>QTY</u>
Typewriter 13"	9	Watch, wrist	20
Imprinter, addressograph	5	Portable Typewriter	1
Trailer, Water	1	Typewriter, 13"	2
Extinguisher, Fire	6	Recorder Reproducer	1
Gas Tank For Burner Unit M1937	1	General Purpose Tent	2
Immersion Burner	4	Embossor, addressograph	1
Lantern, Electric T1	3		
303/U			
Cover, 50 Cal. Machine Gun	2		

SECRET

(2) The following was taken to FLSG Ordnance and Optics Shops:

<u>WORK COMPLETED</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>PENDING</u>	<u>QTY</u>
Rocket Launcher 3.5"	13	Binoculars (6x30)	12
Elevating and Traversing Mech	1	Rifle 7.62mm M-14	22
60mm Mortars	3	Battery, Sniperscope	1
Rifle 7.62mm M-14	5	Seismic Intrusion Device	1
Grenade Launcher M-79	2	Pistol, .45 cal.	1
Bipod M2 f/M-14	1	Tester Electric	1
81mm Mortar Bipod	1		
Pistol, .45 cal.	2		
Dispenser Riot Control (turned in for excess)	2		
Rifle M-14 (coded X)	1		
Rifle M-14 (turned in f/excess)	75		
60mm Mortar Mount (complete)	1		
Spare Barrel f/M-60	1		
M-60 Machine Gun	1		

c. Food Services

(1) The battalion mess hall provides three (3) hot meals per day for personnel in the Battalion Command Post. The three front line companies personnel are provided with a hot noon meal daily. Food is prepared at the battalion messhall and transported by truck in vacuum cans to company positions. C-rations are utilized for breakfast and supper meals.

(2) The battalion now occupies the new troop messhall.

(3) An addition was constructed to the officer and staff NCO mess to improve food preparation facilities.

(4) The following shortages still exist and are on order:

(a) One (1) hundred foot cubic refrigerator.

(b) One hundred (100) messtrays.

d. Cantonment and Camp Facilities Development

(1) The following projects were completed in coordination and direction from the U.S. Navy, MCB-5:

(a) One (1) new messhall.

(b) Three (3) eight holer heads.

ENCLOSURE (1)

(c) One (1) 14' x 14' concrete refrigerator platform.

(d) One (1) shower house.

(2) The following projects are still in progress under the direction of the U.S. Navy MCB-5:

(a) Improvement of electrical wiring.

(b) Installations of screen doors and stairs.

(c) One (1) eight holer head.

(3) The following camp projects were begun with assistance of a TD-18 provided by Shore Party:

(a) Drainage system.

(b) Outdoor theater.

(c) Road improvement.

(4) The following projects were constructed within this Battalion.

(a) Supply unloading dock.

(b) Vehicle maintenance shed.

(c) Individual improvements to office and living quarters.

(d) One (1) 15' vehicle bridge.

e. Transportation and roads.

(1) Transportation:

(a) Organic battalion vehicles are utilized to maximum; the six (6) M-35 trucks attached daily are utilized for troop movements, resupply and miscellaneous missions.

(2) Roads:

(a) Road construction in Battalion T/AOR is under direction of 3rd Engineer Battalion.

f. Fiscal. The units OpBud report was screened for erroneous charges, corrections were submitted to 3d FSR.

g. Water

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

(1) Water is obtained from local water point within Battalion CP operated by 3rd Engineers.

(2) The Battalion was issued four (4) water trailers on temporary loan. One trailer is maintained at messhall and filled from local water point as required. The other three (3) are at the front line company CP positions and refilled every day by water tanker from FLSG.

(3) Platoon and squad positions are resupplied through the use of water cans.

(4) A bath unit is operated by 3rd Engineers adjacent to local water point utilizing new shower house. Showers operated daily; one half (1/2) hour in the morning and one (1) hour in the evening.

h. Motor Transport

(1) The Battalion has 20 M-422 and 30 M-274 vehicles. None were combat deadlined during March 1966, 100% were available to this battalion. One (1) M-100 trailer has been deadlined, awaiting seals since 11 March 1966; 18 remained available throughout the period. The average availability of trailers is 95%.

(2) Seven (7) M-422-A-1's and 21 M-274 A-1's were received from FLSG on 8-9 March. Prior to 22 March, 21 M-274's and seven (7) M-422's were turned in to FLSG as excess.

i. Embarkation

(1) The movement of supplies and equipment from debarkation point (Migoun Pier) to Battalion CP was completed on 3 March 1966.

(2) Message of all L-form off loaded was sent on 10 March 1966 to FMF Pad.

(3) Battalion has seven (7) school trained Embarkation personnel, two (2) officers and five (5) enlisted.

j. Hospitalization and Evacuation

(1) Evacuation

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
KIA	Air	4
WIA	Air	42
NON-BATTLE	Air	18
Vietnamese	Air	10

ENCLOSURE (1)

13. Air Defense. None

14. Combat Air Support

a. Aviation units from MAG-16 MAW provided resupply and med-evac air craft in support of this battalion during the reporting period. Resupply helicopters were assigned to the 3d Marines on a daily basis and these aircraft were used when needed for resupply of the rifle companies.

b. No aircraft were used in Close Air Support of 2d Battalion, 3d Marines during the month of March.

c. The following is a sequential listing of med-evacs during the reporting period:

2 March 1966 - One (1) Malaria case - USMC
 2 March 1966 - One (1) High Temperature - USMC
 3 March 1966 - One (1) High Temperature - USMC
 3 March 1966 - One (1) Possible Appendicitis - USMC
 4 March 1966 - One (1) Ill Vietnamese (civilian)
 4 March 1966 - Two (2) WIA - USMC
 5 March 1966 - One (1) Ill and one (1) WIA - USMC
 6 March 1966 - One (1) WIA Vietnamese (civilian)
 7 March 1966 - One (1) Ill Vietnamese (civilian)
 7 March 1966 - One (1) Ill Vietnamese (civilian)
 8 March 1966 - Three (3) Ill - USMC
 11 March 1966 - One (1) Ill Vietnamese (civilian)
 14 March 1966 - Two (2) Heat Casualties - USMC
 15 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 16 March 1966 - Three (3) Ill - USMC
 17 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 17 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 18 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 18 March 1966 - Three (3) KIA - one (1) WIA - USMC
 18 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 19 March 1966 - Three (3) - USMC
 19 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 19 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 21 March 1966 - One (1) Ill - ARVN
 21 March 1966 - One (1) Ill - ARVN
 21 March 1966 - One (1) Ill - ARVN
 21 March 1966 - Two (2) WIA - USMC
 21 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 22 March 1966 - Five (5) WIA - USMC
 23 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 23 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 23 March 1966 - One (1) KIA - USMC
 23 March 1966 - Two (2) WIA - USMC
 25 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 26 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - (civilian)

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

27 March 1966 - Two (2) WIA - USMC
 28 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 29 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 29 March 1966 - One (1) WIA (civilian)
 30 March 1966 - Two (2) WIA - ARVN - USMC
 31 March 1966 - One (1) WIA - USMC
 31 March 1966 - Three (3) WIA (civilian)
 31 March 1966 - One (1) Ill - USMC

14. Medical and Dental Support

a. Name of surgeon: M. B. BUTLER, LT MC USNR - 1-31 March 1966
 T. E. FELL, LT MC USNR - 20-28 March 1966
 J. D. JONES, LT MC USNR - 30-31 March 1966

b. Significant Events: None

c. Medical trends.

(1) There has been a rise in the number of diarrhea cases and fevers of undetermined origin.

d. Number of battle casualties: Eight (8)

e. Number of non-battle casualties: 733 total treatments

f. Preventive medicine and sanitation: Malaria prophylaxis administered weekly. The camp sanitation is considered satisfactory.

g. Civil Affairs:

(1) Number treated: 6928

(2) Amount (by type) of medicine dispensed

(a) ASA and Anacin	6000 tabs
(b) Carbamine Antacid	500 pks
(c) Estomul and Amphojel	30 bts
(d) Cepacol	500 pks
(e) Vicks Cough drops	360 bxs
(f) Diarrhea Tablets	4 ons
(g) Furacin Ointment	12 bts
(h) Piperzine	4 bts liquid & 5 bts tabs
(i) Chlorpheniramine Maleate	3 bts tabs & 1 gal syrup

ENCLOSURE (1)

(j)	Oxytetracycline, oral suspension	30 bts
(k)	Erythromycin, Oral suspension	30 bts
(l)	Pediatric sulfa oral suspension	40 sm bts
(m)	Tetracycline Tablets	8 bts
(n)	Erythromycin Tablets	7 bts
(o)	Lentopen Injection	40
(p)	Mediquik Ointment	40 tbs
(q)	Nonvits	36 bts
(r)	Ophthalmic Ointment	48 bts
(s)	Hydrocortisone Ointment	24 bts
(t)	Hydrogen Peroxide	24 bts
(u)	Thimerasol	4 bts
(v)	Undecylenic Ointment	24 bts
(w)	Eugenol	4 bts
(x)	Sodium Salicylate Tablets	6 bts
(y)	Polymyxin B Sulfate, Neomycin and Hydrocortisone Susp. Otic Drops	20 bts
(z)	Chlortetracycline Hol Tablets	6 bts
(aa)	Procaine Benicillin, 1,500,00 U. for Aqueous Inj.	50 bts
(bb)	Water for Inj.	50 bts
(cc)	Band Aids	28 bxs
(dd)	Cotton Roll	4 rolls
(ee)	4X4's	40 pg
(ff)	2X2's	48 pg
(gg)	Applicators wood, Cotton tipped	2000

(hh) Tongue Blades	400
(ii) Disposable Syringes	600
(jj) Adhesive Plaster	30 rls
(kk) Blade, Surgical Prep, Razor	25
(ll) Needle, Disposable 21 gauge	650
(mm) Suture, Nonabsorbable, Silk, Twisted 000, $\frac{1}{2}$ inch circleneedle	5 pkg
(nn) Bottle, Screw Cap, Prescription, 2 oz	144 bt
(oo) Bottle, Dropper, 1 oz	12 bt
(pp) Envelope, Drug Dispensing	1000
(qq) Box, Ointment	60 bx's

(3) Schooling Conducted. None.

h. Problem Areas: There were no problem areas encountered during this reporting period.

15. Chaplin Support

a. LT L. L. AHRNSBRACK, CHC USNR

b. 11 Sunday Services conducted 220 in attendance
2 Memorial Services conducted 76 in attendance
10 Weekday Vesper Services 54 in attendance

c. Twelve (12) professional counseling sessions.

d. Significant activities

(1) Called on minister of Baptist Church in TUI LONG I, provided fifteen (15) bags of cement for completion of his church. Additional materials will be provided in the future.

(2) Called on Rev. TRUONG DUONG, minister of Church of Christ in DUONG LAM I. This man has funds from his denomination to purchase cement, but has no transportation. Transportation will be provided as soon as possible to haul his purchase from Da Nang to the church site.

(3) Called on refugee priest living near "G" Company GP. Communication was difficult, but it appears as though he is receiving help from 3rd Engineers.

ENCLOSURE (1)

e. Facilities

(1) Chapel is a 16X32 structure with tin roof, front and back. The sides are screened. Presently the Chapel is being rebuilt and it is anticipated that matting will be put on the overhead prior to Easter Sunday.

16. Civil Affairs

a. Significant activities.

(1) 1 March. The Battalion Civil Affairs Officer visited the village of Hoa Loc, Hoa Phu and Hoa Ninh and met with the Village Chief and Police Chief of each village. During conversations with these village officials, it was learned that many of these men are afraid to carry their weapons because they have no written authority to do so from U. S. units. Plans were made to draw up and issue cards identifying these men and their weapons.

(2) 2 March. The Battalion Civil Affairs Officer installed a TA-1 telephone in the home of Lt. THOUC, the company commander of the Popular Forces unit in Hoa Phu Village, AT 925743. The phone was connected into the Company G switchboard.

(3) 6 March. Company G corpsman treated 75 villagers in Thon Truc (AT 908718) Hamlet. Sick call was held for the first time in Tuy Loan (2) Hamlet (AT 929694) by Company N corpsman. The Pontoon Bridge Aid Station treated 112 civilians. A total of 228 civilians received medical assistance throughout the Battalion TAOR.

(4) 7 March. The Division G-5, LtCol MACKEL, the Battalion S-2 Officer, and Battalion Civil Affairs Officer visited Hieu Duc District Headquarters. Plans were made for the training of five (5) Vietnamese persons in the administration of medical assistance. The training is to be conducted by selected Battalion corpsmen.

(5) 8 March. A civil affairs team held a sick call in the village of Hoa Phu (AT 921724) and treated 133 persons. In addition, two (2) Vietnamese nurses administered anti-cholera shots. The Pontoon Bridge Aid Station (AT 946700) treated 133 persons. A total of 390 persons were administered medical assistance throughout the Battalion TAOR this date.

(6) 9 March. The Pontoon Bridge Aid Station (AT 946700) was painted inside and out by local villagers. A truck was furnished to Mr. NGUYEN PHUNG, a Buddhist priest, in order to haul sand from the river to his pagoda in Thach Nham Hamlet (AT 952714). Vietnamese labor was provided. Five truck loads were hauled.

(7) 10 March. LtGen KONG, Commandant of the Korean Marine Corps and his staff, accompanied by MajGen MCCUTCHEON, CG 1st MAZ visited the Battalion TAOR. They received a briefing by the Civil Affairs Officer on Current Civil Affairs Program as well as

ENCLOSURE (1)

future plans. The Generals then visited Company G, where they observed the administering of medical assistance to the people of Truc Dong Hamlet (AT 908718). A total of 380 people received medical assistance throughout the Battalion TAOR on this date.

(8) 12 March. The Marine Corps Civil Affairs Research Team visited the Battalion on this date. They received a briefing on the current Civil Affairs Program, as well as future plans. A visit was made to Hieu Duc District Headquarters where the team met the District Chief and the Army Sub-Sector Advisor.

(9) 14 March. The Pootoon Bridge Aid Station (AT 946700) moved into the Hieu Duc District Dispensary at AT945699. Coordination and cooperation between the corpsman and the Vietnamese staff was very good. A political meeting was held at Phouc Thuan Hamlet (AT 932731). The Battalion Civil Affairs Officer and NCO were present at the meeting. Contacts were made with several officials of Hoa Think Village and the included Hamlets.

(10) 19 March. The refugee camp located in Hoa Loc Village (AT 899774) was visited and the following items were distributed at the request of the District Chief:

Rice	1848 lbs	Soap	500 bars
Bulgar Wheat	400 lbs	Clothes	150 lbs
Corn Meal	100 lbs	Toys	200 assorted
Peas	100 lbs		

The Battalion Chaplin donated twenty (20) 100 lb bags of cement to the pastor of the Christian Church (AT 946701) located south of Tuy Loan. The cement is to be used to finish construction of the outside of the building.

(11) 21 March. A meeting was held at the home of the Popular Forces unit commander of Hoa Phu (AT 925743) with the Battalion S-2 Officer and Civil Affairs Officer present. Pertinent information was obtained concerning enemy activity within the Battalion TAOR. The contact indicated that he would be willing to continue to pass on information as it becomes available.

ENCLOSURE (1)

ORIGINAL

S & C FILES
3D MARINES
22766

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division, (Rein), FMT
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96602

135 666

3/FJK/rlv
5750
29 March 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, (Rein), FMT
Via: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

2nd BN; 3rd MAR; S & C
CONTROL NO. 0044-66
COPY NO. 1 OF 11

- Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1B
- (b) DivO 03000.5
- (c) DivO 5750.2
- (d) RegtO 3120.1B
- (e) Maps: VIETNAM: 1:50,000, AMS Series L701 Sheets
6658 IV, 6659 III

Encl: (1) Command Chronology for the period 1-31 March 1966.

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c) and (d) enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

W.K. Horn
W.K. HORN

	Action	Info
CO	✓	
XO	✓	
S-1	✓	
S-2	✓	
S-3	✓	
S-4	✓	
Com O	✓	
Hq Com		
S & C		
FSC	✓	
CPW	✓	

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W

992266

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/JEW/ppm
3480
22 March 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Task Force Delta

Subj: After Action Report (Double Eagle)

2nd BN, 3rd MAR, S & C
CONTROL NO. 039-66
COPY NO. 17 OF 21

Ref: (a) TFD OpO 1-66

- (1) Name of Operation - Operation Double Eagle
- (2) Inclusive Dates of Operation - 28 January 1966 - 26 February 1966
- (3) Location - Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces, RVN
- (4) Command Headquarters - BLT 2/3
- (5) Reporting Officer - LtCol W.K. HORN
- (6) Task Organization

BLT 2/3 (TU 79.5.2)

2d Bn, 3d Marines
 H&S Company (-)
 2nd Plt (-) (Rein), Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 Det, Coll and Clearing Plt, Co A, 3d Med Bn
 Det, 1st Serv Bn
 Arty Ln Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, FSR
 Det, 1st SP Bn

Lt Col HORN

Co E (Rein)

Co E
 Det, H&S Co
 FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
 FAC Tm #2
 Det, Med Plt
 Det, S-2 Scouts
 FO Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 1st Squad, 2nd Plt, Co A, 3d Engr Bn

Lt SCHWARTZ

Co F (Rein)

Co F
 Det, H&S Co
 FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

Capt HARDIN

1/3
A/OA DOUBLE EAGLE
28 Jan - 26 Feb 66

Det, Med Plt
 Det, S-2 Scouts
 FO Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Co G (Rein)

Co G
 Det, H&S Co
 FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 FAC Tm #1
 Det, S-2 Scouts
 FO Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 3rd Sqd, 2nd Plt, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Capt WOODARD

107mm Mortar Btry, 3d Bn, 12th Mar

Lt MCKINNEY

106mm BR Plt, H&S Co

S/Sgt HOAGLAND

Provisional Rifle Co

Btry B (-), 1st Bn 12th Mar
 2nd Plt (Rein), Co A, 3rd AT Bn
 2nd Plt (Rein), Co A, 3rd Tk Bn
 2nd Plt (Rein), Co A, 3rd MT Bn
 Det, 1st SP Bn

Capt MOLSBERG

81mm Mortar Plt

Lt VERNON

Det, 1st Force Recon Co

Capt SPENGLER

2nd Plt (Rein), Co A, 3rd Recon Bn

Lt McCASKELL

BLT Reserve Co H (Rein)

Lt EGAN

Co H

Det, H&S Co

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

Det, Med Plt

Det, S-2 Scouts

FO Tm, Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

2nd Sqd, 2nd Plt, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

(7) Supporting ForcesArtillery

Battery H (-), 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, stationed at Bato was in support of Task Force Delta during the linkup with 2/9. Battery H (Rein), 3d Battalion, 11th Marines was in general support of Task Force Delta, during initial landing of 2d Battalion, 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Division, during the landing operation. Trip in GS BS 7142. 107mm Mortar

Battery, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines was in direct support of 2d Battalion, 3d Marines during second phase of Operation from 19 Feb through 26 Feb. Battery M, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines were in general support of Task Force Delta throughout the operation. The 3d 155 Gun Battery (-) (Shore Party) FMF, was also in general support of Task Force Delta throughout the operation. The artillery batteries were used only for on-call missions. Most of the fire was pre-scheduled H&I fires.

Air Support

Both helicopter and fixed wing, were used extensively during the operation. The first Marine Aircraft Wing provided the CAS and helo support for Task Force Delta. Helicopters were used numerous times to lift the battalion or sections of it to various LZ's in pursuit of the VC. CAS aircraft provided LZ preparatory fire along with the UH-1E helicopters. In addition they provided on-call close air support, med-evacs, artillery observers, and psychological warfare missions. Close air support aircraft were used during almost every helilift for fire suppression. Helicopter resupply was used almost on a daily basis. Med-evacs, resupply and close air support were most effective and timely, in that respective order.

Naval Gunfire

The USS Barry (DD 933), USS Topoka (CGC-8) and USS Oklahoma City (CGC-5) were used for H&I fires when available. Naval Gunfire was used to destroy village containing 15 known VC from which heavy small arms fire was received. This occurred while 2/3 was at the airstrip in GS BS 7243.

(8) Intelligence

During the planning phase of the operation much intelligence was received in regards to enemy strength, disposition and situation as found in Task Force Delta OpO 1-66. However, this Battalion, as TFD reserve, was not assigned an objective area until actually committed. When committed initially, no specific intelligence information was available concerning the objective area.

Resistance encountered during Phase I was limited to engagements with local guerrilla forces. Main force units per se, were not encountered but in three instances individuals from main force units were engaged and/ or captured.

- a. On 31 January, 6 VCS were picked up. Upon initial search one was found to have a green uniform in a bag. He was sent to IIT at the BSA.
- b. Approximately 4-6 VC in khaki uniforms with packs and related equipment were engaged on 2 February resulting in two enemy KIA and WIA (WIA were seen being dragged away). Another was captured on 15 February in green uniform, black helmet, pack and U.S. .30 caliber carbine. He was sent to IIT at the BSA.

Phase II

Estimates of forces expected to be encountered were once again found in Task Force Delta OpO 1-66. The enemy was also expected to be able to reinforce within 12-24 hours with the following:

- a. One confirmed battalion
- b. Three probable battalions
- c. One confirmed company

During this phase no main force units or individuals were encountered. Resistance once again was limited to harassing fire from guerrillas. In most instances, encounters were with one and at the most five guerrillas. Mines, booby traps punji pits, stakes and tunnel systems were encountered extensively throughout both phases of the operation.

(9) Mission

- (a) BLT 2/3 as the Landing Force Reserve, prepared to conduct helicopter or surface landed operations as directed by Commander Landing Force or when chopped to Task Force Delta, as directed by that headquarters. BLT 2/3 also prepares to conduct a tactical withdrawal.

(10) Concept of Operations

- (a) BLT 2/3 as the Landing Force Reserve, be prepared to land on order by helicopter to conduct operations as directed by CLF or when chopped to Task Force Delta by that Headquarters. A tactical withdrawal from LZ's and landing beaches will be conducted on order.

(11) Execution

- (a) 24 Jan 66. BLT 2/3 received special landing force Operation order 324-66 (Operation Double Eagle).
- (b) 25 Jan 66. Preparations were made for issuing BLT Operation Order 324-66.
- (c) 26 Jan 66. Commanding Officer, BLT 2/3 issued Operation 324-66 to subordinate units.
- (d) 27 Jan 66. Preparations were made to execute Operation Order 324-66.
- (e) 28 Jan 66. Transferred Companies "G" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) from the USS Montross (APA-212) to the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8).

- (f) 29 Jan 66. Received an order from CG, Task Force Delta, at 291450H to send one company (rein), by helicopter, to seize objective C. Co "E" (Rein) was made ready. The first wave lifted off at 291545H. 38 helicopters were used to lift the company into the area. Co "E" (Rein) was under OpCon Task Force Delta. At 291650H a warning order from CTG 79.5 alerted one rifle company (rein) to be on one hour alert. Co "F" (Rein) was designated and began to issue ammo and supplies. At 291705H an order was received relaxing this units alert status. Objective C was secured by Co "E" (Rein) at 291900H. A warning order was issued by CO, BLT 2/3 to the Provisional Rifle Company.
- (g) 30 Jan 66. The remainder of the BLT was lifted into the objective area commencing at 301500H. 38 aircraft were used to complete the lift. One (1) Marine was KIA by enemy sniper in LZ at GS BS 7142. CAS was provided by F-4's F-8's and UH-1E's. Battalion CP was established at BS 723424 and companies F, G, H and elements of H&S established a 360 degree perimeter defense. Three squad (rein) ambushes were established during the night. Each platoon established two listening posts. Before dark, CG, Task Force Delta, visited the CP. The 81mm Mortar Plt (←) conducted registration firing. During the night there were three reports of incoming sniper fire. There were no casualties and no estimated VC casualties. UH-1E's flying cover for landing zone received fire from village in GS BS 7341. UH-1E's returned fire with M-60 MG and rockets. Results could not be determined by this Battalion.
- (h) 31 Jan 66. Received Frag Order from CTG 79.5 to conduct fan patrols up to 2000 meters to the front of the battalion perimeter. Five patrols were planned each to be of platoon (rein) size. A warning order and patrol was issued to Co Cmdrs and the patrols began preparations to depart. The 5 patrols departed at 310300H. Patrol A from Co "F" (Rein) returned after killing one (1) VC finding rice and uniforms. Patrol B from 2nd Plt, Co A, 3rd Recon Bn returned after capturing 1 VC and 4 VCS and finding 20 bags of rice and 9 bicycles. Patrol C from Co "H" (Rein) found 2000 pounds of rice. This patrol encountered 10 VC and a short fire fight ensued. They estimated killing 1 VC and wounding 2. There were 2 friendly WIA's. Patrol D from Co "G" (Rein) received sniper fire from an unknown number of VC. Fire was returned. It was estimated that 1 VC was killed and one was wounded. Patrol E from Co "H" (Rein) returned with negative contact. CG, Task Force Delta, visited the CP and issued an oral frag order to attack on axis from present position to an objective at coordinates BS 650410.

utilizing two reinforced rifle companies with Command Group Alpha. LOD to be crossed at 010730H. Companies "F" and "G" were issued warning orders and preparation was made to execute instructions by CG, Task Force Delta. H&S (-) and Co "H" (Rein) remained as security for H Btry, 3/11 who occupied an adjacent position. The Provisional Rifle Co formed from Btry B, 1/12 lifted into this area to augment Co "H" (Rein) and the remainder of H&S (-) in the defense of this position. A message from CG, Task Force Delta detached 2nd Plt, Co A, 3rd Recon Bn, and Det, Force Recon at 010800H. During the evening there were 5 ambushes established, 4 combat outposts and listening posts. No contacts were reported.

- (i) 1 Feb 66. At 0730 the Bn (-) with Command Group Alpha began the attack and moved west to the objective area along the prescribed route. An A0 and 2 A-4's were on station throughout the move. There was no resistance met along the route. 3 heat casualties and two non battle casualties were evacuated. At the objective area a perimeter defense was established, CG, Task Force Delta visited the objective area and issued an oral order to continue the attack at 020730H, to an objective at BS 652374. An order was issued to the Company Commanders and special preparations were made to execute it. There were no incidents during the night.
- (j) 2 Feb 66. The move south to the Battalion objective area at BS 652374 began at 0730 with Co "G" (Rein) deployed as the lead element. One VCS was apprehended on the trail and retained for interrogation. Bicycle repair parts, rope and kerosene were found in a cave in vicinity BS 654404. All items were destroyed. As the forward elements of Co "G" approached the objective area Command Group Alpha moved across the LOD. Co "G" (Rein) moved into the objective area and encountered an estimated force of 10 VC. 3 USMC WIA's were sustained by an initial burst of fire. During the fire fight 2 VC were killed and 1 VC wounded. 60mm mortars and CAS (provided by UH-1E's) were directed on the enemy who were driven off in a southeasterly direction. The Army UH-1E's conducted the necessary Med Evac for the 3 WIA's. The fire fight lasted about 30 minutes. Command Group Alpha and Co "F" (Rein) arrived and moved into the position without any further incidents. Battalion received CG, Task Force Delta Frag Order 17-66 to move along assigned route to return to BS 723424, Battalion rear. 1st Plt (Rein), Co G began to move at 022100H. The remainder of the Bn (-) followed at 022300H. The march through the jungle terrain was completed under the cover of darkness.

- (k) 3 Feb 66. At about 0730 as the column approached the objective, Co "F" (Rein), the column's rear element, received fire from a sniper. Fire was returned. There were no casualties and no estimate of VC killed. The rear element arrived at the objective area at 030900H. Battalion received Frag Order 22-66 to be helilifted into an objective area at BS 9226. At 031500H the lift of Co "F" (Rein), Co "H" (Rein) and Command Group Alpha began, 38 helicopters were used in the lift. During the lift fire was received in LZ Sparrow (Rear CP BS 723424) causing 2 helos to go down and causing one friendly KIA and three WIA's. There were 2 VC estimated killed. As the helicopter approached the LZ in the objective, sporadic small arms fire was received. F-8's F-4's, A-1's and UH-1E's flew CAS missions. There was one friendly WIA and one VC killed. Due to the fire in LZ Sparrow, the lift was not entirely completed until 031800H. The battalion established its CP at BS 917267 with Companies "F" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) in a perimeter defense. Ambushes and listening posts were established. No contact was reported during the night.
- (l) 4 Feb 66. Company "F" (Rein) conducted search and destroy operations from GS 9126 south along route 1 to Thach By in GS 9221. Co "H" (Rein) moved out to conduct search and destroy missions south along the coast from GS 9226 to Thach By. Co "H" (Rein) encountered no VC but destroyed caves and tunnels. Co "F" (Rein) encountered 10 VC at BS 912252 and sustained one WIA. Artillery and 81's were fired in support. The enemy was driven off in northern and southern directions. Command Group Alpha moved by LVTP's to BS 925218. At that point Co "H" (Rein) was moved from BS 927220 to BS 925218 by the LVTP's. The battalion established a defensive position at BS 922212 with Companies "F" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) in perimeter defense. Naval Gunfire, artillery and 81mm mortar preparations were fired in the surrounding hills. No incidents were reported during the night.
- (m) 5 Feb 66. At 050600H Co "F" (Rein) moved south to conduct a search and destroy operation of its assigned area along national highway No 1 to Chu'ong (2) in GS 9113. Co "H" (Rein) began its search and destroy mission at 050700H. South generally along NS Grid line 92 to Chu'ong(2). Command Group Alpha moved south along highway 1 at 0730. There were no contacts reported during the move. Battalion CP was established at BS 914139. Patrols were conducted with negative results and night ambushes established. Prior to moving into its position, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines executed a linkup with a RVN Engineer Battalion from II Corps at BS 903130.

- (n) 6 Feb 66. Co "F" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) swept their assigned areas. No VC contacts were made but tunnels, an aid station, and rice caches were found. Tunnels and rice were destroyed. The aid station was in a culvert and contained old beds, used morphine syrettes, none of which were of any significant value. Ambushes were established. No contacts were reported. Liaison was established with special forces elements in II Corps area at BS 903130.
- (o) 7-8 Feb 66. Co "F" (Rein) and "H" (Rein) sent out plt (rein) patrols to sweep their assigned areas. A civic action team (doctor, corpsmen, S-3, S-2 and interpreters) and security element moved into villiage at BS 908136 and BS 903128 distributed soap, cigarettes, food and treated minor ailments. Patrols reported a noticeable lack of VC activity. On 8 Feb, an Army Captain from II Corps Civil Action Team brought a VC rallier to the Battalion CP. A patrol was conducted to confirm the information offered by the rallier. A cave with a small cache of weapons was found at BS 901146, which contained one Russian rifle and 3 grenades. These were turned over to the U.S. Army advisor.
- (p) 9 Feb 66. Co "F" and Co "H" sent out patrols to maintain security and to conduct search and destroy operations along route 1. Received oral Frag Order alerting the Battalion to prepare to assume mission of security for engineer unit working on route No 1, from II Corps Northern boundary to Thach By in GS 9221 to repair highway damaged by VC. Ambushes were established. No contact was reported.
- (q) 10 Feb 66. At about 1200 a patrol from Co "H" received three rounds of carbine fire while moving up hill 65 in BS 885160. One (1) VC was seen armed with a grenade. One (1) VC was killed, but the VC firing a carbine escaped to the North. A patrol from Co "F" picked up two (2) VCS at coordinates BS 915666. Both had safe conduct passes and were evacuated to ITT at BSA. A Civil Action Team passed out one wood working kit, soap and 50 lbs of rations while a medical team treated 25 persons in the village located at coordinates BS 906139.
- (r) 11 Feb 66. A patrol from Co "H" located banners, gas mask filters, a carbine and 45 ammo in small amounts at BS 858198. The same patrol found paintings of american weapons on the wall of a hut at BS 854199. It appeared to be a VC training area. The building was destroyed by burning. The patrol received two (2) rounds of carbine fire at BS 857202 at about 1215. The area was searched and one (1) Vietnamese about 15 years old was found. No weapon was recovered but expended cartridges were found in the area. Vietnamese boy was detained as VCS, and evacuated to BSA. Two (2) VC in black uniforms and one (1) VC in khaki were seen running north from BS 855202. Patrol fire and two were seen to fall. Search of area produced negative results. A patrol from Co "F" found 400 pounds

pounds of rice, 20 pounds of salt, and 200 pounds of dried coconuts in a concealed hut at BS 252263. Items were evacuated by helicopter to BSA. A patrol from Co "F" found two (2) Vietnamese women and four (4) children drying medicine at BS 864169 about 1630. There was estimated to be 125 assorted bottles of aspirin and other pill type medicine. One (1) bottle of penicillin (sp), and 150 envelopes containing a white powder, were found and evacuated. An Army civic action team from II Corps held sick call in the village at BS 907140. 75 persons were treated. The battalion medical officer accompanied the civic action team.

- (s) 12 Feb 66. 2d Battalion, 3d Marines assumed operation control of Companies "F" and "H" of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. A patrol from Co "F" found a map with sheet number 6754I in an abandoned hut at BS 878163. No markings on the map and no signs of friendly troops in area. The Battalion medical team treated 20 persons in the village of Chu'ong (1) at BS 915140. Approximately 50 pounds of rations were also distributed. LT General Thi, I Corps Commander and party visited area to see improvements on Route 1 in Battalion TAOR.
- (t) OpCon of Companies "F" and "H" of 2/4, and "H" 2/3 was chopped to 3/1 rear and 3/1 rear moved into BS 914139 to assume control of 2/3's TAOR. Co "E", Co "F" and Command Group Alpha were helilifted into a landing zone in GS BS 5644 at 1500. Lift was completed at 1600, the IZ and surrounding area were secured.
- One (1) main force VC was captured about 1640 at BS 560448. VC had U.S. carbine, ammo, pack and documents. He was sent to ITT at BSA. Battalion CP was established at BS 549436 with Co "E" in perimeter defense and Co "F" CP was established at BS 552443.
- (u) 14 Feb 66. Co "E" and Co "F" searched the area within grid square BS 5542 to 5543 for suspected POW camp with negative results. Link up with 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was made at BS 559420. Received Frag Order 117-66. and prepared to execute withdrawal in coordination with 2d Battalion, 9th Marines.
- (v) 15 Feb 66. Battalion (-) prepared to execute order 117-66. Companies "E", "F" and Command Group Alpha moved to GS BS 5639 and prepared for helolift to the LPH-8. Lift off began at approximately 1200 with one (1) plt (rein) being helilifted to hill 163 at 849391 to provide security for the withdrawal of the BSA from the beach. The remainder of the Battalion was helilifted to the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8).
- (w) 19 Feb 66. Co "E" and Co "F" with Command Group Alpha were landed in IZ's Thrush and Swallow by 1110, in BS BT 1914. Co "E" and Co "F" conducted search and destroy missions in vicinity of IZ's. Command Group Alpha recovered 10 pounds of rice, in a cloth roll, several small VC entrenching tools, clothes and sleeping mats in a cave at BT 200143.

Co "F" found a VCS crawling through rocks with a serious leg wound at BT 198145. He was evacuated to BSA at 1400. Co "F" had One (1) confirmed VC KIA in vicinity BT 203145 and had two (2) confirmed VC WIA in vicinity of BT 201155. Also recovered were VC literature and propaganda at coordinates BT 203146. There were no friendly casualties. Co "F" located a VC arsenal in vicinity of BT 198143. They recovered 17 shotguns, four (4) M-60 MG barrels, three M-1 barrels, one (1) M-14 w/magazine, seven (7) sound power phones, five (5) rounds 2.75mm ammo, 100 rounds .50 cal ammo, 11 rifles of unknown make, three (3) chinese hand grenades, four (4) 81mm mortar rounds, 350 7.62 rounds. At about 1650 Co "F" received nine (9) rounds of small arms fire from one VC in vicinity of BT 201155. Fire was returned. VC pursued into hut. VC would not surrender so hut was burned. Three (3) secondary explosions and small arms detonations were witnessed. Co "F" killed a total of four (4) VC and wounded two (2) in vicinity BS 261155. The villagers indicated that one (1) VC company of approximately 150 persons entered village in vicinity of LZ Thrush GS BT 1914 to collect rice taxes and other equipment in the area. They departed on the 16th of February and moved to the west. The VC have a caution advisor. The VC were armed with modern weapons believed to be Russian.

- (x) 20 Feb 66. At 0140 an ambush from Co "F" at BT 211154 received four (4) 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire. An 81mm mortar concentration was fired with unknown results. Seven marines were wounded and five were evacuated. Co "F" destroyed tunnel complexes and seven (7) caves in GS BT2116. One (1) confirmed wounded VC at BT 215155. Blood stains found following the air strike. Co "E" killed one (1) VC at BT 196155. VC was armed with a chicom 7.62 k-50 sub-MG. Weapon and ammo captured. At 1000 the CP began moving to BT 218169. At 1130 Co "F" found a VC training area at BT 209152. They found numerous dummy grenades carved out of wood with wire for simulated spoon, one (1) VC gas mask and one (1) K-44 mine or rocket. All the items were evacuated to G-2 Task Force Delta. The Battalion Medical Officer activated a concussion mine attached to a bush approximately 3 feet off the ground. He received leg wounds and the Battalion Commander received missile wounds in the face. Both were evacuated to the BSA at approximately 1330. The Battalion Commander returned to the CP at approximately 1830.
- (y) 21 Feb 66. Companies "E", "F" and Command Group Alpha prepared for helilift from LZ located at BT 217168. Lift was delayed until 1600. Local fan patrols were conducted in GS BT 2116 until time for lift off. Three wounded VN children were treated for missile wounds and were evacuated to BSA on TFD-6 aircraft. One parent accompanied the children as guardian. Approximately 30 lbs of rations were distributed to villagers at BT 215169. The Battalion medical team treated 12 children for skin sores at the same location. Lift of companies commenced at 1600. At 1630 the LZ came under small arms fire and received four (4) rounds of 60mm Mortar rounds. Fire was returned with small arms and air cover by Army UH-1E's. No friendly casualties were received and no results of returned fire could be determined as all elements were lifted out. All elements were in LZ located in GS BT 0226 by 1730. Battalion CP

was established at BT 033266 with Companies "E" and "F" in perimeter defense.

- (z) 22 Feb 66. At 1000 Co "F" received fire from two snipers at BT 036266 killing one (1) sniper, but no weapon was recovered. A cave was discovered during the engagement. It contained tools, VC flag, and VC supply list. All items except the supply list were destroyed. Co "F" destroyed four (4) houses in vicinity of 041262 by burning them. Secondary explosions believed to be grenades and small arms ammo were heard in each case. The villagers indicated that the area had been mined, but the VC had returned earlier and removed them. At 1000 Command Group Alpha came under small arms fire from an estimated four (4) VC snipers at BT 037265. Exchange of fire lasted approximately 30 minutes. Flank security was dispatched to the area of the sniper fire and no further incidents occurred. Battalion CP was established at BT 055274. Seven (7) males, three (3) females and six (6) Vietnamese children requested that our CP assist them in getting to Tam Ky. They had been forced to dig tunnels by the VC and were afraid they would eventually kill them. They were evacuated by the Re-supply helo to ISA. At 2230 Co "F" received one WIA from VC grenade at 048266. WIA evacuated on Task Force Delta's helicopter.
- (aa) 23 Feb 66. Co "F" and Co "E" conducted detailed search and clear operations in GS BT 0527, 0627, 0526, and 0626. No enemy contact. Battalion CP was established at BT 060252.
- (bb) 24 Feb 66. Received Frag Order 144-66 at 0935 to continue search and clear operations. At 1445 we received 12 WIA from a mine explosion at 075240. Nine (9) personnel were evacuated by helicopter that was wounded by the VC mine, included was the Battalion S-3. Command Group Alpha, Co "E" and Co "F" proceeded to new CP location at BT 080244. Co "F" encountered three (3) snipers who withdrew to the South. One (1) friendly WIA from panji stake during pursuit. The mine was possibly an 81mm mortar due to the loudness of detonation and the 12-15 meter burst radius. All WIA's received fragmentation wounds.
- (cc) 25 Feb 66. Command Group Alpha, Co "E", and Co "F" returned to BT 060252 and conducted search and destroy missions throughout the day. Co "F" received two WIA's at BT 076239 from faulty grenade that blew up in one marine's hand before he could throw it. They were in the process of blowing caves and booby-trapped fences. Frag Order 153-66 was received directing us to be prepared to move to the USS Valley Forge by helicopter on 26 February 1966.
- (dd) 26 Feb 66. Fog delayed helilift of Command Group Alpha, Co "E", Co "F" and Co "G" until 1130. The lift was completed at 1300 and CP was aboard the USS Valley Forge. One platoon from Co "G" remained in area to check on possible cave with arms and ammo.

(12) Results Summarized

Casualties - Number of friendly personnel - five (5) KIA - two (2) non-battalio

Prisoners - One (1)

VC Casualties - nine (9) KIA, three (3) probable

Equipment lost or destroyed - None

Apprehensions - 95 apprehended, 53 released

Weapons captured - One (1) russian carbine, one (1) U.S. carbine, one (1) K-50 Chi-Com submachine gun, 17 shotguns, one (1) M-14 w/magazine, and eleven (11) unknown make.

Equipment, material captured or destroyed:

4700 pounds of rice, one (1) M-26 grenade, three (3) homemade grenades, five (5) chinese hand grenades, One (1) cartridge belt w/two (2) magazines, four (4) M-60 barrels, three (3) M-8 barrels, seven (7) sound power phones, five (5) rounds 2.75mm rockets, fifty (50) pounds .50 cal ammd, nineteen (19) entrenching tools, three (3) carbine barrels, twelve (12) machetes, four (4) 60mm mortar rounds, one (1) M-60 trigger mechanism, eight (8) pounds of C-3 explosive.

(13) Administrative Matters(a) Communication problem areas.

1. Battery charging (BB-451) facilities were not available at the BSA and ISA as stated in the operation order. Shore Party was operating some chargers but not enough for an operation this size.
2. The number of batteries (BB-451) in the maintenance float was not sufficient to support all the units in this type of operation.

(b) Recommended solutions are:

1. FLSU or appropriate support units should provide battery chargers and qualified personnel at the ISA.
2. A maintenance float pool of batteries should be established of sufficient size to support the turnover of batteries in an operation of this size.

(c) Other Comments

1. It is felt that in an operation of this type where much of the movement is on foot and all communication equipment has to be manpacked that the antenna RB-292 is best not carried but should be available for delivery by helicopter if the need arises.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(14) Administrative Matters (S-1)

- (a) KIA's and WIA's
KIA - Five (5), two (2) non-battle
WIA - Fifty-one (51), 14 returned to duty
Non-battle casualties - 76, and 39 returned to duty.
- (b) The casualty reporting system was very workable from the battalion's viewpoint. SRB's being located at Chu-Lai created administrative back-log but nothing serious.
- (c) Reports required of the B-1 were manageable but requirement to submit names of casualties in Statistical Casualty Report could have been burdensome if strong VC units had been encountered. It is recommended that Statistical Casualty Report be reduced to twice daily, due to difficulty of submission when battalion is on the move.
- (d) No other problem areas encountered.

W.K. Horn
W.K. HORN

(12) 24 March. While conducting sick call at Hoa Phu Village Headquarters at AT 921724, a nine (9) year old boy Nguyen Trung was brought to the attention of the corpsman. He had a deformed right leg. The boy was brought to the battalion surgeon who in turn brought the boy for further examination to "C" Med. X-rays were taken and plans were begun to have corrective surgery done on the boys leg.

(13) 29 March. While holding sick call at Hoa Phu Village Headquarters at AT 921724, a thirteen (13) year old boy, Huynh-Tinh, was examined. He has a bilateral hair lip. Pertinent facts were obtained and plans were made for further examinations by medical doctors in connection with possible corrective surgery. During the lunch break, three bottles of soda and a bunch of bananas were presented to the corpsmen by the local villagers.

(14) 31 March. The Battalion Chaplain donated twelve (12) 100 lb bags of cement to Nguyen Tien Grang, the pastor of a Christian Church located near Tuy Loan, coordinates AT 946701, to be used in order to finish the construction of his church. Through liaison with the Hieu Duc District Chief the Battalion Civil Affairs Officer was able to obtain seventy bamboo poles ten (10) to fifteen (15) feet in length to be used for communication purposes.

b. Materials Distributed. During the period covered by this report, a total of 6,209 persons received 6,802 treatments from the medical personnel throughout the Battalion TAOR. There were 5,564 pounds of food distributed to 1375 persons, 335 pounds of clothing distributed to 1074 persons, 1986 bars of soap distributed to 1971 persons as well as 3200 pounds of cement distributed to a church.

c. Special Civil Affairs Projects.

(1) Construction of a permanent structure in which to hold sick calls in each village within the Battalion TAOR.

(2) Presentation of selected recreation items, such as volley ball equipment and basketball equipment, to all schools within the Battalion TAOR.

(3) Presentation of concerts by the 3rd Marine Division in selected locations within the Battalion TAOR.

(4) Continued improvement of the medical facilities at the Hieu Duc District Dispensary.

d. Apparent Results of the Civil Affairs Program. All attempts to conduct Civil Affairs activities within this Battalion TAOR have been met with cooperation and gratitude of the Vietnamese people. There have been two occasions on which Marines have received pertinent intelligence information from indigenous persons which would indicate an apparent successful approach being used in the program in effect.

SECRET

PART III

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- Tab - 1. ✓ Journal Sheets
" 2. ✓ Operations Overlay
" 3. After Action Report
" 4. Mine, Booby Trap and Grenade Incident Overlay

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Annex G (Air Support) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 Quang Ngai, Song Tra Khug, Quang Hien, Song Re, My Trang, Ba To, Bien Trung, Series L701, Sheet 6855 III, 6755 I, II, III, IV, 6356 II and III.

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and current INTSUMS.
- b. Friendly Forces. Annex A (Task Organization).

(1) First Marine Aircraft Wing.

2. MISSION. Provide air support for landing force.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. Para 3.a of Operation Order 324-66

b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Attack aircraft will be on station during landings prepared to provide suppression fires, CAS, helicopter escort, and HLZ preparation as required.
- (2) Close air support (CAS) aircraft will be under positive control of either a forward air controller (FAC) or tactical air coordinator airborne (TAC(A)).
- (3) All helicopters will be available for medical evacuation and logistics resupply as situation permits. Medical evacuation request will be on a priority precedence. If casualty is in grave condition, emergency procedure will be used.
- (4) Restrictive fire plans in accordance with NWIP 22-7(A).
- (5) The universal transverse mercator (UTM), military grid reference six (6) digit system of coordinates will be used for target designation.
- (6) Panels marking front lines will be displayed prior to calling air strikes.
- (7) Mark targets for air strikes with white phosphorous if possible.
- (8) Use standard mission request forms for calling missions.

G-1
 G-1

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(9) Helicopter landing zones see Annex D (Operation Overlay)

(10) Unit identification panel markers:

(A) Co E - Orange

(B) Co F - Red

(C) Co G - Green

(D) Co H - Blue

(E) H&S Co - White

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS, Annex J (Logistics)
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS, Annex F (Communications-Electronics)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

C. L. Harrison

C. L. HARRISON
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES

1. Air Schedule For Special Landing Force
2. Air Schedule Notes
3. Air Frequency Plan
4. Air Communications Call Signs

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 324-66

BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

(DOWNGRADED TO SECRET ON D-DAY)

Appendix 1 (Air Schedule For Landing Special Landing Force) to Annex G (Air Support) to Operation Order 324-66

EVENT NO.	MISSION	PROVIDED BY	NUMBER & TYPE A/C	STATION	REPORT ON NET	ENTRY ALTITUDE	REMARKS
21	LZ PREP	1st MAW	4 VA	As Directed	ICEPACK SILVER	ALICE 20,000	RELIEVE ON STATION SEE NOTES 1, 2, & 5 App 3
	HELLO			As	ICEPACK	ALICE	RELIEVE ON STATION
31	ESCORT/CAS	1st MAW	4 VA	Directed	SILVER	22,000	SEE NOTES 1, 2, & 5 App 3
91	TAO/TAC(A)	1st MAW	2 UH1E	Directed	ICEPACK SILVER	ALICE 2,000	TO CONTROL 21 and 31
101	TROOP LIFT	CTU 79.5.3	4 UH34	Directed	FAIRMONT IVORY	1500'	PENSACOLA SHUTTLE TO COMPLETION SEE NOTES 3 & 4 App 3
102	TROOP LIFT	CTU 79.5.3	4 UH34	As Directed	FAIRMONT IVORY	1500'	PENSACOLA SHUTTLE TO COMPLETION SEE NOTES 3 & 4 App 3
103	TROOP LIFT	CTU 79.5.3	4 UH34	As Directed	FAIRMONT IVORY	1500'	PENSACOLA SHUTTLE TO COMPLETION SEE NOTES 3 & 4 App 3
104	TROOP LIFT	CTU 79.5.3	4 UH34	As Directed	FAIRMONT IVORY	1500'	PENSACOLA SHUTTLE TO COMPLETION SEE NOTES 3 & 4 App 3
	MED/FW			As	FAIRMONT	PENSACOLA	
105	EVAC	CTU 79.5.3	2 UH34	Directed	IVORY	1500'	SEE NOTE App 3

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Appendix 2 (Aircraft Schedule Notes) to Annex G (Air Support) to
 Operation Order 324-66

1. Altitude specified for this event is for jet aircraft.
2. Be prepared to neutralize landing zone in the event opposition is encountered. Revert to Cond IV upon completion of troop lift and be prepared to cover withdrawal.
3. Events 101, 102, 103, and 104 will be prepared for backloading on order.
4. All helicopters will be available for medical evacuation as situation permits.
5. TAC(A), when controlling fixed wing CAS aircraft on strikes within the AOA must be in radio contact with FSCC, when established, in order to permit coordination of all supporting arms.

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (IPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Appendix 4 (Air Communications Call Signs) to Annex G (Air Support)
 to Operation. Order 324-66

	<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>COLLECTIVE</u>
TACC	ICEPACK	
TADC	JOYRIDE	
HDG	FAIRMONT	
CTG 76.6	NATALIE	IDIENESS
CTU 76.6.1	TEEMARK	EXPEDITION
CTU 76.6.2	BRUISER	TWO FOLD
CTG 79.5	HEARSAY	POSITIVE
CTU 79.5.1	MISS PORTER	MODEL CITY
CTU 79.5.2	SWEET REWARD	REFORM
CTU 79.5.3	TANDEM	TEXAS SCORE
CTU 79.5.4	WATER LEVEL	PAPA BEAR
IPH-8 VALLEY FORGE	BEARCAT	
APA-212 MONTROSE	EXPERT I	
LSD-35 MONTICELLO	CASHBOOK V	
APA-248 PAUL REVERE	CEDAR F	
LSD-17 CATAMOUNT	WARFIELD W	
AKA-105	CASINO Y	
APA-215 NAVARO	FORFEIT G	
HMM 362	CLIP CLOP	
TACPS		
LST-1159 TOM GREEN COUNTY	GENUINE T	
LST-1170 WINDHAM COUNTY	AGELESS W	

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CIG-8 TOPEKA

LION HEART

CIG-5 OKLAHOMA CITY

FIREBALL

DD-933 BARRY

SILVER ACE

BLT 3/1

COURTHOUSE

BLT 2/3

OLDFIELD

BLT 2/4

SUDDEN DEATH

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Annex H (Naval Gunfire Support) to Operation Order 324-66

- Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Quang Ngai, Song Tra Khue, Quang Hien, Song Re, My Trang, Ba To, Bien Troung, Series L701, Sheets 6755 I, II, III, IV, 6756 II, III, Sheets 6855 III.
 (b) CTG 70.8 OpOrder 307-65 (Gun 9)
 (c) CTG 70.8 Msg 022235Z January 1966

Time Zone: Hotel

TASK ORGANIZATION

TU 76.6.3 Gunfire Support and Screen Unit
 USS BARRY DD933
 USS TOPEKA
 USS OKLAH MA CITY

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and current ISUMS.
 b. Friendly Forces. CG 1st MAW provides CAS.

2. MISSION. Conduct Naval Gunfire Support of the Landing Force during surface and helicopterborne landings, subsequent operations ashore, and withdrawal.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. DD 933. Direct Support BLT 3/1
 b. USS Topeka (CLG-8) and USS Oklahoma City (CLG-5) in direct support of BLT 2/4.
 c. Coordinating Instructions.
- (1) For fire support areas and stations; See Appendix 2 to Annex G to CTG 76.6 OpOrder 304-66.
 - (2) All NGF missions be observed call fire missions to insure positive identification of targets.
 - (3) All call fire missions be coordinated by SACC until control is passed ashore to Task Force Delta.
 - (4) NGF Spotters will keep NGF ships informed of location of friendly front lines at all times.

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- (5) Safety Measures.
- (a) VP fuzes will not be employed where the line of fire passes over friendly troops, landing craft or in the vicinity of aircraft.
 - (b) Safety limits for fires NWIP 22-2, FMFM 7-2.
 - (c) Restrictive fire plans in accordance with Annex I (Fire Support Coordination) and NWIP 22-7(A).
- (6) SFCP establish radio communications with direct support ships as soon as practicable after H-Hour.
- (7) Priority of attack of targets in accordance with article L 75, NWIP 22-2.
- (8) All fire in helicopter routes will be observed to insure helicopter safety unless a restrictive fire plan is in effect.
- (9) The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM Military Grid reference) six (6) digit system of coordinates will be used for target designation.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Details of ammunition replenishment if required will be published.
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 324-66.

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BLT 2/3
USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
250900H January 1966

Appendix 1 (ICF Communication) to Annex H (Naval Gunfire Support) to Operation Order 324-66

CIRCUIT NUMBER	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
CIRCUIT USE	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	PRIMARY	PRIMARY	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
MISSION (ALL USA)	ICF CONTROL	ICF CONTROL	SFC SPOT 1	SFC SPOT 2	SFC SPOT 2	SFC 2
REF U. ICGY	3A3J	3A3J	2A3J	3A2J	2A3J	3A3J
	3179 KCS	2324 KCS	4201 KCS	2233 KCS	2760 KCS	2812 KCS

UNIT	VOIC	C	LL	SIGN
CTG 78.6	R FALLIE	C (1)	C (1)	(2)
DD 933	SILVER ACE	X	0	0
CG 3	LION HEART	X	0	0
3/1 ICF LmC	COURT HOUSE	X	0	0
	26 OSCAR			
3/1 ICF SPOT Tm 1	COURT HOUSE 26		X	0
	CHARLIE ONE			
3/1 ICF SPOT Tm 2	COURT HOUSE 26		X	0
	CHARLIE TWO			
2/4 ICF LmC	SUDDEN DEATH	X	0	0
	26 OSCAR			
2/4 ICF SPOT Tm 1	SUDDEN DEATH		X	0
	26 CHARLIE ONE			
2/4 ICF SPOT Tm 2	SUDDEN DEATH		X	0
	26 CHARLIE TWO			

LEGEND:

C - NET CONTROL

X - GUARD

● - NET CONTROL TO GUARD

M - MONTOR

(1) NET CONTROL UNTIL PASS 0130G, MONTOR THEREAFTER

(2) CONTROL TIME UTILIZED

H-1-1

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BLT 2/3

USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
250800H January 1966

Annex I (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: 1:50,000 Quang Ngai, Song Tra Khue, Quang Hien, Song Re, My Trang, Ba To, Bien Troung, Series L701, Sheets E855 III, 6755 I, II, III, IV, 6756 EII, 6756 II.

(b) NWTP 22-7A

(c) LFM 22

(d) FMFM 7-4

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and current INTSUM'Sb. Friendly Forces.

(1) Annex G (Air Support)

(2) Annex H (Naval Gunfire Support)

2. MISSION. Commencing when command is passed to the shore, FSCC will coordinate the supporting arms available to BLT 2/3.3. EXECUTION.a. Concept of Employment.

(1) Fire support coordination afloat will be coordinated and controlled by SACC. Beaches and landing zones will not be prepared unless required and, if required, CAS and NGF missions will be controlled by TAC(A) or airborne spotters. All fire missions must be coordinated by FSCC. Subsequent CAS and NGF missions will be under positive control of FAC or SFCP.

(2) Fire support coordination ashore will be in accordance with references (b), (c), and (d). Battalion FSCC will coordinate with Task Force Delta when that headquarters establishes ashore.

4. TARGET INFORMATION.

a. Fire planning will be initiated by Company Commanders in coordination with respective FO's. Concentrations should be planned on suspected enemy positions, prominent terrain features and avenues of approach.

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- b. Targets of opportunity will be passed immediately to the unit in whose sector the target appears.
- c. Restricted Targets.
 - (1) Every effort will be made to preserve religious buildings, shrines, museums, hospitals, public utilities, population centers, railroads, highways, bridges, tunnels and medical facilities.
 - (2) Destruction of restricted targets is prohibited except on approval of CATF or CLF, or when failure to destroy would jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission of the BLT prior to receipt of approval.
 - (3) Restricted targets destroyed will be reported immediately to this headquarters.
- d. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) In the event of a fire mission within 600 meters of friendly troops or personnel, "creeping fire" will be utilized by the adjusting FO.
 - (2) If a defensive situation exists, barrages and close night defensive fires will be fired prior to darkness, (time permitting).
 - (3) Overlays for night defensive fire plans must contain the coordinates of the desired concentration and be submitted to the Bn S-3 no later than 1200 hours for that particular day.
 - (4) Patrol overlays must be submitted to the Bn S-3 24 hours prior to execution of said patrol. Overlays must also contain the following information; TOD, TOA, check points and a fire support plan.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY.

- a. Air Sentries and Lookouts.
 - (1) Air sentries will be positioned at artillery firing units, and on Naval Gunfire Support ships, and will check fire when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.
 - (2) Forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will check fire when it appears that the trajectory of artillery, mortar, or naval gunfire will endanger friendly aircraft.

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- (3) Unless special coordination measures are prescribed, fires on helicopter lanes in use are restricted to observed fires where the observer is capable of ensuring the safety of the helicopters using the lane.

b. Restricted Fire Plans

- (1) When possibility of massed naval gunfire and artillery exists and may endanger a simultaneous air mission, a restrictive fire plan will be employed and the code word is VICTOR.
- (2) Units requesting an air support mission will recommend the restrictive fire plan if required.

6. SAFETY GROUND FIRES.

- a. No Fire Line. Company Commanders in coordination with artillery forward observers, will recommend no fire lines in their zones of action. Original NFL's and changed will be reported by the safest means available to the SACC. Reports will include coordinates and date-time-group effective.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.

- a. Annex F (Communication-Electronics)

b. Command Posts

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| (1) Afloat | |
| ATF (TG 76.6) SACC | USS PAUL REVERE (APA-248) |
| LF (TG 79.5) | USS PAUL REVERE (APA-248) |
| BLT 2/3 | USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8) |
- (2) Ashore. (To be announced)

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Annex J (Logistics) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) BnO 4000.4B (SOP for Logistics)

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. SUPPLY.

a. General.

- (1) Supplies to be landed will be sufficient to accomplish initial mission with emphasis on traveling light.
- (2) Supply Sources.
 - (a) Prescribed loads to be drawn from BLT 2/3 Supply aboard USS Valley Forge (LPH-8).
 - (b) While ashore - all classes of supplies to be obtained from the Beach Support Area (BSA).
 - (c) Sufficient "On Call" supplies will be prepared and staged aboard the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8), positioned and ready for helicopter lift to area of operations on on D-Day. (See Appendix 1 (On-call supplies)).
- (3) Prescribed Loads.
 - (a) Class I.
 1. Meal, Combat, Individual - 1 day
 2. Fuel, trioxane bar - 1 day
 2. Salt tablets - 100 tablets per individual
 - (b) Class II.
 1. Individual's combat essential T/E equipment.
 2. Dry cell batteries - 2 days
 - (c) Class V. - One (1) B/A
 - (d) Water.
 1. Two filled canteens per individual
 2. Halizone tablets - 100 tablets per individual

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3. Twenty five (25) filled five gallon water cans per company.

4. Two (2) lister bags per company

(e) Medical.

1. Medical personnel will each carry a Surgical Instrument and Supply Set, Individual (Unit One).

2. Complete basic outfit. (IOL)

b. Control and Distribution.

(1) Control.

(a) Ship-to-Shore Movement.

1. See Annex C (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 324-66.

2. BLT 2/3 TACLOG will be established aboard the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8). TACLOG will consist of the following representatives and function in accordance with reference (a):

a. BLT Embarkation Officer

b. S-3 Representative

c. Radio Operator

3. BLT 2/3 TACLOG to be established when directed and will function until ordered to terminate.

(b) BLT 2/3 Supply Officer retains custody and control of supplies until issued to unit commanders.

(c) When directed, BLT 2/3 Supply Officer and his representatives will report to the Officer-in-Charge of the BSA to function in matters pertaining to BLT 2/3 resupply.

(d) Every effort will be made to insure supplies are safeguarded against damage by the elements, destruction or capture by enemy action, and/or pilferage or wasted by friendly units.

(2) Distribution.

(a) Unit distribution to all forward units of BLT 2/3.

(b) Supply point distribution to all other units.

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c. Resupply.

- (1) Two (2) UH-34D helicopters are assigned to BLT 2/3 for the purpose of resupply.
- (2) Requests for resupply will be submitted to the BLT 3-4 at least six (6) hours in advance of the anticipated need. The primary method of requesting resupply is by messengers. An alternate method is the use of the battalion tactical net.
- (3) Emergency resupply will be reacted to expeditiously.
- (4) Requests for all supplies will include:
 - (a) Unit Location (coordinates)
 - (b) LZ designator
 - (c) How LZ will be marked. (color of panels; color of smoke to be used)
 - (d) Commodity and the amount required. If practical request to the nearest whole case.
- (5) Every effort will be made to alert the unit requesting resupply when it is known that supplies are airborne and enroute to unit LZ.

d. Captured Material.

- (1) All units report type, quantity, condition and location of captured material to this headquarters.
- (2) Units will mark material with time and date of capture.
- (3) Use of captured material is prohibited until reissued by this headquarters or higher echelon.
- (4) Material having intelligence value - See Annex E (Intelligence) to Operation Order 324-66.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION. See Appendix 2 (Medical)

3. TRANSPORTATION.

- a. Ocean. See Embarkation Order 201-65.
- b. Highway. No organic or attached vehicles will be landed.
- c. Air. See Annex G (Air Support)

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4. SERVICE.a. Functions

- (1) Maintenance - Unit Commanders stress the importance of 1st echelon maintenance on all ordnance and communications equipment. 2nd and 3rd echelons of maintenance will be performed by the appropriate service organizations within the BLT.
- (2) Salvage
 - (a) When directed, one BLT Supply representative will report to the Salvage Dump of the BSA for matters pertaining to BLT 2/3 salvage.
 - (b) All units report type, quantity, condition and location of salvage material to this headquarters.
 - (c) Downed aircraft, friendly or enemy, will be placed under guard, and the location reported to this headquarters.
 - (d) Salvage consisting of enemy supplies and equipment is strictly prohibited for use by units until evacuated and evaluated for intelligence purposes by this headquarters and higher echelon.

b. Assignment of Responsibilities.(1) Detachment, 1st Service Battalion

- (a) Provide 3rd echelon maintenance as required.
- (b) Establish contact teams for ordnance and communications repair in the event immediate repairs are required in forward areas.
- (c) Provide representation aboard USS Valley Forge (LPH-8) in the event it is necessary to withdraw mount-out stock.

(2) Detachment, 1st Shore Party Battalion

- (a) Provide Shore Party support in helicopter landing zones.

(3) Detachment, Coll Plt., Co "A", 3rd Med Bn

- (a) Provide medical support as directed by the Battalion Surgeon.

5. PERSONNEL. See Annex N (Personnel)6. Miscellaneous.a. Uniform and equipment for debarkation.

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- (1) Uniform - Utilities w/field boots
- (2) Equipment
 - (a) Normal arms and equipment
 - (b) Light marching pack w/entrenching tool (include one change of clothes with extra socks.
 - (c) Body Armor
 - (d) Poncho
 - (e) Helmet w/camouflage cover (green side out)

b. Special Instructions.

- (1) While ashore, ensure that all personal effects remaining aboard ship are secured under lock and key to prevent their loss.
- (2) Security of all supplies and equipment remaining aboard ship will be provided by H&S Company.
- (3) Information concerning the distribution of ammunition will be published separately.
- (4) Requests for resupply of ammunition should be based on actual ammunition expenditure. If this is not controlled, the mobility of the unit is impaired.
- (5) Used batteries will be destroyed completely to prevent possible reuse by enemy forces.
- (6) Maximum utilization of helicopter space should be attained. Never allow a helicopter to return to the BSA or the LPH empty if at all possible.
- (7) Lister bags should be kept full. Empty water cans should be returned to the water point as soon as possible.
- (8) Reports - See Annex M (Reports) to Operation Order 324-66.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

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APPENDIXES:

1 -- On-call Supplies

2 -- Medical

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 324-66

J-6

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Appendix I (On-Call Supplies) to Annex J (Logistics) to Operation
 Order 324-66

Time Zone: Hctol (-8)

1. The following On-Call Supplies will be prepared and staged aboard the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8), positioned and ready for helicopter lift into the area of operations on D-Day. All helicopter lifts will be INTERNAL.

MCI's w/hoat	200 cases
Water (5 gal. can)	100 cans filled
Ammunition	
7.62 ball A-130	20 cases
7.62 linked A-127	10 cases
Gren. Hand Frag G890	4 cases
81mm HE C-222	30 cases
81mm Illum	10 cases
3.5 Heat H-600	10 cases
3.5 WP H-602	5 cases
Demo Kit M37 M-756	5 cases
Bangalore torp. M-026	4 each
Mine AP Claymore K-143	10 each
Gren. Hand CS-1 G-963	4 cases
Flare, Surf. Trip L-495	5 cases
Batteries	
BA-279	24 cases
BA-270	18 cases
BA-414	6 cases
BA-30	2 cases

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Appendix 2 (Medical) to Annex J (Logistics) to Operation Order 324-66

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. ORGANIZATION

a. Battalion Medical Personnel

- (1) Medical Officers - 2
- (2) Enlisted Hospital Corpsman - 49
 - (a) Battalion Aid Station (H&S Co) - 17
 - (b) "E" Company - 8
 - (c) "F" Company - 8
 - (d) "G" Company - 8
 - (e) "H" Company - 8

b. Detachment, Collection Platoon, Company "C", 3rd Medical Battalion

c. Attached unit Corpsman

2. MISSION

a. Battalion Medical Platoon

- (1) Emergency treatment and preparation for evacuation.

b. Detachment, Collection Platoon, Company "C", 3rd Medical Battalion

- (1) Collect casualties from BAS and transfer them to shore and landing zone evacuation stations or to clearing stations.

3. SANITATION AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

a. Sanitation

- (1) Maximum sanitary discipline commensurate with the conditions at the time will be assured by all unit commanders.
- (2) All water considered contaminated
 - (a) Iodine water purification tablets issued.
 - (b) Iodine drops available for resupply.

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b. Preventive Medicine

- (1) Routine plague and Gamma Globulin immunizations have been accomplished.
- (2) Poisonous and dangerous fish, animals, reptiles:
 - (a) Poisonous fish (if eaten): Spiny Burrfish, Etaurine Puffer, Forest's Barracuda, Trigger Fish, Great Barracuda.
 - (b) Venomous fish (if bitten): Scorpion Fish, New Guinea Puffer, Sting Rays, Eagle Rays.
 - (c) Aggressive Fish: Estaurine Puffer, Blocky Puffer, several species of sharks, Barracuda and Grouper, sometimes the Moray Eel.
 - (d) Other dangerous fish: Lumpy Surgeon Fish, Jelly fish, four species of Venomous cone shell, Sea Snakes, Estaurine Crocodile.
- (3) Malaria Prophylaxis
 - (a) Mosquito repellent and netting supply available has been issued.
 - (b) Chlorquine Premaquine Phosphate tablets issued to each individual (4).
- (4) Special Medical Problems
 - (a) Heat casualties: Adequate salt and water intake emphasized
 - (b) Immersion Foot: Maintenance of dry feet and daily stocking change when possible emphasized.

4. EVACUATION

a. Movement

- (1) Casualties during shipboard phase will be evacuated as directed by the CLF.
- (2) Health of all embarked personnel is the responsibility of the ships Medical Officer.
- (3) Embarked BLT medical personnel will provide assistance to the ships medical staff, as required.

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b. Assault Phase

- (1) Ship to shore: Casualties will remain aboard landing craft.
- (2) Helicopter to shore: Casualties remain aboard helicopter.
- (3) Ashore
 - (a) Casualties on the beach will be evacuated to the forward BAS by stretcher.
 - (b) Casualties in the helicopter landing zone will be evacuated to the BAS by stretcher.

c. Evacuation Policy

- (1) Casualties requiring hospitalization will be transferred from the BAS directly to the primary hospital ship, USS Valley Forge, by helicopter.
- (2) Once the C&C Company has been established at the base support area, all casualties will proceed there for transfer to the primary hospital ship, USS Valley Forge, for triage by the CECO and treatment.

d. Casualty Overload

- (1) When casualty overload exist at BAS, assistance will be requested.
- (2) Casualties will be classified and treated in the following order:
 - (a) Minimal: Those requiring minimal treatment to fit for duty.
 - (b) Immediate: Those requiring immediate treatment to save life or limb.
 - (c) Delayed: Those capable of having treatment delayed for a period of up to 12 hours without hazzard to life or limb.
 - (d) Expectant: Those which are moribund or who cannot reasonable be expected to survive with treatment.
- (3) Casualties will be reclassified as condition indicates.
- (4) Casualties classified as minimal may be used to the extent practicable to assist in collection and evacuation of other casualties.

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(5) Casualties will be evacuated in the following order of priority:

(a) Immediate

(b) Delayed

(c) Minimal

(d) Expectant

5. HOSPITALIZATION

a. Civilians wounded in action will be treated at civilian collection point.

b. POW's will be treated at POW compound.

6. MEDICAL SUPPLY

a. Battalion Aid Station

(1) Basic supply plus ten days medical supplies.

(2) All corpsmen will carry individual Unit One's.

(3) Jungle kit components provided from medical sources at the discretion of the BLT Commander.

(4) Medical material for resupply of individual Unit One's will be provided at BAS.

7. MEDICAL ADMINISTRATION

a. BAS will be divided into two sections:

(1) BAS Forward: Battalion surgeon and assistant battalion surgeon and nine corpsmen.

(2) BAS Rear: LPH-8 Seven corpsmen

b. Collecting platoon 7 corpsmen

c. LPH-8: Surgical team, 2 ships medical officers

d. Location of the BAS forward, and the collecting platoon as designated by BLT Commander

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BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

C. L. Harrison

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Annex K (Withdrawal Plan) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Quang Ngai, Song Tra Khuc,
 Quang Hien, Song Re, My Trang, Ba To, Bien Trong,
 Series L701, Sheets 6755 I, II, III,
 IV, 6756 II, III, Sheets 6855 III

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) See Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 324-66.

2. MISSION. To conduct a tactical withdrawal of BLT 2/3 when ordered.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of the Withdrawal

(1) When ordered, BLT 2/3 will conduct a tactical withdrawal from the designated landing zone, to the Valley Forge or to BSA for subsequent transfer to assigned shipping.

(2) The withdrawal will be executed in accordance with the following schedule:

(a) Command Group B.

(b) Service support elements.

(c) Two (2) rifle companies (to be designated)

(d) Hq elements and CP security.

(e) Command Group A.

(f) Two (2) sections of the 81mm mortar plt.

(g) One (1) rifle company (to be designated).

(h) One (1) section of the 81mm mortar plt.

(i) Last rifle company reinforced with one (1) section of the 81mm mortar plt.


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b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) W-Hour will be announced.
- (2) Withdrawal will be covered by NGF and CAS under control of SACC.
- (3) All radios will remain on their respective nets until granted permission to secure. Request permission immediately prior to enplaning.
- (4) In the event casualties are sustained during the withdrawal, casualty will be removed directly to the landing site for evacuation on the first available helicopter. Evacuation of casualties takes priority over withdrawal of troops. Insure that **proper** casualty reporting procedures are followed.
- (5) While awaiting withdrawal, troops in the vicinity of the landing zone will remain concealed, disbursed and alert.
- (6) Withdrawal will commence on order.
- (7) Each unit notify CO BLT 2/3 upon completion of withdrawal.
- (8) Once aboard LPH-8, units will remain in a combat ready condition until ordered to stand down.

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BLT 2/3
 USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
 250800H January 1966

Annex I. (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Quang Ngai, Song Tra Khue, Quang Hien, Song Re, My Trang, Ba To, Bien Troung, Series L701, Sheets 6755 I, II, III, IV, 6756 II, III, Sheet 6855 III

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. GENERAL.

- a. Nothing shall infringe on the inherent right of the individual Marine to defend himself against hostile attack. In the event of such attack, the individual concerned may take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force with any means available.
- b. In cases where defensive fire is undertaken, care will be exercised to insure that friendly or innocent personnel are not endangered.
- c. In a situation where light fire is received from a populated area, every effort will be made to identify the exact target before engagement.
- d. A recent MACV directive prohibits the destruction of livestock and dwellings in VC controlled areas as a denial procedure. This is to be left to RVNAF units. Request by Vietnamese authorities for employment of U. S. Forces to destroy Vietnamese property, including livestock, will be referred to Headquarters MACV for the personal decision of COMUSMACV.

2. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- a. Unit commanders may direct fire when:
 - (1) They observe and positively identify a person or persons as enemy.
 - (2) Fire is being delivered on friendly troops.
 - (3) Personnel are attempting, by hasty or suspicious acts, obviously to avoid contact with friendly forces.
 - (4) Requested fire by friendly Vietnamese Commanders after approval from appropriate RVNAF officials.

3. INFANTRY WEAPONS (LESS MORTARS)

- a. Forward of the Perimeter or MLR as appropriate

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- (1) Magazines will be inserted in weapons.
 - (2) Rounds will not be chambered unless contact with the enemy has been made, or if, in the opinion of the senior Marine present, contact is imminent. (Exceptions: In the case of ambushes, lay-outs and listening posts, rounds may be chambered prior to contact with the enemy at the discretion of the senior Marine present.
 - (3) Every reasonable effort will be made to identify the person (s) as VC before firing. Any person committing a hostile act or who otherwise presents a threat to the lives of friendly forces shall be regarded as VC.
 - (4) In order to avoid jeopardizing friendly troops, the location and movement schedule of friendly forces operating in close proximity must be promulgated.
 - (5) In order to avoid unfortunate incidents with friendly indigenous personnel, liaison will be maintained with local Vietnamese Officials.
- b. On the Perimeter or MLR
- (1) Magazines will be inserted only when actually manning the perimeter or MLR positions, when under attack or outside the limits of secure areas, i.e., beyond effective small arms range of areas occupied and controlled by friendly forces.
 - (2) Rounds will not be chambered unless contact has been made, or thought to have been made. (Exception: Rounds may be chambered when manning listening posts).
- c. To the Rear of the Perimeter or MLR
- (1) Extreme care must be exercised due to the high concentration of friendly forces, relative inexperience of personnel in dealings with VC and the probable density of indigenous personnel. Frequent periods of instruction must be conducted in order to insure absolute compliance with these instructions by personnel in a highly sensitive rear areas.
 - (2) Magazines may be inserted only when:
 - (a) Actually standing CP or Perimeter security or on duty as an interior guard sentry at night.
 - (b) When under attack.

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- (c) Outside the limits of secure areas, i.e., beyond effective small arms range of areas controlled and occupied by friendly forces.
- (3) Rounds will not be chambered unless contact with the enemy has been made, or is thought to have been made.
- (4) Absolute identification of a person (s) as a VC is imperative before firing. The sequence of engagement in rear areas will be:
 - (a) At night:
 - 1. Challenge.
 - 2. If there is no response to the challenge or the response is incorrect, the area will be illuminated.
 - 3. If the person (s) challenged opens fire or commits any other hostile act and thereby endangers the lives of friendly forces, the challenger may load and fire. The senior Marine present may set aside the requirement of illumination if such action is obviously required to protect the lives of friendly troops. Do not fire on unidentified persons who appear to be avoiding apprehension and who are not committing an act which directly endangers the lives of friendly troops.
 - (b) Daytime:
 - 1. Identify as VC or VCS
 - 2. Attempt to apprehend or capture.
 - 3. Load and fire if a hostile act is committed or if a VC captive attempts to escape.

4. INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS

- a. All preplanned fires will be approved by this Headquarters.
- b. All non-observed fires must be approved by this Headquarters. If practicable and appropriate the unit requesting such fires will obtain clearance from the appropriate district headquarters prior to submitting the request.

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- c. All Naval Gunfire (including H&I fires) must be observed by Naval Gunfire Spot Tm, NOA or FO.
- d. Emergency fire against any target may be initiated by the Battalion Commanding Officer if a delay involved creates undue hazard to Marines.

5. AIR

- a. The same general rules apply for the use of aviation delivered ordnance as for indirect fire weapons. An FAC or TAC(A) will control all CAS missions.

6. RESTRICTED TARGETS

- a. The following restricted targets will not be taken under fire without the express approval of this command, unless in the opinion of the Company Commander, an emergency fire situation pertains.
 - (1) Populated or built up areas.
 - (2) Temples, churches, or shrines or other religious structures.
 - (3) Hospitals or medical facilities.
 - (4) Public installations.
- b. In the event any of the above listed restricted targets are fired upon, an immediate spot report will be made to this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HORN

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Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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BLT 2/3
USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
250800H January 1966

Annex M (Reports) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: LF (TG 79.5) Operation Order 324-66

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

1. To HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

Subject	Orig	Part to	Freq	Rmks	Refs
Pers Rpt	S-1	CTG 79.5 or as directed	As directed	Prepare Daily	
Casualty Rpt	S-1	As directed	As required		MCO P5000.3 CG 3dMarDivO 3040.2A
Isuns	S-2	CTG 79.5	H+4 and every 6hrs thereafter		See Annex B
Spot Rpt	S-2	CTG 79.5	As required		See Annex B
Sit Rpt	S-3	CTG 79.5	Every 4 hrs commencing at H+2		
Rpts Req By CG III MAF	TBA	TBA	TBA		
After Action Rpts	S-3	CTG 79.5		Submit 5 days after completion of OPs to include up to the time OPCON passed to TZ Delta	

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2. FROM SUBORDINATE UNITS

Subject	Orig	Rpt To	Freq	Remarks	Refs
Pers Strengths	Co & Btry	S-1	Daily as of 0700 by 1000 commencing H-Day	Include all Detachm. separately	See Annex N
Casualties	Co & Btry	S-1	Immediately upon Occurrence	By Fastest means of Comm. possible	See Annex N
Spot Rpts	Co & Btry	S-3/S-2	Upon Occurrence		BnO 3800.1C
Sit Rpt	Co & Btry	S-3	Commence H+2 and every 4 hrs thereafter		Format
Deadline Equip	Co & Btry	S-4	As Occurs	Immediately	

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BIT 2/3

USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)

250800Z January 1966

ANNEX N (Personnel) to Operation Order 324-66

Ref: None

1. STRENGTHS.

a. Units will debark for operations with appropriate strengths such as to provide maximum combat efficiency in accordance with Annex A.

b. Personnel Reports

(1) Daily effective strength reports will be submitted daily by 1000 as of 0700. Include all attachments and list Officer/Enlisted and USMC/USN separately. The first report will be submitted on D-Day. (No Change Reports are appropriate.)

2. REPLACEMENTS. None Anticipated

3. PRISONERS OF WAR. Handled in accordance with paragraph 4a of Annex B. Units can anticipate holding VCC/VCS until evacuation to the USS SKAGIT (APA 105) or BSA can be accomplished.

4. CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

a. Civil action will include all measures taken for the purpose of gaining the support of the local populace. This may include emergency medical treatment, distribution of food and medical supplies.

b. Provisions of Annex L (Rules of Engagement) apply.

c. Civilians are not to be employed.

d. All captured rice in significant amounts that has not been contaminated by the VC will be salvaged and returned to the BSA. If it is physically or tactically impossible to evacuate the rice, permission will be requested to destroy the rice or site. Such action will be reported with a detailed account of circumstances preventing recovery.

5. CASUALTY REPORTING.

a. Upon occurrence units will report battle casualties according to the following format.

(1) Last Name, Service Number, KIA/MIA/WIA

(2) Location of Occurrence (i.e. Quang Ngai City)

(3) Type of wound (Specify how wound inflicted and exact location of wound i.e. missile wound, upper right thigh)

N-1

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- (4) Time/Date (of wound infliction)
- (5) Present Location of Body /Casulties
- (6) Type Evacuation requested (Or has been evacuated)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN

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CTF 79.5	2
CO HMM 362	2
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CO Mtr Btry 3/12	2
2ndPlt "A" Co 3d TksBn	1
2ndPlt "A" Co 3d ATBn	1
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