

220366

HEADQUARTERS
4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3:JCL:alb
3480

JUN 5 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology, May 1966

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1

4TH MARINES (REIN)
S&C FILES

660272

COPY 2 OF 7 COPIES

Encl: (1) Command Chronology, 4th Mar (-) (Rein)
(2) Command Chronology, 1st Bn, 4th Mar
(3) Command Chronology, 2d Bn, 4th Mar
(4) Command Chronology, 3d Bn, 4th Mar
(5) Command Chronology, Recon Gru B

(6) Combat After Action Report (Operation Wayne), (3), (4),
1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1), (2), (3), (4),
and (5) are submitted.

(7) Msg 301615 Z Subj: Frag Order 21-66 (Operation Reno)

2. Company A, 3d Shore Party Battalion, Company B, 3d Engineer Bn,
Company B, 3d Antitank Bn, Company C, 3d Tank Battalion, FMF and
Company C, 3d Motor Transport Bn, submitted negative reports perti-
nent to lessons learned and problems encountered.

3. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines submitted their report to 1st Marines,
and 3d Battalion 12th Marines submitted their report to 12th Marines.

D. W. Sherman
D. W. SHERMAN

UNCLASSIFIED

4th Marines
May 1966

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Enclosure (1)

SECTION I
 ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
 4th Marines (-) (Rein)
 PHU BAI, VIETNAM
 COMMAND POST (YD 885134)

COMMANDING OFFICER
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 S-1/ADJUTANT
 S-2 OFFICER

COLONEL D. W. SHERMAN
 LT COLONEL W. F. DYROFF
 FIRST LIEUTENANT E.L. KRATCOSKI
 MAJOR R. R. DARRON
 1 - 15 MAY 1966

S-3 OFFICER
 S-4 OFFICER
 COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
 ARTILLERY LIAISON OFFICER
 AIR LIAISON OFFICER
 NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON OFFICER
 REGIMENTAL SURGEON
 CO, HQ CO, 4TH MARINES
 CO, 1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
 CO, 2ND BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
 CO, 1ST BATTALION, 4TH MARINES
 CO, 2ND BATTALION, 4TH MARINES
 30 - 31 MAY 1966
 CO, 3RD BATTALION, 4TH MARINES
 CO, 3RD BATTALION, 12TH MARINES
 CO, RECONNAISSANCE GROUP "B"

MAJOR O. R. EDMONDSON
 16 - 31 MAY 1966
 MAJOR D. J. FULHAM
 MAJOR J. HASKINS
 MAJOR W. E. HOUSE
 MAJOR H. C. SOMMERVILLE
 MAJOR T. L. GRIFFIN
 LIEUTENANT E. J. O'SULLIVAN, USN
 LIEUTENANT J. T. MALONE, USN (MC)
 CAPTAIN E. W. BESCH
 LT COLONEL V. D. BELL, JR.
 LT COLONEL R. T. HANNIFIN, JR.
 LT COLONEL R. E. SULLIVAN
 LT COLONEL P. X. KELLEY

CO, CO "B", 3D MT BATTALION

LT COLONEL S. A. VALE
 LT COLONEL L. L. PAGE
 CAPTAIN S. L. OWENS
 1 - 12 MAY 1966
 MAJOR D. A. COLBY
 13 - 31 MAY 1966
 CAPTAIN J. J. MC DERMOTT

GENERAL SUPPORT

CO, CO "B", 3D ENGR BATTALION

1STLT J. M. HENNESSY

DIRECT SUPPORT

CO, CO "A" 3D SP BATTALION
 CO, CO "B" 3D AT BATTALION
 CO, CO "C" 3D TK BATTALION

MAJOR D. E. BENSTEAD
 CAPTAIN D.C. SATCHEL
 MAJOR E. L. ERICKSON
 1 - 28 MAY 1966
 CAPTAIN S. H. GREY
 29 - 31 MAY 1966

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SECTION XI

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 - 31 May 1966

Personnel - Administration

1. Personnel

a. Average monthly strength:

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1-24 May 66	163	4744	16	245
25-31 May 66	103	3074	11	163

b. Battle and Non-Battle Casualties:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>BATTLE</u>		<u>SERIOUS</u>	<u>NON-BATTLE</u>	
		<u>DOW</u>	<u>WIA</u>		<u>DEATH</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1-31 May 66	32	0	140	0	0	172

c. Rotation during month: 387

d. Replacements received:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
7	391	398

e. Personnel Summary:

(1) Serious personnel shortages of both officer and enlisted personnel persists. Officer shortage is becoming more acute.

2. Staff studies and estimates: None

3. Local Newspapers: None

4. Photographs: None

5. Journals:

Appended hereto. → see separate S-1 Section, which also contains orig. of this Sect.

6. Discipline, Courts-martial and Office Hours:

a. Courts-martial:

- (1) General: None
- (2) Special: Three
- (3) Summary: Ten
- (4) Office Hours: Fifteen

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7. Morale, PX, Postal Affairs, Liberty and R&I

a. Morale continues to remain high.

b. PX: Continues to stock adequate supply of necessity items. Merchandise with a retail value of approximately \$115,637.69 is on hand at the present time. Sales for the month totaled \$78,800.70.

c. Postal service provided by the 4th Marines Post Office for the month of May was as follows:

Money Orders Issued:	5,928
Amount of Money orders Issued:	\$338,123.51
Registered (Sent out):	226
Registered (Received):	99
Stamps sold:	\$6,498.00
Amount of Money Orders Cashied:	\$8,251.60

d. Liberty: None

e. R&I: During the month of May, approximately 295 personnel were assigned R&I quotas to Okinawa, Manila, Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Saigon and Singapore.

8. Chaplains Support, Religious Services:

The Regimental Chaplain continued to coordinate the Chaplains' activities in the area. Coordinated coverage was given Catholic and Protestant for 2/1, 3/A, 1/A, 2/A, HqCo, MCB-7, YLSU, 3/12 and EBN 163. Chaplain's service was provided during Operations Wayne and Cherisee.

Memorial Services were conducted on 30 May. All units, including other service units participated. Upon conclusion of the services, the following decorations were awarded by Commanding General, 3d Marine Division:

1 Navy Cross	6 Bronze Stars
2 Silver Stars	83 Purple Hearts
1 Air Medal	

2nd Battalion, 1st Marines' Chapel has been redesignated as 4th Marines Chapel.

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Section 711
S-2

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

- I. TERRAIN AND WEATHER
- II. CAPTURED EQUIPMENT
- III. VCS SCREENED AND VC CASUALTIES
- IV. INTELLIGENCE

S-2 JOURNAL
AO REPORTS

See sep. S-2 Section, which also contains original of this section.

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TERRAIN AND WEATHER

A. TERRAIN. The 4th Marines TACR is bounded on the Northeast by the Song Loi Nong and Song Dai Giang river, Route #14 Southwest to the Nui Bang Mountains, West to the Song Ta Trach river then generally North till it joins with the northern most boundary. National Route #1 passes in a Northwest/Southeast direction through the TACR with numerous improved and semi-improved roads interlacing both sides of Route #1. Commanding terrain features along Route #1 are Hills 120 vic (YD 793383), 180 vic (YD 855133) and Hill 48 vic (YD 808186). The dominating terrain in the southern portion of the TACR is Hill 300 vic (YD 845043). The terrain then diminishes rapidly as you progress towards the coastal lowland area which is dominated by villages and large tomb area.

B. WEATHER. During the month of May there was a total of 7.38 inches of rainfall with 16 days of measurable rain and 4 days with a trace of precipitation. The maximum temperature was 100°, minimum temperature 74° and the mean temperature 83°.

CAPTURED EQUIPMENT

1. WEAPONS. A total of 34 weapons were captured during the reporting period, 16 ChiCom Model 53 carbines, 3 AK 47, 1 12 Ga shot gun, 3 MAT 49, 1 pistol 7.62mm M1919 (U.S.S.R.), 1 U.S. M3 SM 45 cal, 2 U.S. M79 grenade launcher, 2 K-50, 2 SKS rifles, 1 U.S. M-1 carbine, 1 U.S. M-1 rifle, 1 RPD MG.

2. OTHER EQUIPMENT. A varied assortment of other equipment was captured or found. These includes:

- A. ChiCom Grenades
- B. TNT with fuses
- C. Various types of ammunition
- D. Packs and other military web equipment.
- E. Medical supplies
- F. Items of clothing

3. DISPOSITION. All captured equipment is logged and processed through intelligence channels in an effort to extract all possible information of value. After processing for information the item may be returned to the individual who captured it, to be retained as a souvenir. This, only after strict compliance with appropriate directives.

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VCS SCREENED AND VC CASUALTIES

A. VCS SCREENED. The total number of individuals processed through the collection point by the 4th Marines was 127 for the month of May. 103 of these were screenings and were released after interrogation. 19 of these were sent to Mang Dien, District Headquarters for further processing. The remaining 5 were sent to higher Headquarters for further processing.

B. VC CASUALTIES. During the reporting period a total of 100 Viet Cong were killed. This figure is confirmed by body count.

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SECTION IVOPERATIONS and TRAININGOPERATIONS

1. 1 May 1966. By 1015H the 1st Bn, 1st Mar reached DONG HA, their final objective in their reconnaissance in force mission in the execution of Operation Virginia. At 1200H Operation Virginia terminated. Unit continued preparation for displacement to their CP within the TAOR. At 1220H General WESTMORLAND arrived at the Regimental CP. After a short briefing he departed for DONG HA to visit 1st Bn, 1st Mar. All other units conducted small unit operations within areas of responsibility.
2. 2 May 1966. At 0800H Co C, 1st Bn, 4th Mar arrived HUE PHU BAI Airfield, via fixed wing from DANANG. Commencing 0800H, Co H, 2d Bn, 1st Mar, participated in Operation LAM SON 264. This operation was a combined search and destroy operation conducted with elements of 1st Inf Div ARVN, centered on grid square YD 7709, immediately West of the TAOR. At 1400H, 1st Bn, 1st Mar returned to their CP YD 811115, from DONG HA, after having conducted Operation Virginia. LAM SON 264 terminated at 1600H, unit returned to CP YD 885134 by 1800H, results: 1 VCC and 9 VCS. No friendly casualties. All other units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility.
3. 3 May 1966. Preparations for Operation Cherokee continued. Regimental Commander and Executive Staff briefed 1st Inf Div, ARVN, at their CP in HUE, RVN, concerning Operation Cherokee. Commanding Officer briefed unit commanders and their respective staffs on Operation Cherokee. At 2015H Operation Cherokee postponed 24 hours due to bad weather. All units conducted small unit operations in areas of responsibility.
4. 4 May 1966. Pending execution, Operation Cherokee, all units conducted small unit operations in areas of responsibility. Contact was very light, within areas of responsibility.
5. 5-7 May 1966. 4th Mar (-) (Rein) conducted Operation CHEROKEE. Operation terminated 071200H. Units returned to their CP's by 072000H.
6. 8 May 1966. As a result of reliable intelligence indicating the location of an enemy battalion planning commenced for Operation WAYNE. The Regimental Command and Executive Staff briefed the Commanding General, III MAF and the Commanding General and Staff of the 3d Mar Div on the proposed operation. Approval was given and detailed planning commenced. All units continued to conduct small unit operations in area of responsibility.
7. 9 May 1966. Preparations for Operation WAYNE continued. Frag O 5-66 was issued at 0400H. Units conducted small unit operations in area of responsibility.

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8. 10-12 May 1966. Operation WAYNE terminated at 121200H. Units returned to their CP's by 1230H, assumed assigned missions in areas of responsibility and commenced small unit operations accordingly.

9. 13 May 1966. 0700H, promulgated Frag O 6-66 directing 3dBn, 4th Mar, to deploy by vehicle to the TROUI Area of Operation bounded by YD 953112, YD 974073, YD 912081, YD 898082, YD 870020, YD 870960, YC 955260, ZC 000975, ZC 003985, ZD 030027, YD 971100, and YD 953112, to conduct operations in area; to find and destroy enemy forces and prevent enemy movement through area, to intercept enemy forces attempting to destroy friendly facilities along Highway One. All other units conducted small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

10. 14 May 1966. At 0750, CG, FMFPAC arrived HUE PHU BAI Airfield by fixed wing aircraft to visit units in area. At 0816H, 4th Mar assumed OPCON 1st FORCE RECON Co (-), in addition, CO, 1st FORCE RECON Co, assumed command of Recon Gru B, 3d Recon Bn, as directed by 4th Mar msg 140116Z. At 1415H, CO Recon Gru B, requested reaction force type assistance to aid a Recon team of eleven Marines including one serious WIA, surrounded by 20 VC and receiving heavy small arms fire, at YD 510245. At 1525H, 2d Bn, 1st Mar, Sparrow Hawk and HMM-163 were alerted. SPARROW HAWK consisting of 23 Marines touched down at 1611H, in vicinity of YD 526237. In attempting to retract the one WIA by hoist, the hoist broke, dropping the WIA approximately 30 feet. A search was conducted immediately, WIA was located and evacuated to Co A, 3d Med Bn. 1640H, Sparrow Hawk received several rounds small arms sniper fire in area of LZ. At 1655H Sparrow Hawk sustained two WIA's. At 1730H CO, 1st Bn, 4th Mar was directed to assume OPCON of all units involved and to take charge of the retraction. Ten helos were dispatched to 1stBn, 4th Marine CP. The retraction was completed at 1935H. The action resulted in 5 VC KIA. Units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

11. 15 May 1966. In accordance with 4th Mar Frag O 6-66, 3d Bn, 4th Mar deployed to TROUI area of operation, approximately 1100H. At 1040H, verbal orders were received by this Headquarters from CG, 3d Mar Div, to displace one Company from 1st Bn, 1st Mar to the DANANG TAOR. Ten minutes later this order was changed to send two companies. By 1428H, the 3d Bn 4th Mar displacement to TROUI Area of Operation was completed with negative contact. CP located at YD 928857. At 1523H Co A, 1st Bn, 1st Mar and elements of H and S Co, were lifted from HUE PHU BAI Airfield to DANANG by C-130, in accordance with 3d MarDiv msg 150750Z Companies A and B, 1st Bn, 1st Mar were chopped OPCON 9th Mar. All other units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

12. 16 May 1966. 3d Mar Div Msg 160945Z directed the return of 1st Bn, 4th Mar to the PHU BAI Combat Base, commencing 170700H. Nothing of significance reported this date. Units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

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13. 17 May 1966. At 0230H, Co D, 1st Bn, 4th Mar, Btry G, 3d Bn, 12th Mar and LSA at YD 549326 received 80-100 rounds of incoming mortar fire, 30-40 VC demolition charges were thrown, by what appeared to be a VC suicide unit of unknown strength, that attempted to penetrate the lines of defense. One VC, KIA and one Chi Com sub-machine gun were recovered from the defensive wire. At least two VC KIA were carried away. Counter mortar fire was returned by Btry G, 3d Bn, 12th Mar while the perimeter security fired M4 and M60 MG's. VC broke contact and fled. Units sustained 16 WIA's and 2 KIA's. Units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility throughout period.

14. 18 May 1966. At 0600H, a helo, with a Recon team aboard went down at YD 612245 as a result of mechanical failure. Recon team aboard provided security, until arrival of a platoon from 1st Bn, 4th Mar CP that provided security until helo was retracted later in the day. At 0830H, 1st Bn, 4th Mar, commenced displacement from YD 568245 to LSA at YD 549326. At 0900H, CG, 3d MarDiv, arrived in the area to visit 1st Bn, 4th Mar and 3d Bn, 4th Mar. At 1530, Companies A and B, 1st Bn, 4th Mar were displaced by helo to vicinity of 1st Bn, 1st Mar CP at YD 811155. At 1710H, the lift was completed and the units chopped to OPCON, 1st Bn, 1st Mar. All other units continued to operate in their areas of responsibility.

15. 19 May 1966. Co C (-) 3d tank Bn, Co C, 1st Bn, 4th Mar and a platoon from Co B, 3d Engr Bn, under the command of CO, Co C 3d Tank Bn remained at YD 537269 to YD 546266 pending improvement of weather conditions and arrival of spare parts for tracked vehicles.

16. 20 May 1966. At 0440H, a platoon of Co C, 1st Bn, 4th Mar with a section of tanks was attacked with 81/82mm mortar and 57mm RR. The unit was assaulted by an estimated company of VC attired in black shorts and green utility jackets and armed with automatic weapons, satchel charges, hand grenades and RPG anti tank weapons. The attack was directed at the West side of the perimeter. The unit sustained 5 KIA, 12 WIA. The enemy sustained 9 confirmed KIA and blood drag marks and bandages in the area indicated the enemy lost another 30 KIA possible. CG III MAF visited this CP from 1010H to 1040H. For remainder of period, units continued small units operations in area of responsibility. Company A, 1st Bn, 4th Mar was ordered chopped from 1st Bn, 1st Mar back to parent unit. Company moved to YD 811151.

17. 21 May 1966. 1st Bn, 4th Mar continued movement toward LSA YD 549326. Other units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

18. 22 May 1966. 1st Bn, 4th Mar continued to displace toward the LSA YD 549326. 1130H, CG, 3d Mar Div arrived Regt 1 CP by helo, was joined by

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Regimental Commander and toured 4th Marine Units and installations, and departed 1615H. All units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

19. 23 May 1966. 1335H, Frag O 12-66 directed Co B, 1st Bn, 4th Mar to displace to PHU BAI Combat Base, upon arrival report OPCON 2d Bn, 1st Mar. 1315H all units 1st Bn, 4th Mar closed on LSA. 1st Bn, 4th Mar and 2d Bn, 1st Mar, commenced preparation to exchange areas of responsibility and/or operations. All units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

20. 24 May 1966. 0900H, a representative from G-2 HQMC and the CO, MARSPTEBn arrived at this CP, were briefed and escorted on an orientation tour of the TAOR, and departed 1315H. All units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

21. 25 May 1966. 1330H, 1st Bn, 4th Mar assumed OPCON Co E, 2d Bn, 1st Mar at YD 549326. 1500H, Co A, 1st Bn, 4th Mar departed CO BI THANH TAN via vehicle, arrived PHU BAI Combat Base at 1615H, and chopped to OPCON 2d Bn, 1st Mar. Units continued to conduct small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

22. 26 May 1966. 0800H, 2d Bn, 1st Mar (forward) departed via vehicle to CO BI THANH TAN, arrived 0930H, YD 549326. 1115H, 2d Bn, 1st Mar assumed responsibility of CO BI THANH TAN area of operation. At the same time 1st Bn, 4th Mar assumed responsibility for defense of the Vital Area and assigned sector of TAOR. 1255H, remainder of 1st Bn, 4th Mar departed and arrived PHU BAI Combat Base at 1330H, this concluded displacement of both units. All other units conducted small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

23. 27 May 1966. No significant events transpired; units continued to conduct small unit operations in their areas of responsibility.

24. 28 May 1966. 3d MarDiv Msg 281920Z directed this Headquarters to place one Company on four hour alert status and be prepared, on order, to move this unit to HUE PHU BAI Airfield for movement by air to DONG HA YD 254597. 4th Mar Msg 282330Z directed 3d Bn, 4th Mar to provide the Company. Co I, 3d Bn, 4th Mar was designated. Upon arrival would chop OPCON to 2d Bn, 4th Mar, currently located in DANANG preparing to displace to DONG HA.

25. 29 May 1966. 1000H, Platoon, Co G, 2d Bn, 1st Mar, observed two VC moving at YD 525263. While in physical pursuit of the VC this unit was taken under heavy small arms fire by an estimated VC platoon at YD 525263. Small arms fire returned immediately and VC withdrew toward XUAN LOC YD 528265, where the VC, again, commenced delivery of small arms fire at the platoon, from firing positions in

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trees and fighting holes. Co E, 2d Bn, 1st Mar, enroute to reinforce the platoon from Co G, received intense and accurate small arms fire from 2-3 snipers located at YD 526273. Fire was returned immediately. Search of JUAN LOC YD 525270 and DON O YD 522265 revealed area to be fortified and intensely booby trapped. During the search the units received four rounds incoming mortar fire. Small arms fire was again exchanged with unknown number VC. Results of encounter were, friendly 21 KIA, 16 WIA, enemy 10 VC KIA confirmed, 8 KIA possible, and 10 WIA possible. The Hamlet of DON O YD 522265 was destroyed by artillery, tanks and air during the afternoon 29 May 1966, and TPQ-10 later on that evening. 3d Mar Div Frag O 397-66 promulgated the mission for 2d Bn, 4th Mar, and code named their Operation Reno. It designated CO, 4th Mar Control Headquarters and directed movement of units from DARANG and PHU BAI to DONG HA. During this date, CG 1st MAW, CG, 3d Mar Div, and the Assistant Division Commander visited this CP. All units conducted small unit operations in areas of responsibility.

26. 30 May 1966. 0845H, with the arrival of advance party, 4th Marines assumed OPCON 2d Bn, 4th Mar, located at DONG HA YD 243600. By 1040H, Command Group 2d Bn, 4th Mar with Companies G and F had arrived at DONG HA. 1440H, Btry H, 3d Bn, 12th Mar had also arrived at DONG HA. 1000H, 4th Marines conducted Memorial Day ceremonies at HMM-163 helicopter pad. All units in the Vital Area were represented and Colors were massed for the occasion. Commanding General, 3d Mar Div delivered the Memorial Day message. Immediately thereafter the Commanding General visited the 2d Bn, 1st Mar CP at CO BI THANH TAN, and returned to this CP by 1245H. All other units conducted small unit operations in their areas of responsibility.

27. 31 May 1966. 0600H, 3d Bn, 12th Mar assumed OPCON 107mm Btry, 3d Bn, 12th Mar. 1355H, Command Group and elements M&S Company 1st Bn, 1st Mar departed via fixed wing aircraft from the HUE PHU BAI Airfield to DARANG. OPCON of 1st Bn, 1st Mar was passed to 9th Mar at 1515H. At 1430H, Company E, and remaining elements H and 3 Company departed from the Combat Base to DANANG via "Rough Rider" (SOUTH). 1510H, 3d Bn, 4th Mar regained OPCON of Co I, 3d Bn, 4th Mar. All other units conducted small unit operations in their areas of responsibility.

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Training

1. Training conducted during the reporting period, for the most part, consisted of on the job training. A total of 535 Marines utilized the range facilities of the DONG DA National Training Center. Training conducted included the following:

- a. Familiarization firing with T/O weapons; M-14's, M-60's, M-79's, U. S. Pistol's Cal. .45, Cal. .50 Machine Guns
- b. Familiarization firing with M-72 LAAW
- c. Demonstration and procedures for the proper handling and using hand grenades and hand-held pyrotechnics.
- d. Pistol combat course.
- e. Field firing, M-60's, lecture, demonstration and application.
- f. Techniques of defensive and offensive fires.
- g. VC tactics, individual protection, fire control and land navigation. Reference material, Lessons Learned.

2. 1st Radio Battalion, conducted four hours Communication Security School, for Headquarters Company, 2d Bn, 1st Mar and 3d Bn, 4th Mar personnel.

*D-3 (SITREP
and
Journals + file) filed sep.*

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1-31 May 1966

Section V

LOGISTICS

I. Summary of Logistics Operations.

1. A Supply Conference was held at FLSU #2 by 3d Marine Division Supply Officer on 9 May 1966. All Supply Officers and Supply Chiefs were requested to attend the conference. The following topics were discussed: Quarterly Reconciliation of Obligations and supply support of attached units.

2. CG 3d MarDiv msg 061244Z May 66 requested Headquarters, 4th Marines to screen all priority O2 requisitions submitted by 3d Marine Division units in Phu Bai and make sure that the data on NAVMC 708-SD is accurate and complete.

3. CO, 4th Marines ltr 4:JH:cwb over 5213/3 dtd 18 May 1966 submitted Logistics Summary Report #19 to CG 3d MarDiv for the period ending 17 May 1966. Significant portions included:

a. A shortage of spare parts for communications equipment still exists in 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines have a significant shortage of spare parts for their galley equipment.

b. Shortages still exist in individual equipment. Items of particular concern are .45 caliber magazines pouches, entrenching tool covers, pneumatic mattresses, tent poles, holsters and canteen covers.

4. CG 3d MarDiv msg 060905Z May 66 directed that trucks M274/M274A1 will not be utilized in rear areas. The following instructions were issued to all Marine units in the Phu Bai area: "Subject Vehicles are to be used within the Phu Bai perimeter only for resupply runs between battalion CP's and companies forward. Outside the perimeter, use will be determined by unit commanders, however long hauls and hard surface roads are to be avoided."

5. CG 3d MarDiv Spdltr CSW:feg over 10370/1 of 23 May 66 informed the 3d Marine Division units of the acute shortage of concertina in country. Present stocks are exhausted. Units are requested to utilize barbed wire in lieu of concertina.

6. A Supply Conference was held on 24 May 1966 at FLSU #2 by 3d Marine Division and 3d Force Service Regiment Supply Officers. Battalions and supporting units Supply Officers and/or Supply Chiefs attended the conference. Quarterly obligation listings were issued to each unit for reconciliation. The new system for reporting Control Items (Controlled Items Reports) was discussed.

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II. Status of Cantonment Construction.

There have been 114 tin roof huts completed in the cantonment program. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Marines moved into the new huts on 29 May 1966. The communication bunker was also completed and in operation on 29 May 66. The COC Bunker is still under construction. Three 16' x 32' showers are under construction for this cantonment.

III. Off Loading of Material at Hue Ramp and Col Co Causeway.

Hue Ramp was evacuated on 17 May 1966 due to the local political situation. All subsequent unloading during the month was at the Col Co Causeway.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION VICOMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

1. STATUS OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT: The following numbers and types of communication equipment are presently being put to actual use by this headquarters:

Radio set AN/PRC-25	7	Radio relay set AN/TRC-27	4
Radio set AN/PRC-41	2	Radio relay set AN/MRC-62	5
Radio set AN/RC-47	5	Telephone EE-8	56
Radiocentral AN/TSC-15	2	Telephone TA-312	19
Radio set AN/MRC-83	1	Switchboard SB-22	9
Teletype Machine AN/TCC-14	3	Teletype Reperferator AN/GGC-3	3

2. DESCRIPTION AND AMOUNT OF COMMUNICATION GEAR INOPERATIVE OR UNSERVICEABLE:
See enclosure (1). ✓

3. SECURITY VIOLATIONS: One violation was reported by 1st Radio Det.

4. AMOUNT OF MESSAGE TRAFFIC SENT AND RECEIVED: Incoming 1472; outgoing 576; total 2048.

5. OVERAGES AND SHORTAGES OF PERSONNEL: See enclosure (2). ✓

6. OPERATIONAL TRAINING CONDUCTED: A contact instruction team from LFTU, Coronado, California, provided instruction on water and weather proofing of electronic equipment on 17 May. Twenty two operators and technicians from this headquarters and from subordinate units attended the four hour instruction.

On the 18th of May a representative of 1st Radio Bn provided one hour of instruction on Radio transmission security. The lecture was given twice; a total of about 110 persons (radio operators, nco's, and officers) attended these sessions.


7. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED: No unusual problems encountered.

8. REGIMENTAL PHONE BOOK: See enclosure (3). ✓

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OVERAGES AND SHORTAGES OF PERSONNEL

<u>MOS</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>OVER</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
2531	11	2	
2532	20		9
2533	10	7	
2539	1		1
2541	7	1	
2543	5		1
2831	7	1	
2861	8		4
2822	2		1
2862	1		1
3051	1		1
2847	0	1	



ENCLOSURE 3

PHONE NUMBER

1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 9
 10
 11
 14, 22, 26
 16
 17
 18
 118
 19
 20
 21
 21A
 27
 28
 29
 31
 131
 34
 35

 135
 36
 41

 44
 45
 49
 50
 51
 60
 61
 70
 71
 119
 201
 WHALE ALPHA
 LUSTY
 I. R. O.

 DEVASTATE CHARLIE
 I. T. I.
 CIVIL AFFAIRS
 INDIAN SUMMER
 AXE HANDLE BRAVO
 1ST MOBILE

SUBSCRIBER

S-1, PERSONNEL
 S-2, INTELLIGENCE
 S-3, OPERATIONS
 S-4, LOGISTICS
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 COMMANDING OFFICER
 SGT. MAJOR
 COMMUNICATION OFFICE
 MESSAGE CENTER
 FSCC
 SICK BAY
 LEGAL OFFICE
 DISBURSING OFFICER
 DISBURSING OFFICE
 CHAPLIN'S OFFICE
 POST OFFICE
 REGIMENTAL SUPPLY OFFICER
 HQ CO, SUPPLY
 MILITARY POLICE
 RADIO SUPERVISOR
 "B" CO, 3D RECON. BN.
 WIRE CHIEF
 SWITCHBOARD SUPERVISOR
 HQ CO, OFFICE
 HQ CO, MOTOR TRANSPORT
 DISPATCHER
 REGIMENTAL M. T. OFFICE
 "B" CO, 3D ANTI TANK BN
 INFORMATIONAL SERVICE
 OFFICE
 MARINE CORPS POST EXCHANGE
 "C" CO, 3D TANK BN.
 ELECTRONICS REPAIR SHOP
 ENLISTED CLUB
 MESSHALL
 STAFF NCO CLUB
 E-5'S BILLET
 OFFICERS CLUB
 MAJORS' BILLETING
 RED CROSS OFFICE
 SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL FILES
 "A" CO, 3D MED BN
 C. I. T.
 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
 OFFICER
 MASS-2 (DET "C")
 7TH I. T. I.
 CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER
 1ST FORCE RECON BN.
 "B" CO, 3D ENGR BN.
 1ST FORCE MFC-88 BN

PHONE NUMBERS

CHECK POINTS
 CEDER BIRD 1

 CEDER BIRD 11-

SUBSCRIBER

DISMOUNT, #1 AND #2
 2ND BN, 1ST MAR PERSONNEL
 OFFICE
 2ND BN, 1ST MAR COMMUN-
 ICATION CENTER

SWITCHING CENTRALS

CALL

LANDSHARK CHARLIE

 AFTERGLOW BAILEY

TINGE
 IMPRESSIVE
 BENDIX
 BEAR MAT
 CEDER BIRD
 SHOVE
 PERFORMANCE

PHU BAI

HUE
 BARREL HOUSE
 PORT A BELLO
 BEAR MAT

BENDIX FORWARD

SUBSCRIBER

DIRECT AIR SUPPORT
 COORDINATION
 REGIMENTAL FSCC-14
 (AIR)
 22 (ARTILLERY) - -
 26 (NAVAL GUNFIRE)
 3RD BN, 12TH MARINES
 1ST BN, 4TH MARINES
 2ND BN, 4TH MARINES
 3RD BN, 4TH MARINES
 2ND BN, 1ST MARINES
 HQ BN, 3RD MAR DIV
 FORCE LOGISTICAL
 SUPPORT UNIT
 8TH RADIO RESEARCH
 UNIT (ARMY)
 MACV
 HMM-161
 MCB-7
 3RD BN, 4TH MARINES
 FORWARD
 2ND BN, 4TH MARINES
 FORWARD

1. PLEASE "RING OFF" UPON COMPLETION OF YOUR CALL.
2. CALL AFTERGLOW 31 OR 131 TO REPORT ANY AND ALL TELEPHONE TROUBLES.

DTD 2 JUNE 1966

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SECTION VIIFIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION AND NAVAL GUNFIRE1. Significant Events and New Developments.

a. The 4th Marines FSCC continued to coordinate the fires of supporting arms within the PHU BAI TAOR, and assigned Reconnaissance Zones. The 3d Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein) remains in direct support of the 4th Marines, with a secondary mission of reinforcing the fires of the 12th Artillery Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, ARVN.

b. During the period 5-7 May 1966, the 4th Marines conducted Operation CHEROKEE, followed by Operation WAYNE during the period 10-12 May. These operations have been the subject of separate reports. On 10-11 May, naval gunfire support was utilized in the TROUI Area during Operation WAYNE.

2. Problem Areas. None.3. Number of Missions Fired in Support of the 4th Marines and 12th Artillery Battalion (ARVN).

a. 3d Battalion, 12th Marines - 4,758

b. Naval Gunfire Units - 26

4. Types of Missions.a. Artillery Unobserved Missions.

(1) Preparation Fires - 77

(2) Harrassment and Interdictions - 2,946

(3) Fires for Effect - 41

b. Artillery Observed Missions.

(1) Targets of Opportunity - 1,660

(2) Registrations - 20

(3) Defensive Concentrations - 14

c. Naval Gunfire Observed Missions

(1) Targets of Opportunity - 26

5. Total Number of Rounds Fired, by Caliber.a. Artillery

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Enclosure (1)
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- (1) 105mm Howitzer - 11,221
- (2) 107mm Howtar - 1,386
- (3) 155mm Howitzer - 1,676

b. Naval Gunfire

- (1) 8 inch/55 - 171

6. Surveillance of Missions. Positive surveillance of missions continues to be difficult due to the type terrain in the area of operations. The target coverage for all observed missions was reported as good to excellent. For those missions where accurate surveillance was obtainable, the following results were reported.

a. Artillery Missions

- (1) KIA (confirmed) - 18
- (2) KIA (possible) - 8
- (3) WIA (confirmed) - 11
- (4) Structures/Installations destroyed,
 - (a) Huts - 6
 - (b) Building (stone) - 1

b. Naval Gunfire Missions

- (1) Structures/Installations destroyed.
 - (a) Viet Cong Imbetrination Camp - 1
 - (b) Fortified base camp - 1
 - (c) Harbor Site - 1

7. Shell, Bomb and Mortar Report. None

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SECTION VIIIAIR SUPPORT AND DEFENSE

1. Air Support Requirements. For the period 1-31 May 1966, the air support requirements of the 4th Marines were considerably greater than for previous months. This increase was due to the two major operations, CHEROKEE and WAYNE. However, because of the concept of employment of air support during these operations, these requirements are not reflected solely in a summation of the sorties flown. This concept involved the use of standby alert aircraft rather than on station alert aircraft thereby conserving operational hours, yet maintaining a capability of meeting any foreseeable threat. Overall, it is estimated that this concept saved 48 operational hours of fixed wing close air support sorties since this number of hours would normally have been flown prior to reverting to standby alert aircraft instead of on station aircraft. A summation of sorties requested follows.

a. Helicopter Requirements

<u>Units</u>	<u>Tactical</u>	<u>Sorties</u> <u>Resupply</u>	<u>MedEvacs</u>
1stBn, 1st Mar	4	56	16
2ndBn, 1st Mar	99	87	14
1stBn, 4th Mar	9	37	30
2ndBn, 4th Mar	0	0	0
(30 May - 31 May)			
3rdBn, 4th Mar	46	16	32
Recon Units	177	18	10
4th Mar	14	101	6
TOTAL	349	315	108

Total Helicopter Sorties Requested.....772

b. Fixed Wing Transport

<u>Units</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
1stBn, 1st Mar	6
2ndBn, 4th Mar	4
4th Mar	6
TOTAL	16

c. Air Strikes (CAS, TPQ, Etc.)

<u>Type of Control</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
TAC(A)	8
FAC	0
TPQ10	1796
TOTAL	1804

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2. Air Support Provided: The Air Support needs of the Regiment were fulfilled to an outstanding degree. 100% of the helicopter requests were fulfilled. Likewise, 100% of the fixed wing transport requests were fulfilled. Although only 33.7% of the requested air strikes were flown, this is not considered to be a representative figure of the support received. Because of the extensive operations of the Regiment, the Regiment has almost unlimited targeting potential for TPQ 10 controlled strikes. Accordingly, all potential targets are programmed each day, and as the situation develops priorities are assigned to individual targets later in the day. The end result is that those targets hit at the end of the day are deleted and those not hit are added to the next day's target listing if they remain valid. The requested figure of 1801 represents much duplication. Actually, it is estimated that approximately 71.4% of the actual targets requested were hit since roughly 50% of all generated targets requested for any day were hit.

3. Target Analysis. Targeting within the 4th Marines area remained a 4th Marine function. HUE COC advised as to potential targets within that area. Because of the political unrest, HUE COC was not able to clear all targets outside of the USMC areas of responsibility. Accordingly, USMC generated targets were confined mostly to USMC areas. During the various operations which occurred during the month, the battalions requested strikes which were in support of their operations. Approximately 50% of all targets generated were in this category.

4. Problems and Solutions. The only major problem encountered during the month was that of clearing individual targets for air strikes if they were outside the USMC areas. This was caused by the confusion which resulted from the political situations at DANANG and HUE. Basically, this was overcome by targeting mostly within the USMC controlled operating areas. However, when important targets appeared outside those areas continued attempts to gain clearance from either DANANG or HUE often proved successful.

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SECTION IXMEDICAL & DENTAL AFFAIRS
1-31 MAY 1966

1. The average number of patients seen during this reporting period was (7). The number of referrals to A Medical Company was (13). There were (3) cases of malaria hospitalized within this reporting period. Gastrointestinal distress, accompanied with diarrhea (46), was the major complaint. There were only (6) cases of emergencies, consisting of lacerations, abrasions, contusions, minor burns and sprains. Routine immunizations (270) were administered during this reporting period.

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SECTION X

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)

1. Personnel. The chargeable strength as of 31 May 1966 was

USMC		USN		<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
23	293	3	3	322

11 Enlisted Marines rotated to CONUS, while 4 Officers and 92 Enlisted Marines joined during May. There were 2 reenlistments. The Sniper Platoon was organized and trained during May. Twenty Officers and ninety Enlisted Marines participated in Operations "Cherokee", and "Wayne" from 5 May 66 to 7 May 66 and 10 May 66 to 12 May 66, respectively.

2. Supply. Of 472 requisitions submitted to FLSU #2, 137 were filled during the month for a completion rate of 29%. The most immediate supply problem is the lack of adequate warehousing.

3. Motor Transport. The Company vehicles traveled 86,056 miles. When he joined on 6 May 66, Capt NOYES, the new Company MT Officer also assumed duties as Ass't Division MT Officer and Regimental MT Officer. Two M-35's were deadlined at the end of the month.

4. Training. While heavy requirements for convoy "shotguns" and working parties held down training time, nevertheless, OJT continued; 4 hours lecture and application on the M60 and Squad and Fireteam Formations were held by the Security Platoon; and a 4 hour field firing course given on 23, 24 and 25 May enabled 165 Hq Co Marines to zero their M14's or fan-fire their pistols on a combat pistol course, see the M72 fired, receive handling of the M26 handgrenade and M127 Al flare, and conduct a live fire defense and 250 yard assault. The training was badly needed and provided a "first" opportunity to train together after the recent large turnover in personnel. A one-week Sniper School was conducted by the Division Sniper School instructors from 3 to 17 May for selected Marines. The Memorial Day Ceremony provided an opportunity for two hour's training in Drill and Ceremonies for 110 officers and enlisted Marines. On "Operation Cherokee", the Security Platoon, conducted one squad and two fireteam patrols and two squad sized night ambushes without contact with the VC.

5. Operations. Operations "Cherokee" from 5 to 7 May and "Wayne" from 10 to 12 May provided the only opportunity for Hq Co personnel (except the Snipers) to participate in combat. The Regimental Command Post (Forward) consisted of about 20 officers and ninety enlisted Marines in each case.

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During the two short operations, the Forward CP was displaced and regimental operations were conducted without significant enemy contact. After completing Sniper School, snipers accounted for 5 VC WIA (Possible) during the month. On 29 May, HqCo moved into its new CP, consisting of wooden huts.

6. Problem areas. The recurring Vietnamese political crisis at the end of the month caused a curtailment of resupply operations, affecting all classes of supply as well as communications. The slight drop in morale due to diminished "A" rations, confusion in understanding the Vietnamese during the recent "rebellion" by I Corps ARVN troops, and the onslaught of even hotter, dustier weather was cancelled by the move into new offices and billeting areas, which was eagerly awaited since the move from Chu Lai.

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SECTION XICIVIL AFFAIRS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE1. Civil Affairsa. Significant Activities

(1) Operation Cherokee. During the period 5-7 May, the 4th Marines participated in "Operation Cherokee" in Pheng Dien District. During this three (3) day period approximately 1,035 civilians were sent to District for relocation. MEDCAP teams from Headquarters Company, 4th Marines and "D" MED treated 310 Vietnamese during this three (3) day period. 900 bars of soap were issued out and a clean-up period was held on the local children. After this was done, 55 lbs. of clothing and 20 pairs of shoes were distributed. Approximately 30 tons of rice was captured and delivered to District Headquarters. The bulk of the rice will be used to feed the refugees. 25 lbs. of candy was also distributed.

(2) Operation Athens. While on "Operation Athens" the 2nd Platoon, "M" Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines was presented with a Vietnamese Flag in ceremonies on 21 May 1966. A joint honor guard of Marines and Popular Forces raised the flag at the Lee An Village Chief's office. This is the first time in several years this village has felt it had adequate protection to fly their flag. During this same operation the villagers have presented gifts of bananas on two (2) occasions to "M" Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines. The village council also drafted a letter addressed to the Company Commander of "M" Company, thanking them for their protection and assistance in preventing the Viet Cong from taking their rice and oppressing the people.

(3) Medical Assistance. Also during the month of May the Medical teams throughout the TAOR kept busy, the following is the number of persons treated during 1-31 May 1966:

(a) Medical-----7,203
 (b) Evacuations-----21

This can be attributed to the cooperation and coordination of units in this area, giving a helping hand.

b. Materials Distributed. During the period 1-31 May 1966 the following materials were distributed:

(1) School Kits-----495
 (2) Sewing Kits-----45
 (3) Material Kits-----25
 (4) Carpenter Kits-----15
 (5) Clothing-----140 lbs.
 (6) Blankets-----20
 (7) Soap-----8,200
 (8) Rice-----1,840 lbs.

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Enclosure (1)

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c. Special Civic Action Projects.

(1) The special civic action projects we are now involved in are the teaching and training of the Hue Medical students in the field of Dentistry, they accompany the doctors of the "A" Company, Dental Medical detachment to the local orphanages and to "A" MED itself. They participate and receive instructions in an on the job type training situation. This is received very well and highly successful.

(2) Another project we have become involved with is the assistance in the construction of nine (9) new classrooms within our TAGR. The building supplies will be donated by the United States, and the Vietnamese will construct the schools themselves with supervision and technical assistance provided by USMC. These classrooms are scheduled for completion before the next school semester starts in August.

d. Apparent Results of Civil Affairs Program. Even with the political situation being as it is in Hue, the local populace seems little affected. They maintain a cooperative and friendly feeling toward Marines, they assist us in projects, offer us gifts of food etc., greet us warmly and are sincerely thankful for what we have done. This can be attributed to the effort put forth by the Civil Affairs units in this area.

2. Psychological Warfare. On 2 May 1966 in conjunction with Operation CHEROKEE the following PsyWar activities were carried out. Two CHIEU HOI tapes were broadcast from U-10 aircraft. Several thousand leaflets were dropped, the theme, of which, was to encourage the support of the people for the combined force of the US and ARVN. Safe-conduct passes were also dropped; the serial numbers of some were recorded. During Operation WAYNE 10 May a similar program was carried out; again CHIEU HOI tapes were broadcast and safe-conduct passes dropped. Between 15 May and 20 May leaflets were provided to 3d Bn, 4th Marines to be distributed within the villages in the TROUI Operating Area. The leaflets were of the type which offers a reward to villagers who report the location of mines to Marines. On 16 May acting on a request from 1st Bn, 4th Marines operating in the CO HI THANH TAN area, drop of 100,000 leaflets was made in an attempt to capitalize on the conditions which resulted in five VC rallies from that area. On 24 May in conjunction with the suspected location of the 802 Bn, another leaflet drop was made following an air strike to encourage defection among the ranks of the VC.

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Enclosure (1)

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SECTION X

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 4TH MARINES (-) (REEN)

1. Personnel. The chargeable strength as of 31 May 1966 was

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<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
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TO

S+C

HEADQUARTERS
4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3: JH:djn
3480
1 June 1966

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218 168

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Encl: (1) Air Support
(2) After Action Report 3/12
(3) Naval Gunfire Support
(4) Concept of Operation Overlay
(5) Operation Overlay D-Day
(6) Operation Overlay D+1
(7) After Action Report 1/1
(8) After Action Report 3/4
(9) After Action Report Co G, 2/1

Not
Enclosed

- Code Name. WAYNE.
- Dates of Operation. 101000H to 121200H, May 1966.
- Location. THUA THIEN Province, within the subsectors of NAM HOA and PHU LOC in the area generally bounded by Route 14 from YD 933070 to YC 900965 East to SONG TROUI at YD 990965, North along the SONG TROUI to YD 961040 and West to Route 14 at YD 933070.

4. Control or Command Headquarters

4th Marines (-) (Rein)

1st Bn (-), 1st Mar

Co G, 2d Bn, 1st Mar

3d Bn (-), 4th Mar

3d Bn (-), 12th Mar

Co B, 3d Engr Bn

Col D.W. SHERMAN

LtCol V.D. BELL

Capt R.E. LAVAN

LtCol S.A. VALE

LtCol L.L. PAGE

1stLt J.M. HENNESSY

5. Task Organization

4th Marines (-) (Rein)

HqCo, 4th Mar

Col D.W. SHERMAN

Capt E.W. BESCH

4TH MAR

A/R RPT (OPN WAYNE)

10-12 MAY 1966

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3: JHG: djn
34801st Bn (-), 1st Mar

LtCol V.D. BELL

Co A, 1st Bn, 1st Mar

Co B, 1st Bn, 1st Mar

Co C, 1st Bn, 1st Mar

Co G, 2d Bn, 1st Mar

Capt R.E. LAVAN

3d Bn, (-), 4th Mar

LtCol S.A. VALE

Co I, 3d Bn, 4th Mar

Co K, 3d Bn, 4th Mar

Co L, 3d Bn, 4th Mar

Co M, 3d Bn, 4th Mar

3d Bn, 12th Mar

LtCol L.L. PAGE

Hq Btry, 3d Bn, 12th Mar

Btry H, 3d Bn, 12th Mar

Btry I, 3d Bn, 12th Mar

Btry M, 3d Bn, 12th Mar

6. Supporting Forces

a. Units

(1) USMC

(a) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

(b) Co B (-) 3d Engr Bn

(c) FLSU #2

(2) U. S. Army - 220th Aviation Company

(3) Naval Gunfire - USS Canberra (CA-2)

b. Detailed discussion of the requirements and support provided are found in the following:

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- (1) Aviation units: see enclosure (1).
- (2) Artillery support; see enclosure (2).
- (3) Naval Gunfire Support; see enclosure (3).

c. The Engineer Company provided mine detecting and demolition support.

7. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy situation in the area of operations prior to the commencement of operation.

(1) Enemy disposition and strength.

(a) Interrogations of a VC district official indicated that the 804th VC Bn with an estimated strength of 400 men was operating in the objective area. This Bn was believed to be armed with 81 and 60mm mortars, K-44 and K-50 assault rifles, and B-40 rocket launchers.

(b) The VC district official further stated that the 804th Bn was being supported by a provincial force known as Group 1. This unit of 100-120 men and armed with K-44 and sub machine guns was also located in the area of operations

(2) Mission

(a) The mission of the 804th is a series of attacks broken into two time frames.

1. During 30 April - 10 May the Bn had the mission to attack the area from CAU HAI (ZD 203009) to THUA LUU (ZD 098007).

2. During the period 10 May - 30 May it intends to attack the area between TROUI and the PHU BAI Bridge.

(b) The mission of Group 1 is to support the 804th by collecting rice and participating in the 10 May - 30 May attacks.

b. Enemy activity during operation.

(1) Enemy activity throughout the operation was very light with all enemy contacts occurring in the 1st Bn, 1st Marines sector of the operation area. Engagements took place with several groups of VC none of which was larger than 5 men. Several enemy camps were discovered containing permanent buildings.

(2) Enemy losses were as follows:

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- (a) 5 KIA
- (b) 3 WIA
- (c) 11 captured weapons
- (d) Assorted documents
- (e) Small arms ammunition

c. Description of the area of operations

(1) General Description. The area of operations is bounded on the West by National Route 14, on the South by the mountains along grid line 98, on the East by the TROUI River and on the North by grid line 06. The area consists of a series of ridge lines and stream filled draws running from East to West. The Southern half of the area is covered by jungle canopy and the Northern half by scrub brush.

(2) Cover and Concealment. The ridge line system provides good cover throughout the entire operation area. In the Southern half good concealment is provided by the canopy.

(3) Obstacles. Since the direction of the operation was from South to North, the East-West running ridges proved to be the most difficult obstacles. The thick vegetation in the Southern sector was also a great hinderance to individual movement.

(4) Critical Terrain Features. Critical terrain features in operation area are the high points in each of the three principal East-West ridge lines.

- (a) Hill 273 (YD 923995)
- (b) Hill 224 (YD 929012)
- (c) MUI BONG Mt. (YD 924024)

(5) Observation and fields of fire. Due to the ridge lines and the thick vegetation, observation and fields of fire are poor throughout the area of operations.

(6) Avenues of approach. The east boundary of the operations area, Route 14, and the west boundary, the TROUI River, provided excellent North-South avenues of approach along the edge of the objective area. East-West avenues of approach are provided by the East-West stream complex. However, movement along these streams is difficult due to the thick vegetation.

(7) Weather. During the operation the weather was clear and hot with the high temperature being the dominant weather effect. Approximately 40 friendly heat casualties were suffered.

d. Intelligence conclusions

- (1) Although no major enemy unit was encountered during the Operation,

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The VCS were taken to ITT and later were released. A security unit from H&S Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines encountered two VC at YC 908900. The action resulted in two VC KIA, and capture of one Thompson sub-machinegun with ammunition, a ChiCom 7.62 bolt action rifle with ammunition, and two hand grenades. Major General KYLE arrived at 4th Marines' forward CP at 101500H and departed same at 101600H. 2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines received automatic weapons fire at YC 923991 at 101630H. Marines returned fire killing 1 VC. Brigadier General NHUAN, CG 1st ARVN Infantry Division, arrived at the Regimental forward CP at 101645H, and departed 101705. Marines continued to operate with little contact. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines found 200 pounds of rice, documents, several huts and a shotgun. The huts and rice were destroyed the documents and shotgun evacuated. All units were located in night positions by 102300H.

e. D+1 11 May 1966. All units continued execution of the operation order. At 110755H, 3d Platoon, Company A encountered 5 VC at YC 933998. The VC were taken under fire resulting in 2 VC KIA, 3 WIA possible and capture of weapons, packs and documents. General WALT arrived at the 4th Marines' CP at 111015H and departed 111130H. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued to move North capturing 8 VC weapons, medical supplies, ammunition, four bangalore torpedoes, and foodstuffs. Units found a barracks type building at YC 934005. CG 4th Marines directed 1st Battalion, 1st Marines located vicinity YD 9102 to discontinue movement to the North and conduct search and destroy operations West along the valley to Route 14 at YC 900012 at 111315H. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines was directed to move West to Route 14 when battalion reached the ridge line YD 929012 and to conduct search and destroy operations enroute to Route 14. At 111400H Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines chopped to OPCON 1st Battalion 1st Marines. Permission to secure operations at 121200H was received from CG 3d Mar Div (Msg 111415Z). Units continued to search the area of operations for the remainder of the day.

d. D+2 12 May 1966. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at 121000H departed the area of operations and arrived at the battalion rear CP at 121040H. Company G departed the area of operations 121235H; 2d Battalion, 1st Marines assumed OPCON, upon arrival their CP. Elements of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued to search the area of operations and found several more huts and a small amount of rice. At 121345H the lead truck in the convoy enroute to retract the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines struck a mine resulting in 11 USMC WIA. All were Med-Evac by helicopter. Retraction was completed at 121800H. 4th Marines CP discontinued the operation of its forward CP at 121435H and the command group arrived at the rear CP at 121515H.

e. The only unusual tactic used was the use of 1000 pound bombs. The bombs individually dropped were an attempted substitute for a B-52 strike. A more complete discussion will follow in the [REDACTED]

f. Difficulty was encountered in attempting to destroy buildings

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and other items by burning. It is necessary to use white phosphorus and other incendiary type grenades to overcome the jungle dampness.

g. Communications with all units was generally good throughout the operation except to Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines which was located in very difficult terrain and thick vegetation during the majority of the operation.

h. There were no civil affairs activities conducted as there were no civilians living in the area of operation.

i. Psychological Warfare activities consisted of a leaflet drop and broadcasts from U-10 aircraft of CHIEU HOI tapes.

11. Results

a. Friendly Casualties

(1) 0 KIA

(2) 11 WIA

b. Enemy Casualties

(1) 5 KIA (conf)

(2) 15 VCS

c. Friendly Equipment Losses

(1) 1 truck cargo, 2½ ton, 6x6, M-35, damaged at 121345H.

d. Enemy Equipment Losses

(1) Weapons

(a) 6 - ChiCom carbines K53

(b) 1 - shotgun

(c) 1 - Thompson submachine gun

(d) 4 - grenades

(e) 2 - MG barrels 7.62mm

(f) 1 - 60mm Mortar Baseplate

(2) Demolitions/Ammunition

(a) 8 pounds TNT

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- (b) 4 Bangalore torpedoes
- (c) 6 - 60mm mortar rds
- (d) 150 - 50 cal rds
- (e) 45 - 45 cal rds
- (f) 200 rds S/A ammo
- (3) Facilities Destroyed
 - (a) 16 Huts
- (4) Other items captured
 - (a) 250 lbs of rice
 - (b) 1 pr binoculars
 - (c) Medical supplies
 - (d) 4 - packs
 - (e) Assorted Documents
 - (f) 4 - canteens plus cups (US)

e. Air Strikes. All areas in which observed air strikes were delivered were searched by ground forces. The TPQ target strike areas were not searched.

12. Administrative Matters.

a. Supply. The supplies on hand at Force Logistical Support Unit #2 (FLSU #2) were sufficient to support the operation.

b. Resupply. All resupply was from the Logistics Support Area (LSA) which was established in the vicinity of FLSU #2. The resupply of some units was delayed, at their request, because they were under the canopy of trees and the helicopters could not land. In one case "C" rations were thrown out of the helicopter and 5 gallon water cans were lowered by hoist through the canopy. However, the problem of retrieving the empty water cans remained. It was necessary to carry the cans out to an area where LZ's were available. A disposable water container would eliminate this problem.

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c. Casualties. Casualty Reporting was in accordance with Division Order 3040.2A. All units provided casualty reporting personnel to man two centralized casualty reporting teams, one at Company A, 3d Medical Battalion and the other at Regimental Headquarters. Plans were made to relocate service records into the centralized Casualty Reporting Center in the event of numerous casualties. Relocation was not necessary.

d. Evacuation. Evacuation of casualties was by helicopters direct to Company A, 3d Medical Battalion.

e. Transportation. The Regimental Headquarters, the Artillery Battery and 3d Battalion, 4th Marines were transported to the objective area by truck. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines were transported to the objective area by helicopters. All units were transported back to PHU BAI by truck upon completion of the operation.

f. Communications. Radio relay equipment AN/TRC-27 was used to provide telephone and teletype communications between the Regiment's forward Command Post and the administrative or permanent Command Post at PHU BAI. A repeater station was utilized to achieve this. Communications by this means was satisfactory when the equipment was operating. However, there was an excessive amount of equipment failure, particularly with generators RC-278 which continuously proved to be unreliable.

13. Special Techniques. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines experimented with a long antenna for the AN/PRC-25 radio to ensure satisfactory communications, even under the canopy. A field expedient antenna, constructed of communication wire, was lifted above treetop level by a lighter than air balloon. The makeshift antenna proved to be entirely satisfactory, although further work is needed to reduce the weight and bulk of the gas-generating apparatus for the balloon.

14. Commander's Analysis. Documents and other evidence found in the area of operations indicate that the original intelligence was correct. The fact that contact was not made appears to be because the enemy battalion was conducting an operation at the time. Our operation did destroy facilities and produce a large amount of valuable intelligence items.

15. Recommendations.

a. That a disposable 5 gallon water container be obtained to resupply water in the field. This would do away with the problem of retrieving empty water cans.

b. That white phosphorus or other incendiary type grenades be carried by units operating in the jungle. These grenades are necessary to effectively destroy buildings or other material by burning in the damp jungle.

D. W. Sherman
D. W. SHERMAN

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~~SECRET~~AIR SUPPORT

1. Planning Stage. The air support planning for Operation WAYNE was relatively easy. Since the units concerned had just completed Operation CHEROKEE, the planning centered primarily around modifying the procedures established during Operation CHEROKEE and by the 4th Marines Operations Order 301-66 to accommodate Operation WAYNE. The major items considered during the planning stage were (1) an intensive air strike preparation of the operation area, (2) maintaining and using the normal Wing Air Control procedures and facilities established at PHU BAI, and (3) establishing logistic and medical evacuation procedures and facilities at PHU BAI to support the operation.

2. From the beginning of the concept of the operation, the 4th Marines and Wing elements were involved in close coordination. This proved to be most valuable during the execution. The cooperation by the Wing given to the operation both during the planning and execution of the operation was superb. Both of these attest to the Wing's ability to respond to large scale operations on short notice.

3. Execution. The execution of WAYNE was as scheduled. The lack of sizeable enemy contact limited air operations, but those which took place were well executed. The Landing Zone preparations were delivered by timely and accurate fire. The large scale preparation of the operating area was both timely and accurate, but it did not accomplish the job expected. Of the 94 bombs which arrived in the area for drop, 54 were effective, 10 were duds, and 30 were returned as "hung ordnance". All helicopter landings were extremely timely and well executed. After the initial landing and preparation, air operations were limited to resupply-logistics and medical evacuation type missions.

4. Lessons Learned. Essentially, the air support provided during this operation was a modification of the type used during Operation CHEROKEE. This avoided the few problems encountered during CHEROKEE. During the operation, two important lessons were learned which should be applied to future operations.

a. USMC aircraft can not presently simulate or duplicate ARCLIGHT type strikes in rapid delivery, total shock effect, or total weight of bombs dropped. The attempt to prepare the operating area with USMC delivered 1000 pound bombs had limited effectiveness. There is no doubt but that a 1000 pound bomb can be delivered with accuracy by USMC aircraft and was in this case, but the rapid delivery and preparation simulating or duplicating ARCLIGHT strikes was not a displayed capability. Accordingly it is recommended that future area preparation be accomplished by large formation flights controlled by TPQ 10 or that ARCLIGHT strikes be used. This command would be interested in testing the area pattern of TPQ 10 formation bombing and has ample target area available for such should the Wing desire to practice this for future operations.

b. Jungle operations require that infantry units know and appreciate

Enclosure (1)

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the limitations which air support units encounter during such operations. Basically those encountered during this operation were as follows:

(1) Helicopters operating over the jungle without LZ's are required to "hover out of ground effect" and are limited to approximately 25% of their original load capacity. This requires ground units to plan their resupply and logistic support around this restriction, i.e., planning on long periods of time for resupply or less total resupply. In extreme cases, it might require a unit to subsist for long periods without any resupply.

(2) Aerial resupply in the jungle may be accomplished by throwing non-breakables over the side. A modification of this procedure might better be used by adapting external loads which could be dropped while "on the go". This would centralize the drop and increase the accuracy of delivery.

(3) Jungle operations severely limit observation. Accordingly, the best control of air support is found in the air borne controller. His greatest limitation, observation of friendly ground units, can be overcome by friendly units marking their units with smoke, since panels cannot be seen through the canopy. This, however, requires units to carry more smoke than normally would be carried on operations.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM - SECRET

3d MarDiv - 2100/1

NRB
DE 9QF7 NR 22

-I- SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES
CG THIRD MARDIV

ZNY SSSSS
P 301615Z
FM FOURTH MAR
TO SECOND BN FOURTH MAR
THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
THIRD BN FOURTH MAR
CO A THIRD SP BN
FLSU-TWO
SA, FIRST ARVN DIV
BT

SECRET

FRAG ORDER 21-66 (OPERATION RENO)

A. CG THIRD MARDIV FRAG 397-66

B. CG THIRD MARDIV 291430Z

C. 4TH MAR COI

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY. ANNEX A TO REF A

B. FRIENDLY

(1) 1ST MAW PROVIDES HELO AND FIXED WING SUPPORT AS REQ

(2) CO A, 3D SPBN ESTABLISHES LSA TO SUPPORT OPERATION

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3 PAGES IWO 246715 SECRET

- (3) 2D REGT, 1ST ARVN DIV CP LOCATED AT DONG HA (YD 242602) CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN AREA.
2. MISSION. 4TH MAR CONDUCTS BN SIZE RECON IN FORCE OPERATION IN DONG HA AREA COORDINATED WITH 1ST ARVN DIV AND EXPLOITATION OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN DIV
3. EXECUTION.
- A. CONCEPT OMITTED
- B. 2D BN 4TH MAR
- (1) CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE OPERATIONS IN AREA DEFINED BY CIRCLE 10 KILOMETERS IN RADIUS BASED ON DONG HA (YD 245597) WITH CMD GRP AND TWO COMPANIES.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT RESULTS OF RECON OPERATIONS
- (3) COORDINATE ALL OPERATIONS WITH 1ST ARVN DIV
- (4) CONDUCT ACTIVE CIVIL AFFAIRS PROGRAM
- (5) ASSUME OPCON OF 2D PLT, CO K, 3D BN, 4TH MAR
- (6) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR US INSTALLATIONS AT DONG HA AS NECESSARY
- (7) LOCATE H&S CO (-) AND ONE COMPANY AT YD 807160 UPON ARRIVAL AT HUE PHU BAI
- (8) UPON ARRIVAL OF 4TH COMPANY AT HUE PHU BAI CHOP OPCON OF ONE

PAGE THREE 9QF7 SECRET
COMPANY TO THIS HQTRS AS REGIMENTAL RESERVE.

C. 3D BN 12TH MAR

- (1) PROVIDE ONE 105 HOW BTRY IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF OPERATION

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) EFFECTIVE ON RECEIPT
- (2) UNCLASSIFIED CODE NAME. RENO
- (3) CO, 2D BN 4TH MAR COORDINATES ACTIVITIES OF ALL 3D MAR DIV UNITS IN OPERATING AREA.
- (4) USE OF RCA AUTHORIZED
- (5) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REMAIN THE SAME
- (6) REPORTS: SPOT REPORTS AS THEY OCCUR AND SIT REPORTS AT 0500, 1100, 1700, AND 2300.
- (7) DIRLAUTH WITH 1ST ARVN DIV
- (8) ESTIMATED DURATION TWO TO THREE WEEKS

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

A. RESUPPLY, LSA

B. OTHER. NORMAL

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS

A. COMM. REF A & B

B. COMMAND POST. REPORT LOCATIONS

GP-4

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