

CTG 79.4

0049-68

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HEADQUARTERS

Battalion Landing Team 2/4  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade FMF  
APO San Francisco 96602

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8 February 1968

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d BATTALION 4th MARINES (Rein)

0058A-68

From: Commanding Officer Copy 1 of 31 Copies  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4  
(2) Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1-31 January 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPACO 5750.3

Encl: ✓ (1) Command Chronology for the period 1-31 January 1968

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

*Charles W. Knapp*  
CHARLES W. KNAPP  
By direction

COPY TO:  
CO, 1st Marines  
CO, 9th Marines  
CG, 3d MarDiv  
CG, III MAF

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DECLASSIFIED COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
Battalion Landing Team 2/4

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 ✓ TAB C     "     "     "     *OPWOSCEOLA*

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SECTION I  
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA, INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS

1. Designation/Location. This report covers the period from 1-31 January 1968. During this period elements of Battalion Landing Team 2/4 participated in Operations OSCEOLA, BALLISTIC ARMOR, NEOSHO II, FORTRESS ATTACK, KENTUCKY, NAPOLEON and LANCASTER II.

Commencing on 1 January 1968 elements of the BLT began embarkation aboard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) shipping from Danang, Dong Ha and Hue, RVN. At 011200H January 1968 the BLT was formally relieved of its defensive responsibilities of the Quang Tri Airfield (Operation OSCEOLA), being relieved by the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. On 2-3 January 1968 the bulk of the BLT helilifted from Quang Tri to assigned shipping, notably the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7), USS COMSTOCK (LSD-19) and the USS WEXFORD COUNTY (LST-1168). On 4-5 January 1968 the ARG with embarked BLT 2/4 steamed for Subic Bay, Philippines for rehabilitation and training, arriving there on 6 January. From 6 January 1968 until 14 January 1968 the BLT underwent extensive rehabilitation of its equipment, supply and materiel. The personnel were subjected to training phases including live weapons fire and maneuver and jungle warfare plus numerous indoctrination type lecture periods all keyed to the conduct of amphibious operations.

On 12 January 1968 the ARG was alerted to stand-by status due to the current situation in RVN. On the morning of 14 January 1968 the ARG sailed for Vietnamese waters, arriving early on 16 January 1968. This rapid deployment caused cancellation of the Amphibious Exercise HILLTOP XIX Scheduled for 15-17 January.

On 221245H January 1968, the BLT was ordered to execute Operation BALLISTIC ARMOR, a heliborne BLT/LCX, immediately. At 221530H the initial assault elements of the BLT were landed at Camp Evans, Thua Thien Province in relief of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. The BLT took the responsibility for the defense of Camp Evans and the outlying outpost, Hills 51 and 746 while under OPCON 1st Marines as part of NEOSHO II.

On 26 January 1968 the BLT was relieved by a U. S. Army Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and commenced backloading, having been alerted for commitment ashore again on 27 January 1968.

At 270715H the assault elements began Operation FORTRESS ATTACK by helilifting to the C-2 position (Cam Lo) in the 9th Marines Area of Operations. The initial units landed at C-2 at 270903H and the BLT was firmly ashore at 271530H. The BLT units were split to conform with the 9th Marines mission in defending many vital areas near and along the DMZ, in Operation KENTUCKY. Company H chopped to the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines upon landing and moved into prepared positions at C-2 bridge. On 31 January 1968, the BLT (-) with three rifle companies and the command group

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was helilifted to the vicinity of Camp Carroll in support of the 4th Marines Operation LANCASTER. The Battalion developed defensive positions north and west of Camp Carroll along Route #9.

2. Name/Rank of Commanding Officers, Staff and Principal Subordinate T/O Billet Assignments.

Commanding Officer	LtCol W. WEISE
Executive Officer	Maj C. W. KNAPP
S-1	1stLt R. L. MORRIS
S-2	Capt R. J. MURPHY
S-3	Maj A. P. BRILL
S-4	Cant L. L. FOREHAND
Supply Officer	1stLt J. D. POMICHTER
Communications Officer	1stLt R. L. KLAUER
Motor Transport Officer	2dLt D. H. NEFF
Medical Officer	Lt F. P. LILLIS USN
Chaplain	Lt S. J. HABIBY USN

Company Commanders

H&S Company	1stLt E. S. DAWSON
E Company	Capt J. E. LIVINGSTON
F Company	1stLt M. H. GAVLICK
G Company	to 10Jan68 - - - Capt R. L. HARSHMAN
	fr 11Jan68 - - - Capt M. S. VARGAS
H Company	Capt J. L. WILLIAMS

Attachments

Battery H, 3dBn, 12th Marines	Capt CONION
Mortar Battery, 3dBn, 12th Marines	Capt SULLIVAN
Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv	1stLt DAWKINS
1stPlt, CoA, 5thTkBn	1stLt KANE
1stPlt, CoA, 5thATBn	2dLt SMITH
4thPlt, CoB, 1stAmTracBn	2dLt NOKE
2dPlt, CoB, 3dEngRbn	2dLt HAMILTON
3dPlt, CoC, 3dMTBn	1stLt FAUST
1stPlt, CoC, 3dSPBn	2dLt COGHILL
Logistic Support Unit, FLC	1stLt DEJARLAIS
1stPlt, CoD, 3dReconBn	1stLt MUTER
ClearingPlt, CoD, 5thMedBn	Lt JOHNSON USN

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SECTION II  
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Period 1-31 January 1968

1. Personnel

a. The average monthly strength during the period:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers:	65	8
Enlisted:	1566	85

b. Critical MOS's and rank deficiencies have been closely monitored and requested.

c. The following number of personnel were transferred during the month:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers:	1	0
Enlisted:	22	0

d. The following number of personnel were joined during this period:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers:	3	0
Enlisted:	82	2

e. The following casualties were taken during this period:

KIA	2
WIA	13
DOW	0
MIA	0
WIANE	2
DISEASED	0
INJURED	4
DOI	0
OTHER	0

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SECTION III  
INTELLIGENCE

1. During the reporting period, 1-31 January 1968, intelligence operations were satisfactory.

2. Enemy Casualties

a. Operation OSCEOLA (010001H Jan68 - 011200H Jan68): None

b. Operation BALLISTIC ARMOR/NEOSHO II (221530H Jan68 - 261200H Jan68): 6 KIA (Confirmed), 7 KIA (Probable) from artillery fires; 1 Detainee by Company G.

c. Operation FORTRESS ATTACK/KENTUCKY/LANCASTER II (270903H Jan68 - 312400H Jan68): None

d. Total KIA since 5 May 1965: 1584

3. Captured and Destroyed Equipment: None

Total weapons since 5 May 1965: 357

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SECTION IV  
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

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1. Special Operations

a. During the period 01001H January - 011200H January 1968 the BLT was participating in Operation OSCEOLA and observing the New Year Truce. No significant action took place during this period, the end signifying the BLT relief by the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.

b. At 221245H January 1968 the BLT was alerted and ordered by CG 111 MAF to execute Operation BALLISTIC ARMOR immediately. Within 2 3/4 hours from the alert, the first elements of the BLT were landing at Camp Evans, Thua Thien Province in support of the 1st Marines and relieving the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. The BLT landed with its CP Group, 3 rifle companies and its 4.2 mortar battery with the mission of assuming the defense of Camp Evans and nearby outposts. This was accomplished expeditiously. Routing patrolling and night listening post/ambush security measures were employed. On 24 January the BLT was alerted for reembarkation and a possible new mission farther North. On 26 January backloading was accomplished in six hours.

c. At 270715H the BLT commenced Operation FORTRESS ATTACK by landing at C-2, Cam Lo, in support of the 9th Marines, Operation KENTUCKY to bolster the defenses along the DMZ. The BLT Command Group, its 4 rifle companies, Mortar Battery, reconnaissance platoon, engineer, mortar and 106 RR platoons landed at C-2 LZ ASH. Company H was attached to the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines at C-2 and the Mortar Battery was sent to A-3 under 9th Marine control. The Shore Party platoon and Battery H were landed at DHCB in direct support roles. The AmTrac and Tank Platoons were landed the evening of D-1 at Cua Viet under OPCON of the 1st AmTracBn in Operation NAPOLEON and the AT Platoon later joined the BLT (-) at Cam Lo Area. The BLT (-) was given the mission to occupy ground between the defensive positions at A-3 and Con Thien (A-4) on Hill 42 (YD 147693). A defense was established and normal daylight and nighttime security and patrol activities were conducted. Minor enemy contact was encountered.

d. On 311300H January 1968 the BLT (-) consisting of the Command Group and 3 rifle companies and the 81mm Mortar, 106RR, Engineer and Reconnaissance platoons were helilifted from the vicinity of Hill 42 to Camp Carroll in support of 4th Marines in Operation LANCASTER II.

2. Training. Activities during the month of January 1968 were as follows:

a. From 2-3 January 1968 the BLT embarked ARG shipping in preparation for its commitment as Special Landing Force ALFA (TG 79.4). On 4-6 January 1968 the BLT was enroute to Subic

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ay, Republic of the Philippines and conducted limited training, such as Shipboard Orientation, Helicopter Debarkation Drills and the Shipboard Drills in accordance with Navy Regulations.

b. At Subic Bay from 6-13 January 1968, the BLT underwent extensive training oriented to Helo-Surface assault missions. This was the welding together of an air-land-sea team. Training was subordinated only to an extensive "rehabilitation" effort to service, repair and replace all vehicles, equipment and materiel in foremost condition for future combat use. A training schedule was prepared while enroute to Subic Bay and the following areas of instruction, demonstration and application were accomplished:

- (1) Infantry units, Assault of Fortified Positions, live fire, at the Zambales Training Area.
- (2) Organic Weapons Firing (Individual arms and Crew-Served weapons), live fire, Zambales and Subic Range.
- (3) Tank-Infantry Assault, Zambales Area.
- (4) Forward Observer Procedures, Zambales Area.
- (5) Artillery, Mortar and 106 RR demonstrations, Zambales Areas.
- (6) Compass and Map Reading, Application, Subic Training areas.
- (7) Small Unit Tactics, Subic Areas.
- (8) Night Defense - Night Assault, Subic Areas.
- (9) Company Tactics, Subic Areas.
- (10) Booby-Traps, Subic Area.
- (11) River Crossing Techniques, Subic Area.
- (12) CPX, BLT Alfa Command Group, Subic Area.
- (13) DMZ Lectures, Subic Area
- (14) Gun Drill (Crew Served, Artillery, Mortars, 106RR, ONTOS, Tanks), Subic and Zambales Areas.
- (15) LCM-8 Embarkation Landings and Withdrawal, Zambales Area.
- (16) LVTP-5 Embarkation Landings and Withdrawal, Zambales Area.
- (17) Basic Communications, Subic Areas.
- (18) Helicopter Embarkation, Landing and Withdrawal, Zambales Area.
- (19) OJT for all attached/organic personnel.

c. During the month all BLT personnel were scheduled to fire individual T/O weapons using the Subic Ranges; supervised by the BLT S-3 and unit leaders.

3. School quotas for January 1968: None, due to the non-availability of BLT personnel engaged in the training/rehabilitation program both aboard ARG shipping and at Subic Bay, Philippines.

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SECTION V  
LOGISTICS

The amalgamation of BLT 2/4 aboard ship and subsequently at Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines was essentially the first time all units were together.

Due to weather, the initial embarkation of the BLT was not as planned. The deviation from planned loading was primarily confined to materiel. This did not result in any major problems due to the fact that the BLT immediately departed for and landed at Subic Bay. However, had the BLT been diverted and been required to conduct a landing prior to the Subic Bay off-load, serious difficulties would have been encountered.

At Subic Bay, 9th MAB and 3dFSR provided a maintenance program that was superior in all respects. Problem areas encountered, were in every case, directly attributed to the fact that the BLT was never physically formed prior to arrival at Subic Bay. Numerous briefings were held by this headquarters and followed up with message instructions, in order to insure timely receipt of instructions by subordinate units. 9thMAB and 3dFSR representatives made an exhaustive effort to inform the BLT of possible problem areas and recommended solutions. Though every effort was made to take action on each recommendation, the physical separation, redesignation of units and the overburdened communication system resulted in some units not being fully and timely informed.

The maintenance and supply effort at Subic Bay, by Provisional Service Battalion and 3dFSR can only be described as outstanding in all respects. A maximum effort was conducted at all times on a twenty-four hour basis. Due to imposed training requirements certain items were not turned in as timely as they should have been, but the initial turn-in volume provided sufficient material to all maintenance facilities.

Due to previously mentioned problem areas while still "in country", a complete and accurate inventory of other than Combat Essential and major items of Equipment listing could not be provided. The listing was not required, however, in order to positively insure each item of the BLT was given a maintenance evaluation inspection, both the BLT and the Maintenance Facility should have such a listing. The time and effort expended to compile such a list would prove to be worthwhile for the entire duration of the SLF.

Training and normal housekeeping functions were not impaired by the turn-in of equipment, except in one major area, office machines. The total limited BLT assets were reduced to zero. The FMFPac Liaison Officer was able to provide from available Navy Station assets, a sufficient number of such items to insure continuation of administration. It is recommended that an emergency pool be established for this purpose or a pool be provided by 3dFSR.

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Even though the rehabilitation/Training period was shortened by the RVN situation, there were no serious effects. The back-loads, compressed time frame, was conducted without undue incident. The only problem area was the continuous arrival of supplies that resulted in unplanned loading. Regardless of this fact, the reaction by the Navy was positive and all supplies were embarked in a timely fashion. After the fact revisions of Landing Plans became necessary due to the volume of supplies received after completion of planning.

The Camp facilities at Subic Bay were adequate and in an excellent state of upkeep. The only drawback was the inadequacy of telephones. The BLT was unable to provide any type of internal wire or radio communications due to the fact that all equipment was turned in to the maintenance facility.

More explicit guide lines should be furnished to the C&C platoon and the LSU Detachment as regards the medical supply block. As a result of the proposed replacement of the LSU block, the fact was ascertained that this block was an exact duplication of the supplies embarked by the C&C platoon. Following this, the medical block issued to the LSU Detachment was returned to 9thMAB.

Discrepancies which existed in the Class V LFORM were not readily apparent due to an initial inaccurate inventory and mixed loading. The CL V BA requisitioned by this headquarters was also delayed. The requisition, submitted by message, was not received in sufficient time to allow complete delivery. Since that time all discrepancies have been corrected. This could be eliminated by an accurate LFORM listing being provided. The CL V BA requisitioned, was questioned, however, quantities requested were based on Change 2 to MCO 8010.1A and RVN expenditure rates.

Upon return to RVN and in-country supply source, no major problems have been encountered. Liaison and a RUC line were established at FLC, Danang prior to departure. To date no delays have resulted in receiving items available in the system.

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SECTION VI  
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS1. Significant Events

During the month of January, this unit embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA and USS CLEVELAND to assume the duties as SLF. This unit also participated in operations' BALLISTIC ARMOR and FORTRESS ATTACK.

2. There have been no new developments for this unit.

3. Problem Areas

Supply shortages in operating components for the PRC-25 remain the most critical problem. This shortage includes modules for second and third echelon repair parts. H-138 and H-189 handset, in addition to AT-271 antennas are the most critical shortages.

Supply problems for the PRC-41 and PRC-47 radios remain constant due to the shortages of Mono-blocks "in country" to keep the batteries in a ready status.

4. Status of Communications Equipment

Upon arriving at Subic Bay, communication equipment from BLT 2/4 and attached units was turned into Sub Unit #1. Gear was checked and returned to BLT 2/4. One (1) TPS-21 was retained by Sub Unit #1.

5. There were no security violations for the month of January.

6. Amount of Messages Sent and Received

Sent: 220

Received: 1734

7. Personnel StatusSHORTAGES

2511-9  
2537-10  
2549-1  
2811-1  
2815-1  
2837-1  
2867-1  
5931-1

OVER

2533-5  
2542-1  
2841-1

8. Summary of Operational Training

Technician Training

450 Hrs Bench Work  
80 Hrs Shop Application

Radio Section Training

720 Hrs Radio Watch  
120 Hrs in field  
24 Hrs Field Work

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Message Center Training

720 Hrs Message Center Watch

Wire Section

720 Hrs S/Board Watch

120 Hrs Field Work

TACP

720 Hrs RadOp Watch

24 Hrs Classes

120 Hrs in field

9. Summary of Operations Participated in, with problems encountered and lessons learned.

The communications platoon participated in all Battalion, Company, and platoon operations during the month, and no new lessons were learned. Minor problems encountered in obtaining radio frequencies prior to landing in Operation BALLISTIC ARMOR.

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FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

1. The following number of missions were fired during the month of January 1968:

	<u>105 How</u>	<u>81mm Mort</u>
a. Missions:	120	52
b. Rounds Expended:	1250	440

2. Surveillance:

a. NVA/VC KIA Confirmed: 6  
 b. NVA/VC KIA Probable: 7

3. Remarks: Rounds expended and missions fired were considerably below normal for this period due to time embarked and training and rehabilitation periods at Subic Bay, R.P.

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SECTION VIII  
AIR SUPPORT

1. During the month of January 1968 the following Air Support was provided Battalion Landing Team 2/4.

- a. MedEvac Missions: Six
- b. Command and Control Missions: Six
- c. Close Air Support Missions:
  - (1) Armed Huey-gunships Six
  - (2) Fixed-wing CAS None
  - (3) Air Observer missions: Four

2. UH-34 Sorties in support of Operation:

- a. BALLISTIC ARMOR/NEOSHO II - 300
- b. FORTRESS ATTACK/KENTUCKY/LANCASTER II - 440

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SECTION IX  
MEDICAL AND DENTAL CAPS

1. Significant Events: None
2. New Developments: None
3. Problem Areas: None
4. Average daily number of patients seen: 11  
Total number of patients for January 1968: 340
5. Number of referrals to NSA, Denang, USS REPOSE  
and USS SANCTUARY 38
6. Routine Complaints
- |                     |     |
|---------------------|-----|
| a. Diarrhea         | 0   |
| b. URI              | 4   |
| c. Dermatitis       | 36  |
| d. BENT             | 128 |
| e. Venereal Disease | 52  |
| f. Immersion Foot   | 0   |
| g. Others           | 120 |
7. Significant disease to the area
- |            |   |
|------------|---|
| a. Malaria | 0 |
| FUO        | 0 |
8. Number of Emergencies
- |                    | <u>Total</u> | <u>Evac</u> | <u>KIA</u> | <u>DOW</u> |
|--------------------|--------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| a. Burns           | 5            | 0           | 2          | 0          |
| b. Lacerations     | 4            | 0           | 0          | 0          |
| c. Heat Casualties | 0            | 0           | 0          | 0          |
| d. Shrapnel Wounds | 12           | 7           | 0          | 0          |
| e. Gunshot Wounds  | 0            | 0           | 0          | 0          |
| f. Others          | 0            | 0           | 0          | 0          |
9. Immunization and Prophylactics administered: 23  
Dental Referrals: 41
10. Officers - included in total count
- |                                   |   |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| a. Officers seen at sick call     | 2 |
| b. Evacuated with shrapnel wounds | 1 |

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SECTION X  
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/LESSONS LEARNED

1. Upon landing ashore on Operation BALLISTIC ARMOR the BLT was not issued radio frequencies and therefore was technically without communication until contact with 1st Marines CP was made. Temporary use of previously assigned frequencies was made during the ship to shore movement.

2. During Operation FORTRESS ATTACK the 106 RR Platoon, the 81mm Platoon and the Engineer Platoon were designated to land as separate platoons, not being attached to the rifle companies as in previous Operations. Serialization already assigned was consistent with that of the rifle companies and minor confusion resulted. By coordination prior to debarkation and by calling the same serial away twice, the existing plan worked, but illustrated the need for a separate serialization for each and every element. In the same light, the definite need for a BLT representative thoroughly acquainted with the landing plans is required to coordinate debarkation, on the hangar deck with the Combat Cargo Officer or assistant.

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Battalion Landing Team 2/4  
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FPO San Francisco 96602

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Ser: 003A03368  
2 Feb 1968

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40 BATTALION 4TH MARINES (Rein)

0056A-68

Page 1 of 67 Cobl

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF  
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4  
(2) Commanding Officer, 1st Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) III MAF msg DTG 220400Z JA 68  
(b) TF 79.4 msg DTG 220620Z JAN68

1. Code Name. BALLISTIC ARMOR/NEOSHO II (U)
2. Date of Operation. 221315H - 261200H January 1968
3. Location. Camp Evans, Thau Thien Province, RVN
4. Task Organization.

Battalion Landing Team 2/4 (-)

LtCol WEISE

H&SCo

1stLt DAWSON

Det HqBn, 3dMarDiv

DetHqCo, 4th Marines

Company E (Rein)

Capt LIVINGSTON

Company F (Rein) (BLT Floating Reserve)

1stLt GAVLICK

Company G (Rein)

Capt VARGAS

Company H (Rein)

Capt WILLIAMS

Mortar Battery, 3dBn, 12th Mar

Capt SULLIVAN

Battery H, 12th Marines

Capt CONLIN

4th Platoon, CoB, 1stAmTracBn

2dLt NOKE

1stPlatoon, CoA, 5th Tank Bn

1stLt KANE

1st Platoon, CoA, 5th AT Bn

2dLt SMITH

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TAB-A

BLT 2/4  
A/O BALLISTIC ARMOR/NEOSHO II  
22-26 Jan 68

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1st Clearing Platoon, CoD, 5th MedBn

Lt JOHNSON, USN

Logistic Support Unit, FLC

1stLt DES JARLAIS

1stPlt, CoD, 3d Recon Bn

2dLt MUTER

2dPlt, CoB, 3dEngrBn

2dLt HAMILTON

1stPlt, CoC, 3dSPBn

1stLt COGHILL

3dPlt, CoC, 3dMTBn

1stLt FAUST

5. Supporting Forces.

a. Mortar Battery (4.2), 3dBn, 12th Marines was in direct support, landing with the BLT. A total of 225 HE and 89 WP were fired for specific missions. Harrassing and Interdiction fires accounted for an additional 423 rounds.

b. Battery 1/11, provided general support to BLT operations in and around the Camp Evans area of operations.

c. 3dMTBn, 3dMarDiv provided OTTER support for movement in the low flooded areas around Camp Evans.

d. Intelligence. Prior to the operation little was known about the enemy operating in the area. Enemy capability was unknown at the time. Liaison was made immediately after landing with the First Marine Regiment. The Battalion was assigned a tactical area of operations within the First Marine Tactical Area of Operations. There are two enemy sanctuaries within the 1st Marine Tactical Area of Operation. They are known as Base Area 101 and 114. These areas have been under enemy control for years and they utilize these areas for training, logistical support, and as a base of operations. The 9th NVA Regiment is located South of Quang Tri City, and is operating in Base Area 101. The estimated strength of the 9th NVA Regiment is 2500. Base Area 114 is located in the southern boundary of the First Marine Regiment North Northwest of Hue. The 6th NVA Regiment is known to be operating in Base Area 114. The estimated strength of the 6th NVA Regiment is 1400.

Mines and booby traps were suspected in and around the vicinity of Hill 51.

The terrain encountered was rolling hills and foothills with heavy underbrush 2-3 feet high and in some places as high as 4-5 feet. Vegetation was exceptionally high in the foothills. Countless foot trails intersected the tactical area of operation. Movement was slow and exhausting when not using trails. Water was unobtainable in the TAOR, however the water point at Phong Dien provided an ample supply of water.

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2. Mission. Commencing on or about 221505H Jan68 CTG 79.4 conducts a Heliborne amphibious landing of BLT 2/4 (-) at Camp Evans (LZ LEMON) to effect relief of 1/9 and assume responsibility of that area.

3. Concept of Operations.

a. Commencing at L Hour on D Day 3 rifle companies (Rein), Btry W/3/12, and Alfa Command Group will be helilifted into LZ LEMON (YD 534415) prepared to effect relief of 1/9 and assume responsibility of that area. Artillery and Communication elements prepare for landing on order. BLT 2/4 reports closing of last elements of Rifle Companies at LZ LEMON.

b. BLT 2/4, Beginning on or about 221530 Jan68 three companies (Rein), Btry W/3/12, and Alfa Command Group are helilifted into LZ LEMON at Camp Evans. Btry H/3/12 prepared to be helilifted into LZ LEMON on order.

c. HMM 361 provide Helo support for movement of BLT 2/4 and required SLF Alfa Communication equipment/Personnel.

9. Execution.

22 January 1968

At 1330H, the BLT received Frag Order #1. Designated units were alerted, and preparations were initiated for the BLT (-)'s helilift into the Camp Evans Area of Operations.

At 1400H, the Command Group Alfa Advance Ready Group departed the USS IWO JIMA for Camp Evans.

At 1440H, the Alfa Command Group arrived at Camp Evans. The BLT Commander was briefed by the 1st Marines Regimental Commander concerning the Camp's Area of Operations and responsibilities of the BLT (-) while in the Camp Evans AO. Further coordination was effected in preparation for the arrival of the BLT (-). The BLT Commander requested from CTG 79.4 that the Mortar Battery, 3d Bn, 12th Marines, because of tactical commitments, be helilifted to Camp Evans as soon as possible. Because 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was effecting a helicopter withdrawal from Camp Evans, the proposed landing zone LEMON (YD 534315) could not be utilized. Therefore, a makeshift landing zone was established (YD 541319).

At 1505H, the lead elements of Company H (Rein) commenced its helilift to the Camp Evans area and continued until the last elements of Company H arrived at Camp Evans at approximately 2000H.

At 2010H, the lead elements of Company G arrived at the designated landing zone (YD 541319) at Camp Evans. Due to darkness and the lack of adequate lighting at this makeshift landing zone, all helicopter traffic was diverted to the landing zone LEMON (YD 534315).

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All elements of 1/9 had completed their helicopter withdrawal. JH-53 helicopters were utilized at this time so as to be able to increase the flow of troops and attachments into the Camp Evans area.

At 2215H, the lead elements of Mortar Battery, 3/12 arrived at LZ LEMON and were transported to their billeting area. Elements of Company G and several sections of H&S Company continued to arrive at LZ LEMON until approximately 2330H. At this time, all helilifts were secured until the following morning at 0745.

At 2400H, Company H, Company G, elements of Mortar Battery, 3/12, the Alfa Command Group, and elements of H&S Company were in the Camp Evans compound. The BLT (-) would not take responsibility for the defense of the Camp at this time. It would remain in a strictly administrative status until the following morning when it would then assume tactical responsibility for the Camp Evans defensive position and the adjacent AO.

23 January 1968

At 0025H, the BLT (-) received Frag Order #2 for period 222300H to 231600H. The BLT (-) was ordered to coordinate with the 1st Marine Regiment in consolidating the BLT's present position and to be prepared to receive Company E at 230745H.

At 0725H, after a more thorough assessment of the tactical situation, the BLT Commander requested of the Special Landing Force Commander that Company E, the 81mm Mortar Platoon (-), the 106 mm Recoiless Rifle Platoon (-), and Mortar Battery, 3/12 (-) be helilifted, in that order, upon resumption of flight operations.

At 0800H, Company G assumed responsibility for the security for the Camp Evans water point and for the road mine sweep moving north and south on Highway#1 from the Camp Evans area. One squad (Rein) as security for the Sea Bee detail working out of P.K. 17 (YD 648278) was also furnished by Company G. Company G was then given the mission of furnishing one Platoon (Rein) as a reaction force for truck convoys passing daily through the Camp Evans AO.

At 0836H, the lead elements of Company E arrived at landing zone LEMON (YD 534315).

At 0952H, Company H assumed tactical responsibility for Hill 51 (YD 549281) and Hill 674 (YD 515219) and their adjacent AO. One platoon (Rein) with attachments was helilifted to Hill 51. All units were in position by 1200H.

At 1100H, the helilift of all units of the BLT (-) from the USS IWO JIMA and USS CLEVELAND was completed, and the BLT (-) was chopped OPCON to the First Marine Regiment effective 231135H, thus concluding Operation Ballistic Armor.

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Operation NEOSHO II

At 1300H, Company E assumed the responsibility for a one platoon (rein) reaction force for the Camp Evans defensive perimeter and the Phong Dien District Headquarters. The BLT (-) Operations Staff and the Company Commander affected coordination with the First Battalion, Eleventh Marines, the tenant units responsible for base defense coordination. Ontos from the Third Antitank Battalion, and Otters from the Third Motor Transport Battalion were made available to the reaction force with the mission of reinforcing the force, as well as furnish a means of transportation. A tactical plan for the deployment of the reaction force was established, and all participating units were summarily briefed.

At 1435H, the waterpoint security detail apprehended one Vietnamese woman selling marijuana. Arrangements were made with the Regimental S-2 to receive the detainee upon the return of the security detail at 1700H.

At 1500H, one platoon from Company G was assigned the mission of moving to Hill 61 (YD 516311) and there to establish a platoon defensive position from which it could successfully screen all movement in the adjacent areas. On the following morning the remainder of Company G would join this platoon and carry out the mission of conducting search and destroy operations within its assigned ten grid square area of operations.

At 1714H, a Company H platoon patrol (YD 545265) received six to eight rounds of small arms fire from vicinity (YD 545264). The patrol immediately returned fire with M-60 machineguns, M-16 rifles, and M-79 grenade launchers. The suspected enemy position was then assaulted and the adjacent area thoroughly searched. No contact with enemy elements was encountered.

At 1830H, the BLT Commander, upon notification from the First Marines Regimental Commander that a Brigade from the First Air Cavalry Division would relieve the BLT (-) on 25 January, issued a warning order for withdrawal to all BLT (-) units. The tentative sequence for the BLT (-) withdrawal would be as follows:

- 1) W Battery, 3/12
- 2) 106 Recoilless Rifle Platoon
- 3) 81mm Mortar Platoon
- 4) Elements of the Alfa Command Group
- 5) Company H
- 6) Company G
- 7) Company E
- 8) HST and the remainder of the Alfa Command Group

At 1837H, the Company G platoon patrol set in its night defensive position (YD 516311).

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At 1854H, the Company G platoon on Hill 61 (YD 516311) observed four VC moving across an open rice field (YD 513327). An artillery mission was called on the enemy position with excellent coverage. Results: 4 VC KIA (Prob).

At 1830H, Company H (-) (Hill 51 - YD 549281) assigned one platoon the mission of screening all activity along route 554. This would be accomplished by the platoon establishing a platoon ambush position (YD 561246). The platoon would maintain this ambush position for a period of thirty hours.

At 2200H, the BLT Commander recommended to CTG 79.4 that the BLT (-) could speed up its withdrawal, as well as reduce its requirement for Heavy Helicopter lift augmentation if the 4.2 Mortar Battery, the 106 Recoilless Rifle Platoon, and Company E were surface transported by LCM-8 from the Hue Ramp to the USS CLEVELAND.

At 2205H, the BLT Commander requested of CTG 79.4 that the 106 Recoilless Rifle Platoon be billeted aboard the USS IWO JIMA upon completion of the present operation.

24 January 1968

At 0400H, the Company G platoon (YD 516311) on Hill 61 observed ten VC (YD 513315, 511315). 81mm Mortar illumination was called on the area, confirming the enemy sighting. An 81mm Mortar fire mission was then called on the enemy position with excellent coverage. The area was searched at first light, but no sign of enemy casualties could be found.

At 0840H, CTG 79.4 advised the BLT Commander that the transfer of the 106RR Platoon from the USS CLEVELAND to the USS IWO JIMA was not feasible.

At 0915H, CTG 79.4 approved the BLT Commander's withdrawal plan for the 4.2 Mortar Battery, 106 Recoilless platoon, and Company E. Four LCM-8's would be made available for backload from the Hue Ramp when directed. The overland transportation from Camp Evans to the Hue Ramp would be furnished by the First Marine Regiment.

At 1350H, Company G medevaced two (2) Marines; one because of an infected toe, and the other for a possible fractured left leg. Result: (2) USMC NBC MEDEVACS

At 1400H, the BLT Commander informed CTG 79.4 that when the First Air Cavalry Division assumed responsibility for Camp Evans, the BLT (-) would be relieved of its tactical commitments. The arrival of the 1st ACD at Camp Evans was expected on 25 January. The 4/2 Mortar Battery, 106 RR platoon, and Company E would be prepared to move to the Hue Ramp at 0900 on 25 January. The BLT

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Commander recommended that the remainder of the BLT (-) be helilifted as follows:

- 1) The 81mm mortar platoon (-) at 0800 from Camp Evans to the LPH.
- 2) Company G from Camp Evans to the LPH.
- 3) Third Platoon, Company H (rein), one 81mm Mortar, and 4500 lbs assorted ammunition and supplies from hill 674 (YD 516219) to the LPH.
- 4) Remainder of Company H (YD 549281), two 81mm Mortars, and 4000 pounds of ammunition to the LPH.
- 5) Alfa Command Group and elements of H&S Company from Camp Evans to the LPH.

At 1708H, Company G observed two VC running into a tree line (YD 493294). No action was taken due to lack of observation of the enemy.

At 2205H, Company H was notified by the Operations Officer that the road between Camp Evans and Hill 51 (YD 549281) would be swept by engineers with security furnished by two squads from Company E. Once the road sweep was completed, vehicles would be dispatched to Hill 51 to remove excess Class I and V supplies. Company H would then assume responsibility for the security of the road until 26 January, when trucks would return to Hill 51 from Camp Evans to transport Company H to LZ LEMON from which it could be helilifted back to the USS IWO JIMA.

At 2245H, the platoon from Company H on Hill 674 (YD 515219) was notified by the Operations Officer that it was to be prepared to evacuate all supplies and personnel on Hill 674 with the exception of two rifle squads, one machine gun section, one 60mm and one 81mm Mortar section, two days rations, and a basic allowance plus two additional days of ammunition for the remaining weapons. The platoon was also instructed to salvage any gear that might be in short supply within the BLT.

At 2250H, CTG 79.4 notified the BLT Commander that it looked as if the First Air Cavalry Division would not be in position and prepared to relieve the BLT (-) by 25 January. It appeared that the BLT (-) would not be relieved until 26 January. The SLF recommended that the BLT Commander consider withdrawing the 4.2 Mortar Battery by Helicopter near the end of the re-embarkation troop lift.

25 January 1968

At 0732H, the Operations Officer requested from the BLT Executive Officer, aboard the USS IWO JIMA that the S-1 Officer, the H&S Company Gunnery Sergeant, and the S-3 NBC Specialist be helilifted to Camp Evans.

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At 0920H, the BLT (-) notified the BLT Rear that the BLT (-) strength was 33 Officers and 761 Enlisted men.

At 1045H, two sections of the 106 Recoilless Rifle Platoon conducted a firing exercise in vicinity YD 523308.

At 1050H, Company H was notified that due to changing tactical plans, it would be responsible for the security of the road between Hill 51 and Camp Evans until further notice.

At 1158H, Company G (YD 502324) received small arms fire from one boat in the Song O Lau River (YD 503329). Four more boats were then spotted attempting to cross the river. An artillery mission was called on the enemy craft with excellent coverage. Three boats were sunk by the artillery fire. Results: (6) VC KIA (Conf) (3) VC KIA (Prob).

At 1537H, the platoon commander from the second platoon of Company G, while on a platoon patrol, triggered a 60mm Mortar Booby-Trap (YD 504328). The platoon commander was seriously wounded. There were also two other enlisted personnel wounded, but not seriously. Result: (3) USMC WIA MEDEVACS. The Executive Officer of Company G assumed command of the second platoon.

At 2000H, an aerial observer spotted ten to fifteen floating haystacks in the Song O Lau River (YD 504330), moving in a westerly direction. An artillery mission was called on the suspected enemy movement with good coverage. A check of the area the following morning produced negative results.

At 2020H, The First Marine Regiment was notified that the unit on Hill 674 was scheduled to withdraw on 28 January at 0800H. The BLT (-) requested disposition instructions on the Radio Relay Personnel/Equipment located on Hill 674.

At 2025H, the Operations Section received an intelligence report from the First Marine Regiment S-2 that there was a large enemy force (YD 500335) detected across the river from the Company G night defensive position. Company G was immediately notified of this report.

At 2100H, the BLT Commander requested of CTG 79.4 that the Ontos Platoon be off-loaded at the Hue Ramp as soon as possible so that they could move overland to Dong Ha where they could be staged in preparation for future operations.

At 2105H, the BLT Commander notified the BLT Executive Officer that he desired religious services be scheduled aboard the IWO JIMA on 27 January as follows:

1. Roman Catholic 1800 (Hangar Deck)
2. Protestant 1900 (Hangar Deck)

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At 2235H, a Company G (YD 506324) Listening Post detected the movement of a large enemy force (YD 505317; 508319) attempting to cross the Song O Lau River. An artillery mission was called on the enemy position with excellent coverage. Several persons were observed fleeing the area.

26 January 1968

At 1000H, the 4.2 Mortar Battery and the 106 Recoilless Rifle Platoon, as previously planned, initiated their move to the Hue Ramp from which they would be transported by LCM-8 to the USS CLEVELAND.

At 1015H, both Company G and H were instructed to begin their movement toward Camp Evans by 1500 in preparation for the BLT (-) withdrawal on the morning of 27 January.

At 1500H, the BLT Commander received a verbal order from CTG 79.4 that the BLT (-) would backload on the 27th of January. On 28 January, the BLT would conduct an amphibious landing in either the Cam Lo, C-2 or Dong Ha Area. The BLT would execute a Reinforcing/Blocking Mission in the Leatherneck Square Area.

10. Results.

- a. Friendly Losses were: KIA: 0 USMC  
WIA: 3 USMC  
NBC: 2 USMC
- b. Enemy losses were: KIA: 6 Confirmed  
KIA: 7 Probable  
PW: 0  
Detainees: 1

c. The area receiving the massed artillery fires was not searched on 26 January 1968 (the following morning) due to withdrawal Frag Order #1 alerting all BLT elements to prepare for backloading ASAP.

11. Administrative Matters. This landing served to test SLF planning within the BLT. Very short notice received, the BLT responded in optimum time with only minor problems.

a. Supply. The supply source was ARG shipping (TG 79.4) and embarked UH34D aircraft of HMM 361 were the delivery means. HST elements of the Shore Party Platoon established and maintained LZ LEMON both for the landing and the withdrawal. A BA+1 of ammunition was initially brought in, however a stockpile already existed at Camp Evans. The BA was backloaded on D+3, 25 January 1968.

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b. Resupply. Resupply operations were minimal due to the short duration of the operation.

c. Maintenance. N/A

d. The BLT BAS was established ashore on D-Day. Treatment of casualties and evacuation medical support was provided by corpsmen assigned the rifle companies. Casualties were treated in the field and evacuated to the LPH-2 for disposition.

The nature of the casualties were:

- 1) 3 WIA medevac due to booby-trap explosion
- 2) 1 NBC infected foot
- 3) 1 NBC fractured left leg

e. Communications. The BLT landed without radio frequencies, however, these were obtained from the 1st Marines upon landing ashore. AN/PRC-47 communication gear was not utilized which could have provided continuous ship to shore linkage throughout the operation. Alternate means were used however, time would have been saved had organic equipment been used. This was an important lesson learned.

#### 11. Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. Otters (3dMTBn) were employed for patrolling and travel in low lying areas predominately covered with water adjacent to the rivers in the AO.

12. Commander's Analysis. The BLT's ability to respond on extremely short notice was well tested and minor problem areas were exposed and corrected. In this regard BALLISTIC ARMOR/NEOSHO II must be considered a success. Revisions to LANDING PLANS and logistic support procedures were the main areas affected. Overall readiness of BLT elements was excellent.

13. Recommendations. Establish emergency radio frequency block for use of the BLT for each area being considered as possible landing areas.

*Charles W. Knapp*  
CHARLES W. KNAPE  
By direction

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Battalion Landing Team 2/4  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade FMF  
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Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) III MAF msg DTG 241540Z Jan68  
(b) TF 79.4 msg DTG 261350Z Jan68  
(c) 3dMarDivO 3100.1D  
(d) Map Vietnam, AMS L7014, 1:50,000, SHEETS 6442 IV and 6342 I

1. Code Name. FORTRESS ATTACK
2. Dates of Operation. 270903H - 271500H January 1968
3. Location. Quang Tri Province, RVN
4. Command Headquarters.

Battalion Landing Team 2/4	LtCol WEISE
H&S Company	1stLt DAWSON
E Company	Capt LIVINGSTON
F Company	1stLt GAVLICK
G Company	Capt VARGAS
H Company	Capt WILLIAMS
Mortar Battery, 3dBn, 12th Marines	Capt SULLIVAN
Battery H, 12th Marines	Capt CONLON
4th Platoon, CoB, 1stAmTracBn	2dLt NOKE

212

ALL FORTRESS ATTACK

GROUP - 4  
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1stPlt, CoA, 5th Tank Bn  
 1stPlt, CoA, 5th AT Bn  
 1st Clearing Plt, CoD, 5thMedBn  
 Logistic Support Unit, FLC  
 1stPlt, CoD, 3dReconBn  
 2dPlt, CoB, 3dEngrBn  
 1stPlt, CoC, 3dSPBn  
 3dPlt, CoC, 3dMTBn

1stLt KANE  
 2dLt SMITH  
 Lt JOHNSON, USN  
 1stLt DES JARLAIS  
 1stLt MUTER  
 2dLt HAMILTON  
 1stLt COGHILL  
 1stLt FAUST

5. Task Organization.

Battalion Landing Team 2/4 (-)

LtCol WEISE

H&amp;SCo (-)

1stLt DAWSON

Det CoC, 3dSPBn HST

Det CoB, 3dEngrBn

Det CoD, 3dReconBn

Det LSU FLC

Det 1st Clearing Platoon, CoD, 5thMedBn

Company E

Capt LIVINGSTON

FAC TM

FO TM H B try 3/12

NGF TM

S-2 Scout Tm

Company F

1stLt GAVLICK

FAC TM

FO TM H Btry 3/12

NGF TM

S-2 Scout Tm

Company G

Capt VARGAS

FAC TM

FO TM H Btry 3/12

NGF TM

S-2 Scout Tm

Company H

Capt WILLIAMS

FAC TM

FO TM H Btry 3/12

NGF TM

S-2 Scout Tm

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6. Supporting Forces.

- a. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 in direct support.

7. Intelligence.

(See Intelligence Estimate for Task Group 79.4 Operation FORTRESS ATTACK dtd 26 January 1968)

8. Mission.

27 January 1968 BLT 2/4 conducted a search and destroy amphibious operation against NVA forces in the amphibious objective area vicinity C-2 position (YD 135645) in Quang Tri Province and other operations as ordered.

9. Concept of Operations.

Commencing at L-Hour on D-Day three rifle companies (Rein) and Alfa Command Group were helilifted into LZ ASH. Btry W/3/12 was helilifted into A-3 (VIC YD 172723). Btry H/3/12 was helilifted into Dong Ha (VIC YD 228598). One company designated as SLF reserve. Prepare for initial employment in C-2 area (VIC YD 135645). Tank, Anti-tank, and LVT platoons were surface landed on order.

10. Execution.

27 January 1968

At 0903H, the BLT (-) Commenced Operation FORTRESS ATTACK by landing at C-2, Cam Lo in support of the 9th Marines' Operation KENTUCKY, to bolster the defenses south of the DMZ. The BLT Command Group, its four rifle companies, 4.2 Mortar Battery, Reconnaissance, Engineers, 81 Mortars, and 106RR Platoons landed at position C-2 in LZ ASH.

Company H, initially BLT reserve, was chopped to the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines upon landing at C-2 bridge, and the 4.2 Mortar Battery was established at A-3 under 9th Marines control. The Shore Party Platoon and Battery H were landed at DHCB in direct support roles. The AmTrac and Tank Platoons were landed in the evening of D-1 at Cua Viet under OPCON of the 1st AmTrac Battalion in Operation NAPOLEON, and the Anti-Tank Platoon later joined the BLT (-) at the Cam Lo Area. Operation FORTRESS ATTACK was concluded at 1500H when OPCON of BLT 2/4 (-) was chopped to the 9th Marines.

11. Results.

None

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~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

12. Administrative Matters.

None

13. Medical.

None

14. Communications.

None

15. Commanders Analysis.

BLT 2/4 successfully conducted an amphibious withdrawal, planned and executed an amphibious attack in only 13 hours. The fact that this was accomplished without major difficulty is testimony to the professionalism and dedicated efforts of the BLT staff and its unit leaders at all levels. The assistance and direction given by the SLF and ARG were also instrumental in accomplishing these complicated operations in an extremely compressed time frame.

*William Weise*  
WILLIAM WEISE  
P.

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT OF Commanding Officer, Battalion Landing Team,  
Two Slant Four Ltr 3/JLK/mab over 003A01068, 10 January 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 1st Marine Regiment  
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Rein), FMR

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

- 1. Forwarded.

*T. V. Barrett*  
 T. V. BARRETT  
 By direction

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To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
Via: Commanding Officer, 1st Marine Regiment

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) 1stMarines Frag Order 086-67  
(b) Map: VIETNAM (1:50,000), SHEET 6442 III Series L7014

1. Code Name. Operation OCEOLA
2. Date of Operation. 311200 Oct67 - 020600 Jan68
3. Location. Quang Tri Province, (Ai Tu) Quang Tri Airfield Complex.
4. Command Headquarters

2d Battalion, 4th Marines  
H&SCo  
Co E  
Co F  
Co G  
Co H

LtCol WEISE  
1stLt DAWSON  
Capt LIVINGSTON  
1stLt GAVLICK  
Capt HARSHMAN  
To 22Nov--1stLt HEBERT  
From 22Nov--Capt WILLIAMS

5. Task Organization

2d Battalion, 4th Marines  
H&SCo (-)  
Co E, 2/4  
FAC TM  
FO TM, "H" Btry, 3/12  
S-2 Scout and Sniper Team  
  
Co F, 2/4  
FAC TM  
FO TM, "H" Btry, 3/12  
  
Co G, 2/4  
FAC TM  
FO TM, "H" Btry 3/12  
S-2 Scout and Sniper Team

LtCol WEISE  
1stLt DAWSON  
Capt LIVINGSTON  
  
1stLt GAVLICK  
  
Capt HARSHMAN

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-4  
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UNCLASSIFIED  
REF ID: A66274  
DECLASSIFIEDTo 22Nov--1stLt HEBERT  
From 22Nov--Capt WILLIAMSFAC TM  
FO TM, "H" Btry 3/12  
S-2 Scout and Sniper Team6. Supporting Forces

- a. Company A (-) 1stATBn provided one section of Ontos in direct support.
- b. Company A (-) 1stEngrBn provided one squad in direct support
- c. Company A (-) 1stBn, 44th Artillery provided one platoon of 40mm Anti-Aircraft Guns in direct support.
- d. B Btry, 1stBn, 11th Marines in direct support.
- e. Air support was provided by the 1stMAW, and consisted of resupply and medical evacuation by helicopter, and several close air support missions by fixed wing and Huey Gunships.

7. Intelligence

a. Prior to the operation, it was known that the enemy had the capability of (1) conducting unconventional and psychological warfare to include: small scale attacks, ambushes, interdiction of lines of communication, terrorism, sabotage, propaganda activities, and the use of mines and booby traps, and (2) attacking Ai Tu Airbase which was defended by the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. It was believed that the enemy could attack the airbase with mortars, artillery, and/or rockets. The airbase was taken under mortar attack at 2240, 15 December 1967. The extent of the damage was 26 General Purpose Tents and 2 hardbacks (living quarters) were heavily damaged; 10 hardbacks, 1 CH-46 Helicopter and 4 UH34D Helicopters were slightly damaged. MAG-36 sustained 2 KIA and 36 WIA of which 20 were returned to duty. 2d Battalion, 4th Marines sustained 2 WIA. A post-attack crater analysis confirmed earlier reports that the attack was initiated from the vicinity of Hill 22 east.

b. A rocket base or storage area was suspected in the vicinity of Hill 80 (YD244) and Hill 58 (YD 2353), with a capability of shelling Ai Tu Airfield.

c. The villages along Highway 1 were considered friendly during daylight hours, and were questionable during the hours of darkness. The villages of Thon Nai Cuu (1), (2), (3), Thon Ai Tu (1), (2), (3), and Thon Nhan Bieu (1), (2), and (3) were considered strickly pro-Viet Cong at all times. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines were subjected to constant enemy sniper fire when operating in the vicinity of the above mentioned villages. The area around Hill 22 east, especially to the south and southwest was heavily mined and booby trapped. Several intelligence reports received during the month of December indicated that the Viet Cong were active in laying mines and setting booby traps in the vicinity of Thon Ai Tu (2) and (3).

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d. The terrain analysis of the Ai Tu Airbase consists of a nearly flat sandy plain with occasional depressions and long narrow marshes with slopes commonly less than 2%. Trafficability is poor for trucks and tanks at all times. There are only a few places where short moderate slopes afford cover from flat-trajectory fire. Concealment from both air and ground observation is afforded locally by shrub measuring 1 to 6 feet. The overall cover is to be considered fair for both personnel and vehicles. The terrain to the west of Ai Tu Airbase consists of a rolling plain with low hills and a few terraces sloping less than 10%. Much of the land is cultivated with ricefields and many native settlements. These fields are bordered by thick hedges, trees and thorny shrub and are interspersed by thick hedges, shrub and grasslands. There are a few steep-banked streams. The soils are generally firm, but mire during the 2 to 3 days following rains of 1 inch or more. The ricefields are firm only during and immediately following the harvest. Trafficability is poor for trucks and fair for tanks when the ground is firm; and becomes unsuitable for trucks and poor for tanks when the ground mires.

e. The main rivers and waterways within the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines assigned tactical area of operations (TAOR) were the (1) Song Vinh Phuoc, the northern boundary of the TAOR; (2) Song Thack Han, the southern and the eastern boundary of the TAOR; and (3) Ai Tu, which intersects the TAOR. These rivers and waterways served the enemy by providing them with excellent supply routes. Traffic on the rivers to the west of the Ai Tu Airbase was considered hostile at all times. Traffic to the east of the Ai Tu Airbase was considered hostile after the 2100 hour curfew. Prior to the operation, it was known that the enemy depended heavily on the rivers and waterways for the transportation of supplies.

f. During December, the Republic of Vietnam is completely under the influence of the northeast monsoon. The northeast monsoon is relatively cool and dry as compared with the southwest monsoon. Relative humidity is high throughout the Republic of Vietnam, resulting in conditions favorable for mildew, corrosion and decay of susceptible items. During December the northeast monsoon is firmly established and mean rainfall amounts continue to decrease over all areas. Most precipitation falls from afternoon and evening showers or thunderstorms, although during surges of the northeast monsoon, drizzle falls from stratus along the coastal areas of the Republic of Vietnam. Showers are generally intense, but short. There is considerable variation in December rainfall from one year to another. Precipitation can be expected to occur on more than 15 days along the coast between Nha Trang and Quang-Tri.

8. Mission. To provide for the defense of the Quang Tri Airfield complex against mortar, artillery and ground attacks.

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DECLASSIFIED9. Concept of Operations

a. (1) Conduct offensive/defensive operations in and adjacent to the Quang Tri Airfield complex while manning close-in security positions. When necessary, to occupy blocking/screening positions and conducting offensive operations.

(2) Maintain one company west of National Route #1 in depth to provide airfield defense in locations/positions as determined by the Commanding Officer 2d Battalion, 4th Marines.

b. Conduct offensive operations in the vicinity of the airfield complex to locate and destroy enemy forces and interdict routes of communication.

c. Provide reaction units from tenant personnel as directed by the Commanding Officer 2d Battalion, 4th Marines not to exceed one rifle company.

10. Execution31 October 1967

At 1000H, the Battalion (-) (Companies E and H) were chopped OPCON to the 1st Marine Regiment with the mission of the defense of the Ai Tu Airfield, at Quang Tri. Both companies and command group moved by convoy to the Airfield where they established defensive positions.

1 November 1967

At 1200H, Company H, while conducting a daylight patrol, apprehended one VN male who could produce no ID card and acted very nervous. The VN was brought back to the CP area and was turned over to the Regimental S-2 for interrogation.

At 1400H, a security element from Company H, with a mine road sweep detail, suffered one casualty when a marine detonated a pressure type booby-trap, resulting in (1) USMC WIA MEDEVAC.

2 November 1967

At 0900H, an explosion occurred about 250 meters southeast of the Battalion perimeter. A crater analysis revealed that the explosion was caused by a 3.5 rocket round fired toward the perimeter from a southeasterly direction. At approximately the same time, a patrol from Company H, in that general area, spotted two vietnamese males running away from the perimeter. They were taken under fire, but they quickly disappeared into the heavy brush.

A patrol from Company E discovered a 250lb bomb (VIC 283538). They did not possess the demolitions necessary to destroy the bomb. The position was marked for future disposal. At 1805H, the 1st enroute to the Battalion position, the Company E ~~DECLASSIFIED~~ voices of several VC. Establishing an immediate ambush position,

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the patrol layed in waiting for the approaching VC. When in the killing zone, the VC were taken under fire, resulting in (1) KIA (Conf) and (1) AK47 captured.

3 November 1967

At 0505, Company E spotted a small craft on the river adjacent to the Battalion Perimeter. The craft failed to respond to challenge, therefore it was taken under fire and sunk.

At 1520H, a platoon patrol from Company E (VIC 295542) received automatic weapons fire causing one casualty (USMC WIA MEDEVAC). Artillery was immediately called on suspected enemy positions. A sweep of the area produced negative results.

At 1745H, one VC with a weapon was seen running in vicinity 293543. The VC was fired on, but disappeared into the heavy brush.

4 November 1967

At 0025H, Company H received three incoming rounds of mortar fire which fell short of the perimeter. The position of the enemy mortar could not be determined.

At 0710H, Company H spotted one VC carrying a rifle move into a hut about 400 meters outside the Battalion perimeter. He was shot by a Sniper attached to Company H and seen to fall. When the area was checked, it was found that the body had been dragged off.

At 1830H, Company H apprehended one Vietnamese male with no ID card. The suspect was turned over to the Regimental S-2 for interrogation.

5 November 1967

At 0900H, a Company H patrol apprehended one Vietnamese male with no ID card. The suspect was detained for further questioning and forwarded to the Regimental S-2.

At 1005H, the Company H patrol found twelve one man fighting holes (VIC 292532). The holes, apparently VC, were not more than three days old and were facing Southeast.

At 1600H, the Company H patrol apprehended 2 VC suspects (VIC 302537) Both were turned over to the S-2 for questioning and later taken to Regiment.

At 2100H, Company E detected movement at its wire. Three M-26 grenades were thrown with unknown results.

At 2235H and 2310H movement again was heard to the front of the Company E position. Several M-26's were again thrown, each time with unknown results.

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At 2354H, Company E received one enemy sniper round from a North-sterly direction. 60mm mortar illumination was fired into the area with negative results.

6 November 1967

At 0700H, Company E spotted two VC (VIC 303568). The enemy were immediately taken under fire, but with negative results.

At 0820H, a member of Company E patrol tripped a M-26 booby-trap, resulting in 2 USMC WIA MEDEVACS.

At 1030H, a Company H patrol apprehended one VC suspect (VIC 311543). The male VN was turned over to the S-2 for questioning.

At 1105H, the Company E patrol spotted one VC with weapon running into the tree line. The patrol lost observation of the enemy before they could bring accurate fire to bear.

At 1135H, the same patrol spotted 2 VC (VIC 285549). An artillery mission was called, but with negative results.

7 November 1967

At 1345H, a Company size sweep conducted by Company H uncovered a box containing 35 Chicom grenades (VIC 311511). The grenades were destroyed in place.

At 1615H, a Company E patrol spotted two VC with weapons (VIC 296548). The patrol fired approximately 10 rounds small arms at the enemy with negative results.

At 1645H, the Company E patrol (VIC 291547) observed two VC entering a hut (VIC 285542). The patrol fired several M-79 rounds at the hut and called artillery on the tree line to the rear, but with negative results.

8 November 1967

At 1030H, a Company E patrol spotted two Vietnamese (VIC 305564). When approached, the suspects threw a grenade into the river. The suspects were apprehended and turned over to the S-2 and forwarded to the Regimental S-2 for interrogation.

At 1420H, a Company H patrol found a tunnel 12 ft long and 4 ft wide (VIC 315535). The tunnel had signs of recent use. It was evident that a large object had been stored in the tunnel. The tunnel was destroyed by a demolition team.

9 November 1967

At 0115H, the Battalion S-3 Officer received word from the Regimental S-3 1st Marines that 15000 lb of TPQ's had been dropped in Grid Square 2450 in reaction to intelligence reports of an NVA

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Battalion of 500 men dispersed along the Ai Tu River (VIC 245500). Secondary explosions were sighted and 14000 more pounds of TPQ were planned for that area. At this time 1st Marines S-3 Officer requested that 2/4 draw up a plan of action to reconiter the YD 245500 area later in the morning.

At 0225H, after careful analysis of the situation, the CO of 2/4 devised a plan utilizing no less than 3 rifle companies in a helicopter assault in the vicinity of YD 245500. The plan consisted of sweeping the enemy into a blocking force using maximum supporting arms. This plan was based on the reported enemy movement and a knowledge of basic NVA tactics.

At 0230H, The Commanding Officer of 2/4 informed Regimental S-3 of the proposed plan by radio. Helicopters were required as well as 2 additional rifle companies to augment 2/4's present force of 2 rifle companies. Regimental S-3 replied that Helicopters were not available and suggested that 2/4 employ 1 rifle company to search out the YD 245500 area in lieu of the 4 company assault. CO 2/4 recommended against such a plan basing his argument on the reputed size of the enemy force of battalion strength and the length of time required to tactically cover the ground to the objective area. Past experience showed that a large enemy force choosing to fight could tear up a lone rifle company. The distance of 5 miles (from LOD to objective) would require the unit to remain overnight in the objective area before being able to conduct a thorough search. The element of quick reaction and surprise necessary in such a move would be lost. On these grounds CO 2/4 advised against sending one rifle company into the area. Regimental S-3 said it would inform the CO of 1st Marines of the situation.

At 0745H, Battalion S-3 informed Regimental S-3 that the CO of 1st Marines directed that a rifle company from 2/4 immediately proceed to YD 245500 to reconiter the area.

At 0750H, E Company was given the assignment to carry out the mission. Briefings were held by CO, S-3 and S-2. Ontos and engineers were attached to the company and maximum supporting arms was planned.

At 0800H, E Company moved across the LOD toward the objective area.

At 1040H, the Assistant Division Commander visited the 2/4 COC. After a briefing on the 2/4 days activities the ADC ordered E Company not to proceed beyond 2000 meters without Division approval. The ADC cited that the objective area was too far and the enemy disposition too uncertain for a lone rifle company on foot.

At 1045H, E Company halted its movement at YD 295528.

At 1130H, a Company E Corpsman tripped a Chicom Booby resulting in (1) USMC WIA MEDEVAC (1) USN WIA MEDEVAC

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At 1313H, E Company given a change of mission to search and clear the area between YD 283593 and 278544. E Company was supported by ontos on this sweep to its original position on the airfield perimeter.

At 1330H, Company E (VIC 294554) received fire from an estimated 10-15 VC (VIC 293549) at the rear of its unit. Fire was immediately returned with M-16's, M-60's and LAAWS. Artillery and mortars were called on the enemy position with good coverage. Results: (2) USMC WIA MEDEVAC  
(3) VC KIA (Conf) and (2) VC KIA (Prob)

10 November 1967

At 1030H, Company E with a KC Scout attached stopped two Vietnamese (VIC 293555) for questioning. The Company received the information that 10 VC were heading for a village (VIC 293540). 40 rounds of 81mm mortar were fired at these coordinates.

At 1043H, a Company H patrol spotted 3 VC running in the open, (VIC 303528). Fifty rounds of M-60 were fired wounding one. Upon investigation it was discovered the VCS was a girl. Another VC was spotted (VIC 208530) and was fired upon with M-60's. He was seen to drop, but when the platoon swept the area, they were unable to find any trace of him. The wounded girl was apprehended, treated, and turned over to the S-2.

At 1135H, the Company H patrol spotted the movement of a large group of Vietnamese (VIC 323518). They were kept under observation, but nothing developed to indicate that they were enemy.

At 1140H, the Company H patrol found one fighting hole (5X5X2) (VIC 304536) well camouflaged and used within the last three days. The hole had a capacity of 4 to 5 men, and was most probably an LP/OP for the VC unit in the area. The position was marked and the camouflage destroyed.

At 1154H, a Company E patrol (VIC 286547) received two enemy sniper rounds (VIC 285545). Fire was returned with M-16's and M-60's.

At 1210H, (VIC 285545) a member of the Company E patrol tripped a Chicom Booby Trap, resulting in (1) USMC WIA MED-EVAC.

At 1315H, the Company H patrol (VIC 285526) fired at suspected enemy position (VIC 286527) with Ontos, 81mm Mortars, and artillery. Area was then swept with negative results.

At 1400H, the Company H patrol found and destroyed one enemy bunker (VIC 282523).

At 1415H, the Company H patrol found and destroyed one enemy bunker (VIC 292532).

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At 1430H, the Company H patrol found three fighting holes (VIC 4533), and destroyed them with demolitions.

At 1435H, the Company H patrol apprehended 2 Vietnamese who had initially ran from the patrol. Even though both had proper identification, they were turned over to the Regimental S-2.

At 1450H, a member of the Company H patrol tripped an M-26 Booby-trap with a delayed fuze (VIC 295532). There were no casualties.

At 1745H, a Marine from Company E (VIC 312555) while attempting to take a blasting cap from a Claymore mine, stepped on the generator setting off the blasting cap. Result: (1) USMC NBC.

At 2305H, movement was observed outside of the defensive wire. (VIC 315556). One grenade was then thrown into the perimeter. Two M-26 grenades were thrown at the suspected enemy position, and illumination was called over the area. Two figures were then spotted swimming in the river and were immediately taken under fire. The river bank was searched with negative results.

#### 12 November 1967

At 0515H, a Company E listening Post (VIC 295550) received one sniper round while returning to the company position. The listening Post was unable to determine the origin of the enemy fire. At 1143H, a Company E patrol (VIC 281551) received about 150 rounds from 7 or 8 VC (VIC 278551). The patrol returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons. The VC immediately broke contact and disappeared.

At 1520H, a Company H platoon was dispatched to check on an intelligence report of a tunnel and supply cache (VIC 306544). The patrol was unable to find any trace of the tunnel or supply cache, but apprehended 7 Vietnamese civilians who were in the vicinity and acting somewhat suspicious.

#### 13 November 1967

At 2010H, the Battalion Command Post observed a red star cluster approximately 3000 meters south of their position. The area was kept under close observation.

#### 14 November 1967

At 0400H, the Battalion (-) departed the Ai Tu Airfield on a search and destroy operation (VIC 261509, 271509, 269510) of reported enemy storage areas/firing sites, and logistical installations.

At 1555H, Company H (VIC 255495) observed three VC (VIC 260489) and immediately took the enemy under fire. Artillery was also called on the enemy position. A sweep of the area was conducted with negative results.

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At 2130H, the Battalion returned to its defensive position at the Tu Airfield. The search produced negative results.

15 November 1967

At 0030H, movement was spotted on the Northeastern side of the Battalion perimeter. 81mm Illumination was called with negative results.

16 November 1967

At 0130H, a Company H platoon ambush patrol (VIC 316526), while moving into position, was fired upon by Vietnamese Popular Forces (VIC 316526). The patrol made contact with the Vietnamese Popular Forces by radio, identifying themselves as friendly forces. The friendly fire ceased.

At 0250H, an ambush patrol (VIC 322538) received a burst of automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of VC. The patrol returned fire, then continued to its ambush site.

At 1225H, a Company H patrol (VIC 324522) apprehended one Vietnamese civilian without an ID card. The Vietnamese was returned to the Command Post for questioning by the S-2.

At 1415H, the Company H patrol (VIC 323513) apprehended one Vietnamese male without an ID card, and carrying documents that seemed of an official nature. The suspect was then turned over to the S-2.

At 1600H, Company G arrived at the Ai Tu Airfield from Cam Lo II, and again came under the operational control of this Battalion.

17 November 1967

At 0905H, a Company H patrol found a 60mm mortar dud (VIC 309541) and destroyed it in place.

At 1130H, Company E, while on a company size sweep, found one dud 105 round (VIC 261541) and destroyed it in place.

At 1145, Company E (VIC 262543) received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy causing (2) USMC WIA MEDEVAC. Company E returned fire with small arms and 60mm mortars.

At 1235H, Company E (VIC 261541) found a dud 105 round. Engineers set a charge using a time fuze to blow the dud. Before the troops could clear the area the dud exploded, resulting in (2) USMC NBC MEDEVACS.

At 1245H, the Company H patrol (VIC 295544) found three fresh one man fighting holes along a trail. These positions were marked for future reference.

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At 1250H, a ~~Company H~~ Company H platoon patrol tripped a Chi-  
m grenade booby trap, resulting in (1) USMC WIA MEDEVAC.

18 November 1967

At 1445H, Company E (VIC 284548) received approximately 20 rounds of small arms fire from their direct front and approximately 25 rounds from their left flank (VIC 285545). They returned fire with M-16, M-60 and M-79 fire. The company then swept the area with negative results.

At 1645H, an ARVN ambulance arrived at the Battalion Command Post with 5 wounded personnel, seeking medical aid. They claimed to have been ambushed approximately 3000 meters north of this position along Highway #1 (VIC 289572). The seriously wounded were medevaced while the non-serious were taken to the hospital in Quang Tri.

At 1650H, a Vietnamese child stopped a Marine vehicle (VIC 286584) and warned the occupants that there were VC on both sides of the highway (VIC 263587). MAG-36, the 1st Marine Regiment, and MCB-10 were notified.

At 2345H, a Company E ambush (VIC 300542) reported sporadic small arms fire between two unknown units approximately 1000 meters away (VIC 295557). No further information was received.

19 November 1967.

At 0745H, a Sniper team from Company H (VIC 302547) observed one VC with a weapon moving South (VIC 294538). The Sniper fired 5 rounds. Result (1) VC KIA (Prob)

At 1030H, the Company H patrol (VIC 296555) found approximately 400 lb of rice. The Battalion notified the Province Chief and a team was sent to that position to collect the rice and redistribute it among the local villagers.

20 November 1967

At 0950H, a Company E patrol apprehended a Vietnamese civilian. With the assistance of an interpreter and an American Advisor the suspect was questioned and then released.

At 1315H, a Company G patrol (VIC 290532) heard a rifle fire to their front. It was believed to be a warning shot for the VC in the area. The patrol continued with no further incidents.

21 November 1967

At 0158H, a Company H platoon patrol (VIC 315542) received two rounds of small arms fire from their East, but could not pinpoint the position. The platoon continued on its route.

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At 0410H, a Marine from Company E was injured by an M-26 grenade which exploded in a bunker while the Marine was trying to retrieve an M-16 magazine, resulting in (1) USMC NBC MEDEVAC.

At 0847H, a Company H patrol (VIC 299558) found one M-26 grenade buried in the mud with the pin still in place. The grenade was destroyed in place.

At 1215H, a Company E patrol (VIC 317552) observed a young Vietnamese boy carrying a 20 round belt of M-60 ammunition. The boy was taken to Command Post and turned over to the S-2.

At 2045H, Company H (VIC 315541) received three rounds small arms fire from the direction of the bridge (VIC 323539). The District Advisor was notified, and he notified the Popular Forces on the bridge not to fire in the direction of the Battalion's position.

22 November 1967

At 0023, while firing 81mm mortar H&I's, a short round landed in the Company G position, resulting in (1) USMC NBC MEDEVAC.

At 1557H, Company E (VIC 291540) observed suspected enemy activity (VIC 270541). An artillery mission was fired with negative results.

At 1620H, Company E (VIC 289547) located three bomb shelters. All the shelters were destroyed.

At 2335H, Company E reported movement to their front. At 2240H Company E received one incoming grenade and several rounds of small arms fire. They returned fire with small arms, but with unknown results.

23 November 1967

At 0700H, Company E and units of CAC-2 made contact with an undetermined number of VC (VIC 265647). CAC-2 took the VC under fire with small arms and M-79's. The VC immediately broke contact. Company E and CAC-2 continued on their mission.

At 1050H, a Company H patrol found a family type bunker (VIC 232523) and destroyed it with demolitions.

At 1145H, a member of the Company H platoon patrol tripped a booby-trap of an unknown type, resulting in (2) USMC WIA, (1) MEDEVAC.

At 1250H, a Company G platoon patrol (VIC 317511) received one sniper round from approximately 50 meters away. The patrol immediately returned fire with M-16's and automatic weapons. A sweep was conducted in the area with negative results.

At 1320H, CAC-2, while participating in a Company E sweep, spotted 2 VC walking toward them (VIC 269547). The CAC unit

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opened fire with small arms and observed both VC drop, but due to the tactical situation were unable to check the area out thoroughly. The result was (2) VC KIA (Prob)

At 1345H, a Company H patrol (VIC 275520) received 15 rounds of small arms fire (VIC 276519). The patrol spotted the weapons flashes and returned fire with small arms and M-79's. An artillery mission was also called on the enemy position. The patrol later swept the area with negative results.

At 1410H, the Company H patrol spotted three VC wearing camouflage utilities heading West on a trail (VIC 278522). The patrol then called an artillery mission on the enemy position with unknown results.

At 1542H, a Company G patrol found a 105mm dud (VIC 287528) and destroyed it in place.

24 November 1967

At 1015H, a platoon patrol from Company E (VIC 295553) found several fighting holes, three bunkers, a punji pit, a trench line, and an M-26 grenade booby-trap. The trench line was 60 meters long and the bunkers were 3X4 feet with no fighting apertures. All installations were destroyed with demolitions.

At 1130H, a patrol from Company H received automatic weapons fire from an estimated 3-4 VC (VIC 276514). The enemy fire came from two different directions. The patrol (VIC 278514) opened fire on the VC and called an artillery mission on the enemy position. Because of a large stream between the patrol and the VC, the area could not be checked.

At 1230H, the same patrol from Company H spotted two VC with carbines (VIC 277523). The patrol immediately took the VC under fire, then swept down into the area, but with negative results.

At 1345H, a patrol from Company G (VIC 584544) received small arms fire from a bunker and treeline (VIC 285544). The patrol immediately returned fire and observed one VC drop. Upon a search of the area, the patrol was unable to find a body. The enemy bunker was destroyed with demolitions. The result was (1) VC KIA (Prob).

At 1350H, the patrol from Company H spotted one VC (VIC 278512). After taking the enemy under fire, the area was searched. Several shelters reinforced with railroad ties, three new huts and one fresh trench big enough for a VC platoon were found. The patrol also found blood trails leading from the area to a nearby stream. All bunkers and huts were destroyed with demolitions. The result was (1) VC KIA (Prob).

At 2020H, the Company H defensive perimeter (VIC 303522) spotted movement to their front across Highway #1. Illumination was called and again movement was observed. A reaction force was dispatched to the area, but with negative results.

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15 November 1967

At 0745H, a patrol from Company G received 15 to 20 rounds of automatic weapons fire. The patrol returned fire and swept the area with negative results.

At 1115H, Company G while on a sweep (VIC 281518) had its point ambushed by 6 to 10 VC; causing (1) USMC KIA. Fire was immediately returned and an artillery mission was called on the enemy position. A search was conducted in the area with negative results.

At 1145H, Company G (VIC 277523) found a Chicom grenade booby-trap. The grenade was disarmed and returned to the S-2.

At 1320H, Company G received 3 rounds of sniper fire from an unknown position. The company continued on it's mission.

At 2155H, a Company E Listening Post (VIC 310561) spotted movement within the defensive wire. Illumination was called and 2 figures were seen running in a northerly direction (VIC 310562) The enemy was taken under fire by M-79's with unknown results.

26 November 1967

At 1515H, the Battalion (-) departed the Ai Tu Airfield with the mission of conducting a cordon operation of a suspected enemy village and harboring site (VIC 287465), while ARVN pacification teams worked in the village.

At 1545H, Company G led with three Ontos attached. At this time one Ontos hit a mine (VIC 295528), causing (2) USMC WIA MEDEVACS. The Ontos was unable to be moved because of a damaged track, so the two remaining Ontos and a rifle squad remained as security while the company continued on its mission.

At 2000H, the Battalion Command Post received 15 rounds of small arms fire (VIC 290488). Fire was returned with unknown results.

27 November 1967

At 0730H, Company E received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire (VIC 305490). The company immediately returned fire, and the enemy broke contact. A sweep was conducted in the area with negative results.

At 1115H, Company G spotted several VC running (VIC 303483). The enemy were immediately taken under fire and one VC was seen to drop. The area was then searched with negative results. The result was one VC KIA (Prob)

At 1233H, the Battalion Command Post (VIC 303487) received 3 rounds small arms fire from an unknown position. No action taken.

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At 1430 H, the rear security element of Company E received heavy enemy small arms fire. The company immediately deployed its units and conducted a sweep of the area (VIC 301491). A firefight ensued with the enemy finally breaking contact as their position was untenable. Result: (2) USMC WIA MEDEVACS, (6) VC KIA (Prob).

At 1515H, the Company E flank security, which was moving back with the main body, was mistaken for VC by Company G and were fired upon. The error was quickly discovered and the fire ceased. Results: (2) USMC WIA MEDEVACS.

At 1800 H, the Battalion (-) returned to its defensive position at the Ai Tu Airfield.

28 November 1967

At 2100H, Company E, along its perimeter (VIC 317543) received 2 rounds of sniper fire from an unknown position. No action was taken.

29 November 1967

At 0030H, Company E received 2 rounds of sniper fire on its sector of the perimeter (VIC 310558). Thirty minutes later another 8 rounds were received. Fire was returned with unknown results.

At 1128H, a patrol from Company E while searching a hut (VIC 306584) found a home-made "Zip Gun" made of wood and metal tubing, with one round in the chamber. The weapon was turned over to the S-2.

At 1450H, the S-2 reported that 5 young Vietnamese males accosted an elderly Vietnamese male along the highway (VIC 301563) north of this position. The man was taken to BAS for treatment and questioning, then transferred to the Quang Tri hospital.

30 November 1967

At 0603H, a Company G Listening Post spotted a Vietnamese male running along their front. Illumination was called, and M-79's were fired at the suspected enemy location with unknown results.

At 0930H, the road-sweep team discovered a 15 pound Chicom anti-tank mine approximately 6 feet off the hard surface of Highway #1 (VIC 326524). The mine was approximately 4 inches under the surface. The mine was removed and destroyed by the Engineer Team.

At 1015H, a patrol from Company H received automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire (VIC 266538) from an enemy force of approximately squad size. The patrol immediately assaulted the enemy position forcing the VC to break contact and flee. The Result was (1) VC KIA (Conf).

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1 December 1967

At 0930H, Company H received small arms fire from an enemy position (VIC 265538). Immediately Company H countered with an artillery mission in which one strap round landed in the vicinity of a CAC-2 blocking force inflicting two friendly WIA. A check-fire was called for and a MEDEVAC requested. Once the MEDEVAC had been completed the company continued its mission with negative enemy contact.

At 1030H, Company H continuing their search and clear mission received additional enemy small arms fire (VIC 258542). The Company returned fire on the enemy position with small arms, and the enemy broke contact. The result was (1) USMC WIA MED-EVAC, (1) USMC WIANE.

At 1300H, Company H located an enemy booby trap constructed from a 155 dud round which was destroyed in place.

At 1425H, Company H in vicinity of 269541 received twenty rounds of small arms fire (VIC 271541). M-16 and M-79 fire was returned. An immediate sweep was made of the enemy position with negative results.

At 1500H, one member of CAC-2 (VIC 269548) tripped a small anti-personnel mine. Result: (1) CAC-2 WIA MEDEVAC.

At 1600H, Company H sweeping through a village (VIC 271541) encountered four women VC suspects. The VC suspects were returned to the POW Compound and were transferred to the Regimental S-2.

At 1722H, Company H discovered one French Grenade Booby Trap in one of the huts in a village (VIC 271541). The grenade was disarmed and returned to the Command Post.

2 December 1967

At 1520H, a squad size patrol from Company E sweeping through a village (VIC 286574) discovered one village hut containing 1000 lbs of rice, a large sum of money, and medical supplies. Mortar fin assemblies were also located throughout the village area. The Province Advisors were notified, and collected all the rice minus 200 lbs for the village use.

At 1920H, Company H reported reported suspicious noises near their defensive position (VIC 300554). One M-26 grenade was thrown by Company H with unknown results.

At 2130H, during an 81mm mortar fire mission one short round landed in the vicinity of the Battalion Perimeter. A check fire was called for immediately. There were no injuries to friendly personnel.

3 December 1967

At 1125H, a platoon size patrol from Company H (VIC 320514) dis-

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vered one ton of rice in a village hut. The platoon placed security around the hut until Province Advisors arrived and collected the rice.

At 1130H, a platoon from Company H received automatic fire (VIC 275543). The platoon returned fire with small arms and artillery fire. The enemy then broke contact. The area was later searched with negative results.

At 1530H, the 81mm Mortar platoon while conducting a fire mission had a short round land approximately 15 meters from one of its gun positions. The reason for the short round was from a lot of reworked ammunition. There were no casualties.

At 1531H, a platoon from Company G received enemy small arms fire (VIC 279540 and 270533). The platoon returned fire with small arms and 60mm mortar fire. Both enemy positions were swept with negative results.

At 1710H, Company E (VIC 260525) sighted several VC departing from a village (VIC 257537) and immediately fired small arms fire and 60mm mortars. Two UH1E Gunships were called to engage the fleeing enemy. A search of the area was conducted with negative results.

At 1730H, a platoon from Company H returned to the Battalion Command Post with 2 VC detainees. Both detainees were taken to the Regimental S-2 for further interrogation.

At 1930H, Company E spotted twenty VC (VIC 256534). Immediately fire was delivered at the VC utilizing small arms, 60mm mortars and two UH1E Gunships with excellent coverage. Due to darkness, the company was unable to search the area until daylight because of danger of enemy ambushes. At daylight a search revealed several blood trails, drag marks and a blood stained poncho.

#### 4 December 1967

At 0105H, a platoon from Company H received one enemy grenade which exploded inside their sector of the Battalion perimeter. It was believed to have been fired from across the river. (VIC 317554) A fire team was assigned to investigate the suspected enemy positions. It later returned with negative results. No friendly casualties resulted from this incident.

At 0730H, a GAC-2 unit (VIC 254531) sighted 2 VC running due West (VIC 259513) and immediately engaged the VC with small arms fire, resulting in (1) VC KIA (Conf).

At 1130H, Company E (VIC 256536) encountered a Vietnamese male, age 40, with ID card. Due to his suspicious appearance the Vietnamese was escorted to the Battalion Command Post and turned over to the S-2 for questioning.

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At 1244H, Company E completed sweeping the area where earlier VC contact had been made on 3 December. Items discovered in the area amounted to one poncho, and several pieces of blood stained clothing. Twenty Vietnamese were detained and escorted to the Command Post for questioning by the S-2. No further VC engagement resulted from the Company size sweep.

At 1352H, a platoon from Company H conducting a platoon size patrol (VIC 313508) received approximately 60 rounds of small arms fire from a nearby tree line (VIC 313508). The platoon engaged the enemy position with small arms fire and the enemy quickly broke contact. The area was searched with negative results.

At 1430H, Company E while conducting a company size sweep (VIC 265548) tripped on unknown booby-trap device, resulting in (2) USMC WIA MEDEVACS.

At 2245H, an unknown Vietnamese youth delivered one M-26 grenade and 10 rounds of assorted small ammunition to the Battalion Command Post. The young Vietnamese was rewarded with 200 piasters by the S-2 Officer.

At 2345H, Company H was assigned the mission of investigating VC/NVA activities in the vicinity of Coord. YD 3150. Upon approaching vicinity YD 316506, the company received approximately 30 rounds of automatic fire. Sighting a total of eleven VC (VIC 314506) fire mission was requested by an AO flying above the area. Due to automatic enemy fire received by the AO plane, it was unable to conduct the fire mission. Two Huey Gunships in the immediate area directed airstrikes upon the suspected enemy positions (VIC 314506). At the completion of the air strikes Company H conducted a sweep through the area with negative results. The pilot of the spotter plane was wounded and the AO successfully landed the aircraft at Quang Tri Airfield. The pilot later died of wounds.

#### 5 December 1967

At 1830H, Company H conducting a company size sweep encountered an enemy ambush (VIC 312510). Approximately 200 rounds of automatic fire was received by the company. Fire superiority was gained by Company H by firing small arms and artillery fire into the enemy's position. Enemy contact was broken, and a sweep of the area ended with negative results.

#### 6 December 1967

At 0200H, the CAC-2 unit reported to Company E that a Marine vehicle moving south on Highway #1 was involved in an accident at a bridge south of Dong Ha. No injuries were received by the two enlisted Marines attached to 2/1 who were in the vehicle. Company E notified Battalion Headquarters of the incident.

At 0730H, a member of a platoon size sweep from Company G tripped

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a grenade type booby-trap; resulting in (1) USMC WIA MEDEVAC.

At 0935H, a Company G platoon size sweep (VIC 263515) received approximately 200 rounds of small arms fire (VIC 2605.3). The platoon gained fire superiority with small arms and 60mm mortar fire. A sweep was conducted through the enemys position with negative results.

At 1100H, a platoon from Company E (VIC 288511) uncovered one 105mm projectile by a hut (VIC 286582) and destroyed the projectile in place.

At 1120H, a platoon size patrol from Company G (VIC 258515) received an unknown number of enemy automatic weapons fire (VIC 242508). The platoon gained fire superiority with small arms and 60mm mortars, and conducted a sweep through the enemy's position with negative results.

At 1530H, a squad size ambush from Company G (VIC 275548) sighted two VC approximately 800 meters from their position (VIC 275540). A Marine Sniper fired at the two VC resulting in 1 VC killed (Prob). The squad could not investigate the area due to the distance between their position and the enemy.

At 1730H, a squad size ambush from Company G (VIC 288538) spotted six VC carrying weapons (VIC 281535). Artillery fire was called upon the enemy which resulted in (1) VC KIA (Conf) and (1) VC KIA (Prob)

At 1810H, a CAC-2 unit reported to the Battalion Command Post that several civilians were hit by U. S. small arms fire while moving from Tan Pho. The incident was investigated and confirmed that no U. S. units from this command were operating in the area at the time of the incident.

At 1820H, Company G (VIC 275512) received automatic weapons fired into their position from vicinity 270520. The company returned fire on the enemy position with 30 rounds of 60mm Mortars. Due to the darkness setting in, it was impossible to search the area. Results: Unknown.

At 2040H, Company E (VIC 311537) while in a defensive position reported hearing noises of suspected enemy movement (VIC 317554). Illumination was requested with negative results.

7 December 1967

At 0855H, Company G (VIC 274526) received 30 rounds of small arms fire from 6 VC (VIC 267520) causing (1) USMC WIA MEDEVAC. The company countered with small arms fire from M-16's, M-79, and M-60 Machine Guns, resulting in (2) VC KIA (Prob).

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At 1000H, a squad size ambush from Company G spotted approximately 1 VC in the open (VIC 269531). Marine Sniper fired 7 rounds at the enemy, resulting in (1) VC KIA (Conf), (1) VC KIA (Prob)

At 1110H, a Vietnamese female was apprehended just outside the perimeter. The suspect had no ID card in her possession and could give no reason for being in the area. She was detained and delivered to the S-2 for questioning.

At 1125H, a platoon from Company H conducting a sweep (VIC 304534) discovered one booby-trap constructed from a Chicom grenade. It was destroyed in place.

8 December 1967

At 1100H, a platoon from Company E while conducting a sweep (VIC 252549) had one Marine trip an unknown explosive device. The result was (1) USMC WIA MEDEVAC

At 1150H, a platoon size patrol from Company E (VIC 254550) encountered 10 VC with weapons. The enemy were pursued by firing approximately 400 rounds of M-60 and artillery fire. Results: (1) USMC WIA NON MEDEVAC

At 1220H, a platoon (VIC 244557) from Company E received fire from an unknown number of VC (VIC 241552). Fire superiority was gained the platoon followed by a sweep through the VC position, with negative results.

At 1350H, a squad size patrol from Company H discovered a cache of rice in a hut (VIC 294534) which was stored in six 55 gallon drums. Contact was made between the S-2 and the District Advisor who later collected the rice for redistribution.

At 1645H, Company E called for an Artillery fire mission on VC base camp. A platoon size patrol was dispatched to the area to obtain a damage assessment. The patrol found pieces of shrapnel covered with blood, and also blood trails leaving the camp. Result: (3) VC KIA (Prob)

At 2115H, a platoon from Company H (VIC 308537) spotted movement to their left front (VIC 313533). Small arms fire was delivered into the suspected enemies position. The area was searched with negative results.

10 December 1967

At 0915H, Company E (VIC 302587) encountered a Vietnamese boy 10 years old with a foot infection and diagnosed it as osteomyelitis. The Company Corpsman treated the youth's foot and attempted to make liaison with the Vietnamese doctor to further treat the boys foot.

At 1730H, the S-2 representative along with 5 ARVNs departed for the rice cache discovered by the squad patrol from H Company

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8 December. Prior to arriving at the hut which contained the force, 8 VC were spotted leaving the village. Supporting arms could not be requested due to the danger of inflicting casualties upon civilian personnel. The detail returned to the Battalion Command Post without making contact.

At 1950H, a squad from Company G (VIC 304547) while enroute to position a LP received small arms fire from (VIC 304547). Small arms and mortar fire was delivered by the squad on the enemy position with excellent coverage. Due to darkness the area could not be searched until the following morning.

At 2112H, a Company E road-block (VIC 310563) encountered 6 ARVN trucks with 1 ARVN officer. Each vehicle was searched and escorted to the road-block at the southern end of the Battalion position.

#### 10 December 1967

At 0715H, Company G dispatched a platoon size patrol to Coord. YD 304547 to check out the enemy's position who fired small arms into the company's defensive position at 1950H, 9 December. No enemy contact or other evidence was found.

At 1238H, a platoon size patrol from Company E (VIC 287514) received approximately 30 rounds of small arms fire from vicinity YD 287513. A squad leader was wounded. The patrol returned fire with approximately 600 rds of small arms fire. First aid was administered to the Squad leader and he was medevaced. ((1) VC KIA (Prob) was assessed)

At 1315H, Company E (VIC 287523) received approximately 50 rounds of automatic weapons fire from vicinity YD 295516) and YD 295556). The company gained fire superiority with small arms fire and an artillery mission. The enemy position was then searched with negative results.

#### 11 December 1967

At 1005H, a platoon (VIC 274532) from Company G spotted five VC located 50 meters to their front. The platoon fired small arms and requested an 81mm mortar fire mission. The area was checked out by a squad size patrol with negative results.

At 1150H, a squad size patrol from Company E encountered a Vietnamese boy 17 years of age without an ID card. The youth was turned to an S-2 representative who checked the young Vietnamese and later released him.

At 2245H, a Company G Listening Post spotted 3 Vietnamese approximately 50 meters from their position and threw one grenade with unknown results.

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At 0720H, a platoon from Company G received small arms fire while crossing a river (VIC 296541). The platoon gained fire superiority and swept the enemy position with negative results.

At 0930H, the patrol from Company E discovered an 81mm mortar dud and destroyed it in place.

At 1330H, the patrol from Company G Spotted 2 VC with weapons (VIC 267545). An artillery mission was requested on the enemy position. One VC body was seen flying through the air from a 105mm burst, resulting in (1) VC KIA (Conf)

13 December 1967

At 1225H, a platoon from Company E uncovered a booby-trap constructed from a 105mm round. The round was destroyed in place and the platoon sweep continued.

14 December 1967

At 1055H, Company E conducting a sweep in the vicinity YD 300500 discovered three 105mm dud rounds. All were destroyed in place.

At 1105H, Company E continuing their sweep received small arms fire from vicinity YD 300501. An artillery mission was called on the enemy position with excellent coverage. The enemy immediately broke contact. A search of the area was conducted with negative results.

At 1122H, the Company E rear elements received small arms fire from approximately 12 VC (VIC 307496). Fire superiority was immediately gained with small arms and 60mm mortar fire. The area was then searched with negative results.

15 December 1967

At 1000H, a Marine from a Company G platoon patrol detonated a 105 booby trap (VIC 286544), resulting in (1) USMC KIA, (2) USMC WIA MED-EVACS.

At 1505H, a Marine from Company E was injured when he walked behind a 3.5 rocket launcher which was being fired (VIC 305535).  
Result: (1) USMC NBC MEDEVAC

At 2005H, a Company H Listening Post (VIC 316533) received one round of sniper fire. The Listening Post moved to another position so as not to be detected.

At 2155H, movement was observed at the southern side of the Battalion perimeter. M-79's were fired at the suspected enemy position with unknown results.

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At 2235H, movement was again observed (VIC 311538). 60mm mortars were fired at the suspected enemy position with unknown results.

At 2240H, the Battalion Defensive position (Ai Tu Airfield) was brought under fire by enemy 82mm mortars. (VIC 298525). The enemy mortars struck the MAG-36 billeting areas, with only two rounds landing on the airstrip. One CH-46 and 4 UH34D helicopters were slightly damaged. Counter-mortar fire was immediately concentrated on the area of the enemy position with excellent coverage. It was later determined that approximately thirty rounds of 82mm mortars struck the Airfield complex; some equipped with VT fuses. The result was (A) MAG-36: (2) USMC KIA, (16) USMC WIA MEDEVACS (20) USMC WIANE (B) 2d Bn, 4thMar: (2) USMC WIA MED-EVACS.

16 December 1967

At 0605H, the roadblock to the north of the Battalion Perimeter received four rounds of small arms fire (VIC 298564). No action was taken.

At 0700H, a Company H platoon patrol found the sites of the 81mm Mortars that struck the Airfield on 15 December (VIC 302527). The aiming stakes were still in place, and there were several empty fuse cans in the area. There were fresh foot trails leading in a southerly direction from this position.

At 0800H, the Company H platoon patrol (VIC 296529) found one 105mm dud round and destroyed it in place.

At 0815H, the same patrol found newly rebuilt punji pits (VIC 301535). Each trap had fresh grass covering which looked only a few days old. All punji pits were destroyed.

At 1045H, a Company E squad patrol found two packs, six canteens, and medical supplies (VIC 305579). All this gear was returned to the Battalion Command Post.

At 1300H, the Company H platoon patrol (VIC 286525) received approximately two hundred rounds of enemy small arms fire from seven VC (VIC 285527) causing (2) USMC WIA MEDEVACS. The patrol immediately returned fire with M-16's, M-79's, M-60's, LAAWS, and 60mm mortars. While searching the area, 62 rounds of AK47 ammunition was found hidden in a haystack.

At 1400H, Company F rejoined the Battalion and was incorporated into the defense of the Ai Tu Airfield.

17 December 1967

At 1320H, the Battalion S-2 (VIC 307553), while working in a village, found two M-79 rounds and one M-26 grenade hidden in some thick grass. All items were destroyed in place. Two Vietnamese civilians were apprehended and held for questioning.

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At 1400H, Armed Propaganda Teams arrived at the Ai Tu Airfield. Broadcasts were made in the villages (VIC 298566) surrounding the airfield. The themes were Chieu Hoi and the Reward Program.

At 1745H, a Company G platoon patrol (VIC 287542) found several pools of blood and pieces of bone and flesh. Mess gear, two helmets, one poncho, and assorted pieces of clothing were also found in the area. It is believed that this incident was a result of H&I fires.

18 December 1967

At 0800H, a Company G platoon patrol (VIC 281538) received ten to twenty rounds of small arms fire from an enemy position (VIC 270539). The patrol immediately returned fire with small arms, and also called an artillery mission on the suspected enemy position. The area was then searched with negative results.

At 1015H, a Company F platoon patrol received a heavy volume of enemy small arms fire from three VC (VIC 313508), causing 1 USMC WIA MEDEVAC. The patrol immediately returned fire, and searched the area with negative results.

At 1835H, the Company F platoon patrol reported that the bridge (VIC 323539) was under fire. The patrol swept the area and apprehended four suspects who were turned over to the S-2.

At 2100H, the Sniper Team located in the observation tower at the Northern edge of the Battalion perimeter observed one male, armed, moving across the front of the Battalion's position (VIC 300566). The Sniper fired one round dropping the armed man. Upon a search of the area, no body could be found.

19 December 1967

At 0630H, the 81mm mortars while firing H&I's, had one short round (VIC 303571). No casualties were incurred.

At 1345H, a Vietnamese boy, 12 years old, was wounded by small arms fire when Marines and ARVN forces were engaged in familiarization firing. The boy was rushed to the Battalion Aid Station where he died.

At 1400H, Company E was dispatched from the Battalion position with the mission of setting up a Company Patrol Base in grid square 3150. The Company AO extended from vicinity 290477 North to vicinity 290520. The Company's primary mission was to deny the VC the use of the villages in its AO as harboring sites.

At 1802H, Company E received sporadic small arms and automatic weapons fire (VIC 295501). Fire was immediately returned, and the area was searched with negative results.

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At 1830H, Company E found one 105mm dud (VIC 291502), and one 105mm mortar dud (VIC 289499). Both duds were destroyed in place.

At 2353H, a Company H Listening Post (VIC 305530) observed five VC approximately fifty meters from its position. The enemy were taken under fire, but with unknown results.

20 December 1967

At 0645H, Company E (VIC 280552) received four rounds of sniper fire (VIC 277552). The enemy were taken under fire, but with negative results.

At 0915H, Company E (VIC 305500) received several rounds of small arms fire causing 3 USMC WIA MEDEVACS. The company immediately returned fire and called an artillery mission on the suspected enemy position. A search of the area was conducted with negative results.

At 0940H, a Company G platoon patrol received ten rounds small arms fire (VIC 274532). The enemy were taken under fire and the area searched with negative results.

At 1026H, Company E (VIC 309493) encountered three VC carrying carbines and dressed in camouflage utilities (VIC 292490). The point man engaged the enemy wounding one in the shoulder. The area was then searched, but with negative results.

At 1123H, Company E received five rounds of automatic weapons fire (VIC 303488). The enemy were taken under fire, but with negative results.

At 1350H, Company E received several rounds of small arms fire (VIC 291502), resulting in (1) USMC WIA MEDEVAC. No action was taken because the enemy's position could not be determined.

At 1750H, a Company E listening Post spotted four VC with weapons moving toward their position. The enemy were immediately taken under fire, and one VC was seen to drop, but the area was searched with negative results.

21 December 1967

At 0730H, Company G (VIC 231534) observed movement to the front of their lines. Six rounds of 60mm mortar were fired, and the area was searched with negative results.

At 0755H, a Company H patrol (VIC 277519) received twenty to thirty rounds of automatic weapons fire from two different directions (VIC 270526 and 276518) causing (1) USMC KIA. The enemy were immediately taken under fire, and an artillery mission was called on the enemy positions. The area was searched with negative results.

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At 1050H, the Company H patrol while moving in pursuit of an enemy sniper who had killed one Marine earlier received a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire from up to a platoon of VC (VIC 282523). The enemy were immediately taken under fire. Huey gunships were called into the area, and several artillery missions were fired at suspected enemy positions. The results were (1) USMC KIA, (5) USMC WIA MEDEVACS, and (1) USMC NBC. A search of the area was conducted with negative results.

At 1640H, a Company E (VIC 300955) received several rounds of small arms fire from the rear of their unit. Small arms and artillery fire were immediately returned but with negative results.

At 1745H, Company E (VIC 307544) received approximately one hundred rounds of small arms fire (VIC 308495). Fire was immediately returned, but with negative results.

At 2100H, a Company G ambush observed three lights signalling one another (VIC 275548). An artillery mission was called with unknown results. The lights, though, were then no longer visible.

22 December 1967

At 0815H, a Company G platoon patrol (VIC 279537) received approximately five rounds of small arms fire (VIC 275541). Small arms fire was returned, and the area was searched with negative results.

At 0915H, Company E observed four VC (VIC 298482). The company surrounded the enemy and after a short firefight captured one woman armed with a submachine gun and one male armed with an AK-47. Both prisoners were turned over to the S-2.

At 0930H, a Company E patrol spotted eight VC running across an open rice paddy (VIC 299490). The patrol opened fire with small arms, and observed four VC to fall, then to be carried off by the remaining four VC. A sweep of the area was conducted with negative results. The results were (4) VC KIA (Prob)

At 1445H, a Company G platoon patrol (VIC 274535) received twenty rounds of small arms fire from two different positions (VIC 280532 and 270530). The patrol immediately returned fire and searched the area with negative results.

23 December 1967

At 1450H, Company E encountered one suspicious male Vietnamese (VIC 312509). The male was apprehended and turned over to the S-2 for further interrogation.

At 2035H, one boat was observed on the river adjacent to the Battalion Position (VIC 310548). Huey gunships were called to check out the craft. The overflight was conducted with negative results.

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24 December 1967

At 0904H, a Company E Listening Post heard noises (VIC 314505) and observed twenty-five VC. The enemy were immediately taken under fire, and the area was searched but with negative results.

At 2221H, Company F observed movement to the front of their lines. One M-26 grenade was thrown with unknown results.

At 2250H, a Company H ambush (VIC 293534) heard drums from an adjacent village. The drums were answered by other drums to the west. No further activity was observed or heard.

25 December 1967

At 0800H, a Company G platoon patrol observed four VC with weapons approximately fifty meters from its point element (VIC 308496). No action was taken due to the Christmas Truce. The enemy made no attempt to fire on the Marines, but rather moved quickly out of the area.

At 0945H, the Company G patrol received ten rounds of small arms fire (VIC 302484). The patrol immediately returned fire and searched the area with negative results.

At 1100H, the Company G patrol observed six VC wearing grey sweat-shirts and carrying assorted weapons. No action was taken due to the Christmas Truce. The enemy quickly moved out of the area.

At 1515H, a Vietnamese civilian found and turned in three pressure-type land mines. The civilian was paid the standard reward, and the mines were destroyed.

At 1830H, a Company E platoon patrol received several rounds of small arms fire from an unknown number of VC. The patrol immediately returned fire and searched the area resulting in (1) VC KIA (Conf)

At 2245H, the Battalion perimeter (VIC 298555) received one incoming M-79 round from an unknown enemy position. No action was taken.

26 December 1967

At 0950H, a Company G platoon patrol received fifteen rounds of small arms fire. The patrol immediately returned fire and searched the area, but with negative results.

At 1445H, while Company H was familiarization firing its weapons at a makeshift range (VIC 314533), they received fifty rounds of small arms fire. The Marines immediately returned fire and searched the area but with negative results.

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1200H, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines assumed the responsibility for the defense of the Ai Tu Airfield. This Battalion began back-loading its personnel aboard designated ships in preparation for its move to Subic Bay, Philippines.

## 11. Results:

## VC/NVA LOSSES

17 KIA (Conf)  
 30 KIA (Prob)  
 2 PW  
 70 DETAINEES

## USMC LOSSES

6 KIA  
 41 WIA  
 37 WIANE  
 16 NBC

12. Administrative Matters.

a. Supply. Many problems were encountered when going through the supply system for combat essential equipment. In many cases weapons, radios, and other types of combat essential equipment were nearly impossible to procure. Many major items and major components were coded out of the system. When in-kind replacements were not available, weapons, radios, etc., had to be reshuffled to accommodate the rifle companies. As a result, H&SCo was usually far below TE. In many cases individual equipment was impossible to procure. Critical items were: Entrenching tools, Helmets, Ponchos and Jungle First Aid Kits.

b. Personnel and Casualties

(1) Replacements were indoctrinated, FAM fired and assigned to companies to maintain equal strength. Replacements were transported to the field via supply helicopter.

(2) There were no difficulties in the administration of casualty reporting. S-1 representatives were placed at all nearby medical facilities to insure prompt reporting. This proved especially beneficial for direct liaison with medical facilities at Dong Ha.

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c. Medical.

1. Navy Corpsman participated in connection with their respective companies.
2. Types of injuries:
  - a. Gunshot and shrapnel
  - b. Skin Disorders-Bacterial and Fungal, warm water immersion
  - c. Malaria, recurrent and falciparum
  - d. Gastric intestinal upsets, recurrent amoebiasis, non specific bacillary dysentery
  - e. Psychiatric
  - f. Burns from exploding cartridge and rocket back blast.
3. Daily foot care should be stressed. Foot sores which require up to 2 weeks to correct can be prevented.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques.

None

14. Commanders analysis.

The combat effectiveness of this Battalion was enhanced considerably during our participation in Operation OCEOLA. Not only were we refurbished logistically and personnel-wise during the period but the combat capabilities of the Battalion improved daily through training and experience.

We received hundreds of replacements in November and December including many key personnel. These newly arrived unit leaders and troopers alike received invaluable training and experience from the numerous small unit operations and patrols that took place during Operation OCEOLA.

Enemy contact ranging from light to medium was constant throughout the period. A steady improvement in the tactical employment of our units was evident as the weeks progressed. The tactical situation and the pacification program around the Ai Tu Air Base improved considerably in two months time. When we first arrived at Ai Tu, contacts with the VC and mining and booby-trap incidents were numerous. Bandit country was considered to be out a few hundred meters west of Highway #1.

As our perimeter around the airbase expanded we were able to occupy more ground. We also sent out companies deeper in search for the enemy. These operations and long range patrols kept the

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enemy off balance and pushed him well away from the airfield complex. Enemy contacts and incidents were reduced significantly during the latter stages of the operation; as our units became accustomed to the terrain and the enemy in the area, we maneuvered and employed our supporting arms more effectively.

Our military progress brought about an improvement in our relationship with the Vietnamese civilians in the Ai Tu area. We worked hard in our efforts to win these people over and with the help of Vietnamese Authorities and U. S. Advisors, our pacification program met with huge success.

I look for the coming weeks to bring about even more significant improvements in the tactical and pacification situation in the area. The progress made by the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines is only the beginning!

  
CHARLES W. KNAPP  
By direction