

CTG 79.4

00106-68

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HEADQUARTERS  
Battalion Landing Team 2/4  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

S&C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
2d BATTALION 4th MARINES (Refr)

3/WDZ/trf  
SerNo: 003A1168  
21 April 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander Task Group 79.4  
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1-31 March 1968

0065A-68  
Copy 1 of 26 Copies

Ref: (a) BrigO 5750.1C  
(b) FMFPacO 5150.8

Encl: (1) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), Enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

*Charles W. Knapp*  
CHARLES W. KNAPP  
By direction

DISTRIBUTION	No.
CTG 79.4	1-15
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GROUP-4  
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Declassified after 12 years

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B L T 2/4

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

Battalion Landing Team 2/4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I	ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
SECTION II	PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION
SECTION III	INTELLIGENCE
SECTION IV	OPERATIONS AND TRAINING
SECTION V	LOGISTICS
SECTION VI	COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
SECTION VII	FIRE SUPPORT
SECTION VIII	MEDICAL AND DENTAL
SECTION IX	PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED - LESSONS LEARNED
SECTION X	CHAPLAIN SUPPORT

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## SECTION I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation/Location. This report covers the period from 1 to 31 March 1968. From 010001H to 051130H March, BLT 2/4 (-) continued participation in Operation LANCASTER II under the OPCON of the 4th Marines. From 051130H March to 312400H March, BLT 2/4 (-) participated in Operation NAPOLEON/SALINE under the OPCON of the 3d Marines.

While OPCON to the 4th Marines (1-5 March), the BLT continued to operate from a base camp established at Hill 91 (YD 135557), it's primary mission was keeping open the access road to Camp Carroll and that portion of National Route 9 within the assigned AO; additional missions were to defend Camp Carroll from enemy attack from the northwest, west and southwest in the assigned AO, and to reinforce Ca Lu or Ton Son Lam (Rockpile) on order; the BLT was responsible for the security of the two bridges at coordinates YD 026562 and YD 043566, which were defended by Company F and the 2d Platoon of Company E, respectively.

In the Camp Carroll area, BLT 2/4 (-) conducted extensive patrolling, ambushing, and improvement of defensive fortifications and barriers. Concurrent training, especially in construction of field fortifications and combat patrolling, was stressed throughout the month.

On 4 March, Companies H and G were chopped back to BLT 2/4 and were helilifted to the present BLT 2/4 CP at Mai Xa Chanh (YD 280667). On 5 March Companies F and the Alpha Command Group were lifted to Mai Xa Chanh. Company E was helilifted to My Loc (YD 306650) and remained there until 7 March when it joined the BLT at Mai Xa Chanh.

By 051130H the move was completed, and the 3d Marines assumed OPCON of BLT 2/4.

The primary missions of BLT 2/4 were to keep the Cua Viet river open to Naval boating by controlling the north bank; to deny the "Jones Creek" drainage system (a known infiltration route) to the enemy; and to conduct search and destroy operations in the assigned AO. Five Battalion size operations of three rifle companies or more, as well as continual ambushing and patrolling highlighted this period.

The 4.2 inch mortar battery (W/3/12) moved from Camp Carroll to Mai Xa Chanh (YD 280667) but remained under OPCON of the 12th Marines. BLT 2/4's own tank and amphibian tractor platoons were in direct support of the BLT during this period but remained under the OPCON of the First Amtrac Battalion. The 1stPlt, Co A, 5thATBn remained under the OPCON of Task Force "Robbie" throughout this month. Hotel Battery (H/3/12) remained under the OPCON of the Twelfth Marines during the month.

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2

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2. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer, Staff and Principal subordinate T/O billet assignments.

Commanding Officer	LtCol W. WEISE
Executive Officer	Maj C. W. KNAPP
S-1	1stLt R. L. MORRIS
S-2	Capt R. J. MURPHY
S-3	Maj G. F. WARREN
S-4	Capt L.L. FOREHAND
Supply Officer	1stLt S. D. POMICHTER
Communications Officer	1stLt R. L. KLAUER
Motor Transport Officer	1stLt D. H. NEFF
Medical Officer	Lt F. P. LILLIS USN
Chaplain	Lt S. J. HABIBY USN
Dental Officer	Lt N. R. DIERS USN

Unit Commanders.

H&S Company	1stLt E. S. DAWSON
Company E	Capt J. E. LIVINGSTON
Company F	1stLt M. H. GAVLICK
Company G	to 20Mar68 - Capt M. S. VARGAS JR.
	fr 21Mar68 - Capt R. J. MASTRION
Company H	Capt J. L. WILLIAMS
Battery H, 3dBn, 12th Marines	Capt A. C. CONLON
Mortar Battery, 3dBn, 12th Marines	Capt F. X. SULLIVAN
Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv	1stLt E. D. DAWKINS
1stPlt, CoA, 5tnTkBn	to 07Mar68 - 1stLt L. D. KANE
	fr 08Mar68 - SSgt T. GARVIN
1stPlt, CoA, 5thATBN	2dLt R. D. SMITH
4thPlt, CoB, 1stAmTracBn	to 09Mar68 - GySgt R. H. SMITH
	fr 10Mar68 - 1stLt H. E. LINDFELT
2dPlt, CoB, 3dEngrBn	2dLt P. S. HAMILTON
3dPlt, CoC, 3dMTBn	to 09Mar68 - 1stLt D. L. FAUST
	fr 10Mar68 - 2dLt J. T. LASLIE
1stPlt, CoC, 3dSPBn	1stLt J. R. COGHILL
Logistic Support Unit, FLC	to 19Mar68 - 1stLt R. A. DESJARLAIS
	fr 20Mar68 - 1stLt B. L. SHERROW
1stPlt, CoD, 3dReconBn	1stLt C. W. MUTER
Collecting and Clearing Plt, CoD	
5thMedBn	Lt E. W. JOHNSON JR. USN

3

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1-31 March

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## SECTION II

UNCLASSIFIEDPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Period 1-31 March 1968

1. Personnel

a. The average monthly strength during the period:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers:	65	8
Enlisted:	1620	88

b. Critical MOS's and rank deficiencies were closely monitored and requested.

c. The following number of personnel were transferred during the month:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers:	9	0
Enlisted:	151	10

d. The following number of personnel were joined during the month:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers:	2	0
Enlisted:	109	6

e. The following casualties were incurred during this period:

KIA - 53	MIA - 0	INJURED - 15
WIA - 243	WIANE - 117	DOI - 2
DOW - 4	DISEASE - 4	OTHER - 22

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INTELLIGENCE

In Operation Lancaster II (1-5 March), the intelligence picture did not change from that reported for the previous month. In Operation Napoleon/Saline (5-31 March), BLT 2/4's AO had become the operating and infiltration route for six confirmed enemy units: the 270th Independent Regiment, the 3d Battalion of the 27th Regiment, 6th Battalion of the 52nd Regiment and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 803rd Regiment and, finally, the K-400 local force company.

Since many of these units were in a transitory or supporting roles, the effective enemy strength in this area averaged about two battalions. Effective enemy fighting strength was roughly 800, broken down as follows: 400 men from the 3d Battalion, 27th Regiment, 300 from the 4th Battalion, 270th Regiment and some 100 from the K-400 local force company.

Agent reports indicated that 2 or 3 companies of NVA operated on a 4-5 day rotating basis in the Lam Xuan (West)/Nhi Ha area. It was predominately from these villages and the village of Vinh Quan Thuong that the NVA operated. Their primary mission was to counter-sweep American patrolling operations and to close the Cua Viet river to U. S. traffic between Cua Viet and Dong Ha.

From 5-31 March there was only one mining incident of a U. S. boat in the Cua Viet River and firing at river traffic from the banks diminished to zero as a result of BLT 2/4 operations. BLT 2/4's extensive patrolling and search and destroy operations accounted for 364 NVA KIA's. Additionally, BLT 2/4 captured 9 POW's and detained some 47 additional persons. Since 5 March, BLT 2/4 captured 18 crew served weapons and 57 individual weapons and numerous items of ordnance. The totals are as follows:

- |  |                                    |
|--|------------------------------------|
| a. 32 AK-47's  | l. 104 RPG rkt rds                 |
| b. 22 SKS  | m. 1 57mm RR rd                    |
| c. 3 RPS-43's  | n. 19 cases of assorted 7.62 ammo  |
| d. 9 RPD's   | o. 2 cases of Russian 7.62 MG ammo |
| e. 5 RPG's   | p. 7 AT mines                      |
| f. 1 ChiCom Lt MG  | q. 6 NVA claymores                 |
| g. 121 ChiCom grenades   | r. 41 cases of 12.7 ammo           |
| h. 2 complete 60mm mortars plus<br>1 60mm mortar tube, 1 base plate<br>and 1 sight | s. 16 cases of 60mm fuzes          |
| i. 363 61mm rds  | t. 10 cans of detonators           |
| j. 254 82mm rds  | u. 45 cans of increments           |
| k. 34 75mm rds   | v. 8 cans of black powder          |
|  | w. 1 NVA Radio.                    |

Hundreds of items of enemy individual equipment and many documents were also captured.

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## SECTION IV

UNCLASSIFIEDOPERATIONS AND TRAINING1. OPERATIONS1-3 March 1968

During this period the battalion was operating northwest of Camp Carroll. The only significant contact made was when a recon patrol ran into an estimated 10-15 NVA at YD 023572 on 3 March. At 1630H on this same date the Battalion received the warning order to move to Mai Xa Chanh (YD 280667) to relieve BLT 3/1.

4 March 1968

The Battalion sent advance parties to BLT 3/1's position, and a liaison officer to the 3d Marines position (YD 246697). Companies G and H were chopped back to BLT 2/4 and were helilifted to Mai Xa Chanh.

5 March 1968

The remainder of the battalion (less Company E) was lifted to Mai Xa Chanh and came under the OPCON of the 3d Marines at 1135H. Company E was lifted to My Loc (YD 305680). Defensive responsibilities were assigned and construction of defensive positions started immediately.

6 March 1968

An unknown size NVA force launched a night ground attack against the Battalion perimeter which was preceded by a heavy mortar and rocket attack. It was repulsed by small arms, mortars and artillery night defensive fires. Only two Marines were slightly wounded and evacuated. In the morning 13 NVA bodies were found outside the perimeter. Enemy weapons collected were 13 individual, and 7 crew served, as well as numerous other ordnance items and pieces of NVA individual equipment.

7 March 1968

Company H and the 3d Platoon of Company F became heavily engaged during a battalion search and destroy operation which lasted through 9 March and involved all the rifle companies of the battalion. Friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 35 WIAE. In addition there were 7 KIA (Body not recovered).

8 March 1968

Battalion Search and Destroy operation continued. Company E seized a BLT objective at YD 257648 against heavy enemy resistance from well fortified

ENCLOSURE (1)

6

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positions. The enemy used artillery, rockets, mortars, automatic weapons and small arms. USMC casualties were 1 KIA and 14 WIAE. Enemy casualties were 15 KIA. Numerous weapons and equipment were captured. Also on 9 March at 1630H a BLT 2/4 LVTP-5 tractor struck a mine in the Cua Viet River resulting in 3 friendly KIA's (2 of the bodies were not recovered until several days later) and 1 WIAE.

9 March 1968

Search and Destroy Operation continued. Company H seized a BLT objective at YD 266658. The enemy suffered 2 KIA and there were 12 friendly WIAE.

10-11 March 1968

BLT 2/4 conducted aggressive patrolling and ambushes in assigned AO with light contact and recovered the bodies of 7 Marines listed as KIA (BNR) on 7 March 1968.

12-16 March 1968

On 12 March Company F made heavy contact with enemy in the heavily fortified village of Lam Xuan (East), YD 285689. The enemy was supported by artillery, rockets and mortars. Some of the Marines killed could not be recovered until 15 March. On 13 March, attempts by Company E and H to seize Lam Xuan (East) were unsuccessful. Three LVTP-5's became stuck in the Jones Creek. On 14 March, this village was subjected to heavy bombardment by air, naval gunfire and artillery. On 15 March the village was seized by Company E which was later joined by Company F. All bodies were recovered. The three LVTP-5's which became mired down in Jones Creek on 13 March were evacuated. Throughout the day heavy enemy artillery and rocket fire was received by BLT 2/4 units in the Lam Xuan area. All BLT units returned to Ma Xai Chanh by 0730H on 16 March.

Totals for this four day engagement were:

Enemy:	KIA - 67
	Weapons and Equipment
Friendly:	KIA - 17 (one body lost during recovery operations)
	WIAE - 59

16 March 1968

Hotel Company made heavy enemy contact while successfully extracting an eight man recon patrol which earlier made contact with a large enemy force at YD 261659, the fortified village of Van Quan Ha. 21 enemy were killed while friendly losses were 3 KIA (BNR) and 9 WIAE. The bodies were recovered on 18 March 1968.

17 March 1968

Plans were made and orders issued for a BLT (-) attack on the fortified village of Vinh Quan Ha.

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At 0345H the BLT (-) crossed the LOD and moved to attack positions. After a 12 hour battle which started at 0730, the objective was finally secured. The enemy was well equipped and fought from heavily fortified, mutually supporting bunkers and trench lines which were cleverly camouflaged. It was later determined from POW's that elements of 4 NVA battalions were located on the objective. Net results of the battle were: 127 enemy KIA's, 4 POW's; friendly losses were 17 KIA and 102 WIAE. Many crew served and individual weapons were captured along with numerous items of equipment, (the most significant of which was an HF radio complete with note book giving enemy call signs and unit designations).

20 March 1968

The CG, 9th MAB, Brigadier General CHIP, visited the Mai Xa Chanh BLT 2/4 CP and was given a briefing on recent combat operations. There was no enemy contact this day.

21 March 1968

Echo Company while patrolling to the north received 40 rounds of enemy artillery.

22 March 1968

While out on a patrol a platoon from Company H ran into an enemy force of unknown size at YD 265648. The Regimental Commander instructed the Battalion to break contact as soon as possible. Company H received enemy artillery and rockets during the contact. The platoon with the aid of the remainder of the Company was able to break contact by 1230H. Marine casualties were 8 WIAE's. Company F found five outer rings from the base plates of an unknown weapon on a stream bottom near the southwest tip of BLT 2/4 AO.

23-24 March 1968

Aggressive patrolling by BLT units resulted in various sightings but no significant contact.

25 March 1968

At 0710H enemy rockets were launched against Dong Ha Combat Base from a position west-northwest of Mai Xa Chanh. Counter battery fires were called in immediately. A Company H patrol found 6 NVA claymores booby-trapped with pressure release devices.

8

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26-28 March 1968

No significant contacts occurred. On the 28th, Company F found three freshly buried NVA bodies. During this period the companies conducted aggressive day and night activities, as well as live fire training in assaults on fortified positions.

29 March 1968

This was D-1 for 3d Marine Division Operation KILO (Phase I). BLT 2/4 (-) (Rein) participated under OPCON of the 3d Marines (-). Additional units included two ARVN Battalions, 1 U. S. Army Armored Cavalry Squadron and the 1st Amtrac Battalion (-). On this date the 3d Platoon of Company G secured Lam Xuan (East), (YD 285690) with no enemy contact. By late afternoon Companies H, E and the Alpha Command had moved to an attack position in the vicinity of YD 305684.

30 March 1968

The 3d Marine Division order directed that the 2d ARVN Regt. secure Lam Xuan (West), located just west of Jones Creek, prior to BLT 2/4 securing Nhi Ha, which is located on the east bank of Jones Creek, but north of Lam Xuan (West). Jones Creek was the east/west boundary between BLT 2/4 and the 2d ARVN Regt. The assault Companies G and F approached Nhi Ha (YD 272704) and were taken under small arms, mortar, and artillery fire by the enemy. Difficulties occurred in coordination with the ARVN to the west as much of the fire, both from ARVN and enemy units, received came from the west side of Jones Creek (which was outside of 2/4's left boundary) and could not be returned because of "friendlies in the area". Company E was ordered to move around the east flank of Company F to secure another objective, Hill 23 (YD 280719). This was accomplished, and shortly thereafter Hill 23 received intense enemy artillery fire. Because of the problem of coordination with the ARVN, permission to attack and secure Nhi Ha was not received from higher headquarters. Company G, which received most of the friendly casualties this day, had to remain in an exposed position while the ARVN unsuccessfully attacked Lam Xuan (West) throughout the 30th. Friendly casualties for the day were 17 WIAE. 17 detainees were sent to Regiment for questioning. Company G killed 6 NVA at Nhi Ha while one of the tanks with Company E killed 12 NVA with 90mm fire when a group of enemy was caught out in the open. Total enemy body count was 18.

31 March 1968

Company G took Nhi Ha with little resistance. A thorough search of the area was not possible as Company G had to vacate the objective in order to allow the 2d ARVN Regt. to seize Lam Xuan (West). A brief search did disclose some rocket-like rounds which were evacuated to Regiment. The battalion continued to maneuver forward securing objectives as it proceeded north. Throughout the day enemy artillery would sporadically come from the north, but an Aerial

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Observer and constant counter-battery kept the enemy's fire relatively ineffective and to a minimum. As the Companies swept the objectives they found enemy equipment, weapons, and ordnance. At YD 261738 Company H met a small pocket of resistance. In the ensuing battle 13 NVA were killed. Two of the NVA were armed with Soviet Model 1891 bolt action Sniper Rifles. Marine casualties were 1 KIA, and 12 WIA medevac. At the close of this period the battalion was still actively engaged in Phase I of Operation Task Force KILO just south of the southern boundary of the DMZ.

## 2. Training

a. When in the Camp Carroll area, BLT 2/4 was in the process of training squad leaders and squads in reconnaissance techniques by augmenting them with Reconnaissance platoon personnel, and sending them out on long range patrols and ambushes. Upon arriving at Mai Xa Chanh operational commitments became such that formal training was temporarily suspended. Near the end of the month however two areas were noted where training would definitely aid the battalion in current operations, these were:

(1) Attack of "A-Frame" fortified positions. Problems encountered earlier in the month when attacking fortified positions of the type found in this region pointed out the need for refresher training on techniques of assault on a fortified position. Tests were conducted on abandoned NVA bunkers to determine points of structural weakness for the assault teams employing LAAWS, 3.5 Rockets, Flame throwers, and 10 lb. C-4 Satchel charges. All rifle platoons and rifle squads in BLT 2/4 conducted live fire exercises in attacking these positions, and afterwards would inspect the damage to the bunkers to determine the effects of different assault techniques and the effects of the various weapons on different structural points on the bunkers.

(2) Night patrolling techniques employed by units in RVN were taught at the squad level by unit leaders and instructors from the attached Reconnaissance Platoon. Each day a squad would be picked to receive training from the recon instructors. At night the squad would "graduate", putting to use all that was taught earlier in the day, by participating in actual squad patrols which emphasized ambushes at each check point. Thus the Marines filled two roles: 1) as instructors and students receiving necessary field skills, and 2) they nightly screened the area northeast of the battalion and in reality were a part of the BLT's night activities.

b. Individual training consisted of instruction in individual and crew served weapons firing and employment plus required troop indoctrination and training of replacements received during this period. Safe handling of weapons was stressed at all levels.

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## SECTION V

LOGISTICS

1. The highlights of this reporting period included the displacement of the BLT (-) from the vicinity of Camp Carroll to Mai Xa Chanh and the displacement ashore from the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) of the administrative rear echelon of the BLT. Both moves were administrative in nature. The latter move was required because the ARG/SLF ships sailed for Subic Bay, P. I. for scheduled upkeep/rehab.

2. The occupation of Mai Xa Chanh posed many new problems. Initially the rapid build-up of supplies above daily requirements placed a strain on the logistic system. The Shore Party Platoon (-) was utilized in the construction and establishment of an ISA that has many similarities to a BSA. Water transportation of all classes of supplies was the only satisfactory means due to weight considerations and lack of roads and heavy lift helicopter support. Within four days after arrival, required levels of class I thru V supplies were on position.

3. The rapid build-up of supplies on position was accomplished utilizing NSA boating from Dong Ha. This boating was initially provided on an informal and voluntary basis. The excellent cooperation of Lt (j.g.) FELTS USN, Naval Support Activity, VN, Detachment Dong Ha proved to be invaluable. This support and cooperation continues.

4. The importance of maintaining a small logistic rear within close proximity to the supporting establishment, in this case FLSG-B, cannot be over-emphasized. This rear echelon insured continuous liaison with supporting maintenance and supply activities. It resulted in excellent supply support and rapid repairs of deadlined equipment at Dong Ha Combat Base. The following personnel were assigned to this "Logistics Rear" and proved optimum for the purpose:

- 1 Supply Man
- 1 Ammunition Technician
- 1 Small Arms Repair Technician
- 1 Helicopter Support Team
- 3 2 1/2 ton trucks w/drivers
- 2 1/2 ton trucks w/drivers
- 3 M274A2 with drivers
- 1 RTF, 3000 lb. w/operator
- 1 Motor Transport Mechanic
- 1 Motor Transport Dispatcher
- 1 Officer in charge

5. Maintenance support was generally satisfactory, however there were instances of unacceptable downtime of equipment. Specific causes were (1) refusal of equipment by FLSG-B because of no equipment records; (2) refusal of equipment by FLSG-B due to the lack of 1st and 2d echelon maintenance

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being performed; (3) the refusal of equipment by FLSG-B due to the selective exchange of parts (cannibalization) being accomplished prior to turn in; (4) refusal to accept equipment due to the use of 9th MAB appropriation data being cited. In each incident the appropriate personnel were contacted as soon as possible by the BLT S-4 and corrective action was taken.

6. Additional delays resulted from misunderstanding of "in-country" units as to the responsibilities of "in-country" activities for SLF/BLT supply and maintenance while the BLT is OPCON to "in-country" commands. Through close coordination with the 3d Marine Division G-4 and the CO, FLSG-B the foregoing problems were resolved.

7. During the period 15-29 March when the ARG and SLF were out of country and the SLF helicopter squadron was not available for direct support, minor delays in transportation were experienced. This problem had been anticipated and did not become serious because of the excellent cooperation of FLC in obtaining helicopter support for the movement of supplies from Danang to Dong Ha. The procedures established during this period will be put into effect for emergency use during future periods of non-availability of SLF support.

8. Logistic support for normal operations experienced no unsolvable problems. The support required for BLT operations have, in some cases, necessitated assistance from the OPCON Regiment. Experience proved that the infantry regiment lacks the resources to provide all assistance required. It was found that utilizing a direct link to supporting activities was essential for adequate logistical support. Direct liaison and support from the support activities to the BLT proved to be highly satisfactory and also reduced the burden on the OPCON Regimental Staff.

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## SECTION VI

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

1. Mutual interference, caused by numerous radios in the same frequency range operating in close proximity to each other continues to be acute. The problem is even more difficult within the BLT due to the frequent changes of location required by the tactical situation. This problem has been reduced by closely monitoring, changing frequencies and selecting those with a minimum of interference for the most important nets. Spare frequencies from higher headquarters are necessary to accomplish this.

2. Additional Problem areas were:

a. Problem: Seven Radios operating simultaneously in the Command Tractor (LVTC) with power outputs ranging between 3 and 35 watts causing mutual interference.

Solution: Remote away from the Command Tractor all radios utilizing the AN/GRA-39 remote, which have over 3 watts power output. This helps eliminate frequency override and mutual interference.

b. Problem: Long Range Communications. The operating range of an AN/PRC-25 radio is 3-5 miles. This is often reduced to as little as 1 3/4 miles useful operating range due to weather and terrain features.

Partial Solution: The AT-271 whip antenna increases this range to approximately 4 miles. However, due to the frequent breaking of these antennae when moving rapidly in brush and "hitting the deck" during incoming, the use of the whip antennae is limited. The radio operator with a whip antenna is also a prime target for enemy snipers and artillery FO's also, replacements for broken whip antennae have been difficult to obtain through the supply system.

c. Problem: Radio Communications between the FSCC and FO's

Solution: This problem can be eliminated by the use of the RC 292 antenna by the FSCC operators. An RC 292 should always be carried by the FSCC and erected whenever the situation permits. FO's may continue utilizing whip or tape antennas.

d. Problem: Operator Maintenance of Communications-Electronics equipment, i.e., radios and telephones.

Solution. The problem of operator maintenance is a never-ending problem. However the use of plastic bags for dirt-proofing and water-proofing will increase the life span of this equipment.

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## SECTION VII

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

## 1. ARTILLERY

Type	Total Missions	H&I's	Rds Expended
a. 105mm	225	279	7904 HE 530 WP 34 ILL 29 HCS 6 CS
b. 155mm	15	---	438 HE 78 WP 15 ILL 45 HCS
c. 4.2 inch Mortar	89	10	3407 HE 289 WP 2 ILL 113 CS
d. 81mm Mortar	246	47	4322 HE 332 WP 89 ILL

Results: 27 Confirmed NVA KIA's  
6 Secondaries

## 2. Naval Gun Fire

a. NGF	44	179	7534 HE
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3. Air Support. During the period 4-31 March the following air support was provided BLT 2/4:

a. Medevac missions	43
b. C&C flights	3
c. CAS	
(1) UH-1E (Armed)	36
(2) Fixed Wing	14
(3) AO	18
d. CSS (TPQ) Missions	40

14

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## SECTION VIII

MEDICAL AND DENTAL

1. Significant Events: None
2. New Developments: None
3. Problem Areas: Marked increase in rodent population causing an increase in rodent bites.
4. Average daily number of patients seen 15  
Total number of patients for March 1968 460
5. Number of referrals to NSA, Danang, USS REPOSE and USS SANCTUARY 53
6. Routine Complaints:
- |                     |     |
|---------------------|-----|
| a. Diarrhea         | 1   |
| b. URI              | 8   |
| c. Dermatitis       | 14  |
| d. EENT             | 5   |
| e. Venereal Disease | 8   |
| f. Immersion Foot   | 0   |
| g. Others           | 366 |
| h. Rabies Shots     | 58  |
7. Significant disease areas
- |            |   |
|------------|---|
| a. Malaria | 0 |
| b. FUO     | 0 |
8. Number of Emergencies
- |                    | Total | Evac | KIA | DOW |
|--------------------|-------|------|-----|-----|
| a. Burns           | 11    | 7    | 0   | 0   |
| b. Lacerations     | 7     | 0    | 0   | 0   |
| c. Heat Casualties | 7     | 7    | 0   | 0   |
| d. Shrapnel Wounds | 212   | 127  | 2   | 0   |
| e. Gunshot Wounds  | 95    | 66   | 50  | 2   |
| f. Others          | 31    | 19   | 1   | 0   |
9. Immunizations and Prophylactics administered 58  
Dental Referrals 4
10. Officers - included in total count
- |  |   |
|--|---|
| a. Officers seen at sick call                        | 3 |
| b. Evacuated with shrapnel wounds and gunshot wounds | 7 |

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SECTION IX  
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND LESSONS LEARNED

1. Item: KC Scouts and Interrogation Translator Teams.

a. Comment: If at all possible the KC Scouts and Interrogation Translator Teams should be immediately assigned to units being moved into a new area of operations. This is especially true in the case of the Battalion Landing Teams which move frequently. Each of the BLT's for example could utilize these teams prior to and after landing for area orientation. KC Scouts would also be helpful in assisting unit leaders during the planning phase of operations. Having Interpreters and ITT teams available to attach to companies during operations would be a valuable asset to the unit commander when he has encountered Vietnamese or captured enemy suspects who might have intelligence of immediate tactical value.

b. Lessons Learned: When the KC Scouts were attached, information from the scouts to unit commanders were invaluable in selecting ambush sites, sniper positions, etc. because these men knew the area and had military experience. The ITT has been especially valuable when an enemy suspect was captured. On small unit size operations the ITT in interrogating suspects on the spot revealed pertinent information which enabled the unit leader to make more effective decisions and better accomplish his mission.

2. Item: Patrol/Ambush Training Techniques (Squad Level)

a. Comment: It has been noticed that at squad level there is continual need for additional training in both of the above categories. In conjunction with other operational commitments one rifle squad of this BLT attends a sixteen hour training program conducted by personnel from the attached Reconnaissance Platoon. The scheduled training consists of four hours of classes followed by an eight practical application period in an assigned area.

b. Lessons Learned: A considerable improvement of each squad completing this period of instruction has been noted by unit commanders during recent operations.

3. Item: Attack of a Fortified Position (A-Frame Bunker)

a. Comment: It is well known to the Marines conducting operations in the I Corps Area that A-Frame type bunkers have the capability to withstand an enormous amount of punishment from supporting arms, LAAW's and 3.5 Rockets. To effectively assault the A-Frame bunker a weak point had to be found in the A-Frame structure. During practice attacks on A-Frame bunkers by several rifle squads it was discovered that placing the satchel charge three feet up from the bottom on either side of the bunker, instead of inside the aperture not only caused considerable damage to the bunker but provided a safety lane for the demolition team without fully exposing them to the bunkers field of fire (that is, the aperture).

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b. Lesson Learned: That a safety lane could be provided to the demolition team without exposing them to enemy fire from the opening in the bunker. It was also discovered that a Marine armed with two LAAW's could maneuver easier towards the bunker than the 3.5 Rocket Launcher Man and still be effective against the obstacle.

4. Item: AT 271AW/PRC "Whip" antenna.

a. Comment: Due to the difficulty in obtaining AT271's, another type of antenna had to be devised for long range transmissions. Long strips of WO-1/TT wire cut to the proper length matching the frequency helped increase the range of the set when whip antennae are not available.

b. Lesson Learned: That WO-1/TT wire can be utilized effectively when the emergency need arises.

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## SECTION X

CHAPLAIN SUPPORT

## CHURCH SERVICES:

1. Conducted by BLT Chaplain

<u>No:</u>	<u>Attendance:</u>
105	1456

2. Memorial Services Conducted by BLT Chaplain

6

718

3. Roman Catholic Services Conducted by visiting Chaplains

8

250

4. Lay Leader Services

- a. Roman Catholic

16

126

- b. Protestant

1

8

Total Services: 136  
 Total Attendances: 2556

5. Counselling: 30 persons

6. Persons Visited at BAS: 150

7. Lay Leader Instruction: 7

8. Received outstanding support from all concerned.

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