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HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)
660140

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3/7

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

3d BATTALION, 4th MARINES (-)(REIN)

1-30 JUNE 1966

4TH MARINES (REIN)
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By Command of LtCol S. A. VALE

Clark G. Henry
CLARK G. HENRY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps

June 1966

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SECTION I

a. Organizational data, including attachments:
3d Battalion, 4th Marines

(1) Designation/locations:
See attached overlay.

(2) Period covered: 1 June - 30 June 1966

(3) Commanding Officer:	LtCol S. A. VALE
S-1	1stLt J. E. RICKMON
S-2	2ndLt M. T. HOPGOOD
S-3	Capt W. E. McKENNA
S-4	1stLt D. A. GRANT
CommO	Capt C. R. MITCHELL
H&S Co	Capt C. R. MITCHELL
I Co	Capt F. W. TUCKWILLER
K Co	Capt R. J. MODREJEWSKI
L Co	Capt T. F. JESSEN
M Co	Capt R. E. AKINS

(4) Average Monthly Strength:	<u>Marine</u>	<u>USN</u>
a. Officers	22	3
b. Enlisted	900	53

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1. PERSONNEL

- a. Number of replacements received:
- | | |
|---------------|----|
| USMC Officers | 1 |
| USMC Enlisted | 69 |
| USN Officers | 0 |
| USN Enlisted | 4 |
- b. Number of personnel rotated:
- | | |
|---------------|-----|
| USMC Officers | 8 |
| USMC Enlisted | 202 |
| USN Officers | 0 |
| USN Enlisted | 6 |
- c. Breakdown of personnel lost other than rotation:
- (1) WIA: 12
 - (2) Died of wounds: None
 - (3) KIA: 1
 - (4) Humanitarian/Emergency transfers: 3 Enlisted
 - (5) Non-Battle injuries: 1
 - (6) IntraDiv/Regt transfers: 1 Officer and 1 Enlisted
- d. R&R Trips: 1

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- a. At the beginning of the period approximately two local force guerrilla companies were operating in the area between highway #14 in the east YC 895995, the Truoi River in the west YC 995963, highway #1 in the north YD 955067, and in the south YC 905961 to YC 992962. The 810th Battalion was believed to be somewhere in the vicinity of YC 9093. The 810th, with a strength of approximately 100 men, is believed to control and direct the operations of the guerrillas in their efforts to collect rice and taxes from the local Vietnamese farmers and villages along the Truoi River from YD 9700 to 9813.
- b. Other units thought to be in the area, but with locations unknown include: The U/I Battalion, a local force organization with a strength of approximately 300; K-41 Company, a main force outfit with about 70 men; and Huong Thuy, a Main Force company with about 75 people.

2. Enemy Incidents During Period. See SECTION IV3. Enemy Losses. 3 KIA Confirmed 22 KIA Probable 22 WIA Probablea. Enemy Equipment and Material Losses.

(1) Weapons: 7 Total

(a) Individual: 2 Chicom 7.62 carbines, 3 Chicom K-50 SMG, 2 Carbines (US)

(b) Ammunition: 16 Chicom Grenades, 2 1/4 blocks of TNT

(c) Equipment: 3 pouches (US), 1 web Belt, 1 plastic canteen, documents, assorted personal gear and clothing.

4. Significant Trends During Period. Reports obtained from the villagers, information translated from captured enemy documents,~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

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and intelligence received from the PHU LOC District Army Advisor revealed that the enemy was forced to utilize other routes and areas in obtaining his taxes and rice. The increasing lack of enemy contact, the farmers repossessing their formerly abandoned outlying rice fields and the friendly attitude of the people towards Marines indicated a decrease of enemy activity in the area. Intercepted letters from VC guerillas gave evidence that Marine operations in the area were making it increasingly difficult for the VC to obtain their logistic necessities of food and medical supplies.

5. Enemy Situation At End of Period. The expansion of the PHU BAI TAOR and Operations Wayne and Athens, conducted in the Truc River area have caused the enemy to shift his operations eastward to the PHU LOC area (ZD 085008) and the BACH MA (ZC 0692) secret resort area. It appears that the 804th and 810th Battalions are operating in THUA THIEN Province and controlling the approximately 750 guerillas who operate in the LOC DIEN, LOC TRI, LOC THUY, and LOC TU districts. The lack of friendly forces in the populated areas around the villages of THON SACH CHU (ZC 085995), THON THUY CAM (ZC 149987), and THON THUY TIU (ZD 009192) has allowed the enemy relative freedom of action in these particular areas. The BACH MA resort area (ZC 0692) is believed to be utilized by the VC as a rest and medical center. The VC have established a pattern of moving into the local villages during the night and departing for their jungle and mountain retreats before first light. If no unusual activity takes place in the morning (ie, USMC Heliborne Operations are usually launched in the AM), the VC move back into the villages and spend the day.

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SECTION IVOPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. The following training was conducted by 3d Battalion, 4th Marines during the period of 01 June to 30 June.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
India Co	20 June	1300-1500	FO Theory and Practice
Kilo Co	03 June	0800-1000	Wire laying - 2 strand apron and concertina
		1300-1600	Bunker construction
	04 June	0800-1200	Scouting and Patrolling
		1400-1800	Technique of Ambushes
	06 June	0900-1100	Mines, booby traps, and flares
	10 June	0800-1600	Wire laying - 2 strand apron and concertina
	18 June	1300-1400	FO Theory and Practice
	19 June	1300-1400	FO Theory and Practice
Lima Co	22 June	1300-1630	FO Theory and Practice
	23 June	1300-1630	FO Theory and Practice
Mike Co	13 to 23 June	1400-1500	FO Theory and Practice
H&S Co (S-2)	20 June	0800-1200	FO Theory and Practice
		1300-1600	FO Theory and Practice
	21 June	0800-1200	FO Theory and Practice
		1300-1600	FO Theory and Practice
22 June	0800-1200	FO Theory and Practice	
	1300-1600	FO Theory and Practice	
106RR Plat	02 June	0800-1000	Nomenclature of 106RR
	07 June	0900-1100	Fire of 106RR

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	08 June	0800-1200	Care and cleaning 106RR
	09 June	0800-1200	Care and cleaning 106RR
	10 June	0800-1200	Care and cleaning 106RR
	17 June	0800-1000	Assembly and dis-assembly of 106RR
	18 June	0900-1030	P.M. 106RR and Mule
	19 June	0900-1200	P.M. 106RR and Mule
Comm Plat	01 June	0900-1000	Care and maintenance of the AN/PRC-6 and AN/PRC-10
	02 June	0900-1000	Radio and Wire procedure
	03 June	0900-1000	Proper message drafting
	04 June	0900-1000	Care and cleaning of the TA-1 and EE-8
	05 June	0900-1000	Proper construction of the RC-292
	06 June	0900-1000	Operation of the AN/PRC-6 and trouble-shooting
	07 June	0900-1000	Operation of the AN/PRC-10 and trouble-shooting
	08 June	0900-1000	Operation of the AN/PRC-25
	09 June	0900-1000	Operation of the AN/PRC-41
	10 June	0900-1000	Comprimises over radio circuits
	11 June	0900-1000	Water proofing the AN/PRC-6 and AN/PRC-10
	12 June	0900-1000	Security
	13 June	0900-1000	Communications in Jungle Terrain

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	14 June	0900-1000	Operation of the AN/MRC* 38
	15 June	0900-1000	Operation of the AN/MRC- 83
	16 June	0900-1000	Message drafting
	17 June	0900-1000	Proper grounding of equip- ment
	20 June	0900-1000	Authnication
	21 June	0900-1000	Operation of the SB-22
	22 June	0900-1000	Operation of the AN/PRC-47
	23 June	0900-1000	Care and cleaning of equipment
	24 June	0900-1000	Field wire construction
	27 June	1300-1400	Message Drafting
	28 June	0900-1000	Retransmission
	29 June	0900-1000	Operation of the AN/PRC-87
	30 June	0900-1000	Authnication
New Person- nel to Bn.	01 June	1300-1500	45 personnel attended Indoctrination program
	03 June	1300-1500	5 personnel attended Indoctrination program
	12 June	1300-1500	4 personnel attended Indoctrination program
	13 June	1300-1500	1 person attended Indoctrination program
	20 June	1300-1500	3 personnel attended Indoctrination program
	22 June	1300-1500	1 person attended Indoctrination program

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24 June	1300-1500	19 personnel attended Indoctrination program
25 June	1300-1500	8 personnel attended Indoctrination program
26 June	1300-1500	10 personnel attended Indoctrination program
27 June	1300-1500	3 personnel attended Indoctrination program
28 June	1300-1500	7 personnel attended Indoctrination program
81mm Mort Plat 12 to 30 June	0900-1100 0100-0400	Dry-gun drill Live fire
Motor Trans- port	0730-1030 1300-1600 1800-1900	Preventive Maintenance Rough-terrain Operation Weekly P. M.
13 June	0730-1030 1300-1400 1400-1600 1800-1900	Safe operation and pre- ventive maintenance Classes on DD 110/SF Form 91 Deep-water fording Weekly P. M.
25 June	0730-0800	Safe driving and local driving rules and con- ditions

2. Command and control.

a. Company I was placed under OPCON of 4th Marine Regiment 01 June 1966.

b. 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, Company K placed under OPCON 4th Marine Regiment as security for USS MAURY on 02 June 1966.

c. Company I returned to OPCON of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 11 June 1966.

d. 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, Company K was returned to OPCON 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 12 June 1966.

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e. Company I was placed under OPCON 4th Marines on 16 June 1966.

f. Company I was returned to OPCON of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 23 June 1966.

g. Company I was placed under OPCON 4th Marine Regiment, Company L and 3d Platoon, Company K were placed under OPCON of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, Company M was placed under OPCON of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines on 25 June 1966.

h. 2d Platoon, Company I and 3d Platoon, Company K were returned to OPCON 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 28 June 1966.

3. NBC. Nothing significant to report.

4. Close Combat.

01 June.

(a) At 011313H, L-3-C received sniper fire from 1 VC. Sniper at ZD 000000. Arty fire mission called. Co L fired 60mm mortars and S/A.

02 June.

(a) At 021847H, Co L CP spotted 35 VC in open moving south up hill at YD 994003. Arty mission fired w/complete coverage of target. 17 possible VC KIA's and 18 possible VC WIA'S.

(b) At 021105H, 2d Plat, Co L patrol apprehended 1 VCS approx 50 years of age, no I.D. card in possession, working in rice paddy along, no other Vietnamese in area. Took VCS to Co M CP for interrogation. Interrogation proved VCS to be friendly and returned to village.

03 to 04 June. Negative enemy contact.

05 June.

(a) At 051132H, the 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, Company L reinforced with a MG squad came under what was believed to be sniper fire in the vicinity of YC 989002. The patrol sustained 2 USMC WIA's, and a third casualty due to a sprained knee. MED EVAC helo was called and was driven off by heavy automatic and semi-automatic weapons. The MED EVAC helo was hit and withdrew without the casualties.

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Arty fire boxed in the patrol as a result of a HUEY observation that the patrol was surrounded on three sides by VC. The HUEY provided fire power support, and the casualties were then evacuated by helo. A 5 man relief team was dispatched by helo to reinforce the patrol but due to the superior VC numbers the remainder of the original patrol and the 5 man relief team were extracted. Arty, fixed wing and helo aircraft continued to fire into the area after the evacuation. Results of the action: USMC - 2 WIA and 1 non-hostile. VC casualties - unknown.

(b) At 052030H, L-22 patrol/ambush was sprung on 3-5 VC at ZD 010014. Results - 2 USMC WIA, 1 VC KIA.

06 June.

(a) At 062030H, the 2d Sqd, 3d Plat, Company L observed 3-6 VC at YD 983019 and ambush was sprung on lead element. Results - negative.

07 to 11 June. Negative enemy contact.

12 June.

(a) At 121035H, the 1st Plat, Company K patrol spotted 1 VC and fired on same. Then the patrol spotted 13 other VC and called artillery fire mission at YD 894998. Results - 1 VC WIA. Search of area resulted in capture of one molotov cocktail, one canteen and personnel effects.

13 June. Negative enemy contact.

14 June.

(a) At 142245H, the 3d Plat, Company M OP spotted 4 VC at YD 969068. VC were fired upon and one rounds of S/A were returned. Area searched by action force with negative results.

15 to 16 June. Negative enemy contact.

17 June.

(a) At 170335H, Company M spotted 1 VC at YD 968102. 81mm illumination (4 rds) and 200 rds S/A were fired. Search of area was conducted with negative results.

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(b) At 172103H, TPS-21 reported movement of approximately a squad at YD 925063. Fired 60mm mortars under illumination. Negative results on search of area.

18 June.

(a) At 182315H, Company K LP spotted 1-3 VCS 200 meters in front of their position. LP fired upon VCS and figures moved out in a northerly direction. LP moved to a new position and area was searched at first light with negative results.

19 June. Negative enemy contact.

20 June.

(a) At 200345H, 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, Company K ambush opened fire upon 4 VCS in vicinity of YD 929061. Area was searched at first light with negative results.

(b) At 201040H, 1st Plat, Company K made contact with 1 VC at YD 869015. Fired 1 rd S/A at VC and after searching area found pool of blood. Results - 1 VC WIA. At 201100H, 1st Plat, Company K again made contact with estimated 3-5 VC. Fired upon VC and VC returned fire; 40 to 100 rds S/A with automatic carbine. 2 VC were seen to be hit. Large pools of blood were found indicating 1 VC WIA and 1 VC KIA (probable). Recovered on pair of sandals. Received 1 friendly WIA, MED-EVAC.

(c) At 202225H, Company L fired on suspected movement at YD 969020 with negative results.

(d) At 202314H, Company L called in fire mission on blinking light at ZD 006008. Artillery fired 18 rds on target. Company L maintained surveillance of area.

21 to 30 June. Negative enemy contact.

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1. Support of Operation ATHENS continued until 25 June 1966. No unusual problems were encountered. On 25 June 1966 two rifle companies and the Battalion command post were transported to the Phu Bai Vital Area from the ATHENS area of operation.
2. Two critical logistic shortages were filled in the last month. The battalion received two (2) kerosene operated refrigerators and four (4) water trailers. One (1) of these water trailers is on temporary loan to 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. In addition, a PU-239 generator was received.

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1. DURING OPERATION AT HENS THE RADIO RELAY SET, AN/TRC-27 WAS EMPLOYED FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN BATTALION AND REGIMENT;
COMMUNICATIONS WAS UNSATISFACTORY DUE TO THE CONSTANT POWER FAILURE USING THE PU/278 GENERATOR.
2. RECOMMENDATIONS: THAT A MORE SUITABLE GENERATOR BE EMPLOYED WHEN USING THE AN/TRC-27.

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1. Significant Events:

a. On 011315H June a squad patrol of 3d Bn, 4th Marines was pinned down by sniper fire. Artillery was called and the squad was able to break contact.

b. On 021915H June an artillery mission was called on 35 VC. India Battery, 3/12 expended 308 rounds, and Mike Battery, 4/12 fired 16 rounds of reinforcing fire. The area was searched the next morning, however no enemy bodies were discovered.

c. On 051220H June a squad patrol of 3-4 was securing a Med-Evac zone when choppers received S/A fire. At once it was apparent that the squad was, in fact, surrounded by VC; artillery was called and effectively neutralized the area so that the squad could be extracted.

d. Many illumination missions were called to support 3-4 line companies when they had sprung ambushes or for surveillance of areas of suspected movement. Blocking fires were also used effectively on possible enemy escape routes after contact with friendly forces had been broken.

e. Surveillance of missions:

KIA possible - 23

WIA possible - not determined by S-2.

Material - 14 huts, 3 log bunkers, and 1 stone enclosure neutralized.

Other - 2 secondary explosions, 7 fires started.

Known enemy routes, assembly areas, OP's, watering points, and camp sites were harrassed and interdicted throughout the area of operations.

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f. During the month of June fifty hours were devoted to FO school - split between theory and practice shooting. Besides the FO's and scout sergeants who support 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, recipients of the schooling were trainee scout sergeants, unit leaders of 3-4 on all levels, the S-2 scouts of 3-4, and a Regimental recon section (4th Marines). Seventy four practice missions were fired in this training period.

g. Operation Athens was terminated at 0800, 25 June. India Battery, 3/12 directly supporting 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on this operation fired a total of:

Shell	High Explosive	10,137
	White Phosphorous	987
	Illumination	106
	Smoke	10
	High Explosive Plastic Tracer	3
Total rounds during Athens		11,243

2. Artillery Units:

- a. India Battery, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines
- b. Mike Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines

3. Navel Ships - None

4. Type of Missions:

Observed	120
Unobserved	3
Service Practice	74
H&I's	1,259
Registration	0
Destruction	0

5. Ammo expended by Shell and Unit:

a. India Battery 3/12

105 HE - 4,622; 105 ILL - 56; 105 WP - 492; 105 HEPT - 3

b. Mike Battery 4/12

155 HE - 122; 155 ILL - 18

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~~~SECRET~~SECTION VIIIAIR SUPPORT - DEFENCE1. Air Support.

a. The Battalion Air Support requirements for the month of June were very limited. A total of sixteen (16) missions were flown in support of the Battalion during June, the majority of which were medical evacuations and resupply missions.

b. The Battalion used the TPQ - 10 radar bombing capability more extensively in June than in preceding months. Attacks on point targets and area saturation using this equipment were considered a very effective means of support.

c. On several occasions helicopters have passed through the Battalion operating area, and some times landed in the area, without calling the Battalion beforehand. Many times artillery fire in our operating area had to be ceased suddenly because of this traffic. It is requested that in the future all helicopters contact the unit involved prior to entering and/or landing in the units operating area, or that the unit be notified by the controlling agency that the aircraft will be in their area. This practice will help eliminate the possibility of aircraft accidently flying through an artillery barrage.

2. Air Defence. Nothing significant to report.~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

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MEDICAL/DENTAL AFFAIRS1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

a. "Operation Athens" ended 1000 25 June 1966. BAS Forward returned with the C.P. Forward.

b. A refrigerator was installed in the BAS 26 Jun 66 and now biologicals, penicillin, etc, can be maintained locally.

2. MEDICAL TRENDS

a. Negative report this month.

3. MEDICAL SUPPLY

a. A special trip was made to Division Surgeon and FLSG (Medical) at DaNang to expedite the laboratory equipment and supplies by our supply petty officer but no supplies were available.

b. A complete inventory was made of both the 10 day mount-out and 20 day K & L block and any defeciencies were ordered.

4. BATTLE CASUALTIES

a. K.I.A. - One (1)

b. W.I.A. - Six (6)

5. NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

a. Nine accidents for this reporting period.

6. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

a. Lecturing to all SNCO's, officers, and Medical personnel by the Battalion Surgeon on preventive medicine concerning malaria based on the most recent data from PMU, NSA, DaNang, RVN has taken place.

7. CIVIL AFFAIRS RENDERED

a. (1728) Vietnamese civilians have been seen and treated by our MedCAP personnel in Loc An, Loc San, and Loc Diem during this reporting period.

8. PROBLEM AREAS

a. It is again repeated platoon leaders should inspect routinely jungle-kits of all their men to insure they have required items, with special emphasis on battle-dressings, salt, and malaria tablets.

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~~~SECRET~~SECTION XCIVIL AFFAIRS - PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES

1. During the period of 15 May 1966 to 25 June 1966 sick call was held for 2849 Vietnamese, 988 persons were assisted, 1496 bars of soap, two (2) carpenter kits, 800 lbs of clothing and 150 lbs of toys were distributed. The articles were distributed and sick call was held in the following villages:

Loc Dien (YD 969062)
 Loc An (YD 964064)
 BaVinh (YD 951069)
 Thon Nam Pho Cam (YD 964051)

2. On 20 May 1966, a contingent of Vietnamese from Loc An (964064), presented a Vietnamese Flag to the second platoon of Company M. In a ceremony at 0800, 21 May 1966, a joint honor guard consisting of Popular Forces and U. S. Marines raised the flag at the Loc An Village Chief's office. This is the first time in several years that this village has felt it had adequate protection to fly their flag. At 1130, 21 May 1966, the Village Chief of Loc Dien (969062) with three village elders and about ten other village officials came to Company M Headquarters and presented the company with approximately 100 lbs of bananas. The gift was the peoples expression of gratitude and appreciation for Marine protection.

(a) Letter from Village Chief of Loc An (964064) to Company M Commander.

"We are the administrative groups in Loc An Village and the people of all levels, thanks very much the Marine Corps Units came here to protect our security and prevent VC to take rice, taxes, oppress people. To show our thankfulness and combination between civilian and military, we solemnly offer some local gifts.

We request and hope Marine Corps come and stay here forever until VC stop to invade. We make in mind to combine with Allied Forces in general and Marine Corps in special in order to fight against VC and keep our nation independent."

"Sincerely

The Village Chief of

Loc An"

/s/ NGUYEN BUT

(b) A medical training program for villages of Loc An (964064) and Loc Dien (969062) has been progressing very well. Eight Vietnamese from Loc Dien and two Vietnamese from Loc An are working with Navy Corpsman at general sick call held every other day. These Vietnamese have had some prior training. Sick calls are being held every other day. On days formal sick call is not set up some Vietnamese report to the Troui Compound for treatment.

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a. Discussion: Areas of the battalion TAOR that initially yielded good results from ambushes were later completely avoided by the VC. Due to the long period of time spent in a relatively small operating area it was necessary to purposely avoid using areas for a period of several weeks in order to tempt the VC into going back into the area. A rapid surprise reentry into such areas usually paid off in VC casualties.

b. Recommendation: That natural routes of infiltration and harboring sites utilized by the VC be purposely ignored for several weeks in order to make it appear safe for the VC to again utilize them.

2. ITEM: Prematurely springing ambushes.

a. Discussion: Too often ambushes were commencing fire on a single VC. As a result of impatience or poor site selection which forced premature triggering of ambushes the main VC party escaped injury.

b. Recommendation: Care must be exercised in selecting ambush sites in order to allow VC security elements to move well into or through ambush sites in order to insure that the main VC body is in the kill zone prior to commencing fire.