


1st Battalion 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) MCF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/RJA/dah
5750
007566
1Jan67



From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 5th Marines
(2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1Dec66 To 31Dec66
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
Encl: (1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

R. J. Alger
R. J. ALGER
By direction

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1st Marine Division (Rein) FME
FPO, San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 December 1966 to 31 December 1966

INDEX

- PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
- PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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ORGANIZATION DATA

1. Designation

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

Commander

Maj. P. L. HILGARTNER

2. Location

1-31 December 1966: Hill 54 CHU LAI RVN

3. Staff Officers

Commanding Officer

Maj. P. L. HILGARTNER

Executive Officer

Maj. B. S. PICKETT

(1-27Dec66)

Maj. R. J. ALGER

(28Dec-31Dec66)

S-1

2ndLt G. L. GORTON

S-2

1stLt W. F. GILLILAND

S-3

Maj. R. J. ALGER

(1-27Dec66)

Maj. W. C. WARREN, JR.

(28-31Dec66)

S-4

Capt. G. J. STREMLow

CO, H&S Company

Capt. F. M. KAUFFMAN

(1-4Dec66)

Capt. M. B. DARLING

(5-31Dec66)

CO, Company A

1stLt A. C. BLADES

CO, Company B

Capt. E. M. LITZ

CO, Company C

Capt. M. B. DARLING

(1-4Dec66)

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(1-4Dec66)

1stLt G. J. DESTEFANO

(5-8Dec66)

Capt. R. J. CASWELL

(9-31Dec66)

Capt. J. J. CARTY

CO, Company D

4. Average Monthly Strength

USMC USN

OFF ENL OFF ENL

33 1053 3 59

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The most significant operation conducted during December 1966 by this Battalion was Operation SUTTER. During the planning phase the possibility of coordinated attacks involving USMC and ARVN forces was considered. All planning was conducted within a framework of coordination and cooperation. The operation was terminated prior to the execution of any coordinated attacks with ARVN forces.

Due to terrain barriers encountered throughout Operation SUTTER, it was necessary to employ radio relay to maintain continuous communications between command echelons. One squad (Rein) provided security for the radio relay. This technique was subsequently employed for three separate company size operations conducted in the RAOR west of the Battalion TAOR during December. The positioning of the relay team was varied periodically to preclude establishment of a pattern.

A significant result of Operation SUTTER was the reported rallying of eight CHIEU HOIs to GVN officials at LY TIN and TAM KY district headquarters. Information was received that these CHIEU HOIs rallied as a direct result of Marine activity during Operation SUTTER.

Throughout the month of December continuous efforts were made to improve and expand the Combined Action Company (CAC) within the Battalion's TAOR. Closer coordination with the LY TIN District Chief and Senior U.S. Advisor resulted in the formulation of an improved and more comprehensive training program for the CAC units positioned on the Islands of KY HOA and KY XUAN. Additionally, on 12 December 1966, eleven Popular Force (PF) personnel moved into the combat base with two USMC Combined Action Squads on the Island of KY HOA.

On 15 December 1966 the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines conducted a personnel inspection at the KY HOA combat base and found the Popular Force personnel who were integrated with the Marines well prepared for the inspection.

Two separate Company (Rein) size search and clear operations were conducted on the island of KY XUAN (BT 488103) during December. In each operation the Commander of Company B had operational control of all Popular Force units employed. Although contact was not made in either operation, the combined planning effort, cooperation and efficient execution reflected a step forward in the fostering of a cooperative relationship between Popular Forces and USMC.

Efforts toward expansion of the Combined Action Company (CAC) program continued during December. The USMC Cadre of the proposed CAC consisting of one officer, 49 enlisted Marines and one Corpsman was formed on 16 December. Upon activation it was planned that the CAC be composed of four USMC/Popular Force (PF) integrated platoons. During the last two weeks of December, the USMC Cadre of the CAC completed a ten day training cycle. In addition to tactics, General Military Subjects and Weapons Training, the syllabus included indoctrination lectures by U.S. Advisors on the Popular Forces Program. The requested expansion of the TAOR upon which the proposed CAC was contingent was approved on 30 December 1966. On 31 December 1966 an advance party of the CAC was positioned with a Popular Force platoon at the proposed CAC combat base.

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Throughout the month of December a continuing effort has been made to improve the security of combat bases within the Battalion TAOR. Forces were relocated for better concealment and defensive posture of each position underwent continuous improvement. In addition to the construction of a new messhall, command attention was devoted to access road repair and renovation of billeting spaces.

Continued emphasis was placed on Civil Affairs activities during December. Rice captured on Operation SUTTER was delivered to the LY TIN District Chief for distribution to refugees. Within the TAOR, lumber was provided for the construction of an additional room to a school house and two pig cooperatives were organized. Medical Civic Action patrols treated 1530 civilians and administered 535 plague inoculations and small pox vaccinations.

Psychological Warfare operations were conducted to the maximum extent feasible in conjunction with each operation executed by this Battalion or units thereof during December. The employment of Kit Carson Teams and U. S. Army HB Psychological Warfare Teams in conjunction with company size operations provided the command with excellent background for use in planning future operations in order to exploit more fully their techniques and capabilities.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS REPORTS

1. 1Dec66 Operation SUTTER continued IAW Bn Frag Order 12-66. (Refer to Tab A)
2. 012115H Company C Marine on bunker watch (BT 397145) shot himself in left foot with his rifle. Was taken to 1st Medical Battalion 2Dec66. Informal Investigation was conducted.
3. 2Dec66 Operation SUTTER continued IAW Bn Frag Order 12-66. (Refer to Tab A)
4. 3Dec66 Operation SUTTER continued IAW Bn Frag Order 12-66. (Refer to Tab A)
5. 4Dec66 Operation SUTTER continued IAW Bn Frag Order 12-66. (Refer to Tab A)
6. 5Dec66 Operation SUTTER continued IAW Bn Frag Order 12-66. (Refer to Tab A)
7. 052230H Company B fire team patrol 5813 coord (BT 429138) observed a boat without lights. Patrol requested illumination. Three rounds of 81mm mortar illumination fired. Three PF's accompanying patrol were sent to investigate. PF's gave chase. Boat went around small island. PF's went around other side and brought boat into shore and apprehended 1 VCS. VCS forwarded to Battalion S-2.
8. 061815H Operation SUTTER IAW Bn Frag Order 12-66, terminated. (Refer to Tab A)
9. 061830H Company D conducted operations in the northwestern area of the RAOR.
10. 070825H Company D S&D mission (BT 294134) received four rounds sniper fire from a range of 250 meters. Sniper was observed at (BT 295136). Artillery mission requested and fired with good coverage. Area was searched with inconclusive results.
11. 071304H Company D S&D mission (BT 295134), while searching hamlet, VC nurses pack and equipment was found consisting of two hammocks, two plastic pouches and one bag pulverized peanuts, miscellaneous clothing, two bandages, one vail probably mothylate, one pouch of rice, one wallet with assorted documents and pictures. All captured gear was forwarded to Battalion S-2.
12. 7Dec66 Company D continued operations in northwestern area of RAOR.
13. 8Dec66 Company C (-) OPREP 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
14. 080925H Company D, S&D mission (BT 292133) apprehended one VCS as he attempted to flee out rear of hut. Hut searched and what appeared to be a VC situation report was found. VCS and document were forwarded to 9th IIT.
15. 8Dec66 Company D continued operations in the northwestern areas of the RAOR.
16. 090915H Company D S&D mission (BT 300146), tripped unknown type booby trap. Booby trap believed to have been two fragmentation grenades concealed in hedgerow placed approximately one foot above ground with trip wire attached. Sustained seven WIA's. Three Marines were medically evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion at 091115H.

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17. 091615H Company D S&D mission coord (BT 300142) received approximately 50 rounds small arms fire from an estimated VC position near VC approximately 300 meters away at (BT 300141). Returned with 15 rounds M-79, 200 rounds small arms fire and four rounds 60mm mortar. No contact and fled in a southwesterly direction. Area searched with inconclusive results.
18. 101200H Company D(-) returned to Battalion Combat Base from operations in the northwestern area of the RAOR.
19. 111200H Company D(-) OPCON 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.
20. 111300H Company B fire team security patrol 5B16, located three tunnels. First tunnel at coord (BT 429137) was 4 feet by 4 feet by 4 feet, and constructed of wood and brick. Second tunnel at coord (BT 426134) was 3 feet by 4 feet by 8 feet and constructed of wood and brick. Third tunnel at coord (BT 430143) was 4 feet by 4 feet by 5 feet and constructed of wood. All three tunnels were searched, nothing was found. None of the tunnels indicated recent signs of VC use. All were destroyed.
21. 111330H 3rd Platoon, Co D OPCON 7th Marines.
22. 12Dec66 Eleven PF's moved into combat base at hill 12 (BT 477143) for integration with the CAC units positioned at that location.
23. 131100H Company C(-) returned from OPCON 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.
24. 131915H 3rd Platoon Company D returned from OPCON 7th Marines.
25. 142145H Company B squad security patrol, 5B12 (BT 483138) spotted boat without lights vicinity (BT 482137). Boat challenged. Boat continued to move away from patrol in a southeasterly direction. Patrol requested illumination. Four rounds 81mm mortar illumination fired. Boat continued to move away. Patrol fired 50 rounds small arms fire with BAR at boat. Boat moved out of range.
26. 142150H Platoon combat base, Company B (BT 487103) received approximately 40 rounds small arms fire from vicinity (BT 493103) a range of approximately 600 meters. Believed weapon to be a BAR. Two tracer rounds hit friendly defensive bunker. No fire returned. A check was made to determine if there was any relationship between 142145H spot report and this incident. Location of perimeter bunker and directions of incoming rounds indicated no relation. Company B fire team security patrol, 5B9 alerted to check the area. Company B squad S&D patrol, conducted search from (BT 495095) to (BT 488109) from 150600H until 151200H with inconclusive results.
27. 142325H Company B squad (Rein) S&D patrol, conducted search of area from BT 405152 to BT 395162 from 141900H to 142325H (Ref 7th Marines report 141520H to 1stBn, 5thMar). Results inconclusive.
28. 15Dec66 No contact throughout the day.
29. 162050H Company B Combined Action fire team patrol, coord (BT 498094) spotted boat and called boat to shore. Boat searched with negative results. A second boat was spotted at coord (BT 500095) moving northward. Boat was challenged but continued movement. Patrol fired approximately 300 rounds small arms fire at boat. Boat moved out of range. Illumination requested. Nine rounds 105mm illumination fired and area searched 50 meters into water with inconclusive results. One VC WIA probable.

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30. 172245H Company B fire team security patrol coord (BT 488139) observed several boats vicinity coord (BT 485136) moving eastward. Boats were challenged. Boats ignored challenge and continued moving. Boats fired approximately 30 rounds small arms fire. Estimate that boats were hit. Boats moved out of range. One VC KIA probable.
31. 181000H coord (BT 399148). Company B Marine shot Vietnamese girl in stomach with .45 cal pistol. Girl was medically evacuated at 181022H to 1st Medical Battalion. Investigation was conducted.
32. 181800H Company C Platoon S&D patrol coord (BT 403125) apprehended three VCS. One VCS had pictures of CHICOM and US weapons. Within his house were papers with US rank structures. VCS were forwarded to Battalion S-2, interrogated and released.
33. 19Dec66 Medical civic action patrol vaccinated and innoculated 535 Vietnamese civilians at KY CHANH village (BT 418124).
34. 19Dec66 Company B(-) conducted a search and clear operation on the island of KY XUAN (BT 425150) from 190800 until 191330H.
35. 200230H Company C platoon patrol base coord (BT 403113) received approximately 125 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated distance of 250 to 300 meters from an easterly direction. VC appeared to be firing at PF OP at coord (BT 416123) at the same time. Company C platoon returned 50 rounds. Artillery illumination mission requested. Four 105mm illumination rounds fired. VC firing ceased. Area searched at first light with inconclusive results.
36. 211800H Company B squad security patrol 5B15 coord (BT 431168) apprehended one VCS with incorrect identification. VCS was taken to 2nd Platoon Company B combat base and questioned by PF's who indicated he was a VCS. VCS forwarded to Battalion S-2.
37. 221300H The Battalion entertained approximately 850 Vietnamese adults and children at KY CHANH village coord (BT 417124). The Village Chief opened the festivities by introducing the Commanding Officer, who in turn delivered a brief interpretation of Christmas in the United States and why Americans celebrate this occasion. Following a presentation of gifts by the Commanding Officer, to the Village and Hamlet Chiefs, entertainment was provided, consisting of a talent show, four movies and caroling by a local Vietnamese Girl's choir. School kits, cookies and soft drinks were given to all children in attendance via the elders. The Vietnamese appeared grateful and enthusiastic throughout the party. A decorated tree with electric lights added to the festive occasion.
38. 241104H Company B squad security patrol, coord (BT 439160) located one 155mm H.E. round (not booby trapped) along trail. Area was cleared of all personnel and round was destroyed.
39. 25Dec66 No contact throughout the day.
40. 26Dec66 Company C (Rein) conducted operation LAW Bn Frag Order 15-66. (Refer to Tab B)
41. 26Dec66 Company B (-) conducted a one day S&C operation on the island of KY XUAN (BT 488103).

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42. 261030H Company C S&D mission coord (BT 351073) received approximately 200 rounds automatic weapons fire from an enemy VC coord (BT 352075) approximately 200 meters away. Company C returned approximately 200 rounds small arms fire, six M-79 rounds and nine M-16 rounds. Area searched with inconclusive results.

43. 261210H Company C S&D mission coord (BT 352081) after checking hut, received one round small arms fire from sniper in an unobserved location, sustaining one USMC WIA who was medically evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion. Area searched, and two uncooperative VCS males both approximately 50 years old, without I.D. cards were apprehended. One VCS was almost blind and was released after interrogation. Other VCS was forwarded to Battalion S-2 and later to 9th ITT. Possible VC training site was located in same area. Equipment found included batteries, rope, shovels, target silhouettes, knives, first aid dressings, small quantity of medical supplies, one canteen and small arms ammunition in different stages of disassembly. Equipment forwarded to Battalion S-2. Interrogation of villagers revealed that three VC left area within the hour with one VC WIA.

44. 261800H Company C S&D mission coord (BT 261503) apprehended one VCS female. Interpreter believed she knew location of VC hospital but would not disclose location. VCS was forwarded to Battalion S-2, and later to 9th ITT.

45. 261800H Company C S&D mission coord (BT 399079) while moving eastward, the point observed two VC wearing black PJ's and carrying weapons moving west on trail approximately 200 to 300 meters away. Point immediately took cover and allowed VC to move closer. VC moved off trail into stream bed. VC apparently did not observe point. VC appeared to be establishing an ambush. Point fired approximately 30 rounds small arms fire, VC returned one round small arms fire and fled south. Point immediately pursued and apprehended one VCC. Other VC escaped. The following was captured from VCC: raincoat, U.S. Carbine, three Carbine magazines, cartridge belt, poncho, hammock, one M-26 Grenade and one cover. VCC was forwarded to Battalion S-2 and later to 9th ITT.

46. 262215H Company C returned to Battalion Combat Base. Operation LAW Bn Frag Order 15-66 terminated.


47. 27Dec66 Company A returned OPCON 1stBn, 5thMar from Chu Lai Defense Command.

48. 27Dec66 Company C OPCON Chu Lai Defense Command.

49. 282124H 2nd Platoon Company B combat base coord (BT 436161) requested medical evacuation of PF who went into a coma. Medical evacuation helicopter received approximately six rounds small arms fire from sniper at coord (BT 451151). No fire was returned. Company B fire team security patrol was directed to patrol earlier than scheduled and search area from which sniper fire originated. Patrol searched area from 282130H to 282351H from coord (BT 436161) to coord (BT 456151) with inconclusive results.

50. 282310H Company D squad ambush 5D5 coord (BT 397118) heard movement to their left rear and requested illumination mission. Two rounds 105mm illumination fired with inconclusive results.

51. 290015H Company B fire team security patrol 5B19 coord (BT 449149) apprehended six VCS, five men and one woman. All looked suspicious and were apprehended on advice of interpreter. Hamlet Chief of HOA XUAN stated that they were suspects. VCS were forwarded to Battalion S-2.



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52. 290820H Company A commenced operations in Bn Frag Order 16-66. (Refer to Tab C)
53. 290840H Company A S&D mission coord (BT 345063) reported Recon OP Copartner coord (BT 345063) observed eight VC with rifles and packs (BT 352071) traveling in a northerly direction. Artillery mission requested and 32 rounds HE fired with good target coverage. Estimate two VC KIA probable and six VC WIA probable. Area was not searched due to distance.
54. 291015H Company A S&D mission coord (BT 374056) reported Recon OP Copartner coord (BT 345063) observed eight VC with rifles and packs (BT 362068) moving in open in a northwest direction within Company A's area of operation. Artillery mission requested. Twelve rounds HE fired with excellent target coverage. Company A searched area from 291015H to 291310H coord (BT 362068) to (BT 360070) with inconclusive results. Recon estimated eight VC KIA probable.
55. 291911H Company A radio relay team in conjunction with Battalion Frag Order 16-66 returned to Hill 54.
56. 291930H Platoon Commander 3rd Platoon Company B at platoon combat base coord (BT 488103) was informed at 1930H by CAC unit leader that approximately 30 PF's had left combat base. PF's were scheduled to accompany USMC patrol activities later in the evening. Platoon Leader contacted the PF unit leader, Mr. CHUOC and asked him to have PF's return to the combat base. The PF unit leader replied no. The Platoon Commander then reported the incident to the Commanding Officer, Company B. While the Platoon Commander was reporting the incident to the Commanding Officer, Company B, the PF unit leader left the combat base. Further investigation revealed that the PF's had been drinking in the hamlet during the afternoon and were in the hamlet. The QUANG TIN Province U. S. Advisor, was notified and initiated an immediate investigation by LY TIN District U. S. Advisor. 3rd platoon Company B was instructed to remain within their combat base and maintain 75% alert status.
57. 292215H Company A (Rein), returned to Battalion Combat Base. Operations IAW Bn Frag Order 16-66 terminated. (Refer to Tab C)
58. 292330H The LY TIN District Chief, U. S. Advisor and additional PF's arrived on the island of KY XUAN to investigate incident.
59. 300100H LY TIN District U. S. Advisor informed the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines that the problem was one of over control by both PF's and USMC units.
60. 301500H In reference to spot report 291930H a conference with the QUANG TIN Province U. S. Advisor, LY TIN District U. S. Advisor, Province and District Chiefs and Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was conducted. It was ascertained that PF's had been drinking as a result of their dispondence over the possibility of being redesignated a Regional Force unit. The incident was complicated by the absence of an interpreter. As a result of the conference the incident was smoothed over. Arrangements were made for an interpreter and every means possible are being explored by this Battalion to continue fostering amicable working relationships between Marines and Popular Force units.

ENCLOSURE (1)
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61. 311835H Fire team listening post (5D2) Company D (4 men) at coord (BT 393142) was moving from the Battalion Combat Base night position when they received three rounds small arms fire from the enemy in the easterly direction at a range of about 100 meters coord (BT 391142). One man sustained a minor flesh wound in the left leg (medical evacuation was not required). Enemy rounds were not fired in rapid succession and were well aimed. Estimated one VC sniper. VC broke contact. Likely route of withdrawal was in a westerly direction. Listening post reported incident to Company Commander and requested instructions. Company D Commander directed listening post to return to the Combat Base with WIA. Upon return to the Combat Base the listening post was assigned a replacement and returned to assigned location by a different route. Upon debrief of the listening post it was learned that the LP returned three rounds small arms fire. Fire team patrol, Company D conducted a search from 010600H until 010730H from coord (BT 390140) to coord (BT 397145). One USMC poncho was found.

62. 311915H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines perimeter defensive position coord (BT 397147) received one round small arms fire from a range of about 300 meters at coord (BT 395150). Round landed in rice paddy about 20 feet in front of bunker. No fire was returned.

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SUB ORIGIN: 5. 11. 11

- Tab A - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines After Action Report; Operation SUTTER
- Tab B - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag O 15-66
- Tab C - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag O 16-66

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 3480
 20 Dec 1966

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1st Bn, 5th Mar ltr 3/JNB/dah over 3480 Ser 0074-66 of 11 Dec 66

From: Commanding Officer, Seventh Marines
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
 Via: Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report; Operation "SUTTER"

1. Readdressed and forwarded.
2. As the result of a planning conference held at the Sixth ARVN Regimental Headquarters in TAM KY on 3 December, a small liaison group from the Seventh Marine Regiment was co-located in the field with the Second ARVN Division CP for the duration of Phase II, Operation SUTTER. Its purpose was to effect the liaison and fire support coordination necessary between the two forces operating in contiguous areas, thereby relieving the committed USMC battalion commander of such responsibility. No problems were incurred.
3. Despite the persistence of the most unfavorable of weather conditions, Operation SUTTER is considered to have been highly successful. The comments and recommendations contained in basic report have been reviewed and this Headquarters concurs in them.
4. The following comments concerning harassing and interdictory (H&I) fires referred to in subparagraphs 5b(1)(f) and (h) are considered pertinent. Just prior to, and again during the operation, severe restrictions and limitations were imposed by higher authority on all H&I fires, both in target selection and ammunition expenditures. Additional information and instructions concerning these restrictions and limitations have been received. They should preclude any future misunderstanding on the part of the infantry battalions and their supporting artillery units.

L. F. Snoddy Jr
 L. F. SNOBDY JR.

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (A-1) MAF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/JNB/dah
3480
0074-66
11Dec66

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report; Operation SUTTER

Ref: (a) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines FragO 12-66
(b) 7th Marines FragO 32-66
(c) DivO 3480.1
(d) Maps: Vietnam AMS Series L 7014 (1:50,000), Sheets 6739 IV
Tra Bong, 6639 I Tien Phuoc

Encl: (1) Operations Overlay D-1
(2) Operations Overlay D-Day
(3) Operations Overlay D+1
(4) Operations Overlay D+2
(5) Operations Overlay D+3
(6) Operations Overlay D+4
(7) Operations Overlay D+5

1. Code Name and Type of Operation. Operation SUTTER (Search and Destroy).

2. Dates of Operation. Phase I 1-3 December 1966
Phase II 4-6 December 1966

3. Location. In the RAOR to the west of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines TAOR, Ly Tin and Tam Ky sector, Quang Tin Province, RVN; on map sheets, AMS Series L7014 (1:50,000), Sheets 6739 IV Tra Bong, 6639 I Tien Phuoc.

4. Command Headquarters.

a. Phase I

CO, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines	Maj. P. L. HILGARTNER
CO, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines	Capt. M. B. DARLING
CO, Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines	Capt. J. J. CARTY
CO, Company K, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines	Capt. R. E. MARESCO
CO, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion	Capt. E. J. CONNELLY, Jr.

b. Phase II

CO, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines	Maj. P. L. HILGARTNER
CO, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines	Capt. M. B. DARLING
CO, Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines	Capt. J. J. CARTY
CO, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion	Capt. E. J. CONNELLY, Jr.

TAB-A

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5. Task Organization.1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein)

Maj. P. L. HILGARTNER

H&S Company (-)
 Det, Company A (-), 1st Recon Bn
 Det, Company C, 1st SP Bn
 Det, Company B, 1st EngrBn
 Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar
 Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm
 Det, 9th ITT, FMP
 Det, 7th Comm Bn
 Det, Headquarters Battalion, 1stMarDiv
 Det, 1st Scout Dog Plt
 Det, ISO
 Det, AO Unit

2nd Bn (-)(Rein) 1st FAG, 11th Marines

LtCol CARVER

Btry D(-), 2ndBn, 1st FAG, 11thMar
 Prov Btry, 4thBn, 1st FAG, 11thMar

Company C (Rein)

Capt. M. B. DARLING

Company C
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, Comm Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 3rd FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
 FAC Tm
 Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm
 Sqd (-) Co B, 1st EngrBn
 FO Tm, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar
 Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Company D (Rein)

Capt. J. J. CARTY

Company D
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, Comm Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 4th FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
 FAC Tm
 Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm
 Sqd (-), Co B, 1st EngrBn
 Det, 1st Sentry Dog Plt
 FO Tm, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar
 Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Company K (-)(Rein) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines

Capt. R. E. MARESCO

Det, H&S Co, 3rdBn, 5thMar
 Det, Comm Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 FO Tm, Btry F, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Company A (-)(Rein) 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

Capt. E. J. CONNELLY, Jr.

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Det, H&S Co, 1st Recon Bn
 Det, Comm Plt
 Det, Med Plt

81mm Mortar Flt (-)

GySgt. J. W. LISEMBY

6. Supporting Armsa. Air Support

(1) Helicopter Support. Operation SUTTER commenced on 1 December 1966. On D-Day two aircraft carried resupplies to (BT 330110). On D+1 one HU-1E landed at coordinates (BT 332105) with Computation "6" and received five rounds sniper fire. HU-1E extracted Computation "6" and proceeded to (BT 340100) to evacuate a sick Scout Dog. Two UH-34's picking up medical evacuations at (BT 339009), received two rounds sniper fire from coordinates (BT 349090). On D+2 two UH-34 helicopters extracted emergency medical evacuations from (BT 348077). On D+3 two UH-34 aircraft shuttled 65 troops and logistical supplies from Battalion LSA to (BT 312094). Four separate trips were made without enemy harassment. On D+4 two UH-34's carried resupplies from Battalion LSA to (BT 290085). Two separate trips were made. The helicopters received 20 rounds of sniper fire from vicinity (BT 285090). On D+5 two UH-34's extracted an emergency USMC medical evacuation from (BT 290085) receiving 30 rounds sniper fire from vicinity (BT 285090) and (BT 290100). On D+5 one HU-1D arrived at (BT 290085) with Computation "5" and received four rounds sniper fire from (BT 285092). On D+5 two UH-34's extracted 1,000 pounds of rice from coordinates (BT 290085). The flight received 30 rounds small arms fire from vicinity (BT 285091). On D+5 four CH-46 helicopters effecting extraction of the Command Group and Company C at coordinates (BT 293104) received five rounds sniper fire. Two HU-1E's flying cover for the extraction fired 30 rounds 7.62 in area to suppress sniper fire.

(2) Fixed Wing. Five TPQ - 10 missions were flown on D+4 and D+5 on enemy targets as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Ordnance Expended</u>
BT 258088	5 - Delta - 1's
BT 263082	5 - Delta - 1's
BT 265084	6 - Delta - 1's
BT 270078	6 - Delta - 1's
BT 274081	6 - Delta - 1's

(3) General. Helicopter support was excellent. The landing zone on D+4 and D+5 at coordinates (BT 290085) was not secure from sniper fire. However, it was the only LZ available. This LZ was located 50 meters from a wide unfordable river, and invariably helicopters received enemy sniper fire from the opposite side. A request was made to extract 1000 pounds of rice from this location. When the helicopter began to extract the rice, it was unable to move for several minutes due to enemy fire from across the river. 81mm Mortars were employed to assist in providing a secure zone.

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b. Artillery

(1) Artillery Support. Operation 'SUTTER' initially consisted of Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines in direct support during D-1, D-Day and D+1. On D+1, Battery L, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines became the direct support battery for the Battalion. During the operation, artillery support provided fires for observed missions and H&I missions. A detailed breakdown follows:

(a) On D+1, an observed mission was called on eight VC snipers vicinity (BT 25103) firing on Company C. Nine rounds were fired by Battery L. The coverage was good and the sniper fire ceased.

(b) On D+2, Commotion, a Reconnaissance OP, fired on eight VC walking south on trail at coordinates (BT 345074). Rounds were on target, however, no positive observation was made due to the heavy vegetation.

(c) On D+3, the Forward Observer with Company C fired on eight VC snipers coordinates (BT 351076). Twenty-five rounds were fired by Battery D with excellent coverage of target area as the enemy fire ceased.

(d) On D+4, a Company C patrol was hit by sniper fire from coordinates (BT 286104). Four rounds were requested, and subsequently fired by Battery L, 4/11. However, snipers had broken contact and withdrawn prior to mission being fired. Recon OP Bitteridge fired on twenty-eight VC moving through the woodline coordinates (BT 259087). Sixteen rounds were fired by 155 Guns (Btry L) with excellent coverage of the area. No positive surveillance available due to heavy vegetation. Approximately an hour later, Recon OP Bitteridge called a fire mission on thirty VC moving through coordinates (BT 261087). Twenty rounds were fired by 155 Guns. The mission had excellent target coverage with an estimated twenty possible VC KIAs. This same concentration was fired again on 10 VC moving in the open. Battery L fired fourteen rounds resulting in one confirmed VC KIA.

(e) On D+5, three rounds were fired by Battery L a possible enemy mortar position at coordinates (BT 286087). The rounds were on target, however, reaction time was very slow. A mission was also fired for a patrol from Company C that was under sniper fire at coordinates (BT 294072). Six rounds were fired by Battery L, with good coverage. Sniper fire ceased. A total of five rounds were fired by Battery L on snipers firing at helicopters as they attempted to land at the Battalion's position coordinates (BT 291004). Good coverage was achieved resulting in elimination of enemy sniper fire.

(f) During the operation approximately 50 H&I concentrations were fired at points of enemy contact and enemy escape routes. Approximately 150 rounds of 105 and 155 were fired on these concentrations. On D+4, H&I's were reduced to a minimum due to the regimental requirements for positive targets and physical surveillance for H&I fires. It was not possible to conduct a surveillance of the planned H&I concentrations because the Battalion could not ford the Song Ba Ky River to get into the target areas.

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(g) Listed below are the approximate number of rounds and type of missions fired:

H&I	150 Rounds HEQ (105 & 155)
Observed missions	115 Rounds HEQ, HEVT & WP (105 & 155)

(h) In ^{IFF}general the artillery support during the operation was good. The reconnaissance inserts accounted for some of the best artillery observation. It is recommended that these inserts be used in future operations. A re-evaluation should be made of the H&I planning requirements levied on a ground unit. In most instances, hard or fixed targets are not identified or located and the current requirement is not practical, and often not feasible.

7. Intelligence

a. Estimate of VC strength, location, and disposition in the objective area.

(1) Forces anticipated in the immediate objective area.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>TACTICAL DISPOSITION</u>
<u>CONFIRMED</u>			
NONE			
<u>PROBABLE</u>			
14th VC Co.	BT 3211	50-100 Men	Unknown
74th LF Co.	BT 2608	75-125 Men	Unknown
706th Co.	BT 3310	750-125 Men	Unknown
VC Dist. HQ.	BT 3508	Unknown	Unknown
Rice Storage	BT 345080		
VC Hospital	BT 342090		

(2) Throughout the month of November 1966, there have been several Chieu Hoi and agent reports of the 74th, 14th and 706th Local Force Companies located in the RAOR to the west of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines TAOR. On 22 November 1966 a squad leader of the 74th Local Force Company defected to an ARVN outpost and the leader of the Economic Cadre, Tam Ky District, defected to the Tam Ky District Headquarters. Initial intelligence information was furnished to this unit from these Ralliers.

(3) Additional intelligence was gained as a result of an aerial reconnaissance mission with the Chieu Hoi's pointing out locations from the air of various VC positions and installations.

(4) The objective of the operation was to fix and destroy VC units in the area and exploit information obtained from the Chieu Hoi Ralliers.

b. VC Strength and Situation Actually Found As Operation was Conducted.

Throughout the operation this unit was in light contact with the enemy. These contacts were mainly with local force guerrillas; however, one Local Force Company was in the area, evidenced by the fact that this unit received one night probe characterized by 60mm mortar fire, 3 rounds, and heavy small arms fire.

c. VC Units Identified. None

d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) A psychological warfare center was discovered in the vicinity of coordinates (BT 341088). Approximately 5,000 propaganda leaflets were captured. The type of propaganda leaflets captured have never been seen in this area before. The text of these leaflets were printed on a press and not a stencil machine.

(2) A VC official was killed, several documents and messages were on his person. The full impact of this information has not been learned at this time.

(3) The objective areas were being used by main force VC as re-supply routes.

(4) It is believed that the enemy fled across the Song Ba Ky River in BT 2808.

(5) Tunnels and Caves. Many small complexes capable of holding three or four people were found. These were left unharmed as they appeared to be individual family shelters. The entire psychological warfare complex was destroyed with approximately 50 pounds of C-4.

e. Terrain

(1) Critical Terrain Features.

Hill 410	BT 388035
Hill 302	BT 313109

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire. The terrain in the area of operation consisted primarily of ridge lines with narrow paddies in the valleys. Most paddies were in cultivation. Observation and fields of fire were limited due to many hills, ridge lines, dense vegetation and hedge rows.

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(4) Obstacles. One major obstacle was encountered - the Song Ba Ky River in BT 2608.

(5) Avenues of Approach. Roads and trails in the area are excellent, many trails exist that do not appear on the map.

8. Mission. To conduct search and destroy operations in the RAOR area west of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines TAOR, in conjunction with forces from the 6th Regiment, 2nd ARVN Division.

9. Concept of Operation

(1) Phase I. On D-1 insert reconnaissance elements, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, by helicopter to conduct ground surveillance of southeastern portion of operations area, move one reinforced rifle company (-) overland to establish blocking position vicinity (BT 374051), move 1st Battalion 5th Marines (-)(Rein) Command Group and two reinforced rifle companies (-) overland to vicinity (BT 328109) (See enclosure (1)); commencing D-Day, Command Group and two rifle companies conduct search and destroy operations in southeasterly direction to vicinity (BT 351077). (See enclosures (1), (3) and (4)).

(2) Phase II. On D+3 move two companies and Command Group by foot to vicinity Objective 2 (BT 293103), and conduct coordinated search and destroy operations in a westerly and southwesterly direction in conjunction with 6th ARVN Regiment. Insert reconnaissance element on Hill 396, coordinate (BT 238086) to conduct ground reconnaissance in western portion of the operational area. (See enclosures (5) and (6)).

10. Execution

a. D-1, 30 November 1966

(1) 301500H Company K (-) commenced movement by foot to vicinity (BT 374051).

(2) 301600H Recon OP (Commotion) established at coordinates (BT 347065).

(3) 301700H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Command Group with Company C (-) and Company D (-) commenced movement by foot to vicinity (BT 328109).

b. D-Day, 1 December 1966

(1) 010100H Company K (-) established night defensive positions at (BT 376061).

(2) 010300H Company C (-), and a Command Group with Company D (-) established night defensive positions vicinity (BT 333104) and (BT 340108) respectively. See Enclosure (1), Operations Overlay D-1.

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(3) 010700H H-Hour Phase I. Company C (-) commenced sweep of Objective "C" from vicinity (BT 33310). Company D (-) and Command Group in blocking position from (BT 332115) to (BT 333110). Company K (-) in blocking position from (BT 370051) to (BT 380051).

(4) 010800H Recon element (Cantilever) inserted at (BT 389034) to conduct ground surveillance of the southern portion of the objective area.

(5) 010815H Company K squad security patrol entered hamlet vicinity (BT 375056). Found one M-1 rifle, one M3A1 Sub-machine gun, one cartridge belt, one locally manufactured grenade and one M-1 Magazine pouch containing miscellaneous first aid equipment in a vacant house. Captured weapons and equipment forwarded to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines S-2.

(6) 010845H Company C search and destroy patrol vicinity (BT 327110) received 28 to 30 rounds automatic weapons fire from (BT 327107), a distance of 300 meters southwest. Patrol returned three rounds M-79 and maneuvered to eliminate enemy sniper fire. Patrol sustained 3 USMC WIA's. Enemy fled to southwest. Artillery mission called on coordinates (BT 325105) with good coverage on target. Searched area with inconclusive results.

(7) 010920H Company C (-) secured Objective "C" coordinates (BT 330110).

(8) 011200H Company D (-) departed from blocking position and commenced sweep toward Objective "D".

(9) 011330H Company D Combat patrol spotted five VC wearing black pajamas and cartridge belts run south from house at (BT 337100). Patrol initiated action firing 30 rounds 7.62 and 1 round M-79 at distance of 150 meters. Patrol observed five VC falling, however, subsequent search of area revealed only one VC who later died of wounds. Four VC WIA Probable. Further search found one tunnel (25 by 5 by 5 feet) with one cartridge belt and one M-26 grenade booby trapped with trip release device. Tunnel and booby trapped grenade destroyed. A search of the house VC ran from resulted in the capture of the following weapons and equipment: One Russian carbine, two French carbines, one cartridge belt, and 30 rounds of 7.62 ammunition. One female VCS was apprehended in the house and sent to MTT. The captured weapons and equipment were forwarded to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines S-2.

(10) 011335H Company K departed from blocking position vicinity (BT 375051) and commenced move to secure Objective "E".

(11) 011600H Company K secured Objective "E" at coordinates (BT 367065) with negative enemy contact.

(12) 011800H All units established night defensive positions. Refer to Enclosure (2), Operation Overlay D-Day.

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c. D+1, 2 December 1966

(1) 020919H Recon Op (Commotion) located at (BT 345065) spotted three VC with weapons at (BT 352078) moving in eastern direction. One VC wore gray clothing and two wore dark clothing. No fire mission called due to close proximity of friendly troops.

(2) 021000H Company D squad combat patrol at (BT 340096) found six VC wearing black pajamas in harbor site eating chow. When VC attempted to run, patrol fired 25 rounds 7.62, and one M-79 round resulting in five VC KIA and one VC WIA Probable. Patrol captured one M-1 French carbine, one pack and miscellaneous documents, all forwarded to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines S-2.

(3) 021145H Company C patrol at (BT 339089) received 100 rounds small arms fire and two rifle grenades from (BT 341099). The company returned 300 rounds 7.62, 10 rounds M-79, and 10 rounds 60mm mortar as enemy fled to the southeast. Search of area subsequently uncovered a VC psychological operations center with 5000 propaganda leaflets, appealing directly to Americans, KMC and ARVN. Also discovered were mixed items of clothing, three steel bear traps, two carbine magazines, weapons cleaning gear and one document pertaining to a VC Farmers Association, dated 18 October 1966. Results of fire fight: 4 USMC WIA, medically evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion.

(4) 021200H Company K at vicinity (BT 367065) released to return OPCON 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(5) 021315H Recon OP (Commotion) at (BT 347065) spotted twelve VC wearing raincoats and short khaki trousers with rifles and packs at (BT 347075). The VC turned south off trail when artillery mission was called.

(6) 021530H Company C platoon combat patrol discovered a hamlet of fifteen huts made of new materials at (BT 341087) two tunnels (30 by 5 by 5 feet) and newly dug bomb shelters surrounded by fighting holes. Patrol searched the area and found miscellaneous documents, VC school books, and tax receipts. Captured one VCS who indicated the immediate area was a VC Company CP and Barracks location. VCS sent to ITT.

(7) 021730H All units established night defensive positions. See Enclosure (3), Operation Overlay D+1.

d. D+2, 3 December 1966.

(1) 031000H Two tunnels reported 021530H were destroyed.

(2) 031100H H&S Company combat patrol at (BT 343084) discovered two VC in brush adjacent to trail wearing short gray trousers. When VC tried to run, patrol fired three rounds 7.62 ammunition resulting in two VC KIA at a distance of 50 meters. One .45 cal pistol, with holster, belt, two magazines, and 14 rounds of ammunition were found on one of the KIA's and forwarded to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines S-2. VC KIA wearing the pistol believed to be VC official.

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(3) 031115H Company D combat patrol at (BT 342084) found two booby trapped M-79 rounds with a trigger housing group of an M-1 rifle used as a detonator. Booby trap was destroyed in place.

(4) 031200H Company C combat patrol at (BT 346081) received one round of sniper fire from one VC from a distance of 150 meters. Patrol returned five rounds 7.62 and pursued sniper. Patrol found heavy blood spots and one large pack at (BT 347079). One VC WIA Probable.

(5) 031300H Company C combat patrol at (BT 348078) received 15 rounds sniper fire from estimated six VC at a range of 200 meters. Patrol returned fire with 50 rounds 7.62, 10 rounds 60mm mortar and called artillery mission with good coverage on target. Patrol searched area with inconclusive results. One USMC WIA medically evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion.

(6) 031610H Recon OP (Commotion) spotted four VC moving down trail in pairs at (BT 349069). VC dressed in black shirts, shorts, trousers, soft hats and no shoes. Patrol initiated action at a distance, 75 meters resulting in three VC KIA and one VC WIA who died of wounds at 040610H. Patrol captured two CHICOM rifles, one French MAAS-36, and one hand grenade of unknown type. Captured weapons forwarded to 1st Reconnaissance Battalion S-2.

(7) 031700H All units established night positions at (BT 347077). Refer to Enclosure (4), Operation Overlay, D+2.

e. D+3, 4 December 1966

(1) 040800H Battalion Command Group and Companies C and D departed night defensive positions and commenced movement to Objective 2, Phase II.

(2) 040805H Recon OP (Bitteridge) inserted by helicopter onto Hill 396 coordinates (BT 238086).

(3) 040830H Recon OP (Commotion) extracted by helicopter from coordinates (BT 350070).

(4) 041500H Resupply and insertion of Battalion Reserve (two platoons) by helicopter completed at coordinates (BT 312096).

(5) 041745H Company C combat patrol at (BT 290104) received four rounds small arms fire from three VC in khaki clothes from distance of 400 meters. Patrol returned fire with 20 rounds 7.62 and one round M-79. Searched area and apprehended one VCS. VCS forwarded to 9th ITT.

(6) 041800H Objective 2 secured.

(7) 041820H Established night positions at (BT 291105). Refer to Enclosure (5), Operation Overlay, D+3.

(8) 041930H Company C squad reconnaissance patrol at (BT 295103) tripped booby trap device of unknown description resulting in small explosion with no shrapnel effect.

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1. D44, 5 December 1966

- (1) 050430H All units commenced movement to Objective 3.
- (2) 050800H Objective 3 secured.
- (3) 050925H Patrol at (BT 291103) received 40 rounds small arms sniper fire from four VC vicinity (BT 287104). Patrol returned 50 rounds 7.62. Called artillery mission with good coverage on target. VC fled southwest. Patrol searched area with inconclusive results.
- (4) 050940H Company C combat patrol at (BT 291081) spotted three VC on trail wearing black pajamas. One VC had a weapon. Patrol opened fire at 300 meters firing 10 rounds 7.62, one round M-79. VC fled south as the patrol gave chase and captured one female VCC, one M-1 rifle, one clip .30 caliber ammunition (eight rounds) and one bag of rice. VCC forwarded to ITT and captured weapons and equipment sent to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines S-2
- (5) 050940H Recon OP (Bitteridge) on Hill 396 (BT 238086) spotted 28 VC, all armed with weapons and wearing black pajamas, moving west on trail at (BT 259087). Artillery mission called with good coverage on target area. VC fled south into tree line.
- (6) 051020H Recon OP (Bitteridge) on Hill 396 spotted 30 VC moving east on trail at (BT 262086). Appeared to be same group as in 050940H report. Artillery mission called. Again VC fled south into tree line. AO made surveillance on both target area reporting inconclusive sightings. Estimate 20 VC KIA Possible.
- (7) 051130H Company D squad security patrol at (BT 291084) apprehended one VCS with knowledge of VC activity in the area. Found bamboo signalling device and one small bear trap in his house. VCS forwarded to ITT, and captured equipment forwarded to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines S-2.
- (8) 051245H Company D combat patrol attempted to ford Song Ba Ky River at (BT 290087). Of the four men who attempted to cross at this fording site, only one was successful. The current of the river at this site was estimated to be approximately 20 to 25 knots, average depth 6 to 8 feet with sandy bottom prohibiting sure footing. A Chieu Hoi who was familiar with the area stated that this was the best fording site in the area and that the VC used boats to cross the river. Patrol searched area but were unable to find boats. One M-14 rifle and one M-14 magazine with 20 rounds 7.62 ammunition were lost in the river.
- (9) 051505H Resupply helicopter at (BT 291084) received six to eight rounds small arms fire from ridge line vicinity (BT 284087). Returned four rounds 81mm mortar. Unable to search due to river barrier.

PAGE 11

UNCLASSIFIED

(10) 051600H Recon OP (Bitteridge) at (BT 238086) observed ten VC running south from treeline into village at (BT 257084). VC wore black and white pajamas and carried packs and weapons. Artillery mission called with good coverage on target. One VC KIA confirmed.

(11) 051615H Recon OP (Cantilever) extracted by helicopter from vicinity (BT 388035).

(12) 051730H All units established night positions at (BT 291084). Refer to Enclosure (6), Operations Overlay, D+4.

(13) 051945H Company C squad security patrol spotted three VC with weapons moving into river at (BT 295072). VC initiated action with ten rounds automatic weapons fire. Patrol returned 80 rounds 7.62 and threw two M-26 grenades into river. Patrol searched area but was unable to find bodies. Three VC WIA Probable. Apprehended two VCS in the area who volunteered information on VC activity in the area. ITT released the VC suspects after interrogation.

g. D+5, 6 December 1966.

(1) 060230H H&S Company at (BT 291084) received three rounds of incoming 60mm mortar rounds and 40 rounds small arms fire from (BT 287084) a distance of approximately 500 meters. Returned fire with three rounds 81mm mortar, ten rounds 7.62 and called artillery mission. Mortar attack resulted in three USMC WIA, not medically evacuated.

(2) 060700H Company C platoon combat patrol at (BT 292076) received five rounds small arms fire from snipers at (BT 292074), a range of 200 meters. Patrol returned two 3.5 Rocket Launcher rounds (white phosphorous), and 100 rounds 7.62 ammunition. Artillery mission called with good coverage of target area. Unable to search due to river barrier. Action resulted in three USMC WIA medically evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion.

(3) 061050H The caretaker of the Vietnamese Catholic Church at (BT 291084) requested USMC extract rice cache containing about 1000 pounds of rice.

(4) 061500H Company D commenced movement by foot from Objective 3 (BT 291084) out of the Phase II operational area IAW Commanding Officer 7th Marines verbal order 051000 December 1966.

(5) 061615H Rice evacuation by helicopter completed with approximately 1000 pounds of rice (not of USAID sources) extracted. During evacuation helicopters at (BT 291084) received 20 to 25 rounds small arms fire from snipers across river vicinity (BT 288084). H&S Company security returned 60 rounds 7.62, and called artillery mission. Patrol was unable to search due to river barrier. Action resulted in one USMC WIA, not medically evacuated.

(6) 061700H Battalion Command Group and Company C commenced helicopter extraction from coordinates (BT 291105).

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(7) 061717H Company C at LZ received approximately ten rounds sniper fire from vicinity of (BT 2951 5), a distance of 500 meters. Company C returned 50 rounds 7.62 in direction from which sniper fire came. Area not searched due to helicopter extraction. Action resulted in one USMC WIA who was medically evacuated by helicopter to 1st Medical Battalion. USMC was DOW upon arrival

(8) 061750H Helicopter extraction of Command Group and Company C to Hill 54 (BT 397146) completed.

(9) 061815H Operation SUTTER terminated on order of Commanding Officer, 7th Marines.

11. Results

a. Personnel

(1) Enemy

- (a) VC KIA 13
- (b) VC KIA (Possible) 20
- (c) VC WIA (Probable) 9
- (d) VCC 1
- (e) VCS 4

(2) Friendly (USMC)

- (a) KIA 0
- (b) DOW 1
- (c) WIA 15

b. Equipment and Material

Captured

Rifle, M-1	2	Propaganda Leaflets	5,000
Sub-Machine Gun, M3A1	1	Bear Traps, Steel	4
Carbine, MAAS 36, French	4	VC School Books	4
Rifle, CHICOM	2	VC Tax Receipts	3
Pistol, U.S., Cal .45	1	Pistol Belt	1
Cartridge Belt	2	Pistol Holster	1
Pack	4	Magazines, .45 Cal.	2
Box Assorted Documents	1	Magazines, Carbine	2
Weapons-Cleaning Gear		Ammunition, 7.62 rds	30
Mixed Clothing		Ammunition, .45 Cal. rds	14
		Ammunition, .30 Cal. rds	8
		Rice (Non-USAID) pounds	1,000

- (a) VC KIA
- (b) VC KIA (Possible)
- (c) VC WIA (Probable)
- (d) VCC
- (e) VCS

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(2) Friendly (USMC)

- (a) KIA
- (b) DOW
- (c) WIA

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Destroy:

Tunnel 25' X 5' X 5'	2
Booby Trapped Grenade (Unk type)	1
Extensive Tunnel Area and Psy-Ops Center	1
Huts, Small Barracks Type	15
Tunnels 30' X 5' X 5'	2
Grenades (Unk type, locally fabricated)	2

Lost

M-14 Rifle	1
M-14 Magazine w/20 rounds 7.62	1

c. Search of Air Strike Areas.

The five TPQ-10 missions executed on D+4 and D+5 were not searched by ground forces due to the river barrier formed by the Song Ba Ky River in BT 2808. (Reference paragraphs 6.a.(2) and 10.of.(10) above).

12. Administration Matters

a. Supply and Logistics. During the execution of Operation SUTTER a local LSA was established at the Battalion Combat Base (BT 397145), and operated by a Helicopter Support Team from Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion. Through employment of the HST's attached to the units in the field, all resupply requests were processed on the HST radio nets from the operational area to the LSA. This aided the Battalion in the accomplishment of the mission, and no problems were encountered in processing or meeting the demands from units in the field. Normal arms and equipment, plus a basic allowance of ammunition were carried by committed units. Resupply was effected based on required replacements.

b. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization. Initial treatment of casualties was accomplished by the Battalion Surgeon and unit corpsman. Those individuals requiring evacuation were processed through HST channels to 1st Medical Battalion. Despite the inclement weather that was characteristic during the Operation, all casualties were evacuated at the earliest time possible.

c. Communications. The primary means of communication during Operation SUTTER was AN/PRC 25. This radio proved to be a very reliable except when heavy cloud covers persisted or when mountainous terrain separated communicants. When these conditions existed, the Battalion relied on a manual radio relay located on Hill 194 (BT 377102) to relay messages to higher Headquarters. The AN/PRC 47 functioned poorly because of the torrential rains and heavy cloud cover that existed throughout most of the operation. The AN/PRC 41 performed in an outstanding manner throughout the operation. At no time did the Battalion fail to have adequate communications to aid in controlling subordinate units and in meeting the

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requirements established by higher headquarters. The following communications equipment was used:

27 AN/PRC 25	3 TA-1
3 AN/PRC 41	1 TA-312
1 AN/PRC 47	

d. Medical Evacuation. The poor weather conditions, resulting in an over-exposure to water, caused minor medical difficulties. Immersion foot and leech bites were the major causes of non-battle casualties. Through vigorous leadership and supervision this problem did not preclude the Battalion's execution of assigned missions.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. Four (4) scout dogs were included in the Task Organizations, and although their employment had been productive on past operations, their effectiveness on Operation SUTTER was marginal. The constant over-exposure to water caused their foot pads to become tender. Additionally, leech bites were a cause of irritation and infection.

b. The Combat Photographer (ISO Team) encountered difficulty in keeping his equipment dry, thereby precluding utilization of this asset to the maximum extent possible.

14. Commander's Analysis

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) The value of utilizing the assets of the Helicopter Support Teams for Shore Party Battalion was vividly demonstrated during Operation SUTTER. Their control of resupply and medical evacuation requirements were executed with dispatch and maximum efficiency.

(2) During the monsoon season ropes are mandatory as part of the normal equipment carried by ground units. Throughout the conduct of Operation SUTTER this item of equipment was used repeatedly to aid in crossing rivers and flooded rice fields.

(3) In view of the enemy situation, local force and guerrilla elements, the Battalion employed a saturation method of covering the operational area. This disposition resulted in achieving greater flexibility, better area coverage, and the denial of freedom of action for the enemy.

b. Psychological Warfare. The following psychological warfare projects were executed in conjunction with Operation SUTTER:

(1) 40,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were dropped in the area of operation.

(2) 40,000 leaflets offering monetary awards to persons who locate VC mines and booby traps for USMC personnel.

To date, the psychological warfare efforts has resulted in six (6) Chieu Hoi Ralliers turning themselves in at Iq Tin District Headquarters.

c. The non-combatant populace were passive in their relations with the battalion. An attempt was made to effect relocation of refugees who might be interested in seeking sanctuary. However, it appears that all GVN sympathizers had previously left the area, and only Viet Cong influenced inhabitants remained.


15. Recommendations.

a. That scout dog teams be employed on short patrol missions during the monsoon season.

b. That the intelligence gained be exploited by future combat operations in the SUTTER area.


P. L. HILGARTNER

SECRET



Maps: Vietnam AMS Series L7014
 (1:50,000) Sheets 6731IV, 6639I


ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

OPERATION OVERLAY D+1
020601 - 030600 December 1966

Maps: Vietnam, AMS Series L7014
(1:50,000) Sheets 6739IV, 6639I.



05
3D

12
40

Recon
Company
020601-
030600

020601-
030600

020601-
030600

Recon
Cantilever

ENCLOSURE (3)

SECRET

SECRET

OPERATION OVERLAY D+2
030601 - 040600 December 1966

Maps: Vietnam, AMS Series L7014
(1:50,000) Sheets 6739IV, 6639I

030601-
040600



020601-
030730
Security Patrol

030730-
031200


031100

031200


031700

040600

031300-
040600



030601-
031300
Recon
Communication




030601-
040600
Recon
Cattilever

ENCLOSURE (4)

SECRET

SECRET



Maps: Vietnam, AMS Series L7014 (1:50,000) Sheets 6739IV, 6639I

25 05

12 37


SECRET

ENCLOSURE (5)

Recon OP
Cantilever
040601-050600
A

SECRET

OPERATION OVERLAY D+4
050601 - 060600 December 1966



Maps: Vietnam, AMS Series L7014
(1:50,000) Sheets 6739IV, 6639I.

050601-
060600

Recon
Can till after
050601-
051615

ENCLOSURE (6)


SECRET

SECRET

OPERATION ORIELAY D+5
060601 - 061815 December 1966

▲ Recon
Bitteridge
060601

Maps: Vietnam, AMS Series L7014
(1:50,000) Sheets 6739IV, 6639I.



Combat Patrol
060630-060900

25
05

12
37

▲ 060601

ENCLOSURE (7)

SECRET

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CEU LAI, RVN
 221600H December 1966

Bn FRAG ORDER 15-66

Ref: (a) Map RVN 1:50,000, Sheet 6739IV of Series L 7014

(b) BnO 3300.1 Rules of Engagement

(c) BnO 2000.1A Communications SOP

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Elements of the A-14th LF Co, AKA 706th LF Co, operate in the objective area and are armed with automatic weapons and have 60mm mortar capability.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) 7th Marines continues defense of assigned TAOR.

(2) 3rdBn, 5thMar defends within assigned TAOR.

(3) Artillery

(a) 2ndBn (-), 11thMar direct support to 5th Marines.

(b) Elements of 4thBn (-), 11thMar and 155 Guns general support/
reinforcing.(4) Air. 1st MAW provides helicopter and fixed wing support as requested.c. Attachments and Detachments

(1) Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv

(2) Det, HqCo, 5thMar

(3) Det, 1stEngBn

(4) Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm

(5) FO Tm, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

(6) Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

(a) Det, Med Plt

(b) Det, Comm Plt

(c) TACP

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TAB-B

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2. MISSION

To conduct search and destroy operation in the area of operations.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operationb. Company C (Rein)

(1) Commencing at L-Hour on D-Day land in predesignated LZ vicinity BF 356071 and conduct search and destroy operation with emphasis on locating VC hospital, rice storage, and harbor sites vicinity coordinates BF 351071, 349080 and 358078.

(2) Commence movement overland to Bn TAOR at L+9.

c. H&S Company

(1) Insert one Squad (Rein) manual radio relay at coordinates BF 383104 at L-Hour.

d. Company D

(1) Provide one platoon (Rein) on 30 minute standby to reinforce Company C on order.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) All attachments effective 251800H Dec66.

(2) All personnel wear helmets and upper body armor.

(3) Comply with reference (b).

(4) D-Day 26 December 1966.

(5) L-Hour 0730H

(6) LZ Prep Fires commence L-30 minutes and cease L-10 minutes.

(7) Termination of operation on order of CO, 1stBn, 5thMar.

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Carry 3 MCI per individual.
- b. Carry BA ammunition.
- c. Carry Rope for stream crossing.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS

a. Command

(1) Reports to the CO, 1stBn, 5thMar will be made as follows:

- (a) Hourly progress reports.
- (b) Spot Reports as occurring.

b. Communications - Electronics

- (1) Effect radio silence until H-Hour.
- (2) See reference (c).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER



B. S. PICKETT
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX:

= Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: 7thMar (2)
5thMar (2)
Co C (1)
11thMar (1)
1stEngBn (1)
3rdBn, 5thMar (1)
File (1)

3




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VN 371145 3rd 1967

ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 15-66

Ref: Map RVN 1:50,000; AFS Series L7014, Sheet 6739IV

Time Zone: H



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B. S. Fickert
 B. S. FICKERT
 Major, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

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1st Battalion, 5th Marine
CHU LAI RVN
29 December 1966

Bn Frag Order 16-66

Ref: (a) Map RVN 1:50,000 Sheet 6739IV of Series L7014
 (b) BnO 3300.1 Rules of Engagement
 (c) BnO 2000.11B Communications SOP

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Elements of the A-14th LF Co and 706th LF Co operate in the objective area and are armed with automatic weapons and have 60mm mortar capability.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) 7th Marines continues defense of assigned TAOR.

(2) 3rdBn, 5thMar Defends within assigned TAOR.

(3) Artillery

(a) 2ndBn (-), 11thMar direct support of 5th Marines

(b) Elements of the 4thBn (-), 11thMar and 155 Guns general support/reinforcing.

(4) Air 1st MAW provides helicopter and fixed wing support as requested

c. Attachments and Detachments

(1) Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv.

(2) Det, HqCo, 5thMar

(3) Det, 1stAngBn

(4) Det, ARVN Interpreter Tn

(5) FO Tn, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

(6) Det, EB Pys Warfare Tn

(7) Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

(a) Det, Med Plt

(b) Det, Comm Plt

(c) TACP

TAB-C

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2. MISSION

To conduct search and destroy operations of operations.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operationb. Company C (Rein)

(1) Commencing at L-Hour on D-Day land in predesignated LZ and conduct search and destroy operations in objective area to uncover possible VC ammo caches.

(2) Commence movement overland to Bn TAOR at H+10.

c. H&S Company

(1) Insert one Squad (Rein) manual radio relay at coordinates BT 383104 at L-Hour.

d. Company D

(1) Provide one platoon (Rein) on 30 minute standby to reinforce Company C on order.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) All attachments effective 281500H Dec66

(2) All personnel wear helmets and upper body armor.

(3) Comply with reference (b).

(4) D-Day 29 December 1966

(5) L-Hour 0730H

(6) LZ Prep Fires L-25 min to L-5 min.

(7) Termination of operation on order of CO, 1stBn, 5thMar.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Carry 3 MCI per individual

b. Carry BA ammunition

c. Carry Rope for stream crossing

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICSa. Command

a. Hourly progress reports

b. Spot reports as occurring.

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b. Communications - Electronics

- (1) Effect radio silence until H-Hour.
- (2) See reference (c).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER



B.S. PICKETT
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX:

I - Operation Overlay




DISTRIBUTION: 7thMar (2)
5thMar (2)
Co C (1)
11thMar (1)
1stEngBn (1)
3rdBn, 5thMar (1)
File (1)

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ANNEX A (Operation Overlay to Bn Encls Order 1 -66)

Ref: Map RVN 1:50,000;
AMS Series L7014,
Sheet 6739 IV

Time Zone: H



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B. S. PICKETT

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