

SERIAL NO. 0047-67
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HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

1 February 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 5th Marine Regiment

Subj: 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology Report for Period
of 311601Z Dec66 to 311600Z Jan67

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2A
(b) MCO 5720.2

Encl: (1) Command Chronology
(2) Appendix A (List of References)
(3) Appendix B (Documentation)

1. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology, consisting of enclosures (1), (2) and (3) is hereby submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

D. E. Esslinger
D. E. ESSLINGER

5TH MAR S&C FILES

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ENCLOSURES (1), (2) AND (3)

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I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

a. Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division
(Rein) Fleet Marine Force.

(1) Location: Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam.

(2) Period Covered: 311601Z Dec66 to 311600Z Jan67.

(3) LtCol D. E. ESSLINGER	Commanding Officer
Maj J. P. WHITE	Executive Officer
2ndLt B. F. BEGGS	S-1
1stLt S. E. LINDBLOM	S-2
Capt E. S. PIPER, Jr.	S-3
Capt S. S. GLAIZE	S-4
Capt C. KELLY	S-5
1stLt M. D. CAREY	H&S Company Commander
Capt J. M. SIMS	Company I Commander
Capt R. E. MARESCO	Company K Commander
Capt R. W. VORREYER	Company L Commander
Capt J. R. McELROY	Company M Commander

2. COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

a. The most significant event for the month of January was the participation in Phase I of Operation DESOTO. This action was preceded by the assignment of Company K to a security mission for an Engineer Survey Party operating along the Mo Duc-Duc Pho portion of Route One. The operation began on 25 January with a helilift of Company K (-)(Rein) into initial landing zones at Mo Duc and Duc Pho. Units moving from the north and south were to converge at one point along the route and then return to the Chu Lai TAOR by helicopter. However, in the morning of 26 January heavy resistance was encountered by units moving north along Route One, less than 2000 meters from Duc Pho. Company K elements continued to receive heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire each time they attempted to move to complete the security mission. Later that day an observation aircraft was brought down by enemy fire in the vicinity of the conflict. Late in the evening of 26 January Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and the Alpha Command Group of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines were helilifted to Duc Pho to reinforce and assist Company K in a new mission which was to (1) rescue any crew members (2) recover any classified documents and equipment and (3) to destroy the aircraft. On 27 January Company C commenced its mission and met heavy enemy resistance from well prepared positions. Later that morning all units were ordered to withdraw to Duc Pho for a return helilift to the Chu Lai TAOR. (For a detailed account see Tab B to Appendix B; Combat After Action Report for Phase I of Operation DESOTO)

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b. Another significant event was an action occurring on the morning of 13 January. At 130205H an alert PF at the CAC K, 4th Platoon compound opened fire on three VC who were maneuvering into position near the perimeter. This was followed by a VC attack by an estimated 20-30 man force which lasted almost an hour and a half. Reinforcements from Company K, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines were sent to the unit as more small arms and grenade fire was received. The CAC unit received one USMC KIA during the attack. This action is believed to have been a diversionary move by the VC to cover a larger attack on the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, which commenced shortly after the initial CAC contact. The attack against the artillery unit's perimeter was well planned and vigorous. The attack was repulsed; this was due in great measure to supporting mortar and small arms fire from Company I. Later that morning a Combined Action Company patrol killed one of the attacking VC, capturing one weapon.

c. Early in the month of January this command received twenty-five XM-16E1 rifles and was given the mission of forming a cadre to train personnel of the 5th Marine Regiment in the use of this weapon. During the second week of January this training cadre gave instruction to selected personnel from Headquarters Company and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. By the end of January initial instruction and familiarization firing was conducted for all members of this command. The results of this instruction have generated much interest and enthusiasm for the use of this weapon.

3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

a. Personnel and Administration

(1) The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines began the month of January with an on rolls strength of 33 Marine Officers and 1120 enlisted Marines. The shortages in Lieutenants O302 and enlisted MOS's 2533 and 3516 have decreased immensely by the over-manning-level strength of on board personnel. Our current on-board strength is 35 Marine Officers and 1168 enlisted Marines.

(2) During the early weeks of January the turnover in enlisted personnel was normal. However, in the latter part of the month 15 Staff NCO's and 145 enlisted personnel were transferred to 1st Military Police Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marines, and 7th Communications Battalion. These transfers were initiated on a man-for-man basis. The purpose of these transfers was to break up the April rotation tour dates within this organization.

(3) 55 personnel were promoted to Corporal and 84 personnel were promoted to Lance Corporal for the normal promotion period during January.

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(4) This organization has experienced no major problems during the month of January in the area of personnel administration.

b. Intelligence

(1) First Lieutenant Stephen E. LINDBLOM, formerly with Company M, was assigned as the S-2, Intelligence Officer at the beginning of January. Other personnel changes involved the loss of two S-2 Scouts due to RTD transfers.

(2) For the past month, the Battalion S-2 Scouts have helped supplement the defensive positions around the Battalion CP area and have attended schools on both the TPS-21 and the PRS-1. They have also conducted numerous patrols and night ambushes in the Battalion TAOR.

(3) The predominant types of enemy activity continued to be small arms and automatic weapons harrassing fire, and booby traps. There has been an increase of sniper harrassment and in line-probing; both of which can be related to the thinning of troops over an extended TAOR.

(4) There have been confirmed reports of a VC main force Battalion conducting some operations within the 5th Marines TAOR. This was evidenced by the unsuccessful attack on the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines on 13 January.

(5) Enemy casualties consisted of six (6) KIA's (Confirmed), ten (10) KIA's (Probable), one (1) Chieu Hoi, and four (4) Civil Defendants. Three (3) weapons were captured along with assorted equipment and clothing.

c. Training

(1) During the month of January, four one-week Troop Indoctrination Courses were conducted for newly joined personnel of this command. A total of 168 men were processed through the course. Personnel received instruction on the Rules of Engagement, Religions, History, and Customs of RVN, Communications, Intelligence, NBC, Small Unit Tactics, Civic Action, Compass and Map Reading.

(2) Two three-day Landmine Warfare, Booby Trap and Demolitions courses were conducted by the 1st Engineer Battalion for 58 personnel of this command.

(3) Familiarization instruction of the XM-16E1 rifle was given to 900 personnel during the month. This consisted of classroom lecture, demonstration, and practical application covering nomenclature, disassembly and assembly, operation and functioning, sight adjustment, care and cleaning, stoppages and immediate action, as well as twenty-five rounds of familiarization firing.

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(4) One Marine attended NCO Leadership School in Okinawa.

d. Special Operations

(1) From 2 to 5 January Company M conducted a platoon (Rein) search and clear operation, called "Operation GREYHOUND" in the eastern sector of the TAOR.

(2) From 8 to 10 January the 2nd Platoon (Rein), Company K conducted "Operation DOBERMAN", a search and clear in the rugged mountains of the central sector of the TAOR.

(3) From 10 to 13 January Company I conducted a platoon (-) search and clear operation, called "Operation BOXER", in the southern sector of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines TAOR and into avenues of approach into the northwest sector of the 3rd Battalion's TAOR.

(4) From 16 to 19 January Company M again covered the western sector of the TAOR with a company (-) operation called "Operation SHEPHERD".

(5) "Operation HUSKY" was conducted from 22 to 23 January by the 3rd Platoon, Company K in the southern sector of the TAOR.

(6) Company I, using one platoon (-), extensively patrolled the northwest sector of the TAOR from 30 to 31 January during "Operation BULLDOG".

e. Artillery Support

(1) Ammunition expenditures in support of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines during the month of January were as follows:

(a) 1230 rounds of HE and 21 rounds of WP fired as H and I's and unobserved fire missions based on intelligence information.

(b) 350 rounds HE, 74 rounds illumination and 25 rounds WP were fired in observed fire missions.

(c) 146 rounds HE and four rounds WP were fired as landing zone prep fires.

(2) Concerning the attack on the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, on 13 January, artillery support originated by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines consisted of two observed fire missions conducted on reported VC mortar sites and FSC firing of appropriate concentrations of the counter mortar and blocking fire plan when intelligence showed the attack to be ending and the VC retreating. The 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, conducted firing of illumination on pre-cleared perimeter illumination. The fact that these missions were pre-cleared greatly reduced the time required

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to fire the missions. This points out the effectiveness and necessity of having, on a daily basis, pre-cleared perimeter defense missions.

f. Air Support

(1) During the month of January 520 personnel were transferred by helicopter including two VCS.

(2) There were two liaison visits by the Battalion Commander and his staff.

(3) 700 pounds of cargo was moved in one lift to resupply a rifle company with rations and batteries.

(4) Two emergency medevacs were requested and completed.

(5) Nine tactical helicopter requests were cancelled due to weather.

g. Logistics

(1) General. The overall logistic status of the Battalion is excellent. Since the last report, no major logistical difficulties have been encountered. Road conditions have been a serious problem area during the monsoon season. Transportation supporting the Battalion have had difficulty with brakes on wet and muddy roads. Class IV and Class V supply items have been adequate with no major difficulties witnessed. During the month of February tin roofing will be constructed on ten existing strongback tents.

(2) Motor Transportation. Motor Transportation is excellent, considering the heavy rain during the past month. The maintenance program has been effective, although problems exist after each heavy rain. The maintenance effort is primarily preventive in nature. At present three vehicles have been deadlined over 15 days. All vehicles are M-274 mules and are at FLSG-B for 3rd Echelon maintenance.

(3) Supply. The only significant problem area has been encountered in the procurement of 782 gear problem area should resolve itself. Presently, replacement personnel from the states are reporting with 782 gear and weapons, which is solving the 782 gear problem. Body armor has been on order on priority O2 requisition.

As soon as the monsoon season is over Battalion Supply will be moved from Hill #49. This will result in better security and more adequate control of supply activities.

h. Civic Action

(1) During the month of January 6100 people were treated in the villages of Ky Lien, Ky Khuong, Ky Sanh. Three PF's are currently undergoing medical training at the Ky Khuong medical facility.

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(2) The construction on the new dispensary in Long Phu I has begun. This dispensary is centrally located to accommodate the people of both hamlets (Long Phu (1) and (2)). Materials which include 15 bags of cement and sufficient lumber were supplied through Civic Action. The actual construction is being done by Vietnamese who live in the hamlets of Long Phu (1) and (2), and supervised by the Hamlet Chiefs.

(3) Movies have been shown in Ky Khuong school house to the school children and local PF's attached to the CAC units in Ky Khuong.

(4) Approximately 500 pounds of waste food has been distributed daily to the village of Ky Khuong and the Hamlet of Long Phu (1) in order to assist the Vietnamese in feeding their livestock.

(5) A solatium payment was made to the family of a small boy who was seriously injured by an enemy or ARVN booby trap (40,000\$ VN).

(6) English language classes are being held daily in the village of Ky Khuong and Hamlet of Long Phu (1). Approximately 100 children attend, classes are taught by Civic Affairs personnel.

(7) Audio Visual team conducted a one day operation at the Ky Khuong CAC unit.

(8) 22 carpenter kits, 500 bars of soap, 50 pounds of clothing, and toys were distributed in the hamlets of Long Phu (1) and (2) and the Village of Ky Khuong.

4. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 2 Jan Company M (-) commenced Operation GREYHOUND.
- 5 Jan Company M (-) terminated Operation GREYHOUND.
- 7 Jan 1st Lieutenant S. E. LINDBLOM assigned as Battalion S-2 Officer vice Capt R. P. TATUM who was assigned to the 5th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- 8 Jan 3rd Platoon, Company K commenced Operation DOBERMAN.
- 10 Jan Operation DOBERMAN terminated.
- 13 Jan Attack on CAC K, 4th Platoon by 20-30 VC.
Company I terminated Operation BOXER.
- 16 Jan Company M commenced Operation SHEPHERD.
- 19 Jan Operation SHEPHERD terminated.

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- 21 Jan 1st Marine Division Band performed at the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines CP.
- 22 Jan Operation HUSKY commenced by Company K.
- Major General Herman NICKERSON, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) and Brigadier General STILES, Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray, visited the CAC K, 4th Platoon.
- 23 Jan Operation HUSKY terminated.
- 25 Jan Company K (Rein) commenced Engineer survey security mission between Mo Duc and Duc Pho.
- 26 Jan 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) commenced Phase I of Operation DESOTO.
- 27 Jan 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) terminated Phase I of Operation DESOTO.
- 30 Jan Company I commenced Operation BULLDOG.
- Lieutenant James C. CHARNLEY assigned as Battalion Chaplain vice Lieutenant Victor H. KRULAK, Jr. to 1st Medical Battalion.
- 31 Jan Operation BULLDOG terminated.

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APPENDIX A (LIST OF REFERENCES)

1. CO 7th Marines verbal frag order for Phase I of Operation DESOTO.

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APPENDIX B (DOCUMENTATION)

1. ✓ Tab-A - Operation Overlay of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines activities for month of January 1967.
2. ✓ Tab-B - Combat After Action Report for Phase I of Operation DESOTO.

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HEADQUARTERS

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
APO San Francisco, California 96602

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3/DGD/jec
3121
3 February 1967

From: Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein)
Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) CO 7th Marines verbal Frag Order 25 January 1967

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay
(2) Enemy Bunker and Trench Overlay

1. CODE NAME. Phase I of Operation DESOTO.
2. DATES OF OPERATION. 262000H January 1967 to 271830H January 1967.
3. LOCATION. Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS. See Task Organization.
5. TASK ORGANIZATION

3rd Bn(-)(Rein), 5th Marines

LtCol ESSLINGER

H&S Co (-)
Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar (Ln Tm)
Det, Hq Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)
Det, 1st Engr Bn

Co K (Rein)

Capt MARESCO

Co K
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat
Det, 81mm Mort Plat
FAC Tm
FO Tm, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar
NGF Spot Tm, Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar

Co C (Rein), 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Capt WALKER

Co C
Det, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 7th Mar
Det, Med Plat
FAC Tm, 3rd Bn, 5th Mar
FO Tm, Btry G, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar
NGF Spot Tm, Hq Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

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App B, Tab B

26-27 Jan 1967

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SECRET6. SUPPORTING FORCESa. Artillery

(1) There was one six gun 105mm Howitzer Battery in direct support of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines during Phase I of Operation DESOTO.

(2) A total of nine observed missions were fired consisting of eighty-one rounds HE and two rounds WP.

(3) Damage inflicted upon the enemy totaled three confirmed VC KIA's, 10 probable KIA's and the destruction of several trench lines.

b. NAVAL GUNFIRE

(1) Naval gunfire fire support was provided by three five inch fifty-four guns of the USS MANLEY DD-940.

(2) A total of twenty-two observed missions were fired consisting of 438 rounds HE.

(3) Destruction of enemy personnel and equipment consisted of one VC KIA (Confirmed), six structures, six machine gun emplacements, and seven bunkers.

c. AIR

(1) The helilift of the Alpha Command Group and Company C on the evening of 26 January was completed smoothly after the hours of darkness.

(2) Close Air Support was provided by two A-4E aircraft.

(3) One airstrike was called during the operational period. The strike was a combined effort of the FAC and TAC(A). The TAC(A) proved to be invaluable in selecting targets due to his better observation capability. The FAC is limited in his ability to observe targets but can assist in the coordination of the airstrike.

(4) It is recommended that a more compatible ordnance load be used to accommodate the types of targets encountered. As an example, 500 rounds snake eye and 1000 pound HE with delay fuze would have proved more effective against the deep bunkers and trenches which were encountered.

(5) One emergency medevac was conducted to evacuate four KIA's and eight WIA's. In order to assist the helicopter crew during medevacs from an insecure zone the ground units must always provide covering fire as was done here.

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SECRET7. INTELLIGENCE

a. The terrain in the Duc Pho area is predominately flat, rice-paddy land that is still wet and hard to move through. There are numerous small streams with steep banks about four to five feet high, but with no more than one to two feet of water. Hedgerows border 90% of all rice-paddies and there are some cane fields (over five feet high) and bamboo groves scattered throughout the area (see overlay). Route #1 and the railroad track that run through the area are built up higher than the paddies and offer good fields of fire across the paddies in most places.

b. The villages shown on the map do exist and are occupied. The entire area is very populous. Except for Duc Pho itself all hamlets in the area are definitely VC influenced and VC dominated. Bunkers that were destroyed by air one day were found to be rebuilt on the following day. This is believed to be the result of civilian labor groups. During one strike on a series of trench lines in the vicinity of BS 789393 enemy fire was directed towards civilian women and children who were running from their huts. No reason could be determined for this action and it is the first time it has been reported in this area.

c. VC strength in the area was estimated to be one battalion. There are at present two confirmed local force companies operating in the area surrounding Duc Pho. Heavy automatic and semi-automatic small arms fire was received from two different positions. Well directed moderate to heavy fire was received both from snipers and from fortified emplacements. Some booby traps made from M-26 frag grenades were located. The enemy units engaged were well supplied with ammo and were a very aggressive force who at the time seemed to have no intention of leaving the area.

d. The well constructed bunkers were built low to the ground and were concealed with sod, etc. Bunkers were found mostly on the railroad tracks and across (north of) the rivers while fighting holes and trench lines were found throughout the area in hedge rows around the huts and in the small groves of trees. It is estimated that the bunkers have a good tunnel system behind them both for escape and protection from bombing and shelling.

e. It is highly probable that the VC have radio monitoring capabilities in the area since a large number of ARVN PRC-10's have been captured in that area. Slight radio interference was encountered.

f. It was found that the 1:25,000 maps of the area are very helpful in picking out details, and are accurate. Aerial photo coverage of the area is adequate. The Duc Pho District Headquarters has recent information as to units in that area that are fortified. Captain BANKS, the Advisor at Duc Pho, proved very helpful as an intelligence source and his intelligence on the area is up to date.

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8. MISSION. During Phase I of Operation DESOTO, the 3rd Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines was assigned the following mission:

Execute a tactical movement to the site of a downed observation aircraft and (1) rescue the crew members, (2) recover any classified documents and equipment and, (3) destroy the aircraft.

9. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. On the evening of 26 January the Alpha Command Group of 3rd Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines and Company C (-)(Rein), 1st Battalion, 7th Marines were helilifted from landing zones in the Chu Lai TAOR to join Company K, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines at Duc Pho. On the morning of 27 January, the 3rd Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines deployed towards the site of the downed aircraft.

10. EXECUTION

a. D-day - 26 January 1967. At 1830H the Alpha Command Group of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines were helilifted from Landing Zones in the Chu Lai TAOR to Duc Pho. Arrival at Duc Pho was at 2000H where a link-up was made with Company K. The landing was made smoothly under flareship lighting.

b. D+1 - 27 January 1967

(1) At 0710H Company C commenced a movement from Duc Pho to the site of the downed aircraft (BS 788393).

(2) At 0730H Company C was located at BS 787388 with no enemy contact.

(3) At 0800H the Alpha Command Group and Company K began to receive heavy small arms and .50 caliber machine gun fire from an estimated 13 bunkers along the railroad tracks from BS 783395 to BS 786387 and from a hamlet at BS 786394.

(4) Company C advanced to BS 788390 by 1100H and continued to receive heavy fire. Artillery fire and airstrikes were called on the enemy bunkers and enemy controlled hamlet. Company C supported by mortar fire assaulted several bunker positions.

(5) At 1200H Company C was unable to progress further due to intensive enemy fire from the north, west and south. At this time an order was received to consolidate units for a withdrawal to Duc Pho. Company C had progressed to within an estimated 300 meters of the aircraft but could not observe it because of the terrain.

(6) Company C passed through Company K and the Command Group and arrived at the Duc Pho compound at 1300H.

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(7) At 1615H Company C commenced a helilift from Duc Pho back to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines TAOR. An initial helilift of the Alpha Command Group and Company K began at 1810H and was terminated at 1850H. Remaining elements of Company K were transported by helicopter and truck from Duc Pho to the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines TAOR on 28 January. The movement was completed at 281630H.

11. RESULTS

a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines:

(a) VC KIA (Confirmed) - 9.

(b) VC KIA (Probable) - 19.

b. Friendly

(1) Casualties sustained by 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines were as follows:

(a) Killed in Action - 4 (Company C, 1/7).

(b) Wounded in Action - 9 (Company C, 1/7).

c. Captured Equipment - None.

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

a. Resupply

(1) Due to the short duration of this phase of Operation DESOTO no major resupply problem was encountered. Resupply was conducted by helicopter directly from the logistical support area at Quang Ngai.

b. Maintenance. Maintenance support was effective and no problems developed.

c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation and Hospitalization

(1) No significant problems were encountered in the treatment of casualties. Wounded were expeditiously evacuated from the battlefield and excellent care was received throughout the evacuation chain.

(2) The time and distance required for medevac from the battlefield to 1st Medical Battalion, Chu Lai was considered to be excessive. In a larger operation this will be a major problem area if there are large numbers of casualties.

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(3) Difficulty was experienced in the recovery of individual equipment evacuated with casualties. All 782 gear was placed in one bin at 1st Medical Battalion and no control was established when releasing the gear. As a result of this lack of control another unit obtained eleven sets of 782 gear belonging to Company K.

d. Transportation. Transportation to support tactical and logistical requirements was effectively accomplished via helicopter as necessary.

e. Communications

(1) The operation was approximately thirty-four miles from 7th Marines HQ and a radio relay site was established at Mo Duc ARVN outpost. Once established there were no troubles save the normal voice delays through relay.

(2) Battalion Tactical net at times became overloaded. This was due mainly to a lack of radios which would provide a Battalion Admin net.

(3) In an effort to keep equipment dry and avoid remoting radios, a ten-foot whip antenna (bent double at center joint) will provide communications past tape antenna range and is short enough to operate inside bunkers.

(4) A class on field expedient maintenance of portable radios will be given within a month for all radio operators. This will encompass remedial efforts to overcome moisture, leaks, circuit shorts and breakage.

13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES. None.

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

a. No civic action program was conducted due to the brevity of Phase I of Operation DESOTO.

b. Although the original mission was not completely accomplished because of enemy strength and volume of fire in the objective area, much vital intelligence was obtained which will be of assistance in following phases of the operation. The aircraft itself was destroyed by friendly air strikes.

15. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Timely casualty reporting was hampered by lack of communication with the rear echelon. Casualty information included in situation reports transmitted to the 7th Marines was not always relayed to the CRCC located at the Battalion rear; this was due to lack of coordination prior to the operation because of the rapidity of deployment. In future operations where communications with the organization maintaining administrative control is not possible, liaison must be maintained with the organization having operational control to ensure relaying of casualty information to the CRCC.

D. E. Esslinger
D. E. ESSLINGER




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OPERATION OVERLAY
3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINES
PHASE I OF OPERATION DESOTA
262000H-271830H JAN67
MAP: VIETNAM, 6640 II, 1:50,000





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
ENCLOSURE (1)

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OVERVIEW OF
 ENEMY BUNKER AND TRENCH LINES
 PHASE I OF OPERATION DESOTO
 262000H-271800H January 1967
 MAP: VIETNAM 5640 NT, 1:50,000



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ENCLOSURE (2)