

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS  
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/AJD/der  
3000  
3 May 1966

2nd Bn. 7th Marines  
Log No. 0155-66  
Copy No. 1 of 8  
SER No 024-66

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines (Rein) FMF  
Subj: Command Chronology Report  
Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2A  
Encl: (1) Command Chronology


1. As directed by reference (a) enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

*Leon N. Utter*  
LEON N. UTTER

7thMar S&C Log No.  
00322-66 Copy# 1 of 7

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

ORIGINAL



*Apr 1966*

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY1. Organization Data.

- a. Location. 2nd Bn, 7th Marines (Rein) CP Location Chu Lai VN BT 504036.
- b. Period Covered. 1-30 April 1966.
- c. Commanding Officer and Staff.

(1) Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. UTTER	Commanding Officer
(2) Major G. H. GENTRY 1-22 April 1966	Executive Officer
Major R. E. MOSS 23-30 April 1966	Executive Officer
(3) 1stLt R. W. HALL	S-1
(4) 1stLt G. V. HARTMAN	S-2
(5) Major A. J. DOUBLET	S-3
(6) 1stLt M. T. HARRIGAN	S-4

2. Detailed Description of Significant Events.a. Personnel

(1) During the month of April this battalion joined 3 officers (2 Majors, 1 Captain) and 60 enlisted. One officer (Major) and 88 enlisted were transferred largely due to normal rotation.

(2) Casualties during the period were two enlisted KIA and thirteen enlisted WIA's.

(3) One lieutenant was promoted to captain, 63 promotions to corporal, 78 promotions to lance corporal, and 7 promotions to PFC were effected during this period.

(4) One silver star, 22 Vietnamese crosses of gallantry and 92 purple hearts were awarded in April.

b. Intelligence. Significant intelligence obtained and acted upon during the period resulted in Operation "NEVADA" and "HOT SPRINGS". Supporting information is contained in paragraph 7 of the combat after action reports attached as Appendix A.

1.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Training. Extensive commitments to airfield defense and two battalion size operations limited training during the period. Four Marines received formal training on the portable "Mighty Mite" smoke generator. They will in turn conduct indoctrination for other members of the battalion. Seven men from Company "H" attended the Engineer Battalion Landline Warfare School. Additional quotas are being requested for May.

d. Special Operations.

(1) There were two operations of battalion size and two of company size during the month. The battalion operations were in rapid response to 2nd ARVN Division intelligence, to which a high credibility rating had been given. The one company operation was initiated due to sightings of VC activity by Reconnaissance Battalion units, while the other was on order of Commanding Officer, 7th Marines. All operations are covered in detail within the attached combat after action reports.

(2) During the month the following small unit activity was conducted within the battalion TAOR.

(a) 2 Platoon search and destroy operations.

(b) 10 Squad search and destroy operations.

(c) 5 Squad night ambushes.

(d) 95 Fire team night ambushes.

(e) 95 Fire team night security patrols.

(f) 270 night listening posts.

e. Command and Control. Battalion operations conducted during April were under the command and control of the Commanding Officer, 7th Marines. Company operations were under command and control of Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.

f. Close Combat.

(1) Close combat during battalion and company operations is described in the attached combat after action reports.

(2) Close combat within the TAOR was as follows:

(a) On 6 April Company "H" position at BT 515012 received one incoming grenade resulting in one WIA and one KIA. VC were engaged with small arms in return and the area searched the following day with negative results.

ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(b) On 17 April Company "F" ambush moving into position received two rounds of small arms fire but no casualties. Returned fire with small arm and automatic weapons. Searched contact area and found only foot prints and blood stains.

g. Fire Support.

(1) A concise picture of fire support furnished for operations is contained in paragraph 6 of each of the attached combat after action reports.

(2) Fire support within the TAOR amounted to 180 H&I fire missions during the period.

h. Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

(1) In late March and early April the First Tank Battalion, First Anti-tank Battalion and Headquarters Battery of Eleventh Marines moved into our TAOR at BT 518042. Liaison was made with these units and a division of responsibility was agreed upon for Civil Affairs/Civic Action activity.

(2) A well and shower unit were completed near the school house in the hamlet of Long Phu (1) (BT 508034), and a similar well and shower project has been started in Long Phu (2) (BT 511032).

(3) During Operation "NEVADA" and "HOT SPRINGS" med-cap activities were carried out among the civilians living in area of operation resulting in a total of 56 people being evacuated to Quang Ngai. An additional 77 refugees were evacuated from a company area of operation at BS 474955 to Quang Ngai. On 27 April LtGeneral WALT toured the area of Long Phu (1) to inspect the battalion civil affairs activity. He praised the accomplishment of the program and congratulated the hamlet chief for the progress his people had made. LtGen WALT also reemphasized the importance of Civil Affairs in the present conflict and reconfirmed our own beliefs in the necessity of living and working with the Vietnamese people. In spite of the security problem posed by the closeness of the peoples market Gen WALT wholeheartedly agreed with our method and praised our efforts in winning the friendship of the people. Gen WALT further stated that he believed the hamlet of Long Phu (1) to be the most unique and successful civil affairs project he has witnessed in South Vietnam and directed that his staff make it the subject of a Huntley-Brinkley report.

APPENDICES:

- A - List of References
- B - Documents

UNCLASSIFIED  
ENCLOSURE (1)

ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix A to Enclosure (1) of Command Chronology Report

List of References:

NFF1 - Maps: AMS Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L-701, Sheets 6756 I and IV, 6757 III

2 - ✓ After Action Report - "Operations NEVADA"

3 - ✓ After Action Report - "Operation HOT SPRINGS"

4 - ✓ After Action Report - Company "G" Search and Destroy

5 - ✓ After Action Report - Company "F" Search and Destroy

A-1

UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGINAL


## Appendix B to Enclosure (1) of Command Chronology Report

List of Documents:

- ✓1 - Battalion Frag Order No 4-66
- ✓2 - Battalion Frag Order No 5-66
- ✓3 - S-2 Command Journal for April 1966
- 4 - S-3 Command Journal for April 1966
5. Battalion Newspaper, Vol 1, #7, 30 Apr 66

B-1

ORIGINAL

TWO  
SEVEN

TOOTER

Volume 1, No. 7

April 30, 1966

"If all the villages in South Vietnam were like yours, the war here would soon be over."

These were the words of Lieutenant General Louis Walt, III Marine Amphibious Force commanding general and senior Marine officer in Vietnam. He was speaking to Mr. So, Long Phu #1 village chief.

#### SCHOOLHOUSE

The three-starred general made the comment after viewing the civil affairs program of 2/7 during a visit he made here Tuesday.

General Walt, accompanied by Major General Lewis Fields, 1st Marine Division commanding general and staff officers, were met at the Long Phu #1 schoolhouse by Lieutenant Colonel Leon Utter, battalion commander, and First Lieutenant Ken Snyder, civil affairs officer for the battalion.

Both generals, after a brief handshake and welcome, took seats in the Long Phu #1 schoolroom as the civil affairs officer explained 2/7's past and current people-to-people program.

An inspection of the schoolhouse's dispensary, newly completed wall and half-finished shower unit, followed the briefing.

From the school, the visiting generals were flown to the Long Phu #1 market where they were greeted by shopkeepers and children of the marketplace.

After a thorough look at what the village had to offer and a series of questions about the progress of civil affairs here, the general commented:

"This is the best civil affairs program I've seen in South Vietnam."

\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

#### BATTALION REPLACEMENTS

operations

Major Stevens, from Headquarters Bn., 1st Marine Division, has arrived at 2/7 and will relieve Major Doublet as operations officer May 1. Major Doublet is going to Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.

chaplain

Chaplain Hiskett, a former Marine sergeant who was wounded at Chosin Reservoir in Korea, has been relieved by Chaplain Pearson. Chaplain Pearson's office will remain in the battalion chapel. Chaplain Hiskett has been transferred to the Naval Hospital, Great Lakes, Chicago, Ill.

\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

#### MEN ROTATING THIS MONTH:

Marines returning to the United States are reminded not to take any type of ordnance with them, grenades, bullets, demolitions etc. These Marines are further requested to check at their company offices and fill out a change of address form for forwarding their mail. According to a Marine Corps order, each Marine must take one C-Ration meal with him when he leaves the battalion area for CONUS.

\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

APPENDIX "B" - #5

## COMPANY NEWS

## "E" or ECHO ECHO'S COLUMN:

It seems Gunny Lisset is having problems with soda rations. He claims he needs a full-time calculator (Maybe a blonde 38-22-28 would help?)

Need some help real fast against the V.C.'s. Try calling on "Pennington's Panthers." Sergeant "P" doesn't claim his platoon is ready because he wants at least a minute to get them mounted out.

PFC Walters said he's not sure its true, but he heard AFPS might start saluting the Marine Corps units by 1967. (It'd be here to know by the way.)

Pfc. Galta, E Co., reporter

"E" — The company first shirt is nearing his 120th month of overseas duty since he joined the Marine Corps.

Lieutenant Madeo tried to get Gonzalez on the Princeton, but it was off fighting the wardrobe war. Next time, Gonzalez, we'll snag her when she's offshore.

"H" — Stands for very hot hotel. If anybody doubts this aphorism, they can visit her positions on the airfield; that's right in the middle of the Chu Lai desert.

"G" — The Big "G" stands for goodness and there is no greater goodness, than a good, goodness—no scoop this week.

"MRS" — The sergeant major was walking toward his tent yesterday when he started going, "Thee, Kheee, Kheeee," finally he paused, billowed his cheeks, and blurted out stentorically: "Keerist is it hot."

Plasters are on sale at the company office.

"AS" — Welcomes aboard IM1 Boswell and congratulates Saint on his new stripes.

\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

## CHURCH SCHEDULE

Protestant services at the battalion chapel will be held at 1030. Services for "G" Company goe at 1400 and "E" Co., at 1730. Catholic Mass will be celebrated at 1300 in the battalion area.

\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

(The following poem was submitted by Pfc. E. Willis and Cpl. M. Smith from 1st Platoon, "E" Company and is dedicated to all Marines at the 2nd Bn., 7th Marine Regiment.)

## A LETTER

It doesn't cost a lot of dough,  
To keep a Marine on the go,  
A post-paid letter is all it takes,  
It's something he appreciates.

A Marine's letter is number one,  
It comes before his food or fun,  
It chases all his blues away,  
And brightens up his every day.

He reads it over many times,  
Till there's no ink between the lines,  
No matter what you have to say,  
It's treasured in a special way.

A letter gives him spirit,  
Potential, faith and drive,  
Your single little letter,  
Is keeping his spirit alive.

Your letter keeps him on the go,  
While fighting off unfriendly foes,  
In Vietnam or anywhere,  
A letter is a Marine's Prayer.

\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

## "JACK" BOHNS BAD STUFF

"He who treats himself has a fool for a patient and a fool for a practitioner."

If you get a cut or scratch that might get infected, don't try to be your own doctor. Have a corpsman take a look at it and clean it out for you.

\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

## ORDERS FOR THE U.S.

As of this printing, orders for the May draft personnel, Cpl and below, have been recieved at the battalion S-1 office. Only orders of men with names starting from A-J have been recieved. The remaining orders should be in sometime this week, within the next two days.

\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

PAYDAY FOR 2/7 MARINES IS TOMORROW!!!!

\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

(out thanks to Cpl. Schone and LCpl. Reichle for printing the tooter.)

Dear 2/7 Marine,

Due to a lack of mail and the nearness of your departure from RVN, the following letter is dedicated to you.

#### THE MEMORY OF WAR

It was a long, hard, sweaty haul, but they packed the gear and now it is theirs forever--the memory of war.

They landed in July 1965, at a place called Qui Nhon, Republic of South Vietnam. They had moved to the ports at San Diego, California under a heavy shroud of secrecy and sailed toward the setting sun to a place called Vietnam--to a place where they would fight and some would die, but none would forget.

They had a name and a creed. The creed made the name, but the men made the creed and stuck by it.

Their creed was: "Ready for Anything, Counting on Nothing"--it belonged to them like the pride of holding a first place medal at a track meet; nobody could claim what was theirs, not even the Viet Cong.

They were the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter.

When the battalion landed at Qui Nhon they didn't know what to expect. The men were green and anxious and many were scared--as all men new to battle are.

The first night ashore many shadows became clandestine Viet Cong sneaking towards the lines, but soon the troops began to season with the temperature, time and mosquitoes.

The battalion stayed at Qui Nhon for four months. They started with 21 square miles and ended up with 81 to protect. Their mission was a big one, but they were a big battalion, tall in stature and TD in strength. They were to provide security for the airfield, port and logistics facilities at Qui Nhon.

It was hot before the monsoon came at Qui Nhon. A man's sweat was cheap and salt pills became life savers. Memories stick in the men's minds of hills--409 and its heavy terrain and back breaking height; 562 with its view overlooking the airfield; 586 and the Cu Mong Pass where the Viet Cong occasionally probed.

There was the Van Can Valley where operations were conducted to pacify and protect the area from the Viet Cong, and the long protective vigil of Highway #1 when the Army was moving to An Khe.

The 2/7 Marines won't soon forget their airdale brothers from Qui Nhon. It was the helicopters from HM 161 that brought mail and water to the troops on the hilltop outposts in any kind of weather.

They won't forget the hullabaloo raised about the battalion commander's choice to use riot control agents--a choice that became standard procedure throughout Vietnam when the use of tear gas would save lives of civilians who the Viet Cong used as shields in tunnels and caves.

As the men of the battalion recall the past at Qui Nhon there are thoughts of the rainy season when men slept on sand bags to keep from getting soaked by the streams of water on the ground; when their pancho's fell in on them in the morning because the rain had collected in gallons during the night and collapsed the shelter roof.

(over)

(Memory of War continued)

The men who patrolled Highway #1 won't readily forget the innumerable nights they spent wrapped up in ponchos between patrolling and perimeter guard, or the look of their wrinkled hands and feet from being wet for extended periods of time.

And then the battalion moved to Chu Lai, making an amphibious landing and sweep November 10--the Marine Corps Birthday.

Their conditions were better at Chu Lai. Wooden tents replaced their poncho shelters and sand bag beds. They were closer to supplies and their own parent--The Marine Corps.

But the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines weren't in for a rest at Chu Lai. Operations were a keynote in their mission of protecting the Chu Lai enclave from enemy attack. Harvest Moon in late December was a long, wet, walk until the enemy attacked on the 10th day turning the operation into a hot fight for life. Ky Phu was the spot many 2/7 Marines won't forget. They fought gallantly that day, even though weary and fatigued from their 10-day march through the muck and mire of enemy territory.

Their next big battle with heavy contact was Utah. The Viet Cong were having lunch until the Marines came. It was hell that day for both sides. Nobody in the battalion will forget the mortal chug, chug chug of the Viet Cong 50 caliber machine gun fire. Nobody will forget the sight of the hills getting up and moving as the Viet Cong pressed closer dressed as bushes and brush--nobody who was there that day will forget the valor and heroism of almost every man in defending and repelling the enemy from his particular piece of the battalion, or the gallant corpsmen and doctors giving their life saving attention to the wounded.

There were other operations, most of them hot walks in the sun with the Viet Cong fleeing from the wrath they knew 2/7 could wield.

And then came the climax of the battalion's play in Vietnam--Operation Hot Springs.

The operation only lasted two days but it took its toll on the V.C. Five 50 caliber machine guns were captured and 62 Viet Cong were killed. Only one Marine was lost that day.

These are a few of the memories the 2nd Bn., 7th Marines who landed in Qui Nhon in July 1965 will have to remember about their war. Most of the "old timers" are rotating now during May and June. They've been through the guts of Vietnam, slapped the Viet Cong in the face and chased him into a corner where he could be destroyed. They've seen their friends die and known the fatigue of week-long walks without solid contact. Now the replacements are coming and the "old" are drifting away one by one. The new blood is beginning to flow in 2/7's veins. Some wonder whether the battalion will be the same. But the spirit is there in the creed, "Ready for Anything, Counting on Nothing"--a creed that should easily take the "new" 2/7 safely and heroically through the same hell the "old" 2/7 has just completed.

Respectfully Submitted to the "old" 2/7

Clifford A. McKenzie

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein) MAF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/AJD/der  
3000  
25 April 1966

2nd Bn. 7th Marines

Log No. 0126-66

Copy No. 49 of 50

SERNO 018-66

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines  
Subj: After Action Report, "Operation NEVADA"  
Ref: (a) 3rd MarDiv Order 3100.1B

- Encl: (1) Cave and Tunnel Complex - 1
- (2) Cave and Tunnel Complex - 2
- (3) Cave and Tunnel Complex - 3
- (4) Operations D-Day AM
- (5) Operations D-Day PM
- (6) Operations D+1
- (7) Operations D+2
- (8) Operations D+3 AM

1. Code Name. "Operation NEVADA".
2. Dates of Operation. 12-15 April 1966.
3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam. AMS Map Series I(01), 1:50,000 Sheet 6756 I and IV.
4. Command Headquarters. CO, 7th Marines.
5. Task Organization

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein)

LtCol UTTAM

MSG Co f-A(Rein)

Capt. GROSS

Hq Mag Plat

MSG  
SP2

Company E (Rein)

Capt. GATCHEL

Sect 81mm Mortar Plat

Arty RC Pl  
Mag Pl

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
UNCLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

APPENDIX "A" #2

UNCLASSIFIED

Company F (Rein)

Capt LEE

Sect 81mm Mortar Plat

FAC Tm

Arty FO Tm

NGF Spot Tm

Eng Tm

Sqd Flares

Scout/Interp Tm

Company G (Rein)

Capt SEYMOUR

Arty FO Tm

Eng Tm

81mm Mortar FO Tm

Scout/Interp Tm

Company H (Rein)

Lt LAU

Sect 81mm Mortar Plat

FAC Tm

NGF Spot Tm

Arty FO Tm

Eng Tm

Scout/Interp Tm

6. Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery. Elements of 1st and 4th Battalions 11th Marines supported 2/7 operations from Nui Vo (BS 621845) and Binh Son (BS 601927) during Operation NEVADA. Fire support amounted to E&I fires the nights of D-day and D+1 and one fire mission on enemy troops in the open DRL. All artillery fire support was considered responsive with very good communications prevailing.

b. Naval Gun Fire. The Shore Fire Control Party provided spotter teams with two assault companies. Supporting fires were called for and received on D-day and D+1 with good target coverage. Communications with support ships was constant throughout the operation.

c. Air

(1) Helicopter Transport. Helicopter support amounted to three separate troop lifts, helicopter resupply on D-day to D+3, and the evacuation of refugees and in excess of 20 tons of rice to Quang Ngai. The battalion size lift on D-day was supported by 22 MAG 36 helicopters from LZ Carp (BF 509052) to LZ Bravo (BS 684853). On D+1 24 MAG 36 helicopters lifted Company "F" from LZ at BS 632851 to an objective LZ at BS 724854. On D+3 the battalion was extracted by 24 MAG 36 helicopters from a LZ at BS 734853 to LZ Goose (BS 504035). All lifts were completed without difficulty.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Armed Helicopters. Armed helicopter support was provided for all troop lifts. On D+1 they detected and engaged VC in the open at BS 724872. The target area was covered well. Results unknown.

(3) CAS. Fixed wing aircraft provided LZ prep on D-day. No other support was requested.

## 7. Intelligence.

### a. Estimate of VC Strength, Location and Disposition in the Objective Area.

#### (1) Forces anticipated in immediate objective area.

(a) <u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Tactical Disposition</u>
<u>Confirmed</u>			
52nd Bn	BS 672870 BS 700861 BS 715870	350	Scattered
<u>Probable</u>			
104th Bn	BS 6692	300	Unknown
109th Bn	BS 7283	300	Unknown
<u>Possible</u>			
316th Regt Hq	BS 702866	Unk	Unknown
51st Bn	BS 659962	Unk	Unknown
52nd Bn	Unknown	Unk	Unknown
53rd Bn	BS 673898	Unk	Unknown
2nd Div Hq	BS 723821	Unk	Unknown
310th Bn	BS 726817	Unk	Unknown
324th Bn	BS 726817	Unk	Unknown
329 Bn	BS 734780	Unk	Unknown
340th Bn	BS 742775	Unk	Unknown

Other - Secret VC base area vicinity Nui Phuong Hoang hill mass BS 690865.

(2) The intelligence information which predicated "Operation NEVADA" was initially furnished to this unit on 11 April 1966 at which time it was considered reliable and valid.

(3) The objective of the operation was to fix and destroy any VC units in the assigned area, and to locate and confiscate or destroy VC food and ammo caches which were believed situated in the region.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Strength and Situation Actually Found as Operation was conducted.

(1) With the exception of limited hostile sniper fire in LZ Pravo, coordinates BS 695847 on 12 April, and two VC killed by a Company "H" ambush in the early morning of 15 April, no solid enemy contact was established by 2/7 during the conduct of the operation.

c. VC Units Identified. None.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained:

(1) No evidence could be found by 2/7 to support the contention that a VC secret base existed on the Eastern slope of the Nui Phoung Hoang hill mass vicinity BS 6885. The area was thoroughly searched by Company "F" with negative findings.

(2) Two apparently temporary hamlets were located in 2/7's zone of operations at coordinates BS 693852 and BS 659853. No hamlets are located on map sheet 6756 L. Approximately 15-20 tons of rice was confiscated from these two locations; the majority of these supplies were hidden in earthenware jugs and baskets located in individual niches in hedgerows. Some rice was found in small tunnels and under false floors in the temporary living quarters constructed there. It is felt that the area in question was not a permanent VC storage facility but rather, a temporary installation to be utilized during the harvest season or until the rice supplies could be transported elsewhere for distribution.

(3) Hamlets at the following locations were found to have major stores of rice: BS 693845, 697846, 745855, 755954.

(4) Almost all the hedgerows in the area bounded by BS 780860, 788860, 788857, 780857 contained hidden paths and in some instances limited fortifications. It is doubtful that any of these trails or fortifications could be observed from the air.

(5) Tunnels and Caves.

(a) General. For the most part no caves of particular interest were uncovered by 2/7 on "Operation NEVADA". Of the numerous caves searched, the vast majority appeared to be small individual shelters for family groups. Moreover, many of these shelters contained sizable family rice caches, usually in earthenware or basket containers. These caves were not destroyed. Of some interest is the fact that English lettered signs posted on them which read: "This is a peoples bomb shelter - please do not destroy or fill with noxious fumes". Civilians in the devastated hamlets in grid squares BS 7736 - 7785 were adamant in their request that their shelters not be destroyed.

(b) Hamlets and Locations. Approximately 15 minor cave and tunnel complexes were searched and destroyed in the vicinity of Nhan Hoa (L)(H), Binh Nam (V), Binh Son district on 13-14 April 1966. The two temporary

4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

villages previously mentioned that are located at BS 694852 and BS 696853 contained most of the complexes. All appeared to be of recent construction and were combination shelter and storage facilities. Enclosure (1) is a representative diagram of the cave-tunnel complexes destroyed at the above locations. Engineers estimate 10-20 lbs demolitions were required to seal each of these complexes. Approximately 15 more significant cave and tunnel installations were destroyed in the vicinity BS 780860 to BS 787859 on 15 April 1966. All caves in this category were unoccupied and did not contain supply caches. Enclosure (2) and (3) are representative diagrams of the cave-tunnel complexes in this area. Again, 10-20 lbs of demolitions were used to destroy the entrances.

(c) Size and construction. The smaller complexes were of 10' to 50' in length and had a tunnel diameter of 3' to 4'. In most cases little or no reinforcement was required except at the entrance. The majority had one to two entrances. The larger complexes were of 50 to 150 meters in length and had a tunnel diameter of 3' to 4'. Reinforcement was unnecessary except in porous or sandy soil. Sleeping and storage chambers were prevalent but empty when searched. Two to five entrances were encountered in each case.

(d) Demolitions Required. Approximately 10-20 lbs of demolitions were used to seal the entrances to caves and tunnels. Fifty lbs of TNT, 40 lbs cratering charges, and 16 (C-4) kits were used to destroy the smaller complexes in grid squares BS 6984 and BS 6985. A total of 2200 lbs of explosives were used in sealing or destroying the larger complexes in the vicinity BS 780860 to BS 787859.

e. Terrain

(1) Critical Terrain Features.

Hill 144	BS 675966
Hill 110	BS 729849
Hill 42	BS 732840
Pass	BS 731845
lane ridge from BS 757857 to	BS 765853
Dune ridge from BS 772852 to	BS 774857

(2) Observation and fields of fire. The terrain in the area of operation was comparatively flat interrupted only by abruptly rising hill masses. Fields of fire would have been excellent for both defender and attacker.

(3) Cover and Concealment. Both were sparse except for those areas crisscrossed by hedgerows.

(4) Obstacles. No major obstacles were encountered during the course of the operation.

8. Mission. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein) conducts operations in assigned area in Quang Ngai Province at L-hour on D-day in conjunction with

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

coordinated ARVN operations to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment located therein.

9. Concept of Operation. After securing LZ Bravo (BS 684853) one company (-) would sweep the high ground at BS 691859. Once the high ground was secure the battalion would conduct search and destroy operations to the East with two companies abreast, one following in trace, and supporting elements and an H&S provisional platoon responsible for security to the rear. One artillery battery was in direct support of 2/7 and CAS was on strip alert. One company was designated as regimental reserve and under operational control of CO, 7th Marines.

10. Execution.

a. Planning. Planning for this operation commenced as early as 9 April 1966, but execution was delayed by higher headquarters. On 11 April 1966 the CO, 7th Marines and Staff conducted a briefing for "Operation NEVADA" with an execution date of 12 April 1966. Battalion Frag Order #4-66 was issued 11 April 1966 at which time a full briefing was conducted by the Commanding Officer and Staff for all task organization unit commanders.

b. D-day 12 April 1966. At 120500H Company "E" reported to CO, 7th Marines and remained under control of that Headquarters until 171430H. At 120639H leading elements of Company "F" were lifted by 22 MAC 36 helicopters from LZ Camp (BT 609052) to LZ Bravo (BS 684853). Company "F" secured the LZ followed by Company "H". The Company "E" lift had one helicopter fired upon going into LZ Bravo from BS 695852 resulting in one WIA who was immediately evacuated. The helicopter lift was completed at 120915H without opposition. At 120930H elements of Company "F" started to sweep and secure the high ground at BS 690860 looking for any caves or tunnels that might lead to a reported secret VC combat base. Results of this sweep were negative. Simultaneously one platoon of Company "G" uncovered a large rice cache at BS 693852. On order, the rice was confiscated and bagged for helicopter evacuation. At 121145H Company "F" apprehended six VCS at BS 694852. One VCS had a VC flag in his possession. At 212330H Company "H" searched village at BS 692844, apprehended one VCC, and also found a large rice cache. At this point further advance east had to cease due to the number of tactical units involved in evacuation of large quantities of rice by helicopter. In excess of 20 tons was eventually lifted out. Permanent positions were established during the day and patrol and ambush activity sent out at night. (Encl (4) and (5)). No contact during the night.

c. D+1 13 April 1966. At 131000H Company "F" conducted a helicopter-borne assault from BS 693852 to an LZ at BS 724854 without opposition. (Encl (5)). At 131040H Company "F" reported mines and booby traps at BS 733852. Companies "G" and "H" were committed to rice confiscation during the day with helicopters evacuating same to Quang Ngai. In excess of nine tons were taken out during day. At 131440H Company "F" Naval Gun Fire Spot Team, and subsequently their artillery FO, fired missions on VC in the open at BS 724852. Target coverage was good but surveillance not possible. At 131530H

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Company "G" sent a patrol to the West to meet an AT platoon moving East to provide direct support for 2/7. The AT's were slowed due to obstacles on the road. All units arrived in 2/7 CP at 131700H. The platoon was attached to Company "H" for the night. At 132000H night ambush activity moved into position at locations indicated on enclosure (6). No contact was made during the night.

d. D-2 14 April 1966. At 140900H 2/7 (-) moved to the East astride road starting at BS 695844 with Company "H" leading followed by H&S elements and Company "G" bringing up the rear. A heavy and light section of AT's were attached to Companies "H" and "G" respectively. Company "F" supported this move from positions on hill 110 at BS 729849. (Encl (7)). At 140930H S-3 7th Marines directed the return of the AT platoon in view of the possibility that it would impede the progress of the entire tactical column to the East. One platoon of Company "G" provided escort for the AT platoon as it moved West to highway one. The 2/7 sweep to the East was conducted without major contact. One VCS was apprehended. A detailed search was made of villages at BS 745855, BS 755852 and BS 777858. Large quantities of rice were found throughout these villages and reports made to S-3 7th Marines. Local ARVN forces were sent to evacuate rice. Methodical cave and tunnel destruction commenced in areas located in grid squares 7785, 7786, 7885. The CP was established for the night at BS 776859 with all companies in a defensive perimeter. Ambush activity was went out. (Encl (7)). The battalion was alerted for a possible helo lift back to Chu Lai on 15 April 1966.

e. D-3 15 April 1966. At 150120H Company "H" ambush at BS 774856 was sprung firing upon suspected VC. Ambush returned to friendly lines and at first light searched the contact area finding two VC KIA with weapons. During the morning 2/7 conducted search and destroy of all caves and tunnels in operation area. (Encl (8)). At 151215H the Commanding Officer advised 1/7 by radio of areas still to be searched for tunnels and caves as 2/7 was to commence helicopter lift back to Chu Lai at 151300H. The lift commenced at 151305H and was completed at 151630H without incident.

## 11. Results.

- a. Friendly Casualties. One WIA.
- b. Enemy Casualties and Captive.

(1) <u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total</u>
VC KIA	2
VCS	1
VCS	7

- c. Captured Equipment and Supplies

1 Chi Com Carbine  
1 US Thompson SMG  
20-25 tons of rice

UNCLASSIFIED

d. Friendly Equipment Losses. None

UNCLASSIFIED

12. Administrative Matters.

a. Communications. Some difficulty was experienced when support helicopters repeatedly came up on the battalion tactical net instead of the LZ control net upon arriving in our sector on support missions. Increased helicopter traffic, due to numerous missions flown to evacuate rice and civilians, resulted in frequent interruptions of traffic on the battalion tactical net. A LZ control net had been established, was in use, and control was by the attached Helicopter Support Team. Emphasis needs to be placed on utilization of the LZ control net by helicopters on support missions to avoid similar occurrence in the future.

b. Support. If evacuation of rice can be foreseen as a requirement for units conducting search and destroy operations, then containers in sufficient quantities and of durable construction should be stocked in the LSA to ensure responsive and effective execution of such a mission.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

14. Commander's Analysis.

a. Considerable effort was expended by members of this command to evacuate rice in excess of 20 tons. Once this task was undertaken it was done so at the expense of committing tactical units to other than their primary task to finding, fixing and destroying the VC.

b. There were 48 refugees who requested to be evacuated to Quang Ngai from the objective area. Helicopters were requested and provided for this civil affairs project. An additional 50 civilians with all their livestock were provided escort from the objective area to highway one where they were to go on to Quang Ngai.

c. The center of the objective area was an exceptionally fertile valley which gave every indication of being a major rice producing area. A rice harvest had just been completed and obviously explains the major rice caches uncovered. Without government control it is also obvious that the VC derive abundant food supplies from this area.

15. Recommendation

a. Should the local province authorities have no immediate plans for the pacification and resettling of refugees under government control in the objective area, then serious consideration should be given for a plan of crop destruction.

b. Establish a requirement for local RF or PF units to supervise and evacuate any large rice caches once uncovered by U.S. forces. This would permit tactical units to continue their primary mission, and permit local

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

government agencies to deal directly with the people from whom rice is being taken. The latter would negate a possible VC propaganda effort of disclaiming U.S. forces for taking food supplies from the populace.


*John H. Utter*  
DEAN H. UTTER

DISTRIBUTION:

CO, 7th Marines	45
Files	<u>5</u>
	50


UNCLASSIFIED





2nd Bn, 7th, Marines

"OPERATION NEVADA"




Typical Cave - Tunnel - Shelter found on Operation "Nevada" vicinity Chau Tuon (1), Binh Luc (1), coordinates BS 76860, on 15 April 1966.

Cave and Tunnel Complex 2 Encl (2)

200, 50, 700, 1000

"OPERATION NEVADA"

HILL MASS



Typical Cave - Tunnel complex found on Operation "Nevada" vicinity  
Cheu Thuan (1), Binh Dac (1), coordinates BS 785860 on 15 April 1966.


Cave and Tunnel Complex Encl (3)

2nd Bn, 7th Marines

"OPERATION NEVADA"

FROM LZ CARP  
BT 50905R

L-HR 120700H



83


81

MAP: Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam.  
AMS Map series L701, 1:50,000 Sheet 6756 IV, and I.

Operations D-Day AM

Enclosure (4)

2nd Br, 7th Marines  
OPERATION NEWADA



D-DAY PM

64


82

MAP: Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam.  
AMS Map series L701, 1:50,000 Sheet 6756 I and IV.

Operations D-Day PM

Enclosures (5)

2nd Bn, 7th Marines  
OPERATION NEVADA



63

81

MAP: Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam.  
AMS Map series L701, 1:50,000 Sheet 6756 I and IV.


Operations D+1

Enclosure (5)

2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th, 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 76th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 99th, 100th

OPERATION NEVADA

77  
88



69

92


MAP: Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam.  
AMS Map series L701, 1:50,000 Sheet 6756 I and IV.

Operations D+2 PM

Enclosure (7)

2nd Bn, 7th Marines  
"OPERATION NEVADA"

80  
+  
88



78  
+  
82

MAP: QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, VIETNAM.  
AMS Map series L701, 1:50,000 Sheet 6756 I and IV.

Operations D+3 AM

Enclosure (8)

UNIT OR SECTION

S-2 2nd Battalion Seventh Marines

PLACE

Chu Lai S. Vietnam

DATE:

FROM: 120600H

TO: 141840H April 66

TIME		J #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC.
IN	OUT			
			120600H	"Operation Nevada Commenced"
			121810H	2/7 Isum Nr. 1 from 120700H to 121800H: 3(a) (1) At 120800H H company recd approximately 5 rds sniper fire from BS 685847, which resulted in one USMC WIA. (2) F and H company uncovered estimated 10-15 tons of Rice Vic BS 693852 and 693845. Rice was evacuated to LSA. (3) F company apprehended (6) VCS BS693852 at 121230H. Suspects evacuated to LSA. 4 (a) Negative. (b) 6 VCS (c) Est 10-15 Tons rice confiscated. 5-7 Negative 8. Villagers at BS 692353 rptd 10 VC left their hamlet early this AM and headed North East. 9-10 Negative. 11 (a) Rice confiscated today was not hidden. It was found in normal locations. (b) Villagers in area appear to be transient but can find no evidence to support. (c) Many villagers approx 100 desire to leave area.
			122030H	Spot Rpt: A 2/7 H company. (b) 121855H (c) BS 846696 (d) & (E) H company apprehended 1 VCS who tried to run from them: Suspect was identified as a VC school teacher by a hamlet elder. Suspect admitted same: Info gained from suspect: (1) VC use beach as main NS trail route. (2) Approx 40 VC left 2/7 area 1 day ago and headed in a SE direction: F-N: Negative.
			131856H	2/7 Isum Nr. 2 from 121800H to 131800H: 3 (a) H company apprehended 1 VC school teacher at BS 846696. VC evacuated to LSA. (b) at 131650H H company apprehended 1 wounded Viet male Vic BS 697860. ARVN Intelligence team state he is VC: VC evacuated to LSA. 4 (a) Negative. 4 (b) 1 VC. 5-11 Negative.
			141840H	2/7 Isum Nr. 3 from 131800 to 141800H 3 (a) No significant enemy contact. (b) At 141045H H company apprehended 1 VCS BS 709842. (c) At 141400H H&S company apprehended 1 VCS and 1 PF deserter at BS 756853. 4-11 Negative.

APPENDIX "B" #3

UNIT OR SECTION	S-2 2nd Battalion Seventh Marines
PLACE	Chu Lai S. Vietnam
DATE:	
FROM:	150200H
TO:	201240H April 66

TIME		J #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC.
IN	OUT			
			150200H	H Company ambush killed 2 VC and captured 1 ChiComm carbine and 1 Thompson Sub-machine Gun at BS 77858.
				"Operation Nevada Ended"
			191000H	"Company F Operation Commenced"
			191240H	F Company location BS 472955 found extensive tunnel networks and false floors in Tho An. F-6 rpts tunnels encountered were of various dimensions. Longest approx 90' openings approx 2' wide and 5' tall. Air vents were camouflaged. Tunnels bridged in only two cases.
			191345H	F Company captured one VCS and found one Shot gun in Tho An BS 472955. Villagers rpt 10-15 VC left on arrival of Helo's.
			191420H	F company rpts receiving sniper fire from BS 470950.
			191507H	F company rpts snipers on hill BS 473948. 60mm Mortar fire utilized. F-II drove estimated 3-4 VC with carbines off hill.
			191818H	F company sighted VC on hill 661 Vic BS 457984. Arty mission called with Air Strikes at 200630H.
			192000H	F-6 estimates hill Vic BS 444986 being used as OP or base. Estimate based on visual sightings from combat base.
			192120H	F company rpts received heavy Auto wps fire at BS 468957. F returned with S/A. Auto wps and 60mm Mortar fire. Arty mission had good coverage. Possible two VC KIA.
			201240H	F company rpts 5-7 VC sighted at BS 413958. Arty fire mission called VC moving west. F Company rptd fire mission resulted in secondary explosion

UNIT OR SECTION	S-2 2nd <sup>B</sup> Battalion 7th <sup>AA</sup> Marines
PLACE	Chu Lai S. Vietnam
DATE:	
FROM:	201336H
TO:	221900H April 66

TIME	IN	OUT	J #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC.
				201336H	F company rpts 3 VC in open at BS 474949. Arty fire mission called resulting in 2 VC WIA.
				201515H	F company destroyed extensive tunnel complex vic BS 453927. Capacity 400 to 600 personnel. " Company B Operation Ended" " Operation Hot Springs Commenced"
				221920H	1. 2/7 Isum Nr. 1 from 220900H to 221800H 3 (a) (1) H Company killed 1 VC vic BS 524842 also destroyed 300 rds 50 Cal Ammo at 221000H. (2) H company found sight apparatus for 12.7 AA gun vic BS 535826 at 21. 1030H. (3) From 221200H to 221630H Bn has engaged estimated company VC Vic BS 537714-Battle continuous with 4ir and 81mm Mortars employed. (58) VC KIA that position by Marine body count. Wpns captured are listed. (4) At 221630H G company rptd 3 VC KIA by air strike. VC were part of approx 40 VC fleeing south from location at BS 537714. Estimate additional 10-15 VC KIA. 4 (a) 62 VC KIA by body count 10-15 VC KIA estimated. (b) 1-VCC WIA (c) Wpns captured: 4/50 Cal MG, 7/50 Cal mounts: 1/BAR 7 ChiComm Carbines 7 US carbines: 1. Medical kit. All Wpns evacuated to 7th Marines CP. 5 thru 10 Negative 11. (a) 7.62 ChiComm carbine ammo found was brand new. (b) All VC KIA were equipped with black green or khaki uniforms. (c) All VC KIA had cartridge belt with grenades. (d) 2/7 S-2 believes unit engaged was company of wpns Bn.
				221900H	1. 2/7 Isum Nr. 2 from 221800H to 221800H 3 (a) At 220800H H company found 1 50 Cal MG with ground mount in village at BS 537814. Wpns evacuated to 7th Marine CP. (2) At 220815H E company apprehended 1 VC WIA vic BS 547820, evacuated to Quang Nghia hospital. (3) At 221030H G Co apprehended 2 VCS of military age vic BS 557828 also found 25 packs (1) 60mm Mortar rd (100) 30 Cal rds and 1 new M-17 Gas mask, and documents



JOURNAL COMMAND DIARY  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
ORGANIZATION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
010900H April 66	082130H Apr 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops
			010900H	RECOMMENDED REAR BOUNDARY DISAPPROVED. 2/7 REAR BOUNDARY NOW EXTENDS TO AIRFIELD WIRE. NO PATROLS NEED BE CONDUCTED BACK THAT WAY DUE TO 1/11, AT'S, TANKS AND ARMY HQ, HOWEVER, ANY FIRE MISSIONS BY OTHER UNITS, PARTICULARLY AIRFIELD DEFENSE UNIT (2/7 CO'S "E" & "F") WILL BE THROUGH OUR FSCC.		
			011150H	H&S CO ASSIGNED SPARROW HAWK ALERT MISSION UNTIL RETURN OF CO'S "E" AND "F".		
			022230H	CAPT GRODZ REPORTS SUSPECTED GRENADE THROWN IN MOTOR-POOL AREA.		
			031100H	NOTIFIED BY REGT, TO FURNISH TWO T/O RIFLE PLATOONS AND BN STAFF WITH COLORS FOR CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONIES AT REGT, AT 040800H.		
			041645H	ASST SECTY DEF MR. VANCE, SENATOR FROM WYOMING VISITED CO "G" POSITIONS AND TROOPED PART OF CO "G" LINES. DEPARTED AT 1500.		
			062330H	SPOT REPORT TO BH. A. FATSTUFF H B. 062330 C. BT 515012 D. "H" FIRE TEAM CP REC'D (1) INCOMING GRENADE. HEARD VC LEAVE AREA IN A SE DIRECTION. E. 5 RDS 7.62 RETURNED WITH NEG RESULTS F. (1) USMC KIA G. (1) USMC WIA		
			080815H	BH 3A REPORTS ROUTE #1 CUT AND MINES EMPLACED AT COORD BS 589943 AND BS 590939. PF'S ARE CLEARING THE ROAD.		
			082130H	CW3 & 2 RETURNED FROM BRIEF BY BH3 ON SCHEDULED OPERATION FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE. FULL BRIEF TO BE HELD AT BH CP ON 9Apr66. CWE & F TO BE RELIEVED ON AIRFIELD AT 091200H.		

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

XXXXX COMMAND DIARY  
 JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-6S (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
ORGANIZATION 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) 090900H Apr 66	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) 121330H Apr 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN			
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops	S-Staff	F-File
			090900H	CW6, 3, 2 & COMD ATTENDED BH 6 BRIEF ON OPERATION NEVADA SCHEDULED FOR 10APR66. DURING THE COURSE OF THE BRIEF OPERATION WAS TENTATIVELY POSTPONED FOR 18APR66. CO'S "E" AND "F" WILL STILL RETURN FROM AIRFIELD DEFENSE. 2/7 STANDING BY TO ALSO RELIEVE 3/7 SHOULD THEY BE COMMITTED TO THE DA NANG AREA.				
			111910H	ALL 2/7 UNITS RELIEVED BY K-3-7 AND ELEMENTS OF 1ST TANK BN, AMTRACS, AND ONTOS				
			120520H	2/7 DEPARTED CP AREA FOR OPERATION NEVADA				
			120639H	1ST LIFT OF CO F DEPARTED FOR OBJECTIVE LZ BRAVO.				
			120815H	CO AND COMD GRP IN LZ BRAVO. NO CONTACT				
			120910H	CO F FOUND CAVE WITH RICE CACHE AT BS 693852.				
			120915H	2/7 HELO LIFT COMPLETE WITH ARRIVAL OF CO G IN LZ. CO G STARTS SEARCH OF HIGH GROUND AT BS 680860.				
			120940H	ADDITIONAL RICE CACHE FOUND AT BS 693852. S-3 7TH MARINES DIRECTS EVACUATION OF RICE.				
			121000H	CO F ON HILL 143 (BS 680860). NEGATIVE CONTACT. NO CAVES UNCOVERED.				
			121005H	CO 7TH MARINES VISITED FIELD CP. RICE CACHES FOUND NOW EXCEED 9 TON.				
			121145H	CO'S ALERTED TO MOVE EAST COMMENCING 121300H.				
			121200H	CO F APPREHENDED 6 VCS ONE WITH VC FLAG. SITREP #2 SUBMITTED.				
			121330H	MOVE EAST CANCELLED AS PRIORITY OF RICE EVACUATION CONTINUES. 36 REFUGEES REQUESTING EVACUATION. CO H ORDERED TO NORTH SOUTH GRID LINE AND HOLD. FOUND ADDITIONAL RICE CACHES IN VILLAGE AT BS 692844.				

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

~~JOURNAL~~ COMMAND DIARY  
 NAVMC 219-63 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
ORGANIZATION 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) 121615H Apr 66	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) 131700H Apr 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN			
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops	S-Staff	F-File
			121615H	CO 7TH MARINES AGAIN VISITS CP. ORDERS CONTINUED RICE AND REFUGEE EVAC. BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO CHU LAI 13 APR 66.				
			121730H	SITREP #3 SUBMITTED.				
			121800H	ALL COMPANIES DIRECTED TO PUT PATROLS AND AMBUSHES ACTIVITY OUT. LOCATIONS SUBMITTED BY OVERLAY OR THRUST POINT.				
			122100H	NGF FIRED H&I'S ON HILL 100 (BS 725859) H&I'S AT BS 681869.				
			122400H	SITREP #4 SUBMITTED.				
			130600H	SITREP #5 SUBMITTED.				
			130700H	ALL PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY RETURNED. NEGATIVE CONTACT.				
			130945H	FRAG ORDER #1 ISSUED. CO F CONDUCTS HELO-BORNE ASSAULT TO HILL 100 (BS 725859).				
			131000H	CO F FIRST LIFT DEPARTS FOR HILL 100 LAND UNOPPOSED.				
			131040H	CO F ELEMENTS FIND MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS AT BS 733852.				
			131200H	SITREP #6 SUBMITTED.				
			131315H	CO F ARMY FO FIRES MISSION ON VC IN OPEN AT BS 7287. HAD FIRST BEEN SIGHTED BY AO. NGF ALSO FIRED ON THIS TARGET. GOOD COVERAGE. SURVEILLANCE NOT POSSIBLE.				
			131530H	CO G SENDS ONE PLAT TO WEST TO ESCORT AT PLAT INTO 2/7 POSITIONS.				
			131640H	CO 7TH MARINES VISITS TO DISCUSS NEXT DAY ACTIVITY.				
			131700H	AT'S WITH PLAT FROM CO G ARRIVE IN CP. AT'S ATTACHED TO CO H.				

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

XXXXX COMMAND DAIRY  
 JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
ORGANIZATION 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) 132000H Apr 66	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) 140830H Apr 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops
			132000H	NIGHT PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY SENT OUT.		
			132225H	FRAG ORDER #2 ISSUED. 2/7 TO MOVE EAST ASTRIDE ROAD TO ASSIST 1/7 IN CAVE AND TUNNEL DESTRUCTION.		
			132400H	SITREP #8 SUBMITTED.		
			140600H	NO CONTACT DURING THE NIGHT. SITREP #9 SUBMITTED.		
			140900H	2/7 COMMENCES SWEEP TO EAST.		
			140945H	S-3 7TH MARINES ORDERS AT TO HIGHWAY ONE TO AVOID DELAYING TACTICAL COLUMN. CO G PROVIDES ONE PLAT FOR ESCORT.		
			141200H	SITREP #10 SUBMITTED.		
			141500H	S&D OF VILLAGES AT BS 745855, 755854. MAJOR RICE CACHES UNCOVERED AND REPORTED TO 7th MARINES. TO TURN RICE EVACUATION MISSION OVER TO ARVN.		
			141630H	ESTABLISHED CP AT BS 776859.		
			141650H	CG 1ST MARDIV VISITS POSITIONS.		
			141715H	SITREP #11 SUBMITTED. ACTIVITY FOR THE NIGHT DIRECTED.		
			142115H	CO 7TH MARINES FRAG ORDER RECEIVED. CONTINUE S&D CAVES AND TUNNELS. PREPARE FOR HELO LIFT TO CHU LAI, ABOUT 051300H.		
			142150H	FRAG ORDER #3 ISSUED.		
			142330H	SITREP #12 SUBMITTED.		
			150120H	CO H AMBUSH SPRUNG ON 3VCS. AMBUSH RETURNED TO FRIENDLY LINES. TO SEARCH CONTACT AREA FIRST LIGHT.		
			140545H	CO H FOUND 2 VC KIA WITH WEAPONS IN CONTACT AMBUSH SIGHT.		
			140830H	CO'S MOVED TO ASSIGNED S&D AREAS AS PER FRAG ORDER #3.		

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

JOURNAL COMMAND DIARY

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 8-56)  
SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
ORGANIZATION 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) 151215H Apr 66	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) 161210H Apr 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops
			151200H 151215H <sup>h</sup>	SITREP #13 SUBMITTED CO INFO'D 1/7 ON WHAT AREAS NEEDED STILL BE SEARCHED AFTER OUR DEPARTURE.		
			151305H	HELO LIFT COMMENCED TO CHU LAI.		
			151630H	HELO LIFT COMPLETE.		
			151645H	ALL COMPANIES LESS ECHO CO HAVE RETURNED FROM OPERATION NEVADA AND ASSUMED TAOR.		
			152315H	CO ISSUED VERBAL FRAG ORDER FOR 2/7 OPN COMMENCING 16APR66. CO G EXECUTES HELO ASSAULT TO EVALUATE A/C STRIKE AREA AND LOOK FOR VC MAIN FORCE CO. CO "F" IS BACK UP CO. ALL PARTIES INFO'D.		
			160530H	CWF AND CWH HAVE TAKEN OVER CWG LINES WHILE THE LATTER HAS BEEN DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE TAOR.		
			160822H	CWG IN LZ. NEGATIVE CONTACT. POSITION LOCATED BS 625931.		
			160905H	CWG REPORT TUNNELS WITH VC HIDING IN THEM AT BT 629935. WILL SMOKE WITH CN.		
			161050H	CWG REPORTS OF 1040 AND 1050 LOCATED 3000 POUNDS OF RICE AT BS 629942. WOMAN REPORTS VC COLLECT RICE IN AREA AND TRANSPORT SAME IN EASTERLY DIRECTION. WOMAN HAD RECEIPT DED 6 APR FOR 50 KILOS OF RICE. INFORMER REPORTS 30 VC IN AREA 2 DAYS AGO, DRESSED IN BLACK UNIFORMS, ARMED WITH CARBINE AND SUB MACHINE GUNS.		
			161115H	CWG RECOMMENDS SWEEP OF HIGH GROUND TO EAST OF HIS POSIT BEFORE CONTINUING MISSION. CWG TOLD TO CONDUCT SWEEP AS RECOMMENDED BY CWG.		
			161210H	CWG SITREP LOCATION BS 635935. NEG CONTACT.		

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

~~XXXXXX~~ COMMAND DIARY  
 NAYMC 219-68 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
ORGANIZATION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
161735H Apr 66	181600H Apr 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops
			161735H	BH3 REQUESTS AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR FS"G" ACTIVITY BY 21 APRIL 66.		
			161928H	CWG CP LOCATION AT BS 623957. BUS ACTIVITIES FIRETEAMS AT BS 614949, BS 622955, BS 617961, SQD AT BS 615953: NEG SITREP. BH 3 NOTIFIED.		
			162245H	CWG RPTD CONTACT WITH 2 VC AT BS 614949. "G" FIRED APPROX 20 RDS WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. WILL CHECK AREA AGAIN AT FIRST LIGHT.		
			170845H	CW E(-) HAS RETURNED FROM OPERATION NEVADA.		
			171200H	CWG LOCATION BS 582959, NO CONTACT WILL WALK IN ETA 1500.		
			171510H	BH3 REQUEST SECURITY FOR DOWNED COPTER ON LZ GOOSE COMMENCING 171600H		
			171600H	CO "F" RETURNED TO CO CP AT 1600, OPERATION TERMINATED.		
			171930H	RECEIVED SPOT FROM CWG. ONE NON-COMBAT WOUND AS RESULT OF ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE OF .45 CAL PISTOL. INCIDENT OCCURED AT 171900H, AT BT 515025, INVOLVED SGT DERROLD E. ROBERTS 1659087, WOUNDED IN INSTEP OF RIGHT FOOT.		
			172030H	CWF ACTIVITY 18 RECEIVED TWO ROUNDS INCOMING SMALL ARMS FIRE AT BT 486036, RETURNED 5 RDS SA, 60mm AND 81 ILLUM. FIRED 15-20 RDS SA INTO SUSPECTED AREA, AREA SEARCHED, FOOTPRINTS AND BLOODSTAINS FOUND ON GROUND. AMBUSH ACTIVITY CONTINUED.		
			180930H	CWG HAS TAKEN OVER THE LINES FROM CWH AND CWF		
			181000H	BRIEFING HELD FOR CO "F" OPERATION ON 19Apr66 WITH AN L-HOUR OF 191130H.		
			181600H	BH ALERTED 2/7 TO PROVIDE ONE CO FOR AIRFIELD DEFENSE COMMENCING 191000H. CO "H" TO BE ASSIGNED.		

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

JOURNAL COMMAND DIARY  
 NAVMC 219-68 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai RVN	
ORGANIZATION	
190955H Apr 66	191818H Apr 66
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			190955H	CO F DEPARTED FOR LZ CARP ON COMPANY S&D OPERATION.	
			191110H	CO F LEADING ELEMENTS ARE IN LZ THRUSH.	
			191116H	CWF LANDED BS 458962, NO OPPOSITION, COPTER DOWN DUE TO ENGINE TROUBLE.	
			191135H	CWF ALL ELEMENTS IN LZ. NO CASUALTIES, ONE PLAT ASSIGNED SECURITY OF DOWNED CHOPPER.	
			191240H	CWF LOCATION BS 472955, FINDING EXTENSIVE TUNNEL NETWORKS AND FALSE FLOORS IN THO AN.	
			191345H	CWF CAPTURED ONE VCS AND ONE SHOTGUN AT THO AN, VILLAGERS REPORT 10-15 VC LEFT ON ARRIVAL OF COPTERS. FINDING NUMEROUS LARGE SHELTERS AND TUNNEL COMPLEXES.	
			191405H	CWF REPORT 130 PEOPLE REQUEST EVAC TO REFUGEE CENTER. BH ADVISED, CWF TOLD TO AWAIT DECISION.	
			191420H	FSF RECEIVED SNIPER FIRE FROM BS 470950 SPOT REPORT SENT TO BH3.	
			191507H	CWF CONTACT VICINITY BS 473948, SNIPERS ON HILL 60mm FIRE UTILIZED, FOXTROT 2 DROVE VC OFF TO SOUTH, MED EVAC BEING REQUESTED, NO ADDITIONAL WIA, SPOT REPORT SENT TO BH3.	
			191550H	CWF REPORT, FOXTROT 2 AT BS 479948, DROVE OFF EST. 3-4 VC, WITH CARBINES, FOXTROT 2 PENDING MED EVAC, FOLLOWUP SPOT SENT TO BH3.	
			191620H	CWF 2 REPORT, MALAY WHIP BOOBY TRAP BS 475948. ALL UNITS MOVING BACK TO COMBAT STATION, INFORM CW 10 OF INTRUSION ON UNIT TAC BY VIETNAMESE.	
			191730H	AS OF 1800 THIS DATE CHATSWORTH CALL SIGN HAS BEEN CHANGED TO COUNTY FAIR.	

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

- F. To make entries:
- a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages..
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items(messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

A 23608

JOURNAL COMMAND DIARY  
 MAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-66)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
ORGANIZATION 192010H Apr 66	201336H Apr 66
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION-TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			192010H	ACTIVITIES MOVING INTO POSITION. AVERAGE REPORTS ARTY MISSION RELAY CFF MAY HAVE 2 VC KIA. OF ESTIMATES 25 to 30 VC NOW USING HILL VICINITY BS 444986 AS OP OR BASE. ESTIMATE BASE NOW VISUAL SIGHTING FROM COMBAT BASE. TUNNELS INCOUNTERED WERE OF VARIOUS DIMENSIONS. LONGEST WAS APPROX 40 FEET. OPENINGS WERE APPROX 2 FEET WIDE AND 5 FEET TALL, AIR VENTS WERE CAMOFLAGED, TUNNELS BRIGED IN ONLY CASES.	
			192107H	BE ADVISED YOUR H&I APPROVED. OTHER H&I'S SHIFTED TO AREA YOUR REFERED TO AS POSSIBLE VC OP OR BASE.	
			192120H	SPOT REPT A- FATSTUFF FOXTROT B-191906H C- BS 474954 D- FOXTROT UNITS REC'D HEAVY AUTO WPNS FIRE AT BS 468957 E- RETURNED FIRE WITH SA, AUTO WEAPONS AND 60mm, ARTY FIRE MISSION HAD COOD TARGET COVERAGE F-H-NONE I-TWO ESTIMATED J-N-NONE.	
			201030H	CFF DEPOYING IN OPERATION AREA CFF 2 LOCATION BS 440950, CCF3 BS 445947, CFF COMMAND POST BS 446949.	
			201035H	KLONDIKE LOCATED VC AT BS 420925 ARTY CALLED, 5-7 VC IN OPEN.	
			201110H	CFF2 LOCATION BS 434955, CFF3 LOCATION BS 445944, CFF COMMAND POST AT BS 444945. ARTY MISSION ON HILL 848 BS 420924 WAS CONTROLLED BY KLONDIKE EFFECT WAS EXCELLENT.	
			201240H	CFF REPORTS 5-7 VC SIGHTED AT BS 413958, ARTY FIRE MISSION CALLED VC MOVING WEST.	
			201332H	FROM CFF ARTY FIRE VICINITY BS 413958 RESULTED IN SECONDARY EXPLOSION, ORGIN UNKNOWN.	
			201336H	FROM CFF AVERAGE REPORTS 3 VC IN OPEN AT BS 474949 ARTY CALL SECOND ARTY MISSION.	

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

A 23608

JOURNAL COMMAND DIARY  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
ORGANIZATION	
201340H Apr 66	211115H Apr 66
OPENED (DTG, Month, year).	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION-TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
			201340H	FROM CFF MISSION FIRED FOR AVERAGE RESULTED IN 2 VC WIA POSSIBLE.		
			201515H	CFF DESTROYED EXTENSIVE TUNNEL COMPLEX VIC BS 453927, CAPACITY 400 TO 600 PERSONNEL. INFO TO S-2. CFF-3 RETURNED TO COMBAT BASE.		
			201812H	CFF NIGHT ACTIVITY NOW DEPARTING, 10 RDS ARTY FIRE OF UNKNOW ORIGIN 1000 TO 1500 METERS OF THEIR POSITION.		
			201900H	BH2 REPORT: BINH SON DISTRICT CHIEF REPORTS ONE VC BN AT BS 475915 CAME FROM TRA BONG. THEY GET WORDERS FROM NEARBY HAMLET. THEY HAVE AA GUN. ONE VC CO AT BS 703954 LOCAL FORCE WITH ONE 60mm MORTAR, ONE LIGHT MG AND NINE BAR'S.		
			202230H	CO AND STAFF ATTENDED BRIEFING BY CO 7th MARINES AND STAFF ON OPERATION "HOT SPRINGS" COORDINATION AND LIAISON MADE FOR ASSURANCE OF 2/7 FRAG ORDER.		
			210010H	CO HELD FULL BRIEF FOR ALL ACTION COMMANDERS ON OPERATION "HOT SPRINGS". VERBAL ORDER ISSUED.		
			210700H	ALL ELEMENTS MOVE TO LZ CARP FOR HELO LIFT AND 0900 L-HOUR.		
			210830H	FIRST ELEMENTS OF CO H DEPART FOR OBJECTIVE LZ (BS 528824).		
			211000H	CO AND COMMAND GROUP IN LZ. CO'S DISPERSED OVER WIDE ARE DUE TO VARIANCE OF HELO LANDING POINTS. CO H HAS ONE WIA FROM SNIPER ALSO ONE VC KIA AND 300 RDS OF .50 CAL AMMO.		
			211050H	2/7 HELO LIFT COMPLETE.		
			211115H	CO H RECON'S VILLAGE AT BS 528823, NEG CONTACT.		

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items(messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

A 23608

XXXXX COMMAND DIARY  
 JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
ORGANIZATION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
211150H Apr 66	211715H Apr 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
			211150H	2/7 MOVES TO EAST WITH CO'S G AND H ABREAST H&S AND CO E FOLLOW.		
			211200H	SITREP #1 SUBMITTED.		
			211230H	<sup>"H"</sup> CO RECEIVERS HEAVY CALIBER AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE FROM BS 537816. CO H HAS ONE KIA AND TWO WIA. AIR STRIKES CALLED ON VC MACHINE GUN POSITIONS. ALSO 81MM MORTARS IN BETWEEN AIR STRIKES.		
			211300H	MED-EVAC HELO'S FIRED ON BY VC 50 CAL. NO HELO'S HIT. DIVERTED TO COVERED AREA FOR EVAC'S. AIR STRIKES AGAIN CALLED ON VC POSITIONS CO G 3RD PLAT MOVED TO SECURE HILL 97 (BS 538825).		
			211430H	CO H AGAIN MOVED AGAINST VC MACHINE GUNS POSITION ONLY TO BE PINNED DOWN AGAIN. 81's CALLED ON TARGET WHILE WAITING FOR ADDITIONAL CAS, CO G 3rd PLAT ON RIDGE AT BS 529823.		
			211450H	AIR STRIKE ON VC MACHINE GUNS COVERED TARGET WELL. CO H MOVED OUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER AIR STRIKES COMPLETED. CO G 3RD PLAT COVERED BY FIRE FROM HIGH GROUND ABOVE TARGET.		
			211515H	CO H SECURED VC POSITION. 8 WIA FROM CO H, ONE FROM CO G.		
			211500H	REMAINDER OF 2/7 SWEEPED UP TO RIDGE LINE BETWEEN HILL 97 AND 85. NO OPPOSITION. CO H CONTINUES TO SEARCH VILLAGE NEAR VC MACHINE-GUN POSITION. THUS FAR FOUND 62 VC KIA AND 50 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS.		
			211700H	2/7 COMMENCES TO ESTABLISH NIGHT PERIMETER. AIR STRIKE CALLED TO SOUTH OF HILL 85 AND EAST OF HILL 97. VC IN OPEN. 3rd PLAT ESTIMATES 10-15 KBA ON TARGET SOUTH OF HILL 85.		
			211715H	3/7 ON LEFT REQUESTED TO EVALUATE AIR STRIKE CONDUCTED IN OUR ZONE AS THEY HAD RECEIVED HEAVY FIRE FROM THIS AREA. CO GRANTED PERMISSION.		

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

JOURNAL COMMAND DIARY  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
ORGANIZATION 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) 211730H APR 66	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) 221200H Apr 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops
			211730H	SITREP #2 SUBMITTED.		
			211845H	CO H RETURNED TO BN PERIMETER. VC WPOWS COUNT 4 50 CAL. MG, 7 50 CAL MG MOUNTS, 7 US CARBINES, 7 CHI COM CARBINES, 1 BAR. 3/7 PULLED BACK INTO THEIR ZONE.		
			211900H	ON CALL FIRES REQUESTED. H&I'S DISAPPROVED DUE TO CLOSE PROXIMITY OF FRIENDLY FORCES.		
			212000H	2/7 FRAG ORDER #1 ISSUED FOR 22 APR ACTIVITY - CO H TO SEARCH VILLAGE AT BS 537816. 2/7 SWEEPS TO EAST. CO H BRING UP THE REAR.		
			212142H	CO E POSITIONS RECEIVED THREE SERIES OF 2 RDS EACH OF ARTILLERY FIRE CLOSE TO THEIR POSITION. NO CASUALTIES. 7TH MARINES PSCC ADVISED. NO FURTHER REPR RECEIVED.		
			212345H	FRAG ORDER #2-66 RECEIVED FROM 7TH REGT. REQUIRED SOME ADJUSTMENT TO 2/7 FRAG ORDER.		
			212400H	SITREP #3 SUBMITTED.		
			220700H	CO H RE-SEARCHING VILLAGE AT BS 537816 FOUND AN ADDITIONAL 50 CAL MG COMPLETE.		
			220600H	SITREP #4 SUBMITTED.		
			220730H	AFTER 40 MINUTES ARTILLERY PREP CO E JUMPED OFF TO S&D VILLAGE COMPLEX AT BS 547820. ABOUT 29 ARTY ROUNDS ARE LONG CAUSING ONE MINOR WIA. CO G PREPARED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS FROM HILL 97.		
			220900H	REMAINDER OF 2/7 MOVES EAST WITH CO H BRINGING UP REAR CO G FINDS PACKS, AMMO AND MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN VILLAGE AT BS 551828. SIX DEAD VC FOUND IN THIS AREA. CREDITED TO 3/7 ACTION OF 21APR66. NO OTHER CONTACT.		
			221200H	S&D OF TUNNELS AND CAVES TO THE EAST CONTINUES TO EAST WITHOUT OPPOSITION. HEAT OF DAY AND HEAT EXHAUSTION CASE, SLOWS PROGRESS. SITREP #4 SUBMITTED.		

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items(messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

**JOURNAL COMMAND DIARY**  
 NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 8-66)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
ORGANIZATION 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai, RVN	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) 221535H Apr 66	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops
			221535H	2/7 ASSEMBLED ALONG RAILROAD. ORDERED TO HIGHWAY #1 BY 1700 FOR TRUCK CONVOY.		
			221645H	ARRIVE HIGHWAY #1.		
			221820H	2/7 DEPARTS IP AT BS 632820 WITH ALL UNITS CLOSING ON PERMANENT CP AT 222015H.		

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items(messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

A 23608

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Copy No.      of      Copies  
 2nd Bn, 7th Marines (Rein)  
 CFU LAI, RVN  
 171700H Apr 66

**UNCLASSIFIED**

FRAG ORDER 5-66

Ref: (a) AMS MAPS Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L701 Sheets 6757 III and  
 6756 IV 2nd Bn, 7th Marines  
 (b) 2/7 Operation Order 206-65

Log No. 095-66

Time Zone: H

Copy No. 28 of 32  
 SER NO. 017-66

## 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Situation. Small units of VC have been reported operating possible supply storage areas vicinity of Tho An (BS 473955).
- b. Friendly Situation.
- (1) MAG 36 helicopter support.
  - (2) MAG 12 CAS.
  - (3) 11th Marines provide artillery fire support.
  - (4) 1st Recon Bn Units - DS.

## 2. MISSION

Elements 2nd Bn, 7th Marines (Rein) conduct helicopter-borne assault vicinity of (BS 465956) to further execute three to four day search and destroy operation of the Tho An (BS 473955), Tinh Trung (BS 440952), Phuoc Lam (1) (BS 476915), and An Khuong (1) (2) (BS 475930) areas.

## 3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation.

On D-day recon team is inserted on hill 294 (BS 453956) to take Tho An under surveillance. At L-hour one rifle company (Rein) lands vicinity of (BS 465958) to secure LZ and commence three to four day search and destroy operation of Tho An + Tinh Trung - Phuoc Lam and An Khuong (1) (2) areas. One company provides reserve/reaction force for employment as required. (Annex A Operation Overlay).

b. Go "E" (Rein).

Attached: Arty FO Tm  
 81mm Mortar FO Tm

- (1) On order assume responsibility for MTR positions of Company "F" with one platoon (Rein).
- (2) Be prepared to execute reserve/reaction force mission in support of Company "F" operation on order. (Annex E to reference (b)).

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

**UNCLASSIFIED**

APPENDIX "B" #2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Co "F" (Rein).

Attached: Eng ~~Unit~~ *J94*  
 FAC Tm  
 Arty FO Tm

(1) On D-day Company (-)(Rein) departs LZ Carp (BT 509052) and conducts helicopter-borne assault into LZ Thrush (BS 465956) at L-hour and commences search and destroy operation of Tho An - Tinh Trung - Phuoc Lam and An Khuong (1) (2) areas.

d. 2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-)(Rein). Continue to conduct normal operations in TAOR.

e. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) D-day - to be announced.
- (2) L-hour - to be announced.
- (3) Rules of engagement and disposition and safeguarding of private property as set forth in paragraph 3 to reference (b).

#### 4. ADMIN - LOGISTICS

- a. Uniform - as directed by company commander.
- b. Ammunition - B/A.
- c. Water - 2 canteens, carry adequate halosone.
- d. Rations - 2 MIC.
- e. Resupply - Helo on D+1 and D+2.

#### 5. COMM-ELEC

- a. Annex F to reference b.
- b. Current 7th Marines SOL.
- c. Thrust points.

- (1) Any Animal BS 470950
- (2) Any Tree BS 440930

d. Reports.

- (1) Location of combat bases as established.
- (2) Situation reports every two hours after L-hour. Spot reports any time.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL UTTER

*G. H. Gentry Jr.*  
 G. H. GENTRY JR  
 MAJOR, U.S. Marine Corps  
 Executive Officer

ANNEX: A - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Special


UNCLASSIFIED

LZ GOOSE LZ CARD

Annex : A to Frug Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps AMS Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 III, 6756 IV.

2nd Bn, 7th Marines  
Chu Lai, Vietnam



DISTRIBUTION: Special

CONFIDENTIAL  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
 UNCLASSIFIED

Copy No. 1 of 1 Copies  
 2nd Bn, 7th Marines (Rein)  
 CHU LAI, RVN  
 111400H April 1966

Frag Order 4-66

Ref: (a) AMS MAPS Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L701, Sheets 6756 I & IV  
 (b) 2/7 OpOrder 206-65  
 (c) 7th Mar AdminO 302-66

2nd Bn, 7th Marines

Log No. 093-66

Time Zone: H

Copy No. 8 of 45

1. SITUATION

SER NO 016-66

a. Enemy Situation. Current INTSIMS.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) MAG-36 helicopter support.

(2) MAG-12 CAS.

(3) "C" Btry 1/11 DS.

(4) NCF - DD \_\_\_\_\_.

(5) AT Plat - DS.

(6) 2nd ARVN Div conducts coordinated operations on our right.

(7) 1/7 conducts combined operations on our left.

2. MISSION

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein) conducts operations in assigned area in Quang Ngai Province at L-hour on D-day in conjunction with coordinated ARVN operations to capture or destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment located therein.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operations. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein) at L-hour on D-day conducts helicopter-borne assault in LZ BRAVO (BS 687853). Initially secures high ground to the West with one company and then conducts operations to the East with two companies abreast, one following in trace and a provisional platoon in reserve.

b. No F (Rein).

Attached - Sect 81mm Mortars

FAC Tm  
 Arty FO Tm  
 NCF Spot Tm  
 Scout/Interp Tm  
 Eng Tm  
 Sqd Flames

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

APPENDIX "B" #1

UNCLASSIFIED

- (1) Conduct helicopter-borne assault to seize and defend LZ BRAVO (BS 687853). Ensure security of LZ out to effective small arms range.
- (2) On arrival of Co "H" in LZ assume responsibility for the defense of North 180° of LZ.
- (3) On order be prepared to seize high ground to the West of LZ BRAVO.
- (4) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations to the East moving in Northern half of assigned sector.

c. Co G (Rein).

Attached: arty FO Tm  
 81mm Mortar FO Tm  
 Scout/Interp Tm  
 Eng Tm

- (1) Land in LZ BRAVO (BS 687853) and consolidate in the West of LZ.
- (2) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations to the East following in trace of two lead companies.
- (3) Be prepared to assume the mission of any other company.

d. Co H (Rein).

Attached: Sect 81mm Mortar  
 FAC Tm  
 NGF Spot Tm  
 Scout Interp. Tm  
 Eng Tm

- (1) Land in LZ BRAVO (BS 687853) and upon coordination with Co "F" assume responsibility for the defense of South 180° of LZ.
- (2) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations to the East moving in Southern half of assigned sector.

d. Co I (-) (Rein).

Attached: HST  
 Eng Tm

- (1) Be prepared to support operations as directed.
- (2) Provisional platoon designated as battalion reserve. Provide rear guard security in movement to East.

2  
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

f. Co E (Rein). Regt Reserve.

Sect 8mm Plat

Arty FO Tm

Eng Tm

- (1) On order report OPCON of CO 7th Marines.

g. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) D-day 12 April 1966

- (2) L-hour 120700H

- (3) Position reports will be by thrust line as follows:

BS 630890	Any Beer
ES 740860	Any Cigarette
BS 780850	Any Soft Drink

- (4) Sequence of landing in LZ will be Co "F", Co "H", Cmd Grp, H&S including Provisional Plat and Co "G".

- (5) 8mm Sections less FO's with Co's "F" and "H" revert to general support role on order.

- (6) Rule of engagement and handling of private property contained in reference (b).

- (7) Use extreme caution for mines and booby traps.

- (8) Use of CS/ON authorized. Notify CO prior to utilization.

- (9) Co "F" base company for direction and control.

4. LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY

Reference (a).

5. COM-FIELD

- a. Communications in accordance with Division Order P2000.2B and Operation Order 206-65 except as modified herein.

- b. Guard radio nets upon reaching LZ CAEP.

- c. Cryptographic. 7th Marines SOI will be used internally. Be prepared to employ KAA-60, KAC-138, and KAG-24 on external nets.

- d. Radio frequencies and call signs.

3

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>Freq designator</u>	<u>Net</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Net designator</u>
D87	Regt Tac #1	39.5	EMIGRANT	M361
D31	Regt Comd #1	47.2	"	M438
D85	Regt Comd #2	2116	"	M8
D87	Regt Intell	41.0	"	M381
D88	Bn Tac	44.4	CHLTSWORTH	M413
D107	81mm COF	44.7	" WHISKEY	M416
D108	Co E Tac	53.6	" ECHO	M488
D109	Co F Tac	52.4	" FOXTROT	M479
D110	Co G Tac	51.8	" GOLF	M474
D111	Co H Tac	50.2	" HOTEL	M460
D129	H&S Co Tac	48.0	" YANKEE	M443
D16	TACP local	43.3		M403
D40	Div Air Obs #1	39.6	BLACKGOAT	M365
D41	" #2	369.1	"	M617
D50	Naval Gunfire Supp	3271(p) 9446(s)		M68 M9
D80	SFC Spot #1	8125		M172
D35	" #2	2300		M17
D36	" #3	6229		M244
I85	" #4	8720		M184
D156	Arty COF	36.0	ARTIFICIAL CHARLIE	M335
D43	ECM logistics	5272	CHLTSWORTH TEAM	M126
D64	L3 Control	49.8(p)		M457
D25	"	43.2(s)		M402
D16	2nd ARVN advisor	42.8(p)	LYRICAL	M398
D276	"	43.3(s)	"	M403
	Co C 1st AT Comd	23.8	COWHIDE CHARLIE	M275

e. Special Assets.

- (1) 7th Marines BS 661755
- (2) 2nd Bn, 7th Marines BS 687853
- (3) Companies report locations when established.

f. Remarks.

- (1) Position reports every six hours commencing 120800H.
- (2) Spot reports as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL UTTER

*G. H. Gentry Jr*  
G. H. GENTRY Jr  
Major, U.S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

ANNEX

A - Operation Crowley

DISTRIBUTION: Special

4 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
EOD 01R 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex A to Frag Order #4-66


Ref: (a) Map Sheets 6756 I & IV

"OPERATION NEVADA"

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (Rein)  
CHD IAI, RVN  
111400H Apr 66

77  
+  
90

LZ ALFA



PL ALFA

PL BRAVO

PL CHARLIE

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL WYLER

*G. H. Gentry Jr.*  
 G. H. GENTRY JR.  
 Major, U.S. Marine Corps  
 Executive Officer

111  
 RVMC  
 OFFICIALS:  
 A. J. DOUBLET  
 USMC  
 5-3

DISTRIBUTION: Special

82

A-1

## HEADQUARTERS

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein) PMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/AJD/der

3000

2 April 1966

2nd Bn. 7th Marines

Log No. 0153-66Copy No. 50 of 50

SERNO 022-65

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivO 3430.1

Encl: (1) Operations D-day AM  
(2) Operations D-day PM  
(3) Operations D+1 AM  
(4) Operations D+1 PM

1. Code Name. Company Search and Destroy Operation.
2. Dates of Operation. 19-21 April 1966.
3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam, AMS MAP Series L-701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 IV and 6757 III.
4. Command Headquarters. CO, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.
5. Task Organization.

Company "F" (Rein)

Capt LEE

Eng Squad  
BAC Tm  
Arty FO Tm  
Scout/Int Tm

6. Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery. "H" Battery 3/11 provided fire support from their permanent position at BT 501033. Six missions were fired during the operation in direct support of Company "F". In most cases artillery fires covered targets very well. Timeliness of fire missions became a problem in two instances. One mission was delayed when the 7th Marines FSCC had to check on the location of a recon unit working in what was presumed to be a close proximity. Another fire mission called by an AO was delayed due to communication difficulties.

b. Air.

(1) Helicopter Transport. Helicopter support amounted to two separate troop lifts, helicopter resupply on D+1 and the evacuation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

APPENDIX "A" #5

of civilians on D-day. The company size lift was supported by MAG-36 helicopters from LZ Carp (BT 509052) to a LZ in the objective area (BS 468965). The lift was completed in 30 min. On D+3 the company was extracted by MAG 36 helicopters from a LZ at BS 449937 to LZ Goose (BT 504035). All lifts were completed without difficulty except for the lift on D-day when one aircraft was downed temporarily due to mechanical difficulty.

(2) Armed Helicopters. Armed helicopters supported all troop lifts. On D-day they received some sniper rounds from the village of Tho An (BS 474954). The armed helicopters conducted an air strike on the village in response.

(3) CAS. Fixed wing aircraft provided LZ prep on D-day. A napalm run was made on a portion of the village of Tho An (BS 474554), after export helicopters received fire from this area. Target coverage was very good. On D+1 a strike was called in response to visual sightings of 20-30 VC in the vicinity of BS 457980. The strike came in just after first light and gave adequate coverage to the target area. Results could not be evaluated.

c. Radio Relay. A radio relay site was maintained at BS 573963 and gave outstanding support throughout the operation.

d. Reconnaissance Element. Two recon teams were operating in the hills to the North (BS 479968) and West (BS 454956) of the objective area and were able to provide the company with timely observations. One recon member, familiar with the area, was attached to the company as a guide.

## 7. Intelligence.

### a. Estimate of VC Forces in the Operation Area.

(1) It was initially anticipated that only local force VC guerrillas were active in the objective area. The area had long been under recon surveillance and no sightings of any sizable VC forces had resulted.

(2) The objective area appeared to have a recent increase in possible VC supply activity. It had long been felt that the VC might be using this foothill area as a logistics base and possible harbor sites.

(3) Evidence had recently become available that the VC were infiltrating sizable units into Quang Ngai Province from Quang Tin via the area North of the Song Tra Bong River. It was considered possible that the VC might be attempting to shorten this infiltration route into Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts by cutting through the Tinh Trung Hamlet area vicinity BS 4395.

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) The intelligence information which generated the operation was predominantly obtained from the patrol reports of 1st Reconnaissance Battalion.

(5) The objective of the operation was to find, fix and destroy any VC units that might be harboring in the area, demolish any VC fortifications and harbor sites that might be located, and to confiscate or destroy any VC food caches.

b. VC Strength and Situation Actually Found as Operation was Conducted.

(1) The intelligence had been correct in that no sizeable VC forces were located in the objective area.

(2) Periodic sight contact with small groups of VC (3-4) prevailed during the course of the operation.

c. VC Units Identified. None.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) Villagers at Tho An Hamlet (BS 4795) reported 10-15 VC had departed when Company "F" began landing at BS 459962 on the morning of 19 April 1966.

(2) Company "F" reported finding extensive tunnel network and shelters in Tho An. Those encountered were of various dimensions, the longest being approximately 40' with 2-5' wide entrances and camouflaged air vents.

(3) At 191800H, approximately 25-30 VC were sighted in the vicinity of hill 661 BS 444986. It was believed that the VC were using the site as an OP or harbor site.

(4) At 201240H Company "F" sighted 5-7 VC at BS 413958. Artillery fire was requested and resulted in a secondary explosion at the same location.

(5) On 20 April Company "F" located and systematically destroyed the POW camp and political indoctrination center previously located by recon units at BS 457935. The area was reported as well camouflaged fortified and considered capable of harboring from 400-600 persons.

e. Terrain.

(1) Critical Terrain Features.

Hill 282	BS 480967
Hill 294	BS 453956
Hill 261	BS 546944
Ridge line	BS 430984-BS 466990
Trail	BS 446952-BS 463950

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire. The objective area was dominated on all sides by prominent high ground providing excellent observation for whoever occupied it. Fields of fire were satisfactory except for those areas covered with dense underbrush.

(3) Cover and Concealment. The area of operations offered both attacker and defender excellent materials for cover and concealment.

(4) Obstacles. No major obstacles were encountered.

8. Mission. Company "F" 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines conducts search and destroy operations in assigned area in Quang Ngai Province at L-hour on D-day to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment located therein.

9. Concept of Operation. One rifle company conducts heli-borne assault to conduct search and destroy operations. After securing the LZ two platoons would assault the village of Tho An. Once the village was secure, the company would conduct search and destroy operations in the valleys to the West and South.

10. Execution.

a. Planning. Planning for this operation commenced as early as 22 March 1966, but execution was delayed due to a battalion sized operation. Battalion Frag Order #5-66 was issued on 17 April 1966, at which time a full briefing was held by the Commanding Officer and staff for Company "F" commander and all attached unit leaders.

b. D-day 12 April 1966. At 191057H the Company "F" helicopter lift commenced. The company was placed in an LZ at BS 468965, which was somewhat North and East of desired LZ. One aircraft was downed in LZ due to mechanical troubles. Upon completion of the Helicopter lift, the 1st platoon was ordered to provide security for the downed aircraft. E-2 and E-3 moved to assault the village of Tho An (BS 474954) (Encl (1)). The recon unit at BS 479968 reported that the armed helicopters were receiving fire from the village, and the PlC requested a napalm run from the "on-station" aircraft. The village was assaulted after the air strike. The two platoons entered and searched the village without opposition. Two squads were positioned on the Southeastern side of the village and the remainder of the area was checked out a second time. One shot gun was uncovered in a house and several tunnels were blown. These tunnels were short, narrow, and poorly hidden, however, they were considerably more extensive than the normal house shelters. During the assault of the village E-2 continued to remain in the vicinity of the LZ. After the village was secured, E-1 conducted search operations in the stream beds and on the hillsides at BS 4596 and BS 4696 with negative contact. All civilians in the village were gathered together and questioned. They all admitted that the VC used the village and that 8-12 VC had been there that morning. One VCS was taken into custody, interrogated, and later evacuated. Initially there were approximately 130 people who requested evacuation to the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

refugee center; but during the period of interrogation VC snipers fired into the immediate vicinity where the civilians were located and many fled. F-2 was deployed to attack the snipers, and 60mm fire was used to drive them away. The VC were pursued for 800-1000 meters but escaped into another village. Company "F" suffered 2 WIA's during the engagement. At approximately 191730H, Company "F" withdrew from Tho An and established a combat base at BS 466956. Seventy-seven civilians were evacuated by helicopter to Binh Son. At 191901H a detail of Marines getting water at BS 474954 were taken under fire by 2-3 VC with M-3 SMG's and machine pistols. The detail returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery and 60mm mortars were also used to engage the VC. No friendly casualties. Estimated two VC KIA's. At the same time an estimated 18 VC were seen climbing the side of Hill 661 in the vic of BS 457986. Artillery fire was ineffective due to nature of terrain and an airstrike was requested for early on D+1. Three night ambushes were set out by squad size units. But no contact was made with the VC (Encl (2)).

b. D+1 20 April 1966. At 200640H Tho An was attacked for the second time, searched for the third time, and found to be empty. The company moved in tactical column to the west. At 201018H F-2 was detached to search and destroy in the vicinity of BS 4295, BS 4395, BS 4495, BS 4294, BS 4394, and BS 4494. The remainder of the company moved to vicinity BS 453931 and established a combat base. F-3 accompanied by a guide from the Reconnaissance Battalion proceeded to the South to conduct search and destroy in the vicinity of a reported POW and reeducation camp (Encl (3)). F-3 found the camp deserted. The camp consisted of several structures, believed to be a POW holding facility, a messhall, two living structures, and one classroom. A tunnel complex was also found in this area. All structures were burned and the tunnels were gassed and blown shut. Ambushes were set out the night of D+1 but no contact was made. (Encl (4)).

c. D+2 21 April 1966. At 210040H a message was received from Commanding Officer of 2/7 directing the Company to be prepared for helicopter extraction on 21 April 1966. Further operations were cancelled. The company moved rapidly to another LZ at BS 449937 at first light on 21 April 1966 for extraction. The lift did not commence until late afternoon and was completed without incident.

## 11. Results.

- a. Friendly Casualties. 2 WIA
- b. Enemy Casualties and Captives.

VC KIA -2 (Possible)  
 VC WIA -2 (Possible)  
 VCC 0  
 VCS 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- c. Captured Equipment and Supplies. 1 U.S. Shot gun, 12 guage.  
 d. Friendly Equipment Losses. None

12. Administrative Matters.


a. Communications. The communications support throughout the operation was excellent with the exception of some difficulty experienced on the artillery conduct of fire net.

b. Support. The company received satisfactory helicopter re-supply support after initially experiencing some confusion. A message was received on the FAR net that the request for resupply had been unfairly and would not be filled. This proved to be false as the Battalion AIO had submitted an official request the day previous.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.

14. Commanders Analysis. There were two areas that effected the responsiveness of artillery fire support during this operation. The first was the establishment of the "no fire area" for a reconnaissance element that was operating in a close proximity to Company "F". In one instance, a Company "F" target overlapped into the "no fire area" resulting in an extensive delay of fire support while the reconnaissance personnel were contacted by radio from the Regimental FSCC to determine their location. Prior adjustment of the "no fire area" and direct communications between the reconnaissance and other operating unit can resolve this time delay. The second delay factor was the reconnaissance element relaying fire missions through Company "F"'s conduct of fire net rather than going direct to the supporting artillery agencies as they normally do. (The recon unit was not attached, but only provided enemy sightings). The procedure of relaying fire missions through Company "F" was for one of safety, but is considered unnecessary as long as the two operating units are talking and coordinating by radio and the common FSCC is monitoring the requested fire mission.

15. Recommendations. That search and destroy operations of company size and of 3 or 4 day duration, continue to be conducted in this area to offset utilization and control by VC forces.



LEON N. UTTER

DISTRIBUTION:


CO, 7th Marines	45
Files	<u>5</u>
	50

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS ON D-DAY AM

F Company  
2nd Bn, 7th Marines

Map: Quang Ngai, Province, Vietnam AMS Series L701  
1:50,000 Sheets 6756 IV & 6757 III.



49  
+ 97


43  
+ 93

Incl (1)

OPERATIONS D-DAY PM

Map: Quang Ngai, Province, Vietnam AMS Series L701  
1:50,000 Sheets 6756 IV & 6757 III.

F Company  
2nd Bn, 7th Marines




Encl (2)

OPERATIONS ON D + 1 AM

Map: Quang Ngai, Province, Vietnam AMS Series L701  
1:50,000 Sheets 6756 IV & 6757 III.

FCompany  
2nd Bn, 7th Airborne






Encl (5)

OPERATIONS D + 1 PM

F Company  
2nd Bn, 7th Marines

Map: Quang Ngai, Province, Vietnam AMS Series L701  
1:50,000 Sheets 6756 IV & 6757 III.



Encl (4)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## HEADQUARTERS

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines

1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF

APO, San Francisco, California 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3/AJD/der

3000

1 May 1966

2nd Bn. 7th Marines

Log No. **0141-66**Copy No. 48 of 56

SER NO. 020-66

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivO 3480.1

Encl: (1) Operations D-day AM  
 (2) Operations D-day PM

1. Code Name. Company Search and Destroy Operation.
2. Dates of Operation. 16-17 April 1966.
3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam, AMS Map Series L-701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, II and 6757II.
4. Command Headquarters. CO, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.
5. Task Organization.

Company "G" (Rein)

Arty FO Tm  
 Sect 81mm Mort Plat  
 Eng Tm  
 FAC Tm  
 Scout/Int Tm

Capt SEYMOUR

6. Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery. Elements of 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines located in Chu Lai were prepared to support the company during D-day and D+1. Other than night defensive fires for the night of D-day, no other fires were requested.

b. Air.

(1) Helicopter Troop Lift. Twenty-four MAG-36 helicopters transported Company "G" from landing zone Carp (BT 509052) to the objective area LZ (BS 625928) on D-day. Lift commenced at 160805H and was completed at 160822H. Negative enemy contact on landing.

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED A T THREE YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

APPENDIX "A" #4

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Armed Helicopters. Armed helicopter support was provided for the helicopter lift on D-day, and for security and observation during the initial movement to the objective area. Effective close supporting fires on a VC trench line and cave were delivered during the initial movement.

(3) Helicopter Med-Evac. Request for med-evacs for heat casualties were both timely and without incident.

(4) CAG. Fixed wing aircraft were on strip alert during the operation. No support was required.

## 7- Intelligence.

### a. Estimate of VC Strength, Location, and Disposition in the Objective Area.

#### (1) Forces Anticipated in the Objective Area.

(a) <u>Local Forces</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Tactical Disposition</u>
I VC Company	BS 629938	Unk	Unk

(b) On about 15 April 1966 reports were received indicating one company had moved to the northwest into the objective area, from where Marine units were located during Operation "NEVADA". These reports were not given a reliability rating.

b. VC Strength and Situation Actually Found as Operation was Conducted. Throughout the conduct of the operation, no resistance was encountered. Two VC trench lines and other prepared positions indicated recent use in the vicinity of the objective area. One trench line was located at BS 629936 and the other at BS 628940. Both had adjoining caves extending about 10 meters back into the hill. If the statements of the two civilians from the village located at BS 629943 are valid, the VC use that area as a rice collection point for further transportation to the East. One male civilian reported 50 VC arrived with carbines and automatic rifles, dressed in khaki and black uniforms, and stayed in their village on the night of 14 April 1966. He further stated the VC were North Vietnamese and that they collected 50 kilo of rice per month from each family in the village. Further indications of VC activity were discovered in the vicinity of BS 641936 where numerous foot print stakes were found throughout the area.

c. VC Units Identified. No Viet Cong units were identified through documents or interrogation of local civilians.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained. No significant information was obtained other than mentioned in paragraph b. above.

#### e. Terrain.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Critical Terrain Features.

Hill BS 529957  
 Hill BS 640955  
 Hill 106 BS 648955  
 My Hue Village BS 612953

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire. The area of operation was characterized by low rolling hills with heavy dense vegetation at places, and large open rice paddies. Fields of fire and observation were excellent over the open areas surrounding the hill.

(3) Cover and Concealment. Heavy vegetation growing in patches on the hills could have provided excellent concealment for a platoon to company size force.

(4) Obstacles.

Swamp BS 635945  
 Song Tra Bong R. BS 623953, 613952 and 593961  
 Stream BS 627951

The water-ways are tidal rivers which change in depth according to tidal variation. During low tide, water was only 2-3 feet deep at river crossing points. When the tide was high, the water at crossing points was 4-5 feet deep. No major difficulties were encountered during four river crossings. Recommended river fording sites are as follows:

BS 627951	Depth low tide 2-3 feet
BS 623953	" " " 3-4 feet
BS 613952	" " " 2-3 feet
BS 593961	Depth high tide 4-5 feet

8. Mission. Company "G", 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rein) conducts a helicopterborne assault in the objective area at L-hour on D-day to evaluate air strike on a reported Viet Cong company located at BS 629957, and to conduct search and destroy operations against possible remaining elements of the VC Unit.

9. Concept of Operation.

a. On D-day Company "G" conducts helicopter-borne assault into the objective LZ (BS 625928) to evaluate an earlier air strike in the vicinity of a small hill located at BS 629957. Further, to find, fix and destroy Viet Cong forces reportedly operating in the objective area. (Encl (1)).

10. Execution.

a. Planning. Company "G", 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was alerted to be prepared to conduct a two day search and destroy operation commencing 16 April 1966 at approximately 151800H. At about 152230H, the Company

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

Commander received a briefing by the Battalion Commander, and Staff representatives concerning the operation. An oral frag order was issued at this time by the Battalion Commander and arrangements were made for a helicopter reconnaissance at 160630H, to select among other things the objective M. At approximately 152330H the operation order was issued to the platoon and attachment commanders based on GO, 2/7 verbal frag order.

b. D-day 16 April 1966. At 160730H the Battalion Commander and Commanding Officer Company "G" made an aerial reconnaissance of the objective area and selected a helicopter landing zone. Company "G" was staged in LZ Camp (BT 509052) at 160630H. Twenty-four MAG 36 helicopters commenced the assault lift at 160755H arriving in the LZ at 160805H. The lift was completed at 160822H. Each platoon had been assigned responsibility for one third of the LZ perimeter with the Company Headquarters and attachments deployed on the high ground on the North end of the LZ (BS 625930). At 160345H a sweep of the high ground at (BS 629935) was initiated with two platoons abreast. One platoon with one section of 81mm mortars attached were held in reserve (BS 629930) to support the assault elements by fire if necessary. During the sweep, two trench lines were found with small adjoining caves located at BS 629936 and BS 628939. Individual firing positions located around the trench lines were also observed. Approximately 5000 pounds of rice was found in Giau Thuy (3) village (BS 629942) and reported to 2/7 Headquarters. Two local civilians reported 30 VC were in the village on 14 April 1966. They were reported as North Vietnamese who collected and transported rice from the village to the West. Based on this information a search and destroy operation was conducted to the West to include the high ground at BS 641935) and village at BS 642941 with negative results. Company "G" then moved to the vicinity of BS 622954 without contact where resupply by two MAG 36 helicopters was completed at 161700H. At the same time, Commanding Officer 2/7, arrived with the resupply helicopter, and was briefed on the days operations. The Company set in for the night at 161800H in a defensive perimeter around a deserted hamlet at BS 617957. Ambush sites were established at BS 616953, BS 611949, BS 623936, and BS 617962. (Encl (2)). At 162215H a fire team ambush reported seeing two men approximately 50 meters north of their ambush site (BS 617962). Approximately 20 rounds were fired at the two men, but a search of the area after the firing and the next morning produced negative results.

c. D+1 17 April 1966. At 170800H a search of the island at BS 623963 was conducted with negative results. At 170945H the company commenced its return to the 2/7 CP area. Two Popular Force Platoons were observed at BS 604953 who had reportedly moved into that area about 5 April 1966. Company "G" returned to its position by foot march at 171545H without incident.

#### 11. Results.

- a. Friendly Casualties. None.
- b. Enemy Casualties and Captives. None

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- c. Captured Equipment. None
- d. Friendly Equipment Losses. None

12. Administrative Matters. None

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None


14. Commanding Officer's Analysis.

a. Company size operations outside the TAOR, of 2-4 day duration, may be used to attain several goals including timely intelligence, disorganizing small enemy units operating outside the Chu Lai enclave, and denying the enemy the use of established resupply routes and areas. Continued consideration should be given to maximum helicopter support during the initial stages of the operation as was done in this operation. Helicopter lift time for the rifle company reinforced was 17 minutes which is considered excellent. A ready reserve unit of company size or larger should have the ability to reinforce the committed unit within one hour to enable the timely exploitation of any tactical advantage.

b. While this was an excellent exercise in the rapid deployment of a Marine Rifle Company by helicopter and served to give added spirit and cohesion to Company "G", it was, nonetheless, fruitless. The operation launched on uncredited intelligence to the effect that the VC had fled toward the Marines positions at Chu Lai in order to escape the Marines participating in Operation "NEVADA". Such a report hardly makes sense as was proved by the operation.

c. It was readily apparent from the presence of two platoons of PF units at BS 604953 that a determined effort had recently been initiated to provide protection for the resettlement of the area.

15. Recommendations. It is recommended that our resources and time not be expended in chasing such unreliable reports in the future.

  
LEON N. UTTER

DISTRIBUTION:


CO, 7th Marines	45
Files	5
	50

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS D-JAN 74

MAP: SON TRA  
Sheets 6757 I  
Series L701  
1:50,000

Co G 2nd Bn,  
7th Marines



CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS


Encl (2)

OPERATIONS D-DAY AM

MAP: SON TRA  
Sheets 6757 I  
Series L701  
1:50,000

D-Day

CO G 2nd Bn  
7th Marines



CONCEPT OF OPERATION

Encl (1)

2nd Bn. 7th Marines

Log No. **0131-66**Copy No. 49 of 50

SERNO 019-66

## HEADQUARTERS

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
1st Marine Division (reinf) MAF  
APO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/AJD/der

3000

28 April 1966

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines  
Subj: After Action Report "Operation HOT SPRINGS"

Ref: (a) DivO 3480.1

Encl: (1) Enemy Dispositions on D-day  
(2) Operations D-day AM  
(3) Deployment of 2/7 on D-day PM  
(4) Operations D-day PM  
(5) Operations D+1 AM and PM

1. Code Name. "Operation HOT SPRINGS".
2. Dates of Operation. 21-22 April 1966.
3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam; AMS Map Series L701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I and IV.
4. Command Headquarters. CO, 7th Marines.
5. Task Organization.

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein)

LtCol UTTER

M&S Co (-)(Rein)

Capt GROSZ

EST

HQ Eng Plat

Company "E" (Rein)

Capt GATCHEL

81mm Mortar FO Tm

Arty FO Tm

Eng Tm

Company G (Rein)

Capt SEYMOUR

81mm Mortar Sect

Arty FO Tm

Eng Tm

Scout/Int Tm

Flame Sq

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

APPENDIX "A" - # 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Company H (Rein)  
 Elem Mortar Sect  
 Arty FO Tm  
 Eng Tm  
 Scout/Int Tm  
 FAC Tm  
 Flame Sq

Capt JAU

6. Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery. "H" and "I" Batteries of 3/11 were positioned at Nui Vo (BS 62844), one battery of 155's at Quang Ngai (BS 628722), and one platoon of 8" at Binh Son (BS 597626). All artillery was in general support. Artillery was not used on D-day due to the fact that the gun-target line pointed directly at advancing friendly troops. Fortunately this poor positioning of artillery was offset by the preponderance of close air support. H and I fires were requested for the night of D-day but were disapproved due to close proximity of friendly forces. On call fires were planned but not utilized the night of D-day. Prep fires to support a tactical maneuver were fired on D+1 on a village complex at BS 544920 with good coverage. Approximately 20 rounds of this mission landed long and showered friendly positions with nearly spent shell fragments. One Marine received a slight wound and was evacuated.

b. Air.

(1) Helicopter Troop Lift. The battalion had only one troop lift which occurred on D-day. Twenty MAG-36 helicopters lifted the battalion from LZ Carp (BT 509052) to LZ #1 (BS 523823) in the objective area. The troop lift went smoothly with the exception that separate divisions of helicopters landed in the extreme north and south ends of the LZ. This involved a separation of tactical units over an area of some 500 to 800 meters, and hindered unit commanders in regaining unit integrity. This also resulted in some helicopters landing outside of the established security perimeter for the LZ. First elements were lifted from LZ Carp at 210830H. All units were in the LZ by 211050H.

(2) Close Air Support. All close air support in the objective area on D-day was controlled by USAF TAC (A). Since the TAC (A) had additional aircraft waiting on station they were used to control CAS on targets with minor adjustments by the 2/7 FAC. CAS struck three targets for 2/7. The first was the village at BS 537845 on which three strikes were called. The first strike was made at 211345H by two F-8's with 20mm on a run from the south to north. Coverage was good with impact on northern portion of target. The second and third strikes on the same village were made at 211430H with two A-4's and two F-4's equipped with "zuni" rocket pods and 20mm on runs from west to east. These runs were on target and skillfully executed considering the hill mass in the immediate vicinity on the east side of the target. These latter strikes were the turning point of the engagement as rockets stunned the enemy enough to permit Company "H" and elements of Company "G" to maneuver and then assault with minimum casualties. The 2nd target

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

was 40 VC in the open at BS 542810. This target was spotted by the 3rd Plat of Company "G" from hill 85 (BS 542816). Two A-4's made bomb runs with excellent coverage. The 3rd Plat of Company "G" observed the strike and conservatively estimated 10-15 VC KIA. The third target was a village complex at BS 548821. Two USAF B-57's were called in with napalm, bombs, and 20mm. Ordnance was on target with good effect. All requests for 2/7 air support were made directly to the TAC (A).

(3) Armed Helicopters. 2/7 did not use UH-1E aircraft until D+1 because of non-availability of air space on D-day. On D+1 two UH-1E's were requested via the EAC net to fly in direct support of 2/7 in its sweep to highway #1. Within 30 minutes two UH-1E's were on station. No targets were discovered while the first two UH-1E's were on station. Two more UH-1E's were requested and promised to relieve on station, however, none arrived.

(4) Helicopter Med-Evac and Resupply. Reaction time was generally excellent except in a few instances where poor communications delayed requests. On one occasion helicopter pilots demonstrated their highly professional ability when they were fired upon in the EE by .50cal machine guns while attempting a med-evac. They took off, circled around, and made a low level approach to a near-by area behind a screen of trees from which they successfully effected the med-evac.

## 7. Intelligence.

### a. Estimate of VC Strength, Location, and Disposition in the Objective

#### (1) Forces Anticipated in Immediate Objective Area

Unit	Location	Strength
1st Regt Hq	BS 532819	Unk
1st Bn (60th)	BS 547827	Unk
2nd Bn (90th)	BS 547817	Unk
3rd Bn	BS 539808	Unk
Weapons Bn	BS 536808	Unk
CP NVA Reg't	BS 532846	Unk

(2) The intelligence information which predicated Operation "HOT SPRINGS", was initially obtained by 2nd ARVN Division forces from a VC who defected at Vui Tuon on 20 April 1966. The information was subsequently furnished to 2/7 at 2230 on the same day at which time it was considered to be reliable and valid.

(3) The objective of the operation was to find and destroy suspected VC units in the assigned area of responsibility.

b. VC Strength and Situation Actually Found as Operation was Conducted. It is readily apparent that the VC unit engaged by 2/7 on 21 April was part

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

of the heavy weapons battalion initially anticipated to be in the objective area. The number of VC killed at the site of contact (BS 537814), plus the number and type of weapons captured, indicate the unit was of company size. Better than half of this company was eliminated.

- c. VC Units Identified. None.
- d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) The diagram in enclosure (1) and the following narrative is presented as significant intelligence gained by 2/7 on Operation "HOT SPRINGS" about VC weapons deployment and defensive tactics.

(a) The occupied VC .50 cal MG positions were located on line along the trail at BS 536814 as indicated on the diagram. All the weapons were positioned to cover the trail and the open rice paddy area to the West. The positions were circular with a raised mound in the center to afford a 360° sweep of the area.

(b) Position number 6 on the sketch contained an anti-aircraft mount but no weapon. The position was masked by a house to the West and North, and a hedgerow to the South. Observation of the position would have been almost impossible from the ground or the air. It is significant to note that effective ground fire could not be delivered from this location, however, it appeared to be an excellently concealed position from which to observe and fire on aircraft.

(c) During the initial contact, and prior to the air strikes on the hamlet at BS 537814, the VC wisely fired only one or two short bursts at a time with one .50 cal MG, thereby giving no indication that more than one such weapon was located there. This procedure may have been a ruse in an attempt to draw Marine units close to the hamlet without the benefit of supporting arms preparation.

(d) Camouflage and concealment of the .50 cal MG positions was excellent. In fact, position number 3 on the diagram was not located until the morning following the battle when a second search was being conducted and a Marine fell through the camouflage covering wherein a .50 cal MG was located. In addition, the VC gunners did not use tracer ammunition making it difficult to pinpoint the gun locations.

(2) The hamlets in grid squares BS 5283, 5282, and 5382 showed a noticeable lack of civilian habitation. It is believed that these areas were being used exclusively for the quartering of VC forces. However, an abundance of farm tools and new entrenchments were discovered in these locations.

(3) The hamlet of Bai Loc (1) at BS 536220 was found to contain a comparatively new series of excellently camouflaged and concealed positions at BS 531821. The quality of these fortifications were comparable to those encountered by 2/7 on Operation "UTAH" at BS 555831.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

e. Terrain.(1) Critical Terrain Features.

Hill 97	BS 539826
Hill 85	BS 541817
Hill	BS 557825

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire. The terrain in the area of operations was comparatively flat interrupted only by hill masses and built up areas of habitation. Observation and fields of fire would have been in favor of the defender had he chosen to occupy any of these locations.

(3) Cover and Concealment. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the apparent sparsity of cover and concealment in an area does not hinder VC movement for deployment. He is able to make maximum use of previously prepared and concealed positions in almost any area of operation. In addition, by making use of a hand made circular wicker covered with camouflage and worn on his back, he is able to adequately conceal himself even in a wide open area.

(4) Obstacles. No major obstacles were encountered during the course of the operation.

8. Mission. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) conducts helicopter-borne assault on 21 April 1966 in conjunction with RVN forces to conduct search and destroy operations in designated zone.

9. Concept of operation. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) conducts helicopter-borne assault on D-day at L-hour in LZ #1 (BS 523823). One company initially secures LZ then the eastern 180° of zone on arrival of the second company. The second company secures western 180° of LZ on landing. The battalion command group, H&S Company (-) and reserve company follow into LZ in that order. On order 2/7 commences search and destroy operations to the East with two companies abreast, one company in trace and H&S Company provisional platoon in reserve.

10. Execution.

a. Planning. At 202230H the Commanding Officer and his staff were briefed by the CO 7th Marines and his staff, on operations to be conducted on 21 April 1966. Combat and combat service support unit commanders were present. All orders and instructions were verbal, and based on orders and instructions received and liaison conducted. Commanding Officer 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines issued verbal orders for execution of Operation "HOT SPRINGS" at 210010H at the Battalion CP.

b. D-day 21 April 1966. 2/7 (-)(Rein) commenced helicopter lift at 210815 from LZ Carp (BT 509052) to objective LZ #1 (BS 528824) supported by 20 MAG 36 Helicopters. (Encl 2). Leading elements of Company "H"

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

landed in LZ at 210245H and encountered one lone sniper resulting in one friendly WIA. Company "H" was widely scattered due to separate helicopter divisions landing at extreme ends of the general area of the LZ. At 210915 Company "H" killed one VC, found 300 rounds of .50 caliber machine gun ammunition, a sight for an anti-aircraft .50 caliber machine gun and some documents. At 211050H the helicopter lift was completed and after some delay all units were consolidated and dispersed in the LZ. Company "H" recon element scouted out village at BS 528823 at 211115H with negative results. 2/7 continued East at 211145H with Companies "G" and "H" abreast Company "G" on the left. The Command Group and H&S Company (-) followed in trace with Company "E" bringing up the rear. Company "H" received heavy caliber automatic weapons fire from BS 537816. The enemy position was engaged with 81mm mortars, small arms and automatic weapons fire. Air strikes on the enemy position followed. Company "H" had one KIA and 2 WIA. Company "G"'s 3rd Platoon moved aggressively to seize hill 97 (BS 538825) and did so without opposition while air strikes continued on enemy positions. Med-evac helicopters were fired on by the same enemy .50 caliber machine gun but were unsuccessful. Evacuation helicopters were diverted to a covered area to execute the mission. Air was again called on target at 211430H after which Company "H" launched a second assault on enemy positions only to be pinned down once again. Company "G"'s 3rd Platoon then worked South on ridge line at BS 529823 to gain high ground above the enemy position. A third air strike was called with excellent target coverage, after which the 3rd platoon of Company "G" provided supporting fires for Company "H" who launched a determined assault at 211515H and successfully carried the enemy position. (Encl (3)). One platoon of Company "H" maneuvered to the South end of the village and destroyed VC forces attempting to flee through this avenue of escape. The 3rd platoon of Company "G" continued to spot fleeing targets for Company "H", and was also successful in providing target information for an air strike on VC in the open at BS 539811. Company "H" commenced consolidation and a thorough search of village at 211550H, finding numerous dead VC and weapons. The remainder of 2/7 moved to the high ground and consolidated for the night on hills 97 (BS 538825) and 85 (BS 541816). After completing its search, Company "H" joined the battalion night defensive perimeter at 211845H. An air strike was called at 211730H on the village complex at BS 546827 with good target coverage. 3/7 elements on the left requested to evaluate results of the air strike as they had received heavy small arms fire from this area earlier. Permission was granted by CO 2/7 with all 3/7 units pulling back to their zone at 211845H. Night activity was sent out a 212100H (Encl (4)). There was no enemy contact throughout the night. On call fires were planned but not used. H&I fires were denied by CO, 7th Marines due to close proximity of friendly forces.

c. D+1 22 April 1966. CO, 7th Marines Frag Order directed 2/7 to sweep East to railroad tracks in zone. At 220700H Company "H" returned to again conduct a detailed search of previous day's activity in village located at BS 537816. Company "H" found one additional .50 caliber machine gun complete. Company "E" commenced search and destroy of village complex at BS 547820 at 220730H after a forty minute artillery preparation. Company "G" was prepared to support from hill 97. Close proximity of artillery caused one minor WIA in Company "E". Also one other WIA was incurred from a panji stake as Company "E" moved out to objective area. No contact was encountered in village.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

At 220900H Company "H" rejoined battalion forces, and Company "G" moved to come up on line with Company "E". Company "G" found VC packs, ammunition and miscellaneous equipment as they swept through village at BS 551823. Six dead VC in village were credited to 3/7 action in this area on 21 April 1966. Search and destroy operations to the IR tracks were made without contact. Destroyed bunkers, caves and tunnels were discovered throughout the area during search and destroy operations. Progress was slowed due to excessive heat and med-ovac heat exhaustion cases taken out by helo. 2/7 closed on the railroad tracks at 221535H. Armed helo's escorted the battalion part way, but were not replaced as requested and promised. CO 7th Marines directed CO 2/7 to continue to highway #1 for vehicle pickup at 221700H. Arrived at Highway #1 at 221645H, departed aboard trucks from IP (BS 632820) at 221820H with all units closing permanent CR without incident at 222015H.

## 11. Results.

### a. Friendly Casualties.

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total</u>
FIA	1
WIA	14

### b. Enemy Casualties and Captives.

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total</u>
VC KIA (Body count)	64
VC KIA (Estimate)	10-15
VC (Both WIA)	2
VCS	2

### c. Captured Equipment.

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Total</u>
50 Cal MP	5
50 Cal MG ground mounts	3
Carbine, U.S.	7
Carbine, Chicom	7
Bar	1

## 12. Administrative Matters.

a. Higher headquarters should not rely on casualty figures contained in tactical spot reports or situation reports. Responsibility for correct casualty figures rests with the S-1 and is given in reports by the S-1. The present casualty reporting system employed by Regimental S-1 is unacceptable as it groups together WIA and non-battle evacuations into one figure. This does not reflect a correct picture for the required reports. Further, no provision is made for wounded in action, not evacuated.

b. Resupply requests were not properly filled. On D-day one case of M-26 frag grenades was ordered and thirteen cases came in. The excess was

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

immediately placed aboard a later arriving helicopter for return to the LSA. A D-day request for 40mm ammunition for the M-79 grenade launcher was not fulfilled. No reason was given for lack of resupply.

c. Separate radio nets operating in the immediate vicinity of one another lacked sufficient span between radio frequencies. Bn Tac net was 41.7 mcs while the helicopter direction net was 41.5 mcs. The result was constant interference on one or the other net.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

14. Commanders Analysis.

a. Close air support again played a vital role in reducing the volume and accuracy of enemy fire, thus permitting enemy positions to be overrun by the infantry with minimum casualties. Control of close air was once again by TAC (A) even though an FAC team was attached to the assault company. The latter only recommended minor adjustments to the strikes and then only to the TAC (A) who in turn relayed the corrections to the strike aircraft. If the TAC (A) is going to continue to monopolize control of attack aircraft when it comes on station, then we best reevaluate the present mission of the FAC. This battalion stands solidly on the position that FAC's should control strikes.

b. Attacking on the gun-target line of artillery requires detailed coordination with both the supported and supporting agencies. When possible pre-positioning of artillery should be influenced by an attempt to locate firing positions that would be perpendicular to the assumed direction of attack.

c. The enemy's tenacious effort to resist capture was evidenced by his refusal to surrender when encouraged to do so from a trapped position. His reply was a grenade thrown in response. Even against superior odds the enemy shows a determination to resist. This is certainly an indication that he is a better trained fighter than some would believe.

d. The Battalion Civil Affairs Team treated two adult females and six children who had received wounds when the enemy positions were under attack. All were evacuated to Quang Ngai Hospital by helicopter for further treatment.

15. Recommendations

a. In a helicopter-borne assault into a large area of uniform terrain, every effort must be made to mark the location of where the initial lift has landed. In the absence of such markings, pilots of subsequent lifts can be oriented by armed escort helicopter who remain in the vicinity of the assault LZ.

b. Requested air support must be confirmed or denied - not ignored.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Ensure positive control of all artillery, U.S. and ARVN, in the area of operation. Particular emphasis should be made to position artillery so that the gun-target line does not coincide with the axis of advance of infantry.

d. Radio frequencies assigned to units in the area of operations must have sufficient spread to avoid radio interference with tactical nets.

*Leon N. Utter*  
LEON N. UTTER

DISTRIBUTIONS:


CO, 7th Marines	45
Files	<u>5</u>
	50

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS D-DAY AM

2nd Bn, 7th Marines  
Operation "Hot Springs"  
27 April 1966

Map: Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam NTC Series L701  
1:50,000 Sheet 6757b IV.




P. ALFA  
59  
79

Encl (2)

Map: QUANG BINH PROVINCE, Vietnam AMS Series L704, 1:50,000  
Sheet 6750 IV.

ENEMY POSITIONS D-DAY

2nd Bn, 7th Marine  
Operation "Hot Springs"  
27 April 1965




Occupied 50 Cal MG Positions  
Unoccupied 50 Cal MG Positions

Inset (1)

Map: Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam AMS Series L701, Sheet 6754 IV.

MEASUREMENT 0 1/2, 1966

2nd Bn, 7th Marine  
Operations  
21 APRIL 1966




Sheet (3)

OPERATIONS D-DAY PM

Map: Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam JMS Series L701,  
1:50,000 Sheet 6756 IV.

2nd Bn, 7th Marines  
Operation "Hot Springs"  
27 April 1966



Enc. (4)

