

114868

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

68 3325

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1st BN. 9th MAR
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8 Feb 1968
SER 002A4968

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From: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO 3D)

Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 January 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.1A

Encl: (1) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is submitted.

J. F. Mitchell
J. F. MITCHELL

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

1st BN 9th MAR

COM CHRON

8 Feb 1968

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 January - 31 January 1968

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATION

1st Battalion, 9th Marines

"H&S" Company

Company "A"

Company "B"

Company "C"

Company "D"

COMMANDERSJ. F. MITCHELL
1 January-31 January 1968Capt. J. W. CARGILE
1 January-8 January 1968
1st Lt. M. J. WALKER
9 January-31 January 1968Capt. H. J. M. RADCLIFFE
1 January-31 January 1968Capt. R. T. BRUNER
1 January-26 January 1968
1st Lt. A. N. MANGHAM JR.
27 January-31 January 19681st Lt. K. L. HARMON
1 January-8 January 1968
Capt. J. W. CARGILE
9 January-31 January 1968Capt. F. L. SCHAFER
1 January-31 January 1968

ENCLOSURE (1)

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2. During the period 1-22 January 1968, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was located at Camp Evans, RVN and for the rest of this reporting period the Battalion was located at a strongpoint northwest of the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

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3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer	Major J. A. DONNELLY 1 January - 31 January 1968
S-1	1st Lt. P. A. WOOG 1 January - 31 January 1968
S-2	1st Lt. R. J. ARBOLEDA 1 January - 31 January 1968
S-3	Major E. M. RINGLEY 1 January - 31 January 1968
S-4	1st Lt. J. M. GEORGI 1 January - 31 January 1968
S-5	1st Lt. R. J. ARBOLEDA 1 January - 31 January 1968

4. Average Monthly Strength

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
42	1154	2	60

ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-22 January 1968, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was located at Camp Evans, RVN as the Resident Infantry Battalion. The mission of the Battalion was to provide for the security of Camp Evans and its ancillary facilities at PK-17 (YD652-280), an ARVN Artillery Position; Hill #51 (YD549281), a Rifle Platoon (Rein) strongpoint; and Hill #674 (YD516219), a Rifle Platoon (Rein) Strongpoint/Radio Relay Station. The Battalion was further required to provide available personnel for saturation patrolling and ambushing in known avenues of approach within 5000 meters of the Camp Evans Perimeter.

On 22 January 1968, the Battalion was moved from the Camp Evans area to the Khe Sanh Combat Base, its mission was to establish, occupy and defend a defensive strongpoint northwest of the Khe Sanh Combat Base Perimeter. (XD831417).

On 1 January 1968, Company "D" was returned to Camp Evans and came under operational control of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. The Company had previously been located at Nam Hoa (YD744133), the site of a "Rock Crusher" operated by the Seabees. On 2 January 1968 there were no significant occurrences within the 4th Marines AO. Routine daylight and night activities, to include patrols, ambushes, LP's and OP's were conducted in the vicinity of Camp Evans.

On 3 January 1968, personnel from the 3d Platoon, Company "B", located at Hill #51 (YD549281) observed two Marines approaching the hill from the south. The two Marines turned out to be the only survivors from Division Reconnaissance Team Tarzan, which made contact with the enemy the previous day. Six of the eight man team had been killed by the enemy. The two survivors of the Reconnaissance Team were packed up by helicopters at Hill #51 and returned to their parent unit.

On 4 January 1968, Company "D" while operating in the vicinity of YD488275 was assigned the mission of retrieving the bodies of the members of Division Reconnaissance Team Tarzan, killed in action on 2 January 1968. At 1140H on 4 January 1968, the 2d and 3d Platoon of Company "D" reinforced with an Engineer Team and a Forward Air Control Team, loaded on four CH-46 Helicopters and began Operation Tarzan. The two platoons were flown to the vicinity of Reconnaissance Team last known position and one landed in a landing zone at YD556230 while the other remained in reserve. The platoon moved approximately 150 meters to the south, finding the objective area, the six bodies and various equipment. The bodies and equipment and 3d Platoon of Company "D" were then helilifted from the objective area with the 3d Platoon being returned via helicopter to its company operating base at YD488275 while the other helicopters with the bodies and equipment returned to higher headquarters.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

Following the completion of Operation Tarzan Company "D" (Rein) continued on its assigned mission in the vicinity of YD488275. At 1325H on 4 January, a platoon size patrol from Company "C" (Rein), received one WIA from a surprise explosive device. The incident occurred in the vicinity of YD497323, the man was medevaced. On 5 January 1968, there were no significant occurrences in the 4th Marines AO. The Battalion conducted routine daylight and night activities in the Camp Evans vicinity.

At 1200H on 6 January 1968, a composite platoon from "H&S" Company was used to detain a group of Vietnamese personnel lingering near the Camp Evans perimeter. Two of the squads were helilifted behind the Vietnamese personnel and swept east driving the Vietnamese into a 3d squad serving as a blocking force. Twenty Vietnamese were detained and later released as innocent civilians.

At 1130H on 7 January 1968, a platoon size patrol from Company "B" received sniper fire from the vicinity of YD575269. A Scout Sniper Team attached to the platoon brought the sniper under fire resulting in one VC KIA (Conf). At 1140H on 7 January 1968, the same platoon from Company "B" received one WIA as a result of a surprise explosive device. The Marine was medevaced.

At 1620H on 7 January 1968, Company "D" returned to Camp Evans following the completion of its search and destroy mission in the vicinity of YD488275. A platoon size ambush from Company "B" was triggered at 2145H on 7 January 1968. The contact resulted in one NVA KIA (Conf). A French submachinegun and other assorted gear was captured and forwarded to the Battalion S-2.

During the early morning hours of 8 January 1968, a platoon size ambush from Company "B" called an artillery mission on suspected enemy movement at YD584294. The area was checked at first light with negative results.

At 1140H 8 January 1968, Company "A" (Rein) departed Camp Evans to conduct a Search and Destroy Operation in the vicinity of YD595270. Later the same afternoon, Company "A" (Rein) observed five VC in the vicinity of YD583274. A Scout/Sniper Team attached to Company "A" brought the VC under fire resulting in one VC KIA (Conf). One U.S. M-1 Carbine was captured and forwarded to the Battalion S-2.

At 2145H on 8 January 1968, a squad size ambush from Company "A" accounted for five VC KIA (Conf) when they triggered their ambush at YD593294. A search of the area found six ID Cards, documents and two, two hundred and fifty pound bombs. The VC were transporting the bombs for use as surprise explosive devices on Route #1 in the vicinity of Camp Evans.

On 9 January 1968, Company "A" (Rein) received two WIA's from a surprise explosive device at YD594266. Both injuries were minor.

At 0515H 10 January 1968, a Platoon (Rein) size ambush from Company "C" opened fire on one VC in a sampan on the O LAH River in the vicinity of YD512339. The sampan was sunk and one VC KIA (Conf) was recorded. At 1200H Company "A" (Rein) received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire from the vicinity of YD593263. An artillery mission was fired and the enemy fire ceased. At 1500H the 2d Platoon of Company "A" engaged four to five VC at YD604268.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

The enemy were on the south side of the O HO River prohibiting the platoon from closing with them. Six hundred pounds of rice was discovered and destroyed by Company "A" at YD598267.

At 2120H a squad size ambush from Company "B" opened fire on suspected enemy movement at YD493321. A search of the area at first light revealed negative results. In the vicinity of YD515337, a squad size ambush from Company "C" fired on suspected enemy troops, the ambush site was checked immediately with negative results.

On 11 January 1968, a platoon from Company "C" received three rounds of 60mm mortar within their platoon patrol base at YD527336. No fix was obtained on the enemy position. At 1406H Company "A" completed its Search and Destroy Operation and returned to Camp Evans. The remainder of the 4th Marines AO was quiet on 11 January.

On 12 January 1968, Company "B" departed Camp Evans on a Search and Destroy mission in the vicinity of YD490320. Once again, the 4th Marines AO was quiet with no significant occurrences. The Battalion employed its routine daylight and night activities.

On 13 January 1968, Company "B" sighted four VC at YD487325. A Scout/Sniper Team took the VC under fire and observed one VC fall. Area was checked out resulting in one VC KIA (Conf). At 1045H 13 January Company "B" reported one WIA from a surprise explosive device placed on a trail. While waiting for the medevac helicopter to evacuate the casualty, the company received sporadic sniper fire. During the sniper fire, another Marine was wounded when he broke his shoulder while seeking cover. Both casualties were then medevaced. The remainder of the 4th Marines AO was quiet for the day.

Activity in the 4th Marines AO on 14 January 1968, was very light. A platoon size patrol from Company "D" observed three VC in the vicinity of YD577307. The platoon opened fire and observed one VC fall. The contact resulted in the capture of one U.S. M-1 Carbine and one VC KIA (Conf).

At 1045H on 15 January, one Marine from Company "D" (-) stepped on a surprise explosive device at YD556303 causing one WIA. The casualty was medevaced. A platoon from Company "D" apprehended 2 VC suspects while sweeping a small hamlet. The VC suspects were forwarded to Phong Dien District Headquarters where they were found to be on the local list of VC in the area. The two suspects were turned over to ITT Personnel. The same platoon from Company "B" later apprehended another Viet Cong suspect in the vicinity of YD566310. The suspect was forwarded to Regimental S-2 for questioning. At 1805H a squad size ambush from Company "B" received one Marine WIA from a surprise explosive device. The squad was enroute to its ambush site when the incident occurred. The casualty was medevaced.

A squad size patrol from Company "C" observed and took under fire three VC at YD532290, the incident occurred on 16 January. The area was later checked with negative results. A platoon size patrol from Company "D" apprehended one VC suspect at YD558252. The suspect was forwarded to the Regimental S-2 for questioning. A group of VC were spotted by a platoon size patrol from Company "D" at YD556257, the distance between the Marines and the VC was too great for small arms so an artillery mission was fired on the enemy.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

A check of the area revealed blood on the ground, Partially built bunkers were also found in the area. At 1330H on 16 January 1968, Company "B" while on a Search and Destroy Operation, received one Marine KIA and one Kit Carson Scout WIA. The casualties were caused by a surprise explosive device. The Kit Carson Scout and the Marine KIA were medevaced later.

There were no significant occurrences in the 4th Marines AO on 17 January 1968. The Battalion employed its routine daylight and night activities in the Camp Evans area.

On 18 January 1968, a platoon size ambush from Company "C" located at YD556250 spotted eleven VC in the vicinity of YD551250. The platoon began moving towards the enemy but was taken under fire by another enemy unit in the area. The platoon assumed a defensive position and called artillery on the enemy position. The enemy then broke contact and moved out of the area. A sweep of the area revealed fresh blood tracks and two straw hats. The remainder of the 4th Marines AO was quiet on 18 January 1968.

On 19 January 1968, Company "D" received one USMC WIA as a result of sniper fire. The company was moving west in the vicinity of YD600288 when a sniper took them under fire. The company returned fire with small arms but failed to get the sniper. The wounded Marine was medevaced from the area.

At 1400H on 19 January 1968, a squad size patrol from Company "C" observed enemy movement on a road in the vicinity of YD556240. The squad contacted the Company Commander at Hill #51 (YD549281) and two more squads were sent out to the area of the sighting. When the two squads reached the area they deployed on line and made contact with the enemy. A fire fight developed during which a AO Spotter Plane arrived in the area. The AO controlled an artillery mission on the enemy position. Following the artillery mission the two squads swept the area and another fire fight developed. Finally, the enemy broke contact and moved south into the mountains. The fire fight resulted in six NVA KIA (Conf) and the capture of assorted enemy equipment including one AK-47 rifle. The captured equipment was forwarded to the Regimental S-2.

At 0755H on 20 January 1968, a platoon size ambush from Company "D" received approximately twenty rounds of automatic weapons fire at YD598286. The ambush observed three VC running and pursued them. The ambush fired on the VC resulting in one VC KIA (Conf). A female Vietnamese was also captured and detained as a VCS. The VCS was forwarded to the Phong Dien District Headquarters for interrogation.

At 0800H on 20 January 1968, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines chopped operational control of the 4th Marines and picked up by the 1st Marines.

At 1145H on 20 January 1968, Company "D" captured one North Vietnamese Regular Army Sergeant and two VC POW at YD610271. The POW's had various equipment which was forwarded to Regimental S-2. The POW's were forwarded to 1st ITT at Camp Evans. At 1810H on 20 January Company "D" received approximately 100 rounds of sniper fire and four RPG rounds into their positions in the vicinity of YD605265. The Company returned fire with small arms, grenade launchers and 60 millimeter mortars. Action resulted in one USMC WIA, and one VC KIA (Conf). The USMC WIA was medevaced.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~PART III

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SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTSI. FMF Organizations committed to combat and the SLF.

A. Combat Missions Assigned. The Battalion was employed in Operation Neosho from 0001 1 January 1968 to 1900H 22 January 1968. At 1900H 22 January 1968, the Battalion came under operational control of the 26th Marines.

(1) Operation Neosho. 1st Battalion, 9th Marines directs and coordinates at Camp Evans all missions to be accomplished for security of the Camp Evans perimeter and its ancillary facilities by establishing ambush sites in known avenues of approach and aggressive daylight patrolling and saturation out to 5000 meters with maximum forces available.

(2) Operation Scotland. To establish, occupy and defend a defensive strongpoint northwest of the Khe Sanh Combat Base (XD831 417).

B. Significant Operations Conducted. The Battalion continued to carry out its primary mission of defending Camp Evans and its ancillary facilities as a part of Operation Neosho.

C. Casualties Inflicted on the Enemy.

KIA (Confirmed)	POW
17	8

D. Casualties Sustained

USMC KIA: 4	USN KIA: 0
USMC WIA: 30	USN WIA: 0

E. New Techniques Employed. By moving during the hours of darkness to establish daylight ambush sites along known rice routes. The Battalion was able to use smaller units, denying the enemy freedom of movement, and get more kills.

F. Command Relations. During the period 0001 1 January through 0940H 20 January 1968 the Battalion was under operational control of the 4th Marines. At 0940H on 20 January 1968 through 1900H 20 January the Battalion was under operational of the 1st Marine Regiment. From 1900H on 22 January through 2100H 31 January 1968 the Battalion was under the operational control of the 26th Marine Regiment.

ENCLOSURE (1)
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G. Equipment. During this reporting period organic motor transport has been engaged in household, administration and supply runs for the Battalion.

The motor transport situation has improved slightly in the case of the M422A1. The lack of M422A1's is still serious (eight out of a T/E of twenty) but the 3d and 4th echelon service organizations are showing complete cooperation in the rapid repair/replacement of these vehicles.

H. Logistics. During the majority of this reporting period we continued to support the Battalions activities in the Camp Evans area, also their outposts on Hill #51 and Hill #674 were maintained with a twenty day supply on hand. During the last week of this month, movement of the Battalion's Rear from Camp Evans to Dong Ha was accomplished.

I. Civic Action. The only Civic Action Project during this reporting period was a self help project in which Vietnamese refugees filled sandbags for the Marine Position at Camp Evans. The Vietnamese were paid in commodities which amounted to 350 Piastras for every four hundred sandbags filled and loaded on trucks. 44,000 sandbags were filled and the following commodities were expended:

- (a) 8 bags of Oats
- (b) 181 gallons of cooking oil
- (c) 102 boxes of dry milk.

J. Administration. Nothing significant to report.

K. Personnel. The following personnel were transferred from this Command.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
4	65	0	4

Personnel who were joined to this Command.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
3	75	0	4

ENCLOSURE (1)

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L. Intelligence. During this reporting period, the known enemy units operating around the Camp Evans area were the 800th Main Force Battalion at YD5421. The 806th Battalion Headquarters, C-4, C-5 and C-11 through C-17 Companies and the Headquarters of the 810th Local Force Battalion were located in Base Area 114. The C-114 and C-115 Local Force Companies were located in the An Lo area. The C-11 Intelligence Company was located in the My Chanh area and the 800th and 806th Battalions were located in the "Street Without Joy" area.

The first three weeks of the month, the Battalion continued saturation patrolling up to 5000 meters outside the Camp Evans perimeter by platoon size patrols. The saturation patrolling uncovered twenty-five surprise explosive devices, mainly M-26 fragmentation grenades rigged with a tripwire. There was also a few 105mm rounds and 81mm mortar rounds, which were discovered rigged as surprise explosive devices. Practically all the surprise explosive devices were positioned alongside trails or avenues of approach.

After analyzing compiled intelligence information of enemy mining activities, previous contacts and areas of sightings; definite enemy access routes through the OA were determined. Subsequent platoon and company size operations were planned to block these access routes.

Utilizing the known information, Company "A" established an ambush at YD593294 and thwarted a very significant enemy attempt to mine National Route #1 with a "daisy chain" of three two hundred and fifty pound bombs and two five hundred pound bombs. Company "A" killed five Viet Congs, captured two, two hundred and fifty pound bombs, one five hundred pound bomb and valuable Viet Cong documents.

Company "B", which had the mission of interdicting the suspected enemy supply routes along the Song O Lau River, discovered an enemy base camp at YD493332 and a 1,6000 pound rice cache. Company "B" activities in this area enabled a more precise determination of enemy movement from Base Area 114 along the Song O Lau River.

Company "D", which relieved Company "A", continued to make contact with small enemy units along the railroad grade access route. On 15 January Company "D" captured two Viet Cong suspects. One was confirmed Viet Cong and the other was associated with a Viet Cong collaborating group.

On the 19th of January, Company "C" had a squad size ambush at YD556240, which made contact with thirty-six North Vietnamese Army Regulars, killing six, capturing one AK-47 and documents, which further confirmed enemy routes and plans in the Co Bi Thanh Tan area.

Company "D", on 20 January made a very significant intelligence catch by capturing an NVA Sergeant and two Viet Cong collaborators. Information obtained from the prisoners pinpointed Viet Cong and NVA supply routes, methods and times of resupply, enemy movement and other important tactical information of Viet Cong and NVA activity in the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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On 22 January, the Battalion had to make an immediate move to the area of the Khe Sanh Combat Base to counteract a large enemy built-up. The known enemy units operating in the Khe Sanh area, were the 325C Division and the 304th Division. The 320th Division, which was positioned in the vicinity of grid square XD0166 was also within striking distance of Khe Sanh. Elements of the 101st Regiment of the 324B Division had not been confirmed but was believed to be operating in the area to the direct west of Khe Sanh Combat Base.

The 324C Division and the 304th Divisions were supported by long range artillery from Co Roc and in the vicinity of grid square XD68 48 of Laos. The 325B Division was also supported by 122mm rockets, which were generally located eight to ten thousand meters to the north and northwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. The 304th Division was supported by rocket positions which were generally located eight to nine thousand meters to the southwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base.

The S-2 Rewards Fund was one of the most active in the 3d Marine Division and expended eighty thousand Vietnamese dollars for the month of January. Ordnance turned in by civilians at Phong Dien included everything from bombs and 120mm mortar rounds to grenades and small arms rounds.

N. Weather. During the first week of January the Camp Evans area received light showers. The temperatures for this period ranged from the low 50's to the mid 70's. Visibility for this period was severely limited.

During the second and third weeks of January the weather made an abrupt change over that experienced during the first week of the month. Almost no rainfall was received for this period and the skies remained clear. Temperatures ranged from the mid 50's to the low 80's.

While in the vicinity of Khe Sanh during the last part of the month the Battalion experienced unreasonably warm weather and scattered cloud cover.

O. Artillery. During January nine hundred and one artillery rounds were fired in support of the Battalion. Artillery targets during Operation Neosho included prep fires, troops in open, snipers and suppressing fires. A total of one hundred and eighty two rounds were fired in support of the Battalion in Operation Scotland at active artillery, rocket and mortar sites, troop in open and supply trains.

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P. Air Support. During January helicopters were used for resupply, medical evacuation, and visual reconnaissance. On 6 January two platoons were helilifted in conjunction with the extraction of the Division Reconnaissance Team "Tarzan". On 22 January, the Battalion was transferred by helicopter from Camp Evans to the Khe Sanh Combat Base. The Battalion received no close air support during this reporting period.

Q. Activation/Deactivation/Redesignation. None

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S-2/3-3 JO REAL

CAMP EVANS (OPN N. OCHO)

010001 JAN 68 012400H JAN 68

	0542	1	010600	GM/JB	SitRep	#162		SP
	1130	2	011200	GM/JB	SitRep	#163		SP
1355		3	011330	GMCI/GM	SpotRep	#1	Final	SP
	1730	5	011800	GM/JB	SitRep	#164		SP
	2400	6	012400	GM/JB	SitRep	#165		SP

TAB A

8-2/8-3 JOURNAL

CAMP EVANS (OPN K USHO)

020001 JAN 68

022400H JAN 68

	0515	1	020600	GM/JB	SitRep	#166		SF
0815		2	020730	GMCP1/GM	SpotRep	#1	Final	SF
	1135	3	021200	GM/JB	SitRep	#167		SF
	1755	6	021800	GM/JB	SitRep	#168		SF
	2330	8	022400	GM/JB	SitRep	#169		SF

(A)

S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

CAMP EVANS (OPN NEGSHO)

030001 JAN 68 032400H JAN 68

0505	1	030510	GM/JB	SitRep	#170		SP
1130	3	031200	GM/JB	SitRep	#171		SP
1353	6	031200	GM/JB	SpotRep	#1	Final	SP
1800	9	031800	GM/JB	SitRep	#172		SP
2400	10	032400	GM/JB	SitRep	#173		SP

S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

CAMP EVANS (OPN N. OSHO)

040001 JAN 68

042400H JAN 68

	0600	1	040600	GM/JB	SitRep #174		SF
0905	0920	4	040905	AP3/EM	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
0933	0935	5	040930	AP3/EM	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
	1156	6	041200	GM/JB	SitRep #175		SF
1330		8	041325	GVC2/RV	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1345		9	041100	D3	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
1330		10	041325	Mine & Booby trap	Rep from CP2		SF
1405		11	041325	CP2	WIARep		SF
1500		15	041500	CP2	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
1600		16	041530	CP2	SpotRep #6	Final	SF
1706		17	041645	GVA1	SpotRep #7	Final	SF
	1730	18	041800	GM/JB	SitRep #176		SF
	2340	19	042400	GM/JB	SitRep #177		SF

S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

CAMP EVANS (OPN NBC/HO)

050001 JAN 68

052400H JAN 68

	0530	1	050600	GM/JB	SitRep #178		SF
0800		4	051630	D/IV	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
		5	050830	C2/OV	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
1100		14	051030	SVV/OV	NBC Rep		SF
1100		15	051030	OVD/OV	NBC Rep		SF
	1150	18	051200	GM/JB	SitRep #179		SF
	1735	22	051710	CP3/GM	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
	1737	23	051800	GM/JB	SitRep #180		SF
2145		25	052130	C3/OV	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
2230		26	052225	C3/OV	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
	2330	27	052400	GM/JB	SitRep #181		SF

3-2/3-3 JOURNAL

CAMP EVANS (OPN NROSHO)

050001 JAN 68

052400H JAN 68

0800	0530	1	050600	OM/JB	SitRep #178		SF
		4	051630	D/OV	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
		5	050830	G2/OV	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
1100		14	051030	GVD/OV	NBC Rep		SF
1100		15	051030	GVD/OV	NBC Rep		SF
	1150	18	051200	OM/JB	SitRep #179		SF
	1735	22	051710	CP1/OM	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
	1737	23	051800	OM/JB	SitRep #180		SF
2145		25	052130	O1/OV	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
2230		26	052225	O1/OV	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
	2330	27	052400	OM/JB	SitRep #181		SF

(A)

0-2/4-3 JOURNAL

C.M.F. (1968)

070001 68

0724001 JAN 68

	0930	21	070600	GK/3 (Late entry)	Sit rep	186	
1100		3	061700	GV 3/GV	Spot rep	#1	Final
		4	061120	GV 3/GV	Spot rep	#2	Initial
	1100	5	071200	GK/3B	Sit rep	#187	
1120		7	071130	B 3/W	sit rep		
1240		8	071240	B 3/GV	Spot rep	#3	Final
1240		9	071240	B 3/GV	Spot rep	#4	Final
1600		17	071500	B 1/GV	Spot Rep	#5	Initial
		18	071530	B 1/GV	Spot rep	#6	Initial
		19	071700	B 1/GV	Spot rep	#7	Final
	1750	20	071700	GK/3B	Sit rep	#188	
2100		22	071800	B 2/GV	Spot rep	#9	Final
		21	071800	01/GV	Spot rep	#8	Final
2145		23	072130	B 3/GV	sit rep		
2240		24	072130	B 3/GV	Spot rep	#10	Initial
2300		25	072300	B 3/GV	Spot rep	#11	Follow up
	2330	26	072400	GK/3B	Sit rep	#189	

(A)

S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

CAMP EVANS (OPN NCSHO)

080001 JAN 68

082400H JAN 68

0100		1	080019	BP3/GV	SpotRep	#1	Final	SF
	0530	2	080600	GM/JB	SitRep	#190		SF
750		3	080750	BA3/GV	SpotRep	#2	Final	SF
	1140	4	081200	GM/JB	SitRep	#191		SF
1120		5	081120	G2/GV	SpotRep	#3	Final	SF
1458	1515	11	081455	BP1/GV	SpotRep	#4	Final	SF
1500	1600	13	081500	GV01/GV	SpotRep	#5	Final	SF
1539	1645	14	081515	BP1/GV	SpotRep	#6	Final	SF
1620		16	081600	GVA/GV	SpotRep	#7	Initial	SF
	1725	17	081800	GM/JB	SitRep	#192		SF
1745		18	081600	GVA/GV	SpotRep	#8	Follow UP	SF
	1835	19	081600	GVA/GV	SpotRep	#9	Final	SF
1749		20	081754	GVA/GV	SpotRep	#10	Final	SF
		22	082130	AA21/GV	SpotRep	#11	Final	SF
	1120	23	082400	GM/JB	SitRep	#193		SF

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CAMP EVANS (OPN NEOSHO)

090001 Jan 1968 092400 JANUARY 1968

	0555	1	090600	GV/GM SitRep #194	SF
0915		2	090900	BP1/GV SpotRep #1 Final	SF
1115		5	091030	"A" Co./GV SpotRep #2 Final	SF
	1130	6	091200	GV/GM SitRep #195	SF
1130		7	091030	"A" Co/GV WIA Report	SF
1130		8	091030	"A" Co/GV WIA Report	SF
1215		12	091145	BP1/GV SpotRep #3 Final	SF
1348		13	091315	GVA1/GV SpotRep #4 Final	SF
	1745	19	091800	GV/GM SitRep #196	SF
1840		20	091840	BP3/GV SpotRep #5 Final	SF
1840		21	091840	C-1/GV SpotRep #6 Final	SF
1930		22	091930	BP3/GV SpotRep #7 Final	SF
	2330	25	092400	GV/GM SitRep #198	SF

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CAMP EVANS (OPN NEOSHO)

100001 January 1968 102400H JAN 68

0520	1	100600	GV/GM	SitRep #198		SF
COMMENT		100915	B3 MIA	Found By AP11 at kP# 4		COMMENT
1155	7	100515	C3/GV	SpotRep #1 Final		SF
1155	8	101155	B3/GV	SpotRep #2 Final		SF
1145	9	101200	GV/GM	SitRep #199		SF
1215	11	101200	GVA/GV	SpotRep #3 Final		SF
1430	17	101430	GVA/GV	SpotRep #4 Final		SF
1515	18	101436	GVA/GV	SpotRep #5 Final		SF
1530	19	101525	GVA/GV	SpotRep #6 Final		SF
1800	23	101800	IV/GM	SitRep #200		SF
2245	26	102120	GVB/GV	SpotRep #7 Final		SF
2330	27	102400	GV/GM	SitRep #201		SF
2300	25	102205	GVC/GV	SpotRep #9 Final LateEntry		SF

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CAMP EVANS (OPEN RECORDS)

11000H JANUARY 68 112400 JAN 1968

0145		1	110200	GVC1/GV	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
	0530	2	1110600	GV/GM	SitRep #202		SF
0750		4	110700	GVEP1/GV	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
0846		5	110845	GVCL/GV	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1105		6	111005	BP1/GV	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
	1130	7	111200	GV/GM	SitRep #203		SF
1220		8	111220	GVC2/GV	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
1353		9	111315	GVA/GV	SpotRep #6	Final	SF
	1735	10	111800	GV/GM	SitRep #204		SF
	2310	12	112400	GV/GM	SitRep #205		SF

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CAMP EVANS (OPN NEOSHO)

120001 JAN 68

122400 H JAN 68

	0530	1	120600	GV/GM	Sit Rep #206		SF
1100		2	121010	GVB6/GV	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
	1130	3	121200	GV/GM	SitRep #207		SF
	1730	12	121800	GV/GM	SitRep #208		SF
	2330	14	122400	GV/GM	SitRep #209		SF

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CAMP EVANS OPN NEOSHO)

130601HJAN 1968 132400H JAN 1968

	0530	1	130600	GV/GM	SitRep #210		SF
0930		2	130855	GVB/GV	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
1025		3	131025	GVB/GV	WIA Report		SF
1100		4	131045	GVB3/GV	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
1130	1130	5	131200	GV/GM	SitRep #211		SF
1130		6	131110	GVB6/GV	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1155		7	131150	GVB/GV	WIA Report		SF
1300		8	131110	GVB6/GV	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
1310		9	131300	GVD/GV	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
1350		12	131000	CP2/GV	SpotRep #6	Final	SF
1505		16	131430	GVD/GV	SpotRep #7	Final	SF
	1745	18	131800	GV/GM	SitRep #212		SF
2130		20	131810	D2/GV	SpotRep #8	Final	SF
2130		21	132015	D2/GV	SpotRep #9	Initial	SF
	2310	22	132400	GV/GM	SitRep #213		SF

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CAMP EVANS (OPN NEOSHO)

140001H JAN 68 142400H JAN 68

	0530	1	140600	GV7GM SitRep #214		SF
1000		6	140320	DA30/GV SpotRep #1	Final	SF
1015		7	140900	DF20/GV SpotRep #2	Final	SF
1115		8	141047	GVB3/GV SpotRep #3	Final	SF
	1125	9	141200	GV/GM SitRep #215		SF
1130		10	141155	DP2/GV SpotRep #4	Final	SF
1235		11	141235	GVD2/GV SpotRep #5	Final	SF
1400		13	141700	WaterPoint spotRep #6	Final	SF
1435		15	141330	GVD2/GV SpotRep #7	Final	SF
1500		16	141440	GVB/GV SpotRep #8	Final	SF
	1730	18	141800	GV/GM SitRep #216		SF
2115		21	141850	GVDA3/GV SpotRep #9	Final	SF
2100		22	141910	GVD2/GV SpotRep #10	Final (PFB)	SF
	2305	23	142400	GV/GM SitRep #217		SF

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CAMP EVANS (OPN NBSOHO)

150001 JAN 68 152400H JAN 68

	0530	1	150600	GV/GM	SitRep #218		SF
1050		5	151045	GVB/GV	WIA Report		SF
1115		7	151030	GVD/GV	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
	1132	9	151200	GV/GM	SitRep #219		SF
1310		13	151320	BP23/GV	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
1310		14	151320	BP21/GV	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1410		18	151430	GVB/GV	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
1530		23	151330	GVD/GV	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
	1650	26	151530	GVS-2/GV	SpotRep #6	Final	SF
	1750	29	151800	GV/GM	SitRep #220		SF
1925		33	151935	GVB/GV	WIA Report		SF
1928		34	151850	BA11/GV	SpotRep #8	Final	SF
	COMMENT		152010	MEDEVAC COMPLETED FOR "B"'S WIA			COMMENT
2200		36	152200	INTELLIGENCE MSG FROM PHONG DIEN HDQTRS			SF.
	2305	37	152400	Gy/GM	SitRep #221		SF
	2310	38	151930	G /GM	SpotRep #8	Final	SF

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CAMP EVANS (OPN NEOSHO)

160001H JAN 68 162400H JAN 68

	0530	1	160600	GV/GM	SitRep #222	SF
1015		3	160959	B2/GV	SpotRep #1 Final	SF
	1120	5	161200	GV/GM	SitRep #223	SF
1135		7	161020	CP2/GV	SpotRep #3 Final	SF
1230		9	161145	BSS/GV	SpotRep #4 Final	SF
1230		10	161301	BP2/GV	SpotRep #2 Final LateEntry	SF
1355		13	161350	CP2A/GV	SpotRep #5 Final	SF
1400		15	161330	B/GV	SpotRep #6 Final	SF
1425		17	161425	B/GV	WIA & KIA Report	SF
1630		24	161625	CP2/GV	SpotRep #7 Final	SF
	1725	26	161800	GV/GM	SitRep #224	SF
	2330	27	162400	GV/GM	SitRep #225	SF

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CAMP BY LNS (OPN NEGOSH)

170001 JAN 68 172400H JAN 1968

	0530	2	170600	GV/GM	SitRep #226		SF
0715		3	161630	GM/GV	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
0915		7	170900	GVD/LV	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
0955		8	170952	AP31/GV	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1005		9	171002	AP31/GV	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
1115		11	171110	AP31/GV	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
	1130	12	171200	GV/GM	SitRep #227		SF
1315		16	171250	GVC/GV	SpotRep #6	Final	SF
1323		17	171315	GVD/GV	SpotRep #7	Final	SF
1450		20	171415	GVD/GV	SpotRep #8	Initial	SF
1520		21	171400	AP32/GV	SpotRep #9	Final	SF
	1740	23	171800	GV/GM	SitRep #228		SF
	2300	25	172400	GV/GM	SitRep #229		SF

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CAMP EVANS (OPW NEGSHO)

180001 JAN 1968 182400H JAN 68

0530	1	180600	GV/GM	SitRep #230	SF
1130	11	181200	GV/GM	SitRep #231	SF
1330	14	181310	AP2/GV	SpotRep #1 Final	SF
1630	23	181700	C1/GV	SpotRep #2 Final	SF
1630	24	181600	C1/GV	SpotRep #3 Final	SF
1615	25	181525	C3/GV	SpotRep #4 Final	SF
1730	26	181800	GV/GM	SitRep #232	SF
2045	27	181750	CA2/GV	SpotRep #5 Final	SF
2130	28	181900	SVC/GV	SpotRep #6 Final	SF
2330	30	182400	GV/GM	SitRep #233	SF

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CAMP EVANS (PN NEOSHO)

190001H JAN 68 192400H JAN 68

0530	2	190600	GV/GM	SitRep #234		SF
0550	3	190615	GVD/GV	SpotRep #1	Initial	SF
0555	4	190616	GVD/GV	WIA Report		SF
0840	6	190530	GVD/GV	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
1000	8	190900	D5/GV	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1130	11	191200	GV/GM	SitRep #235		SF
1117	13	191110	GVD/GM	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
1259	14	191115	GVC/GV	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
1345	16	191310	GVC/GV	SpotRep #6	Final	SF
1400	18	191115	GVD/GV	SpotRep #7	Final	SF
1730	22	191800	GV/GM	SitRep #236		SF
2020	24	192020	CL/GV	SpotRep #8	Initial	SF
2300	26	192255	GV/GM	SpotRep #9	Follow Up	SF
2300	27	192355	GV/GM	SpotRep #10	Final	SF
2330	28	192355	GV/GM	SitRep #237		SF

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3-3 JOURNAL

CAMP EVANS (OPN NEOSHO)

200001H JAN 68

202400H JAN 68

0020		1	200020	GVA/GV	SpotRep	#1	Final	SF
	0530	2	200600	GV/GM	SitRep	#238		SF
0830		6	200755	D2/GV	SpotRep	#2	Final	SF
0910		7	200850	WT/GV	SpotRep	#3	Final	SF
1115		15	201115	GVD/GV	SpotRep	#4	Final	SF
	1135	16	201200	GV/GM	SitRep	#239		SF
1235		17	201145	GVD/GV	SpotRep	#5	Final	SF
1616		30	201650	GVB/GV	SpotRep	#6	Final	SF
1735		31	201730	D/GV	WIARep			SF
1940		36	201805	GVB/GV	SpotRep	#7	Final	SF
1940		37	201808	GVD/GV	SpotRep	#8	Final	SF
1940		38	201859	GVP/GV	SpotRep	#9	Initial	SF
2000		39	202000	GVD/GV	SpotRep	#10	Final	SF
	1730	39	201800	GV/GM	SitRep	#240	(Late Entry)	SF
	2330	41	202400	GV/GM	SitRep	#241		SF

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CAMP EVANS (OPERATION)

210001B JAN 68

212400H JAN 68

	0530	1	210600	GV/GM	SitRep	#242		SF
0933		2	210933	GVD/GV	SpotRep	#1	Initial	SF
1115		6	211114	AP2/GV	SpotRep	#2	Initial	SF
	1130	8	211200	GV/GM	SitRep	#243		SF
1205		10	211200	GVA/GV	SpotRep	#3	Final	SF
1225		12	211210	GVD/GV	SpotRep	#4	Final	SF
1230		13	211230	AP2/GV	SpotRep	#5	Final	SF
	1307	14	211230	AP2/GV	SpotRep	#6	Final	SF
1340		17	211333	GVD/GV	SpotRep	#7	Final	SF
		19	211355	CI/GV	SpotRep	#8	Final	SF
1740	1740	25	211800	GV/GM	SitRep	#244		SF
1730		26	211645	GVA/GV	SpotRep	#9	Final	SF
1850		28	211830	GVD/GV	SpotRep	#10	Final	SF
	1130	31	212400	GV/GM	SitRep	#245	FINAL	SF

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KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

220001H JAN 68 222400H JAN 68

1	221800	All Units of the Command have reached Khe Sanh except "G" Company.	SF
2	221900	"D" Co. had two WIA's	SF

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KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

230001 JAN 68 232400H JAN 68

COMMENT	230800	1/9 Proceeded out of Khe Sanh Combat Base	COMMENT
COMMENT	231000	1st Platoon "A" Co, assaulted hill at XD823416	COMMENT
COMMENT	231200	1/9 Proceeded to XD829415 & Set Up CP	COMMENT
1800 1	231800	GV/26th Marines SitRep #1	SF
2400 2	232400	GV/26th Marines SitRep #2	SF

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KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

240001 JAN 68

242400H JAN 68

0600	1	240600	GV/26th Marines SitRep #3	SF
1130	2	241155	GV/26th Marines SitRep #4	SF
1730	3	241800	GV/26th Marines SitRep #5	SF
2300	4	242400	GV/26th Marines SitRep #6	SF

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KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

250001H JAN 68

252400H JAN 68

0540	1	250600	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #8		SF
1040	2	251045	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
1130	3	251200	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #8		SF
1730	4	251800	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #9		SF
1800	5	251800	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
1815	6	251815	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1850	7	251850	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
2200	8	252200	GV/26th Marines	Ammo Expenditures		SF
2400	9	252400	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #10		SF

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KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

260001 JAN 68 262400H JAN 68

0110	1	260110	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
0250	2	260250	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
0330	3	260330	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
0330	4	260330	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
0530	5	260600	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #11		SF
1130	6	261200	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #12		SF
1100	7	261100	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
1440	8	261440	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #6	Final	SF
1700	9	261800	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #13		SF
1757	10	261757	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #7	Final	SF
2300	12	262400	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #14		SF

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S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

270001 JAN 68 272400H JAN 68

0120	1	270120	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
0335	2	270325	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
0500	3	270500	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #15		SF
1100	4	271100	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #16		SF
1315	5	271315	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1430	6	271430	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
1700	7	271700	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #17		SF
2300	9	272300	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #18		SF

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KHE SANH

280001 JAN 68 282400H JAN 68

0035	1	280035	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
0100	2	280100	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
0500	3	280500	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #19		SF
0925	4	280925	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
0950	5	280950	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
1030	6	281030	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
1100	7	281100	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #20		SF
1120	8	281120	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #6	Final	SF
1130	9	281130	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #8	Final	SF
1200	10	281200	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #8	Final	SF
1230	11	281230	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #9	Final	SF
1315	12	281315	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #10	Final	SF
1400 ^v	13	281400	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #11	Final	SF
1445	14	281445	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #12	Final	SF
1700	15	281700	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #21		SF
1710	16	281710	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #13	Final	SF
2000	17	282000	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #14	Final	SF
2300	19	282300	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #22		SF

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KHE SANH

290001 JAN 68 292400H JAN 68

0500	1	290001	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #23	SF
1100	2	291100	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #24	SF
1700	3	291700	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #25	SF
2300	5	292400	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #26	SF

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KHE SANH

300001H JAN 68 302400H JAN 68

0205	1	300205	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
0500	2	300500	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #27		SF
0530	3	300530	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
0730	4	300730	GV/26th Marines	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1100	5	301100	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #28		SF
1700	6	301700	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #29		SF
2300	8	302300	GV/26th Marines	SitRep #30		SF

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KHE SANH

310001H JAN 68 312400H JAN 68

0500	1	310500	OV/26th Marines	SitRep #31		SF
1100	2	311100	OV/26th Marines	SitRep #32		SF
1232	3	311232	O/26th Marines	SpotRep #1	Final	SF
1240	4	311240	OV/26th Marines	SpotRep #2	Final	SF
1307	5	311307	OV/26th Marines	SpotRep #3	Final	SF
1345	6	311345	OV/26th Marines	SpotRep #4	Final	SF
1416	7	311410	OV/26th Marines	SpotRep #5	Final	SF
1420	8	311420	OV/26th Marines	SpotRep #6	Final	SF
1443	9	311433	OV/26th Marines	SpotRep #7	Final	SF
1700	10	311700	OV/26th Marines	SitRep #33		SF
2300		312300	OV/26th Marines	SitRep #34		SF
2340	13	312400	OV/26th Marines	SpotRep #8	Final	SF

145968

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

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4 March 1968

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From: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines
Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1D
(b) Map Vietnam: Scale 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheet 6441 I
6441 IV, 6442 II, 6442 IV

1. Code Name: NEOSHO
2. Date of Operation: 230800H November 1967 to 221900H January 1968
3. Location: Thua Thien Province
4. Task Organization

1st Battalion, 9th Marines

J. F. MITCHELL
23 November 1967-22 January 1968

"H&S" Company (Rein)
"H&S" Company

1st Lt. R. A. CROWE
23 November - 6 December 1967
Capt. J. W. CARGILE
7 December 1967-8 January 1968
1st Lt. M. J. WALKER
9 January - 22 January 1968

Company "A" (Rein)
Company "A"
FO Team, D Btry 2/12
DET, "H&S" Company
FAC Team
FO Team, 30MM
DET, Med Plt
DET, Comm Plt

Capt. H. J. M. RADCLIFFE
23 November 1967-22 January 1968

1st BN, 9th MAR
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ENCLOSURE (6)
TAB-B

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A/A Rpt (Opn NEOSHO)

23 Nov 1967 - 22 Jan 1968

On 21 January 1968, one USMC personnel was injured by a surprise explosive device at YD519296. The wounded Marine was medevaced. The remainder of the 1st Marines AO was quiet. The Battalion employed its routine daylight and night activities to include patrols, ambushes and LP's within the Camp Evans area.

At 0820H on 22 January 1968, a squad size ambush from Company "D" received approximately ten rounds sniper fire at YB600285. The squad returned fire and wounded one VC sniper in the leg. The VC attempted to escape but was finally captured after the squad had followed her track of blood from the wound. The VC later died due to loss of blood, all available effort was made to keep the VC alive. At 1010H on 22 January 1968 one Marine from Company "D" activated a surprise explosive device at YD601282. Three friendly casualties were sustained, one of which was a Kit Carson Scout. All the casualties were medevaced.

At approximately 1200H on 22 January 1968, the Battalion was ordered to prepare for an immediate move to Khe Sanh Combat Base at XD849417. Company "D" returned from a search and sweep operation via helicopter to Camp Evans and placed on standby awaiting helicopter transportation to the Khe Sanh Combat Base. At 1420H 22 January 1968, the helilift of the Battalion to Khe Sanh began; Company "D", Company "A", Company "B" and the Forward Battalion Command Group were then helilifted to Khe Sanh Combat Base by shuttle. At 1645H Company "D" received two USMC WIA at the Khe Sanh Combat Base from incoming rockets. Company "C", "H&S" Company (-) and the Rear Command Group arrived at Khe Sanh at 1500H 23 January 1968.

At 1900H on 22 January 1968, the 1st Marine Regiment relinquished operational control of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines to the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe Sanh Combat Base. The Battalion remained within the tactical wire at Khe Sanh Combat Base during the night of 22 January 1968.

At 0800H on 23 January 1968, the Battalion moved from Khe Sanh Combat Base to the vicinity of XD831417 where a Battalion defensive strongpoint was established. A platoon from Company "A" established a platoon strongpoint at XD823416. Immediately upon occupying these defensive positions the Battalion began preparing fortified positions and laying defensive wire.

On 23 January 1968, the Battalion remained in its defensive position at XD831417. Maximum effort was directed towards improving the defensive position by digging fighting holes, building bunkers and laying tactical wire. Routine daylight patrols were employed to familiarize the Battalion with the area and listing posts were employed at night.

The period of 24 January through 26 January 1968, was relatively quiet for the Battalion with no significant occurrences. Routine daylight and night activities were employed.

On 27 January 1968, the Battalion Command Group, Company "B" and Company "D" located at XD830415 received approximately thirty rounds of mixed artillery and rocket fire from unknown enemy locations. The Battalion sustained fourteen WIA and three KIA as a result of the attack.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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Company "E" (Rein)
 Company "B"
 FO Team, D Btry 2/12
 DET, "H&S" Company
 FAC Team
 FO Team, 81MM
 DET, Med Plt
 DET, Comm Plt.

Capt. R. T. BRUNER
 23 November 1967-22 January 1968

Company "C" (Rein)
 Company "C"
 FO Team D Btry 2/12
 DET, "H&S" Company
 FAC Team
 FO Team, 81MM
 DET, Med Plt.
 DET, Comm Plt.

Capt. C. B. HARTZELL
 23 November-31 December 1967
 1st Lt. K. L. HARMON
 1 January-8 January 1968
 Capt. J. W. CARGILE
 9 January-22 January 1968

Company "D" (Rein)
 Company "D"
 FO Team D Btry 2/12
 DET, "H&S" Company
 FAC Team
 FO Team, 81MM
 DET, Med Plt.
 DET, Comm Plt.

Capt. F. L. SCHAFFER JR.
 23 November 1967-22 January 1968

5. Supporting Forces

a. Air. The helicopter accounted for the major portion of air support utilized by the Battalion during Operation Neosho.

Thirty-four personnel were medevaced from the field by H-34 and H-46 aircraft during this period. Personnel and resupply missions to Hills #674 (YD516219) and 51 (YD549281) were conducted exclusively by helicopters. Battalion and Company Commanders also used helicopters for visual reconnaissance prior to starting area patrols. On 6 January 1968 two platoons were helilifted in conjunction with the extraction of Division Reconnaissance Team "Tarzan". On 21 and 22 January 1968 the entire Battalion was helilifted in shuttles from Camp Evans to the KHE SANH Combat Base. One flight of visual fixed wing support east of Highway #1 was utilized under AO control along with fifty-eight day-time and one hundred and twenty-seven night TPQ's.

b. Artillery. At the start of Operation Neosho artillery was mainly concerned with the evaluation of the defensive fire plan for Camp Evans. The plan included artillery and organic direct and indirect fire weapons. Recommendations for the coordination of artillery and organic weapons were made to obtain more effective supporting fires. In addition, as a result of the heavy helicopter traffic in the area, an air watch was established as a safety factor.

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Targets of opportunity fired on during Operation Neosho included active mortars, troops in the open, and snipers. Also fired were suppressing fires, prep fires, suspected troop locations and intelligence targets. A total of one hundred and ninety - five missions and one thousand one hundred and forty-five rounds were fired by the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and 3d Battalion, 12th Marines in support of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.

c. Armor

a. A Company of tanks was employed during Operation Neosho. They were used in a defensive role on the perimeter security of Camp Evans and as a reaction force in the event of ground attack. In an offensive role they were used for direct and indirect fire support, and for patrolling in the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines AO.

b. In addition, one operation was conducted in the sand flats of the "Street Without Joy" consisting of a Battalion (-), fourteen APC's, seven otters accompanied by appropriate infantry. This was the first tactical experience for this Battalion, in the use of Armor mined with troop carrying Otters. The APC's were supplied by elements of the 1st ARVN Division. (See Chapter 9 (Execution)).

6. Intelligence. When the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Camp Evans the Northern Front Headquarters and the 6th NVA Regiment had the mission of keeping supply routes open and for providing security for units moving from the coastal lowlands to Base Area 114. Saturation patrolling up to 5000 meters outside Camp Evans perimeter with platoon size patrols restricted enemy movement and reduced the number of explosive devices/mines that could have been deployed. This saturation patrolling uncovered fifty-nine surprise explosive devices. The majority of these being M-26 fragmentation grenades. There were also 105mm rounds and 81mm mortar rounds. Practically all the surprise explosive devices were positioned along trails and avenues of approach. After compiling and analysing intelligence information of enemy mining activities, previous contacts and sightings, definite enemy access routes were determined in our AO. Utilizing this information Company "A" established an ambush at YD593294 and stopped a significant enemy attempt to mine National Route #1 with a "daisy-chain" of three (two hundred and fifty pound bombs) and two (five hundred pound bombs) Company "A" killed five VC and captured two (250 pound bombs) and one five hundred pound bomb and some valuable VC documents. Company "B" had the mission of interdicting the suspected enemy supply routes along the Song O Lau River. They discovered a 1,600 pound rice cache and a base camp at YD493332. Company "D" relieved Company "A" and continued to make contact with small enemy units. On 15 January Company "D" captured two Viet Cong suspects. One was a confirmed Viet Cong while the other was associated with a Viet Cong collaborating group.

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On 19 January Company "C" had a squad size ambush at YD556240, which made contact with thirty-six NVA regulars killing six, capturing one AK-47 rifle and some documents. The documents further confirmed enemy routes and plans in the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley.

Company "D" on 20 January 1968 made a significant intelligence catch by capturing an NVA Sergeant and two VC collaborators. Information obtained from these prisoners pinpointed VC and NVA resupply routes, methods of resupply, times of resupply movement and other tactical information of enemy activity in the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley.

Weather. Weather being influenced by Northern Monsoons caused heavy rainfall and limited visibility due to clouds. This lasted from the last part of November to the middle of December. From the middle of December to the last part of that month the weather was clear with a high in the mid 70's. During the first part of January the weather was extremely cloudy and limited visibility.

7. Mission. To direct and coordinate all missions for the security of Camp Evans and its ancillary facilities and conduct extensive ambushes, OP's, LP's and patrols within 5000 meters of Camp Evans and Company size Search and Destroy Operations throughout the assigned AO.

8. Concept of Operation. One Company (Rein) maintained perimeter security for Camp Evans. One Company (-) outposted Hill #51 and conducted activities out to 5000 meters of their Camp Evans perimeter. One platoon provided security for Hill #674 and the remainder of the Battalion conducted continuous day and night search and destroy, interdiction, counter guerrilla and ambush activities.

9. Execution. During the period 21 November to 22 January 1968 the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was located at Camp Evans, RVN as the Resident Infantry Battalion. The mission of the Battalion was to provide for the security of Camp Evans and its ancillary facilities at PK-17 (YD652280), an ARVN Artillery Position; Hill #51 (YD549281), a Rifle Platoon (Rein) Strongpoint; and Hill #674 (YD516219) a Rifle Platoon (Rein) Strongpoint/Radio Relay Station. In addition to the defense of Camp Evans and its ancillary facilities, the Battalion was also required to place one Rifle Platoon (Rein) under operational control of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines as security for a "Rock Crusher" operated by the Seabees at Nam Hoa (YD744133). Company "B" came under operational control of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines on 24 November 1967. The Battalion was further required to provide available personnel for saturation patrolling and ambushes in known avenues of approach within 5000 meters of the Camp Evans perimeter.

From 22-24 November 1967 there was no significant occurrences within the 4th Marines AO. Units from the Battalion conducted routine daylight and night activities to include patrols, ambushes and listening posts in the Camp Evans vicinity.

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During this time the Battalion Command Group, the Battalion Rear, "H&S" Company, Company "A" and Company "C" were located within the Camp Evans perimeter. Company "B" was located at Nam Hoa (YD744133) under operational control of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines and Company "D" was occupying the three Platoon (Rein) Strongpoints at PK-17 (YD652280), Hill #51 (YD549281) and Hill #674 (YD516219).

On 25 November Company "A" was assigned the mission of denying access and cutting off lines of communications in the village of KOM BO DIEN, platoon and squad size patrols found numerous fighting holes, bunkers, and three M-26 grenades booby traps resulting in one WIA medevaced. Company "C" while on a infantry/tank patrol approximately 2000 meters south of Camp Evans sustained one minor WIA from a booby trapped 105mm round and had four wheels knocked off a tank.

On 26 November 1967 to 4 December 1967 there was no significant occurrences within the 4th Marines AO. Units from the Battalion conducted routine daylight and night time activities to include patrols, ambushes and listening posts in the Camp Evans vicinity.

On 5 December a daylight OP at YD513282 observed approximately fifteen VC at YD503277. The personnel of the OP took the VC under fire. A sweep of the area later revealed three VC KIA (Conf), and four VC KIA (Prob). Assorted equipment was found during the search of the area. The equipment was forwarded to the Battalion S-2.

On 6 December a Platoon (Rein) from Company "D" at Hill #51 (YD513282) received one Vietnamese male under the Chieu Hoi Program. The individual concerned turned himself in under a white flag. The Chieu-Hoi carried assorted equipment and wore green shorts and shirt. The equipment and Chieu Hoi were forwarded to the Battalion S-2.

At 1840H on 6 December Company "B" at Nam Hoa (YD744133) received approximately thirty-five rounds of enemy 82mm mortar fire. All the rounds landed within the Company's perimeter causing six WIA and eight KIA (one KIA was a Kit Carson Scout). Counter mortar fire was fired with 81mm mortars, with unobserved results.

The period 7-13 December 1967 was uneventful with no significant occurrences for the Battalion. During this period routine daylight and night activities to include patrols, ambushes, OP's and LP's were conducted by the Battalion.

On 14 December Company "B" (Rein) and Company "D" (Rein) switched AO's using motor vehicles and helicopter transportation. The new locations of the Companies placed Company "D" (Rein) at Nam Hoa (YD744133) under operational control of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines while Company "B" (Rein) occupied the three Platoon (Rein) strongpoints at PK-17 (YD652280), Hill #51 (549281) and Hill #674 (YD516219).

During the period 16-17 December 1967 the Battalion employed routine daylight and night activities to include patrols, ambushes, OP's and LP's. There were no significant occurrences within the 4th Marines AO.

On 18 December 1968 Company "C" moved to the vicinity of YD485415 to establish a blocking position in connection with a joint Marine/ARVN Airborne Operation in the area of the "Street Without Joy".

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Company "C" departed Camp Evans on 18 December and moved via motorized march to the vicinity of YD460400 where they disembarked from vehicles and set out by foot on the north side of the Thoc Ma River. At the same time two "Boston Whaler" type boats with outboard motors moved up the Thoc Ma River, abreast of Company "C". In the vicinity of YD473417, Company "C" using their boats crossed the river to their assigned blocking position in the vicinity of YD485415.

At 1745H on 18 December Company "C" received two rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an enemy position at YD482423. Due to the proximity of the enemy position M-79 grenade launchers were used to counter the enemy fires. At 2245H on 18 December a squad (Rein) ambush from Company "C" made contact with four VC in the vicinity of YD477422. Upon springing their ambush, the squad (Rein) began receiving automatic weapons fire from four different enemy positions around the ambush site. The squad (Rein) broke contact with the enemy and returned to the Companies perimeter. The result of the action resulted in one VC (Prob).

On 19 December 1967 Company "C" detonated a surprise explosive device while entering a gate into a small hamlet at YD477427. The resulting explosion caused one USMC casualty who was medevaced. At 2019H on 19 December Company "C" received approximately three rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an enemy position at YD480430. The incoming rounds caused three USMC casualties, all minor. Counter mortar fire was shot with artillery.

On 20 December Company "C" departed its position in conjunction with the completion of the operation. As the Company was crossing the Thoc Ma River at YD473417, one boat began taking water and capsized. All personnel made it safely to the shore but considerable equipment was lost. The boat was uprighted and brought to shore. At this time, the second boat was dispatched to pick up a Recon/Scuba Team at the My Chanh Bridge where the Thoc Ma River meets National Highway #1. When the divers returned to the area, security was set up on both sides of the river and the lost equipment was recovered. Just as the divers had recovered the last of the equipment, they began receiving heavy automatic weapons fire. The security forces returned fire and reported observing two VC fall resulting in two VC KIA (Prob). A squad was dispatched to search the enemy firing positions but again, automatic weapons fire began, prohibiting the searchforce from completing their mission. As the firing ceased, the remainder of Company "C" the Scuba Team, the retrieved equipment and the boats began their movement southwest to reach National Highway #1. In the vicinity of Ap Phouc Phu, the Company again was taken under heavy automatic weapons fire. The Company immediately returned fire under the enemy broke contact. The contact resulted in six VC KIA (Conf). The remainder of the Company "C"'s movement returned to Camp Evans via motorized march. The remainder of the Battalion reported no significant occurrences during the period 18-20 December 1967.

The period 21-22 December 1967 showed the 4th Marines AO to be quiet with no significant occurrences. Routine daylight and night activities to include patrols, ambushes, LP's and CP's were conducted by the Battalion.

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On 23 December in the vicinity of YD582298 a Platoon (Rein) patrol from Company "A" received approximately forty-two rounds of friendly artillery fire on their defensive perimeter. The Platoon (Rein) was set for the night when the rounds, with no prior warning began falling near their perimeter. The incident resulted in two USMC casualties, both of which were evacuated by helicopter on 24 December 1967.

On 24 December a large artillery mission was fired on VC in the open in the vicinity of YD525246. On 25 December Company "C" was helilifted to the above coordinates to conduct a search of the area in hopes of finding evidence of enemy activity in the area. The searched disclosed no evidence of enemy activity in the area and Company "C" returned to Camp Evans late in the afternoon on 25 December 1967.

On 26 December Company "A" was helilifted into a landing zone at YD515424 in the vicinity of the "Street Without Joy". Their mission was to occupy a blocking position at YD508442 in conjunction with an amphibious operation being conducted by the SLF. Upon occupying the landing zone, suspected enemy movement was observed in the area. Search of a swamp adjacent to the landing zone resulted in the capture of one VC (Conf). As the Company swept north from the landing zone to the blocking position, steady enemy resistance in the form of sniper fire developed into small fire fights but the enemy consistantly broke contact to avoid a full scale engagement. At nightfall Company "A" assumed their defensive position at YD508442.

On 27 December Company "A" conducted a Search and Destroy Operation in the vicinity of their blocking position. Enemy sniper fire was encountered throughout the day but major fire fights failed to develop. The search of numerous hamlets in the area turned up many bunkers and fighting holes, some of which required the use of demolition to destroy. At nightfall Company "A" returned to its blocking position in the vicinity of YD508442.

On 28 December Company "A" continued its Search and Destroy Operation in the vicinity of their blocking position. Platoons (Rein) were employed as blocking and sweeping forces as the area was systemically searched. Once again, numerous bunkers and fighting holes were found throughout the hamlets in the area. Enemy sniper fire continued during the day. An air observer on station assisted the ground forces in locating an enemy position at YD334440. Fixed wing air strikes and artillery were fired at the enemy position. Late in the afternoon on 28 December 1967 Company "D" 1st Battalion, 1st Marines came under operational control of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and was helilifted into the vicinity of YD520450 to reinforce Company "A". The evening of 28 December found Company "A" and Company "D" occupying defensive positions in the vicinity of the original blocking position. Company "A" received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire within their defensive position during the night. Counter battery was fired.

On 29 December both Companies held their blocking positions and conducted squad (Rein) and Platoon (Rein) patrols in the area.

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On 30 December in conjunction with their return to Camp Evans Company "D" established a blocking position at YD510430 while Company "A", located at YD513449 swept southeast into the blocking position. Heavy sniper fire was encountered, developing into several fire fights. The enemy also employed 60mm mortars against both Companies. At 1100H on 30 December an armored convoy of seven Otters and fourteen Armored Personnel Carriers left Camp Evans to rendezvous with the two Companies. Since time was of the essence the Armored convoy moved to YD513424 to expedite the movement of the two Companies and at the same time support them if necessary. At approximately 1400H Company "A" passed through Company "D"'s blocking position, was loaded and dispatched to Camp Evans. Company "D" then withdrew from their blocking position in trace of the vehicles, and established a strongpoint at YD538408 to await the return of the Armored vehicles. At 1630H the armored vehicles after shuttling Company "A" to Camp Evans, returned to the strongpoint picked up Company "D" and returned to Camp Evans.

The entire operation from 26-31 December resulted in fourteen VC KIA (Conf), seventeen VC-KIA (Prob) and one POW. Friendly casualties amounted to three KIA of which one was a Kit Carson Scout and twenty WIA. The remainder of the Battalion conducted routine daylight and night activities during the period 26-31 December 1967.

On 22 January 1968, the Battalion was moved from the Camp Evans area to the Khe Sanh Combat Base, its mission was to establish, occupy and defend a defensive strongpoint northwest of the Khe Sanh Combat Base perimeter (XD831417).

On 1 January 1968, Company "D" was returned to Camp Evans and came under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. The Company had previously been located at Nam Hoa (YD744133), the site of a "Rock Crusher" operated by the Seabees. On 2 January 1968 there was no significant occurrences within the 4th Marines AO. Routine daylight and night activities, to include patrols, ambushes, LP's and OP's were conducted in the vicinity of Camp Evans.

On 2 January 1968 personnel from the 3d Platoon, Company "B" located at Hill #51 (YD549281) observed two Marines approaching the hill from the south. The two Marines turned out to be the only survivors from Division Reconnaissance Team "Tarzan", which had made contact with the enemy the previous day. Six of the eight man team had been killed by the enemy. The two survivors of the Reconnaissance Team were picked up by helicopters at Hill #51 and returned to their parent unit.

On 4 January 1968, Company "D" while operating in the vicinity of YD488275 was assigned the mission of retrieving the bodies of the members of Division Reconnaissance Team "Tarzan", killed in action on 2 January 1968. At 1140H on 4 January 1968, the 2d and 3d Platoon of Company "D" reinforced with an Engineer Team and a Forward Air Control Team loaded on four CH-46 Helicopters and began Operation Tarzan. The two platoons were flown to the vicinity of Reconnaissance Team's last known position and one platoon landed in a landing zone at YD558230; while the other remained in reserve. The platoon moved approximately 150 meters to the south, finding the objective area, the six bodies and various equipment.

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The bodies and equipment and the two Platoons of Company "D" were then helilifted from the objective area with the two Platoons returning via helicopter to its Company operating base at YD488275 while the other helicopters with the bodies and equipment returned to higher headquarters. Following the completion of Operation Tarzan, Company "D" (Rein) continued on its assigned mission in the vicinity of YD488275. At 1325H on 4 January 1968, a platoon size patrol from Company "C" (Rein), received one WIA from a surprise explosive device. The incident occurred in the vicinity of YD497323, the man was medevaced. On 5 January 1968 there were no significant occurrences in the 4th Marines AO. The Battalion conducted routine daylight and night activities in the Camp Evans vicinity.

At 1200H on 6 January 1968, a composite platoon from "H&S" Company was used to detain a group of Vietnamese personnel lingering near the Camp Evans perimeter. Two of the squads were helilifted behind the Vietnamese personnel and swept east driving the Vietnamese into a 3d squad serving as a blocking force. Twenty Vietnamese were detained and later released as innocent civilians.

At 1130H on 7 January 1968, a platoon size patrol from Company "B" received sniper fire from the vicinity of YD575269. A Scout Sniper Team attached to the platoon brought the sniper under fire resulting in one VC KIA (Conf). At 1140H on 7 January the same platoon from Company "B" received one WIA as a result of a surprise explosive device. The wounded Marine was medevaced.

At 1620H on 7 January 1968, Company "D" returned to Camp Evans following the completion of its Search and Destroy mission in the vicinity of YD488275. A platoon size ambush from Company "B" was triggered at 2145H on 7 January 1968. The contact resulted in one NVA KIA (Conf). A French submachinegun and other assorted gear was captured and forwarded to the Battalion S-2.

During the early morning hours of 8 January 1968, a platoon size ambush from Company "B" called an artillery mission on suspected enemy movement at YD584294. The area was checked at first light with negative results.

At 1140H on 8 January 1968, Company "A" (Rein) departed Camp Evans to conduct a Search and Destroy Operation in the vicinity of YD595270. Later that same afternoon, Company "A" (Rein) observed five VC in the vicinity of YD583274. A Scout/Sniper Team attached to Company "A" (Rein) brought the VC under fire resulting in one VC KIA (Conf). One U. S. M-1 carbine was captured and forwarded to the Battalion S-2.

At 2145H on 8 January 1968, a squad size ambush from Company "A" accounted for five VC KIA (Conf) when they triggered their ambush at YD593294. A search of the area found six ID Cards, documents and two (two hundred and fifty) pound bombs. The VC were transporting the bombs for use as surprise explosive devices on Route #1 in the vicinity of Camp Evans.

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On 9 January 1968, Company "A" (Rein) received two WIA's from a surprise explosive device at YD594266. Both injuries were minor.

At 0515H on 10 January 1968, a Platoon (Rein) size ambush from Company "C" opened fire on one VC in a sampan on the O Lau River in the vicinity of YD512339. The sampan was sunk and one VC KIA (Conf) was recorded. At 1200H Company "A" (Rein) received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire from the vicinity of YD593263. An artillery mission was fired and the enemy fire ceased. At 1500H the 2d Platoon of Company "A" engaged four to five VC at YD604268. The enemy were on the south side of the O Ho River prohibiting the platoon from closing with them. Six hundred pounds of rice was discovered and destroyed by Company "A" at YD598267. At 2120H a squad size ambush from Company "B" opened fire on suspected enemy movement at YD493321. A search of the area at first light revealed negative results. In the vicinity of YD515337, a squad size ambush from Company "C" fired on suspected enemy troops, the ambush site was checked immediately with negative results.

On 11 January 1968, a Platoon from Company "C" received three rounds of 60mm mortars within their platoon patrol base at YD527336. No fix was obtained on the enemy firing position. At 1406H Company "A" completed its Search and Destroy Operation and returned to Camp Evans. The remainder of the 4th Marines AO was quiet on 11 January.

On 12 January 1968, Company "B" departed Camp Evans on a Search and Destroy Mission in the vicinity of YD490320. Once again, the 4th Marine Regiment AO was quiet with no significant occurrences. The Battalion employed its routine daylight and night activities.

On 13 January 1968, Company "B" sighted four VC at YD487325. A Scout Sniper Team took the VC under fire and observed one VC fall. Area was checked out resulting in one VC KIA (Confirmed). At 1045H on 13 January Company "B" reported one WIA from a surprise explosive device placed on a trail. While waiting for the medevac helicopter to evacuate the casualty, the company received sporadic sniper fire. During the sniper fire, another Marine was wounded when he broke his shoulder while seeking cover. Both casualties were then medevaced. The remainder of the 4th Marines AO was quiet for the day.

Activity in the 4th Marines AO on 14 January was very light. A platoon from Company "D" observed three VC in the vicinity of YD577307. The platoon opened fire and observed one VC fall. The contact resulted in the capture of one US M-1 carbine and one VC KIA (Conf).

At 1045H on 15 January, one Marine from Company "D" (-) stepped on a surprise explosive device at YD556303 causing one WIA. The casualty was medevaced. A platoon from Company "D" apprehended two VC suspects while sweeping a small hamlet. The VC suspects were forwarded to Phong Dien District Headquarters where they were found to be on the local list of VC in the area. The two suspects were turned over to ITT Personnel. The same platoon from Company "D" later apprehended another Viet Cong suspect in the vicinity of YD566310. The suspect was forwarded to the Regimental S-2 for questioning. At 1850H a squad size ambush from Company "B" received one Marine WIA from a surprise explosive device. The squad was enroute to its ambush site when the incident occurred. The casualty was medevaced.

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A squad size patrol from Company "C" observed and took under fire three VC at YD532290, the incident occurred on 16 January. The area was later checked with negative results. A platoon size patrol from Company "D" apprehended one VC suspect at YD558252. The suspect was forwarded to the Regimental S-2 for questioning. A group of VC were spotted by a platoon size patrol from Company "D" at YD556257, the distance between the Marines and the Viet Cong was too great for small arms so an artillery mission was fired on the enemy. A check of the area revealed blood on the ground. Partially built bunkers were also found in the area. At 1330H on 16 January 1968, Company "B" while on a Search and Destroy Operation, received one Marine KIA and one Kit Carson Scout WIA. The casualties were caused by a surprise explosive device. The Kit Carson Scout and the Marine KIA were later medevaced.

There were no significant occurrences in the 4th Marines AO on the 17 January 1968. The Battalion employed its routine daylight and night activities in the Camp Evans area.

On 18 January 1968, a platoon ambush from Company "C" located at YD556250 spotted eleven VC in the vicinity of YD551250. The platoon began moving towards the enemy but was taken under fire by another enemy unit in the area. The platoon assumed a defensive position and called artillery on the enemy position. The enemy then broke contact and moved out of the area. A sweep of the area revealed fresh blood tracks and two straw hats. The remainder of the 4th Marines AO was quiet on the 18th.

On 19 January, Company "D" received one USMC WIA as a result of sniper fire. The company was moving west in the vicinity of YD600288 when a sniper took them under fire. The company returned fire with small arms but failed to get the sniper. The wounded Marine was medevaced. At 1400H on 19 January 1968, a squad size patrol from Company "C" observed enemy movement on a road in the vicinity of YD556240. The squad contacted the Company Commander at Hill #51 (YD549281) and two more squads were sent out to the area of the siting. When the two squads reached the area; they deployed on line and made contact with the enemy. A fire fight developed during which a AO Spotter Plane arrived in the area. The AO controlled an artillery mission on the enemy position. Following the artillery mission the two squads swept the area and another fire fight developed. Finally, the enemy broke contact and moved south into the mountains. The fire fight resulted in six NVA KIA (Conf) and the capture of assorted enemy equipment including one AK-47 rifle. The captured equipment was forwarded to the Regimental S-2.

At 0755H on 20 January 1968, a platoon size ambush from Company "D" received approximately twenty rounds of automatic weapons fire at YD598286. The ambush observed three VC running and pursued them. The ambush fired on the VC resulting in one VC KIA (Conf). A female Viet-Nameese was also captured and detained as a VCS. The VCS was forwarded to the Phong Dien District Headquarters for interrogation.

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At 1900H on 20 January 1968, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines Chopped operational control of the 4th Marines and came under the operational control of the 1st Marines.

At 1145H on 20 January 1968, Company "D" captured one North Vietnamese Regular Army Sergeant and two VC POW at YD610271. The POW's had various equipment which was forwarded to Regimental S-2. The POW's were forwarded to 1st ITT Team at Camp Evans. At 1810H on 20 January Company "D" received approximately 100 rounds of sniper fire and four RPG's into their positions in the vicinity of YD605265. The Company returned fire with small arms, grenade launchers and 60mm mortar rounds. Action resulted in one USMC WIA and one VC KIA (Conf). The Marine WIA was medevaced.

On 21 January one Marine personnel was injured by a surprise explosive device at YD519296. The wounded Marine was medevaced. The remainder of the 1st Marines AO was quiet with the Battalion employing its routine daylight and night activities to include patrols, ambush and listening post within the Camp Evans area.

At 0820H on 20 January a squad size ambush from Company "D" received approximately ten rounds of sniper fire at YD600285. The squad returned fire and wounded one VC sniper in the leg. The VC attempted to escape but was finally captured after the squad had followed his track of blood from the wound. The VC later died due to loss of blood all available effort was made to keep the VC alive. At 1010H on 22 January one Marine from Company "D" activated a surprise explosive device at YD601282. Three friendly casualties were sustained, of which one was a Kit Carson Scout. All the casualties were medevaced. At approximately 1200H on 22 January 1968, the Battalion was ordered to prepare for an immediate displacement to Khe Sanh Combat Base at XD849417. Company "D" returned from a Search and Clear Operation via helicopter to Camp Evans and placed on standby awaiting helicopter transportation to the Khe Sanh Combat Base. At 1420H 22 January 1968, the helilift of the Battalion to Khe Sanh began. Company "D", Company "A", Company "B" and the Battalion Forward Command Group were then helilifted to Khe Sanh.

At 1900H on 22 January 1968 the 1st Marines relinquished operational control of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and so ended Operation Meosho for this Battalion.

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10. Results. During the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines participation in Operation Neosho the below listed casualties were listed:

a. Casualties Sustained.

USMC KIA: 5
 USMC WIA: 44
 USMC MIA: 0

b. Casualties Inflicted:

VC/NVA KIA	(Conf)	34
VC/NVA KIA	(Prob)	26
VC/NVA POW	(WIA)	10

c. Captured Materials. All materials and weapons found during this operation were turned over to the Regimental S-2. No foodstuffs or medicine of U. S. origin were captured from the enemy.

11. Administrations.

a. Supply. Throughout this operation period prime consideration was given to maintaining a twenty day supply of Class I, II, III & V on Hills #51 (YD549281) and Hill #674 (YD516219). When feasible resupply was accomplished by vehicles, but normally entailed the use of helicopters. No major logistical problems were encountered during this operation. In general, effective support of Battalion activities was achieved in regards to Class II and IV material.

b. Maintenance. The maintenance situation during this reporting period was excellent for 3d and 4th echelon repair of ordnance and motor transport equipment. The "Down Time" for combat essential equipment was reduced when maintenance facilities at FLSG-A was utilized.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization. The medical care was quite variable due to the different situations. The care on patrols was handled by corpsmen and consisted of symptomatic treatment of everyday complaints and battle casualties. Problems they couldn't handle and casualties were medevaced to Dong Ha or Phu Bai for further evaluation. Minor problems were handled at the BAS at Camp Evans. Medevacs as a whole were considered very good.

d. Transportation. During Operation Neosho organic motor transportation was primarily engaged in household, administrative and resupply runs for the Battalion. Due to the location of our Companies logistical support was provided by M274A2 mechanical mules.

The motor transport situation has improved slightly in the case of M422A1 during this Operation.

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The lack of M422A1 is still serious (eight out of a T/E of twenty), but the 3d and 4th echelon service organization are showing complete cooperation in the rapid repair/replacement of these vehicles.

e. Communications. Radio communications for Operation Neosho was reliable, although some shortages existed due to previous high combat losses of the AN/PRC-25. Wire communication was used extensively in order to supplement radio communication.

f. Medical Evaluation. There were many problems with immersion foot, abrasion foot and cellulitis. The silicone ointment was helpful when it was available. Corpsmen checked feet either daily or every other day. A lack of electricity during this Operation made refrigeration impossible and therefore many shots were not available. Several cases of carbon monoxide occurred secondary to riding in Otters. Rashes were prevalent and felt by some to be accentuated by the rain suits.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. Prior to and during the first weeks of Operation Neosho the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines discovered three individual reaction techniques of significant value in reducing casualties. The first was the "Quick Fire" techniques described in the 3d Marine Division publication under the title "Quick Fire Report". The second technique is to simply lay flat on the ground when under mortar attack so that only a direct or nearly direct hit will cause a casualty with emphasis placed on early warning through recognition of the sound of a mortar firing. And thirdly, the surprise explosive devices in the Neosho area were found to be predominantly of a delay fuse variety. The Battalion found that the individual tripping such a device could run out of the casualty radius of most of these devices, if there was no significant delay in reacting. This was done in the field on several occasions during Operation Neosho. Hence, these three reaction techniques were taught in a "Jungle Trail" walk-through course constructed by the Battalion which employed booby traps made of M-26 grenade fuzes, surprise small arms targets and live mortar fire impacting about 300 meters from the trainees. This "Jungle Trail" training was made part of the Battalion's indoctrination and retraining program. During the Battalion's first weeks in Operation Neosho it was also found that large sweeps were of little value in operations against the VC. The only result of these sweeps was to subject friendly personnel to constant sniper fire and surprise explosive devices. In lieu of sweeps, the Battalion employed a technique which had not been employed in recent months in the Camp Evans area. Platoon and squad size units were dispatched at night to ambush sites which they occupied that night and the following day. On the second night they would move to another position and repeat the process, and so forth for periods up to four days. This technique reduced friendly casualties, increased the number of enemy contacts and kills, permitted better coverage of the AO, neutralized enemy resupply routes, shifted the initiative to the friendly units and allowed small units to operate successfully in the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley where larger units had operated in the past with little significant ground contact.

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13. Commanders Analysis

a. In order to close with the enemy, intradict his ability to resupply food, equipment and personnel from mountain base camps to the coastal areas, it was necessary to design friendly unit into smaller groups. This allowed speed of movement, better control, as well as coverage over a larger enemy area simultaneously with the Battalion, required defense of Camp Evans.

b. Since this Battalion had come from the DMZ and conventional type warfare, it was paramount that small unit training must be accomplished concurrently with our assigned combat mission. Since the immediate area was heavily laden with surprise explosive devices, this mission was two fold; find them and dispose of them, prevent the enemy from emplacing them on likely avenues of approach, roads and trails. Special concurrent training was instigated involving live fire, discovery of delay fuze explosive devices in time to react, jungle trail training, as well as live firing of all organic Battalion weapons.

c. Since the VC will not heavily engage friendlies with it being of his "Own time of choosing" it was discovered that large sweeps of Company size or larger was ineffective as it was impossible to fix the enemy, the ratio of friendly/enemy kills was not acceptable. Therefore, all daylight movement was kept to an absolute minimum. Patrol bases, ambush sites and potential enemy assembly areas were approached after the hours of darkness. Thereby establishing fixed positions by which to draw the enemy to us. In addition by constantly moving from day to day, the enemy was unable to fix our positions and negated to a degree his freedom of movement. In effect, we were able to turn the tables so to speak, in using his tactics. An additional obvious effort, was the maximum use and economy of forces as well as a larger AO coverage.

d. To establish the above techniques was not without its "Trial and Error" process and necessary individual skills and stealth in night training for all Battalion personnel. After learning and becoming familiar with our AO, weather, terrain, peculiarities of the enemy in this area, we were able to basically take the initiative away from the enemy. Then the current exigencies required the movement of this Battalion to another area of operation. It will require a relieving unit sometime to again establish a firm control and knowledge of this area of operation regardless of techniques of operation so utilized.

14. Recommendation.

a. The Camp Evans area was found to be interlace with waterways both chartered and unchartered varying from seasonal flood lands to swift rivers. In many instances this Battalion's patrols were either unable to cross waterways or were channalized over man-made crossings,

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the safety, amount and the value of the Marine's equipment makes swimming an unacceptable means of constant navigation. Also clandestine riverine operations are felt to be necessary in completely neutralizing enemy supply routes. Therefore, it is recommended that infantry units, especially those operating in lowland areas have eight to ten man rubber rafts available to them for the conduct of normal operations.

b. During Neosho the Battalion also found that helicopter resupply missions had to be aborted for many days at a time because of inclement weather. Thus it is recommended that a twenty day supply of Classes I, II, III and V be established and maintained at all semi-permanent, isolated positions, observation posts or strongpoints.

c. The Battalion also found live fire training to be feasible and extremely valuable in a guerrilla/counterguerrilla situation such as the Camp Evans area. Such training should include marksmanship, quick-fire training, a walk through reaction range, and fire and maneuver. All organic weapons should be included whenever possible and training should include both counterguerrilla and conventional tactics.

d. When the fortunes of war will allow it is highly advisable/désirable to have military units remain in the same AO's to capitalize on the knowledge techniques, weather and terrain and from the specific "Lessons Learned". It is felt that if this Battalion had remained in the Camp Evans area for an indefinite period, more results would have been accomplished.

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