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HEADQUARTERS
 3d Battalion, 9th Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LCJ/elc
 005750
 1 August 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology 1-31 July 1966
 (2) S-2 Journal
 (3) S-3 Journal
 (4) Lessons Learned dtd 1 August 1966
 (5) FragO 37-66
 (6) FragO 38-66
 (7) FragO 39-66
 (8) FragO 40-66
 (9) FragO 41-66
 (10) FragO 42-66
 (11) FragO 43-66
 (12) FragO 44-66
 (13) FragO 45-66
 (14) FragO 46-66
 (15) FragO 47-66
 (16) FragO 48-66
 (17) FragO 49-66
 (18) FragO 50-66
 (19) FragO 51-66
 (20) FragO 52-66

*Handling
(WIF)*

✓ADDED TAB-A: A/A Report, Operation MACON, 4-14 Jul 1966
 1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures (1) through (20)
 are submitted.

F.D. MACLEAN, JR.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY, 1-31 JULY 1966

1. Organization Data:a. Designation Location:

- (1) 3d Battalion, 9th Marines
- (2) 1-31 July occupied Battalion CP vic (AT 875473) (Ah Hoa)

b. Period Covered: 1-31 July 1966c. Commanding Officer, (Staff and Principal Subordinates):

- (1) Commanding Officer -- 1-31 July Major G.H. GRIMES
- (2) Executive Officer -- 1-31 July Major W.D. HUBBARD
- (3) S-3 -- 1-27 July Capt. R.P. BROOKS
28-31 July Capt. G.E. YARBROUGH
- (4) S-2 -- 1-31 July 1st Lt. J.E. BAZIS
- (5) S-4 -- 1-31 July 1st Lt. T.H. FITZPATRICK
- (6) S-1 -- 1-31 July 1st Lt. H.T. MACKIN
- (7) Co. Cmdr., Co. "I" -- 1-31 July 1st Lt. T.A. MC GOWAN
- (8) Co. Cmdr., Co. "K" -- 1-4 July Capt. V.V. PAVLOVSKIS
6-31 July 1st Lt. R.F. STALEY
- (9) Co. Cmdr., Co. "L" -- 1-31 July Capt. C.J. PYLE
- (10) Co. Cmdr., Co. "M" -- 1-31 July Capt. J.C. COOPER
- (11) Co. Cmdr., I&S Co. -- 1-27 July 1st Lt. J.A. RANK III
28-31 July 1st Lt. T.H. FITZPATRICK

d. Average Monthly Strength:

- | | |
|---------------------|-----|
| (1) Marine Officers | 30 |
| (2) Marine Enlisted | 925 |
| (3) Navy Officers | 3 |
| (4) Navy Enlisted | 56 |

2. Significant Events:a. Personnel

- | | | |
|---------------------------|-----|-----------------|
| (1) Wounded in Action | 109 | (Med Evac., 56) |
| (2) Killed in Action | 12 | |
| (3) Died of Wounds | 1 | |
| (4) Non Battle Casualties | 8 | |
| (5) Non Battle Deaths | 0 | |

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b. Intelligence(1) Situation:

(a) Enemy activity during the month of July was highlighted by a general increase in enemy contact and sightings. On 4 July, contact was made with an estimated two companies from a main force battalion believed to be operating in the area. In mid July a series of sightings of VC in grey and green uniforms were noted. The Duc Duc District headquarters located (AT 867477) was mortared on 15 July. Sniper and harrassing fire type incidents were prevalent with some enemy harrassment occuring every day, however, mining and booby trap activity has decreased significantly. An unusual number of intelligence reports were also received during July. Reports from local sources generally indicated the proximity of three battalion sized units, one or more of which was reported to be a North Vietnamese regular unit. Intelligence reports continually indicated an attempt would be made to mortar USMC units in and around the An Hoa area.

(b) Recon sightings in the mountains to the south of An Hoa were highlighted by an observed massing of approximately 300 VC, 11 kilometers southeast of An Hoa (AT 986496). VC activity in the moutains continues at a moderate rate. The majority of sightings being groups of 2 to 8 men with packs and weapons.

(2) Enemy Losses:(a) Personnel:

(1) VC KIA (CONF)	179
(2) VC KIA (PROB)	385
(3) VC WIA (PROB)	156
(4) VCS	61
(5) VCC	6

(b) Destroyed Enemy Material:

(1) Trenchline	2918 meters
(2) Covered trenchline	300 meters

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- (3) 2 U.S. M-1 Rifles
 (4) 1 K-50 MG.

c. Training: Training during this period was directed toward maintaining a high degree of proficiency in combat skills. Special training was conducted for all replacement personnel prior to assignments to company units. Ref: 3d Battalion, 9th Marines msg 230910Z.

d. Communication/Electronics: During the month of July, the communications platoon provided communications for operations within the An Hoa TAOR. Supported joint USMC/ARVN operations by providing radios and operators to support U.S. Army advisors to the 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment.

Close Combat:

1-3 July: During this period the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines engaged in search and clear operations designed to gain control of an LOC from An Hoa to the south bank of the Song Thu Bon in GS (AT 92-53).

Operation Macon:

4 July: Phase I of Operation Macon began at 041500H when Co. "K" conducting search and clear operations in GS (AT 91-50) with LVTP-5 leading the company was ambushed in the vic (AT 914507), two amtracs were disabled by direct hits from RPG-2. An AO reported sighting 250-300 armed VC in the vic of (AT 904512). Co. "K" came under heavy fire from 60MM mortars and numerous small arms both automatic and semiautomatic, including a 50cal. MG. At about 1720 Co. "I" approached the battle area from the southwest to support Co. "K". Both companies had continued contact with the enemy during the night of 4 July. On 5 July this command received 9th Marines Fragu (186-66) directing the initiation of Operation Macon. On 5 July Phase I of the operation continued with 3d Battalion, 9th Marines attacking with three companies abreast from an LOD generally formed along a line described by coordinates (AT 903518) (AT 907504), and (AT 910497) in a northeasterly direction.

Phase II: Phase II of Operation Macon commenced with the insertion of friendly blocking positions generally along the railroad bed to the south and east and along the north bank of the

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Song Thu Bon, and Song Ky Lam. During this phase 3d Battalion, 9th Marines continued the attack in a northeasterly and easterly direction until establishing contact with 1st Battalion, 3d Marines at 101515H in the vicinity of (AT 000535). thus termination of Phase II. Phase II was characterized by light contact with the enemy.

Phase III: Phase III of Macon was initiated on 11 July and consisted of search and destroy operations in the vic of (GS 9852,9853,9753,9754,9654,9554 and 9453).

11 through 31 July: Operation Macon has continued as a search and clear operation in the area of the proposed road from An Hoa operating base to the Song Thu Bon including providing the security for Vietnamese workman engaged in the construction of the road.

f. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination:

(1) During the month of July, Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, fired in excess of 150 missions, approximately one third of those were in support of Reconnaissance OP. Artillery killed 34 VC by body count and another 188 probable.

(2) On the night of 6 July, Battery F, expended 1500rds. of ammunition in one continuous fire mission.

(3) Artillery was employed on one mission during July to clear a suspected mine field, resulting in several secondary explosions. The unit being supported then moved through the area without any mine casualties.

(4) The time necessary to process an average a fire mission was four minutes which is not satisfactory. When control extends beyond the battalion and the respective supporting batteries, the time necessary to process a mission increases greatly. Therefore, it is highly desirable that control of supporting arms remain with the lowest echelon of command possible.

g. Medical and Dental Support:

(1) The battalion aid station treated 93 casualties during Operation Macon. There was no lack of material needed for medical support and the functioning of the battalion aid station was satisfactory.

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(2) There were 562 visits to the sick bay during July. (537 Marines, 12 Navy, and 3 Army). Light duty was given to 27 personnel and no duty to 9. There were 19 patients admitted to the ward. 28 men were medically evacuated not as a result of hostile action.

(3) The Med Cap program for the month was curtailed due to operational commitments of battalion aid personnel. However, a total of 1,640 civilians were treated.

(4) Approximately 500 immunizations were given this month.

(5) The dental detachment treated 249 Marine patients and performed 723 procedures. During this same period, 30 Vietnamese were treated for a total of 44 procedures.

h. Chaplain Support:

(1) Divine Services:

(a) Protestant:

1. No. Services: 11
2. Total Attendance: 248

(b) Catholic:

1. No. Services: 9
2. Total Attendance: 189

(2) Memorial Services: 4

(3) Civil Affairs: The Battalion Chaplain accompanied a Mike Co. civil affairs patrol in My Loc hamlet at 281700.

(4) Significant Events:

(a) A chapel and Chaplain's office has been provided in one of the new tropical huts.

(b) The tactical situation now permits the Chaplain to resume holding divine worship services in the field.

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i. Civil Affairs:

(1) Public Health: Medical treatment was given to 410 women, 277 men and 619 children. 65 Vietnamese were medically evacuated. Surgical and diagnostic cases were accepted by BAS when referred by local medical personnel.

(2) Public Welfare: The following items were distributed to refugees and needy persons. 564 lbs. of food and several hundred cans of unopened C rations, 275 lbs. of clothing, 902 bars of soap, 171 boxes of candy and 2 textile kits.

(3) Food and Agriculture:

(a) The first Duc Duc District Farmers Seminar sponsored by 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was held 27 July. Officials from Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture, 29 C/A Co., and local officials attended this seminar. The farmers expressed a desire to form a cooperative for the purchase of fertilizer and other needed materials.

(b) It was agreed that the second Duc Duc District Farmers Seminar will be held 14 August 1966. During this seminar a team will be present to form the farmers into a cooperative. A representative from National Agriculture Credit Organization will be present to arrange credit for the cooperative.

(4) This command has provided security for civilian construction workers involved in building about 8 kilometers of road from coord. (AT 888465 to 931524), the road will serve as an MSR for civilian and military activity in the An Hoa area.

(5) Psychological Warfare:(a) Primary Themes:

1. Inevitability of VC defeat
2. USMC is in Vietnam to help GVN in its fight against the VC.

(b) Means of Dissemination:

1. Land Broadcast
2. Helo-Drops of 50,000 Leaflets
3. Manual Distribution 330 Magazines
4. Motion Pictures

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FVF
c/o WFO, San Francisco, California

3/GEY/alc
3100.1
4 August 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1B
(b) 3d Marine Division FragO 408-66
(c) 9th Marine fragO 189-66

Encl: (1) Artillery
(2) Air
(3) Armor
(4) Engineers

1. Code Name: Operation Macon, Search and Destroy
2. Dates of Operation: 041500H July - 140800H July 1966.
Operation continues in area outside of 3d Marine Division TACR.

3. Location: Quang Nam Province (Duy Xuyen and Duc Duc District)

4. Command HQ:
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
Maj. G.H. GRIMES

5. Task Organization:
Co. "A" Lt. MC GOWAN
Co. "K" Lt. STALEY
Co. "L" Capt. PYLE
Co. "M" Capt. COOPER
Amphibian Howitzer Plt. Capt. SCAPATI
Co. "B" (-) 3d Tk. Bn. Capt. TUNGE
3d Plt., Co. "L" 3d Ing. Bn. Lt. WALLS

6. Supporting Forces: (See enclosures 1 through 4).

7. Intelligence:
a. Enemy forces estimated to be in the objective area prior to commencement of the operation were one R-20 Bn. (-) and the Q-13 LF Company, with a combined strength of 500 men, plus an undetermined number of guerrillas in each of the hamlets.

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b. Other units considered to be within reinforcing distance of the area of operation were the V-25 Co., Q-14 IP Company, Q-15 LF Company and the H-33 LF Company, with a combined strength of 700 men, plus an undetermined number of local guerrillas.

c. Enemy courses of action were considered to be as follows:

(1) Conduct small scale attacks, ambushes and harrassing action with up to one battalion plus one company, augmented by local guerrillas.

(2) Defend with up to one battalion and one company augmented by local guerrillas.

(3) Reinforce the above units within the objective area with an additional battalion and three companies.

(4) Withdraw or exfiltrate out of the area of operation.

d. The enemy employed capability (1) and (4). Large concentrations of enemy were observed only twice during the operation (200-300 men, 4 July), (200 men on 7 July). On 14 July another estimated 300 enemy troops were observed massing in the mountains southeast of An Hoa outside of the area of operation. In the latter case it appeared that the enemy was intending to move north into the operating area.

e. Pre D-Day intelligence was timely and accurate. Requests for aerial photography were filled expeditiously. (Four days)

f. The area, particularly the hamlets, contained elaborate systems of trenches and fighting holes, along with miscellaneous tunnels.

g. Terrain Analysis:

(1) Critical Terrain: The critical terrain in the area of operations were the individual hamlets, the Ba Ren and Cay Khe Vinh Truong rivers.

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation in rice paddy areas was good. Numerous hamlets and dense vegetation restricted observation and reduced fields of fire. High grass, mulberry bushes, corn and cane fields hampered observation in the area between the Song Pa Ren and the Song Thu Bon/Song Ky Lam.

(3) Cover and Concealment: Cover and concealment was provided by tunnels, trenches, caves, grass huts, hedgerows and bamboo fences in the hamlets. Dikes offered limited cover and concealment in the rice paddies. Cemeteries consisting of large mounds along the Song Thu Bon/Song Ky Lam afforded good cover and concealment.

(4) Obstacles: Natural obstacles were limited to the rivers. Man made obstacles were the hamlets and bamboo fences. Large mounds in the cemeteries proved to be obstacles to LVT traffic.

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(5) Avenues of Approach: The avenues of approach were covered by fire, with many of them augmented with fighting holes and trenches.

(6) Helicopter Landing Zones: Most of the rice paddies in the area of operation were suitable for helicopter landing zones (paddies were dry). However, the close proximity to hamlets offered the continuous probability of sniper and/or harassing fire. Rice paddies in the vicinity of AF 957536 contained anti-helicopter plants tied together with barbed wire.

h. Captured Material, Weapons and Documents:

(1) Captured Material: Captured material included, rifle and hand grenades, 7.62 mm rounds, 5.71 mortar rounds, various enemy type mortars, gas less rockets and a considerable amount of medical supplies. (Ordinance items were destroyed).

(2) Captured Weapons: The only weapon that was captured was one walkie talkie.

(3) Captured Documents: Of the many documents that were recovered none revealed anything of immediate tactical value. All documents were forwarded to higher headquarters for further evaluation.

i. VC Tactics:

(1) The VC employed only harassing tactics with the exception of the action with Co. "K", on the 4 July, and the ineffective mortaring of the battalion command post on 12 July. During the mortar attack, an estimated 100 rds. of small arms were also fired.

(2) Mines and Booby Traps: There was limited use of mines and booby traps throughout the entire operation.

j. Intelligence Gained from Interrogation and Rallies:

(1) Of the 12 persons apprehended during Operation Macon, 39 were delivered to Lao Duc District Headquarters and 5 were forwarded to 3d Interrogation Translation Team, Da Nang for further interrogation. Most of the captives belonged to some VC association. (VC Farmers Assn., Old Men's Assn., etc.). The people claimed they did not belong to these associations by choice but were forced to join. This area was under complete VC domination prior to the operation and as long as the area is not permanently occupied by USMC or government forces, the VC will soon regain some degree of control.

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(5) Avenues of Approach: The avenues of approach were covered by mine, with many of them augmented with fighting holes and trenches.

(6) Helicopter Landing Zones: Most of the rice paddies in the area of operation were suitable for helicopter landing zones (paddies were dry). However, the close proximity to hamlets offered the continuous probability of sniper and/or harassing fire. Rice paddies in the vicinity of AF 937536 contained anti-helicopter pits and were strung together with barbed wire.

h. Captured Material, Weapons and Documents:

(1) Captured Material: Captured material included, rifle and hand grenades, 57mm mortar rounds, 60mm mortar rounds, various enemy type uniforms, gas masks, packs and a considerable amount of medical supplies. (Ordinance items were destroyed).

(2) Captured Weapons: The only weapon that was captured was one Walther pistol.

(3) Captured Documents: Of the many documents that were recovered none revealed anything of immediate tactical value. All documents were forwarded to higher headquarters for further evaluation.

i. VC Tactics:

(1) The VC employed only harassing tactics with the exception of the action with Co. "K", on the 4 July, and the ineffective mortaring of the battalion command post on 12 July. During the mortar attack, an estimated 100 rds. of small arms were also fired.

(2) Mines and Booby Traps: There was limited use of mines and booby traps throughout the entire operation.

j. Intelligence Gained from Interrogation and Rallies:

(1) Of the 24 persons apprehended during Operation Macon, 39 were delivered to Duc Duc District Headquarters and 5 were forwarded to 3d Interrogation Translation Team, Da Nang for further interrogation. Most of the captives belonged to some VC association. (VC Farmer's Assn., Old Man's Assn., etc.). The people claimed they did not belong to these associations by choice, but were forced to join. This area was under complete VC domination prior to the operation and as long as the area is not permanently occupied by USMC or government forces, the VC will soon regain some degree of control.

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Conclusion:

(1) There was a reinforced VC battalion in the area of operation prior to and on D-Day.

(2) The VC will, when possible, withdraw/exfiltrate from an area rather than face USMC units when they believe the time and place is not to their advantage. Small groups of guerillas will harass USMC forces to allow the VC the time to exfiltrate.

(3) There are still fortified areas within the area of operation as well as an undetermined number of guerillas.

(4) Main force VC units can and do reenter the area by infiltration anytime USMC units are not physically in the area.

8. Mission:

3d Battalion, 9th Marines acts as movement force in elimination operation conducted by 9th Marines to destroy enemy forces and influence in the objective area.

9. Concept of Operation:

Operation Mason was a three phase operation. Phase I commenced at about 041520 July when Co. "K" engaged enemy forces in GS (AT 9054). Phase II was initiated on 6 July with the insertion of two battalions (-) as blocking forces, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines in the foothills to the south (AT 937486-BT 003518). 1st Battalion, 3d Marines along the railroad bed on the east (BT 003518-AT 998546), and with elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, already in place, forming blocking positions along the northern bank of the Song Thu Bon. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines attacked northeast from the LOD which generally followed a line described by (AT 903518), (AT 907504), and (AT 910497), toward the railroad to the east. Phase II was terminated on order at the time that elements of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines made contact with 1st Battalion, 3d Marines in the vicinity of (AT 995530). Phase III consisted of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines conducting deliberate search and destroy operations from east to west through the operating area to the vicinity of that position of the proposed Liberty Road south of the Song Thu Bon and is being continued as a clear and hold operation in that area.

10. Execution:

4 July - At about 041520Z lead elements of Co. "K" in the vicinity of (AT 914504) were engaged by VC forces located at (AT 918510), (AT 918503) and (AT 910500). One LVTP-5 received

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hits from what was first believed to be a 57MM recoilless rifle, but later learned to be an RPG-2 resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 2 USMC WIA. Co."K" assumed the offensive, taking action to physically pursue the enemy, requesting artillery and air support. Co."I" directed to move from AT 889503 south to AT 892499 in order to approach the battle area from the northwest and relieve pressure on Co."K". Co."K" having, by this time received 8 KIA'S and 16 WIA'S. Between 1700 and 1730 Co."I" consolidated positions in the vicinity of (AT 900505 - AT 905505). At about 1800 an AO sighted 250-300 armed VC in the vicinity of (AT 904512) and directed an air strike resulting in 50 VC KIA (CONF) and 25 KIA (PROB). At 1805 Co."L" departed the An Hoa operating base for a position in the vicinity of (AT 924473) in preparation to enter the battle area on order. After dark Co."K" directed artillery missions on VC moving out of the battle area in the vicinity of (AT 914508) and (AT 914491). Routes of egress were saturated with mortar and artillery, and continuous illumination was provided by aircraft flares. Co."K" was returned to operational control of this battalion upon the completion of Helo-lift to the An Hoa operating base at 2100 and assumed defense of the base.

5 July - Phase I of the operation continued as a search and destroy operation with sporadic enemy contact through the day. On the morning of that day VC moving in the vicinities of Companies "I" and "J" were engaged with artillery and fixed wing aircraft. Received Regimental FragO (186-66) directing the commencement of Operation Macon.

6 July - At 061100H Co."I", "M" and "L" crossed the LOD and began an attack to the northeast. At about 1115 Co."L" in the vicinity of (AT 920511) received approximately 15rds. of 60MM mortar and observed 30 VC in the vicinity of (AT 927506), Co."L" directed artillery fire. Target coverage good. 2 VC KIA (CONF), 10 VC KIA (PROB), 12 VC WIA (PROB). 1900 Co."L" (AT 920512) observed 35-50 VC in the vicinity of (AT 939507), directed artillery mission, estimated 15 VC KIA (PROB) and 15 VC WIA (PROB).

7 July - Third platoon of Co."I" at (AT 914525) observed 150-200 VC in the vicinity of (AT 918528). An artillery mission of approximately 1500rds of 105MM and 155MM, WP and HE was fired. Fifty percent casualties was estimated. The area was searched at first light, three bodies were discovered, bloody stretchers, bits of bloody clothing and bloody bandages led to an estimation that the enemy sustained 50 KIA'S. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines assumed operational control of a platoon of tanks and a section of LVTP-6's and LVTP-5's, continued the attack within the ZOA.

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12. Administration:

a. Supply. Resupply to three forward companies and the forward CP was accomplished by helicopter on a daily basis. Logistic support was provided from PLSG by fixed wing aircraft (C-123), delivery to ANZAC in accordance with previously established procedures.

Communications:

(1) Communications were excellent throughout. PRC/25 radios insured continuous contact with battalion rear which monitored and control all radio traffic. This practice reduced paperwork by the forward CP. PRC/25 radio was available for back up but was utilized only once.

(2) Battalion Command Group utilized a LWP-C-1 from 8-11 July. A C-123 AS 390 UH-1A was replaced which enhanced air-ground communication via PRC/25.

(3) No frequency interference was experienced during major.

13. Commander's Analysis:

a. The reaction to the initial enemy contact of 4 July was outstanding. The reaction by 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines was timely and effective in that the enemy still remained in the target area. Participation by 2nd Battalion 51st ARVN Regiment was requested at noon on 6 July and shortly thereafter they occupied blocking positions on the south tying in with 3d Battalion, 3d Marines and Co. "M" 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Their location at that time and place filled a sizeable gap in the cordon.

b. It is accepted that a sizeable force broke through the sparsely cordoned area near (AT 9152) on 6-7 July. It is likely that the VC, in small groups, exfiltrated to the south where effective blocking by two companies was impossible. Heavy casualties were inflicted by a battery during their break out of 6-7 July. Reconnaissance artillery and air mission caused numerous casualties 7 July in the mountain assembly area.

c. Population and refugee control support was requested from 9th Marines. Prompt action by C/A officer produced the desired results when helicopter broadcasts directed civilians to a refugee control point near (AT 001). Thus 3d Battalion, 9th Marine units were not required to cope with large numbers of civilians.

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d. VC units can and will infiltrate back into areas recently searched and cleared. The VC continually harrass and snipe at USMC units from previously cleared areas. It is evident that unless a area is physically occupied, the VC will return or come out of their hiding places to continue their harrassing activities.

c. Although the results of Operation Macon were largely negative, the impact upon the VC can be considered damaging.

14. Recommendations:

a. Division units maintain continuous preparedness for committment as blocking forces in an area where sizeable VC elements have been detected.

b. Future operations in a cordoned area include, to the extent possible, a centralized refugee collection point where civilians are directed by airborne broadcasts.

c. Occupation by ARVN or US forces should follow operation to conduct pacification and psychological warfare operations and enhance CVN control of the area.

W.D. Hubbard
W.D. HUBBARD
By direction

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ARTILLERY

1. General: Artillery support was provided by the 105MM howitzer battery reinforced by two 155MM howitzers, located at An Hoa. Two batteries of 105's, one battery of 155 (SP) and a platoon of 8" howitzers supported the operation from hill 55. Artillery support during Operation Macon was excellent. There was a minimum of delay in obtaining clearance or with getting data to the guns. All requests for supporting fires were filled with speed and accuracy. Existing supply of Class V in the LSA dump at An Hoa was sufficient to support the operation throughout. Even when large volumes of artillery were delivered in a short time, as on the 4th and 6th of July, the ammo level never became critical.

2. II and I Fire: II and I fires were planned each night during the operation. When possible II and I's were fired from one of the reinforcing batteries to conserve the ammunition supply at An Hoa. All II and I fires were closely coordinated with the movement of friendly units.

3. Operations:

a. Forward Observers: Forward observers generally performed in an excellent manner; the most opportune targets were engaged during Phase I of the operation.

b. Net Discipline: There were several instances where FO's cut into the middle of a transmission occurring in the early stages of the operation, it is attributed to inexperience of new operators. Action taken by the FSCC precluded repetition beyond the third day.

c. Fuzes: Variety of fuzes were stressed for fire missions. Fuze delay, in particular, was employed when it was known the enemy was sheltered by trenches and fortifications.

d. Aerial Observation: Aerial observation was employed to provide surveillance of artillery missions. On occasions the AO could not observe as well as the ground observer. On 6 July, when Co. "I" engaged a VC company, the AO was requested to control the artillery. Though a flare ship was on station, the AO could not observe the target due to the heavy smoke from artillery impact. On occasions such as this, control best remained with the ground observer. However AO's were effectively employed in coordinating air strikes together with artillery. The use of the AO in controlling the air and artillery, allowed the maximum coordination of artillery and air support. Artillery

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ceased fire when air was prepared to make their strikes and resumed fire when the air strike was completed. The chain of communication between FDC, FSCC, air and ground observers, enhanced the effectiveness of the supporting arms.

4. FSCC:

a. On 9 July, the FSCC was split. There was a mobile FSCC with the forward command group. The PRC/9 used by the mobile FSCC, was inadequate. Reliable communications were established by a PRC/25 to all fire control units. The mobile FSCC became, in many instances the only link of communication between the observer and the FDC.

b. The problems occurred with a split FSCC, obtaining rapid clearance and immediate assignment of concentration numbers. Clearance was delayed for on call fires because three stations were clearing the missions. Due to the nearness of friendly units, final clearance could not be given by the mobile FSCC.

5. Recommendations:

a. Continue employment of 10 or tactical air controller airborne for coordinated air-artillery missions. Insure, as far as possible, the communication chain from FDC, to FSCC, aerial observer.

b. To expedite clearance of missions, establish bomb lines to describe the area where mobile FSCC can grant final clearance to supporting fires.

c. When mobile FSCC is employed, FDC assign a block of concentration numbers for their use during the operation.

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AIR

1. General: Air support for Operation Macon was provided for in the form of a split Air Liaison Officer section. One element with the forward CP group; the second element remained with the rear CP at An Hoa. Four OH-6A helicopters were on station between 0700-1800, two were on station between 1800-0700. The helicopters were employed for medical evacuation, resupply and tactical operations.

2. Air support for Operation Macon was, with minor exceptions, excellent. The capability of resupply by helicopter enabled combat troops to travel lighter and faster. In particular, timely resupply of demolition teams provided maximum destruction of fortifications and minimized the amount of explosives carried by the troops.

3. Comments: Helicopter requests from units in the field. Normally helicopter requests are sent by battalion tactical net to the radio operators who in turn submit the request to the Air Liaison Officer section for action. This system generally produced satisfactory results with a minimum of confusion. However, when the Air Liaison Officer (Actual) is with the battalion forward CP, Company Commanders sent their helicopter requests to him over the battalion tactical net. The Air Liaison Officer forward, had no direct communications with the Air Liaison Officer rear due to the insufficient number of radios. Consequently, the Air Liaison Officer forward, upon receipt of a helicopter request, out of necessity had to use the battalion tactical net to contact the rear radio operators, who in turn submitted the request to the Air Liaison Officer rear.

4. Recommendations: That regardless of the establishment of an Air Liaison Officer forward unit, Company Commanders continue to send their helicopter requests directly to the rear over the battalion tactical net. This system will alleviate the need of sending the same messages twice over the battalion tactical net, as well as eliminating one link in the request chain, producing faster helicopter service.

Enclosure (2)

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ARMOR1. General:

a. Amphibious howitzers, tanks and amtracs were employed by 3d Battalion, 9th Marines during Operation Macon. On 7 July, the armored vehicles joined the battalion after crossing the Thu Bon River.

b. Vehicles were distributed in the following manner:

(1) Gun tanks, flame tanks and M-6's were assigned direct support of rifle companies.

(2) One gun tank, (The Company Commanders vehicle), one gun tank, equipped with a dozer blade, an LVT C-1 and M-51 recovery vehicle were in general support, and remained with the battalion command group.

2. Tactical Employment:

a. Gun tanks ranged ahead of foot troops, although in foliated areas, close infantry support was provided. 90MM guns were fired into suspected mined areas, and the tanks were used to breach entry routes through tangled treelines. Tanks in direct support entered the rifle company net and close coordination was effectively maintained.

b. Terrain was excellent for armor. Some difficulty was experienced passing through thick treelines and large grave mounds were avoided, somewhat channelizing armor. Only two incidents of tanks bogging down in paddies were reported.

c. During the period 12-14 July tanks, M-6's and the LVT C-1 were in general support. It was intended to employ the heavy tank section as a quick reaction unit to support either rifle company had an encounter with a sizeable VC element occurred.

3. Coordination: A liaison officer was assigned to the battalion command group. Employing a PRC/8 radio, he insured continuous contact with all tank units. Communication and control was enhanced by this technique.

4. Proper Areas:

a. Transportation of supplies by P-5's added to the number of armored vehicles without adding to tactical capabilities.

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Enclosure (5)

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b. Antracs and Amphibian howitzers were refueled by air-delivered drum fuel on 11 July. The H-6's and P-5's were thus delayed four hours while refueling took place.

5. Recommendations:

a. When armor units are in support of an Infantry Battalion, continue to provide a Liaison officer with a radio that will net with armor units.

b. When possible establish logistic support areas from which timely refueling vehicles, air or surface, can be dispatched to rendezvous with armor units.

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ENGINEERS1. General:

a. 3d platoon, Company "A", 3d Engineer Battalion was initially divided into two teams, one assigned to support Co. "M" the second to support Co. "I".

b. A tunnel team, provided by 3d Engineer Battalion, equipped with heavy pipe blowers, rescue equipment, protective masks and riot control agents, were in general support throughout the operation.

c. The following VC fortifications were destroyed by supporting engineers.

- | | |
|------------------------------|---|
| (1) 97 bunkers | (6) 5 meters of tunnel |
| (2) 47 fighting holes | (7) 4 caves |
| (3) 14 punji traps | (8) 1 90MM rd. dud |
| (4) 4 gates | (9) 2 green star clusters signal flares |
| (5) 240 meters of trenchline | |

d. Engineers and tunnel team were detached from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines on 11 July.

2. Tactical Employment:

a. The speed of movement denied full utilization of engineers support. The tunnel team remained with the command group and was deployed on call of the rifle company. No extensive tunnel networks were discovered, although suspected areas were reported and investigated by the tunnel team.

b. Demolition teams followed in the traces of each advancing rifle company with security elements provided by the rifle company. Bunkers and tunnels marked by forward elements were destroyed by demolition teams. Rapid movement reduced the effectiveness of searches. It is accepted that many hiding places were bypassed.

3. Recommendations:

That in future operations, engineer support be more closely allied with rapidity of the attack. Increased engineer support is required where speed of movement is essential or desired.

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