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HEADQUARTERS
3A Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/BWC/jhw
05750
31 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Reinf)
(2) Commanding General, Third Marine Amphibious Force
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

881167

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 July to 31 July 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8

Encl: ✓(1) Command Chronology 1-31 July 1967
✓(2) S-2 Journal
✓(3) S-3 Journal
✓(4) After Action Report - Operation BUFFALO
✓(5) After Action Report - Operation HICKORY II
✓(6) A/A RPT (OPN CIMARRON)

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) and (b), enclosures (1) through (3) are submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3 year intervals, declassified after 12 years, DOD Dir 5200.10.

W. J. Woodring, Jr.
W. J. WOODRING, JR.

3B 9 Marines S&C No 70172-67
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D. P.

HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Reinf) TIF
APO, San Francisco, California 96602

Command Chronology
1 July to 31 July 1967

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATION.

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

Major W. J. WOODRING, JR.
1-31 July 1967SUBORDINATE UNITS

Company I

Captain E. H. COYLE
1-3 July 1967Captain R. W. SWIGART
4 July 1967Captain W. A. CONGER
5-31 July 1967

Company K

Captain J. E. GILES
1-11 July 1967Captain R. L. CLOSE
12-31 July 1967

Company L

Captain T. T. SHIRLEY
1-31 July 1967

Company M

Captain R. B. JOHNSTON
1-31 July 1967

H&S Company


2dLt. W. C. HELTON
1-24 July 19671stLt. G. L. BARLOW
25-31 July 19672. LOCATION.

1-8 July 1967 Dong Ha, Republic of Vietnam

9-31 July 1967 Cam Lo, Republic of Vietnam

3. STAFF OFFICERS.

Executive Officer

Major J. G. METAS
1-3 July 1967Major J. C. STUDD
4-31 July 1967

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S-1

2dLt. H. L. TIEKING
1-17 July 19671stLt. D. J. MOSSEY
18-31 July 1967

S-2

1stLt. H. F. WRIGHT
1-31 July 1967

S-3

Captain G. D. NAVADEL
1-31 July 1967

S-3A

1stLt. G. GUDJONSON
1-11 July 1967Captain J. E. GILES
12-31 July 1967

S-4

Captain R. W. SWIGART
1-3 July 19671stLt. G. GUDJONSON
12-31 July 19674. AVERAGE STRENGTH.USMC

Officers 35 Enlisted 1093

USN

Officers 2 Enlisted 57

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PART II

1 . . .

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-2 July 1967, this battalion continued in the defense of the Dong Ha Combat Base. From 2-9 July 1967 this battalion participated in a search and destroy operation in conjunction with Operation BUFFALO. On 9 July 1967 this battalion established a new CP at the Cam Lo Base Camp (YD 142614), relieving 2d Bn, 9th Marines of this AO. Emphasis was placed on aggressive patrolling within the respective company sectors to counter and minimize enemy activity in these areas. The battalion established outposts and ambushes throughout the assigned TAOR.

From 14-16 July 1967 the battalion employed as a blocking force in conjunction with Operation HICKORY II. During the remainder of the period the battalion was utilized in the support of Operation KING FISHER. All of the operations were in the Quan Cam Lo District and Quan Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.

PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. FMF organization committed to combat.
 - a. Combat mission assigned.
 - (1) Conduct unilateral offensive operations within assigned sector of TAOR.
 - (2) Conduct unilateral and/or coordinated operations within the Division area of responsibility as directed.
 - (3) Occupy and defend assigned sector of TAOR.
 - (4) Provide security for Artillery positions located at Cam Lo Base Camp, YD 143616 .
 - (5) Provide security along Route 561 in OA by aggressive patrolling.
 - (6) Provide security for mine sweep teams along Route 561 in OA.
 - (7) Provide security for Cam Lo Bridge site, YD 148604.
 - (8) Provide security for engineer personnel and equipment while upgrading Route 561.
 - (9) Be prepared to provide relief/reinforcement of Gio Linh and VA VIET Facility in the event of enemy attack.

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b. Significant operations conducted.

(1) 2-14 July 1967 this battalion was engaged in a search and destroy operation in conjunction with Operation BUFFALO. 14-16 July this battalion was in blocking positions in conjunction with Operation HICKORY II. See enclosures (4) and (5). During the remainder of the period the battalion conducted assigned operations in designated areas of assigned TAOR.

c. Casualties inflicted on the enemy.

- (1) KIA Confirmed ----- 481
- (2) KIA Probable ----- 200
- (3) POW ----- 1
- (4) Detainees ----- 1

d. Casualties sustained.

- (1) KIA ----- 16
- (2) WIA ----- 130

e. New techniques employed. None.

f. Command relations. Command relations with all supporting units were excellent. Coordination and assistance received on all levels of command were excellent. During the period this battalion functioned as the main force of the 9th Marines.

g. Equipment. During this period there were no serious problems with equipment and normal Marine Corps Issue was sufficient in all respects.

h. Logistics.

(1) Supply and Distribution.

(a) Company size and larger operations have been supported by HST from 3d Shore Party Battalion.

(b) During the past month a warehousing project was initiated. Data approximately 90% of bulk storage material has been warehoused.

(c) During the month some of the following "hard-to-get" supply items were received: Lightweight utilities, aiming post stakes, cleaning gear for the M-16 rifle.

(d) All critical shortages have been requisitioned on priority or OS as applicable.

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(2) Transportation.

(a) During the month the motor pool was divided into a forward and rear section. The forward at Car Lo and the rear at Dong Ha.

(1) Non-organic transportation requirements for troop movements has been outstanding.

i. Medical Activities.

The medical health activities program conducted during this period revolved around the MEDCAP Program. Personnel from this Battalion's aid station conducted the MEDCAP Program treating all civilians who participated.

j. Administration. There were no administrative difficulties encountered during this period.

k. Personnel. Replacement personnel have not been available in sufficient quantities to fully replace losses due to combat and rotation to CONUS. A particularly critical area lies in Officers and Staff Non-Commissioned Officers.

l. Intelligence.

(1) Terrain. The terrain north of the trace between Con Thien (YD 13570) and Gio Linh (YD 213732) consists of terraced farm lands and open fields. The fields are open and bordered with hedgerows. The vegetation ranges from short grasses in the fields to thick brushwood along the hedgerows. In places up to 10 meters in height, the critical terrain is the area between the Trace, between Con Thien and Gio Linh (YD 135708) to (YD 135725), and Market (YD 135725). Terrain is favorable for major helicopter operations. Concealment ranges from excellent in the thick hedgerows to poor in the open fields.

The terrain just north of the Song Cam Lo is low rolling hills and rice paddies. Vegetation ranges from short grasses in dry rice paddies to brushwood with height of 10 feet. Concealment ranges from poor in the rice paddy areas to good in the brushwood area. HLZ's are plentiful. Critical terrain features are Song Cam Lo, MSR, and Hills 30 and 31.

(2) Weather.

(a) Temperature. The mean maximum temperature ranged between 88°-93° Fahrenheit. The mean minimum temperature ranged between 73°-76° Fahrenheit.

(b) Winds. The winds were from the southwest at a mean speed of 8-10 knots.

(c) Precipitation. Only five days of very light precipitation were recorded during the month of July 1967.

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(d) Humidity. The relative humidity averaged 78% for the month of July 1967.

(e) Clouds. Cloudiness was at a minimum, and the clouds that were present were at a high altitude.

(f) Visibility. Visibility was unlimited for ground troops. Fog and haze was virtually nonexistent.

(3) Order of Battle. From identification cards captured the enemy is believed to be from the 7th, 8th and 9th Battalions, 90th Regiment 324th Division of the North Vietnamese Army.

(4) Significant Events. The enemy increased the use of artillery on friendly troops and installations. Fire ranged from 2-4 rounds of H&T's to a volley of over 600 of prep fires.

The enemy left behind a great deal of electrical wiring used for command detection of claymores and explosive devices.

The enemy policed the battlefield of bodies, equipment, and weapons, and very little gear was left behind.

(5) Summary of Incidents. During Operation BUFFALO, 3/9 relieved 1/9 in the vicinity of the Market (YD 135725) against a regiment of NVA. 3/9 conducted aggressive patrols in this area in order to maintain contact and retrieve MIA's. The NVA conducted harrassing fire missions, and they were answered with mortars and artillery. 3/9 retrieved all friendly dead and went on to search area north of Market.

3/9 acted as a blocking force in Operation HICKORY II. There was no contact made by 3/9 during this operation.

(6) Equipment and Positions.

(c) Captured Equipment:

HMG	1
RPD	8
SKS	28
AK-47	37
60mm tube	3
60mm rounds	49
82mm rounds	143
RPC	1
Casoline (US)	1
AT mine	20
LP mine	5
Claymores	3
250 lb bomb	1

(b) Positions found north of the trace in the area of the Market were predominately covered bunkers, 6x4x4 feet with 3 layers of

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logs and packed dirt for the top. Bunkers were connected with trenches.

(7) Detection Devices.

(a) Number credited to Battalion - 20 AN/PRS-1 (SID)

(b) Number available - 16

(c) Number in daily use - 0

of the 30 for at the [redacted] in the process of being established [redacted]

of the [redacted] continued to support the battalion by means [redacted] provided radiomen to the various [redacted] while using the same for the Command [redacted]

c. Fire Support. Not counting the [redacted] operations which were recorded in After Action reports, 41 missions were fired by Battery "F", 2d Battalion, 12th Marine "A Direct" support of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. These 42 missions included 10 suspected enemy positions, 2 counter mortar missions, 12 prep fires and 19 night defensive registrations. In addition 30 to 40 F&I's were fired nightly.

of the [redacted] fired wing strikes were primarily controlled by [redacted]

of the [redacted] is listed below:

	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>
Medical - [redacted]	6	6
[redacted]	1	1
[redacted]	9	9
Resupply - [redacted]	14	13
Priority	4	4
Emergency	5	5
Helo Trooplift	4	4
Helo Gunships	4	3
[redacted]	1	1
TOT	41	41
Helo Recon	4	4
Placed Wing - CAS	44	44
IMS	19	19
[redacted]	5	unk
	9	

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>
Flare Ship	4	3
AC-47	4	3

g. Chaplain. During the month of July twelve protestant services were held with a total of 305 attending. The chaplain made 18 visits to the dispensary. Circumstances did not permit the holding of memorial services. The chaplain continued to conduct troop indoctrination lectures on the religions of Viet Nam. With an attendance of 351, counseled 42 personnel, wrote 65 letters, conducted 1 Holy Unctions, and took care of 6 Red Cross cases. During the period Catholic services were held by Father Richard and Father Kiley, chaplains of 9th Marine Regiment and 11th Engineers, respectively. Both chaplains participated in Operation BUFFALO, and were in direct support of Operation HICKORY II and KING FISHER. 4 boxes of children's clothes were received from Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, these were turned over to S-5 for distribution.

r. Medical.

- (1) The medical status of the Battalion is presently satisfactory.
- (2) There were 347 visits to sick call this month, 844 Marines and 3 Navy.
- (3) There were 75 clinical laboratory procedures performed this month.
- (4) The present strength of the Medical Department of this Battalion is 53 Hospital Corpsmen and one Doctor. Two Hospital Corpsmen are presently in CONUS on emergency leave. One corpsman on medical at VA Med.
- (5) Medical supply is adequate.
- (6) Four Vietnamese civilians were treated this month.
- (7) The sanitation of the forward area meets minimum standards, the rear battalion area is satisfactory.
- (8) There have been 10 cases of venereal disease in the battalion this month.

JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marine

From _____ TO _____

TIME	IN	OUT	SER NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
1112			3	020935H	OF "I"	OF	Final from OF "I" while sweeping through area, found traces of blood on trail headed west continued search with negative results.
1440			4	021440H	OF "I"	OF	OF "I" final; 2 snipers fired from 300 meters to patrols on left flank, rec'd approximately 5 rounds. Friendly YD 294534, enemy YD 291534, swept area with negative results.
1510			5	011110H	OF "L"	OF	OF "L" researched area of contact, found 1 VC KIA and following gear, green short sleeve shirt, black shorts, USMC type helmet with no liner but had camouflag cover, rubber sandals, 1 cartridge belt with 3 pouches with 10 rounds for M-1 rifle, 1 US poncho, VC santeen and cup, 3 large packages of fish
1520			5	021435H	OF "I"	OF	OF "I". 60 civilians old men and women, children found in ville, brought to CP for. CIT to interrogate, interrogation in process (1 name on black list) sending in on resupply.
				030500H			JOURNAL OPENED 030500H to 040800H July 1967 received 125 rounds of explosive shells. No casualties. no damages to Bn area.
				040600H	15th CI	OF	JOURNAL OPENED 040800H to 050800H July 1967 One NVA battalion reported digging in YD 271515, strength 300 wearing green uniforms and civilian clothes. Possible from 95th NVA regiment. Rated F-3.

ENCLOSURE (2)

JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

TIME	IN	OUT	SECT NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
1930			10	01930H	OF "L"	OF-2	Moving to west in heavy brush at YD XXXXX 204545. Moving between LP-3 OP and LP-2 ambush. LP-2 right flank man in ambush saw VC. 1st fired VC went down, 1 VC spied and fired into LP position which was facing road bed in northerly dir, VC opened fire in southerly direction. VC also threw several grenades. East ambush opened up with 150 rounds 5.56mm and 5 M-79. Searched area immediately after initial contact. found blood trail but lost it in brush line. Enemy mortar rounds were heard being fired and rounds landed near an RF posit Vic YD 104584. P-1 in headquarters compound went to red alert. P-1 heard noises around perimeter wire. Pilsner observed mortar flashes and fired counter mortar fire on enemy fire. Short of target. P-1 fired shot at noises
2300			11	012300H	TP	OF-2	
2319			11	012319H	TP-2A	OF-2	TP-2A point took saf from 2 VC approximately 10 rounds, and 1 grenade. VC armed with AK-47's. TP-2A returned fire with 150 rounds. Searched area fired illum with negative results. Returned to CP.
1015			1	020800H			JOURNAL OPENED 020800H to 030800H JULY 1967
			2	020935H	OF "I"	OF	OF "I" received approx 40 rounds of harrassing fire from approximately 3 VC (possibly 1 automatic carbine). Returned fire with 100 rounds 7.62mm, 75 rds 5.56mm and 16 rounds HE 105mm. Now on possible route of escape. Presently searching area coord Friendly 244542 and Enemy 286538.

ENCLOSURE (2)

JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

TIME	IN	OUT	SER NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
1230			7	011110H	Co. "L"	OF	I-2 spotted 5 VC coming down towards river from the north wearing Kaki Uniforms and helmets painted green. one carrying bar and one carrying a rocket. I-2 ambush opened fire from south of river with approximately 50 rounds M-60. VC returned approximately 40 rounds 30 cal. fire and withdrew to the north. Unable to pursue due to river. Hit 1 VC w/M-60 fire. Incoming enemy rounds impacted in I-6 OP on high ground, south of river, also south of I-2 position. 1 USMC KIA. 1 VC KIA (prob) I-2 at YD 294547 found 1-M-1 rifle, 1 canteen with cups containing cesamy seeds, 3 pair trousers, 1 Naval flare, 1 empty canister containing pills and fish line, 3 bunkers 8'x4'x4', 3 documents, 2 pictures of people, 2 metal emblems, 5 tons of rice, 1 Elwe B bunkers that had secondary explosions. also blew rice bins and 1 Naval flare. Found also 40 rounds M-1 type Ammo, found 2-50 Cal., 5 M-1 shell casing.
1330			8	011215H	Co. "I"	OF	P-1 OP observed squad VC at same time several initial reports were received by village chief at PL of 100 NVA with recoilless rifle, 1 mortar, north of above coords of 113602. Arty called by PL. Movement observed impact area fired for effect adj on movement. VC movement observed moving NW grid YD 092609. Arty called observed no further movement.
2140			9	012140H	TP-1	OF-2	

From _____ TO _____

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JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

TIME	SER NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
0935	1	010800H	29524 CO "I"	OF	Journal Opened S-F- Co "I" Received light automatic fire and carbine fire received approx 60 to 80 rnds. Called in Arty and returned fire persently sweeping ville. Coord F. YD 295543 E- YD 293538
1145	2	010930	CO "I"	OF	Co. "I" received harrassing fire from across river light automatic and carbine fire. Approx 60 to 80 rnds. returned fire in process of sweeping vill returned approx 400 rnds 5.56 200 rnds 7.62 link 10 rds M-79 and called in friendly arty. Also 1 M-1 Carbine. F- YD 295543 E- YD 293538 (3 MIA friendly arty).
1122	3	010930	Co "I"	OF	Co "I" found bunker with tunnel 8x10x5 room enough to sleep comfortable. Another tunnel enside house. 2 1/2 feet in diameter bunker and tunnel destroyed with C-4.
1138	4	010900	Co "I"	OF	Co "I" (con't from above.) called arty or sniper hit by scrapnel when arty called in on snippers minor scratched by the arty (3 MIA)
1143	5	010900	Co "I"	OF	Co "I" (con't from above) Blown suspected enemy houch. Had secon dary explosion which came from ceiling of house.
1155	6	011120H	Co "I"	OF	Co. "I" coord YD 296548 found Punji Pit 3x3x4 located 2 feet left side of trail. Destroyed with C-4.

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3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

SER NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
	040700H	15thCIT	OF	Local VC in are YD 295545 told meeting evening 3 Jul to discuss ways of keeping USMC out of area. Ways discussed were mortaring TP-2 or mining area Rated F-3.
	042007	TP-3 3/9	OF	Rated C-1 Vc imitating civilians with appropriate ID papers drawing maps of DONG HA base and TP-3 positions. The VC cadre is supposedly hiding out with civilians coord YD 104596. Civilians say VC are going to attack TP-3 and fire on DONG HA Air base in the near future.
	060314H	TP-2A	OF	JOURNAL OPENED 060800H to 070800H JULY 1967 TP2A at YD 273574 was hit by 3 VC in ambush site. Received approx 80 rounds TP2A returned 200 rounds with negative results. xxxx After that moved to new location.
				Police Agent Districe intelligence rates C-3 the VC plan in July to destroy the CAM LO refugee resettlement area. This will be done by the 270th Regt. under command of Col. TRUONG GUANG NGU, reinforced by the battalions working th the GIO LINH and CAM LO areas. This info was received by the agents wife from a VC platoon leader.
	070800H			JOURNAL OPENED 070800H to 080800H JULY 1967
	080800H			JOURNAL CLOSED

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TIME	SER NO	IN	OUT	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
				081200H			JOURNAL OPENED 080800H to 090800H JULY 1967
							A 175mm was found YD 118687 no action taken by patrol-- S-4 was notified.
							JOURNAL OPENED 090800H AND CLOSED 100800H JULY 1967
							JOURNAL OPENED 100800H AND CLOSED 110800H JULY 1967
							JOURNAL OPENED 110800H AND CLOSED 120800H JULY 1967
							JOURNAL OPENED 120800H AND CLOSED 130800H JULY 1967
				130840H			JOURNAL OPENED 130800H to 140800H JULY 1967
	1			140800H	OF "K"	OF	"K" 1 A found 1 AT mine on left side of Highway 9. Mine blown in place with C-4.
0907	2			140850H	OF "K"	OF	JOURNAL OPENED 140800H to 150800H
							FOUND TWO AT MINES AT YD 133655 BLOWN IN PLACE FOUND ANOTHER MINE AT S-HILL COORDS
2000	3			142000H	QUANG TRI	OF-2	ALSO BLOWN IN PLACE. FOUND ONE MINE AT MINE IN SHIE VIC YD 130645
2040	4			142007H	TP-3	OF	AGENT RATED B-2, 1 VC Co LOCATED YD 172680. HIS TON TO SHELL TRUC KHE.
							INTELLIGENCE REPORT - SOURCE DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE AGENT REPORT RATTIS 641 - CIVILIANS
							XXXX IN VICTOR CHARLIE IMITATING CIVILIAN WITH APPROPRIATE ID PAPERS BEARING IAPS OF
							DONG HA BASE AND THE POSITION. THE VC CAPTE ARE SUPPOSEDLY HIDING OUT WITH SOME CIVIL-
							AT YD 104596. SOME CIVILIANS SAY VC ARE DEFINITELY GOING TO ATTACH PAPA 3 AND FINE
							DONG HA BASE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

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JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

TIME	SER NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
1100	1	150800H			Journal Opened
	2	150930H	BLCKING	OF-2	FOUND AT YD 153613 ONE HOOCH ABOUT 3 WEEKS OD, APPROX 4' HIGH, 5' WIDE, 5' LONG, LOCATED ABOUT 75 METERS FROM ROAD. FROM THIS POSITION COULD NOT OBSERVE ROAD AND COULD OBSERVE ONLY TOP OF OF CP ON HILL 30. NOT BELIEVED TO BE AN OP. BELIEVED USED FOR SKIVEY HOUSE.
	1	160800H			Journal Opened for the 16 of July.
	2	170800H			Journal Closed
171015	1	170800H			Journal Opened for the 17 of July
	2	171038H	OF"K"	OF	YD 126626 There is a water point
	3	180800H			Journal closed
	1	180800H			Journal Opened for the 18 of July
	2	182203H			JOURNAL CLOSED
2245	2	182203H	OF"U"	OF	"U" 1 reported seeing what appeared to be 8 to 10 personnel to their direct front at 0300. Approx 450 meters from their position. 1 reg. illur and 81MM mission. HE consisting of 36 rds. Obs. one secondary explosion on first concentration. Fired two other concentrations. Mission compl excellent coverage. OF"U" 145621.

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From _____ TO _____

TIME	SER NO	IN	OUT	DTC	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
0718	1			190800H			JOURNAL OPENED FOR 19 of July.
0800	2			190715H	OF L	OF	Ref. to spot report 182203H. Search out area with negative results
1120	3			190600H	OF I	OF	1 PF arrested. 1 ARVN deserter returned to village police at coord YD 144604.
	4			190910H	OF K-2	OF	Spotted 18 civilians coords YD 133644, 13 women, 3 boys, 2 girls. Found 1/3.5 rd. (WP) approx 125 meters from road. Found 3 more civilians on west side 175 meters from road. These 3 people had PIC 25 radio battery w/attached electrical batter wire Possible to set up booby trap with 3.5 rd. Apprehended and searched them and found gear listed below. 1/3.5 rd, in good shape 1/M-14 cartridge belt, with loaded M-14 magazines in pouches, 1 canteen cover, 1 first aid pouche, 1 battle dressing with pouch. Gear on people 2 USMC canteens, 2 cans c-rations, 1 RPC 25 battery
1915				190910H	OF K-2	OF	3 detainees returned to OF CP by convoy.
							Battalion S-2 interrogated detainees found to be innocent civilians. Civilians were return to village.
							Journal Closed
	1			200800H			JOURNAL OPENED FOR 20 JULY 1967
	2			210800H			JOURNAL CLOSED

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JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

TIME	SER NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
	1	220800H			JOURNAL OPENED FOR 22 JULY 1967
1530	2	221500H	2700 Co	OF	While on patrol. Point man found trip wire across trail attached to "C" ration can same set up as IP1 found last night. Also approx 10 ft. from where TP1 found theirs. Disoriented and brought back to CP. Coords YD 146602
	3	230800H			JOURNAL CLOSED
	1	230800H			Journal Opened for 28 July 1967
2100H	2	231955H	Elmor Raids 26	OF	Intelligence report, rated R-2, 1 VC Co., 1 VC company and 1 guerrilla platoon. Have with them 4/82mm's and 3/81 MMS at YD 165613 and YD 183613. 16 rounds 81MM fired and 18 rounds 105MM fired. Unobserved target.
2250	3	232150H	LP-3	OF	LP-3 spotted flickering light at YD 128627. Light didn't move remained in one position. OT asimuth 5600; Call 81MM MSN, fired 24 rds good coverage. Light no longer seen in area.
0115	4	240150	KP-2	OF	Saw one man walking down trail wearing dark cloths, he had carrying something undis inghishing in hand. Man moving SE from North. Man 20 meters from KP-2 throw 1 M-26, fired 3 rds 5.5 6 rds search area with negative results.
	5	240800H			Journal Closed

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JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

IN	OUT	SER NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
		1	240800H			JOURNAL OPENED FOR 24 JULY 1967
0750H		2	REF to Spot Report 232130H			LP-3 Check out area Negative Results.
2323		3	242045H	OFK	OF	K-3-5 spotted 7VCS at YD 153612. Seemed to be dragging something white, acted as if they didn't want to be seen. When first seen mung N. Ellum fired change dir to E. Wasn't pos. to determine sex or if carrying wpns Requested an illuminated flare for 1 1/2 hrs. Bke visual contact at 2150H
		1	250800H			Journal Opened for 25 July 1967
1210		2	251200H	SIEN-2	OF-2	YD 163668 - A0 spotted 2 bodies ducking in tree line looking suspicious after being spotted they ran deeper in tree line.
1220		3	251113H	OFI	OF	YD 165644 Discovered 6 females, 3 male woodcutters, 3 males disappeared in tree line, 3 of the females had no ID card (questioned and released by OF-2 Scout. Pursued 3 males with negative results.
1530		4	251514	OFL	OF	YD 148605 While checking sampans found one man whose ID card had been altered. Contacted OF-2, OF-2 came with interpreter to question man. OF-2 sending man to Dong Ha for further interrogation.
1630		5	251630	OFI	OF	OF I-2 vic (YD 165639) came across 15 children, 8 boys, 7 girls ages 8-14 with cattle near voter point out side of PHU NGAN 1 boy age 13 wearing ARVN shoes

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ENCLOSURE (2)

claims brother is ARVN in Dong Ha. Brother from Long Chanh. Name of brother

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JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

TIME	SER	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
IN	OUT	NO			
		261345H	OF "I"	OF	YD 168658 - Found one grave 12'x12' heaped in two mounds 3'x8'. Grave 1-2 Days old. Dug up graves found 2 bodise 1-2 weeks old. Clothes brown utilities, cause of death Bad burns caused by WP. Negative ID cards, etc. Following gear found at YD 168658, 1 E-tool, (USMC), 3 hand made picks, 1 shovel, 1 US water can, 1 cooking pot with spoon, 20 lbs freshly butthered meet, 1 aiming stake for 60mm mortar with cleaning brush on top, utilities, 4 shirts, 1 trousers, 2 T-shirts, 2 skavy shorts, 2 bowas, 1 USMC plastic canteen, 1 San llegal beer bottle (empty), 1 block C-4, 1 Demo Bag, 1 259-MA battery box, 1 chicom, concussion grenade, 1 chicom frag grenade, 1 letter and fishing gear in pouch, 1 pack cigarretts, 1 political pamphlet, and 1 hammock.
		262000H	OF "I"	OF	OF "I" recidved approximately 20 rounds 60mm mortars from Enemy position Vic YD YD 167659. Negative causalities. Returned 12 rounds 60mm called arty mission exploded 3 WP and 36 HE. Plotting counter mortar fire at present.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

TIME	SER	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
IN	OUT				
0905	1	260800H			JOURNAL OPENED 260800H JULY
	2	251730H	OF "I"	OF	In reference to spot report DTG 251730H search out area found foot prints approx. 2-3 days old. Discovered many foot prints headed S-SE
1130	3	251100H	OF "I"	OF	Discovered 4 Fighting holes 2'x2'x6' at YD 167656, also freshly cut wood and bloody bandage. Found sleeping and cooking sight also in same general area.
1215	4	261155H	OF "I"	OF	YD 167656 - Received carbine sniper fire approx 10-20 rounds from XXXXXX ridge line
					Returned 6 M-79 rds. 8 Friendly WIA. Also tripped to explosive devices. OF "I" 3
					deployed and sweeping area. Found one explosive device (chicommm grenade rigged with trip wire) Med-Evac in process. Friendly WIA-8. 1 explosive device captured, destroyed
					in place. Chopped received S/A fire 400 meters to the north of OF "I" position.
					Huey escort strafing area. Continuing sweep of area, will box area with arty when Med-Evac completed.
	5	261325H	OF "I"	OF	YD 168658 - Found booby trap at YD 168658 composed of large Chicom grenade cylinder type
					5 " long 2 1/2" wide, serrated body. 10" long stuck in ground secured into bottom entire
					device stuck in ground, blasting cap screwed into top, slack trip wire lying across
					trail attached to blasting cap. Destroyed in place.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

SER NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
				Also found where 4 old fighting holes (3'x4'x4'). On south side of the paddy were found 6 old fighting holes (3'x4'x4') in the treeline within the 5 meters of the paddy.
				Deeper into te treeline some 40 meters from the paddy were found 3 bunkers (4'x8'x2') in the initial stages of development. Also found 2 cooking pots with rotten rice and meat paste at YD 167657 on the side of a hill. Adjacent to the NW end of the paddy were found 7 fairly new covered bunkers (4'x6'x5'). Roof 2 inches sticks covered by 1' dirt. 8 old fighting holes 3'x3'x3', 1 cooking stove dug into ground (Destroyed) comm wire, 200 AK-47 rounds, 7.62mm old and corroded in plastic bag. 3 canvas Ammo pouches at YD 165657. Found in bushes very old mortar position 5'x3'x3' with three covered trenches (6'-10') used for storing ammo.
6	271347H to 271945H	OF I"	OF	YD 172639 - Observed around area of above coord much movement including 10 persons moving NE at 1700 also there appeared to be a mound with small brown rock marks in the area. During day similar movement to and from mound with persons carrying loads away was observed continued to observe area.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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JOURNAL FOR S-2, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

From _____ TO _____

TIME	IN	OUT	SER NO	DTG	FROM	TO	INCIDENT
			1	270800H			JOURNAL DEBRIED
			2	201535H	OF I	OF	YD 160670 - Spotted one NVA at about same position that we received income fire from last night calling in arty mission!
2030			3	272115H	15 CIT	OF	DONG HA Nat Police reported people heard in vic of Yd 2000650 and YD 160660 heard guns firing on Dong Ha base night of 26 Jul, and morning of 27 July in jungle area between above coord. Source claims many large holes in area. Guns believed to be located in holes. Rated F-3 OF I notified.
2030			4	274412	15 CIT	of	1st ARVN repts. Guns hitting D.H. base on 26 and 27 July having been fired from following coords. YD 160690, 160660, 180690, and 180660. Also on night of 22 July NVA forces used unknown No. of Elephants to carry unk items to Cont. from 272117H YD 221664 pf OF I X Notified
2150			4	272010H	OF I I	OF	Received approx 25-30 rounds incoming 60mm mortar fire from YD 161661. Called Arty mission. Also returned 16 rounds 60mm fire, calling H&I's fire on possible enemy position
2245			5	271945H	OF I I	OF	4 Friendly WIA. 2 Med-Evac and 2 Non-serious. The following is a summary of bunkers destroyed at YD 167656. 12 new bunkers (4'-5') by (8'-10') by (4'-5') in various stages of development from 18" deep to one completed bunker with a roof of 3" to 4" of logs covered with 3' of dirt. The bunkers were connected by trails thru the underbrush, which gave them excellent overhead concealment.

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ENCLOSURE 2

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

PLACE

Dong Ha, RVN

FROM (Date and hour)

01000

TO (Date and hour)

012400H July 1967

TIME		SERIAL NO	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	I-Troops I-File
0930		1	010900	Company I, at YD 295543, YD 293538, received approximately 60 to 80 rounds light automatic and carbine fire. Called in artillery and returned fire. Presently sweeping village and burning suspected areas. At 010930H received harrasing fire from across river, approximately 60 to 80 rounds light automatic weapons and carbine fire. Returned approximately 400 rounds 5.56, 200 rounds 7.62 link, 100 rounds M-79, in process of sweeping village. Called in artillery. Received 3 WIA's, friendly artillery, also 1 M-1 carbine. Found bunker with tunnel, 8x10x5, with room enough to sleep comfortably. Another tunnel inside house, 2 1/2' in diameter. Bunker and tunnel destroyed with C-4. At YD 295543, blown enemy houch. Had secondary explosion which came from ceiling of houch. Called in artillery on snippers. 3 WIA's, minor scratches, hit by scrapnel when artillery called in on snippers. YD 296548, found punji pit, 3x3x4, located 2' from left side of trail. Destroyed with C-4.		S-F, 9th Marines
1230		2	011110	2dPlt, Company L spotted 2 VC, YD 212545, coming down towards river from the north wearing kakhi uniforms and helmets painted green. One carried a BAR and other carried a rocket. Ambush opened fire from south of river with approximately 50 rounds M-60 fire. VC returned approximately 40 rounds of 30 caliber fire and withdrew to the north. Unable to persue due to river, hit 1 VC with M-60 fire. Incoming enemy rounds impact on L-6 CP on high ground, south of river and 2dPlt-L position. 1 USMC KIA, 1 VC (probable).		S-F, 9th Marines
1330		3	011215	2dPlt, Company I, at YD 294847 found 1 M-1 rifle, 1 canteen with cup containing cesamy seeds, 3 pair trousers, 1 Naval flare, 1 empty canister containing pills and fish line, 3 bunkers 8x4x4, 3 documents,		

(See reverse side for instructions)

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ENCLOSURE (3)

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION 3d Battalion, 9th Marines	
PLACE Dong Ha, RVN	
FROM (Date and hour) 01000	TO (Date and hour) 012400H July 1967

(Classification)

TIME		SERIAL NO	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps I-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
1330		3	011215	2 pictures of people, 2 metal emblems, and 5 tons of rice. Blew 3 bunkers that had secondary explosions. Also blew 2 rice bins and 1 Naval flare. Found 2-50 caliber rounds, 5 M-1 shell casings, 1 pair kakhi trouser. Disposed of shell casings in river.	S-F, 9th Marines
1850		4	011815	Company I, squad patrol (YD 295546) received 40 rounds small arms fire from approximately 3 VC (YD 294546) in treeline by river. And returned 200 rounds small arms fire, 6-60mm, 4 M-79, pushed enemy into thick undergrowth and enemy headed in a westerly direction and searched area with negative results. 4 USMC WIA's medevaced.	S-F, 9th Marines
2000		5	011930	CAC unit, YD 113601, observed 1 squad of VC, and from information available they are believed to be moving behind Hill 46 (YD 1060). From report 100 NVA, armed with 2 60mm and 10 RR already in Hill 46 area. Report received from local sources. Request fire mission, by 2d Battalion, 9th Marines.	S-F, 9th Marines
2005		6	011935	Company I destruction report: 16 Huts, 16 bunkers (6x5x3), 4 tunnels (8x4x4), 2 punji pits (3x3x2). Bagged 6500 lbs., left 5000 lbs to bag.	S-F
2130		7	011930	Company L while moving in heavy brush at YD 204545, moving between 2dPlt Company L OP and 2dPlt Company L ambush, right flank man saw VC, spun and fired into Company L position, which was facing road bed, in northerly direction. And VC opened fire in southerly direction, the VC also threw a couple grenades. East ambush opened up with 150 rounds of 5.56 and 5 M-79 fire. Searched area after unit contact and found blood trail but lost trail in brush line. Captured 1 helmet, 3 friendly WIA'S	

(See reverse side for instructions)

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(Classification)

ENCLOSURE (3)

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS

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(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION 3d Battalion, 9th Marines	
PLACE Dong Ha, RVN	
FROM (Date and hour) 04000	TO (Date and hour) 042400H July 1967

TIME		SERIAL NO	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
0712		1	040700H	Battalion began attack north with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.		S-F, 9th Marines S-3
0920		2	040915H	Company K made contact with an established NVA company (YD 127718).		S-F, 9th Marines S-3
0922		3	040916H	Company L attacking on right flank of Company K made contact. Both receiving S/A and 60mm mortar fire. 3dPlt, Company K's commander reported KIA. Tanks attached to Company K received 3 RPG rounds. Returned canaster 90mm.		S-F, 9th Marines S-3
1025		4	041015H	Tank attached to Company L hit w/RPG round and disabled. Tank evacuated from the area.		S-F, 9th Marines S-3
1047		5	041045H	Company K received heavy S/A fire. Friendly KIA's - 12, WIA's - 17.		S-F, 9th Marines S-3
1057		6	041055H	Medevac completed		S-F, 9th Marines S-3
1104		7	041100H	Company K and L, pulled back to YD 129717. Battalion CP under heavy artillery and rocket attack.		S-F, 9th Marines S-3
1200		8	041200H	Heavy friendly air and artillery attack began on areas of contact. Tanks fired at targets of opportunity with 5 NVA KIA.		S-F, 9th Marines S-3
1640		9	041630H	Company K, L, and tanks jumped off to sweep area of previous contact		S-F, 9th Marines S-3
1645		10	041645H	Dong Ha Combat Base received eight enemy artillery shells. No casualties or damage in Battalion rear.		S-F, 9th Marines S-3

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(Classification) FORM A 1

ENCLOSURE (3)

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION	
3d Battalion, 9th Marines	
PLACE	
Dong Ha, RVN	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
050001	052400H July 1967

TIME		SERIAL NO	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	I-Troops I-File
0005		1	050005H	Frag O from 9th Marines, Ref. Operation CIMARRON. Continue operations in accordance w/ref. H hour 050730, artillery prep fire 0545 to 0630. Air prep fire 0630 to 0730. Prep area bounded by YD 123720 - YD 146724.	S-F	
0545		2	050545H	Artillery prep fire began	S-F	
0635		3	050630H	Air prep fire began	S-F	
0825		4	050815H	Company L, K, and I began attack. CO of Company A assumed joint command of Co. A and Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.	S-F, 9th Marines S-3	
0935		5	050919H	Company L found 15 MIA's (all KIA) from 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (YD 135725). Company L found mine field w/20 mines, one 250 lb. and one 500 lb bomb. Set for electrical detonation.	S-F, 9th Marines S-3	
1041		6	051030H	Company L captured 43 82mm mortar rounds and cleaning gear (YD 131723), ammo destroyed in place.	S-F, 9th Marines S-3	
1135		7	051121H	Company I captured one complete 60mm mortar (YD 130726).	S-F, 9th Marines S-3	
1141		8	051122H	Company L received 4 rounds enemy 120mm rockets. Reported enemy rocket position at YD 147734, artillery called.	S-F, 9th Marines S-3	
1231		9	051225H	Company I captured 7.62 LMG (YD 132725) w/drum cannister feed and leaf sight. Gun sent to S-2. Found grave w/one NVA body. Found two connecting bunkers w/43 rounds 82mm mortar ammunition and 15 AT mines, destroyed in place w/C-4.	S-F, 9th Marines S-3	
1315		10	051300H	3d Battalion, 9th Marines recovered 47 bodies of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines who were MIA.	S-F, 9th Marines	

(See reverse side for instructions)

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ENCLOSURE (3)



HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division, FIF
APO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/BWC/bwc
3100.1
19 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, Ninth Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6342I, 644IV
(b) Ninth Marines Operation Order 7-67
(c) Ninth Marines FragO 9-67
(d) Ninth Marines FragO 10-67
(e) Ninth Marines Operation Overlay to FragO 9-67

1. Code Name. Operation BUFFALO.
2. Dates of Operation. 021000H - 140900I July 1967.
3. Location. Dong Ha Combat Base (2-9 July), Cam Lo Base Camp (9-14 July),
Quang Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Task Organization.

<u>9th Marines</u>	Colonel G. E. JERUE
<u>3d Battalion, 9th Marines</u>	Major W. J. WOODRING, JR.
Company I, 3/9	Captain E. H. COYLE (2 - 4 July) Captain R. W. SWIGART (4 July) Captain G. D. N. VADEL (4 - 5 July) Captain W. A. CONGER (5 - 14 July)
Company K, 3/9	Captain J. E. GILLS
Company L, 3/9	Captain T. T. SHIRLEY
Company A, 1/9	Captain A. C. SLATER
Company C, 1/9	Captain E. L. HUTCHINSON, JR. (2-4 July) 2dLt. D. M. TILIP (4 - 5 July) Captain A. C. SLATER (5 - 14 July)
Company H, 2/9	Captain F. L. SOUTHARD
3dPlt, Company C, 3d Tanks	2dLt. L. V. ANDERSON
Reconnaissance Detachment	1stLt. S. M. HARTNETT

5. Supporting Units.

a. Artillery.

(1) From 2 July to 9 July, Echo Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

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3/9
a/a
Open BUFFALO
2-14 Jul 67

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and Whiskey Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines were in direct support of this battalion. Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, USA, (175mm), Charlie Battery, 1st 8" Howitzers, and Kilo Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines (155mm), were in general support.

(2) Two FOT's and 41 fire missions were fired with an expenditure of 6971 HE, 37 WP, and 1196 illumination rounds. Co L FO called in mission on an NVA truck convoy at YD 130787. Echo Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines fired until Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, USA, took over the mission. A surveillance of two secondary explosions was given. The FO for Co C, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines called a mission on NVA troops at YD 123725. Echo Battery fired the mission which resulted in a surveillance of 75 NVA KIA's. Several counter-battery missions fired at YD 082 47 were controlled by Co L FO and fired by Echo Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines. Several secondary explosions were observed by the FO.

(3) The following is a target list derived from missions controlled by other units:

<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>CONVOYS</u>	<u>ARTILLERY</u>		<u>MORTARS</u>
121740	150788	095854	080755	125718
140715	125848	085795	082847	122578
125728	130787	097783	081789	117682
126730	115800	095795	084708	
128737		093823	096834	
113755		105775	098831	
136718		105755	100795	
		110843	103793	
		119759	092797	
		095775	082781	
		030850	116778	
		003834	056834	

b. Air. During Operation BUFFALO the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines received the following air support:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>
Medevac - Routine	5	5
Priority	0	0
Emergency	4	4
Helo Resupply - Routine	11	10
Priority	2	2
Emergency	4	4

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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Trooplift		2	2
Gunships		4	3
Admin Lift		1	1
TACA		32	32
Fixed Wing	CAS	44	42
	DAS	19	19
	TPQ	5	(UNK)
Flareship		4	3
AC-47		4	3

6. Intelligence.

a. Weather/Astronomical Data.

(1) Temperature. The temperature for the period 02-10 July 1967 ranged from a low of 70 degrees to a high of 95 degrees farenheit.

(2) Precipitation. Negative.

(3) Winds. Winds from the southwest at 3-5 knots.

(4) Cloud Cover. The clouds were at 10,000 feet and scattered.

(5) Visibility. The visibility was excellent and haze was virtually non-existent. Dust clouds on the trace produced by helicopters presented some problem in the LZ area.

(6) Light Data. An average of 13 daylight hours per day during the operation was experienced.

<u>DAY</u>	<u>BMCT</u>	<u>SRISE</u>	<u>SSET</u>	<u>EECT</u>	<u>MRISE</u>	<u>MSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>	<u>LILLUM</u>
2	0533	0623	1930	1953	0204	1458	Last	30%
3	0533	0623	1930	1953	0241	1447	Last	21%
4	0533	0624	1930	1953	0321	1639	Last	14%
5	0534	0624	1930	1953	0405	1734	Last	8%
6	0534	0624	1930	1953	0455	1901	Last	3%
7	0534	0625	1930	1953	0549	1928	Last	1%
8	0535	0625	1930	1952	0648	2023	New	0%
9	0535	0625	1930	1952	0748	2115	New	2%
10	0536	0625	1929	1952	0848	2202	New	6%

(7) Effect on Enemy Operations. Weather conditions afforded the enemy good visibility. Therefore, helicopters and fixed wing aircraft were easily observed, and routes of approach could be observed at a great distance.

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(8) Effect on Accomplishment of Own Mission. Weather was favorable for air operations, particularly close air support and helicopter operations. The nights were clear and therefore night illumination from the moon or pyrotectics was received at a maximum. The heat during the day hampered long range patrolling and movement.

b. Terrain.

(1) Con Thien - The Artillery/USMC Outpost located at YD 115701 is the highest point in the area of operation.

(2) Trace - The man made trace between Con Thien (YD 115701) and Gio Linh (YD 213732) is a cleared area approximately 500 meters wide.

(3) Road - The north to south road (YD 137708) to (YD 135725) is easily recognized in the area and is accurately drawn on the map (Quang Tri, Sheet 6442 IV, Series L7014).

(4) Market - The destroyed market area (YD 135725) is randomly scattered but can be recognized easily.

c. Observation and Fields of Fire. The open fields offer excellent observation and fields of fire. Observation and fields of fire from one field to another is hampered by hedgerows thus limiting said field of fire to 60 to 75 meters.

d. Cover and Concealment. Concealment ranges from excellent in the thick hedge fows to extremely poor in the open fields. Concealment is excellent for small groups of personnel. Large groups of personnel can be afforded cover if deployed properly. Hedge rows have old fighting holes and a few destroyed bunkers that provide good cover. Many terraced rice fields have ditches that were dug to provide drainage and dirt for dike construction. Remnants of houses also provide cover for snipers.

e. Obstacles. The major obstacle for foot troops and track vehicular movement was thick hedgerows consisting of brushwood, undergrowth, bamboo, and elephant grass. Never-the-less, troops and tanks did move without great difficulty.

f. Avenues of Approach - Any part of the area can be easily approached and there are no particular points of channelization.

g. Landing Zones. LZ's are plentiful. Any number of helicopters can land on the trace between Con Thien and Gio Linh. The open fields afford areas for two to five helicopters.

h. Effect on Enemy Operations. North of the trace the terrain favors the enemy with relation to ambushes and fighting positions, however any massive enemy movement could easily be seen by aerial reconnaissance. Water can be obtained from the tributaries of the Ben Hai and the Ben Hai itself, also artesian wells at YD 128738 and the lake at YD 141730 are excellent water points.

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i. Effect on Accomplishment of Own Mission. Terrain is favorable for major helicopter operations. Tracked vehicles can easily move, and in some areas wheel vehicles can be used; particularly the USMC mule. Troop movement is hampered when hedgerows produce difficulty in maintaining contact.

j. Enemy Situation.

(1) Composition. From identification cards captured the enemy is believed to be from the 7th and 8th Battalions, 90th Regiment, 324B Division of the North Vietnamese Army. One NVA prisoner interrogated is believed to be from the 34th Independent Battalion.

(2) Strength and Combat Efficiency. The 90th Regiment, 324B Division has a strength of 2,400 personnel. The 90th Regiment's weapons consist of 82mm mortars, 60mm mortars, 75mm RR's, 12.7 AAG's, LMG's, HMG's and are believed to be readily available from units north of the Ben Hai. Combat efficiency of enemy forces is assumed to be excellent.

k. Enemy Activity.

(1) The enemy and equipment. The enemy soldier was the NVA regular with average height of 5'4" and average weight of 120 pounds. The enemy had brush haircuts. The enemy wore green uniforms similar to USMC. Their boots are canvas with rubber cleated soles. A few jungle covers were discovered, but the most predominate covers were made of strips of bamboo, paper, plastic and camouflage type material. These covers are obviously designed to look like the USMC helmet. There is a possibility the NVA were wearing flak jackets obtained from USMC dead. The enemy was well equipped with web gear, all of which was in excellent condition. This gear consisted of cartridge belts, ammo pouches and grenade pouches.

(2) Enemy Weapons. The enemy was equipped with AK-47's, SKS's type 56, RPD's, RPG-2's, RPG-7's, 82mm mortars, 60mm mortars, assorted artillery, new ChiCom grenades, US anti-tank mines, and Russian claymores.

(3) Enemy Positions. The enemy dug bunkers with tops reinforced with logs 3" to 6" in diameter and 1' to 2' hard clay. Bunkers were flush to the ground. Most bunkers were connected by a trench line. Three circular positions, 4' deep and 8' in diameter, were found at YD 125728. These positions believed to be used as either mortar positions or AA positions. The three circular positions were located within banana trees and were well camouflaged from ground level. Over 200 12.7mm shells were found in one hole.

l. Captured Weapons.

HMG -----	1	AK-47 -----	37
SKS -----	27	60mm Mortar Tube ---	3
RPG-7 -----	1	M-1 Carbine -----	1
RPD -----	8		

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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7. Mission. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (-)(Reinf) effect relief of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and conducted search and destroy operations in assigned area, to locate and capture or destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment.

8. Concept of operation. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (-)(Reinf), commencing H-hour on 3 July 1967, attacked north along assigned axis, to exploit contact developed by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on 2 July 1967. See reference (e).

9. Execution.

a. Upon notification at approximately 021500 July 1967 of the requirement to reinforce 1st Battalion, 9th Marines elements in heavy contact, Co. K and the Command Group moved to helo-zone, Dong Ha for shuttle helolift to the trace east of Con Thien at YD 130706. Co. L followed being lifted from the field from vicinity YD 213536 Co. I moved by road from vicinity YD 303562 to the helo-zone, Dong Ha to complete the lift. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines units commenced lift at 021630 and completed same at 021900 except for 1st Platoon, Co. I which arrived 030900. At 021830 the CP received two volleys of incoming 105mm artillery from unknown source to the north. Co. K contacted Co. A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at 021930 killing one and capturing one NVA soldier who had been wounded. Co. K returned with all Co. A personnel and the POW at 022130. Co. I contacted Co. C, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at 022045. During this period medevac's were being accomplished and completed by 02224. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was assigned OPCON of A and C Co, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. During the course of the night all 3d Battalion, 9th Marines units continued to receive sporadic incoming artillery and mortar rounds. At 022300 all units were consolidated in vicinity of YD 131707 and night defensive fires were established. E&I fires continued throughout the night.

b. During 3 July all efforts were concentrated on finding MIA's from 1/9 ZOA while awaiting 1/3 to link up for an attack to the north. At 030730 saturation by air in 40A to the north commenced and secured at 030820. Air strikes accounted for 1 confirmed NVN KIA and numerous probables at YD 145748. Throughout the entire day 3/9 units continued probing for 1/9 MIA's and were constantly subjected to sniper, RPG and small arms fire from concealed positions. Co. K found 2 NVA KIA's at 031353. Co. L found and destroyed 1 RPG round employed as an AT mine. During the remainder of the afternoon and evening all 3/9 units continued to receive sporadic artillery and mortar fire. At 031935, 1/3 effected link-up with 3/9. Night defensive positions were established.

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c. At 040700, 3/9 and 1/3 units jumped off in the attack to the north. At 040915 Co L made contact with an estimated NVA company at YD 127718. Co L on the right flank of Co K, also made contact with an unknown sized IV unit. Co I and L received incoming 60mm mortar rounds with each unit taking 1 MIA from fragmentation. Co K moved forward and established contact with the NVA forces. Co K and L were taken under heavy automatic, semi-automatic and 60mm mortar fire. At 040925 the 3d Platoon Commander Co K, was killed in the fire fight. At 040945 three RPG rounds were fired at the tanks attached to Co K which were providing suppressive fire for the evacuation of Co K casualties. The tanks fired at the R.G position with canister rounds and no more RPG's were fired from that position. At 041015 a Co L tank was hit with an RPG round, disabled, and evacuated from the battle area. At 041043 Co C, 1/9 reported 11 MIA's * from artillery fragmentation, including the Company Commander. By 041050 all medevacs were evacuated by helicopter. Enemy fire from bunkers and trenchlines, including all types of weapons increased and by 041045 further movement forward was ceased as Co K had sustained 12 KIA's and 17 MIA's. The decision was made to pull Co K and L back 200 meters to the vicinity of the east-west road, YD 129717, so that the area of contact could be saturated with artillery and air strikes. The withdrawal was accomplished by 041150. During this period 3/9 CP group was taken under fire by rockets and artillery from the west of Con Thien for a period of 35 minutes. From 041200 to 041600 heavy air and artillery strikes were called in the area of original contact. Tanks attached to Co K fired on targets of opportunity accounting for 5 NVA KIA's. At 041630 Co K with 2 platoons from Co I and tanks attached, jumped off in the attack to sweep the area of previous contact and to recover Marine KIA's. The sweep was accomplished by 1830 with Co I elements suffering 2 KIA's and 4 MIA's from enemy small arms fire from the right flank. One of the KIA's was the Company Commander, Co I. The 3/9 S-3 was assigned command of Co I with the S-3A taking the responsibility of the S-3. By 042000 all units had returned to the vicinity of the east-west road and established night defensive positions. Night defensive fires were registered and, except for harrassing fires from NVA artillery, further contact with enemy forces were negligible.

d. At 05055 artillery began prep fire on areas YD 142720, YD 145728, and YD 145712. At 050630 artillery ceased and air began their prep of the same area. At 050730 all air prep of the area ceased. Co I, L, and K jumped off at 050715. At this time Co A and C, 1/9 were combined under the Commanding Officer of Co A. Co I, at 050825, reported crossing the road and uncovering 5 AT mines. At 050856, both Companies I and K reached the LOA. 050919 Co L reported finding 15 of 1/9 MIA's halfway to the LOA (YD 135725). Within the next hour Co L uncovered a minefield with 20 assorted mines, 1-250# bomb, and 2-500# bombs all set for electrical detonation. All ordnance was blown in place with C-4. At 051000 Co I set out OP's approximately 75 meters from their position. Negative contact resulted. S-2 captured one crypto authentication table at an 8km position.

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051030 Co. L captured 43 rounds of 82mm with a large amount of increments and cleaning gear at YD 131723. 051121 Co. I captured a 60mm mortar complete with base plate and bipod assembly at YD 130726. At the same time Co. L received 4 rounds 120mm rockets from a position 4000 meters northwest of them. Again at 051156 4 more 120mm rockets were fired. Co. L reported the enemy position at YD 147734 and called artillery. 051225 Co. I reported capturing 1 7.62 light machinegun w/bipod at YD 132725. The gun was drum cannister fed with leaf sights. Co. I discovered five fresh shallow graves, with grave markers each containing one body. Co. I found two bunkers connected with trenchline heavily reinforced and covered with natural camouflage. In the bunkers were 43 82mm rounds attached to poles for carrying. 15 AT mines were uncovered. All mines and ordnance were blown in place with C-4. 051300 3/9 had recovered 47 1/9 KIA's. Co. I sent a notebook and Laotian currency (YD 132725), to 3/9 CP. Commanding Officer, 9th Marine Regiment arrived at CP at 051515 and departed at 051405. 051410 3/9 CP received incoming 120mm rockets. Counter battery was called and enemy fire ceased. Co. A 1/9 confirmed 3 NVA KIA at 051500. Co. L confirmed 2 NV KIA's by artillery at 051607. At this time Co. A reported one additional NVA KIA. All 3/9 units prepared night defensive positions.

e. 060840 Co. A, 1/9 and a unit from 3d Reconnaissance Battalion established a patrol base at YD 125727. At 061110 3/9 CP received 4 rounds of incoming artillery. This artillery was countered with artillery and the enemy positions were silenced. Co. L received 12 incoming artillery rounds. At 061320, 3/9 CP displaced to YD 128713. During the period 061645 - 061735 3/9 units less Co. A were subjected to a continuous proposition from three separate artillery batteries and one rocket battery. 500 to 600 rounds impacted in the area occupied by the forward companies and the Battalion CP, 150 meters to their rear. Co. A 1/9 was held in its position 1200 meters to the north west (YD 123725). All units prepared for a ground attack. Commencing 061700 enemy movement was observed to the north and northwest of 3/9's position. At this time all fires were being directed at the enemy artillery positions. 4.2 howitzer, 81 and 60mm mortar and tank fire was brought to bear on the advancing enemy. A large enemy unit of some 400 men in approach march formation was observed moving toward the 3/9 positions under the artillery prep from the northwest obviously unaware of the Co. A position. Co. A took the enemy flank underfire with machine gun, M-79, rifle and 60mm mortar fire at a range of 150 meters. The enemy then closed on all sides and remained in heavy contact with Co. A until 062200. Artillery was called in to box the Co. A position and fired continuously until the heavy contact ended. From 062200 to 070530 Co. A received sporadic small arms and 60mm mortar fire. Co. I, K and L brought fire to bear on the advancing enemy 061715. The enemy unsuccessfully concentrated his effort on destroying the tanks located with the front line companies with RPG's. Ground contact at the 3/9 position ended 062130. Sporadic small arms and mortar fire was received throughout the night. Flare ships, Huey gunships, fixed wing and all available artillery was brought to bear on the enemy

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throughout the engagement. 070530 Co. A with all casualties returned to the 3/9 perimeter without serious incident. Immediately after Co. A cleared the night position, a thirty minute enemy artillery preparation fell within their old lines. An immediate search of the battle field in excess of fifty meters in front of Co. A's position was precluded due to enemy observation, sniper, mortar and pre registered artillery fire throughout the area and to urgency of moving the Co. A casualties to the only secure LZ south of the Battalion CP along the trace. The results of the nights activity were:

Friendly - USMC KIA ----- 3

USMC WIA ----- 21

Enemy - KIA Conf ----- 394

Enemy Equipment destroyed:

60mm tube ----- 1

LMG ----- 3

AK-47 ----- 3


ENCLOSURE (4)

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f. 070620. Enemy artillery started and lasted for approximately 20 minutes. At 070730 Co. A and reconnaissance unit returned to 3/9 CP. At 070915 Co. L reported receiving 50 rounds enemy artillery. Co. L FO spotted 2 NVA KIA confirmed. Co. L reported 4 VEA's. 071030 Co. L observed an NVA truck convoy (YD 130787) moving east to west. 071100 Co. L and AO spotted truck convoy and NV troops in masses. 105mm artillery was called in boxing in the convoy. At this point 175mm artillery was called along with TPQ 10's to cover YD 133755. Artillery lifted and air strikes and Huey gunships were called in. Results were 20 NVA confirmed and 50 probable. Artillery continued to fire after air had departed. This fire mission lasted until 071915. Co. I captured an unidentified barrell and receiver group. All gear was turned over to S-2 for identification. 3/9 units prepared night defense positions.

g. 080800 artillery prep fire were called in on area of planned activities in the vicinity of YD 125723. 081040 Co. I and L units reached the area where Co. A, 1/9 and reconnaissance units had been engaged in heavy contact on the preceeding day. 3/9 established a two company perimeter (YD 125724). All USMC gear was recovered and NVA packs and booby traps were uncovered by S-2 scouts. Two reconnaissance teams departed the perimeter to conduct reconnaissance mission in the area. One pit helmet, assorted NVA 782 gear, and several CHICOM grenades were captured by team two. Team one returned with three Russian claymores, 5-82mm rounds, and 3 boxes of 82mm igniters from YD 131723. NVA gear captured includes:

- 1 - SKS
- 1 - CHICOM blasting cap
- 1 - CHICOM booby trap
- 37 - 82mm rounds
- 1 - NVA range card
- 3 - Russian claymores
- 1 - Box civilian clothing (Female type)
- 1 - 100 pound bomb

081300 all units were ordered to return to the CP. All displacements were completed by 081345. All 3/9 units were ordered to displace to southern side of trace. The move was completed at 081655. 081630 3/9 CP was established at YD 132701. All units consolidated and formed a defensive perimeter.

h. 090800 3/9 chopped OPCON of 1/9 and 2/9 units and began move to Cam Lo Operating Base. 091100 Co. K reached Cam Lo. Co. L and the Command Group then proceeded to pick up point YD 120688. 091800 units departed pick up point and proceeded to new CP area. 3/9 relieved 2/9 of their TAOR and proceeded to establish the CP and night defensive positions.

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Co. I chopped OPCOM to 2/9 for night and returned to 3/9 upon arrival at Cam Lo, 101600.

i. During period 10 July to 140900 July all 3/9 units occupied and defended artillery units positions in the Cam Lo area (YD 141614), conducted Cam Lo - Con Thien road security and Cam Lo bridge security.

10. Results.

a. Friendly Casualties:	USMC KIA ----	16
	USMC WIA -----	97
b. Friendly Equipment Losses:	None	
c. Enemy Casualties:	KI CONF -----	481
	KELI PROB -----	200
	POW (WIA) -----	1
d. Enemy Equipment Losses:	HMG -----	1
	SKS's -----	27
	RPG-7 -----	1
	RPD's -----	8
	AK-47 -----	37
	60mm Mortar Tubes -	3
	M-1 Carbine -----	1
	Russian Claymores -	3
	60mm Mortar rounds	49
	AT Mines -- -----	20
	AP Mines -----	5
	82mm Mortar rounds	43
	CHICOM Grenades ----	in excess of 50

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ENCLOSURE (1)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~11. Commanders Analysis.

a. Initially, this battalion received the mission of reinforcing Co's A, B, C, and elements of Co D, 1/9 engaged in heavy contact in the vicinity of the "Market" (YD 1372) north of the trace running from Con Thien to Gio Linh. 3/9 was instructed to assume operational control of all units on the battlefield upon link-up. In view of the fact that this contact had started more than four hours prior the time 3/9 received its mission, the Commanding Officer with a ten man command group elected to land with the assault company by helicopter. Heavy mortars and artillery in the LZ harassed but did not slow the landing. By using the trace as an LZ, succeeding waves were landed 500 to 1,000 meters laterally from the initial touch down. Sporadic small arms and MG fire was delivered upon the Marines as they crossed the trace. Satisfactory communications were established within 15 minutes. 3/9 assumed OpCon of 1/9 units at this time. A link-up with the elements of Co D and tanks was effected within 15 minutes. 1/9 casualties were shifted to a safe area and evacuations started. Co K moved to link with Co A and found Co A in a 360 degree defensive perimeter with moderate to heavy contact. They were receiving small arms, mortar and artillery fire. The enemy fire was neutralized and Co K was assisted in moving the casualties to the LZ for evacuation. Co I linked with Co C and the remaining men of Co B and the wounded were evacuated. The KIA of Co B were not recovered at this time. Co B and D personnel were moved to Con Thien that evening. Co A and C were consolidated within the 3/9 positions.

b. During the following three days enemy contact varied from light to very heavy as the area was being searched for MIA's from Co B, 1/9. The enemy had all areas of previous contact registered with artillery and mortar fire.

c. Throughout the eight days 3/9 was in the field during Operation BUFFALO daily contact was established by each unit of the battalion. On 4 July, while on the move with 2 companies abreast, a sizeable enemy force in defensive positions was encountered. Again contact was at extremely close range and the enemy attempted to encircle the flank of the attacking unit. He used the same basic tactic when the 3/9 defensive positions were attacked during the period of 6-7 July.

d. After personally viewing the battlefield and the disposition of the friendly KIA's and the enemy bodies found, the following conclusions were drawn:

(1) Co A was well disposed and in a tactical position to engage the enemy at all times. Shortly after Co B was attacked by the NV force Co A became engaged and, although well disposed, suffered casualties to the extent they were unable to fight and move simultaneously. However, Co A was still in a good defensive position, still fighting and had inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy when link-up was accomplished.

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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(2) The other route of advance was along a trail running generally south to north from the trace to the "Market" on an old cart road 8 to 12 feet wide. In many areas the trail is cut and worn three to four feet below ground level. Practically the entire trail is bordered on both sides by a bamboo and thorn bush hedge which is virtually impassible to foot troops except for cuts and breaks in the hedge at irregular intervals. It appears as though the Co. was in a column along the trail stretched from 500 meters north of the trace to the vicinity of the "Market" when they were engaged by the enemy. Practically all of the Co. B KL's recovered were in the trail. The few not physically in the trail were within 15 meters of the trail. After engaging the Co., with small arms, the enemy utilized grenades and preregistered mortar fire. Most Marines in the trail could not get out except through the few openings in the hedge row which were obviously covered by fire. From the high number of small craters made by grenades it appeared as though the enemy pinned the Co. down in the trail and lobbed grenades over the hedge row.

e. The NVA forces appear to be fully aware of the Marine tradition to remove all wounded and dead from the battle field. Evacuation efforts were covered by enemy artillery, mortar and small arms fire. Further if our aid station or LZ could be located they were subjected to heavy artillery fire.

f. Enemy tactics from previous contact in the operating area were reaffirmed during Operation BUFFALO. It is apparent that the NVN desires to wait until conditions are to his advantage before initiating action. He has consistently showed a reluctance to engage major units that are tactically disposed with a good front and solid flank security. However by using the tactics of extreme close initial contact coupled with his demonstrated ability to rapidly maneuver; he will strike any unit regardless of size deployed in a column or linear formation lacking depth or flank security.

g. Due to the fact that the entire area north of the trace from Con Thien east almost to Gio Linh is a series of trenches, fighting holes and hedgerows affording excellent cover and concealment, units on the move most likely will not observe enemy forces prior to a meeting engagement or, if the unit does not have proper security and the ability to rapidly maneuver, and ambush.

h. Movement throughout the area of operation in all tactical formations is possible. Such movement is not easy and is slow but can be accomplished. When entering extremely heavy brush over a large area units can still move deployed in 3 parallel columns. This affords security to the flanks and permits further maneuver in the event of enemy contact.

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i. This Battalion encountered no evidence of the NVA using gas or wearing Marine flak jackets and helmets. In fact the Co. B 1/9 KIA's recovered after 3 d ys on the battle field still had their individual equipment less some weapons, most of which were evacuated with the wounded on 2 July.

j. In order to maintain control and keep aware of the tactical situation in this close quarter combat, the command group remained no more than 150 meters from the lead companies. This has some disadvantages in that the command group is subjected to small arms fire that passes through the brush and mortars and artillery that are fired long at the lead companies. However, if the commander is ever to use an OP or personally observe and influence the action when his units are in contact it is imperative that he be near his lead unit.

k. Due to heavy H&I's, TPQ's and the lack of water in the area around the "Market," it appears as though the enemy only moves into this area when he has a mission. However adequate water and harbor sites are available in vicinity of GS YD 1373 and in the DMZ.

l. The terrain in the area of contact consisted of terraced farming squares bordered by hedgerows with fighting holes and trenches in each hedge row. Most of the trenches appear to have been dug as a part of the overall agricultural project years ago. Trenches on either side of the bamboo line prevents the bamboo from spreading throughout the field. The squares appear to have been made dependant upon the slope of the ground. Each square is bordered by a hedge row to prevent erosion and a drop or rise depending upon the ground level of the next plot. This area has not been farmed in some years. Consequently the farm plots are over grown with grass, brush and banana trees.

m. A ridge line extends from "Market" westerly for almost 3500 meters. This ridge affords excellent long range observation south to Con Thien, Dong Ha and much of the terrain in between. It also affords observation north up to a range of 14000 meters. Movement out of the DMZ south to the reverse slope of this ridge is possible without being observed from Con Thien. This ridge complex is critical both to the enemy and friendly units. The easiest approach from the south to the ridge complex is along the high ground running northeast for 2000 meters from Con Thien and east along the ridge complex itself. Movement from the east is under observation from the ridge in the vicinity of the "Market." Movement from the trace north towards the "Market" is under enemy observation.

12. Recommendations.

a. That operations conducted in the BUFFALO operation area be of battalion size at a minimum regardless of previous enemy sightings and contacts.

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A Battalion of 4 companies reinforced with tracked vehicles can conduct operations including reconnaissance in force in this area. At the same time in the event of a major encounter, a unit of this size can remain self supporting in heavy contact for two or three days until necessary reinforcements could be employed.

b. That the tactical formation affording the required security during movement be no less than three parallel columns separated by approximately fifty meters.

c. That extensive use of artillery and air be employed in all suspected areas prior to entry with ground forces. If supporting arms are not available at the time desired; delay movement.

d. That tracked vehicles including Ontos and LVT's be utilized extensively when operating in this area in a general support role. The RPG has been found to be relatively inaccurate at ranges greater than 150 meters. By careful employment of infantry forces, the effects of the RPG can be minimized. The tanks supporting 3/9 were fired at daily with RPG's and only one was hit. That tank left the battlefield under it's own power.

W. J. Woodring, Jr.
W. J. WOODRING, JR.

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/BWC/bwc
3100.1
20 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, Ninth Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

- Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6342I, 6442IV.
- (b) Ninth Marines Operation Order 11-67.
- (c) Ninth Marines FragO 1-67 to Operation Order 11-67 to Operation HICKORY II.
- (d) Ninth Marines FragO 2-67 to Operation Order 11-67 to Operation HICKORY II.
- (e) Ninth Marines Operation Overlay for Operation HICKORY-II.

1. Code Name. Operation HICKORY II.
2. Dates of Operation. 140900H July 1967 - 161559H July 1967.
3. Location. Quan Con Lo District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Task Organization.

<u>Ninth Marines</u>	Colonel G. E. JERUE
<u>3d Battalion, 9th Marines</u>	Major W. J. WOODRING, JR.
Company I, 3/9	Captain W. A. CONGER
Company K, 3/9	Captain R. L. CLOSE
Company L, 3/9	Captain T. T. SHIRLEY
9th Marines Scout Sniper Team	SSgt. R. E. SMITH

5. Supporting Arms.

a. Artillery. Whiskey Battery, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines was in direct support of this battalion from 14 July to 16 July 1967. The battery fired 13 missions for the FO's for India and Lima Companies. These missions included 7 on likely enemy positions and avenues of approach to the flanks and 6 defensive registrations. 25 HE&I's per night were fired on targets derived from the battalion S-2 and targets suggested by the FO's. Negative surveillance was given on all missions.

b. Air. One FO was utilized for a visual reconnaissance during this operation.

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ENCLOSURE (5)

3/9

a/c, HICKORY II

14-16 Jul 67

6. Intelligence.

a. Weather.

(1) Temperature. The temperature average for the period 140900 - 161559 was a high of 94 degrees fahrenheit and a low of 69 degrees fahrenheit. The relative humidity was 80 %.

(2) Precipitation. The precipitation for this period consisted of very light sprinkles, but no heavy measurable amounts were recorded.

(3) Winds. The winds were variable at a speed of 6-15 knots.

(4) Cloud Coverage. The clouds were scattered at a height of 10,000 feet. During the periods of light precipitation, the clouds were still of considerable height and scattered.

(5) Visibility. The visibility averaged 15 miles, and fog and haze were virtually non-existent.

(6) Light Data.

<u>DAY</u>	<u>BHCT</u>	<u>SRISE</u>	<u>SSIT</u>	<u>ECT</u>	<u>MRISE</u>	<u>MSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>	<u>LUNAR ILL</u>
14	0604	0627	1929	1952	1238	0006	First	42%
15	0604	0627	1929	1951	1336	0045	First	54%
16	0604	0627	1928	1951	1434	0127	First	65%
17	0604	0627	1928	1951	1535	0213	First	76%

An average of 13 hours of daylight was present during the operation.

(7) Effect on Enemy Operations. Weather conditions afforded the enemy good visibility over HLZ's and routes of approach. The lunar illumination afforded the enemy enough visibility for extensive night movement.

(8) Effect on Accomplishment of Own Mission. Weather was favorable for air operations, particularly close air support and helicopter operations. The nights were generally clear, and therefore, lunar illumination and pyrotechnics could be utilized to a maximum. The heat hampered long range patrolling during the mid-day, but early morning and late afternoons afforded more comfortable temperatures for movement.

b. Terrain.

(1) Critical Terrain Features. The Song Cam Lo runs from west to east in the general vicinity YD 1259 to YD 1760, south of this particular TAOR.

[REDACTED]

(2) MSR. This road, the main supply route, extends from Cam Lo to Con Thien. The road is cleared approximately 200 meters on each side, and this feature can easily be seen from area of operation.

(3) Hill 30 and 31. These 2 hills, located vicinity YD 1461 and 1561 respectively, are the location of USMC installations.

(4) Observation and Fields of Fire. The vegetation ranged from short grasses in dry rice paddies to brushwood with a height of 8 feet. The dry rice paddies afforded relatively good observation and fields of fire. The brushwood afforded approximately 10 meters of observation and restricted fields of fire.

(5) Concealment and Cover. Concealment ranges from poor in the rice paddy areas to good in the brushwood areas. The low rolling hills and rice paddy dikes afford fair cover from ground fire, but the cover is poor for mortar and artillery fire.

(6) Obstacles. Major obstacles to foot and track vehicles are the brushwood areas and thick vegetation along stream beds. Movement of troops is possible but generally very difficult. The stream beds are either dry or have very little water, however, the steep banks of the stream beds constitute a major obstacle to track vehicles.

(7) Avenues of Approach. Any part of the area can be approached from any direction. The tank trails in the area affords easy and rapid movement.

(8) Landing Zones. The LZ's are not plentiful and multi-landing in a small area is not probable. The terrain affords randomly located LZ's which could be used for resupply and medevac purposes. The MSR affords unlimited LZ's for any operations.

(9) Effect on Enemy Operations. Small groups of enemy personnel could move with little difficulty without being observed. Large units would not have adequate concealment and cover for massive movement without detection during daylight hours.

(10) Effect on Accomplishment of Own Mission. Terrain is favorable for blocking forces. Water is available from stream (YD 123626) south to the Sung Cam Lo. Large scale helicopter operations can be conducted from the MSR. Foot and track vehicles can move but with some difficulty.

c. Enemy Situation.

(1) Composition. The suspected enemy in our area of operation was reported by agents and no physical contact or sighting was made. An agent reported 1 VC main force battalion (unknown name) appeared at YD 165635. They later moved to YD 167645 and YD 172643 to dig foxholes.

Another report stated one VC main force company appeared at YD 162653 and moved to about YD 156644 for rest. The company then moved to YD 147645 and disappeared. Both reports had an F-6 rating.

(2) Strength. From agent reports the VC main Force battalion is completely armed with weapons. The troops were wearing light blue uniforms and some women were with the battalion. The VC main force company was armed with 82mm mortars, machine guns, BAR's and individual weapons.

(3) Enemy Activity. There have been reports of AP and AT mines in the area. AP mines have been reported along the streams located from YD 153676 to YD 188675 and from YD 155657 to YD 164666. Command detonated claymores have also been reported in the area. 9 AT mines were discovered along the MSR in grid square YD 1365.

7. Mission. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines continue defense of C M LO and establish minimum of two company sized blocks to support scheme of maneuver.

8. Concept of Operation. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines establish blocks with two companies, one to each side of Route #561, in the vicinity of the 625 East-West grid line; coordinate block established by two Cam Lo RF companies in vicinity YD 1060.

9. Execution.

a. Prior to 0600 on 14 July 1967, Co I and L departed Cam Lo perimeter to establish blocking positions approximately 1000 meters to the north. At 0845, Co L was in their blocking position with their flanks extending from YD 135625 to YD 144625. At 1045, Co I reported their blocking position established from YD 124626 to YD 123626. At 1130 two local Regional Forces from Cam Lo District reported their blocking positions established from YD 105602 to YD 110603. At 1200 the RF unit spotted 7 VC at YD 125604 and fired small arms and 60mm mortar fire with negative results. No further contact throughout the day or night. The RF unit was relieved nightly at 1800 by CAC-1 reinforced with a squad from Co I and a sniper team.

b. On 15 July 1967 all 3d Battalion, 9th Marines units remained in their same blocking positions of 14 July, and no enemy contact developed. RF companies resumed their block at 150000.

c. Blocking positions for 3d Battalion, 9th Marines units were withdrawn by 161125 July 1967 with negative enemy contact throughout the operation. Operation WICKORY II terminated at 161559H July 1967.

10. Results.

- a. Friendly Casualties: None
- b. Friendly Equipment Losses: None
- c. Enemy Casualties: None.

- [REDACTED]
- d. Enemy Equipment Losses: None.
- e. Enemy Weapons Losses: SIS - Type 56 ----- 1
11. Administrative Matters. None were encountered during this operation .
12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.
13. Commanders Analysis. None.
14. Recommendations. None.

W. J. WOODRING, JR.

3 Bn. 9 Marines S&C No. 40165-67
Copies 9 of 10

HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

9th Mar Regt.
Control No. 0638-67

3/BMC/jm Copy No. 9 of 10
3100.1
14 Jul 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, Ninth Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

- Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6342I, 6442IV
- (b) Ninth Marines Operation Order 1-67
- (c) Ninth Marines Operation Order 7-67
- (d) Ninth Marines FragO 1-67 for Operation CIMARRON
- (e) Ninth Marines FragO 3-67 for Operation CIMARRON
- (f) Ninth Marines FragO 7-67 for Operation CIMARRON
- (g) Third Battalion, Ninth Marines FragO 1-67 for Operation CIMARRON
- (h) Third Battalion, Ninth Marines FragO 2-67 for Operation CIMARRON
- (i) Third Battalion, Ninth Marines Combat After Action Report dtd 1 Jul 67
- (j) Third Battalion, Ninth Marines Combat After Action Report dtd 6 Jun 67

3/4
A/A Rpt (Opn CIMARRON)

1. Code Name. Operation CIMARRON
2. Dates of Operation. 010001 Jun67 - 021000 Jul67.
3. Location. Dong Ta Combat Base, Quan Cam Lo District, Quan Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Task Organization.

9th Marines	Colonel G. E. JERUE
3d Battalion, 9th Marines	Major W. J. WOODRING, JR.
Company J, 3/9	Captain E. U. COYLE
Company K, 3/9	Captain J. E. GILES
Company L, 3/9	Captain T. T. SHIRLEY
Company M, 3/9	Captain G. D. N'VADEL Captain R. B. JOHNSTON
Company D, 1/9	Captain R. J. SASEK Captain G. D. N'VADEL

1 June - 2 July 1967

ENCL (6)

~~1st Plt, Co C, 3d Tanks~~

1stLt. J. B. BROCK

3dPlt, Co C, 3d Engineers

1stLt. W. L. HOGUE

5. Supporting Arms.

a. Artillery. During the period of Operation CIMAARRON, an average of 29 HEI fires per night and 3 rounds per mission were fired in support of Third Battalion, Ninth Marines. 14,000 rounds of HE, 132 rounds of WP, and 24 rounds of illumination were fired in direct support of this battalion.

b. Air Support. During Operation CIMAARRON, air support was requested for direct support of this battalion. Of the 79 missions requested, 78 were received providing this battalion with excellent air support. A detailed breakdown by type of aircraft is as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>
Helo Trooplift	2	1
Medevac - Routine	5	5
Priority	7	7
Emergency	7	7
TACA (AO)	13	13
Resupply	28	28
Helo Recon	2	2
DAS	4	4
CAS	11	11

6. Intelligence.

a. See reference (i).

b. Terrain. Terrain is of two different areas. The terrain north of the Cam Lo River and that area near the DMZ is characterized by plains leading to low mountains with elevations ranging from 50 to 300 meters with the exception of Dong Ha Mountain which is the commanding terrain feature at YD 019593. The hills become increasingly rugged toward the west with short ridges randomly orientated in an easterly direction. The most prevalent vegetation in this area is dense undergrowth forest, particularly along the larger stream valleys. Brushwood is interspersed between the forests. This undergrowth is passable with difficulty by foot troops and impassable by conventional vehicles except along trails and roads. Tanks can slowly clear paths through the shallow root vegetation in the rolling plains.

The brushwood areas consist of moderate growth and does not exceed 3 meters in height. In the terrain south of Dong Ha the plains are low rolling with elevation between 10 and 58 meters. The vegetation is predominantly brushwood averaging in height of four feet. Vegetation along the streams is particularly dense with a height of 4 meters.

c Significant Events. During the period 1-7 June this battalion remained in the Operation HICKORY 1 area. See reference (j). 1 June contact was made with an estimated reinforced company in the vicinity of Hill 94 (YD 089652). The enemy was well covered in bunkers and concealed in brushwood and heavy undergrowth. The enemy was in a security position for Hill 94. Their defenses were disposed to cover the corridor running from north to south. The position was reduced by attacking through heavy brush from east to west. During the period 13-20 June 1967, a search and destroy mission was conducted, north of Con Thien. See reference (a). In excess of 500 bunker complexes were detected and destroyed. Positions were predominately covered bunkers, 6x4x4 feet with three layers of logs and packed dirt for the top. The majority of these bunkers were in some military tactical position, either 360's, 180's, or "L" shaped. Many of these bunkers were connected by trenches and mortar positions were within the trenches. All mortar positions were directed toward Con Thien. On 28 June 1967 the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in connection with 2d ARVN Regiment and three RF companies from Quang Tri Province in the area east of Route #1 between Dong Ha and Quang Tri with negligible contact. A VC rice cache in excess of 5 tons was captured.

7. Mission. See references (b) through (h).

8. Concept of Operation. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (-)(Reinf) conducted deliberate search and destroy operations in assigned operating areas to locate and capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment. See references (b) through (h).

9. Execution. During the period 1-9 June 1967, this battalion continued in the defense of Camp J. J. CARROLL and the CUA VALLEY area (YD 095515). Emphasis was placed on aggressive patrolling within the respective company sectors to counter and minimize enemy activity in these areas. The battalion established outposts and ambushes throughout the assigned TAOR.

On 10 June 1967, this battalion completed the move into Dong Ha Combat Base and was assigned the basic mission of base reaction force and Sparrow Hawk. The battalion CP area was established at (YD 241592). One company was chopped Opcon to the 12th Marines for the defense of Cao Linh.

From 1-7 June, 13-20 June and 28 June, the battalion participated in search and destroy operations in conjunction with Operation CIMARRON in the Quan Cam Lo District and Quan Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province. RVN.

10. Results.

a. Enemy Casualties: USMC KIA ----- 16
 USMC MIA ----- 122

b. Enemy Equipment Losses: None.

c. US Casualties, KIA (Conf) ----- 44

d. Enemy Equipment Losses:

HMT - Wheel Mounted -----	2
MG -----	2
81mm Type 56 -----	2
4.2" -----	8
M-1 Carbine -----	1
RPG-2 Rocket Rounds -----	15
RPG-2 Launcher -----	1
82mm Mortar Rounds -----	19
82mm GR Rounds -----	3
7.62mm Rounds -- In excess of 10,000 rounds	
Russian Claymores -----	7
Mines, AT -----	2
CHICOM Grenades -----	In excess of 100
Assorted 782 Gear -----	

e. Enemy bunkers destroyed: In excess of 600.

11. Administrative Matters. No difficulties were encountered during Operation CIMARRON.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.

13. Commanders Analysis. See reference (i).

14. Recommendations. See reference (i).

W. J. Woodring, Jr.
 W. J. WOODRING, JR.