

HEADQUARTERS
 Battalion Landing Team 1-26
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

SER:003A247

3/PDR/dac

5750

4 September 1966

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, Special Landing Force (CTG 79.5)

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
 (b) BrigOrder 5750.1
 (c) CO, SLF ltr ser 5750 of 30Aug66

Encl: (1) BLT 1-26 Command Chronology for the period 2-31 August 1966

1. In compliance with references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This chronology includes all pertinent and significant information as defined in reference (a).

A.A. Monti
 A.A. MONTE

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BLT 1-26 COMMAND CHRONOLOGY (PART I)

1. The following organizational data is submitted.

a. Designation. Battalion Landing Team 1-26

b. Composition

(1) 2-31 August 1966

1st Bn, 26th Marines

Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Marines

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th SP Bn

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Engr Bn

1st Plt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Amtrac Bn

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AT Bn

1st Plt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Tk Bn

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Recon Bn

Det, Hq Co RLT-26

Logistic Support Unit

Det, Comm Spt Co (-), 9th Comm Bn

Det, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Med Bn

Det, 15th Dental Co, FMF

(2) 3-31 August 1966

107mm Mortar Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Marines

1st Plt, 3rd Force Recon Co

c. Locations

(1) 2-8 August 1966 - embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and the USS THOMASTON (LSD-28).

(2) 9-12 August 1966 - San Jose Area, Mindoro, Philippine Islands.

(3) 13-15 August 1966 - embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and the USS THOMASTON (LSD-28).

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(4) 16-20 August 1966 - Republic of Vietnam. See BLT 1-26 After Action Report for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I.

(5) 21 August 1966 - embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and the USS THOMASTON (LSD-28).

(6) 22-29 August 1966 - Republic of Vietnam. See After Action Report for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO.

(7) 30-31 August 1966 - embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and the USS THOMASTON (LSD-28).

d. Period covered by this Report. 2-31 August 1966

2. Personnel

a. Average Monthly Strength:

(1) USMC:	Officer	67
	Enlisted	1647
(2) USN:	Officer	8
	Enlisted	90

b. Personnel Assignments/Attachments

(1) Commanding Officer	LCol A.A. MONTI
(2) Executive Officer	Major T.E. DONNELLY
(3) S-1	2Lt G.E. BOLEN
(4) S-2	Capt J.S. VOGT
(5) S-3	Major P.D. RATCLIFF
(6) S-4	Capt W. DREBUSHENKO
(7) CO, H&S Co	Capt R.P. CARLISLE
(8) CO, Co A	Capt R. VELASQUEZ
(9) CO, Co B	Capt J.F. SIMPSON
(10) CO, Co C	Capt C.W. KAPPELMAN
(11) CO, Co D	Capt R.J. WEIDNER
(12) CO, Btry A, 1-13	Capt R.W. BAILEY

UNCLASSIFIED CO, 107mm Mortar Btry, 2-12	Capt R.O. MERRITT
(14) PltCmndr, 1st Plt, 3rd Force Recon Co	Capt K.D. JORDAN
(15) PltCmndr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Recon Bn	1stLt W.J. SPAINHOUR, JR
(16) PltCmndr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Engr Bn	2Lt E.C. DEAR
(17) PltCmndr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th AT Bn	1stLt J.C. DEBILIO
(18) PltCmndr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Amtrac Bn	1stLt W.J. DIBELLO
(19) PltCmndr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Tk Bn	1stLt R.L. LARKIN
(20) PltCmndr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th SP Bn	1stLt D.L. ANDERSON
(21) Logistic Support Unit	Capt J.L. MARABLE
(22) DetCmndr, Det, Co A, 5th Med Bn	Lt (USN) S.C. SMITH, JR (MC)
(23) DetCmndr, Det, 15th Dental Co	Lt (USN) J.L. DUGAN (DC)
(24) DetCmndr, Det, HqCo, RLT-26	2Lt J.V. MOORE
(25) DetCmndr, Det, CommSpt Co, 9th Comm Bn	Sgt R.V. THOMPSON

3. Administration

a. The 107mm Mortar Battery, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines and 1st platoon, 3rd Force Recon Co were attached 3 August 1966.

b. No administrative problems were encountered during HILLTOP VI and DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and II. A BLT Rear Administrative Center was established aboard the USS IWO JIMA. Administrative clerks with service record books and six line addressograph plates were helicopter transported to the USS IWO JIMA from the USS VANCOUVER and USS THOMASTON in order to provide immediate access to personnel records for casualty reporting procedures. This central location of all records proved highly satisfactory for this purpose. The CinC BLT Rear maintained daily communication liaison with the S-1 in the field in order to ensure accurate accountability of personnel in the rear, in the field, those evacuated and those returned to duty in the field.

c. Medical evacuations and casualty reporting were handled in accordance with the SLF SOP. Casualty cards were prepared by a Collecting and Clearing Platoon Corpsman immediately upon arrival of a casualty on the hangar deck. The card was collected by a clerk from the Administrative Center who then entered the information in a log and delivered the card and service record book to the SLF Casualty Reporting Center.

4. Intelligence

a. There were no significant items concerning intelligence during the reporting period except for Operation DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and II/Operation TOLEDO. This period is covered in detail in the BLT 1-26 After Action Report for the above operation.

5. Training. BLT 1-26 chopped from TF 79 to the SLF (TG 79.5) at 1200H, 2 August 1966. The BLT had arrived in SUBIC BAY on 28 August and an active training program was in progress. This included:

a. Intensive physical conditioning was conducted both aboard ship and ashore with all individual equipment including armored vests. This was rewarded by relatively few heat casualties during HILLTOP VI and DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and II.

b. Tanks, ONTOS, 105 Btry and 81mm Mortar Plt were able to fire on Beach GREEN giving these units the necessary practical experience needed prior to actual combat operations.

All rifle companies were able to move ashore for 2 days and 2 nights for jungle training with negrito guides and also conditioning marches.

d. Due to being in the harbor the BLT was unable to get the helicopter training which it sorely needed. The first helicopter training received other than familiarization training in CONUS with CH-46 helicopters was on the day of rehearsal for HILLTOP VI.

e. On 3 August the BLT S-3 and the SLF S-3A made a reconnaissance of the SAN JOSE Area, MINDORO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS for HILLTOP VI.

f. Plans were completed and the operation order for HILLTOP VI was issued. This operation took place from 9-12 August 1966 in the SAN JOSE Area, MINDORO, PHILIPPINES Islands. HILLTOP VI included a vertical assault of 2 rifle companies and 2 rifle companies landed across the beach. It was hoped to get the much needed helicopter training for this BLT during this exercise by moving all units at least once by helicopter while ashore. Due to fuel problems aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) this helicopter training was curtailed. Other than the final withdrawal only 2 companies were able to be lifted during the exercise. However, each rifle company did participate in a tactical lift at least once. All communications and fire control procedures were exercised and brought several problem areas to light. These problem areas were resolved prior to actual combat operations. The withdrawal went smoothly and as it later turned out was a model for our "in-country" withdrawals. Division and Force Recon Plts were utilized initially during this operation in the conventional manner. Both units were inserted into the objective area on D-1 to gather intelligence information. After the landing on D-day the plts made their patrol reports and were then phased back into the exercise as the aggressor force.

6. Command and Control. This command encountered no problems in this area although the SLF was chopped to IIFORCEV during DECKHOUSE III, PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO. The transition was smoothly executed and communications were established with an adjacent Army unit and a higher Army headquarters with a minimum of difficulty. See BLT 1-26 After Action Report of above operation for details.

7. Special Operations

a. During the periods 16-20 August 1966 and 22-29 August 1966 the BLT participated in Operation DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and II/Operation TOLEDO in the Republic of VIETNAM. See BLT 1-26 After Action Report for the above operation for details.

BLT 1-26 COMMAND CHRONOLOGY (PART II)

- NIF {
1. SLF Msg 041316ZAug66 (FragOrder #1 for HILLTOP VI)
 2. SLF Msg 142315ZAug66 (FragOrder #1 for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I)
 3. SLF Msg 211630ZAug66 (FragOrder #1 for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO)
 4. ✓ After Action Report of BLT 1-26 for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and II/Operation TOLEDO, 16-29 Aug 66
 5. 1/26 OpO 380-66 HILLTOP VI (4 Aug 66) S+L 297 929*2
 6. 1/26 OpO 328-66 DECKHOUSE III (13 Aug 66) S+L 298 351

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1-26
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602 SER: 00 3A245

3/PDR/dac
3121
2 September 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Special Landing Force (CTG 79.5)
Subj: Combat After Action Report for Operation DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I
and PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 328-67
(b) Maps: AMS L701 6442 I, (1:50,000) XA BINH GIA
AMS L701 6442 II, (1:50,000) XA PHUOC THO
AMS L701 6443 II, (1:50,000) XA THUA-TICH
AMS L701 6542 IV, (1:50,000) AP BINH CHAU
AMS L701 6543 III, (1:50,000) TAN TAO

Encl: (1) Report of DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I
TAB (a) Operation Overlay
(2) Report of DECKHOUSE III, PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO
TAB (a) Operation Overlay

1. This report is submitted in accordance with instructions contained in reference (a).
2. Operation DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and II/Operation TOLEDO were two separate amphibious operations that utilized surfaceborne and helicopterborne assault forces in both instances. Although the Special Landing Force was placed under the operational control of COMUSMACV by COMSEVENTHFLT at 241200H there was no change of operation title. Direct operational control of the Special Landing Force was exercised by IIFORCEV.
3. D-day for Operation DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I was 160900H. PHASE I ended at 201518H. D-day for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO was 220800H. At 241200H the Special Landing Force was chopped from COMSEVENTHFLT to IIFORCEV. The Special Landing Force reverted to operational control of COMSEVENTHFLT at 282400H. PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO terminated at 291630H.
4. The target area for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and II/Operation TOLEDO was the coastal lowland of Binh Tuy and Phuoc Tuy provinces. The area was generally an uncultivated plain covered with dense one and two canopy jungle, secondary brush and heavy swamp grass.
5. BLT 1-26 Command Post initially was located aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) for PHASE I and II. At 1039H on D-day for PHASE I the Command Post displaced ashore to vicinity of LZ EAGLE YS 829714 where it remained for the duration of PHASE I. At 1030H on D-day for PHASE II the Command Post displaced ashore to the vicinity of LZ HAWK at YS 645700 where it remained for the duration of PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO.

BLT
1/26
a/a
DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I-II/
TOLEDO
16-29 Aug 1966

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Encl (4)

6. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

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a. Logistics(1) Resupply

(a) Routine resupply was requested by using units one day prior to its intended use. Whenever possible, resupply was direct from ships to using units and was programmed to peak during early morning and evening hours. As many as six helicopters were utilized in direct support to provide this service. Rapid resupply was facilitated by simultaneous staging of supplies on both the LPD and LPH. Turn around time was minimized by making maximum use of the LPD as a supply source. (The LPD is generally located closer inshore than the LPH).

(b) The BLT CP landing zone also functioned as a resupply source, providing unit distribution by D+1. Whenever supplies were programmed to be delivered to a unit on the move and a suitable landing site could not be located, supplies were delivered and held at the BLT CP. Two helicopters on standby in the landing zone could then provide 30 minute service to any unit when required. Normally, a 4 to 6 hour lead time must be anticipated for any supply requirements other than routine resupply. Example: special equipment, repair parts, etc.

(c) Emergency resupply was generally limited to Class V items and could be expected to be delivered within one hour.

(2) Maintenance. Organizational maintenance was performed by the respective units. For items requiring 2d or 3d echelon repairs, wherever possible, items were exchanged and returned to the CP or to the ships for repair. This was usually done with small arms and communications equipment. In the event items could not be repaired within an acceptable time frame, they were immediately evacuated to repair facilities aboard the LPH.

(3) Evacuation. The primary method of requesting evacuation was channeled through the S-4, to Tac-Log, and then to the Helicopter Direction Center (HDC). Units in direct communications with Tac-Log could by-pass the S-4 to avoid undue delay. In emergencies, any communications system could be utilized to effect rapid evacuation. Routine evacuees were transported by first available helicopters. Two helicopters were assigned the mission as med-evac helicopters in direct support and on flight-deck alert. Usually these helicopters would be on the scene within thirty minutes. Eventually, these helicopters remained on station at the BLT CP and were available within 15 minutes. Overall, only isolated and minor problems were encountered involving the evacuation of casualties.

(4) Transportation. The helicopter was the primary means of transportation between units ashore and the ships. The M274A2 was used extensively to support resupply in the BLT CP Landing Zone. Four M274A2 provided excellent service. They greatly facilitate the offloading of cargo from helicopters.

(5) Salvage. Recovery of individual equipment from casualties was effected by evacuating the equipment with the casualty, and recovered aboard ship by a unit representative. Other items that in any way could be useful to enemy forces were either returned to the ship for proper disposition or destroyed in place, i.e., tin cans, boxes, food stuffs.

[REDACTED] RN [REDACTED]

(6) Communications

(a) BLT Tac-2 netted all units with the S-4 and Tac-Log. This communication system proved highly effective for ordering supplies and requesting medical evacuation. Net Control was established in the S-4 Office. Whenever units could communicate with Tac-Log, supplies were ordered direct from supply point to unit concerned. Normally, units ordered through the S-4 and this proved the better of any systems used.

(b) A separate net was also established as backup between the S-4 ashore and Tac-Log. This consisted of either a PRC-25, PRC-47 or MRC-62. The MRC-62 was used extensively throughout both operations and proved its worth many times over. The MRC-62 was helilifted into the BLT CP Landing Zone (approximately 8 miles inland) by CH-47 CHINOOK Helicopters.

(7) Tac-Log

(a) Routine resupply requests were normally received via the Tac-Log Net or the Tac 2 Net directly from the units or from S-4. Upon receipt of requirements, the supplies were selected from pre-staged dumps aboard the LFD and LPH, and sent to the flight deck for the lift ashore. The normal resupply mission was on its way to the beach within a two hour period; emergency resupply was somewhat faster and dependent upon helicopter availability.

(b) Requests for organic equipment or equipment which had not been pre-staged was referred to the units' representative aboard that ship for collection and delivery to the hangar deck.

(8) Activities of the Ships Platoon

(a) Resupply Operations. The Ships Platoon aboard the LPH carried out its functions as the resupply working party in conjunction with the BLT Tac-Log. Upon receipt of a requirement, the Tac-Log forwarded a request form to the OIC/NCOIC Hangar Deck. The Ships Platoon then filled the request. As soon as it was ready to be transported ashore, the Hangar Deck notified Tac-Log by means of a field phone. Along with this notification the supplies were sent to the flight deck by means of an aircraft elevator with the request form accompanying them. Upon reaching the flight deck, the supplies were staged near the island until the assigned helicopters were available for delivery. The ship provided forklifts and operators. This system proved to be highly satisfactory.

(b) Casualty Handling. Casualties were handled jointly by the LPH and the BLT. Ships Platoon personnel acted as stretcher bearers on the Flight Deck. The after aircraft elevator was used to bring casualties to the hangar deck. While on the elevator the casualty was stripped of all weapons, ordnance and 782 gear. This was accomplished by the BLT armorers, and ships gunnery personnel. The gear was inspected to insure that all ammunition was confiscated, then taken to the BLT armory for appropriate disposition. The casualty's clothing and personal effects were handled by the S-1 section of the BLT.

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(c) No significant problems were encountered in the operation of the Ship Platoon or in the processing of casualties.

(9) Significant Equipment Losses

(a) The following significant losses occurred as a result of being dropped while being transported by helicopter. Salvage operations were not feasible. The items were dropped in the ocean off the coast of Viet Nam. The lost communications items were part of two lifts and were secured to the M274A2 involved.

- 2 Mule (M274A2)
- 2 Chest - BC-5
- 1 Switchboard - SB-22
- 6 Battery - BB-451
- 6 Radio Set - PRC-25 (Complete)
- 1 Handset - H-33
- 1 Groundstake - GP-10
- 1 Climbers - LC-5
- 6 TS-10 Telephone (Component of CE-11)
- 6 Telephone - TA-1
- 1 Multimeter - URM-105
- 1 Accessory Bag (PRC-47) Complete, includes:
 - ... -Ant - AS-1320
 - MT-2786 - Legs Electrical
 - Cover, Battery Box - MX-4430
 - Rucksack
 - Assy Kit Frame Rucksak
 - Key Telegraph - J-45
 - Handset - H-33
 - Headset - H-70C
 - Loudspeaker - LS-166/U
 - Antenna, long wire - AS-1321
 - Cable Assembly (50 ft)
 - Cable, Special Purpose - CX-8396
 - Cable (3 $\frac{1}{2}$ ')
- 1 Assy Bag - PRC-25
 - Antenna - AT-271
 - Antenna - AT-892
 - Handset - H-138/U
 - Harness - ST-138
 - Support AB-591
- 1 Screwdriver Cross Tip
- 5 Screwdriver Flat Tip
- 1 Wrench Adjustable Open End
- 1 Pliers Diagonal 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch
- 1 Pliers Short, Round Nose
- 1 Wrench Set, Socket
- 1 Bag, Tool
- 1 Knife, Pocket

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b. Personnel and Administration

(1) The S-1/Adjutant established a Battalion Administrative Center aboard the LPH on D-1. The Administrative Center consisted of the Asst S-1/Adjutant, two S-1 clerks, each Company Administrative Chief and a UD/SRB clerk from each company (except A Btry, 1/13 - provided an Admin Chief only.) These administrative personnel remained on the rolls of their respective companies/batteries. The Administrative Center functioned and operated on a "Battalion Administration" level. The Asst S-1/Adjutant (OIC, Admin Center) has "By direction" authority to sign UDs, SRBs and routine matters pertaining to all units concerned. Appropriate personnel records were moved to the LPH with the Admin Personnel prior to D-day. The Admin Center was desolved after W-day.

(2) The S-1/Adjutant and the remainder of the administrative personnel displaced with the Battalion Command Post and operated in the field in accordance with the USMC Staff Manual.

(3) References, Manuals, Orders, etc.

(a) Central files and orders and directives were maintained in the Admin Center.

(b) Field elements operated with an absolute minimum of equipment. Acetate covered waterproof charts were utilized to keep an accurate up-to-date personnel daily summary of all participating units/detachments. A copy of the operation order and pertinent personnel and casualty reporting directives were the only references taken forward. The S-1/Adjutant section "desk" consisted of a hand-made waterproof box size approximately 18" x 24" x 12" which contained the necessary admin supplies and directives, i.e., memo pads, personnel rosters, notebooks, message books, JAG Manual, casualty reporting cards, pens, and pencils. A portable typewriter was not carried nor required.

(c) Casualty Reporting

1 Casualty reporting was in accordance with CMC, FMFPAC, 9th MAB and BLF directives in 3040 series. The casualty reporting center was established aboard the LPH and consisted of SLF/BLF Admin and Medical personnel. Since the BLT SRBs were maintained in the Admin Center aboard this enabled the casualty reporting center to obtain individual service records immediately as required.

2 782 gear and personal effects of casualties were inventoried and safeguarded by logistics and administrative personnel on the LPH

(d) Evacuation. Evacuation of casualties was accomplished by helicopters. Medical-Evacuees requests were handled and coordinated by the S-4 in the field and the Tac-Log aboard the LPH.

(e) Captives. Safeguarding and handling of captives was coordinated by the S-2 and the HqCmdt. After completion of interrogation all captives were delivered to the local RVN District Chief or as directed by the SLF Commander.

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(f) Civic Action. Civic Action was coordinated by the SLF Commander and his Staff. BLT Medical and Dental personnel offered their services to the nearby local village.

(g) Miscellaneous

1. There were no disciplinary problems or incidents.
2. There were no replacements required.
3. The BLT Chaplain was in the field and moved about and visited with each unit.
4. There was no personal mail delivery.
5. Guard Mail was delivered and picked up by helicopter in almost all instances.

(h) Communications

1 General

a Personnel. The number of radio nets required to be maintained during SLF Operations are considered to be too numerous to be maintained by a T/O Infantry Battalion, Communication Section. In many instances radio operators were handling as many as three and four nets at a time.

((1)) Tac-Log Communications. The requirement for the BLT communications section to maintain ship to shore and ship to ship Tac-Log communications places a severe strain upon the Battalion Radio Section. This function is normally handled at Regimental level and is not a requirement reflected in the Infantry Battalion table of organization.

((2)) Radio Communications. Radio communication between TG 79.5 and BLT 1-26 is multiplexed in that LF TAC #1 and LF TAC #2, are parallel nets which are required to be continually activated. One radio net is more than adequate to handle the amount of traffic which is passed between TG 79.5 and BLT 1-26. The requirement to establish stations on radio nets to higher and adjacent Army units when the BLT is under Army operational control also places an undue burden upon the BLT Radio Section.

((3)) Radio Relay. The requirement to furnish personnel to maintain the shipboard station of the ship to shore Radio Relay link was met by utilizing the detachment from HqCo, 26th Marines. This arrangement proved satisfactory, but in the event that the TRC-27 is used these personnel will not be available to man the shipboard end of the MRC-62 Radio Relay Link.

2 Radio Communications. Radio Communications in general, were excellent throughout both phases of DECKHOUSE III. The one exception was the LF TAC #1. The marginal reception which occurred periodically on this net could be eliminated by utilizing the RT-524 on the SLF end of this particular [REDACTED]

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3 Wire. Wire Communications within the BLT CP posed no problem during either phase of DECKHOUSE III. The use of long locals was prohibited by the nature of the terrain.

4 Radio Relay. During PHASE I of DECKHOUSE III, the MRC-62 was situated on Beach BLUE and served no useful purpose because of inability to lay wire from the MRC-62 to the BLT CP. This inability was due to the distance involved and the prohibitive nature of the terrain. The MRC-62 was helilifted into the BLT CP during PHASE II of DECKHOUSE III by Army CH-47 helicopter. This proved to be a more workable arrangement and functioned satisfactorily except for intermittent periods of outages due to generator failures and frequency interferences.

5 Recommendations

a That the BLT Communications Section be augmented with sufficient radio personnel to more adequately maintain the ship and ship to shore Tac-Log Radio Communication System.

b That the SLF Staff be augmented with Radio Relay personnel to maintain the shipboard side of the MRC-62 Radio Relay link.

c That Landing Force TAC #2 Radio Net be eliminated or reduced to a secondary/overload net and not be continually maintained in the BLT CP unless a heavy traffic load or poor communications of LF TAC #1 requires it to be activated.

d That a RT-524 be used on the shipboard side of Landing Force TAC #1.

e That every effort be made to situate the MRC-62 in close proximity to the BLT CP. If this is not feasible then the MRC-62 should remain aboard ship until the situation changes or the means to transport it becomes available.

7. SUPPORTING ARMS

a. Supporting Arms (General)

(1) Fire Support for BLT 1-26 was provided by a 105mm Howitzer Battery, a 107mm Howtar Battery, one 5"/38 Destroyer, one LSMR, one Heavy Cruiser, armed helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft from 7th Air Force. During PHASE II a 5"/54 also was made available to relieve the Heavy Cruiser.

(2) In Operation DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I the 105's were landed over the beach by boat and the 107mm Battery was landed by helicopter. In PHASE II both batteries were landed by helicopter with the 105mm Battery helilifted into position by CH-47 CHINOOK helicopter.

(3) Missions fired by supporting units included on call missions, beach prep fires, landing zones prep fires, H&I fires, and night defensive fires.

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(4) Control of Artillery and Naval Gunfire was passed ashore in DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and II. Control of Air remained afloat throughout both operations. Coordination of supporting arms was passed ashore however, but it was necessary to coordinate with the ship for helicopter safety reasons.

(5) Terrain was a limiting factor in the effective use of supporting arms since ground observation was usually severely limited.

(6) With as much information that must be relayed back to the ship, for coordination, radio relay is essential and plays an important role in this respect.

b. Fire Support Coordination Center

(1) It was discovered that should continuous illumination missions be required it is more feasible to resort to Naval Gunfire and the "firefly" aircraft, in view of artillery's limited basic allowance of illumination.

(2) The PRC-25 proved to be a most proficient piece of communications equipment for ensuring fire support directly available to supported units.

(3) It was repeatedly demonstrated that fire support could be available and effective to units not having a trained FO with them.

(4) The primary artillery frequency should be in the range of 24.9 to 54.0 if possible in order to utilize the air observer more effectively.

(5) The most perplexing problem for Fire Support Coordination involved helicopters in flight. The BLT FSCC had no positive means of knowing exactly when the helicopters were transiting the firing areas and what their destinations were. Determined efforts must be made to solve this one single problem which debilitates the mission of supporting arms for timely and accurate fires.

c. Naval Gunfire Support

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(1) Operations

(a) Ships assigned in direct support of BLT 1-26 did not have cryptographic material that was compatible with the supported units ashore.

(b) Ships assigned did not have copies of the operations order and were therefore deficient in the knowledge of operations ashore.

(c) One particular ship assigned, reporting towards the end of the operation to relieve another ship, lacked even the CTG 76.5's operation order which contained such valuable information as communications information, the battalion's checkpoint system, and call signs of each supported unit. This precluded sending such information as friendly front line positions without circumventing the task force to find compatible crypto material.

(d) All ships that attended the pre-operation conference on Naval Gunfire Support, held by CTG 76.5, appeared to be most interested in working with the SACC and FSCC. They all anchored close and under the protective support

of assigned swift boats in order to provide more accurate fires. Most ships were ready to shoot targets within the prescribed doctrinal time. The St. Paul, however, did not maintain this aggressive attitude throughout and on one occasion took 64 minutes to make a ready report for one call-fire and never provided an explanation for the delay. The target had to be cancelled due to a change in friendly front lines and any late firing would have endangered friendly troops.

(2) Communications

(a) Frequencies assigned during PHASE I were adequate; however, when changed for PHASE II, not all units received the changes and our communications were extremely limited during PHASE II by the lack of compatible channels.

(b) Ships assigned a primary mission of Naval Gunfire Support have two built in FM radios which should be utilized if at all possible, since they are capable of performing communications relay work with these units, but cannot be utilized effectively if the circuits are not compatible with their frequencies. The following array of frequencies is recommended for future operations of the SLF.

Spot 1 (pri)	30.0 - 38.2mcs.	(FM)
Spot 1 (sec)	2.0 - 11.99mcs.	(HF)
Spot 2 (pri)	38.5 - 54.0mcs.	(FM)
Spot 2 (sec)	38.5 - 54.0mcs.	(FM)
NGF Control (pri)	2.0 - 11.99mcs.	(HF)
NGF Control (sec)	2.0 - 11.99,cs.	(HF)
SFCP Local	30.0 - 70.0mcs.	(FM)

(c) Ships which are gunfire support ships secondarily do not have built-in FM equipment. The majority have a semblance of FM equipment rigged on board in order to do the job. It is recommended that the ARG/SLF be allocated PRC-25's along with RC-292 antennas and appropriate remote units, to be made available to the ships assigned Naval Gunfire Support Missions, in order to improve ship-to-shore communications in this vital area.

d. Air

(1) Communications

(a) Communications between the ALO and TACC was unsatisfactory and at times non-existent for periods of up to 24 hours. The deficiency can be traced to the equipment in TACC due to the fact that the ALO could raise other stations aboard the IWO JIMA on other frequencies although he could not raise TACC. This particular problem with TACC was also experienced by the unit FAC's. The above problem was alleviated somewhat when the radio relay van was in operation, however, even this system was unreliable at times due to inherent generator problems.

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(b) Communications between the FAC's and ALO were satisfactory except when the company to which a FAC was assigned was on the move and operators were forced to use short antennas.

(2) Support. The assignment of two direct support helicopters and two Med-Evac helicopters at the Battalion CP proved to be very successful and highly desirable. It expedited intra-battalion operations. It is recommended that the Battalion have at least four direct support helicopters available for the initial hours and the final two hours of daylight in order to permit a more timely logistical support of the rifle companies which are usually on the move until dusk from early daybreak.

8. Commander's Analysis

a. Operation DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and PHASE II proved highly successful in imparting sound, combat experience to all the officers and men of BLT 1-26. The combat capability of the BLT was tested and improved daily. Rifle companies operated over widely separated areas and relied on small unit patrols to adequately search the area. Although the enemy in both phases was successful in avoiding any meaningful contact, the experience gained by the individual Marine and the BLT staff was deemed invaluable. Fire support coordination began slowly but improved from day to day. By the conclusion of the operation, the FSCC was a smooth, well integrated operation. Resupply by helicopter was initially a hap-hazard affair; however, by the termination of PHASE II the operation had become quite routine and most effective. The helicopter squadron, HST personnel and Tac-Log personnel were functioning as a team with a minimum of delay.

b. The transition from COMSEVENTHFLT operational control to operational control of IIFFORCEV was accomplished smoothly and expeditiously. Direct liaison was established with IIFFORCEV and also with the units of the 173rd Airborne Brigade which occupied areas in close proximity to our own elements. Radio nets were established with IIFFORCEV forward Command Post and with another adjacent unit, the 1st Battalion, 503 Regt. Personal visits were made to these units on the ground and an outstanding working relationship was in effect. For the BLT and the individual officers concerned this contact and coordination was both professionally informative and enlightening.

c. Although little substantial intelligence was uncovered that would have been of immediate value to the BLT, it is believed that the presence of an ITT team in the BLT CP did give it the capability to exploit any intelligence that may have become available. These personnel are deemed necessary in any combat operations of this nature.

d. Civic action was effected only during PHASE II and primarily controlled by the SLF staff. However, contact was made with the District Chief and a Liaison Group of 1 officer and 4 enlisted were established at District Headquarters. When the withdrawal was executed, excess rations and other useful items were turned over to the District Chief.

e. The assignment of 2 direct support aircraft and 2 Med-evac aircraft to the BLT during daylight hours proved highly successful and permitted units

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to be kept widely dispersed and adequately supplied. As previously recommended it is believed that a total of 4 direct support aircraft would permit the BLT to resupply such items as rations, ammo, water at peak demand periods between 0600-0800 and 1600-1800 more expeditiously. The tactical consideration and not utilization should be the primary consideration in the use of helicopters. Water cans should not become a burden to a unit prior to "jump off". It is fully realized that resupply solely by helicopters has certain inherent disadvantages but the need continues to exist to lighten the basic load of the individual Marine in this particular terrain and climate to permit him to move rapidly and exploit any advantage offered. This is tantamount to success, although often a calculated but necessary risk.

f. Prior to PHASE I the intelligence information received from outside sources was slightly outdated and the operation indicated the units which had been operating in the area had moved to the west. The PHASE II intelligence information was outstanding. Indications were that in most cases BLT 1-26 units were less than 12 hours behind the VC. The VC units operating in the AOA could not be induced to make a stand nor be identified. The VC were successful in either exfiltration from the area or hiding from our forces; however, it is estimated that he suffered a major setback on Operation DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I and PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO which is evidenced by the list of items destroyed. Noteworthy was a complex of over 300 bunkers, the destruction of which it is believed set the VC Operations in Phuoc Tuy Province back by an estimated six to eight months.

A.A. Monti
A.A. MONTI

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3121

2 September 1966

REPORT OF DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I

1. Task OrganizationBLT 1-26

LtCol MONTI

H&S Co (-)
 Det, Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (Ln Tm)
 Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)
 Det, Hq Co (-), 26th Mar

Radio Relay Tm
 Det, Postal Unit
 Det, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div (Photo)
 Det, Disbursing

Det, Comm Spt Co (-), 9th Comm Bn
 Logistic Support Unit

Det, Command Sect
 Det, MT Sect
 Det, Supply Sect
 Det, Maint Sect

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th SP Bn

1st Plt.
 Det, Beachmaster Unit-1

Det, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Med Bn

Det, Collecting Plt
 Clearing Sect
 Det, 15th Dental Co, FMF

Co A (Rein)

Capt VELASQUEZ

Co A
 Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plt
 1st FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

1st FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn 13th Mar
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn
 Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13 Mar (NGF Spot Tm)

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Co C (Rein)

Capt KAPPELMAN

Co C
 Det, H&S Co, 1-26

ENCLOSURE (1)

Det, Med Plat
 3rd FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
 1st FAC Tm

3rd FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
 Sub Unit #1, 1st ANGLICO (NGF Spot Tm)
 2d Sqd, 1st Plt. (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn

Co D (Rein)

Capt WEIDNER

Co D
 Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plat
 4th FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat
 2nd FAC Tm

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4th FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
 3rd Sqd, 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn
 Sub Unit #1, 1st ANGLICO (NGF Spot Tm)

Btry A (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar

Capt BAILEY

Btry A (-)
 Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

107mm Mortar Btry (-) (Rein), 2nd Bn, 12th Mar

Capt MERRITT

107mm Mortar Btry
 Det, Mess Sec, Serv Plt, Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, 1st Plt, (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn
 1st Plt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th MT Bn

1st Plt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AmTrac Bn

1stLt DIBELLO

1st Plt, (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AT Bn

1stLt DEBILIO

1st Plt
 Det, Co Hq, Co A (-) (Rein)

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Engr Bn

2ndLt DEAR

1st Plt (-)
 Det, Co Hq, Co A (-) (Rein)

81mm Mortar Plt (-) (Rein)

1stLt MOONEY

106mm Recoilless Rifle Plt. (Rein)

1stLt TERRILL

106RR Plt
Flame Sec
Det, Med Plt, H&S Co, 1-26

1st Plt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Tk Bn

1stLt LARKIN

1st Plt, 3rd Force Recon Co, FMF

Capt JORDAN

1st Plt, Co A, 5th Recon Bn

1stLt SPAINHOUR

BLT Reserve (Reaction Force)

Capt SIMPSON

Co B (Rein)

Co B
Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plt
2nd FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

2nd FO Tm Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
Det, 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn
2nd Sqd, 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn

2. Intelligence

a. Terrain:: The area of Operations was characterized by jungle and brush covered plains. Elevation varies from 100 to 200 meters until the mountainous area of the MAY TAO Mountain is reached in the northwest and NUE BE Mountains northeast. Several streams are interspersed throughout the area and these are usually filled to overflow during the month of August. Lowland areas are flooded and make trafficability poor for ground troops. Vegetation consisted of one and two canopy jungle, thick secondary brush; and along the coast heavy brush and swamp grass. A dirt road parallels the beach approximately 1,000 meters inland. The bridge located at coordinates 827 713 had been destroyed. It was reported that the trail network in the area was heavily used but this cannot be seen from the air. Trafficability throughout the AOA was fair to poor.

b. Beach Study

Location: Left Flank: YS 827698
Beach Center YS 831699
Right Flank YS 833700

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Length and Usable Length: 800 yds all usable.

Beach Width: 70-100 yards (LW-HW).

Beach Gradients: 1:45

Beach Approach: Offshore: Unrestricted.

Nearshore: Unrestricted.

Surf and Tidal Range: Surf of 4' or greater should be expected to occur 4% of the time in winter, 8% in spring, 21% in summer, 10% in fall. Tidal range 8.5% - springs.

Material and firmness: Sand, firm in wetted areas, soft where dry.

Terrain Immediately Behind the Beach: Beach was backed by high dunes 20' and higher. Dunes are backed by steep bank which drops into a swamp and marshy area. Swamp and marshy area, extend inland 500-600 meters to low cultivated rice paddies. Paddies backed by dense vegetation which extend well into the hinterland.

Exits Inland:

1. For troops. Exit directly across beach. One foot trail located at left flank which leads through swamp and marshy area to rice paddies and on to loose surfaced road. Numerous foot trails lead inland.
2. For wheeled vehicles. No exit off beach.
3. For tracked vehicles. No exit off beach.


Enemy Fortifications. None Apparent.

c. Pre D-day Intelligence indicated the area of operations had been under absolute control of the VC for 1½ years. There had been no RVN or Allied military operations conducted in this area. The 5th VC Division Headquarters, located in the MAY TAO Secret Zone, has two subordinate Main Force Regiments, the 274th and 275th, each with three battalions. The base area in the MAY TAO Zone, being a major supply and training installation, allows these Main Force units to operate freely in BINH TUY, PHUOC TUY, and LONG KHANH Provinces. Infiltration routes have been reported along the coast vicinity coordinates YS 814688 to YS 827699. This route goes in a northerly direction, following numerous trails, to the MAY TAO Zone. The base area, YS 820920, believed to have enough food storage to feed 10,000 troops for one year. Houses on the beach have either been burned or destroyed. All persons in area were considered VC or VCS, including women and children.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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d. Order of Battle.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
5th VC Div CP	YS 780815	6Aug66	
274th Regt	YS 810790	6Aug66	12-60mm Mortars 8-81mm Mortars
1st Bn	YS 700755	6Aug66	12-LMG 5-57mm RR
2nd Bn	YS 815735	6Aug66	3-75mm RR 3-12.7mm MG
3rd Bn	UNKNOWN		Assorted small arms & Automatic Wpns.
275th Regt	YT 770091	6Aug66	6-81mm Mortars 16-60mm Mortars
1st Bn	UNKNOWN		10-57mm RR 12-12.7 MG
2nd Bn	UNKNOWN		18-50 Cal MG 8-30 Cal MG
3rd Bn	UNKNOWN		Assorted S/A & Wpns

e. No substantial contact was made with elements listed above during the operations. There was no positive identification of any enemy units. Resistance ashore consisted of sporadic sniper fire.

3. Mission. As directed by the SLF Frag Order #1 for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I the mission assigned to BLT 1-26 was:

"Commencing at H and L hours conduct waterborne and helicopterborne amphibious assault over Beach BLUE, LZ BLUEBIRD and LZ CANARY to establish blocking positions in support of 173rd Airborne Brigade and conduct search and destroy operations."


4. Concept of Operations. The BLT 1-26 scheme of maneuver for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I was as follows:

a. Commencing at H-hour land Cos A and C across Beach BLUE by LVT and landing craft to attack and seize LF objs 1 and 3; conduct search and destroy operations as directed.

b. Commencing at L-hour land Co D in LZ BLUEBIRD to attack and seize LF Obj. 2. Land Co B in LZ CANARY to act as BLT Reserve/Reaction Force. Both units to conduct search and destroy operations as directed.

c. After securing LF Objs 1,2 and 3 and on order, Cos C and D attack and seize LF Obj 4, 5 and 6; establish blocking positions in vicinity of LF Objs 5 and 6.

ENCLOSURE (1)



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d. 107mm Mortar Btry to be landed in LZ EAGLE and set up in firing position. Btry A to be landed on Beach BLUE and moved inland by LVT to designated firing positions. Amtracs to remain with Btry A as a security element.

e. MF Platoon to be landed with 107mm Mortar Btry as a provisional rifle platoon. Initially AT Platoon and Tank Platoon to remain aboard ship until ordered ashore either with their major equipment or as provisional rifle platoons.

5. Execution

a. D-Day, 16 August 1966

(1) Co C landed at 0900H by LVT approximately 1000 meters to the left of beach BLUE. Co A landed at H + 4 in the same location. Shore Party, Beachmaster Unit and A Btry recon party landed at 0810H on the same beach. Due to an error in the initial landing which situated the units far to the left of the assigned landing beach, the rifle companies experienced much difficulty exiting from the beach area. When the CO's Command Group landed at 1039H only 2 platoons of Co A had entered the area immediately behind the beach on which they had been landed. The CO who had been on an aerial reconnaissance on 15 August 1966 realized that they had been landed on the wrong beach and immediately began moving Co C to the right to get it in position to move inland. After locating the correct beach, Co C began movement inland. Co A's leading elements secured LF Obj 1 at 1300H. After arrival of the remainder of Co A, LZ EAGLE was secured at 1500H and the scheduled helilifts that had been postponed after the initial delay were continued. H&S Co (-), 81mm Mortar Platoon and 107mm Mortar Btry were all landed in LZ EAGLE by 1900H. Night defenses were set in and BLT CP established. Btry A came ashore at 1338H and was in position to support by fire at 1515H. 107mm Mortar Btry was prepared to support by fire at 1730H.

(2) Co D landed at L-hour in LZ BLUEBIRD. By 1027H the helilift had been completed and Co D moved out to secure LF Obj 2. Co D found an AP mine of foreign make and exploded it in place at YS 859787. Co B was landed commencing at 1055H and the helilift was completed at 1150H. Co B was scheduled to be landed in LZ CANARY but was landed at YS 882738 on the edge of a reported minefield. Upon orienting itself Co B began to move to LZ CANARY to set up a defensive perimeter and to act as a reaction force. Co D secured LF Obj 2 at 1530H and continued the attack to secure LF Obj 6. All units landed unopposed and had no contact on D-day.

(3) Defensive perimeters were set up and units were located as follows:

(a) BLT CP - YS 820714

(b) Co A - YS 824715

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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- (c) Co B - YS 866739
- (d) Co C - YS 826725
- (e) Co D - YS 856789
- (f) H&S Co (-) - YS 819715
- (g) A Btry - YS 816691
- (h) 107mm Mortar Btry - YS 823716
- (i) AmTracs - YS 816691
- (j) SP and BM - YS 818698

(4) Each rifle company sent out 2 night patrols and set 2 night ambushes. There was negative contact prior to 2400H; however, Co A and Co D reported hearing voices outside their perimeter. This resulted in calling for and receiving illumination. The flickering shadows caused considerable friendly small arms firing and a number of grenades were thrown. There was no enemy firing directed toward any friendly position. As a result of this the BLT CO directed that illumination would be utilized only if fire was being received or positive observation was made of enemy personnel.

b. D+1, 17 August 1966

(1) At 0450H 1 VC was sighted by Co A ambush located at YS 823708. One hand grenade was thrown with negative results. No further activity was reported at this ambush site.

(2) Co C continued its advance at first light and at 0818H secured LF Obj 3. At 0900H Co C discovered a VC camp at YS 815730. The camp consisted of 7 thatch huts and contained live chickens, 8 bundles of punji stakes and 4 sets of black pajamas. Co C continued its attack toward LF Obj 4 after destroying the camp, secured LF Obj 4 at 1530H. A hamlet, located at YS784793 was discovered at 1824H. The hamlet consisted of 9 thatched huts and contained a hospital with 6 bamboo beds, crutches, bandages and 20 lbs. of rice. Numerous tunnels were found throughout the hamlet. Due to the dampness of the material and lack of demolitions, the hamlet was not destroyed at this time. Co C continued the attack and secured LF Obj 5 at 1845H.

(3) Co D continued its attack to seize LF Obj 6 at 0745H. A delay was caused by empty water cans on hand to be helilifted out. At 1424H LF Obj 6 (YS 833797) was secured. The attack was continued and LF Obj 6 was secured at 1730H.

(4) Co A provided BLT CP security and conducted search and destroy

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ENCLOSURE (1)

patrols toward LZ BLUEBIRD. There were no contacts with the VC. A patrol reported at 1520H that it had observed barefoot and sandal prints of 3 to 5 personnel at YS 826723.

(5) The Reaction Force, Co B, conducted search and destroy missions west along road running parallel to the beach. Co B was alerted at 1100H to be ready to move from LZ CANARY at 1400H. It retraced its path to the designated LZ and was helilifted to LZ WREN commencing at 1400H. At 1642H a local security patrol sighted and fired on 1 VC with negative results. VC escaped to the west of LZ WREN.

(6) The AT platoon was helilifted from USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) to LZ EAGLE as a provisional rifle platoon. Engineers improved LZ EAGLE by sawing trees down and using demolitions. An accidental discharge inside an LVT caused 3 WIA.

(7) At 1800H the Division Recon Platoon was helilifted to YS 765 723. The assigned mission was to establish an OP at YS 752725. The platoon was to be extracted by helicopter at 0600H on 19 August 1966 at YS 751731.

(8) All units established defensive perimeters by nightfall as follows:

- (a) BLT CP - YS 829714
- (b) Co A - YS 824715
- (c) Co B - YS 834795
- (d) Co C - YS 786804
- (e) Co D - YS 818834
- (f) H&S C6 (-) - YS 819715
- (g) Btry A - YS 816691
- (h) 107mm Mortar. Btry - YS 823716
- (i) AmTracs - YS 816691
- (j) SP and BM - YS 816691

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(9) During the night voices and movement outside their lines were reported by all units. Although friendly troops fired in their direction no return fire was received. Co B sustained 1 KIA inflicted accidentally by a man in the same fighting hole.

(10) Supporting arms fired H & I and registration missions throughout the day and night.

ENCLOSURE (1)

c. D+2, 18 August 1966

- (1) Movement and voices outside perimeters continued but no contact was made. Co A and Co C reported receiving several rounds of incoming small arms fire. No friendly casualties.
- (2) Co A conducted search and destroy mission in grid squares YS 8072 and YS 8073 with no enemy contact and negative results.
- (3) Co B conducted a search and destroy mission through grid squares YS 8279, YS 8179 and 8079 with no enemy contact and negative results.
- (4) Co C conducted a search and destroy mission through grid squares YS 7881, YS 7882 and YS 7883. In addition a reinforced platoon was dispatched to the hamlet located at YS 784793 to destroy it. They were unable to completely destroy it. At 1115H a village of 15 buildings was discovered at YS 782819. Items found in the village were 25 lbs. of rice, 1 medical kit, numerous books, propaganda material and personal papers. The village and tunnels were partially destroyed. At 1030H a local security patrol around Co C patrol base encountered 3 VC on a trail at YS 764815. The VC were dressed in black pajamas with gold headbands and were carrying small arms. The security patrol fired on the VC, 1 VC WIA dropped an M1A1 Air Travel Firing Device. The VC WIA was carried away by the remaining 2 VC. Numerous propaganda leaflets were found in the area. Another local security patrol at 1430H discovered a farm tractor with initials MF on front at YS 771813. It had a wheel missing and no gas in tank and appeared to have been abandoned approximately 1 month. No cultivation in area. Tractor was destroyed. An air strike was called on both villages mentioned above to complete the destruction.
- (5) Co D conducted a search and destroy mission down the trail leading through grid squares YS 8283, YS 8383, YS 8484 and YS 8584. Another search and destroy mission was conducted through grid squares YS 8283, YS 8184 and YS 8085. Both patrols reported they had observed fresh foot prints near base of hill 568.
- (6) At 1100H a patrol from Btry A destroyed an empty 25 foot fishing boat at YS 816682.
- (7) The 107mm Mortar Btry was helilifted along with the provisional rifle platoon attached (MP Plt) at 1100H from LZ EAGLE to LZ WREN. The Tank Platoon had been helilifted to LZ WREN at 0900H as a provisional rifle platoon to act as a security element for the 107mm Mortar Btry. Force Recon Platoon was helilifted into LZ EAGLE at 1150H. Engineer personnel continued to improve LZ HAWK by removing trees.
- (8) All units established defensive perimeters for the night. No

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ENCLOSURE (1)

patrols or ambushes were employed. Listening posts were employed extensively. Positions of units were as follows:

- (a) BLF CP - YS 829714
- (b) Co A - YS 824715
- (c) Co B - YS 834795
- (d) Co C - YS 786804
- (e) Co D - YS 818834
- (f) H&S Co (-) - YS 819715
- (g) Btry A - YS 816691
- (h) 107mm Mortar Btry - YS 834795
- (i) AmTracs - YS 816691
- (j) SP & BM - YS 816691

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(9) A warning order was issued to Co's C and D to be prepared to commence withdrawal at 190800H.

(10) No contact with the enemy was made prior to 2400H. While calling H&I fires from 107mm Mortar Btry, Co D received a short round within its defensive perimeter. One casualty with shrapnel wounds resulted. Supporting arms fired H&I and registration missions throughout the period.

d. D+3, 19 August 1966.

(1) Co D reported an estimated 3 or 4 enemy to their front. Small arms fire and hand grenades resulted in no casualties to the enemy.

(2) At 0530H the Division Recon Platoon made contact with an estimated 30 VC at YS 752725 as the platoon moved toward the extraction point. The VC were taken under heavy small arms fire by the platoon and artillery fire was requested. A platoon from Co A in LZ EAGLE was lifted as a reaction force but were landed back in LZ EAGLE. The VC broke contact and moved to the east. An estimated 10 VC were KIA and an estimated 14 VC were WIA. There were no friendly casualties. The platoon was extracted by helicopter at 0700H from the scheduled extraction point.

(3) Co C was helilifted from LZ DOVE at 0930H to Beach BLUE and embarked aboard landing craft to return to LPD-2 at 1113H.

(4) Co D moved by foot at 1005H to LZ WREN and was helilifted commencing at 1300H to LPH-2. As Co D moved south from LZ HAWK VC were observed moving into LZ HAWK. Naval gunfire was called on this position by the aerial

observer. Results were undetermined.

(5) Co A and B continued search and destroy missions with negative contact. No contact was made during the night. There were no changes in unit locations except for units moving back to assigned shipping.

e. D+4, 20 August 1966

(1) The withdrawal continued with 107mm Mortar Btry and Co B helilifted from LZ WREN commencing at 0630H to LPH-2. At 0930H the units from LZ EAGLE were helilifted to LPH-2 except for Co A and provisional rifle platoon who were lifted to Beach BLUE to be moved by landing craft to assigned shipping. DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I, terminated at 1518H.

6. Results

a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted by BLT 1-26:

VC KIA POSSIBLE	10
VC WIA CONFIRMED	1
VC WIA POSSIBLE	14

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material destroyed by BLT 1-26.

Huts	32
AP Mine	1
Black Pajamas (sets)	4
Rice (lbs)	45
Punji Stakes (Bundles)	8
Medical Kit	1
Fishing boat 25'	1
Tractor (MF on front)	1
MLA1 Air Travel Device	1

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ENCLOSURE (1)

Crutches (Pr)

3

Assorted Documents

Assorted Bandages

b. Friendly

(1) Casualties sustained by BLT 1-26 are summarized below:

(a) Killed in Action - 1

1 Gunshot - 1

(b) Wounded in Action - 7

1 Shrapnel - 6

2 Gunshot - 1

(c) Non-Battle Casualties - 16

1 Heat - 5

2 Injuries - 5

3 Snakebite - 1

4 Immersion foot - 1

5 Miscellaneous - 4

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FDR/ges
3121
2 September 1966

REPORT OF DECKHOUSE III, PHASE II/OPERATION TOLEDO

1. Task Organization. Remained the same as for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE I except for the detachment of the 1st ANGLICO NGF Spot Teams. See enclosure (1).

2. Intelligence

a. Terrain: The area of operations is characterized by a brush and swamp covered plain. Numerous levees and dikes varying two to three feet in height are located throughout the lowland areas. Many streams and swamps back this beach area. Most streams have steep banks and low natural levees. Two large rivers located in this area are the RACH SONG CAI and SONG BA DAP. Both flowing seaward and converging at coordinates YS 585575. Lowland areas are mostly flooded June through December and make trafficability poor for ground troops. Vegetation is thick secondary brush, with heavy swamp grass. A dirt road parallels the beach approximately 6 miles inland.

b. Beach BROWN

Location: Left Flank: YS 662580
Beach Center: YS 664580
Right Flank: YS 673580

Length and Usable Length: 1100 Meters. Beach BROWN is a slightly concave shaped beach terminated on the right flank (East) by a rocky point. Numerous rocks extend out from this point and into the surf. Beach is terminated on the left flank (West) by a less defined sandy point. All beach area usable.

Beach Width: 70-100 yards (LW to HW)

Beach Gradients: 1 on 30 to 1 on 45 LW to HW
1 on 10 to 1 on 20 HW Zone

Beach Approach: Nearshore approach partially obstructed by partly drying shoals as far as 15NM off beach center.

Surf and Tidal Range: Surf 4' or greater can be expected to occur 4% of the time in winter, 8% in spring, 21% in summer, 10% in fall. Tidal range 8.5' springs.

Material and Firmness: Sand. Firm in wetted areas, soft where dry. Rocks on right flank.

Terrain Immediately Behind the Beach: Beach backed by partly brush covered dunes which extend inland for approx 600 yards. Dunes in turn

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ENCLOSURE (2)

backed by dense vegetation which extends well into the hinterland.

Exits Inland:

- a. For Troops. Exit directly across the beach to unimproved dirt road which leads inland from village at right flank.
- b. For Wheeled Vehicles. Exit at right flank to unimproved dirt road. Matting will probably be required when crossing dry beach sand.
- c. For Tracked Vehicles. Exit for tracked vehicles same as for wheeled vehicles.

d. Pre-D-day Intelligence indicated elements of the 5th VC Division were operating in Phuoc Tuy Province. On 10 and 11 August elements of the 274th VC Regiment attacked Phu My (YS 2574) withdrawing eastward to vicinity YS 5388. The 275th VC Regt withdrew east and northeast following the 18th of August attack on the Australian Task Force at YS 4967. The 860th Bn is a local force unit and has operated with the 274th and 275th regiments. It is believed that a good percentage of the 5th VC Division is composed of North Vietnamese Army personnel. The NVA 721st Anti-Aircraft Company has been infiltrating from the Cambodian border area for the past few months and are intergrating with 5th Division units.

e. Order of Battle in AOA:

(1)	U/I VC Plat	YS 651645
	U/I VC Company	YS 6461
	U/I VC Plat	YS 6067
	U/I VC Plat	YS 5763
	U/I VC Company	YS 5568

(2) On 20Aug66 SPAR reports placed the CP or elements of the 274th Regt at coordinates YS 530880.

(3) On 21Aug66 SPAR reports placed the CP or elements of the 275th Regt at coordinates 530720.

(4) No substantial contact was made with the enemy or units named above. The enemy exhibited the ability to evade contact and to exfiltrate the area of operations.

3. Mission. SLF Frag Order #1 for DECKHOUSE III, PHASE II assigned BLT 1-26 the following mission:

"Conduct waterborne and helicopterborne amphibious assault at H and L hours over Beach GREEN and into designated landing zones to attack and seize LF objs, to conduct search and destroy operations and to establish blocking positions in northwest portion of AOA".

ENCLOSURE (2)

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4. Concept of Operations

a. Land Co D in LZ DOVE at L-hour to attack and seize LF Obj 2; conduct search and destroy missions on order.

b. Land Co B and Co A in LZ HAWK to attack and seize LF Objs 3 and 4 and establish blocking positions at these objectives.

c. LandCo C over Beach GREEN by LVT to attack and seize LF Obj 1; conduct search and destroy missions on order; act as BLT Reserve/Reaction Force.

d. Land 107mm Mortar Btry at LZ HAWK and move to designated firing positions; land Btry A at Beach BROWN and move by Army CH-47 helicopter to vicinity of LZ HAWK.

5. Execution.

a. D-day-22 August 1966.

(1) The landing commenced at H-hour, 0800H, with Co C landing over Beach GREEN by LVTP-5 and Co D being landed by helicopter at L-hour, 0830H, in LZ DOVE. Co B was helilifted to LZ HAWK commencing at 0915H and Co A, H&S Co (-), 81mm Mortar Plt and the 107mm Mortar Btry were helilifted in trace of Co B. Btry A and Shore Party landed over Beach BROWN by landing craft. Btry A was helilifted from Beach BROWN to vicinity of LZ HAWK at YS 697653 by CH-47 Army helicopters where firing positions were established. 107mm Mortar Btry was prepared to fire missions at 1130H. AT Plt, Division and Force Recon Plts were landed in LZ HAWK to provide BLT CP security and execute other missions as directed. MT Plt and Tank Plt were landed in LZ HAWK and assigned as provisional rifle plts to 107mm Mortar Btry and Btry A respectively.

(2) Co C landed on Beach GREEN and swept to the west and secured LF Obj 1 and Beach BROWN. There was no enemy contact. Co C was assigned the mission of BLT Reserve/Reaction Force and was also given the mission of conducting limited search and destroy operations. At 1645H a Co C patrol fired on 2 VC at YS 676604 and killed 1 VC and captured 1 CKC semi-automatic rifle and 30 rounds of ammunition.

(3) Co D secured LZ DOVE by 0900H and commenced the attack on LF obj 2 at 0910H. At 1100H contact was made with an unknown number of VC. The Co was hit from the rear and sides by sniper fire and one mortar round at YS 642657. Fire was returned and VC broke contact and moved in a northerly direction. Trails of blood indicated 3 (probable) or more VC WIA. At 1145H Co D secured LF obj 2. Patrols were sent out to search the tree lines on both sides of road after firing 8 rounds of 60mm Mortar HE. At 1306H and 1400H small arms fire was received from the vicinity of YS 618654 and YS 618643. A close air strike was delivered with unknown results.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

(4) At 1225H Co B commenced attack on LF obj 3 from LZ HAWK. Co B made contact with a VC column of 8 VC at YS 611678. It received an estimated 50 rounds of small arms fire. The VC retreated west around a grove of trees. Co B called NGF on target. Results are unknown.

(5) At 1433H Co A commenced attack on LF obj 4. No contact with enemy was made and LF obj 4 was secured at 2000H.

(6) At 1800H Force Recon Plt was helilifted to YS 616582 to conduct surveillance of the area.

(7) At 2000H all companies had established defensive perimeters, set ambushes and dispatched night patrols. The units were located at the following positions:

- (a) BLT CP - YS 648700
- (b) Co A - YS 617719
- (c) Co B - YS 626696
- (d) Co C - YS 675585
- (e) Co D - YS 629652
- (f) Btry A - YS 653697
- (g) 107mm Mortar Btry - YS 646705

(8) During the night Cos B and D received scattered small arms fire but no significant contact with the enemy. Artillery, Mortars and Naval Gunfire Support Ships fired registration and H and I fires throughout the night.

b. D+1 - 23 August 1966.

(1) At first light Cos A, C and D continued search and destroy operations. Co B continued advancing toward LF obj 3. At 0930H Beach BROWN was closed and Shore Party returned to the USS THOMASTON. The Amtrac plt returned to the USS VANCOUVER then was helilifted to LZ HAWK at 1300H to act as a provisional rifle plt for the BLT CP.

(2) At 1220H Co D sighted 4 VC at YS 627642 but was unable to make contact. At 1253H Co B discovered a bunker complex (75) at YS 596677. Miscellaneous supplies were found. Co B was ordered to continue investigation and destruction of the complex. Co D was ordered to move through Co B and continue the attack to seize LF obj 3 and establish a blocking position.

(3) At 1640H Co A captured 1 VCS at YS 609738. The captive was evacuated to LZ HAWK where the Army ITT team determined that the suspect was a VC. The captive was turned over to the District Chief.

(4) The Force Recon Plt was extracted at YS 604594 at 1730H and the Division Recon Plt was inserted at YS 712633.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

(5) A Co C patrol located an abandoned plt bivouac site at YS 629594 at 1130H. At 1355H the same patrol came upon a group of 6 abandoned foxholes facing east at YS 624597. One unidentified man was observed escaping west.

(6) Co B continued its investigation of the bunker complex. Bunkers were in various stages of construction and sleeping racks were found for in excess of 200 men. Bunkers were of various types and sizes. Some were trench lines uncovered. However, most were trenches (6' x 3') with the middle 3 feet covered with logs and dirt to a thickness of 2 to 3 feet. The trenches were 5 feet deep. Some bunkers had caves 4' square dug in the side. Sleeping racks for 3 men were near each bunker. Sleeping areas included hammock poles, clothes rack, fireplace, food racks and mosquito net supports. One area had sleeping racks covered with thatched roofs and tables for eating. Possibly it was an officers area. It was estimated that a plt occupied this area the night before and a company within previous 4 days. Items found in this area included 200 lbs. of rice, cooking utensils, small amounts of medical supplies, white jackets, maroon shirts, bloody bandages, tooth brushes, 2 ponchos, desks, textbooks, U. S. type survival kit and mosquito netting.

(7) All units established defensive perimeters by 2000H, dispatched patrols and ambushes and were located as follows:

- (a) Co A - YS 615728
- (b) Co B - YS 593678
- (c) Co C - YS 675585
- (d) Co D - YS 621677

NOTE: Other units did not change.

(8) During the night small arms fire was received by Cos A, B and D. Co A suffered 2 WIA. Co B discovered an estimated VC plt moving near the company perimeter. Artillery fire was called. 1 VC WIA was confirmed. At 2319H the Division Recon Plt reported an estimated VC company at YS 712633. The enemy had not observed the Recon Plt. Artillery fires were called and the VC dispersed. Results of the supporting fires are unknown.

c. D+2 - 24 August 1966.

(1) Division Recon Plt continued to call fire on the suspected VC unit in their area. 2 WIA (confirmed) at 0130H. A Co B patrol engaged an estimated plt sized VC unit at YS 595681. Artillery was called and screams were heard from that direction. The VC broke contact and moved off to the north. At 0625H Co D received an estimated 20 rounds of sniper fire and what appeared to be an incoming mortar round to its front. Co D fired 6 rounds of 60mm Mortar HE in area and then searched the area with negative results except for discovering a VC type claymore mine and 5 U. S. type butterfly bombs. Co D received 3 WIA.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

(4)

(2) At 0200H Co B heard voices in vicinity of YS 593684. Artillery was requested with unknown results. At 0230H Co B heard an estimated platoon sized force near edge of jungle at YS 592682. NGF was requested and screams were heard. Results were unknown. At 0830H a patrol from Co B investigated and found no blood or other evidence but found freshly cut trails and fields of fire running east-west from YS 592682. Co A received an estimated 50 rounds of small arms fire from vicinity of YS 616729. Artillery was requested. Results of fire are unknown.

(3) At 0950H a Co C patrol made contact with 1 VC. The VC threw an explosive hand device that resulted in 3 WIA for Co C. A Co C patrol received estimated 40 rounds of small arms fire in vicinity of obj 2. The fire was returned and the enemy broke contact and fled to southwest.

(4) At 1530H Co D discovered and destroyed 3 huts with anti-U. S. literature. At 1600H Co D sighted 2 VC who fled into jungle. It discovered 4 more huts and 1 ton of rice in storage house at YS 590673. It also found more anti-U. S. documents, food and household tools. All destroyed by fire except papers. 100 meters down the trail Co D discovered 3 huts, one of which was a first aid station. Hot water was still on the stove. Medical supplies such as sulfa, penicillin and bandages was found. Bloody bandages were also found. Buildings and supplies were destroyed by fire.

(5) Patrolling continued throughout the day. At 1200H BLT 1/26 chipped to IIFORCEV in Support of Operation TOLEDO. Co B continued investigating and destroying the bunker complex. Total number of bunkers had reached 225.

(6) The Division Recon Plt was extracted by helicopter at 1700H at YS 734642 and returned to LZ HAWK. Co D encountered thick jungle and swamp area in moving toward LF obj 3. As a result it held up about 1000 meters short of the obj.

(7) Units established defensive perimeters, dispatched patrols and ambushes. As of 2000H units were located as follows:

- (a) Co A - YS 615728
- (b) Co B - YS 594676
- (c) Co C - YS 672585
- (d) Co D - YS 576670

NOTE: Other units did not change.

(8) During the night each company sent out 2 patrols and set 2 ambushes. No hard contact made prior to 2400H. Units continued to receive light sniper fire and supporting arms were used extensively by all units. Supporting arms fired H and I fires throughout night.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

RETURN

(4)

d. D+3 - 25 August 1966

(1) A Co B recon patrol reported being surrounded at 0100H. Artillery was requested and contact was broken.

(2) Co D continued moving on LF obj 3 and secured it at 0750H. Due to thick canopy and underbrush it required an aerial spotter to fix Co D's position. At 0755H Co D discovered a hut containing an estimated 2000 50' rolls of plastic used for ponchos or ground sheets. It was destroyed by 3.5 WP rockets. Material was manufactured in Japan. At 0805H Co D fired on 2 VC who fled and discovered a 3 hut complex at YS 576675 with a dispensary and 2 warehouse huts. This complex contained 1½ tons of rice, documents, 1 dozen Chinese made grenades, 1 small home made rifle with 100 rounds of ammunition, 5 U. S. type butterfly bombs, 5 small mines, 125 flashlight batteries, 5 pigs, 12 chickens, 10 type-writer ribbons, a set of barber tools, 5 gallon can of gas, 2 small cans of oil, 4 bags of salt and 2 slaughtered hogs. All huts and their contents were destroyed.

(3) Co B continued destruction of bunker complex. Patrol returned at 1600H to report they had destroyed a clothing factory, ½ ton of rice and 5 bunkers. Documents and 13 57mm rounds returned to company area. The 57mm rounds were destroyed. At 1115H at YS 589678 a patrol discovered 87 white jackets, 65 VC gas masks, 7 U. S. field jackets, 40 U. S. Army sheets, and 1 U. S. gas mask. All were destroyed except 1 VC gas mask.

(4) Co C patrol encountered a village at 1745H at YS 613592 consisting of 4 huts with bunkers underneath which were old and unused for several months. There were 4 punji pits located around village. The buildings and punji traps destroyed.

(5) After crossing the river on a foot bridge at YS 574675 Co D reported a suspected minefield at YS 566678. After investigation only three makeshift mines were found made from 81mm Mortar rounds. They were destroyed in place.

(6) Co A reported observing 7 men in black run into cave at 1550H at YS 607738. Local woman said they were VC. No men present in village.

(7) Companies established defensive perimeters and sent out night patrols and ambushes. Units were located as follows:

- (a) Co A - YS 615728
- (b) Co B - YS 594676
- (c) Co C - YS 672585
- (d) Co D - YS 563680

NOTE: Other units did not change.

(8) There was no enemy contact prior to 2400H. Supporting arms fired H and I fires throughout evening.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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ENCLOSURE (2)

(4)

e. D+4 - 26 August 1966.

(1) During the morning units continued with search and destroy missions. No contact was made. At 0816H a Co C patrol located a cache of 100 30 lb. bags of salt stored on a platform at YS 602585 covered with plastic sheeting and tin. A bunker and trench line nearby. All were destroyed. At 0850H at YS 605585 a Co C patrol received a hand thrown explosive device. Shrapnel inflicted superficial wounds on 1 man. The VC fled and the patrol lost contact.

(2) Co B patrol discovered and destroyed a cache of rice at 1725H at YS 591668. Co D patrol discovered an English-made tractor in good condition at 0950H at YS 557677. In the same area were 2 huts and 1 butterfly bomb. 50 meters away was a Massey-Ferguson trailer 10 ft long made of steel. All items were destroyed. Another Co D patrol discovered 4 huts at 1415H at YS 565670. Three oxcarts, a few cans of C-rations, 15 lbs of salt, tunnels and fresh footprints were in the area. The same patrol located 10 huts at YS 563605. Huts were destroyed by fire. A Co D patrol located cache of 3 tons of rice and 3 tons of wheat at 1000H at YS 555680. At 1005H at YS 591671 a company size base camp was discovered by a Co B patrol. Empty medical containers of anpheramine, calcium serym, glucose, gastral sedative, steptomysin and 3 full bottles of an unknown medicine. There were cooking utensils, a bunsen burner, sterilizer, 782 gear, 1 carbine magazine and some clothing.

(3) At 1400H Co C (-) was helilifted to LZ OWL to conduct search and destroy operations in a southerly direction. Co B was designated BLT Reserve/Reaction Force. The 3rd Plt of Co C was operating with Force Recon Plt when it discovered and destroyed an abandoned village at YS 604584.

(4) Co A captured 16 VCS at YS 707739 and evacuated them to LZ HAWK for interrogation. A patrol from Co B made contact with 4 VC at YS 589666 at 1200H. Results were 1 VC KIA and 1 VC woman captured and evacuated to LZ HAWK. She was armed with a grenade when captured. Two semi-automatic rifles were captured.

(5) Units established defensive perimeters and sent out patrols and ambushes. Units were located as follows:

- (a) Co A - YS 615728
- (b) Co B - YS 594676
- (c) Co C - YS 764733
- (d) Co D - YS 563680
- (e) 3rd Plt, Co C and Force Recon Plt - YS 602580

Note: Other units did not change.

(6) No contact was made with enemy during night. Supporting arms fired H and I throughout the night.

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f. D+5 - 27 August 1966.

(1) During the morning all units closed on their respective CP's. At 1220H Co C was helilifted back to Beach GREEN. At 1600H Co B was helilifted to the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2). Co B continued as the BLT Reserve/Reaction Force.

(2) At 1000H 3rd Plt Co C with Force Recon Plt returned to village at YS 602585 destroyed 26Aug66 and discovered a store of approximately 20 gal of kerosene, assorted clothing, 45 rounds of foreign make ammo and 25 rounds of .45 cal. ammunition. Co A was ordered to move to an area across the river included in expanded AO. Due to heavy jungle, underbrush and rain it was unable to cross river.

(3) Units ashore established defensive perimeters and sent out patrols and ambushes. Units were located as follows:

- (a) Co A - YS 589705
- (b) Co B - USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
- (c) Co C - YS 675585
- (d) Co D - YS 563680

(4) No contact was made during the night except for 3 explosions near 107mm Mortar Btry believed to be incoming mortar rounds but later determined to be Chinese Claymore mines that had been emplaced during a heavy rain storm. One WIA and two tires blown on 1 HOWTAR. Heavy sand bagging prevented more casualties.

g. D+6 - 28 August 1966.

(1) At 0740H Co A secured LZ CANARY. Due to swollen river stream foot bridge needed to cross was 4 feet under water. At 1300H Co A was lifted from LZ CANARY to LZ HAWK and integrated into defensive perimeter at that position. Cos C and D sent out search and destroy patrols. Co C sent 2 plts along road leading to Obj 2. Co D sent two separate plt-sized patrols into new section of AO that Co A was unable to move into because of a swollen river.

(2) A Co C patrol detonated a mine at 1205H at YS 650603. The same patrol made contact with 6 VC at 1228H. A fire fight ensued as patrol pursued VC. The VC fell back to prepared positions and delivered heavy fire. The patrol kept contact with the VC for over 1000 meters as they withdrew to east from initial contact point. NGF and aerial observers were in support but a heavy rainstorm assisted the VC in breaking contact. Results of this engagement were 3 friendly KIA, 9 friendly WIA and no enemy KIA or WIA that could be confirmed.

(3) Co D patrol located 3 huts at YS 566696 at 1300H with 500 lbs of rice. Destroyed huts and rice. Another Co D patrol located a VC training camp at YS 555693 at 1610H. It consisted of 18 huts with a hospital well stocked with medicine. It also included a bakery hut,

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ENCLOSURE (2)

(4)

a 40-man classroom, 1 rifle rack capable of holding 40 rifles, 500 lbs. of rice, 100 lbs. of flour, assorted clothing, fish, chickens, household tools, 30 tops to U. S. butterfly bombs and 1 hut used as a jail. One 5 gal bucket was booby trapped. When it was blown with demolitions it made a hole 10' deep and cleared an area 100' around. There was a large amount of basket work in this village. Items of interest were a training schedule dated 26May66 and a menu for the school. Some training manuals were dated 1966. Items of intelligence value were evacuated to the SLF and the remainder were destroyed.

(4) All units ashore established defensive perimeters. Patrols and ambushes were sent out. Units were located as follows:

- (a) Co A - YS 645700
- (b) Co B - USS IWO JIMA
- (c) Co C - YS 675585
- (d) Co D - YS 563680

Note: Other units did not change.

(5) At 2210H the 107mm Mortar Btry received 6 HE incoming rounds of unknown type. A Co A listening post received a shotgun blast that resulted in 1 friendly WIA at YS 652702. There was no other contact during the night.

h. D+7 - 29 August 1966.

(1) The withdrawal continued with Co D lifted commencing at 0710H from LZ WREN to USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2). All elements of Co D were clear of LZ WREN by 0828H. Commencing at 0830H H&S Co (-) was helilifted from LZ HAWK to USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2). At 0930H CH-47 Army helicopters commenced lifting Btry A to Beach GREEN where it was loaded aboard landing craft for return to USS THOMASTON (LSD-28). At 1000H the 107mm Mortar Btry was lifted back to USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2). The lift was completed at 1100H. At 1130H Co A was helilifted back to Beach GREEN for return by landing craft to USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2). Co A received sniper fire while holding perimeter for H&S Co (-) to be helilifted. There were no casualties. Shore Party and elements of Co C returned to assigned shipping leaving 3 LVT's and 1 plt from Co C on Beach GREEN as security for the DUKW which had been left on the beach when an LCM-6 sank. At 1600H all equipment and personnel were aboard assigned shipping. DECKHOUSE III, PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO terminated at 1630H.

6. Results

a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted by BLT 1/26.

VC KIA BODY COUNT 2

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ENCLOSURE (2)

VC WIA CONFIRMED 2
 VC WIA POSSIBLE 6
 VCS CAPTIVE 3

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured and/or destroyed by BLT 1/26:

(a) Ordnance, Weapons and Individual Equipment.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Carbine, 7.62mm, Chicom, Type 53	4
Small arms Ammunition 7.62	130 rounds
Cartridge Belt	1
Individual Pack	1
AT Mine	2
US Survival Kit	1
Booby Trap	3
57mm RR Ammunition	14 rounds
Grenade, Chicom Wooden Handle	12
81mm Mortar Ammunition	4 rounds
60mm Mortar Ammunition	2 rounds
Gask Mask (NVA)	65
Gas Mask (US)	1

Supplies. (b) Hospitals, Dispensaries, Medical and Surgical

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Medical Supplies	Assorted
Dispensary	1

(c) Food and Clothing

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Wheat	3 Ton
Rice	8.1 Ton
White Jackets	87
Maroon Shirt	6
Clothing Factory	1
Lard	28 gallons
Salt in 25 pound bags	139 bags
Slaughtered Hogs	4
Soy Bean Oil	10 gallons
Flour	30 pounds
Field Jacket	7

(d) Construction Material and Shelters.

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Bunkers	327
Cement in 80 pound bags	10 bags
Huts (Avg 8' x 10')	58
 (e) <u>Documents</u>	
<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Document (assorted)	75 pounds
 (f) <u>POL</u>	
<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Oil	9 gallons
Kerosene	100 gallons
 (g) <u>Miscellaneous</u>	
<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Cooking Utensils	Assorted
Flashlight Batteries	150
Plastic Rolls, 4' x 20'	2000 rolls
Tractor	1
Trailer	1

b. Friendly

(1) Casualties sustained by BLT 1/26 are summarized below:

- (a) Killed in action - 3
 - 1 Gunshot - 3
- (b) Wounded in Action - 25
 - 1 Shrapnel - 22
 - 2 Phosphorous burns - 3
- (c) Non-battle Casualties - 42
 - 1 Heat - 9
 - 2 Miscellaneous - 33


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CONFIDENTIAL

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BLT



26

*1/26
QPO 330-66
HILLTOP VI*

HILLTOP

VI

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

OPERATION ORDER

330-66

*297929 #2
Hist PRS (6)*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966

Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS S501-ND 51-13 (1:250,000) San Jose
 AMS S733-3256IV (1:50,000) Ambulong
 AMS S733-3257III (1:50,000) San Jose
 AMS S733-3157II (1:50,000) Adela
 AMS S733-3257IV (1:50,000) Pitogo
 AMS S733-3157I (1:50,000) Calintaan

(b) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Intelligence Summaries as issued.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) conducts an amphibious assault for the purpose of establishing TU 79.5.2 ashore in order to:

- (a) Destroy enemy forces thereon.
- (b) Seize designated landing force objectives.
- (c) Conduct search and destroy operations within assigned zones.
- (d) Execute tactical withdrawal on order.

(2) Air

(a) Close air support provided by CTG 79.3 in accordance with Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.

(b) Helicopter support provided by HMM-363 (TU 79.5.3).

(3) Naval Gunfire NGF support provided by CTG 76.5 in accordance with Appendix 1 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.

c. Attachments and Detachments See Annex A (Task Organization).

2. MISSION BLT 1-26 lands at H-hour and L-hour by surface and helicopter means to seize Landing Force Objectives 1 through 7; destroys enemy installations; captures or destroys enemy personnel and material; conducts search and destroy operations within assigned area; and executes tactical withdrawal on order.

CONFIDENTIAL3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operations

(1) BLT 1-26 lands two companies by helicopter with designated supporting units commencing at L-hour, D-day in LZ SPARROW (LZ CROW-ALT) and secures LF Obj 3; conducts search and destroy operations as directed.

(2) BLT 1-26 lands two companies with designated supporting units commencing at H-hour, D-day by surface means over Beach RED, seizes LF Objs 1 and 2; conducts search and destroy operations within assigned areas.

(3) BLT 1-26 lands one rifle company on order by helicopter in vic of LF Obj 7; seizes LF Obj 7; conducts search and destroy mission as directed.

(4) On order BLT 1-26 helilifts three rifle companies to vic of LF Objs 4, 5 and 6; seizes LF Objs 4, 5 and 6; conducts search and destroy missions as directed.

(5) BLT 1-26 executes tactical withdrawal when directed.

b. Company D (Rein)

(1) Land by helicopter at L-hour on D-day in LZ SPARROW (LZ CROW-ALT) in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Attack and seize LF Obj 3; destroy enemy installations.

(3) Capture or destroy enemy personnel and material.

(4) Establish defensive positions on west side of LZ SPARROW (LZ CROW-ALT) extending from 931755 to 928748.

(5) Be prepared on order to be helilifted from LZ SPARROW (LZ CROW-ALT) to vic of LF Obj 7.

(6) Attack and seize LF Obj 7; destroy enemy installations.

(7) Capture or destroy enemy personnel and material.

(8) On order conduct search and destroy operations in assigned area.

c. Company C (Rein)

(1) Commencing at H-hour, D-day land by LVT in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Attack and seize LF Obj 1 and destroy enemy installations.

(3) After seizure of LF Obj 1, be prepared to support the attack on LF Obj 2.

(4) Be prepared on order to revert to battalion reserve prior to Company B's attack on LF Obj 6.

(5) After seizure of LF Obj 6 and on order be prepared to be helilifted to vic of LF Obj 5.

(6) Attack and seize LF Obj 5; destroy enemy installations + thereon; capture or destroy enemy personnel and material.

(7) On order conduct search and destroy operations in assigned area.

d. Company A (Rein)

(1) Land by landing craft on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

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(2) On order move through Company C; attack and seize LF Obj 2; destroy enemy installations located thereon; capture or destroy enemy personnel and material.

(3) Be prepared to revert to battalion reserve prior to Company C's attack and seizure of LF Obj 5.

(4) After seizure of LF Obj 5 by Company C and on order be prepared to be helilifted to vic of LF Obj 4.

(5) Attack and seize LF Obj 4; destroy enemy installations thereon; capture or destroy enemy personnel and material.

(6) On order conduct search and destroy operations in assigned area.

e. 81mm Mortar Plat (-) (Rein)

(1) Land by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and occupy positions prescribed by Annex C (Operations Overlay).

(2) General support of BLT 1-26.

f. Btry A (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Marines

(1) Land by landing craft on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan). Proceed to firing positions prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay).

(2) Direct Support of PLT 1-26.

g. 107mm Mortar Btry (-) (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Marines

(1) Land by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan). Proceed to firing positions prescribed in Annex C (Operations Overlay).

(2) Direct Support of BLT 1-26.

h. 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th Antrac Bn

(1) Land assault elements of BLT 1-26 in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan). Move clear of immediate beach area and disembark troops.

(2) Provide prime movers for 105mm Howitzer as required.

(3) General Support of BLT 1-26.

i. 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th AT Bn

(1) Land heavy section by landing craft in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Be prepared to land as a provisional rifle platoon without ONTOS.

j. 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn

(1) Land by landing craft on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) General Support of BLT 1-26.

CONFIDENTIALk. 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 5th Tk Bn

(1) Land heavy section by landing craft in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Be prepared to land as a provisional rifle platoon without tanks.

l. 106 Recoiless Rifle Plat (Rein)

(1) Land as a provisional rifle platoon on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Provide security for Bn CP as directed by HqCmdt.

m. 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th MT Bn

(1) Land by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Provide security for 107mm Howtar Btry as directed by Btry Cndr.

n. BLT Reserve(1) Company B (Rein)

(a) Land by helicopter in LZ SPARROW (LZ CROW-ALT) in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(b) Establish defensive positions on east side of LZ SPARROW (LZ CROW-ALT) extending from 931755 to 928748.

(c) Be prepared on order to assume the mission of any other rifle company.

(d) Be prepared, on order, to conduct search and destroy operations in any assigned area.

(e) When directed be prepared to attack and seize LF

Obj 6.

o. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Essential elements of Attack: Annex C (Operation Overlay) and Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).

(3) D-day: 9 August 1966

(4) H-hour: 0800

(5) L-hour: 0830H

(6) W-hour: (Withdrawal): to be designated

(7) All units will have front line panel markers.

(8) Code name for this operation - HILLTOP VI.

(9) All precautions will be taken to avoid damage to Philippine property and injury to Philippine nationals.

(10) Unit commanders will ensure that adequate security is maintained on all equipment to prevent expected attempts at pilferage by indigenous personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. See Annex I (Logistics).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Annex F (Comm-Elec).

b. Command Posts: AFLOAT ASHORE

- | | | | |
|-----|---|-------|------------------|
| (1) | CTG 79.5 | LPH-2 | |
| (2) | CTU 79.5.2 | LPH-2 | to be designated |
| (3) | CTU 79.5.3 | LPH-2 | |
| (4) | Subordinate units report locations ashore when established. | | |

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT


A. A. MONTI

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
CommandingANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operation Overlay
- D - Landing Plan
- E - Fire Support Coordination
- F - Communication-Electronics
- G - Reports
- H - Withdrawal Plan
- I - Logistics
- J - Rehearsal
- K - Checkpoints
- Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 330-66

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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

BLT 1-26

LCol MONTI

H&S Co (-)
Det, Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (Ln Tm)
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)
Det, Hq Co (-), 26th MarRadio Relay Tm
Det, Postal Unit
Det, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div (Photo)
Det, DisbursingDet, Comm Spt Co (-), 9th Comm Bn
Logistic Support UnitDet, Command Sect
Det, MF Sect
Det, Supply Sect
Det, Maint Sect

1st Plat (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th SP Bn

1st Plat
Det, Beachmaster Unit-1

Det, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Med Bn

Det, Collecting Plat
Clearing Sect
Det, 15th Dental Co, FMFCo A (Rein)

Capt VELASQUEZ

Co A
Det, H&S Co, 1-26Det, Med Plat
1st FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat1st FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
1st Sqd, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP BnCo C (Rein)

Capt KAPPELMAN

Co C

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Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plat
3rd FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat
1st FAC Tm

3rd FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Spot Tm)
2d Sqd, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn

Co D (Rein)

Capt WEIDNER

Co D
Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plat
4th FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat
2nd FAC Tm

4th FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
3rd Sqd, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn

Btry A (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar

Capt BAILEY

Btry A (-)
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

107mm Mortar Btry (-) (Rein), 2nd Bn, 12th Mar

Capt MERRITT

107mm Mortar Btry
Det, Mess Sec, Serv Plat, Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 12th Mar
Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn

81mm Mortar Plat (Rein)

1stLt MOONEY

81mm Mortar Plat (-)
Det, Med Plat

1st Plat, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Amtrac Bn

1stLt DIBELLO

1st Plat, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th MT Bn

2Lt CLEELAND

1st Plat (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AT Bn

1stLt DEBILIO

1st Plat
Det, Co Hq, Co A (-) (Rein)

1st Plat (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Engr Bn

2Lt DEAR

1st Plat (-)
Det, Co Hq, Co A (-) (Rein)

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<u>106mm Recoilless Rifle Plat (Rein)</u>	1stLt TERRILL
106RR Plat Det, Med Plat, H&S Co, 1-26	
<u>1st Plat, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th TK Bn</u>	1stLt LARKIN
<u>Reconnaissance Group</u>	Capt JORDAN
1st Plat, 3rd Force Recon Co 1st Plat, Co A, 5th Recon Bn	
<u>BLT Reserve</u>	Capt SIMPSON
<u>Co B (Rein)</u>	
Co B Det, H&S Co, 1-26	
Det, Med Plat 2nd, FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat	
2nd FO Tm Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn	



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BLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS S501-ND 51-13 (1:250,000) San Jose
 AMS S733-3256 IX (1:50,000) Ambulong
 AMS S733-3257 III (1:50,000) San Jose
 AMS S733-3157 II (1:50,000) Adela

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.a. General

(1) The United States Government, in carrying out its treaty agreements, has been engaged in in-country operations in direct support of Friendly Nation's military effort against communist insurgent forces of Enemy Nation. As a result, insurgency approaching Phase III (was of movement characterized by military organization and employment along conventional lines) has developed.

(2) Current, usually reliable, intelligence sources have reported increased enemy buildup of supplies, equipment, and forces on the border between the belligerent nations. These same sources have also reported similar activity along certain coastal areas of Enemy Nation. There is growing evidence to support the contention that the insurgents are training organized combined armed units of battalion, regiment, and brigade size. The enemy has also stepped up conscription input, and increased his trained ground potential..

(3) In order to cause the enemy to focus attention elsewhere so that his efforts to buildup his ready forces for commitment to large-scale operations are precluded, at least temporarily, the JOS have ordered amphibious raids to be executed on the enemy's homeland.

b. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)

c. See current INTSUMS and Special Intelligence Reports as issued.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Determine if the enemy will defend the coastal area within the zone of action. If so, where and in what strength?

b. Determine the location, strength, identification and composition of Enemy Nation Forces in the objective area.

c. Determine if the enemy will reinforce. If so, when, where and in what strength?

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- d. Determine if the enemy will infiltrate from the area of operations. If so, over what routes?
- e. Determine the location and strength of enemy forces occupying the high ground north east and north west of Objective 3.
- f. Determine the load capability of the bridges located at the following coordinates: 891667, 882718, 877733, 898742, 894721, and 890718.

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONSa. Orders to subordinate units(1) All units

- (a) Conduct aggressive reconnaissance patrols and make maximum use of observation and listening posts.
- (b) Report all incidents of enemy use of crew served weapons with particular attention to heavy mortars (120mm) and recoilless rifles; include the type of weapons and locations.
- (c) Report all enemy contacts; including disposition, strength, and identification.
- (d) Report all enemy obstacles and tunnels, including those destroyed by friendly troops.
- (e) Report the civilian attitude toward troops and toward our operations.
- (f) Requests for AO support will be forwarded to Battalion S-2.

b. Requests to higher, adjacent and supporting units.(1) Commander, Special Landing Force

- (a) Provide aerial photography as requested.
- (b) Provide current and predicted weather data.
- (c) Provide information as obtained on beach and surf conditions.
- (d) Provide Tactical Air Observer support as requested.
- (e) Provide inland ground reconnaissance as requested.

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4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.

- a. Prisoners of War. Prisoners of war are lucrative sources of military information. Every effort must be made to capture prisoners. The term "POW" shall include military personnel of any enemy state, civilians bearing arms against our forces or serving their interests.
- b. Processing of POW's.
- (1) Capturing units will handle POW's in accordance with Ref: (b) emphasizing the five S's - Search, Segregate, Silence, Speed, and Safeguard. POW's will not be mistreated but will be handled so as to maintain the shock of being captured.
 - (2) Capturing units will:
 - (a) Immediately disarm and search POW and enforce rigid silence.
 - (b) Prisoners should be segregated as soon as possible into four groups; Officer, NCOs, Enlisted men, and deserters.
 - (c) Tag segregated POW's with standard POW tag as provided.
 - (d) Place documents removed from prisoners in appropriate Captured Document Envelopes as provided and identify with the prisoner.
 - (3) Wounded captives will be given adequate medical treatment and will be evacuated through captive medical channels in accordance with the physical condition of the captive. Medical Officer will report to the BLT S-2 any information voluntarily disclosed by wounded captives.
- c. Interrogation. Companies and subordinate units will limit interrogation of POW's to developing that information which is of immediate tactical value to the capturing unit. POW's must be processed back to trained interrogators as quickly as possible.
- d. Special Restrictions on Interrogation. The below listed categories of POW's are of special importance and interest and should be handled as such:
- (1) Field Grade Officers
 - (2) Pilots and crew members
 - (3) NBC personnel
 - (4) Intelligence and Counterintelligence personnel
 - (5) Communications/Electronics personnel

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- e. Captured Documents. The primary sources of captured enemy documents are:
- (1) POW's both military and civilians
 - (2) Captured enemy CP's and Installations
 - (3) Enemy dead
 - (4) Captured enemy vehicles and equipment
 - (5) All captured enemy documents from whatever sources will be placed in a Captured Document Envelope and immediately forwarded to the Bn S-2.
- f. Captured equipment. All captured enemy equipment will be tagged with a completed Captured Equipment Tag as provided and forwarded to the BLT S-2 as soon as possible.
- (1) The below listed types of captured material and equipment of special intelligence interest and must be evacuated to the S-2 immediately:
 - (a) Soviet and ChiCom/North Korean manufactured arms and equipment.
 - (b) Communications/Electronic Equipment.
 - (c) Aircraft and missiles and/or their related components.
 - (d) NBC equipment.
 - (2) Items of captured equipment will not be maintained as souvenirs but will be forwarded to the S-2 for intelligence processing. When items cease to be of an intelligence value they will be returned to the capturing individual.

5. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

- a. Standard Reference Maps: AMS Series S733 sheets 8256 IV, 3257 III and 3157 II.
- b. Aerial photographs will be distributed as they become available.
- c.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

- a. The following counterintelligence measures will be implemented by all units:
 - (1) Utilize maximum concealment and maintain high standards of camouflage and march, light and noise discipline.
 - (2) Re-iterate Code of Conduct responsibilities for all personnel in case of possible capture.
 - (3) Maintain strict physical control of classified material and limit access to a strict "need to know" basis.
 - (4) Comply with communications security measures.
 - (5) Immediately report to the S-2 the loss or compromise of classified material.
- b. Challenge and Password
 - (1) Challenge and Passwords, unless compromised or otherwise

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changed will be in effect for a 24 hour period, normally 1200 to 1200 local time.

- (2) The BLT S-2 will be immediately notified when compromise of the Challenge and Password is suspected.
- (3) See Appendix 3.
- c. Only those civilian news correspondents and photographers specifically authorized by Commander Amphibious Task Force will be allowed in the objective area.

7. REPORTS

- a. Reporting of any and all information with regard to the enemy must be continuous by all units to this headquarters (Attn S-2). Reports must be forwarded by the most expeditious means possible and be in the form of the key word SALUTE:

S - Size of enemy force in numbers.
 A - Action that has taken place including direction of enemy withdrawal.
 L - Location.
 U - Enemy unit designation if known.
 T - Time action took place.
 E - Equipment of enemy.

- b. Special reports will be submitted on request from this headquarters.

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Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Commanding

APPENDICES

1. Intelligence Estimate
2. Landing Beach Study
3. Challenge and Password (To Be Published)
4. Astronomical and Tidal Data (To Be Published)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 3 (Distribution) to Operation Order 330-66

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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 040800H August 1966

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 330-66, HILLTOP VI

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS S501-ND 51-13 (1:250,000) San Jose
 AMS S733-3256 IV (1:50,000) Ambulong
 AMS S733-3257 III (1:50,000) San Jose
 AMS S733-3157 II (1:50,000) Adela

1. MISSION. BLT 1/26 lands at H - hour and L - hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to sieze Objectives 1, 2, and 3 as prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay); destroys enemy troops, equipment, and supplies; conducts search and destroy operations within assigned area; and executes tactical withdrawl on order.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS.

a. Weather. Mindoro Island is located in the west central portion of the Phillippine Island Group. Weather is of a subtropical to tropical nature and is chiefly influenced by the monsoonal flow. Partly cloudy skies with associated light tropical showers will pervail the majority of the time. Exact weather conditions will be disseminated prior to D-Day and daily thereafter. See Appendix 4 for Astonamical data.

b. Terrain.

(1) Existing situation.

(a) The area is lowland coastal plain that gently rises to the NE finally reaching a height of 20M. The only dominating terrain in the area is the small hill complex in grid square TP 9879 which is 448 meters.

(b) The lowland area is flanked with sandy foothills, dry land crops and grass. Soil on the river beds is generally sandy with some coarse gravel. The area is primarily paddy (cultivated in wetland rice) interlaced with numerous streams, ditches, and canals. Ground is soft and miry when wet and firm when moist. When dry, sandy ground is firm, whereas clay ground is hard and may develop cracks. The soil in the area is wet and flooded during July-November; dry during February May; and moist during the intervening periods.

(c) The primary road that runs through the area is an all weather, lightly surfaced road, two lanes wide with occasional one lane defiles. It is potholed and suffers from lack of maintenance. Several fair weather roads bisect the area and trails exist throughout.

(d) San Jose airfield (TP 8767) has a single strip graded rolled runway 3600 feet in length. It is rated at C47 capacity. Off runway facilities consist of hardstands and gravel taxiways. The run-

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way is not lighted, and emergency equipment is not available. Maintenance buildings and hangars are not present. A radio beacon operating part time is the only navigational aid available. The airfield is used regularly by Phillipine Airlines.

(f) Abandoned fighter airstrips of World War II construction are located at TP 881705 and TP 930745. Their usefulness to fixed wing aircraft is negligible except in extreme emergencies.

(g) Towns within the area include Progresso (TP 9073), La Charua (TP 8772), Bagong Silat (TP 8968) and San Jose which is adjacent to the area of operations. All of the towns have populations of under 3,000 with the exception of San Jose which is over 4,000.

(2) Effects on enemy operations. The generally uncovered terrain will afford the enemy excellent observation and fields of fire within the area. Although the terrain will pose no trafficability problem to the enemy, his movement will be hindered by the general absence of concealment.

(3) Effects on our operations. The area will afford excellent observation and fields of fire and use of supporting arms. HLZ's around the area and will permit rapid massing of troops.

3. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Installations that have been identified within the AOA include Tenchan, a combined arms training camp, vic TP 9375 (LF Obj:1), Comm Chan, a vital radio station, vic TP 9375 (LF Obj:3), and a possible enemy command post in the village of Bagong Sikit, TP 8968 (LF Obj:2).

b. Enemy force within the AOA consists of a Local Force Battalion of a strength of about 400. In addition, Main force elements of Enemy Nation have been identified in the general area contiguous to the AOA. Units known to be in the general area include:

- (1) 3rd Co, 71st Bn (MF - 160 men)
- (2) 2 Sep Cos (MF - unconfirmed strength)

c. The 21st Enemy Nation Regiment is known to be operating north of the AOA and is considered capable of reinforcing units within the objective area in 24 hours. The regiment has a strength of approximately 1500 men. Forces in the objective area are known to be equipped with 30 and 50 caliber weapons and probably possess 60 and 81 mm mortars, 57 mm Recoiless rifles, and assorted small arms.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.**a. Enumeration.**

- (1) Attack any target within the objective area with a force of up to one Local Force Battalion and three separate companies.
- (2) Defend at a time and place of their choosing with a force of up to one Local Force Battalion and three separate companies.
- (3) Reinforce capabilities (1) and (2) above with all or part of the 21st Enemy Nation Regiment within 24 hours after movement commences.
- (4) Evade direct contact with superior U.S. Forces and resort to

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small unit harassing attacks, ambushes, mining and the use of booby traps in an effort to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. Forces and to decimate small units operating at extended distances from reinforcing elements.

(5) Exfiltrate the area prior to or after commencement of operations.

b. Analysis and Discussion.

(1) Capability (1). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: The superior knowledge that the enemy possesses of the terrain and his ability to have pre-registered fires plotted throughout the objective area. Indications militating against the adoption of this capability are the lack of cover and concealment there by making it difficult for the enemy to mass his forces for an attack.

(2) Capability (2). Indications favoring the adoption of this capability consist again of his superior knowledge of the terrain in addition to the excellent fields of fire and observation that exist within the objective area. Indications militating against the adoption of this capability are the enemy's respect for our ability to employ supporting arms and his reluctance to be tied to a fixed position thus restricting his freedom of maneuver.

(3) Capability (3). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: The forces capable of reinforcing are readily available; the area is controlled by the enemy, thereby providing freedom of movement. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability include the risk of detection and possible attack by air, artillery, and naval gunfire during movement and the reluctance of the enemy to mass forces.

(4) Capability (4). Indications which favor the adoption of the capability are: This is a time tested enemy tactic which provides the enemy with the capability of inflicting significant damage on the opposing force. Under these conditions the enemy is least vulnerable to the effects of supporting fire. There are no indications which militate against the adoption of this capability.

(5) Capability (5). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are the enemy's superior knowledge of the terrain and his desire to conserve his Main Force strength when opposed against superior forces. Militating against the adoption of this capability is the fact that the enemy's homeland is being jeopardized which may force him to fight tenaciously in place.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Probable courses of action. The probable courses of action are summarized below:

(1) Against friendly operations of short term duration in the objective area the enemy would probably execute capability (4) and conduct small scale harassing attacks.

(2) Should friendly forces attempt a major buildup or com-

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mence advancing out of the objective area the enemy would probably execute capabilities (2) and (3).

b. Vulnerabilities. Enemy Nation Forces when concentrated are vulnerable to attack by air, naval gunfire, and artillery. Although little is yet known about the enemy's command and control capabilities, it is believed that communications are basic with only a minimal number of short range radios located at battalion and regimental headquarters. In the past Enemy Nation main forces units have been known to break contact when confronted by a superior force.

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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 040800H August 1966

Appendix 2 (Landing Beach Study) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation
 Order 330-66

Ref: (a) AMS S733, 3257 III, 1:50,000 Central Philippines

1. LOCATION.

a. Red One Center TP 862678
 Left Flank TP 860680
 Right Flank TP 863677

2. OFFSHORE. (beyond 18 fathom curve).

- a. Hazard to Navigation. There are no uncharted hazards to navigation.
- b. Tides and Currents. Littoral current is generally South. Tide is chiefly diurnal and the tidal range is $3 \frac{3}{4}$ feet.
- c. Bottom Composition. Sand.

3. NEARSHORE. (18 fathom curve to low water mark).

a. Gradient.

Average distance from MLLW to 1 fathom curve: 20 yards.
 Average distance from 1 fathom curve to 2 fathom curve: 65 yards.
 Average distance from 2 fathom curve to 3 fathom curve: 120 yards.
 Average distance MLLW to 1 fathom curve: 1:10.
 Average distance from 1 fathom curve to 2 fathom curve: 1:33
 Average distance from 2 fathom curve to 3 fathom curve: 1:60
 Average near shore gradient (DATUM line to 3 fathom curve): 1:34.

b. Bottom Composition. Sandy with a few small pea sized rocks intermixed.

c. Obstacles and Hazards. There are no coral heads or other obstacles.

4. FORESHORE. (low water mark to dune line).

a. Gradient. 1:15

b. Shape of Beach. Slightly concave

c. Length of Beach. 500 yards

d. Width of Beach. 20 to 25 yards

e. Beach Composition. Fine sand and a few scattered pea sized rocks.

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f. Beach Trafficability. Good; firmly packed base should support all vehicles and personnel.

g. Beach Obstacles. There are no observed beach obstacles other than fishing boats.

5. BACKSHORE.

a. Character. There is no significant berm.

b. Trafficability. Good for tracked vehicles, fair for vehicles.

c. Exits. Access to a 15 foot wide gravel road that runs along most of the length of the beach can be gained at almost any point.

6. HINDERLAND.

a. Terrain. Flat

b. Vegetation. Sparsely covered with short vegetation.

c. Roads. A 15 foot wide gravel road runs along most of the beach about 40 yards from the high water line.

d. Buildings. Scattered native huts and several small villages composed of native huts.

e. Towns. Several small villages. Town of San Jose just South of Beach.

7. EVALUATION.

a. Landings. All of this beach is considered excellent for any type landing craft up to and including LST's, which can expect a dry ramp.

b. Paratroop and Helicopter Landing Zones. Excellent helicopter and paratroop landing sites are available as most of the area is flat and open.

c. Miscellaneous. Matting will not be required in most areas.

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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 040800 August 1966

Appendix 3 (Challenge and Password) to Annex B (Intelligence) to
 Operation Order 330-66.

CODE	DATE	PRIMARY		ALTERNATE	
		CHALLENGE	PASSWORD	CHALLENGE	PASSWORD
22	7 Aug	Blue	Grass	National	League
33	8 Aug	Hot	Rod	Deep	Wave
46	9 Aug	Yellow	Lemon	Fish	Tale
59	10 Aug	Window	Pane	Red	Baron
63	11 Aug	Mountain	Lake	Tom	Collins
74	12 Aug	Pink	Lady	Black	Widow
87	13 Aug	Whiskey	Sour	Dumb	Waiter

Challenge and Passwords will be in effect from 1200 to 1200 daily on dates indicated.

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 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 040800 August 1966

Appendix 4 (Astronomical and Tidal Data) to Annex B (Intelligence) to
 Operation Order 330-66.

SITUATION.

A. Weather, Enemy, Terrain, Hydro, Astro and Tidal Data.

(1) Weather: Dur Aug area dominated by S. W. monsoon and typhoon season. Heavy precipitation may be expected throughout opn in form of showers and thunder storms. Visibility will remain relatively good except dur shower activity. Temp expected to reach high 89, low 75, ave humidity mo. of Aug. 8%

(2) Enemy: IAW annex B Ref. B and Hilltop INTSUMS and SPOTREPS.

(3) Terrain: Rain during periods opn will limit vehicular traffic. Numerous streams throughout area flood making fording difficult. Under-current and swiftness of streams dangerous; caution must be exercised while fording. San Jose airfield loc at TP 8767, 3600 ft., rated at C47 capacity. HLZ's loc throughout area. See annex B ref. B for detailed terrain info.

(4) Beach data: See Tab A (Landing Beach) to Appex 1 (Intelligence Est.) to Annex B, Ref B.

(5) Astronomical Data:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BMNT</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EENT</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>MOONPHASE</u>
8 Aug	0524	0546	1816	1844	2256	1051	1 ☾
9 Aug	0524	0546	1816	1844	2336	1141	1 ☾
10 Aug	0524	0546	1816	1843	2351	1233	1 ☾
11 Aug	0524	0547	1815	1843	0019	1326	1 ☾
12 Aug	0524	0547	1815	1843	0108	1435	1 ☾
13 Aug	0524	0547	1815	1843	0205	1527	1 ☾

TIDAL DATA

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>HEIGHT (Feet)</u>
8 Aug	1352 (H)	3.0
	0743 (L)	1.6
	2034 (C)	1.2
9 Aug	0306 (H)	2.9
	0930 (L)	1.9
	1443 (H)	2.5
	2030 (L)	1.4

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TIDAL DATA (Con't)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>HEIGHT</u>
10 Aug	0338 (H)	3.2
	1134 (L)	1.3
	1619 (H)	2.0
	2005 (L)	1.5
11 Aug	0442 (H)	3.6
	1332 (L)	0.9
12 Aug	0516 (H)	4.0
	1445 (L)	0.4
13 Aug	0616 (H)	4.4
	1539 (L)	0.1


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Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

a. This plan provides for:

- (1) Landing two reinforced companies with designated supporting units by helicopter in Landing Zone SPARROW (LZ CROW-ALT).
- (2) Land two reinforced companies with designated supporting units by surface means over Beach RED.
- (3) See Appendixes for detailed instructions.

2. SHIP-TO-SHORE CONTROL. TacLog Group representation will be provided in accordance with Annex I (Logistics).APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Landing Craft Availability Table
- 2 - Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table
- 3 - Helicopter Availability Table
- 4 - Landing Diagram
- 5 - Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table
- 6 - Serial Assignment Table
- 7 - Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table
- 8 - Helicopter Wave and Serial Assignment Table
- 9 - Helicopter Landing Diagram
- 10 - Assault Schedule
- 11 - Pre-D-Day Transfer Schedule



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Appendix 1 (Landing Craft Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan)
 to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>LCM-6</u>	<u>LCM-8</u>	<u>LCU</u>
LPD-2	3	2	0
LSD 28	1	2	1
Total	4	4	1
Spares	0	0	0
Naval Requirement	1	0	0
Total Naval Requirement	1	0	0
Total Available to Landing Force	3	4	1

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Appendix 2 (Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

SHIP	AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE UNIT	NUMBER & TYPE AMPHIBIAN VEHICLES LVTP-5 LVTC DUKW	REMARKS
LSD-28 LSD-28	1st Plat, Co A, 5th AmTrac Bn, FMP	10 1 :	
LSD-28	Det, BMU-1		1



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Appendix 3 (Helicopter Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan)
 to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: FMFM 3-3

Time Zone: H

HELICOPTER UNIT AND DESIGNATION	NUMBER OF A/C	A/C AVAILABLE		TYPE	CARRIER	DECK	
		FIRST TRIP	OTHER TRIPS			LAUNCH CAPACITY	REMARKS
HMM 363 (MILLPOINT)	24	19	16	UH-34D	LPH-2	10	



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Appendix 4 (Landing Diagram) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to
Operation Order 330-66.

H-hour: 0800

Beach RED

Wave 1
H-hour

Co C (Rein)

X X X X* X X X X X X X
1-0 1-1 1-2 0-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8 1-9

Ser: 100

Wave 2
H+4

Co A (Rein)

O O* O
2-2 2-1 2-3

Ser: 102

Wave 3
H+10

SP Flat (-)
Recon Party, Btry A
Beachmaster Unit (-)

O O*
2-2 2-1

Ser: .
302
374

LEGEND:

X LVTP-5
X LVTC
O LCM(6)

O LCM-8
(O) LCU
* Wave Cmdr



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Appendix 5 (Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table)
 to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

<u>BOAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SPACES</u>	<u>FORMATIONS</u>
	1st WAVE		<u>COLUMN</u>
1-0	2 Sqd 1 Plat Co C	13	
LVTP-5	1 Sqd 3.5 Co C	7	X*
	1 PlatGd Co C	1	1-0
	Corpsman 1 Plat Co C	2	
		<u>23</u>	X
			1-1
1-1	1 Sqd 1 Plat Co C	13	
LVTP-5	1 Sqd MG Co C	9	X
	1 PlatCmdr Co C	1	1-2
	1 Plat Msgr	1	
	Radioman 1 Plat	1	X
		<u>25</u>	0-2
1-2	3FT 2 Sqd 3 Plat Co C	4	X
LVTP-5	3 Sqd 3 Plat Co C	12	1-3
	1 FAC Tm H&S Co C	5	
	3 PlatSgt	1	X
	Corpsman 3 Plat	1	1-4
		<u>23</u>	
			X
1-3	CO Co C	1	1-5
LVTC	Radioman Co C	2	
	Driver Co C	1	X
	Corpsman Co C	1	1-6
	Wpns PlatCmdr Co C	1	
	Naval Gunfire Spot Tm	7	X
		<u>13</u>	1-7
1-4	3 Sqd 3.5 Co C	8	X
LVTP-5	3 Sqd 60 Mortar Co C	4	1-8
	1 FT 2 Sqd 3 Plat Co C	4	
	2 FT 2 Sqd 3 Plat Co C	4	X
	2 SqdLdr 3 Plat Co C	1	1-9
	Gren 2 Sqd 3 Plat Co C	1	
	Corpsman 3 Plat Co C	1	
		<u>23</u>	
1-5	1 Sqd 3 Plat Co C	13	
LVTP-5	3 Sqd MG Co C	9	
	3 PlatCmdr	1	
	3 Plat Msgr	1	
		<u>24</u>	

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<u>BOAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SPACES</u>	<u>FORMATIONS</u>
1-6	3 Sqd 1 Plat Co C	13	
LVTP-5	FO Tm Artv	5	
	1 PlatSgt Co C	1	
	Corpsman 1 Plat Co C	1	
	SecLdr MG WpnsPlat Co C	1	
	1 Sqd 60 Mortar Co C	<u>4</u>	
		25	
1-7	2 Sqd 1 Plat Co A Engr	12	
LVTP-5	3 FO Tm 81 Mortar	2	
	XO Co C	1	
	Chief Clerk Co C	1	
	Co GySgt Co C	1	
	Supply Cgt Co C	1	
	Clerks Co C	2	
	1stSgt Co C	11	
	Chief Corpsman Co C	1	
	Radioman Co C	1	
	Msgr Co C	1	
	WpnsPlatSgt Co C	<u>1</u>	
		25	
1-8	1 Sqd 2 Plat Co C	14	
	2 Sqd MG Co C	8	
	2 PlatSgt Co C	<u>1</u>	
		23	
1-9	2 Sqd 2 Plat Co C	14	
	2 Sqd 3.5 WpnsPlat	6	
	2 PlatCmdr Co C	1	
	Radioman 2 Plat Co C	1	
	Corpsman 2 Plat Co C	<u>1</u>	
		23	
1-10	3 Sqd Co C	14	
	2 Sqd Mortars Co C	4	
	Mortar SecLdr Co C	1	
	Corpsman 2 Plat Co C	1	
	2 PlatGd	<u>1</u>	
		21	

2nd WAVE

WEDGE

2-1	CO Co A	1		0*
LCM-6	CoGySgt Co A	1		2-1
	WpnsPlatCmdr Co A	1	0	0
	3 PlatCmdr Co A	1	2-2	2-3
	3 PlatSgt Co A	1		
	3 PlatGd	1		
	3 PlatMsgr	2		
	1 Sqd 3 Plat Co A	13		
	2 Sqd 3 Plat Co A	13		

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<u>BOAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SPACES</u>	<u>FORMATIONS</u>
	3 Sqd 3 Plat Co A	13	
	Corpsman 3 Plat Co A	2	
	1 FO Tm Co A 1 Bn 13th Mar Co A	5	
	Det, 5 Engr Co A	11	
	FO Tm 81 Plat H&S Co	2	
	Chief Corpsman Co A	1	
	Radioman Co A	2	
	3 Sqd MG WpnsPlat Co A	8	
	3 Sqd 3.5 WpnsPlat Co A	6	
	3 Sqd 60 Mortar WpnsPlat Co A	3	
	60mm SecLdr WpnsPlat Co A	1	
	3.5 SecLdr WpnsPlat Co A	1	
		<u>89</u>	
2-2	2 PlatCmdr Co A	1	
LCM-6	2 PlatSgt Co A	1	
	2 PlatGd Co A	1	
	2 Plat Msgr	2	
	2 Plat Corpsman Co A	2	
	1 Sqd 2 Plat Co A	14	
	2 Sqd 2 Plat Co A	13	
	3 Sqd 2 Plat Co A	10	
	2 Sqd MG WpnsPlat Co A	7	
	2 Sqd 3.5 WpnsPlat Co A	7	
	2 Sqd 60 Mortar WpnsPlat Co A	3	
	1 Sgt Co A	1	
	CoArmor Co A	1	
	MG SecLdr WpnsPlat Co A	1	
		<u>64</u>	
2-3	XO Co A	1	
	1 PlatCmdr Co A	1	
	1 PlatSgt Co A	1	
	1 PlatGd Co A	1	
	1 Plat Msgr Co A	2	
	1 Plat Corpsman Co A	2	
	1 Sqd 1 Plat Co A	13	
	2 Sqd 1 Plat Co A	14	
	3 Sqd 1 Plat Co A	13	
	1 Sqd MG WpnsPlat Co A	8	
	1 Sqd 3.5 WpnsPlat Co A	6	
	1 Sqd 60 Mortar WpnsPlat Co A	4	
	WpnsPlatSgt Co A	1	
	AmmonCO WpnsPlat Co A	1	
	CoPo1Sgt Co A	1	
	Co Driver Co A	1	
	WpnsPlat Corpsman Co A	1	
		<u>71</u>	

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<u>BOAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SPACES</u>	<u>FORMATIONS</u>
	3rd WAVE		
3-1	SP Plat (-)	30	
LCM (8)	Recon Party, Btry A	18	0*
	TD-15	—	3-1
		—	0
		<u>48</u>	3-2
3-2	Beachmaster Unit (-)	15	
LCM (8)	Driver, Comm Plat	1	
	MPC - 62	—	
		<u>16</u>	
	<u>ON CALL</u>		
LCU	Tank Plat (-)	12	
Ser: 302	3 M48A3	—	
303		—	
304		<u>12</u>	
LCM (8)	AT Plat (-)	9	
Ser: 200	3 M50 ONTOS	—	
201		—	
202		<u>9</u>	
	<u>NON SCHEDULED</u>		
LCM (6)	Btry F (-)	33	
Ser: 339	2 105mm How	—	
340		<u>33</u>	
LCM (6)	Btry F (-)	33	
Ser: 341	2 105 How	—	
342		<u>33</u>	
LCM (8)	Btry F (-)	40	
Ser: 343	2 105 How	—	
344		<u>40</u>	
LCM (6)	Beachmaster Unit (-)	2	
Ser: 381	1 DUKW	—	
		<u>2</u>	
LCM (6)	Comm Pers	2	
Ser: 357	1 MRC 109	—	
		<u>2</u>	

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Appendix 6 (Serial Assignment Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to
 Operation Order 330-66

SEPIAL NUMBER	UNIT	PERS	MATERIAL EQUIPMENT VEHICLES	CRAFT NO/TYPE	SHIP	REMARKS
100	Co C	248		10 LVTP 1 LVTC	LPD-2	1st Wave
102	Co A	224		3 LCM (6)	LPD-2	2nd Wave
302	SP Plat (-), Recon Party, Btry A	48	1 TD-15	1 LCM (8)	LSD-28	3rd Wave Land with Ser: 374
374	Beachmaster Unit (-)	15	1 MFC - 62	1 LCM (8)	LPD-2	3rd Wave Land with Ser: 302
200						
201	AT Plat (-)	9	3 M-50 ONTOS	1 LCM (8)	LPD-2	On Call
202						
302						
303	Tank Plat (-)	12	3 M48A3	1 LCU	LSD-28	On Call
304						
339						
340						
341						
342	Btry A (-)	106	6 105mm How	2 LCM (6)	LSD-28	Non Sched
343				1 LCM (8)		
344						
381	Beachmaster Unit (-)	2	1 DUKW	1 LCM (6)	LSD-28	Non Sched
357	H&S Co (-)	2	1 MFC - 109	1 LCM (6)	LPD-2	Non Sched



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(5) Relief of fire support ships in accordance with ref (b).

(6) Illumination missions restricted to 48 star shells/hour, unless directed otherwise by FSCC. Destructive illumination missions will employ the modified illumination method of fire.

(7) Smoke missions will be fired only on the request of the supported unit commander.

(8) Concentration numbering in accordance with Annex E (Supporting Arms Coordination).

(9) Standard call fire missions will be 1 gun 4 salvos or 2 guns 2 salvos after adjustment.

(10) Safety Measures

a. VT fuzes will not be fired over the heads of friendly forces unless specifically requested by the supported unit commander.

b. Creep method of spotting will be used in all danger/danger close missions.

c. Rounds will not be fired closer to friendly elements than 350 yards observed, 550 yards unobserved.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Initial ammunition loading and provisions for replenishment in accordance with ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. See Tab 2 (Naval Gunfire Communications Plan).

TABS:

- A. Naval Gunfire Support Operations Diagram
- B. Naval Gunfire Communications.



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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to
Operation Order 330-66.Ref: (a) FMFM 7-2
(b) Annex G (Naval Gunfire Support) to CTG 76.5 Operation Order 331-66.

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) TG 76.5 provides NGF support.

2. MISSION. TU 76.5.1 Fire Support Unit, supports the landing and operation ashore of BLT 1-26 with Naval Gunfire.3. EXECUTIONa. Ship Assignments

- (1) See ref (b)

b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Fire Support Areas (FSA) and zones of responsibility (ZR's) in accordance with Tab A (Naval Gunfire Support Operation Diagram).

(2) Priority of Fire

- a. Defense of fire support ships against counterbattery, air, and submarine attacks takes precedence over all other fires.

- b. Anti-mechanized and Flak-Suppression fires take precedence over call fires.

- c. Call fires take precedence over prearranged fires unless specifically directed otherwise by the controlling agency, SACC or FSCC.

(3) Priority of Targets

- a. Anti-Aircraft Positions.
- b. Artillery Positions.
- c. Mortar Positions.
- d. Active Automatic Weapons Positions.

(4) All fire missions will be observed and under positive control of the SFCP, artillery FO's or airborne observers.

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AFLOAT

ASHORE

(c) 107mm Howtar Btry,
2nd Bn, 12th Mar

LPH-2

PRIMARY ALTERNATE
Vic 929748 Vic 944769



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c. 107mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines

(1) Land in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and occupy positions prescribed in Annex C (Operations Overlay).

(2) Direct Support BLT 1-26

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Firing Chart. Grid Sheet 1:25,000.

(2) Survey. To be provided by Survey Party, Btry A, 1st Battalion 13th Marines as required.

(3) Priorities of Fire

- (a) Anti-mechanized.
- (b) Counterbattery/countermortar.
- (c) Direct Fire weapons.
- (d) Automatic Weapons.
- (e) Observed Fires.

(4) Counter-Battery/Counter-mortars. Semi-Active Policy.

(5) Azimuth of Fire

- (a) A Btry (-) Primary - 850, ALT 0610.
- (b) 107mm Mortar Btry (-) Primary 4670 ALT 1290.

(6) Concentration Numbers. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).

(7) Meteorological Data - To be promulgated as available.

(8) No Fire Lines See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).

(9) Restriction on Fires See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination)

(10) Ammunition Restrictions Units will not expend more than 80 percent of available supply rate without approval of BLT Commander.

(11) Target Information See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. See Annex I (Logistics).
- b. Available supply rate (Rds/Wpr/Day)

105mm Howitzer	<u>80</u>
107mm Howtar	<u>81</u>

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics)
- b. Command Post

	<u>AFLOAT</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>
(a) BLT 1-26	LPH-2	to be announced
(b) Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Mar	LPH-2 LSD-28	<u>PRIMARY</u> <u>ALTERNATE</u> Vic 861679 Vic 897741

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Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization)
- (2) See Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire).
- (3) See Appendix 3 (Air Support).
- (4) See Appendix 4 (Offensive Fire Plan).

2. MISSION

a. Btry A, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, lands by surface means on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and executes assigned missions in direct support of BLT 1-26.

b. 107mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, lands by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and executes assigned missions in direct support of BLT 1-26.

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Artillery Employment

(1) Battery A, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, will, after landing by landing craft over designated beach in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan), support BLT 1-26 by providing direct support conventional fires.

(2) 107mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, will, after landing by helicopter in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan), support BLT 1-26 by providing direct support conventional fires.

b. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines

(1) Land in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and occupy positions prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay).

(2) Direct Support BLT 1-26.

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- 5. This event becomes effective upon completion of events 105 thru 108.
- 6. Condition of aircraft readiness in accordance with NWP 41 (A).
- 7. Time on station is the time that aircraft report to the controlling assigned orbit or entry point.


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TAB A (Air Schedule) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.

Event NO.	MISSION	PROVIDED BY	NUMBER & TYPE A/C	STATION	TIME ON REPORT	TO ON NET	ENTRY PT ALTITUDE	REMARKS
82	TAO/TAC(A)	HMM	1 UH34	H-30	H-30	ICEPACK GOLDPACK	LPH	RELIEVE ON STATION
100	MED EVAC	HMM	2 UH34	COND III/IV	COND III/IV	ICEPACK FAIRMONT	LPH	NOTE 1 & 2
171	SAR	HMM	1 UH34	H-30	H-30 TO H+15	GOLD	LPH	NOTE 1 & 2
31	LZ PREP/HELLO ESCORT	CTG 79.3	2 VA	L-15	L-15 TO H+45	ICEPACK	SUE	NOTE 3
51	CAS	CTG 79.3	2 VA	COMPLETION	H-15 TO COMPLETION	ICEPACK GOLD	SUE	RELIEVE ON STATION SUN* RISE - SUNSET NOTE 3
105	TROOP LIFT	HMM	4 UH34	L-15	L-15	FAIRMONT BLACK	1500	PENSACOLA NOTE 4
106	TROOP LIFT	HMM	4 UH34	L-15	L-15	FAIRMONT BLACK	1500	PENSACOLA NOTE 4
107	TROOP LIFT	HMM	4 UH34	L-15	L-15	FAIRMONT BLACK	1500	PENSACOLA NOTE 4
108	TROOP LIFT	HMM	4 UH34	L-15	L-15	FAIRMONT BLACK	1500	PENSACOLA NOTE 4
109	TROOP LIFT	HMM	8 UH34	COND IV	COND IV	FAIRMONT BLACK	1500	PENSACOLA NOTE 5

NOTES

1. All helicopters will be available for med evac. sunrise to sunset. COND III daylight hours, COND IV after sunset.
2. Airborne helicopters will be assigned SAR as necessary during daylight operations.
3. Aircraft reporting in at entry point will remain VFR.
4. Events 105 thru 108 will be prepared for backloading on order.

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(5) The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM), Military Grid Reference six (6) digit system of coordinates will be used for target designation.

(6) CATF will maintain communications with San Jose tower and civil aircraft on assigned frequency. No air strikes will be conducted during arrival or departure of aircraft.

(7) General instructions, safety precautions and helicopter control and protection plan in accordance with Annex H to CTG 76.5 Operations Order 330-66.

(8) Panels or a suitable substitute will be displayed prior to calling in air strikes to mark friendly front lines.

(9) Helicopters will be available for medical evacuation and logistics resupply as the situation permits. Medical evacuation requests will be given a priority precedence.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Annex I (Logistics).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS. Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

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TABS:

- A - Aircraft Schedule
- B - Aircraft Armament
- C - Air Communications
- D - Air Frequency Plan
- E - Call signs
- F - Approach and Retirement

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Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS S733 - 3256 II (1:50,000) AMBULONG
 AMS S733 - 3257 III (1:50,000) SAN JOSE
 AMS S733 - 3157 II (1:50,000) ADELA

(b) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. ENEMY FORCES. Annex B (Intelligence)

b. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) Air Support will be provided by CTG 79.3

(2) CTG 76.5 establishes TACC/TADC as appropriate, provides coordination and control of all aircraft which may be assigned to support operations, exercises air traffic control over all aircraft transiting the AOA.

2. MISSION. Conduct air operations in support of Landing Force.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Annex E (Fire Support Coordination)

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) AOA (Aircraft Operating Area) defined as:

(a) An ARC 10NM from Coordinates TP8668 overland and 25NM Seaward.

(b) The San Jose airstrip and area immediately adjacent will be excluded from the AOA.

(2) Restrictive Fire Plans, if employed, will be in accordance with NWIP 22-7 (A)

(3) Control of air will not be passed ashore.

(4) CAS aircraft will be under positive control of either a Forward Air Controller (FAC) or Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (TAC (A)) at all times.

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Tab B (Naval Gun Fire Frequency Plan) to Appendix 2 (Naval Gun Fire Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

NET	NGF CONTROL	NGF SPOT	SFCP LOCAL	AIR SPOT	CALLSIGN
	C-1	C-3	M-65	H-9	
CIRCUIT	3A3J	3A3J			
EMISSION	(USB)	(USB)		6A3	
FREQUENCY	5439	2304	48.4	283.4	
UNIT					CALLSIGN
TU 76.5.1	G				
USS O'HARE	G	G		G	BARN DOOR
1-26 NGLO		B	C	G	BELLGRADE 26 "O"
1-26 SPOT TEAM		G	G		BELLGRADE 26 "C"
SACC	C	B		G	ICEPACK

- B - CONTROL WHEN DIRECTED
- C - CONTROL
- G - GUARD

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
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TAB A to Appendix 2 to Annex E
(NGF Support Operations Diagram)

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FSA Corner Points

<u>Pt</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
A	TP 808735
B	TP 795728
C	TP 823663
D	TP 848679
E	TP 863651
F	TP 841631
G	TP 841590
H	TP 865605
I	TP 880623
J	TP 863631



Drawing Not To Be Used
For Navigation

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Appendix 7 (Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

WAVE	HELI UNIT & FLIGHT NUMBER	NO/TYPE A/C	FROM		LOAD	TIME		DESTINATION		TROOP UNIT EQUIPMENT AND SPECIAL
			CARRIER REPORT	TO		Launch	Land	I2	IS	
1	MILLPOINT 1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L-40	L-30	L-Hour	SPARROW	Co D	
					L-40	L-25				
					L-40	L-20				
					L-40	L-15				
2	MILLPOINT 1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+9	L+11	L+20	SPARROW	Co D	
					L+10	L+12	L+21			
					L-13	L+15	L+24			
					L-14	L+16	L+25			
3	MILLPOINT 1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+29	L+31	L+40	SPARROW	Co D Co B	
					L+30	L+32	L+41			
					L+38	L+40	L+49			
					L+46	L+48	L+57			
4	MILLPOINT*1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+54	L+56	L+65	SPARROW	Co B	
					L+62	L+64	L-73			
					L-58	L+60	L+69			
					L+66	L+68	L+77			
5	MILLPOINT 1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+74	L+76	L+85	SPARROW	Co B	
					L+78	L+80	L+89			
					L+82	L+84	L+93			
					L+86	L+88	L+97			

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WAVE	HELI UNIT & FLIGHT NUMBER	NO/TYPE A/C	FROM CARRIER OFFICIN	TO REPORT LOAD	LOAD	TIME LAUNCH	LAND	DESTINATION LZ LS	TROOP UNIT, EQUIPMENT AND SERIAL
6.	MILLPOINT	1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+94	L+105	SPARROW	Co B 81 Mortar
		3-1	UH-34D	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+98	L+109		
		2-1		LPH-2	LPH-2	L+102	L+113		
		4-1		LPH-2	LPH-2	L+106	L+117		
7	MILLPOINT	1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+114	L+125	SPARROW	CO's Command
		3-1	UH-34D	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+118	L+129		Group Comm Plat
		2-1		LPH-2	LPH-2	L+122	L+133		Hq Cndt Group
		4-1		LPH-2	LPH-2	L+126	L+137		
8	MILLPOINT	1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+134	L+145	SPARROW	Hq Cndt Group
	*	3-1	UH-34D	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+143	L+154		Security Plat
		2-1		LPH-2	LPH-2	L+142	L+153		107mm Mortar Batry
	*	4-1		LPH-2	LPH-2	L+151	L+162		
9	MILLPOINT	*1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+159	L+170	SPARROW	107mm Mortar Batry
		*2-1	UH-34D	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+167	L+178		
		3-1		LPH-2	LPH-2	L+163	L+174		
		4-1		LPH-2	LPH-2	L+171	L+182		
10	MILLPOINT	1-1	16	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+179	L+190	SPARROW	107mm Mortar Batry
		3-1	UH-34D	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+183	L+194		XO's Command Group
		2-1		LPH-2	LPH-2	L+187	L+198		
		4-1		LSD-28	LSD-28	L+191	L+202		
PlayBoy	1	1	UH-34D	LPH-2	LPH-2	L-35	TBA	LPH-2	TAO/TAG (A)
	Pedro	1	UH-34D	LPH-2	LPH-2	L-35	L+225	LPH-2	SAR

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WAVE	FLIGHT NUMBER	A/C	FROM		TO		TIME LAUNCH	LAND	DESTINATION LZ	TROOPS UNIT EQUIPMENT AND SERIAL
			CARRIER ORIGIN	LOAD	CARRIER ORIGIN	LOAD				
On Call	MILLPOINT 5-1	2	UE-34D	LPH-2	LPH-2	TBA	TBA	TBA	TBA	Med/Evac

Refueling time for those flights indicated.

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Appendix 8 (Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Table) to
 Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

WAVE	HELITEAM	PERSONNEL		SUPPLIES	WEIGHT ()		ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT	TROOP	UNIT	AND	PERS	EQUIP TOTAL	
1	MILLPOINT 101 101-1	3SqdLdr	1Plat 1 CoD		1350	1350	TBA
		Gren 1Sqd	1				
		1Plat CoD					
		1FT 1Sqd	4				
		1Plat CoD	6				
1	MILLPOINT 102 101-2	1PlatCmdr	CoD 1	PRC-25	1350	25	1375
		Radioman	1	(25#)			
		1Plat CoD					
		1SqdLdr MG Sec					
		CoD	1				
		2FT 1Sqd					
		1Plat CoD	3				
			6				
1	MILLPOINT 103 101-3	3FT 1Sqd	3	MG (58#)	1350	110	1460
		1Plat CoD		600 Rds			
		1FT (-) 1Sqd	3	(52#)			
		MG Sec CoD	6				
1	MILLPOINT 104 101-4	2SqdLdr	1		1350		1350
		1Plat CoD					
		Gren 2Sqd	1				
		1Plat CoD					
		1FT 2Sqd	4				
		1Plat CoD	6				
1	MILLPOINT 105 101-5	1PlatGd	CoD 1	400 Rds	1350	35	1385
		Corpsman	1	(35#)			
		1Plat CoD					
		AmmoMan 1Tm	1				
		1Sqd MG Sec					
		CoD					
		2FT 2Sqd	3				
		1Plat CoD	6				
1	MILLPOINT 106 101-6	3FT 2Sqd	3	MG (58#)	1350	110	1460
		1Plat CoD		600 Rds			
		2FT(-) 1Sqd	3	(52#)			
		MG Sec CoD	6				
1	MILLPOINT 107 101-7						
1	MILLPOINT 108 101-8	3SqdLdr	1		1350		1350
		1Plat CoD					
		Gren 3Sqd	1				
		1Plat CoD					
		1FT 3Sqd	4				
		1Plat CoD	6				

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT		PERSONNEL		SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT			WEIGHT ()		ENPLAN- ING STATION
	SERIAL NO	TROOP UNIT	NO		PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL			
1	MILLPOINT	2FT 3Sqd	3	400 Rds	1350	35	1385		TBA	
	109	1Plat CoD		(35#)						
	101-9	1PlatSgt CoD	1							
		Corpsman	1							
		1Plat CoD								
		AmmoMan 2Tm	1							
		1Sqd MG Sec								
		CoD	6							
1	MILLPOINT	3FT 3Sqd	3	2 PRC-25	1350	50	1400			
	110	1Plat CoD		(50#)						
	101-10	Radioman	2							
		CO CoD	1							
			6							
1	MILLPOINT	FAC #2	1	PRC-25	1350	163	1513			
	111	Radioman	5	(25#)						
	101-11		6	PRC-41						
				(46#)						
				PRC-47						
				(92#)						
1	MILLPOINT	2SqdLdr	1		1350		1350			
	112	2Plat CoD								
	101-12	Gren 2Sqd	1							
		2Plat CoD								
		2FT 2Sqd	4							
		2Plat CoD	6							
1	MILLPOINT	2PlatCmdr CoD	1	PRC-25	675	25	700			
	113	Radioman	1	(25#)						
	101-13	2Plat CoD								
		2SqdLdr MG	1							
		Sec CoD	3							
1	MILLPOINT									
	114									
	101-14									
1	MILLPOINT	3FT 2Sqd	3	MG (58#)	1350	110	1460			
	115	2Plat CoD		600 Rds						
	101-15	1FT(-) 2Sqd	3	(52#)						
		MG Sec CoD	6							
1	MILLPOINT	3SqdLdr 2Plat	1		1350		1350			
	116	CoD								
	101-16	Gren 3Sqd	1							
		2Plat CoD								
		1FT 3Sqd	4							
		2Plat CoD	6							
1	MILLPOINT	2PlatGd CoD	1	400 Rds	1350	35	1385			
	117	Corpsman	1	(35#)						
	101-17	2Plat CoD								
		AmmoMan 1Tm	1							
		1Sqd MG Sec								
		2FT 3Sqd	3							
		2Plat CoD	6							

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CONFIDENTIAL		HELITeam		SUPPLIES			ENPLAN-		
FLIGHT		PERSONNEL		AND	WEIGHT()		ING		
WAVE	SERIAL NO	TROOP	UNIT	NO	EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
1	MILLPOINT	3FT	3Sqd	3	MG (58#)	1350	110	1460	TBA
	118		2Flat CoD		600 Rds				
	101-18		2Tm(-) 2Sqd	3	(52#)				
			MG Sec CoD	6					
2	MILLPOINT	1Sqd	60mm Sec	5	60mmMor	1350	155	1505	
	201		CoD		(45#)				
	201-1		60mmSecLdr	1	30 Rds				
			CoD	6	(110)				
2	MILLPOINT	2Sqd	60mm	5	60mmMor	1350	155	1505	
	202		Sec CoD		(45#)				
	201-2		WpnsFlatCmdr	1	30 Rds				
			CoD	6	(110)				
2	MILLPOINT								
	203								
	201-3								
2	MILLPOINT	FO Tm(-)		2	PRC-25	1350	60	1410	
	204		A/1/13		(25#)				
	201-4		Corpsman	1	400 Rds				
			GySgt CoD	1	(35#)				
			Misgr CoD	1					
			AmmoMan 2Tm	1					
			2Sqd MG Sec	6					
			CoD						
2	MILLPOINT	3Sqd	60mmSec	4	PRC-25	1350	180	1530	
	205		CoD		(25#)				
	201-5		WpnsFlatSgt	1	60mmMor				
			CoD		(45#)				
			Radioman	1	30 Rds				
			WpnsFlat CoD	6	(110)				
2	MILLPOINT	AssltTm(-)		6		1350		1350	
	206		CoD						
	201-6		1Flat CoA						
			5Engr						
2	MILLPOINT	1SqdLdr	2Flat	1		1350		1350	
	207		CoD						
	201-7		Gren 1Sqd	1					
			2Flat CoD						
			1FT 1Sqd	4					
			2Flat CoD	6					
2	MILLPOINT	2FT	1Sqd	4	3.5 Rkt	1350	13	1363	
	208		2Flat CoD		(13)				
	201-8		1Tm(-) 1Sqd	2					
			AssltSec CoD	6					
2	MILLPOINT	3FT	1Sqd	4	4 Rds	1350	36	1386	
	209		2Flat CoD		(36)				
	201-9		AmmoMan 1Tm	1					
			1Sqd AssltSec						
			1SqdLdr Asslt	1					
			Sec CoD	6					

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WAVE	HELI TEAM	PERSONNEL	SUPPLIES		WEIGHT()		ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT		TROOP UNIT	AND NO. EQUIPMENT		PERS EQUIP TOTAL	
2	MILLPOINT 210 201-10						TBA
2	MILLPOINT 211 201-11	1Tm 3Sqd MG Sec CoD 2FlatSgt CoD Corpsman 2Flat CoD	4 1 1 6	MG (58) 600 Rds (52)	1350 110	1460	
2	MILLPOINT 212 201-12	1SqdLdr 3Flat CoD 1FT 1Sqd 3Flat CoD XO CoD	1 4 1 6	PRC-25 (25)	1350 25	1375	
2	MILLPOINT 213 201-13	2FT 1Sqd 3Flat CoD 1Tm(-) 2Sqd AssltSec CoD	4 2 6	3.5 Rkt (13) 3.5 Ammo (36)	1350 49	1399	
2	MILLPOINT 214 201-14	3FT 1Sqd 3Flat CoD AmmoMan 1Tm 2Sqd AssltSec CoD	4 2 6	3.5 Ammo (72)	1350 72	1422	
2	MILLPOINT 215 201-15	2Tm 3Sqd MG Sec CoD 3FlatSgt CoD AssltSecLdr CoD	4 1 1 6	MG (58) 1000 Rds (87)	1350 145	1495	
2	MILLPOINT 216 201-16	FO Tm(-) A/1/13 2Tm 1Sqd AssltSec CoD	3 2 5	PRC-25 (25) 3.5Rkt (13) 4 Rds (36)	1125 74	1199	
2	MILLPOINT 217 201-17						
2	MILLPOINT 218 201-18	FO Tm 81Flat H&S Co 2Tm 2Sqd AssltSec CoD Msgrs	2 2 2 6	PRC-25 (25) 3.5Rkt (13) 4 Rds (36)	1350 74	1424	
2	MILLPOINT 219 201-19	2SqdLdr 3Flat CoD 3SqdLdr MG Sec CoD 1FT 2Sqd 3Flat CoD	1 1 4 6		1350	1350	

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WAVE	HELITEAM		SUN LINES			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT(LBSERS EQUIP TOTAL	
3	MILLPOINT 301 301-1	2FT 2Sqd 3Plat CoD 3PlatCmdr CoD Radioman 3Plat CoD	4 1 -1 6	PRC-25 (25)	1350 25 1375	
3	MILLPOINT 302 301-2	3FT 2Sqd 3Plat CoD 3PlatGd CoD Corpsman 3Plat CoD	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	
3	MILLPOINT 303 301-3	1Tm 3Sqd AssltSec CoD AmmoMan 1Tm 3Sqd MG Sec CoD Corpsman 3Plat CoD	3 1 1 5	3.5Rkt (13) 4 Rds 3.5 (36) 400 Rds MG (35)	1125 84 1209	
3	MILLPOINT 304 301-4	3SqdLdr 3Plat CoD 1FT 3Sqd 3Plat CoD	1 4 5		1125 1125	
3	MILLPOINT 305 301-5					
3	MILLPOINT 306 301-6	2FT 3Sqd 3Plat CoD 1Tm 3Sqd MG Sec CoD	3 3 6	MG (58) 600 Rds (52)	1250 110 1460	
3	MILLPOINT 307 301-7	1stSgt CoD SupSgt CoD ChiefCorpsman Driver CoD AmmoMan 2Tm 3Sqd MG Sec CoD	1 1 1 1 1 5	400 Rds (35)	1125 35 1160	
3	MILLPOINT 308 301-8	3FT 3Sqd 3Plat CoD 2Tm 3Sqd AssltSec CoD	4 2 6	3.5Rkt (13) 4 Rds (36)	1350 49 1399	
3	MILLPOINT 309 301-9	2Tm(-) 3Sqd MG Sec CoD 3SqdLdr AssltSec CoD Clerk CoD SqdLdr MG Sec CoD	3 1 1 1 6	MG (58) 600 Rds (52)	1350 110 1460	

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WAVE	HELITEM	SUPPLIES			WEIGHT()		ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT	FERS NNEL	AND	FERS EQUIP	TOTAL		
	SERIAL NO	TROOP UNIT	NO EQUIPMENT				
3	MILLPOINT 310 301-10	Breach Tm 3Sqd 1Flat CoA Engr	6		1350	1350	TBA
3	MILLPOINT 311 301-11	Med Flat Attach	6		1350	1350	
3	MILLPOINT 312 301-12						
3	MILLPOINT 313 301-13	HST Attach	6		1350	1350	
3	MILLPOINT 314 301-14	1FT 1Sqd 1Flat CoB 1Flat Corpsman 1FlatSgt CoB CoGySgt CoB	3 1 1 1 <u>6</u>		1350	1350	
3	MILLPOINT 315 301-15	2FT 1Sqd 1Flat CoB 1SqdLdr 1Flat CoB Gren 1Sqd 1Flat CoB 1SqdLdr Asslt Sec CoB	3 1 1 1 <u>6</u>		1350	1350	
3	MILLPOINT 316 301-16	3FT 1Sqd 1Flat CoB 2Tm 1Sqd AssltSec CoB	3 3 <u>6</u>	3.5Rkt (13) 4 Rds (36)	1350	49 1399	
3	MILLPOINT 317 301-17	1Tm 1Sqd MG Sec CoB 1MGSqdLdr CoB 1Flat Corpsman CoB	4 1 <u>6</u>	MG (58) 1000 Rds (82)	1350	140 1490	
3	MILLPOINT 318 301-18	1Sqd MorSec CoB 1FlatCmdr CoB Radioman 1Flat CoB	4 1 1 <u>6</u>	60mm (54) 30 Rds (90) 1 PRC-25 (25)	1350	169 1519	
4	MILLPOINT 401 401-1						
4	MILLPOINT 402 401-2	1FT 2Sqd 1Flat CoB 2SqdLdr 1Flat Gren 2SqdLdr 1Flat CoB	4 1 1 <u>6</u>		1350	1350	

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WAVE	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()			ENPLAN- ING STATION
					PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	
4	MILLPOINT 403 401-3	1 Tm 1Sqd Asslt Sec CoB 2FT 2Sqd 1Flat CoB	2 4 <u>6</u>	3.5 Rkt (13) 4 Rds (36)	1350	49	1399	TBA
4	MILLPOINT 404 401-4							
4	MILLPOINT 405 401-5	CO CoB Radioman CoB FO Tm A/1/13	1 2 3 <u>6</u>	3PRC-25 (75) 1 Donut Roll Comm Wire(35)	1350	110	1460	
4	MILLPOINT 406 401-6	3FT 2Sqd 1Flat CoB 2Tm 1Sqd MG Sec CoB	3 3 <u>6</u>	MG (58) 1000 Rds (82)	1350	140	1490	
4	MILLPOINT 407 401-7	1FT 3Sqd 1Flat CoB 1FlatGd CoB WpnsFlatSgt CoB	4 1 1 <u>6</u>		1350		1350	
4	MILLPOINT 408 401-8							
4	MILLPOINT 409 401-9	2FT 3Sqd 1Flat CoB 3SqdLdr 1Flat CoB Gren 3Sqd 1Flat CoB	4 1 1 <u>6</u>		1350		1350	
4	MILLPOINT 410 401-10	3FT 3Sqd 1Flat CoB MorSecLdr CoB AmmoNCO WpnsFlatCoB	4 1 1 <u>6</u>		1350		1350	
4	MILLPOINT 411 401-11	1FT 1Sqd 3Flat CoB 3FlatCmdr CoB Radioman 3Flat CoB	4 1 1 <u>6</u>	IRC-25 (25)	1350	25	1350	
4	MILLPOINT 412 401-12							
4	MILLPOINT 413 401-13	2FT 1Sqd 3Flat CoB 1SqdLdr 3Flat CoB Gren 1Sqd 3Flat CoB	4 1 1 <u>6</u>		1350		1350	
4	MILLPOINT 414 401-14	3FT 1Sqd 3Flat CoB 2AssltTm 3Sqd Asslt Sec CoB	3 3 6 <u>6</u>	3.5 Rkt (13) 4 Rds (36)	1350	49	1399	
4	MILLPOINT 415 401-15	1Tm 3Sqd MG Sec CoB 3SqdLdr MG Sec CoB SecLdr MG Sec CoB	4 1 1 <u>6</u>					

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WAVE	HELI TEAM FLIGHT SERIAL NO	TROOP UNIT	SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT		WEIGHT()		ENPLAN- ING STATION
			NO		PERS	TOTAL	
4	MILLPOINT 416 401-16						TBA
4	MILLPOINT 417 401-17	1FT 2Sqd 3Plat CoB 2SqdLdr 3Plat CoB Gren 2Sqd 3Plat CoB	4 1 1		1350	1350	
4	MILLPOINT 418 401-18	3FT 2Sqd 3Plat CoB 1Tm 3Sqd Asslt Sec CoB	3 3 6	3.5 Rkt (13) 4 Rds (36)	1350	49 1399	
4	MILLPOINT 419 401-19	2FT 2 nd Sqd 3Plat CoB 3SqdLdr AssltSec CoB1 3Plat Corpsman	4 1 1		1350	1350	
5	MILLPOINT 501 501-1	3Sqd MorSec CoB 3PlatCorpsman CoB 3PlatSgt CoB	4 1 1	60mm (54) 30 Rds (90)	1350	144 1494	
5	MILLPOINT 502 501-2	1FT 3Sqd 3Plat CoB 3PlatGd CoB	4 1		1125	1125	
5	MILLPOINT 503 501-3	2FT 3Sqd 3Plat CoB 3SqdLdr 3Plat CoB Gren 3Sqd 3Plat CoB	4 1 1		1350	1350	
5	MILLPOINT 504 501-4						
5	MILLPOINT 505 501-5	Pol&PropNCO CoB WpnsPlatCmdr CoB WpnsPlat Radioman FO Tm 81mmMor H&S Co2	1 1 1 1	2PRC-25 (50)	1125	50 1175	
5	MILLPOINT 506 501-6	3FT 3Sqd 3Plat CoB 2Tm 3Sqd MG Sec CoB	3 3	MG (58) 1000 Rds (82)	1350	140 1490	
5	MILLPOINT 507 501-7	1FT 1Sqd 2Plat CoB 1SqdLdr 2Plat CoB Gren 1Sqd 2Plat CoB	4 1 1		1350	1350	
5	MILLPOINT 508 501-8	2FE 1Sqd 2Plat CoB 2PlatCorpsman CoB 2PlatSgt CoB	4 1 1		1350	1350	
5	MILLPOINT 509 501-9	3FT 1Sqd 2Plat CoB 2Tm 2Sqd AssltSec CoB	4 2 6	3.5 Rkt (13) 4 Rds (36)	1350	49 1399	

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()		ENFLAN- ING STATION
					PEPS	EQUIP TOTAL	
5	MILLPOINT	2Sqd, MorSec CoB	3	60mm (54)	1350	169	1519
	510	21latCmdr CoB	1	30 Rds			
	501-10	Radioman 21lat CoB	1	(90)			
		CoClerk CoB	1	PRC-25			
			6	(25)			
5	MILLPOINT						
	511						
	501-11						
5	MILLPOINT	1Tm 2Sqd MGSec CoB	4		1350		1350
	512	2SqdLdr AssltSec	1				
	501-12	AssltSecLdr, CoB	1				
			6				
5	MILLPOINT	1FT 2Sqd 21lat CoB	4		1350		1350
	513	2SqdLdr AssltSec	1				
	501-13	CoB					
		2PlatCorpsman CoB	1				
			6				
5	MILLPOINT	1Tm 2Sqd AssltSec	3	3.5Rkt	1350	49	1399
	514	CoB		(13)			
	501-14	2FT 2Sqd 2Plat CoB	3	4 Rds			
			6	(36)			
5	MILLPOINT	3FT 2Sqd 2Plat CoB	4		1350		1350
	515	2SqdLdr 2Plat CoB	1				
	501-15	Gren 2Sqd 2Plat CoB	1				
			6				
5	MILLPOINT	1FT 3Sqd 2Plat CoB	3		1350		1350
	516	21latGd CoB	1				
	501-16	1stSgt CoB	1				
		CoClerk CoB	1				
			6				
5	MILLPOINT	2FT 3Sqd 21lat CoB	3	MG (58)	1350	140	1490
	517	2Tm 2Sqd MG Sec CoB	3	1000 Rds			
	501-17		6	(82)			
5	MILLPOINT						
	518						
	501-18						
5	MILLPOINT	3FT 3Sqd 2Plat CoB	4		1350		1350
	519	3SqdLdr 2Plat CoB	1				
	501-19	Gren 3Sqd 2Plat CoB	1				
				6			
6	MILLPOINT	XO CoB	1	3PRC-25	1350	75	1425
	601	ArtyFOtm 1/13	2	(75)			
	601-1	Radioman CoB	2				
		WpnsPlatCorpsman	1				
				6			
6	MILLPOINT	Med Plat Attach	6		1350		1350
	602						
	601-2						

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WAVE	HELITEAM		PERSONNEL	NO EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()		ENPLAN- ING STATION	
	FLIGHT	TROOP UNIT			PRS	EQUIP		TOTAL
6	MILLPOINT 603 601-3	HST Attach		6		1350	1350	TBA
6	MILLPOINT 604 601-4	1Sqd 81mm MorFlat (-)		5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125 275	1400	
6	MILLPOINT 605 601-5	2Sqd 81mm MorFlat (-)		5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125 275	1400	
6	MILLPOINT 606 601-6	1Secldr 81Flat Hdqs 1Sec		1 4 5	PRC-25 (25) 8 Rds (80) Wire (20)	1125 125	1250	
6	MILLPOINT 607 601-7							
6	MILLPOINT 608 601-8	AsstFlatCmdr Hdqs 81Flat AmmoMan		1 4 1 6	16 Rds (160) PRC-25 (25) Wire(20) FDC Eqp (20)	1325 225	1575	
6	MILLPOINT 609 601-9	3Sqd (-) 81Flat		5	Mortar (115) 16Rds (160)	1125 275	1400	
6	MILLPOINT 610 601-10	4Sqd (-) 81Flat		5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125 275	1400	
6	MILLPOINT 611 601-11	2Secldr SecHdqs		1 5 6	PRC-25 (25) Wire(20) 8 Rds (80)	1350 125	1475	
6	MILLPOINT 612 601-12	5Sqd (-) 81Flat		5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125 275	1400	
6	MILLPOINT 613 601-13	6Sqd (-) 81Flat		5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125 275	1400	

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CONFIDENTIAL		HELI TEAM		SUPPLIES AND WEIGHT()			ENL LAN-ING
WAVE	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL STATION
6	MILLPOINT 614 601-14						TBA
6	MILLPOINT 615 601-15	3SecLdr SecHdqs	1 4 5	PRC-25 (25) 16 Rds (160) Wire(20)	1125	205	1330
6	MILLPOINT 616 601-16	AmmoMan 81FlatCmdr Radioman	4 1 1 6	16 Rds (160) PRC-25 (25)	1325	200	1550
6	MILLPOINT 617 601-17	7Sqd (-) 81Plat	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	275	1400
6	MILLPOINT 618 601-18	8Sqd (-) 81Plat	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	275	1400
7	MILLPOINT 701 701-1	4SecLdr SecHdqs	1 4 5	PRC-25 (25) 16 Rds (160) Wire(20)	1125	205	1330
7	MILLPOINT 702 701-2	CO S-3 S-2 Radioman TAC#1 Radioman LF TAC#1 CommO	1 1 1 1 1 1 6	3 PRC-25 (78)	1350	78	1428
7	MILLPOINT 703 701-3						
7	MILLPOINT 704 701-4	S-4 Radioman TAC#2 NGF Ln TmO NGLnT Radioman	1 1 1 3 6	2PRC-25 (52) 2PRC-47 (93) PRC-41 (45)	1350	190	1540
7	MILLPOINT 705 701-5	AirLnO AirLn Radioman Radioman LF TAC#2	1 2 3 6	4 BB-451 (68) PRC-25 (26) PRC-41 (45) 2 PRC-47 (93)	1350	232	1582

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	SUPPLIES		WEIGHT()		ENPLAN- ING STATION
			NO	EQUIPMENT	TEARS EQUIP	TOTAL	
7	MILLPOINT 706 701-6	AirLn Radioman S-3 InO OppsChief Corpsman	2 1 1 2	PRC-47 T/R (50) PRC-47 Acc (43)	1350 93	1443	TBA
7	MILLPOINT 707 701-7	ArtLn Tm Chief ArtLn Radioman S-3 Clerk SgtMaj S-2 Clerk	1 2 1 1 1	PRC-25 (25) ANCR-39 (22)	1350 48	1398	
7	MILLPOINT 708 701-8	CommChief Radioman MsgCen	1 3 2	2PRC-47 (93) 4BB-451 (68)	1350 161	1511	
7	MILLPOINT 709 701-9	Wireman	6 5 5 1	5 TA-312 5 MX-306 (180) 1 SB-22 (32)	1350 212	1562	
7	MILLPOINT 710 701-10						
7	MILLPOINT 711 701-11	Radioman Wireman CenMan Tech	2 2 1 1 6	2PRC-25 (52) 3RCO292 (144) 2BB-451 (34)	1350 230	1580	
7	MILLPOINT 712 701-12	Wire Chief Wiremen	1 5 6	5 TA-312 5 MX-306 (180) SD-22 (32)	1350 212	1562	
7	MILLPOINT 713 701-13	Radio Chief Radioman Radioman NGF	1 4 1 6	6PRC-25 (155)	1350 155	1505	
7	MILLPOINT 714 701-14	BAS (-)	6		1350	1350	
7	MILLPOINT 715 701-15	BAS (-) S-4 Clerks H&S Co Supply NCO	3 2 1 6		1350	1350	

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WAVE	HELITEAM	PERSONNEL	NO	SUPPLIES	WEIGHT()		ENPLAN- ING STATIC
	FLIGHT			AND	EQUIP	TOTAL	
SERIAL NO	TROOP	UNIT	EQUIPMENT				
7	MILLPOINT	HqCmdt	1	PRC-25	1350	25	1375
	716	H&S CoGySgt	1	(25)			
	701-16	Bugler (radio)	1				
		H&S Clerk	2				
		S-2 Scout	1				
			<u>6</u>				
7	MILLPOINT						
	717						
	701-17						
7	MILLPOINT	XO H&S Co	1	PRC-25	1350	83	1433
	718	1Sgt H&S Co	1	(25)			
	701-18	Radioman 2rlat	1	MG (58)			
		MG Tm(-) H&S Co	2				
		Corpsman	1				
			<u>6</u>				
7	MILLPOINT	Radioman NGF	2		1350		1350
	719	BnScouts	4				
	701-19		<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT	S-3 NBC NCO	1		1350		1350
	801	S-3 Clerks	2				
	801-1	Asst Supply H&S Co	1				
		S-1 Clerks	2				
			<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT	S-1 Clerks	2		1350		1350
	802	Driver HqCo	1				
	801-2	XO's Driver	1				
		CO's Driver	1				
		Photographer	1				
			<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT	Security 1latCmdr	1	PRC-25	1350	135	1485
	803	1latRadioman	1	(25)			
	801-3	1SqdLdr	1	MG (58)			
		MG Tm (-)	3	600 Rds			
			<u>6</u>	(52)			
8	MILLPOINT	2FT 1Sqd	4		1350		1350
	804	3FT (-) 2Sqd	2				
	801-4		<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT						
	805						
	801-5						
8	MILLPOINT	2SqdLdr	1	MG (58)	1350	110	1460
	806	MG Tm 2Sqd	4	600 Rds			
	801-6	2FT(-) 2Sqd	1	(52)			
			<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT	2FT(-) 2Sqd	2		1350		1350
	807	3FT 2Sqd	4				
	801-7		<u>6</u>				

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WAVE	SERIAL NO	HELITEAM FLIGHT	PERSONNEL		SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT		WEIGHT()		EN-PLAN- ING STATION
			TROOP	UNIT	NO		PERS	EQUIP	
8	MILLPOINT		Security FlatGd		1	PRC-25	1350	26	1376
	808		Security FlatMsgr		1	(25)			
	801-8		FlatCorpsman		1				
			MG Tm(-) 1Sqd		1				
			3FT(-) 1Sqd		1				
			3FT(-) 4Sqd		1				
					<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT		3SqdLdr		1	MG (58)	1350	110	1460
	809		MG Tm 3Sqd		4	600 Rds			
	801-9		2FT(-) 3Sqd		1	(52)			
					<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT		2FT(-) 3Sqd		2		1350		1350
	810		3FT 3Sqd		4				
	801-10				<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT		4SqdLdr		1	MG (58)	1350	110	1460
	811		MG Tm 4Sqd		4	600 Rds			
	801-11		2FT(-) 4Sqd		1	(52)			
					<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT								
	812								
	801-12								
8	MILLPOINT		SecurityFlatSgt		1		1350		1350
	813		2FT 4Sqd		4				
	801-13		3FT(-) 4Sqd		1				
					<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT		Security Chief			MG (35)	1350	35	1385
	814		MachineGunner		1				
	801-14		Riflemen		4				
			All 107mmMorBtry		<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT		MT NCO		1	MG (35)	1350	60	1410
	815		Radioman		1	PRC-25			
	801-15		MG Man		1	(25)			
			Riflemen		3				
			All 107mmMorBtry		<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT		XO		1	PRC-25	1350	25	1375
	816		Radioman		1	(25)			
	801-16		FDC man		1				
			Riflemen		3				
			All 107mmMorBtry		<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT		GySgt		1		1350		1350
	817		Wireman		1				
	801-17		FDC Man		1				
			Rifleman		3				
			All 107mmMorBtry		<u>6</u>				
8	MILLPOINT		CO		1	PRC-25	1350	25	1375
	818		OpsChief		1	(25)			
	801-18		Radioman		1				
			CO's Driver		1				
			Riflemen		2				
			All 107mmMorBtry		<u>6</u>				

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CONFIDENTIAL HELITEAM FLIGHT		PERSONNEL	SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT		WEIGHT()	ENPLAN- ING
WAVE	SERIAL NO	TROOP UN T	NO	EQUIPMENT	TEERS EQUIL	TOTAL STATION
9	MILLPOINT 901 901-1					
9	MILLPOINT 902 901-2	SectionChief Cannoneers All 10mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear (80)	1350 80	1430
9	MILLPOINT 903 901-3	SecChief Cannoneers All 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear (80)	1350 80	1430
9	MILLPOINT 904 901-4	SecChief Cannoneers All 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear (80)	1350 80	1430
9	MILLPOINT 905 901-5	SecChief Cannoneers All 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear (80)	1350 80	1430
9	MILLPOINT 906 901-6	SecChief Cannoneers All 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear (80)	1350 80	1430
9	MILLPOINT 907 901-7	SecChief Cannoneers All 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear (80)	1350 80	1430
9	MILLPOINT 908 901-8					
9	MILLPOINT 909 901-9			107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465
9	MILLPOINT 910 901-10			107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465
9	MILLPOINT 911 901-11			107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465
9	MILLPOINT 912 901-12			107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465
9	MILLPOINT 913 901-13			107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465
9	MILLPOINT 914 901-14			107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465
9	MILLPOINT 915 901-15					
9	MILLPOINT 916 901-16	FDC FDC men wireman Rifleman All 107mmMorBtry	1 2 1 2 6		1350	1350

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT		NO	SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()		ENPLAN-ING STATION
	SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT			PERS	EQUIP TOTAL	
9	MILLPOINT	CommChief	1		1350	1350	
	917	FDC Men	2				
	901-17	Rifleman	3				
		All 107mmMorBtry	6				
9	MILLPOINT			Trailer	1400	1400	
	918			(Ext)			
	901-18						
9	MILLPOINT			Trailer	1400	1400	
	919			(Ext)			
	901-19						
10	MILLPOINT			Trailer	1400	1400	
	1001			(Ext)			
	1001-1						
10	MILLPOINT	MT Plat	6	MG (35)	1350 35	1385	
	1002						
	1001-2						
10	MILLPOINT						
	1003						
	1001-3						
10	MILLPOINT	MT Plat	6	MG (35)	1350 35	1385	
	1004						
	1001-4						
10	MILLPOINT	MT Plat	6		1350	1350	
	1005						
	1001-5						
10	MILLPOINT	MT Plat	6		1350	1350	
	1006						
	1001-6						
10	MILLPOINT	MT Plat	6		1350	1350	
	1007						
	1001-7						
10	MILLPOINT						
	1008						
	1001-8			CLIW-M274	1300	1300	
				(900)			
				Supplies			
				(400)(Ext)			
10	MILLPOINT			CLIW-M274	1300	1300	
	1009			(900)			
	1001-9			Supplies			
				(400)(Ext)			
10	MILLPOINT						
	1010						
	1001-10						
10	MILLPOINT	XO	1	2FRC-25	1350 48	1398	
	1011	S-3A	1	(52)			
	1001-11	Radioman TnC#1	1				
	on call	Radioman TnC#2	1				
		AsstOpnCh	1				
		RadioChief	1				
			6				

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNITS	NO	SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()		EN-LA IN- ING STATION	
					TERS	EQUIP TOTAL		
10	MILLPOINT	S-2Chief	1	ERC-25	1350	48	1398	TBA
	1012	ArtyLnTmO	1	(26)				
	1001-12	ArtyLnTm	1					
	on call	S-1	1					
		S-4 Chief	1	AN/GRA-39				
		ArtyLnTm	1	(22)				
			<u>6</u>					



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
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BLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966

Appendix 9 (Helicopter Landing Diagram) to Annex D
(Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66



LZ SPARROW
(PRI)

LZ CROW
(ALT)

027° / 6.2 NM

025° 4.7 NM

Florida

Tampa
(Bridge)

050° 3.7 NM
Florida

Pensacola
(Island)

HELO LANDING ZONE (LZ)

- 1. SPARROW (PRI)(930745)
- 2. CROW (ALT)(942767)

FLIGHT ALTITUDES

- 1. Inbound ALT 1500'
- 2. Outbound ALT 1000'

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Appendix 10 (Assault Schedule) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation
 Order 330-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

Beach		RED
WAVE TIME	CRAFT/VEHICLE SERIAL	UNIT
1 H-hour	10 LVTP 1 LVTC Ser: 100	Co C (Rein)
2 H+4	3 LCM (6) Ser: 102	Co A (Rein)
3 H+10	2 LCM (8) Ser: 302,374	SP Plat (-) Btry A Survey Tm Beachmaster Unit (-)
On Call	1 LCM (8) Ser: 200, 201, 202	AT Plat (-)
On Call	1 LCU Ser: 302, 303, 304	Tank Plat (-)
Non Sched	2 LCM (6) Ser: 337 342 340 343 341 344	Btry A (-)
Non Sched	1 LCM (6) Ser: 381	Beachmaster Unit (-)
Non Sched	1 LCM (6) Ser: 357	H&S Co (-)



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to Operation Order 330-66

TIME	PEFS	EQUIPMENT	FROM	TO	UNIT
081410H	<u>12</u> 12		LSD-28	LPH-2	SP Plat (-)
081400H	8 <u>8</u> 16	2 PRC 25 1 PRC 47	LSD-28 LSD-28	LPD-2 LPD-28	NGF Spot Tm SP Plat (-)
081330H	12 4 <u>6</u> 6 28	3 PRC - 25 1 PRC - 47	LPH-2 LPH-2 LPH-2 LPH-2	LPD-2 LPD-2 LPD-2 LPD-2	Engr Sqd FO Tms, 81mm Mortar Plat 1st FAC Tm Corpsman, Med Plat, H&S Co
081420H	1 1 <u>3</u> 5	--	LPD-2 LPD-2 LPD-2	LPH-2 LPH-2 LPH-2	XO BLT 1-26 Radioman NGF Spot Tm Comm Pers, Comm Plat



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Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.

- Ref: (a) AMS S733-3256 II (1:50,000) AMBULONG
 AMS S733-3257 III (1:50,000) SAN JOSE
 AMS S733-3157 II (1:50,000) ADELA
 (b) NWIP 22-7A
 (c) FMFM 7-4
 (d) Ch 4 BnO 3000.1 (SOP for FSCC)

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex A (Task Organization)1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See Current Intelligence Summaries.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Appendix 1 (Artillery)
- (2) Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire)
- (3) Appendix 3 (Air Support)
- (4) Appendix 4 (Offensive Fire Plan)

2. MISSION. BLT 1-26 lands at H-hour and L-hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to seize objectives 1 through 7 prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay); destroys enemy troops, equipment, and supplies; conduct search and destroy operations within assigned areas; and execute tactical withdrawal on order.

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operations

- (1) Control and coordination of air and Naval Gunfire initially by CATF (SACC).
- (2) Control and coordination of ground supporting arms by this headquarters (FSCC) upon establishment of combat support units ashore.
- (3) Coordination and control of Naval Gunfire passes ashore upon approval by CATF of request submitted by this headquarters through CLF.
- (4) Control and coordination of air remains with CATF.
- (5) Coordination of supporting arms will be returned to SACC prior to commencement of withdrawal.

b. Coordination of Air Support. Close air support requests passed on T&R net will be coordinated to the extent that if considered appropriate and safe, the ALO will state "Glove 14 Concurs" or "Disapproves". SACC

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must give positive approval before the request will be honored by TACC.

c. Coordination of Naval Gunfire Support

(1) During daylight hours following request, the NGF ship will obtain positive approval from NGFLNO on NGF control net before firing a mission.

(2) Planned night defensive fires will be submitted by NGF spotter to FSCC for approval prior to darkness. Further approval of individual night firing mission will be "silence is consent".

(3) All NGF call fire missions will be observed. There will be no free fire areas.

d. Coordination of Artillery Fires

(1) During daylight hours effected by FSCC, including consideration of all air activity.

(2) For night fires the procedures set forth in paragraph 32(c) will be utilized.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Preparation fires on objectives and HLZ will be planned; execution only on order CATF.

(2) Target location will be identified by the Universal Transverse Mercator Grid System, when practical.

4. TARGET INFORMATION

a. Offensive Fire Plan. See Appendix 4 (Offensive Fire Plan).

b. Concentration Designation System

(1) The concentration designator for artillery and mortars will be made up of two letters followed by three numbers. The first letter will signify the controlling agency and the second letter will signify the weapon.

(a) Z-BLT FSCC

(b) W-81mm Mortar, B-107mm Howtar, A-105mm Howitzer.

(c) The three numbers will signify the concentration number.

Block numbers are assigned as follows.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER BLOCK</u>
81mm	100-299
107mm Howtar	400-599
105mm Howitzer	700-999
FSCC	300-399

(2) Naval Gunfire will use prefix "N" followed by two numbers.

CONFIDENTIALc. Restricted Targets(1) CLASS E TARGETS

Religious buildings	Utilities	Bridges
National Shrines	Population Centers	Tunnels
Museums	Railroad	Med Facilities
Hospitals	Highways	

(2) Destruction of class E targets is prohibited except on approval of higher Headquarters, or where failure to destroy would seriously jeopardize the mission of the BLT prior to receipt of approval.

(3) Class E targets destroyed will be reported immediately to this Headquarters.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETYa. Air Sentries and Lookouts

(1) Sentries will be positioned at artillery/mortar positions and will cause the firing units to cease firing when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.

(2) Artillery/mortar forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will cease when it appears that the trajectories of artillery and support ships will endanger friendly aircraft.

b. Restrictive Fire Plan

(1) A restrictive fire plan will be employed when required. These plans will be in accordance with ref (d).

(2) The restrictive plan, if it is required, will be established by this Headquarters. The code name for the plan is "MILKO" and each "PLAN MILKO" will be numbered consecutively with each series beginning at 0001 local time.

c. Helicopter Safety

(1) The Battalion ALO will keep the Fire Support Coordinator informed of the time and location of all scheduled and on call helicopter flights into the combat area.

(2) Unless special coordination procedures are prescribed or required fires on helicopter routes in use are restricted to observed fires where the observer is capable of ensuring the safety of the helicopter using the route.

6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

a. No Fire Line. Initial no fire line will be established by CATF as required. Changes to the initial no fire line, after approval, will be promulgated by FSCC.

b. Bomblines. Initial bomblines will be established by CATF as required.

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Changes to the initial bomblines, after approval, will be promulgated by FSCC.

c. Creeping Fires. Creeping fires will be utilized on all fire missions in close proximity to friendly personnel. Determination as to what constitutes "close proximity" is the responsibility of the infantry unit commander.

d. Sight and Charge Check. Battery commanders and 81mm Mortar Platoon Commander will ensure that section chiefs verify elevations, deflection, charges and sight pictures on all fire missions.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. See Annex F (Comm-Elec)

b. Command Posts AFLOAT ASHORE

- (1) CTG 79.5 LPH-2
- (2) BLT 1-26 LPH-2 to be announced
- (3) Subordinate units submit locations when established.



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APPENDICES:

- 1 - Artillery
- 2 - Naval Gunfire
- 3 - Air Support
- 4 - Offensive Fire Plan

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BLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966

TAB B (Aircraft Armament) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E
(Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.

- a. All ordnance loading will be simulated.
- b. CTG 79.3 VMA Det assigned will simulate loading. Ordnance will be for missions against targets generally soft in nature.
- c. Pilots will report their simulated ordnance load to TACC using standard Seventh Fleet ordnance Codes.
- d. After the Completion of each Close Air Support Mission the flight leader will report to the controlling agency ordnance expended, damage assessment, and enemy intelligence of immediate tactical importance.



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 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
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TAB C (Air Communications) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E
 (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.

1. GENERAL

a. Air Communications in accordance with this TAB and Annex F.

2. FREQUENCY PLAN

a. Air frequencies in accordance with TAB D and Annex F.

b. Net activation times will be promulgated by separate message.

3. CALL SIGNS

a. Call signs in accordance with TAB E, Annex F, and JANAP 119F.

b. Aircraft tactical voice call signs will be derived from squadron call sign, flight number, and flight position.

EXAMPLE: Event 2 call signs

	First Flight	Second Flight
Flight Leader	Old Nick 1-1	Old Nick 2-1
Second Plane	Old Nick 1-2	Old Nick 2-2
Third Plane	Old Nick 1-3	Old Nick 2-3

4. AUTHENTICATION AND NUMERICAL CODES

a. Authentication and Numeral Codes in accordance with Annex F.

b. Zulu time will be used for authentication and numeral codes.

5. RECOGNITION

a. IFF/SIF in accordance with appropriate CINCPACFLT Instructions as indicated below:

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>MODE 3/CODE</u>
Strike and Air Support	Code 13 15 16

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RECONITION (Con't)

AIRCRAFT

MODE 3/CODE

Helo

Code 10 17

Recon

Code 34

Troop Carrier and Itenerant

Code 20

Emergency

Code 77



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 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
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Tab D (Air Frequency Plan) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.

LEGEND

- C - Net Control Station
- W - When Directed or Required
- X - Guard
- L - Listen
- * - To be used only in case of actual SAR event.

	COLOR CODE	FREQ	EMIS- NET SION	CKT
TACC		4335KC	343J TAC	H-1
HDC		4335KC	643 NASBERRY	H-2
LPH/LPH		2840KC	343J TAC/HR (P)	H-3
HELO'S		7710KC	343J TAC/HR (S)	H-4
HELO ESCORT		353.0MC	643 T.T.C/L.T.C	H-5
CAS A/C		349.0MC	643 T.D-1	H-7
AIR BASES	X X	262.6MC	643 T.D-2	H-8
TACP'S		283.4MC	643 T.A.O/4 Spot	H-9
TAC(A)/TAC		315.4MC	643 HD-1	H-10
		230.2MC	643 HELO CMN	H-11
		282.8MC	643 SAR	H-12*
		118.5MC	643 VHF CIVIL TWR	H-13
		362.6MC	643 LPH L L	H-14
		121.5MC	643 VHF TOWER	
		243.0MC	343J UHF TOWER	

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 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
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TAB E (Call Signs) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.

	<u>COMMAND</u>
TACC	ICEPACK
TADC	JOYRIDE
HDC	FAIRMONT
CTG 76.5	COMPANY STORE
CTU 76.5.1	AZALEA BLOSSOM
CTU 76.5.2	LITERARY
CTG 79.5	HEARSAY
LPH-2 USS IWO JIMA	CROSSWALK
LSD-28 USS THOMASTON	COCKTAIL GULF
LPD-2 USS VANCOUVER	SNOWCHIEF
VMA 211	NICKLE
HMM 363	MILLPOINT
TACP	BELGRADE 14
BLT 1-26	BELGRADE
TAC (A)	PLAYBOY

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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 040800H August 1966

TAB F (Approach and Retirement) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E
 (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTION.

a. All inbound aircraft will report to their controlling agency on the net assigned when over the specified control point.

b. Aircraft assigned an "as directed" entry point and altitude will contact their controlling agency as soon as possible after take-off and proceed in accordance with instructions.

c. Communications in accordance with TAB C.

d. Aircraft reporting inbound will give the following information:

(1) Voice call of flight leader.

(2) Event number

(3) Number and type of aircraft

(4) Position and Altitude

(5) Estimated time of departure

(6) Ordnance Load.

e. Assault helos on ship-to-shore movement in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan)

2. CONTROL POINTS AND HELICOPTER APPROACH LANES.

a. Aircraft entry and exit point "Sue", 270 degrees LONM LPH TACAN.

b. Helicopter Wave and Breakup and Rendezvous Point "PENSACOLA" TP 830630 (DONGON ISLAND).

c. Helo Penetration Point "TAMPA" TP 890666.

d. Helicopter Landing Zones (LZ) "SPARROW" TP930745 (Primary), "CROW" TP 942767 (Alternate).

e. Helicopter Approach and Retirement Lane.

(1) "Florida" - "Pensacola" to "Tampa" 050 degrees/3.7NM, "Tampa" to Landing Zone "Sparrow" 025 degrees/4.7NM; "Tampa" to LZ "CROW" 027 degrees/6.2NM.

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3. SEARCH AND RESCUE REFERENCE POINT. The SAR reference point is the USS IWO JIMA. (TACAN chan 20 Ident MY). Available NAV aids include LPH TACAN, NAS Cubi Pt. #1 (Chan 77 Ident NCI), NAS Cubi Pt. #2 (Chan 48 ident NCP), NAS Sangley Pt. (Chan 93 Ident. NSP)



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CONFIDENTIALBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966Appendix 4 (Offensive Fire Plan) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination)
to Operation Order 330-66.

Ref: (a) AMS S733-3257 III (1:50,000) SAN JOSE.

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex A (Task Organization)1. OFFENSIVE FIRE PLAN

a. In accordance with Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) the following offensive fire plan is established.

b.

<u>Conc No.</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Description</u>
Z300	86456864	(BABUG) Obj #1
Z301	89116805	Obj #2 (BAGONG SIKAT)
Z302	89416613	Road Junction (San Jose)
Z303	89956660	Road Junction (San Jose)
Z304	91886920	Trail and Road Junction
Z305	93607045	Buildings (Gamot)
Z306	93707158	Trail & Road Junction
Z307	93307214	Road Junction
Z308	92207250	Road Junction
Z309	92467381	Road Junction
Z310	94157464	Buildings (Cabirian)
Z311	93617509	Buildings
Z312	92707480	Trail Junction
Z313	91507545	Trail Junction
Z314	90617365	(Progresso) Buildings & Trail Junction
Z315	89707411	Trail & Road Junction
Z316	87717318	Road Junction
Z317	90797261	Road & Trail Junction
Z318	91717288	Road Junction
Z319	91727182	Trail Junction
Z320	88157173	Road Junction
Z321	89447205	Canal Fording
Z322	90007115	Trail Near Canal Bend
Z323	88417062	Dismantled RR (LZ)
Z324	89407014	End of Canal
Z325	90497007	Trail Junction
Z326	97337594	Hill 230
Z327	98607820	Hill 540
Z328	97407865	Hill Peak (250) Alt
Z329	94427927	Hill Peak (150) Alt

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<u>Conc No.</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Description</u>
Z330	96308045	Hill 270
Z331	93418178	Hill 230
Z332	98477913	Hill 448
Z333	97107771	Hill Peak (190) Alt
Z334	96867973	Hill 406
Z335	95407967	Stream Bed
Z336	94428114	Hill Peak (150) Alt



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BLT 1-26
 USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)
 040800H August 1966

Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) FMFPacO PO2000.2C
 (b) BnO 2000.1

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISUMS.
- (3) The enemy has the capability to:
 - (a) Intercept, jam, or employ imitative deception on any communication circuit.
 - (b) Cut or tap wire lines for purposes of interception or deception.
 - (c) Ambush wire teams during initial wire installation and trouble shooting missions.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) Command Posts

(a) Afloat

1. CTG 79.5	LPH-2
2. BLT 1/26	LPH-2
3. Co A	LPD-2
4. Co B	LPH-2
5. Co C	LPD-2
6. Co D	LPH-2

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- 7. Btry A 1/13 LSD-28
- 8. 107mm Mortar Btry 2/12 LPH-2
- 9. 1st Plt Co A, 5th Tk Bn LSD-28
- 10. 1st Plt Co A, 5th Amtrac LSD-28
- 11. 1st Plt Co A, 5th AT Bn LSD-28

(b) Ashore

- 1. BLT 1/26 (To be designated)

(3) Subordinate units report C. P. locations when established.

2. MISSION. Provide communications and electronics support for the BLT in the amphibious operation and subsequent operations ashore.

3. EXECUTION.a. Communications Platoon BLT 1/26

- (1) Guard CLF Tact Net # 1 commencing H-1.
- (2) Guard CLF Tact Net # 2 commencing H-1.
- (3) Be prepared to augment organic and attached units with FM radio equipment.
- (4) Be prepared to provide the following equipment and personnel for operation of the BLT TACLOG aboard the LPH and LPD.
 - (a) One radio set AN/PRC - 25
 - (b) Three radio operators 2531/2533
- (5) Provide message center service for BLT elements embarked aboard the LPH.
- (6) Provide one copy each of KAA-60 and KAC-138 to CLF for entire period of operation.

b. Air Support Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).

c. Shore Party Communications.

- (1) See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).

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CONFIDENTIALd, Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) References (a) and (b).
- (2) Messenger Service
 - (a) Helicopter messenger between BLT Command Post ashore and the LPH will be announced.
- (3) Radio
 - (a) Radio Nets. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).
 - (b) Call Signs. See Appendix 2 (Call Signs).
 - (c) Commence guarding assigned radio nets at H-1 on D-Day.
 - (d) Attached units will enter the BLT Tactical Net when other means of communications with this Headquarters fail.
 - (e) Radio checks and test counts will be held to an absolute minimum.
 - (f) All stations will tune to Net Control Stations.
 - (g) All used dry cells will be returned to this Headquarters for disposal.
 - (h) Immediately report to this Headquarters by other means, known or suspected enemy interference, imitative deception or jamming.
 - (i) Local time will be used on all messages transmitted within the BLT.
- (4) Wire
 - (a) Telephone directory and switchboard names in accordance with Reference (b).
 - (b) All wire lines will be retrieved when departing a position or when leaving the objective area under all circumstances.
 - (c) Whenever a wire team leaves the BLT C. P. they will be accompanied by a fire team to be furnished by C. P. security element.

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- (d) There will be no trouble shooting of wire lines, external of the BLT C. P., after dusk, except as directed by the Communications Officer.
- (e) Radio Relay Instructions for Channelization to be distributed separately.
- (5) Visual Communications. See Appendix 3 (Visual Communications).
- (6) Cryptographic Operations.
 - (a) Coordinates will be concealed in accordance with Annex K. (Check Points)
 - (b) Instructions for internal authentication and coupling to be distributed separately.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See Annex I (Logistics).
- b. Dry cell batteries and wires will be replenished on a daily requested basis by the BLT Supply Officer. All units will carry the following initial supply to operate for 24 hours:
 - WIRE - - - - - As required
 - BA - 30 - - - - - As required
 - BA - 386 - - - - - Three (3) per AN/PRC-25
- c. BB - 451 battery charging facilities will be maintained aboard the LPH. Replenishment will be on a one-for-one basis. Users will tag the battery being sent in for recharging. The users identity and locations will be on the tag. Example: FAC #2 - Co "A".
- d. Second and third echelon maintenance will be available aboard the SPH. A limited second echelon maintenance capability will exist ashore.
- e. The BLT Communication Officer must be notified of equipment failure and whether or not a replacement is necessary. All evacuated equipment must be tagged by the user indicating the type of trouble.
- f. A limited replacement float of communications equipment is available aboard the LPD and, when announced, ashore in the objective area.
- g. All communications equipment will have preventive maintenance accomplished in accordance with reference (c).

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- h. Communication equipment will be waterproofed prior to the landing, when crossing rivers and during rainy weather.



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APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Radio & Frequency Plan
- 2 - Call Signs
- 3 - Visual Communications

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BLT 1/26
 USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)
 040800H August 1966

Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics to
 Operation Order 330-66

CTG 79.5
 HMM 363
 BLT 1/26
 BLT 1/26 REAR
 BLT Collective
 Co A
 Co B
 Co C
 Co D
 Co N (Provisional Co)
 HQ CMDT
 81mm Mortar Plt
 106mm RR Plt
 Flame Sec
 FSCC
 NGF LN O
 NGF SPOT TM
 ALO
 FAC #1
 FAC #2
 BLT TACLOG
 A Btry, 2/12
 107mm Mortar Btry
 1/A/5th Amtrac Bn
 1/A/5 AT Bn
 1/A/5th Engr Bn
 1/A/5th Recon Bn
 1/A/5th Tank Bn
 Force Recon TM 1
 Force Recon TM 2
 Force Recon TM 3
 Shore Party
 SP Team
 HST
 Tactical Air Observer

HEARSAY
 MILL POINT
 BELGRADE
 BELGRADE REAR
 COLD TEA
 BELGRADE ALFA
 BELGRADE BRAVO
 BELGRADE CHARLIE
 BELGRADE DELTA
 BELGRADE NOVEMBER
 BELGRADE YANKEE
 BELGRADE WHISKEY
 BELGRADE TANGO
 BELGRADE FOXTROT
 BELGRADE BAILEY
 BELGRADE TWO SIX OSCAR
 BELGRADE TWO SIX CHARLIE
 BELGRADE ONE FOUR
 BELGRADE ONE FOUR ALFA
 BELGRADE ONE FOUR BRAVO
 BELGRADE PRODUCT
 JACKSONVILLE
 JACKSONVILLE WHISKEY
 ALBANIA
 ART POSE
 CALCIMINE
 AMBOY
 ATTIRE
 CHEMICAL
 FERVENT
 BROADMINDED
 AMERICAN BEAUTY
 AMERICAN BEAUTY (BEACH COLOR)
 AMERICAN BEAUTY (LZ NAME)
 HEARSAY PLAYBOY


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 USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)
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Appendix 3 (Visual Communications) to Annex F (Communications- Electronics) to Operation Order 330-66

1. Smoke Signals Will Be As Follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
Signal, Ground, Yellow Smoke, M-64 or Grenade, Rifle, Yellow Smoke or Grenade, Hand, Yellow Smoke	Marking of the friendly unit's position or of a secured area for an urgent or normal aircraft landing.
-----	-----
Signal, Ground, Green Smoke M-65 or Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke M-18 or Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke	Please inform us of the enemy direction or position.
-----	-----
Grenade, Rifle, Red Smoke or Grenade, Hand, Red Smoke (When dropped by A/C)	Marking of the enemy position.
-----	-----
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC (White)	Request for radio communications on the air-ground frequency.
-----	-----

2. Illumination Signals Will be as Follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster (One signal is fired)	Encircled or attacked by the enemy. Request support. Type of support must be affirmed by radio.
-----	-----
Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster (Cont. firing of three or more signal)	Request for emergency illumination. (Radio Liaison must be established.)
-----	-----
Signal, Ground, Green Star Parachute	Request ammo resupply (Confirm type by radio).
-----	-----
Signal, Ground, Green Star M-125 (Hand held)	Request for helo-evacuation.
-----	-----
Signal, Ground, White Star AMM-44A1 or Signal, Ground, White Star Parachute M-127 (Hand held)	Radio Breakdown.
-----	-----

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Signal, Ground, White Star Cluster (Fire 1 signal) Request for radio communications on the air-ground frequency.

Signal, Ground, White Star Cluster (Cont. firing of three or more signal) Request cease firing illumination.

Signal, Ground, Red Star Parachute M-126 (Hand held) We are withdrawing from this position.

3. Panel Signals Will Be As Follows:

a Helo Landing Point Identification

(1) Wherever possible all landing zones will be marked with an "X" formed by using two panels from either Panel Set AP-30C or A p. 30D. The color selected will contrast with the landing point in order to be easily recognized by aircraft. Rifle companies will further identify by using a display showing their respective unit letter designation.

(a) EXAMPLE: Company "A"



(2) Prevailing wind direction will be shown by installing a short pole (about 3 feet) with streamers, flag or pennant of sufficient length to permit the pilot to determine the local wind.

(3) Night marking of helicopter landing points, when tactically feasible, may consist of three flashlights placed at the apex of a triangle or vehicle lights flashed from downwind of the landing point and illuminating the landing area.

(4) Front Line Marking. Marking of friendly front lines will be by use of Panels VS-4/U (Red) placed parallel to the front lines.

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BLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966

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Annex G (Reorts) to Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

Ref: None

1. GENERAL. This Annex contains instruction for the submission of Operational Reports by Subordinate Units of the BLT.

2. REPORTS REQUIRED

<u>REPORTS</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
a. SITREP	All Units	S-3	Commencing at H plus 3 covering previous 3 hrs and every 6 hrs thereafter	Appendix 1 All activity and contacts to be reported in detail Annex E to CTG 79.5 201-YR Any Significant Item Appendix 2
b. CASUALTY REPORTS	All Units	S-1	As Occuring	
c. SPOT REPORTS	AO/OP	S-2	As Occuring	
d. MAJOR ORDINANCE/FNCR EQUIPMENT LOSS/DAM AGE REPORT	All Units	S-4	As Occuring	
e. JAMMING	All Units	S-3	As Occuring	CG FMFPAC Order P03000.5A
f. OPSTAT	All Units	S-3	As Occuring	
g. CHANGE OF LINES	All Units	S-3	As Occuring	
h. SPFL/MORT REP	All Units	S-2	As Occuring	
i. PATROL REPORTS	All Units	S-3/ S-2	As Occuring	A - Patrol Designation B - Size and Type C - Route and Check Points D - Time Out E - Time In F - Information Collected

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REPORTS

j. OP LOCATIONS

k. LOGISTIC SUMMARY REPORT

l. PERSONNEL DAILY SUMMARY

m. MUSTER REPORTS

n. REPORT OF SUPPLIES EXPENDED

FROM

TO

TIME

All Units S-2 As Occuring

Shore Party S-4 D-day submit every 6 hrs, from D+1 submit at 1800 as of 1600

All Units S-1 1800 Daily

All Units S-1 Upon re-embarkation after Opns Ashore

All Units S-4 3 days after completion of HILLTOP VI

Period covered 1600 to 1600 Daily

Message Report

Message Report

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APPENDIX:

1. SITREP
2. Major Ordnance/Engr Equip Loss/Damage Report

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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966

Appendix 1 (SITREP Format) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

1. REPORT TITLE: Situation Report
2. FORMAT: Message
 - a. Enemy
 - (1) Units in contact.
 - (2) Enemy activity during period.
 - b. Own Situation
 - (1) Location of CP at the end of the period.
 - (2) Front line position and boundaries.
 - (3) Own operation during period to include type and number of missions.
 - (a) Scheme of maneuver.
 - (b) Patrols - routes, size, type.
 - (c) Ambushes - location, size.
 - (d) Combat efficiency.
 - (e) Results of operations.
 - (f) Supporting arms employment to include type and number of missions fired.
 - c. Personnel
 - (1) Own
 - (a) Strength at end of period.
 - (b) Casualties - KIA, WIA, MIA.
 - (2) Enemy
 - (a) Casualties.
 - (b) Captives.
 - d. Logistics
 - (1) Locations of administrative type troops and installations.
 - (2) Status of supply and classes.
 - (3) Equipment out of action - give circumstances surrounding - how and where.
 - (4) Captured material and weapons by type and number.
 - e. Civic Action Taken. Brief description.

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f. Any Unusual Events

g. Intentions. Brief summary of contemplated operations.

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CONFIDENTIALBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966Appendix 2 (Major Ordnance/Engineer Equipment Loss/Damage Reports) to
Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 330-66.

Time Zone: H

1. Report Title: Equipment Casualty Report
2. Format: Message
 - a. Item description.
 - b. Coordinates where lost/damaged.
 - c. DTG of occurrence.
 - d. Extent of damage.
 - e. Circumstances concerning incident.
 - f. Replacement required (yes or no.).
3. Frequency: As occurring.
4. Submitted by: Unit concerned.
5. Submitted to: BLT 1-26.



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Annex H (Plan for Withdrawal) to Operation Order 33-66

Ref: Maps: AMS S733-3256 II (1:50,000) AMFULONG
AMS S733-3257 III (1:50,000) SAN JOSE
AMS S733-3157 II (1:50,000) ADELA

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISTMS.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) CTG 79.3 provides CAS to cover withdrawal.
- (2) CTU 76.5.3 provides NGF support.
- (3) CTG 76.5 provides amphibious shipping and necessary landing craft for intra-Task force transfers.
- (4) TAC (A) provides aerial reconnaissance and surveillance for withdrawal.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

d. Assumptions. At the time of the execution of the tactical withdrawal, all elements of BLT 1-26 will be operating in the AOA north and west of LF Obj 3 except Btry A; 1st Plat, Co A, 5th AmFrac; 1st Plat, Co A, 5th SP Bn and Beachmaster Unit-1. These elements will be located in close proximity to Beach Support Area (BSA).

2. MISSION. To conduct a tactical withdrawal from the objective area when ordered to do so by the Landing Force Commander.

3. EXECUTION.a. Concept of Operations

(1) This withdrawal will be executed in four phases. Initial phase: Company D will be helilifted from a LZ to be designated in vic of LF obj 7. Second phase: Withdrawal of Companies A and B to LZ CROW. Withdrawal of Company B to LZ to be designated in vic of LF obj 6. H&S Co (-), 81mm Mortar Plat and 107mm Mortar Btry with security elements will be withdrawn to LZ CROW. Third Phase: Companies A and C will be withdrawn to LZ EACLE. H&S Co (-), 81mm Mortar Plat, 107mm Mortar Btry and Company B will be withdrawn to LPH-2. Fourth Phase: Withdrawal of those units in vic of Beach RED to assigned shipping.

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(2) Commencing at W-hour Company D will be withdrawn from LZ to be designated in vic of LF obj 7 to LPH-2.

(3) Commencing at W-hour H&S Co (-), 81mm Mortar Plat, 107mm Mortar Btry, Company A and Company C will withdraw to LZ CROW. Company B will cover their withdrawal from LF Obj 6. These units will remain in covering positions at LZ CROW while Company B withdraws to a LZ to be designated on west side of LF obj 6 and helilifted to LPH-2

(4) Those units at LZ CROW will be helilifted in following order to the location specified. H&S Co (-) less CO's Command Group will be helilifted to LPH-2; 81mm Mortar Plat and 107mm Mortar Btry will be helilifted to LPH-2; Company C will be helilifted to LZ EAGLE; and Company A will helilifted to LZ EAGLE.

(5) Those units at Beach RED will withdraw by landing craft to assigned shipping in inverse order of landing on D-Day. Company C will be the last unit to be withdrawn and will do so by LVT.

(b) Company D (Rein)

(1) On order withdraw by helicopter from a LZ to be designated in vic of LF obj 7 to LPH-2.

c. Company A (Rein)

(1) On order withdraw from vic of LF obj 4 to LZ CROW and take up covering positions extending from 946772 to 939765 on east side of LZ CROW.

(2) When directed withdraw by helicopter from LZ CROW to LZ EAGLE.

(3) When directed embark in landing craft and withdraw to LPD-2.

d. Company C (Rein)

(1) On order withdraw from vic of LF obj 5 to LZ CROW and take up covering positions extending from 946772 to 939765 on west side of LZ CROW to cover withdrawal of Company F.

(2) When directed withdraw by helicopter from LZ CROW to LZ EAGLE; take up covering positions extending from 867677 to 861680 facing inland.

(3) When directed withdraw by LVT to LPD-2.

e. Company B (Rein)

(1) Cover withdrawal of Companies A and C from LF Objs 4 and 5 to LZ CROW. Also cover withdrawal of H&S Co (-), 81mm Mortar Plat and 107mm Mortar Btry to LZ CROW.

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(2) When directed withdraw by helicopter from LZ to be designated to LPH-2.

f. 81mm Mortar Plat (Fein)

(1) On order withdraw from occupied positions to LZ CROW.

(2) Take up positions at 945769 to cover withdrawal of Company B from LF Obj 6.

(3) When directed withdraw by helicopter to LPH-2.

g. 107mm Mortar Btry (Rein), 2nd Bn, 12th Marines

(1) Cover withdrawal of Companies A, B and C from occupied positions to designated LZ's.

(2) On order withdraw from occupied positions to LPH-2.

h. Btry A (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Marines

(1) On order withdraw tactically to Beach Support Area.

(2) On order withdraw via landing craft to LSD-28.

i. 1st Plat, Co A, 5th SP Bn and Beachmaster Unit-1

(1) As soon as Company C has occupied covering positions and on order withdraw by landing craft to LSD-28.

j. 1st Plat, Co A, 5th Amtrac Bn

(1) When required move Btry A to landing craft for withdrawal.

(2) Align LVT's in same sequence as for landing initially on D-day.

(3) When directed embark Company C and withdraw to LPD-2.

k. 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th AT Bn

(1) When directed withdraw tactically to Beach RED and withdraw by landing craft to LPD-2.

l. 1st Plat (Rein), Co A 5th Tk Bn

(1) When directed withdraw tactically to Beach RED and withdraw by landing craft to LSD-28.

m. H&S Co (-)

(1) On order withdraw tactically to LZ CROW from occupied positions.

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(2) When directed withdraw by helicopter from LZ CROW to LPH-2.

n. Coordination Instructions

(1) W-hour to be announced.

(2) All units will report to this Hqs at the commencement and completion of withdrawal by phases.

(3) Equipment that cannot be recovered will be destroyed completely or damaged sufficiently to deny use by enemy forces upon approval of BLT Commander. (CONSTRUCTIVE).

(4) CO's Command Group will coordinate the withdrawal to and from LZ CROW; the withdrawal of Company D and B; the withdrawal of all units from Beach RED.

(5) CO's Command Group will withdraw from Beach Support Area by helicopter to LPH-2 after Company A has withdrawn and prior to Company C withdrawing.

(6) Coordination of supporting arms will be passed to SACC at W-hour.

(7) The Code name for this Withdrawal Plan is "HONCHO". It will be used in all messages to make reference to this withdrawal plan. At no time will the word "Withdrawal" be used.



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Battalion Landing Team 1/26
 USS IWO JIMA
 041800 August 1966

ANNEX I (Logistics) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) Administrative Order 4-66
 (b) BnO 4000.2 SOP for Tac-Log Party

Time Zone: H

1. SUPPLY

a. General. Supplies to be landed will be the minimum required to accomplish the mission.

(1) Supply Concept. Helicopters will be the primary means of delivering supplies ashore. Most deliveries will be direct from ships to the using units.

(2) Contingency Reserve. To guard against the effects of inclement weather, other operational requirements, and unforeseen circumstances, a contingency reserve will be positioned ashore on order of the Battalion Landing Team Commander. Normally this level of supply will not exceed two days.

b. Supply Sources. Sources of all classes of supply are as designated:

<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Alternate</u>
Class I	USS IWO JIMA	USS VANCOUVER
* Class II	USS VANCOUVER	
Class III	USS VANCOUVER	USS THOMASTON
Class IV	USS THOMASTON	
Class V	USS IWO JIMA	USS VANCOUVER
* Type II Supplies only		

c. Preparation and Staging of Supplies

(1) Supplies will be prepared and staged aboard assigned ships and ready for loading either for helicopter or surface craft on D-1. Thereafter, supplies will be prepared in anticipation of the next days operations.

(2) Embarkation Officers and ships' platoons have the responsibility of preparing and staging of supplies as directed by Tac-Log. Refer to reference (b) for Tac-Log operations.

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Battalion Landing Team 1/26
 USS IWO JIMA
 041800 August 1966

d. Prescribed Load. Prescribed loads are in accordance with reference (a) and as modified below.

(1) Class I - Meal Combat Individual with fuel triozane-1 day

(2) Class II - Essential T/E, T/A items as determined by unit commanders. Individual body armor or gas masks to be included upon order of the Battalion Landing Team Commander.

(3) Class III - For vehicles designated to go ashore, full gas tanks. Minimum one expeditionary gas can full per vehicle.

(4) Class IV - As determined by unit commanders from assets held.

(5) Class V - Basic Allowance. Items are to be prepared and staged prior to D-day but not issued until the morning of D-day.

(6) Water - Two full canteens/individual. Filled water cans on the basis of $\frac{1}{2}$ gallon/individual. Unit commanders coordinate with embarkation officers to prepare and stage water cans on D-1.

(7) Medical - Unit commanders insure salt tablets and halazone tablets are available to each individual.

e. Supplies and Equipment Available. Refer to reference (a).

f. Control and Distribution

(1) Tac-Log

(a) The Tac-Log Party will be established aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) and will function in accordance with reference (b).

(b) The Tac-Log Party will consist of the following representatives:

Battalion Landing Team Embarkation Officer
 Battalion Landing Team S-3 Representative
 Battalion Landing Team S-4 Representative
 Two radio operators

(c) The embarkation officers of each ship will act as alternate Tac-Log Parties aboard their respective ships.

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Battalion Landing Team 1/26
 USS IWO JIMA
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(2) Units will request all classes of supply from this Headquarters (BLT S-4), the Battalion Landing Team S-4 will contact Tac-Log regarding the delivery of supplies.

(3) Unit commanders will report the delivery of supplies to this Headquarters (BLT S-4). Tac-Log will be informed and in turn, will notify CTG 79.5.

(4) Unit commanders will record Class II supplies expended and upon termination of the operation, submit listings of items expended. The Battalion Landing Team S-4 will record the expenditure of all other classes of supply. Upon the completion of the operation, CTG 79.5 will be notified.

(5) Levels of supply in the hands of using units in the objective area will not exceed one (1) day of supply for any class.

(6) Every effort will be made to safeguard supplies against damage, pilferage, or waste.

(7) Prior to reembarkation, unit commanders will insure Class V items to be recovered are free of dirt and rust. Recovery points and procedures will be announced.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. General

(1) Sanitation and Preventative Medicine

(a) The tropical climate and heavy rainfall in the operating area create special medical problems. Chief among these are heat exhaustion and tropical diseases. Foot infections from prolonged immersion in water is a distinct hazard. Use of local water or food products is prohibited.

(b) Unit commanders will ensure maximum sanitary discipline under combat conditions.

b. Evacuation

(1) Movement

(a) Casualties requiring evacuation occurring in landing craft or helicopters will remain aboard if possible and be returned to medical facilities afloat. First Aid or Buddy Aid will be rendered whenever practical.

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Battalion Landing Team 1/26
 USS IWO JIMA
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(2) Assault

(a) Casualties occurring ashore will be evacuated directly to the LPH by helicopter.

(b) Surface means will be used if practical.

(4) Casualty Evacuation Control

(a) The LPH is designated the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship (CECS).

(b) A medical officer on the LPH will be designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Officer (CECO).

3. TRANSPORTATION

a. Land. The landing of wheeled and track vehicles will be restricted to those required for accomplishment of the mission. Specific vehicles will be designated at the time determined.

4. SERVICEa. Functions

(1) Construction. as required.

(2) Maintenance - To be provided by the appropriate service attachment to the Battalion Landing Team. Maximum use will be made of contact teams and end-item replacement.

5. PERSONNELa. Strengths

(1) All units will debark with strengths required to provide maximum combat efficiency.

b. Replacements - nonec. Captives

(1) All provisions of the Geneva Convention will be observed.

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 USS IWO JIMA
 041800 August 1966

(2) Units apprehending captives will insure that an immediate search of the person is made.

(3) Disposition of captives will be as directed by CTG 79.5.

d. Civil Affairs/Civic Action

(1) Action taken will be the minimum required to gain cooperation of local populace.

(2) Distribution of Handclasp material will be as directed by CTG 79.5.

(3) Unit commanders will ensure that troops are especially careful not to damage property, livestock, religious structures, graves, shrines and other property which hold particular significance to the people.

e. Personnel and Casualty Reports

(1) In accordance with instructions contained in BnO 3041.1.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Security of all supplies, equipment and personal effects while aboard ships is the responsibility of embarked commanders.

b. When helicopters are used for logistic support, maximum utilization of space should be attained for the trip, both to and from the LPH.

c. All material requiring salvage will be reported and returned to amphibious shipping by the most expeditious means.

d. No materials of potential use to the enemy will be left unguarded or discarded.

e. All captured material will be evacuated for evaluation.

f. Units will report type, quantity, condition, location, time and date of all captured material.

g. Use of captured material is prohibited unless approved by this Headquarters.

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Battalion Landing Team 1/26
USS IWO JIMA
041800 August 1966

h. Deadlined equipment will be reported immediately to this Headquarters (BLT S-4).

i. Uniform and Equipment for Debarkation

- (1) Utilities with boots
- (2) Helmet (green side out)
- (3) T/O weapon with corresponding belt, pocket or pouch, two canteens, first aid kit, suspenders, and holster as appropriate.
- (4) Individual equipment as appropriate, i.e., compass, k-bar, binoculars, whistles, grenade launchers, etc.
- (5) Haversack, poncho, and entrenching tool.



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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966

Annex J (Rehearsal) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS S711 NR 3064 III (1:50,000) SILANGUIN ISLAND
AMS S711 NR 3064 II (1:50,000) SAN ANTONIO

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. A rehearsal landing for Operation HILLTOP VI will be conducted at Beach GREEN and Landing Zone SWAN, Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.

- a. Enemy Forces: None
- b. Friendly Forces: Paragraph 1b, Operation Order 330-66

2. MISSION. BLT 1-26 conducts a rehearsal landing in order to test the landing plan, communications and control procedures, capability of supporting forces, and to ensure troop familiarity with orders.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations

(1) BLT 1-26 conducts a rehearsal landing over Beach GREEN to include landing of all scheduled surface waves and into Landing Zone SWAN for scheduled helicopter waves.

(2) There will be no enemy situation and no tactical maneuver of troops ashore.

(3) Complete Pre-H-hour transfers will be carried out early on D-day.

(4) LVT wave land over Beach GREEN in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(5) LVT wave proceed inland to clear beach area and debark troops in an area to facilitate rapid turn around, but not to interfere with helicopter operations.

(6) Heliborne forces land in LZ SWAN as follows:

- a. Co D lands 120 men in two waves of 10 a/c. (1st and 2d wave)
- b. Co B lands 60 men in one ten a/c wave. (3rd wave)
- c. H&S Co (-) lands Command Group Alpha with all communications equipment. (4th wave)

(7) LOM-8's will touch down, but ONTOS will not land.

(8) In backload, LVT's will return to LPD-2; troops will also return via landing craft to LFD-2.

b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) No tactical play ashore.
- (2) All communication nets will be activated on shore.
- (3) Emphasize rapid and correct deplaning/debarking procedures and tactical deployment at the beach and landing zone.

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- (4) Waterborne troops retain life jackets for return to parent ship.
- (5) Beach GREEN centered coordinates SS 998400.
- (6) HLZ SWAN centered coordinates SS 997404.
- (7) D-day (Rehearsal) - 7 August 1966.
- (8) H-hour - 0900H
- (9) L-hour - 0930H
- (10) Maximum security on material & equipment while on the beach.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Annex I (Logistics) to Operation Order 330-66.
- b. Medical evacuation from beach to PCS or from LZ to LPH as appropriate.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Communications in accordance with Annex F. Call signs, radio and frequency plan will be issued separately.
- b. Command Posts: Paragraph 5 basic order.



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APPENDIXES:

- 1. Helicopter Employment

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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
040800H August 1966Appendix 1 (Helicopter Employment) to Annex J (Rehearsal)
to Operation Order 330-661. GENERAL

a. Helicopter employment during the rehearsal for HILLTOP VI will be limited to four waves of ten (10) helicopters per wave.

b. Two waves will simulate the landing of the assault elements of each rifle company.

2. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

a. Wave rendezvous point (WRP/IP ALPHA) is designated the NW corner of Grande Island.

b. Landing Zone SWAN (located at SS 997404).

c. SAR reference point will be LPH TACAN CHAN 20 IDENT MY

d. Helicopters will be under the positive control of LPH or HDC at all times.

e. Altitude assignments.

(1) From LPH to WRP/IP - 500'.

(2) From WRP to LZ - 500'

(3) From LZ to WRP to LPH - 1000'.



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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
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Annex K (Checkpoints) to Operation Order 330-66

CHECKPOINTS

A 858689	K 917794	U 973742
B 867675	L 920820	V 997739
C 918687	M 949803	W 022733
D 922725	N 969798	X 042733
E 882717	O 987819	Y 067823
F 859725	P 001800	Z 954715
G 864758	Q 017779	AA 003708
H 915755	R 994772	AC 043714
I 940744	S 952769	AD 049692
J 930770	T 978761	AE 021684
		AG 040760

1. Locations will be described by using the checkpoint system. Forward (F) is always 0 degrees Grid, Back (B) is always 180 degrees Grid, Right (R) is always 90 degrees Grid, and left is always 270 degrees Grid. Meters will be given in 100's. All locations will be in the following format:


Checkpoint Letter(s), F or B, Meters, L or R, Meters.

Example No. 1

Road Junction 877732 would be described as EF14L4 or FF7R18

Example No. 2

The Bend in the River 029688, would be ACB 26L15 or ADB4L21 or AGF4R8.



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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
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Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF COPIES</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF COPIES</u>
CMC (Code A03H)	2	MedO, BLT 1-26	1
CINCPAC	1	MTO, BLT 1-26	1
CG, FMFPac	1	SupO, BLT 1-26	1
Dir, MCLFDC, MCS	1	CO, H&S Co, BLT 1-26	4
COMSEVENTHFLT	1	CO, Co A, BLT 1-26	2
CG, III MAF	1	CO, Co B, BLT 1-26	2
CTG 76	7	CO, Co C, BLT 1-26	2
CTF 79	1	CO, Co D, BLT 1-26	2
CTG 76.5	1	CO, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Marines	2
CTG 79.5	4	CO, 107 Mortar Btry (Rein) 2nd Bn, 12th Marines	2
CO USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)	5	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A, 5th Tank Bn, FMF	1
CO USS THOMASTON (LSD-28)	2	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A, 5th Amtrac Bn, FMF	1
CO USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2)	2	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A, 5th AT Bn	1
CO HMM 364	5	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn	1
CO, BLT 1-26	1	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A, 5th MT Bn	1
XO, BLT 1-26	1	1st Plat (-) (Rein), 3rd Force Recon Co, FMF	1
S-1, BLT 1-26	1	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A, 5th Recon Bn	1
S-2, BLT 1-26	1	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn	1
S-3, BLT 1-26	4	Logistic Support Unit	1
S-4, BLT 1-26	2	Det, Beachmaster Unit, Naval Beach Group	1
CommO, BLT 1-26	1	CO, BLT 3-26	1
		S&C Files, BLT 1-26	12
			<u>87</u>



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Z-1

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
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DECKHOUSE

III

OPERATION ORDER

328-66

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*1/26
OpO 328-66 DECKHOUSE III
(13 Aug 65)*

BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 132400 August 1966

Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) Maps:

AMS L701 6442 I, XA BINH GIA 1:50,000
 AMS L701 6443 II, XA THUA-TICH 1:50,000
 AMS L701 6542 IV, AP BINH-CHAU 1:50,000
 AMS L701 6543 III, TAN TAO 1:50,000

(b) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence)
- (2) Intelligence Summaries as issued.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) Conducts an amphibious assault for the purpose of establishing BLT 1-26 (TU 79.5.2) ashore in order to:

(a) Establish blocking positions in support of 173rd Airborne Brigade.

(b) Conduct search and destroy operations.

(2) Air

(a) Close air support provided by CTF ___ in accordance with Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation 328-66.

(b) Helicopter support provided by HMM-363 (TU 79.5.3).

(3) Naval Gunfire. NGF support provided by CTG 70.8 in accordance with Appendix 1 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation order 328-66.

(4) CTG 115.1 provides Market Time forces.

c. Attachments and detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

2. MISSION. BLT 1-26, commencing at H and L hours conducts waterborne and helicopterborne amphibious assault over Beach BLUE, LZ BLUEBIRD and LZ CANARY to establish blocking positions in support of 173rd Airborne Brigade and conduct search and destroy operations.

SECRET-NOFORN3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operations

(1) Commencing at H-hour land two companies across Beach BLUE by LVT and landing craft to attack and seize LF objs 1 and 3; conducts search and destroy operations as directed.

(2) Commencing at L-hour land two companies by helicopter in designated landing zones to attack and seize LF obj 2; conduct search and destroy operations as directed.

(3) After securing LF objs 1, 2 and 3 and on order, two companies attack and seize LF objs 4, 5 and 6; establish blocking positions in vicinity of LF objs 5 and 6.

(4) Conduct a tactical withdrawal on order.

b. Company D (Rein)

(1) Land by helicopter in LZ BLUEBIRD (Alt - LZ ROBIN) on D-day at L-hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Attack and seize LF obj 2.

(3) On order attack and seize LF obj 6; establish blocking positions as shown on Annex C (Operations overlay).

c. Company C (Rein)

(1) Commencing at H-hour, D-day, land by LVT in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Move by LVT through LF obj 1 and attack and seize LF obj 3.

(3) On order attack and seize LF obj 5; establish blocking positions as shown on Annex C (Operations overlay).

(4) Conduct search and destroy operations as directed.

d. Company A (Rein)

(1) Land by landing craft on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Attack and seize LF obj 1.

(3) Secure LZ EAGLE prior to landing of H&S Co (-).

(4) On order revert to BLT Reserve; establish a defensive perimeter within LF obj 1 to include BLT GP.

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SECRET-NOFORNe. Btry A (Rein), 1stBn, 13th Marines

(1) Land by landing craft on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Establish firing positions at 827717.

(3) Direct support of BLT 1-26.

f. 107mm Mortar Btry (-) (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Marines

(1) Land by helicopter on D-day at LZ EAGLE in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Establish firing positions at 832717.

(3) Direct support of BLT 1-26.

g. 1st Plat (>) (Rein), Co A, 5th Amtrac Bn

(1) Land assault elements of BLT 1-26 in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Move inland 100 meters; embark 1st Plt, 3rd Force Recon to provide security on return to LF obj 1 from LF obj 3.

(2) Move Company C to LF obj 3. Disembark troops.

(3) Return to LF obj 1 with Force Recon Platoon as security. Disembark Recon Platoon and continue to Beach BLUE.

(4) Provide prime movers for 105mm Howitzers as required.

(5) Provide logistic support for units as required.

(6) Provide night security for beach support area.

(7) General support of BLT 1-26.

h. 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th AT Bn

(1) Land in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Be prepared to be landed as a provisional rifle platoon without ONTOS.

(3) General Support for BLT 1-26.

i. 1st Plt (-) (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn

(1) Land by helicopter in LZ EAGLE on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) General support of BLT 1-26.

SECRET-NOFORNk. 1st Plt (-) (Rein), Co A, 5th TK Bn

- (1) Land by landing craft in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) General Support of BLT 1-26.
- (3) Assume the mission as a provisional rifle platoon on order without tanks.

l. 106 Recoilless Rifle Plt (Rein)

- (1) Land in LZ EAGLE on D-day as a provisional rifle platoon for BLT CP security in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan)

m. 1st Plt (Rein, 3rd Force Recon Co, FMF)

- (1) Land by landing craft with Company A.
- (2) Move 100 meters off beach with Company A; embark on LVT's to provide security on their return to LF obj 1 from LF obj 3.
- (3) Disembark from LVT's on their return to LF obj 1.
- (4) Perform reconnaissance and surveillance missions as directed.

n. 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th Recon Bn

- (1) Land by helicopter on D-day in LZ EAGLE in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Perform reconnaissance and surveillance missions as directed.

o. 81mm Mortar Plt (-) (Rein)

- (1) Land on D-day by helicopter in LZ EAGLE in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Establish firing positions at 823710.
- (3) General support of BLT 1-26.

p. 1st Plt (-) (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn

- (1) Land on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Establish a beach support area at Beach BLUE in support of operations ashore.

n. Coordinating Instructions

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- (1) Essential elements of attack: Annex C (Operations overlay) and Annex D (Landing Plan)
- (2) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination)
- (3) D-day - 16 August 1966
- (4) H-hour - 0900 H
- (5) L-hour - 0930 H
- (6) W-hour (Withdrawal: to be designated)
- (7) AOA for DECKHOUSE III is the land area bounded by grid lines 92, 86 and 67.
- (8) All units will have front line panel markers.
- (9) Code name for this operation - DECKHOUSE III
- (10) Unit commanders emphasize that all troops keep at least 10-15 meters between personnel.
- (11) All patrols will carry smoke signalling devices.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. See Annex K (Administration and Logistics)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS

- a. See Annex F (Communication-Electronics)

b. Command Posts.

	<u>Afloat</u>	<u>Ashore</u>
(1) CTG 79.5	LPH-2	----
(2) BLT 1-26	LPH-2	824710 (tentative)
(3) HMM-363	LPH-2	----
(4) Subordinate units report locations ashore when established.		

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

A. A. Monti

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ANNEXES:

- A - Task organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operation Overlay
- D - Landing Plan
- E - Fire support Coordination
- F - Communication-Electronics
- G - Reports
- H - Withdrawal Plan (to be issued)
- I - Checkpoints
- J - (To be issued)
- K - Administration and Logistics
- Z - Distribution

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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

BLT 1-26

LtCol MONTI

H&S Co (-)

Det, Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (Ln Tm)

Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)

Det, Hq Co (-), 26th Mar

Radio Relay Tm

Det, Postal Unit

Det, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div (Photo)

Det, Disbursing

Det, Comm Spt Co (-), 9th Comm Bn

Logistic Support Unit

Det, Command Sect

Det, MT Sect

Det, Supply Sect

Det, Maint Sect

1st Plat (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th SP Bn

1st Plat

Det, Beachmaster Unit-1

Det, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Med Bn

Det, Collecting Plat

Clearing Sect

Det, 15th Dental Co, FMF

Co A (Rein)

Capt VELASQUEZ

Co A

Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plat

1st FOtm, 81mm Mortar Plat

1st FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn

Det, HqBtry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Spot Tm)

Co C (Rein)

Capt KAPPELMAN

Co C

A-1

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Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plat
3rd FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat
1st FAC Tm

3rd FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
Sub Unit #1 1st ANGLICO (NGF Spot Tm)
2d Sqd, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn

Co D (Rein)

Capt WEIDNER

Co D
Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plat
4th FO Tm, 81 mm Mortar Plat
2nd FAC Tm

4th FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
3rd Sqd, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn
Sub Unit #1 1st ANGLICO (NGF Spot Tm)

Btry A (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar

Capt BAILEY

Btry A (-)
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

107mm Mortar Btry (-) (Rein), 2nd Bn, 12th Mar

Capt MERRITT

107mm Mortar Btry
Det, Mess Sec, Serv Plat, Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 12th Mar
Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn
1st Plat, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th MT Bn

1st Plat, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AmTrac Bn

1stLt DIBELLO

1st Plat (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AT Bn

1stLt DEBILIO

1st Plat
Det, Co Hq, Co A (-) (Rein)

1st Plat (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Engr Bn

2ndLt DEAR

1st Plat (-)
Det, Co Hq, Co A (-) (Rein)

SECRET-NOFORN81mm Mortar Plt(-) (Rein)

1stLt MOONEY

106mm Recoiless Rifle Plat (Rein)

1stLt TERRILL

106RR Plat
 Flame Sec
 Det, Med Plat, H&S Co, 1-26

1st Plat, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th TK Bn

1stLt LARKIN

1st Plat, 3rd Force Recon Co, FMF

Capt JORDAN

1st Plat, Co A, 5th Recon Bn

1stLt SPAINHOUR

BLT Reserve (Reaction Force)

Capt SIMPSON

Co B (Rein)

Co B
 Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med plat
 2d FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat

2nd FO Tm Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn
 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn



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 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701, Sheets: 6442 I, 6443 II, 6543 III,
6542 IV (1:50,000)
(b) BnO P3800.1 (Intelligence SOP)

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)
- b. See current INTSUMS and Special Intelligence Reports as issued.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Determine the location, strength, identification and composition of the Viet Cong forces in the area.
- b. Determine if the enemy will reinforce. If so, when, where and in what strength?
- c. Determine the location and condition of LZ's along any route of advance and if they have been booby trapped or mined?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONSa. Orders to subordinate units(1) All units

- (a) Conduct aggressive reconnaissance patrols and make maximum use of observation and listening posts.
- (b) Report all incidents of enemy use of crew served weapons with particular attention to heavy mortars (120mm) and recoilless rifles; include the type of weapons and locations.
- (c) Report all enemy contacts; including disposition, strength, and identification.
- (d) Report all enemy obstacles and tunnels, including those destroyed by friendly troops.
- (e) Requests for AO support will be forwarded to Battalion S-2.

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- b. Requests to higher, adjacent and supporting units.
 - (1) Commander, Special Landing Force
 - (a) Provide aerial photography as requested.
 - (b) Provide current and predicted weather data.
 - (c) Provide information as obtained on beach and surf conditions.
 - (d) Provide Tactical Air Observer support as requested.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.

- a. Captured Enemy Personnel. Prisoners of war are lucrative sources of military information. Every effort must be made to capture prisoners. The term "Enemy Personnel" shall include military personnel of any enemy state, civilians bearing arms against our forces or serving their interests.
- b. Processing of Captured Personnel.
 - (1) Capturing units will handle prisoners in accordance with Ref: (b) emphasizing the five S's - Search, Segregate, Silence, Speed, and Safeguard. Prisoners will not be mistreated but will be handled so as to maintain the shock of being captured.
 - (2) Capturing units will:
 - (a) Immediately disarm and search Prisoners and enforce rigid silence.
 - (b) Prisoners should be segregated as soon as possible into four groups; Officer, NCO's, Enlisted men, and deserters.
 - (c) Tag segregated Prisoners with standard Prisoner tag as provided.
 - (d) Place documents removed from prisoners in appropriate Captured Document Envelopes as provided and identify with the prisoner.
 - (3) Wounded captives will be given adequate medical treatment and will be evacuated through captive medical channels in accordance with the physical condition of the captive. Medical Officer will report to the BLT S-2 any information voluntarily disclosed by wounded captives.

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- c. Interrogation. Companies and subordinate units will limit interrogation of prisoners to developing that information which is of immediate tactical value to the capturing unit. Prisoners must be processed back to trained interrogators as quickly as possible.
- d. Special Restrictions on Interrogation. The below listed categories of prisoners are of special importance and interest and should be handled as such:
- (1) Field Grade Officers
 - (2) Pilots and crew members
 - (3) NBC personnel
 - (4) Intelligence and Counterintelligence personnel
 - (5) Communications/Electronics personnel
- e. Captured Documents. The primary sources of captured enemy documents are:
- (1) Captured Personnel both military and civilians
 - (2) Captured enemy CI's and Installations
 - (3) Enemy dead
 - (4) Captured enemy vehicles and equipment
 - (5) All captured enemy documents from whatever sources will be placed in a Captured Document Envelope and immediately forwarded to the Bn S-2.
- f. Captured equipment. All captured enemy equipment will be tagged with a completed Captured Equipment Tag as provided and forwarded to the BLT S-2 as soon as possible.
- (1) The below listed types of captured material and equipment of special intelligence interest and must be evacuated to the S-2 immediately:
 - (a) Soviet and ChiCom/North Korean manufactured arms and equipment.
 - (b) Communications/Electronic Equipment.
 - (c) Aircraft and missiles and/or their related components.
 - (d) NBC equipment.
 - (2) Items of captured equipment will not be maintained as souvenirs but will be forwarded to the S-2 for intelligence processing. When items cease to be of an intelligence value they will be returned to the capturing individual.
5. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
- a. Standard Reference Maps: (See Ref (a))
 - b. Aerial photographs will be distributed as they become available.
6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
- a. The following counterintelligence measures will be implemented by all units:

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- (1) Utilize maximum concealment and maintain high standards of camouflage and march, light and noise discipline.
- (2) Re-iterate Code of Conduct responsibilities for all personnel in case of possible capture.
- (3) Maintain strict physical control of classified material and limit access to a strict "need to know" basis.
- (4) Comply with communications security measures.
- (5) Immediately report to the S-2 the loss or compromise of classified material.

b. Challenge and Password

- (1) Challenge and Passwords, unless compromised or otherwise changed will be in effect for a 24 hour period, normally 1200 to 1200 local time.
- (2) The BLT S-2 will be immediately notified when compromise of the Challenge and Password is suspected.
- (3) See Appendix 3.

- c. Only those civilian news correspondents and photographers specifically authorized by Commander Amphibious Task Force will be allowed in the objective area.

7. REPORTS

- a. Reporting of any and all information with regard to the enemy must be continuous by all units to this headquarters (Attn S-2). Reports must be forwarded by the most expeditious means possible and be in the form of the key word SALUTE:

S - Size of enemy force in numbers.
 A - Action that has taken place including direction of enemy withdrawal.
 L - Location.
 U - Enemy unit designation if known.
 T - Time action took place.
 E - Equipment of enemy.

- b. Special reports will be submitted on request from this headquarters.



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APPENDIXES

1. Intelligence Estimate
2. Challenge and Password (To Be Published)
3. Astronomical and Tidal Data (To Be Published)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 140800H August 1966

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 328-60.

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6442 I, 6443 II, 6542 IV, 6543 III

(b) CTG 79.5 OpOrder 328-66

1. MISSION. BLT 1/26 lands at H - hour and L - hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to sieze Objectives 1, 2, and 3 as prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay); destroys enemy troops, equipment, and supplies; conducts search and destroy operations within assigned area; and executes tactical withdrawl on order.

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS.

a. Weather:

(1) BINH TUY Province comes under the influence of the south-west monsoon. Winds have an average speed of 8 knots, with gusts up to 50 knots during thunder storms. Clouds remain constant over area of operation becoming broken between 2,000 and 4,000 feet by early afternoon. A somewhat regular daily pattern of rain showers occur in the afternoon. Visibility is good to fair except during showers and thunder storms when it is reduced considerably. Temperature averages in the high 80's and low 90's. Humidity has an average of 85 percent.

(2) Effect on Enemy Courses of Action: Weather will not appreciably effect the enemy. Precipitation facilitates the enemies capability to move undetected from air observation. Flooding will limit his ground movement in the lowlands. Rainy season favors enemy movement.

(3) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action: During periods of low visibility, friendly air observation will be restricted. Heavy rain will hinder movement of ground forces. Weather will not seriously effect friendly operations.

b. Terrain: Area of operations is characterized by jungle and brush covered plains. Elevation varies from 100 to 200 meters until the mountainous area of the MAY TAO mountain is reached in the northwest and NUE BE mountain in the north east. Several streams are interspersed through out the area and are usually filled to overflowing during the month of August. Lowland areas are flooded and make trafficability poor for ground troops. Vegetation consists of one and two canopy jungle, thick secondary brush, and along the coast, heavy brush and swamp grass. A dirt

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road parallels the beach approximately 1,000 meters inland. The bridge located coord 827713 has been destroyed. It is reported that the trail network in the area is heavily used but cannot be seen from the air. Trafficability throughout AOA is fair to poor.

(1) Effect on Enemy Courses of Action: Enemy will make maximum use of concealment afforded by the vegetation. His knowledge of the trail network will aid his rapid movement throughout the area.

(2) Effect of Friendly Courses of Action: Cross country movement will be difficult and time consuming. Vehicular traffic will be very limited and then only to existing roads and trails capable of supporting them. Vegetation will restrict air observation and fields of fire.

3. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. General. The area of operation have been under the absolute control of the VC for years. There have been no RVN or Allied military operations conducted in this area. The 5th VC Div Headquarters located in the MAY TAO Secret Zone, has two subordinate Main Force Regiments, the 274th and 275th, each with three battalions. The base area in the MAY TAO Zone, being a major supply and training installation, allows these Main Force units to operate freely in BINH TUY and LONG KHANH provinces. Infiltration routes have been reported along the coast vicinity coordinates YS814688 to YS827699. This route goes in a northerly direction, following numerous trails, to the MAY TAO Zone. The base area, coord. YS820920 believed to have enough food storage to feed 10,000 troops for one year. Houses on beach have either been burned or destroyed. All persons in area are VC or VCS including women and children.

b. Order of Battle.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
5th VC Div CP	YS780815	6 Aug	
274th Regt.	YS810790	6 Aug	12-60mm Mortars 8-81mm Mortars
1st Bn	YS700755	6 Aug	12-LMG 5-57mm RR
2d Bn	YS815735	6 Aug	3-75mm RR 3-12.7mm MG
3d Bn	UNKNOWN		Assorted Small Arms and Auto. Weapons
275th Regt.	YF 770091	6 Aug	6-81mm Mortars 16-60mm Mortars

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
1st Bn	UNKNOWN		10-57mm RR 12-12.7mm MG
2d Bn	UNKNOWN		18-50 Cal. MG 8-30 Cal. MG
3d Bn	UNKNOWN		Assorted small arms and automatic weapons.

(1) On 11 Aug a SPAR report places an element of the 5th Div Cp at coord. YS 682731.

(2) SPAR reports also place the CP or elements of the 274th at coord YS 637768 on 8 Aug.

(3) The CP or elements of the 275th were reported by SPAR to be at coord YS 341830 also on 8 Aug.

(4) In view of these reports it is believed that these two units, or elements of them, are on separate operations to the west, and the 5th Div CP group controlling their movements.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

- (1) Defend the beach with available forces.
- (2) Mine and booby trap existing trails and areas of possible use to friendly units.
- (3) Attack with up to two Main Force Regiments.
- (4) Harass and ambush friendly units with available forces.
- (5) Withdraw and avoid contact with friendly units.
- (6) Reinforce with one Local Force Battalion within 72 hours.

b. Analysis and Discussion.

(1) It is very unlikely the enemy will defend the beach due to our air support/observation and naval gunfire.

(2) Once the enemy determines friendly direction of advance, he will probably make every effort to inflict casualties with mines and booby traps, thus hoping to impede our rate of advance and deny friendly forces the use of certain trails and areas.

(3) The enemy will most likely attack with any or all of his Main Force units once he discovers friendly forces in the area if the base area is as large and important as intelligence indicates. It is very doubtful he will abandon it to be destroyed. He will also have the

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advantage of his knowledge of the terrain and superior numbers. Bad weather could assist him by decreasing our air support/observation.

(4) For any course of action the enemy may take, friendly forces can expect to be ambushed and harassed in order to delay and inflict casualties.

(5) It is not likely the enemy will avoid contact or withdraw because of reasons stated paragraph (3)

(6) Reinforcement would be a logistical problem and Local Force units would be unfamiliar with the area. This would also leave the Local Force area of operations open for possible exploitation by other friendly forces.

5. CONCLUSIONS The enemy will make maximum use of adverse weather and the terrain to ambush and harass friendly units. Being on his home ground, he can choose time and place of any attack. Use of small unit tactics can be expected in order to confuse and delay.

6. ENEMY OBSTACLES.

a. Abandoned RVN minefields located grid square 8773 and 8873.

b. These minefields are $1\frac{1}{2}$ years old but may have been improved upon by the VC.



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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 140800H August 1966

Appendix 2 (Challenge and Password) to Annex B (Intelligence) to
 Operation Order 328-66.

<u>CODE</u>	<u>PRIMARY</u>		<u>ALTERNATE</u>	
	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
11	Rubber	Lady	Hot	Dog
39	Rifle	Range	Hep	Cat
64	Home	Run	Buffalo	Bill
87	Simple	Simon	Cream	Puff
29	Bald	Eagle	Moon	Shine
57	Snow	Job	High	Noon
33	Barn	Storm	Party	Doll
14	Sugar	Daddy	Hipper	Dipper
77	Home	Run	Stamp	Pad
69	Pipe	Dream	Rebel	Rouser
84	Sword	Fish	Sugar	Foot
15	Jet	Jockey	Orphan	Annie
22	Mud	Pie	Bay	Rum
60	Chicken	Little	Beer	Barrel
44	Fish	Pole	Side	Car
73	Bell	Hop	Sack	Rat

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BLT 1-26


USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)

140800 August 1966

Appendix 3 (Astronomical and Tidal Data) to Annex B (Intelligence) to
Operation Order 328-66.

1. Astronomical and Tidal Data for the period of 15-30 August 1966, is
as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BMNT</u>	<u>SR</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>BENT</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>HT</u>	<u>FT</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>FT</u>	<u>MOON PHS</u>
15	0558	0645	1914	2001	0514	1824	0344 1111	9.1' 9.1'	0640 1859	7.7' 2.3'	Last Qtr
16	0558	0645	1914	2001	0618	1921	0227 1209	9.4' 0.4'	0773 1948	7.1' 2.1'	New Moon
17	0558	0645	1913	2000	0721	2012	0301 1307	9.7' 9.7'	0812 2032	6.8' 2.1'	New Moon
18	0558	0645	1913	2000	0821	2100	0333 1403	9.7' 9.8'	0854 2144	5.6' 1.8'	1st Qtr
19	0558	0645	1913	2000	0921	2146	0405 1459	9.7' 9.7'	0934 2156	5.3' 1.7'	1st Qtr
20	0558	0645	1911	1958	1016	2231	0435 1559	9.4' 9.4'	1017 2238	5.1' 3.3'	2nd Qtr
21	0558	0645	1911	1958	1112	2306	0506 1703	9.4' 9.2'	1103 2321	4.7' 4.2'	2nd Qtr
22	0558	0645	1911	1958	1304	2400	0540 1703	9.2' 9.2'	1103 2321	4.7' 4.2'	Half Mn
23	0558	0645	1910	1957	1304	2400	0003 1251	5.4' 3.9'	0608 1947	9.2' 8.2'	Half Mn
24	0558	0645	1910	1957	1400	0050	0048 1356	6.4' 3.8'	0644 2130	8.9' 8.0'	Half Mn
25	0558	0645	1910	1957	1456	0141	0136 1509	7.0' 3.5'	0724 2318	8.7' 8.2'	3d Qtr
26	0558	0645	1908	1955	1550	0235	0303 1621	7.7' 3.3'	0816 xxxx	8.7' xxxx	3d Qtr
27	0558	0645	1908	1955	1641	0329	0039 0934	8.5' 8.7'	0506 1725	8.0' 3.0'	4th Qtr
28	0558	0645	1908	1955	1730	0421	0130 1041	8.9' 8.7'	0630 1827	7.7' 2.8'	4th Qtr
29	0558	0645	1906	1953	1814	0514	0206 1139	8.9' 8.7'	0712 1911	7.3 2.8'	4th Qtr
30	0558	0645	1906	1953	1853	0602	0233 1233	9.2' 8.9'	0749 1949	6.8' 2.8'	Full Mn



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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966

Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: H


1. GENERAL

a. This plan provides for:

- (1) Landing two reinforced companies with designated supporting units by helicopter in Landing Zones BLUEBIRD and CANARY.
- (2) Landing two reinforced companies with designated supporting units by surface means over Beach BLUE.
- (3) See Appendixes for detailed instructions.

2. SHIP-TO-SHORE CONTROL. TacLog Group representation will be provided in accordance with Annex I (Logistics).APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Landing Craft Availability Table
- 2 - Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table
- 3 - Helicopter Availability Table
- 4 - Landing Diagram
- 5 - Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table
- 6 - Serial Assignment Table
- 7 - Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table
- 8 - Helicopter Wave and Serial Assignment Table
- 9 - Helicopter Landing Diagram
- 10 - Assault Schedule



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 140800H August 1966

Appendix 1 (Landing Craft Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan)
 to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>LCM-6</u>	<u>LCM-8</u>	<u>LCU</u>
LPD-2	3	0	1
LSD 28	3	4	0
<u>Total</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>Spares</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
<u>Naval Requirement</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
<u>Total Naval Requirement</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
<u>Total Available to Landing Force</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>



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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966Appendix 3 (Helicopter Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan)
to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: FMFM 3-3

Time Zone: H

HELICOPTER UNIT AND DESIGNATION	NUMBER OF A/C	A/C AVAILABLE		TYPE	CARRIER	DECK LAUNCH		REMARKS
		FIRST TRIP	OTHER TRIPS			CAPACITY		
HMM 363 (MILLPOINT)	21	16	16	UH-34D	LPH-2	10		



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Appendix 4 (Landing Diagram) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to
 Operation Order 328-66

H-hour: 0900H

Beach: BLUE

Wave 1 Co C (Rein)
 H-hour
 X X X X* X X X X X Ser: 100
 1-0 1-1 1-2 0-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8

Wave Co A (Rein)
 H+4
 O O* O Ser: 102
 2-2 2-1 2-3

Wave 3 SP Plat (-)
 H+10 Recon Party, Btry A
 Beachmaster Unit (-)
 O O* O Ser:
 3-2 3-1 3-3
 302
 374
 381

LEGEND:

- X LVTP-5
- X LVTC
- O LCM(6)
- O LCM-8
- (O) LCU
- * Wave Cmdr



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USS I C JIMA (LPH-2)

140000H August 1966

Appendix 5 (Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table)
to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-66

<u>BOAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SPACES</u>	<u>FORMATION</u>
	1st WAVE		<u>COLUMN</u>
1-0 LVTP	1st Sqd 1st Plat, Co C Plat Guide, Co C 1st Asslt Sqd, Co C Corpsman, Co C Mg Sec Ldr, Co C Breeching Tm, 2ndSqd, En r Plat	13 1 7 1 1 <u>6</u> 29	X* 1-0 X 1-1 X 1-2
1-1 LVTP	2nd Sqd 1st Plat, Co C Plat Cmdr 1st Plat, Co C Msgrs, Co C 1st MG Sqd, Co C 1st Mortar Sqd, Co C	13 1 2 9 <u>4</u> 29	X 0-2 X 1-3 X 1-4 X
1-2 LVTP	3rd Sqd 1st Plat Co C Plat Sgt 1st Plat Co C 1st Sqd, 3rd Sec, 81 Mortar Plat Corpsman, Co C	13 1 9 <u>1</u> 24	1-5 X 1-6 X 1-7 X
0-2 LVTC	CO, Co C Radiomen, Co C NGF Spot Tm Corpsman, Co C Wpns Plat Cmdr, Co C Driver, Co C	1 2 7 1 1 <u>1</u> 13	1-8 X
1-3 LVTP	1st Sqd, 3rd Plat, Co C 1st FAC Tm Plat Sgt, 3rd Plat, Co C 3rd Asslt Sqd, Co C 3rd Mortar Sqd, Co C Corpsman, Co C	13 5 1 8 4 <u>1</u> 32	
1-4 LVTP	2nd Sqd, 3rd Plat, Co C FO Tm, A Btry Plat Cmdr, 3rd Plat, Co C Msgrs, Co C 3rd Mg Sqd, Co C Guide, 3rd Plat, Co C Corpsman, Co C	13 5 1 2 9 1 <u>1</u> 32	

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<u>BOAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SPACES</u>	<u>FORMATIONS</u>
1-5	3rd Sqd 3rd Plat, Co C	13	
LVTP	XO, Co C	1	
	Chief Clerk, Co C	1	
	Co Gysgt, Co C	1	
	Supply Sgt, Co C	1	
	1st Sgt, Co C	1	
	Msgrs, Co C	2	
	Corpsman, Co C	1	
	Clerks, Co C	2	
	Wpns Plat Sgt, Co C	1	
	3rd FO Tm 81 Mortar	2	
	Asslt Tm, 2nd Sqd, Mgr Plat	6	
		<u>32</u>	
1-6	1st Sqd, 2nd Plat, Co C	13	
LVTP	Plat Sgt, 2nd Plat, Co C	1	
	2nd Sqd, 3rd Sec, 81 Mortar Plat	9	
	Sec Ldr, 3rd Sec, 81 Mortar Plat	1	
	Corpsman, Co C	1	
		<u>25</u>	
1-7	2nd Sqd 2nd Plat, Co C	13	
LVTP	Plat Cndr, 2nd Plat, Co C	1	
	Msgrs, Co C	2	
	2nd Mg Sqd, Co C	8	
	Corpsman, Co C	1	
	Asslt Sec Ldr, Co C	1	
	Mortar Sec Ldr, Co C	1	
		<u>27</u>	
1-8	3rd Sqd 2nd Plat, Co C	13	
LVTP	Plat Guide, 2nd Plat Co C	1	
	2nd Asslt Sqd, Co C	6	
	HST, SP Plat	4	
	2nd Mortar Sqd, Co C	4	
		<u>28</u>	

2nd WAVE

WEDGE

2-1	CO, Co A	1		0*
LCM-6	Co Gysgt, Co A	1		2-1
	Wpns Plat Cndr, Co A	1	0	0
	FO Tm, Btry A	5	2-2	2-3
	HST, SP Plat	4		
	Chief Corpsman, Co A	1		
	Mortar Sec Ldr, Co A	1		
	Asslt Sec Ldr, Co A	1		
	Radiomen, Co A	2		
	3rd Plat (Rein), Co A	63		
		<u>80</u>		

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<u>BOAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SEACES</u>	<u>FORMATICS</u>
2-2	2nd Plat(Rein), Co A	61	
LCM-6	1st Sgt, Co A	1	
	Mg Sec Ldr, Co A	1	
	Armorer, Co A	1	
	1st Sec, 81mm Mortar Plat	<u>20</u>	
		84	
2-3	XC, Co A	1	
LCM-6	Wpns Plat Sgt, Co A	1	
	Ammo NCO, Wpns Plat, Co A	1	
	Driver, Co A	1	
	Police Sgt, Co A	1	
	Corpsman, Co A	1	
	1st Plat (Rein), Co A	<u>65</u>	
		71	
	<u>3rd WAVE</u>		<u>WEDGE</u>
3-1	SP Plat (-)	30	0*
LCM-8	1 TD-24	-	<u>3-1</u>
	1 M-422	-	0
	1 M-100	-	<u>3-2</u>
	1 Radio Jeep	-	0
	1 Forklift	-	<u>3-3</u>
	1 Water Trlr	-	
		<u>30</u>	
3-2	BMU(-)	10	
LCM-8	Survey Tm, Btry A	18	
	Det, Comm Spt	3	
	1 TE-24	-	
	1 MRC-62	-	
		<u>31</u>	
3-3	BMU(-)	2	
LCM(6)	1 DUKW	<u>2</u>	
		2	
	<u>ON CALL</u>		
LCM (8)	Btry A (-)	50	
Scr: 339	3 105mm How	-	
	1 M-105 Trlr	-	
	BA Ammunition	<u>50</u>	
		50	

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<u>BOAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SEATS</u>	<u>FORMATION</u>
			<u>WEDGE</u>
LCM (8)	Btry A(-)	50	
Ser: 339	3 105mm How	-	
	1 M-105 Trlr	-	
	BA Ammunition		
		<u>50</u>	
LCU	AT Plat	17	
Ser: 200	5 M-50 Ontos	-	
	1 M-35 Trk	-	
		<u>17</u>	

NON SCHEDULED

LCM (8)	Tank Plat(-)	4	
Ser: 305	1 M48A3	-	
		<u>4</u>	
LCM (8)	Tank Plat(-)	4	
Ser: 305	1 M48A3	-	
		<u>4</u>	
LCU	Tank Plat (-)	12	
Ser: 305	3 M48A3	-	
		<u>12</u>	
LCM (6)	H&S Co (-)	3	
Ser: 357	1 FRC-109	-	
		<u>3</u>	




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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H, August, 1966Appendix 6 (Serial Assignment Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to
Operation Order 328-66

SERIAL NUMBER	UNIT	PERS	MATERIAL EQUIPMENT	CRAFT	SHIP	REMARKS
			VEHICLES	NO/TYPE		
100	Co C	264		9 LVTP 1 LVTC	LPD-2	1st Wave
102	Co A	254		3 LCM (6)	LPD-2	2nd Wave
200	AT Plat	17	5 M-50 Ontos 1 M-35 Truck	1 LUC	LPD-2	On Call
302	SP Plat (-)	30	1 TD-15 1 M-422 1 M-100 1 Radio Jeep 1 ForkLift 1 Water Trlr	1 LCU (8)	LSD-28	3rd Wave Land With Ser: 305 381
305	Tank Plat	20	5 M48A3	2 LCM (8) 1 LCU (6)	LSD-28 LSD-28	NonSched
339	Btry A(-)	100	6 105mm HOW 2 M-105TRLR	2 LCM (8)	LSD-28	On Call
357	H&S Co(-)	3	1 MRC-109	1 LCM (6)	LSD-28	Non Sched
381	BMU(-)	2	1 DUKW	1 LCM (6)	LSD-28	3rd Wave Land With Ser: 302 385
385	BMU(-) Survey Tm, Btry A Det, Comm Spt	31	1 TD-24 1 MRC-62	1 LCM (8)	LSD-28	3rd Wave Land with Ser: 302 381



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Appendix 8 (Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Table)
 to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-66

WAVE	HELITTEAM		SUPPLIES			WEIGHT()		EMPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	
1	DUNBAR	2SqdLdr 1Plat	1		1350		1350	TBA
	101	Gren, 2Sqd	1					
	101-1	1Plat						
		1FT 2Sqd 1Plat	4					
		All D Co	6					
1	DUNBAR	2FT 2Sqd 1Plat	3		1350		1350	
	102	3FT 2Sqd 1Plat	3					
	101-2	All D Co	6					
1	DUNBAR	1SqdLdr 1Plat	1		1350		1350	
	103	Gren 1Sqd	1					
	101-3	1Plat						
		1FT 1Sqd 1Plat	4					
		All D Co	6					
1	DUNBAR	2FT 1Sqd 1Plat	3		1350		1350	
	104	1PlatCmdr	1					
	101-4	1PlatRadioman	1					
		1PlatCorpsman	1					
		All D Co	6					
1	DUNBAR	3FT 1Sqd 1Plat	4		1350		1350	
	105	1PlatGd	1					
	101-5	1PlatCorpsman	1					
		All D Co	6					
1	DUNBAR	3SqdLdr 1Plat	1		1350		1350	
	106	Gren 3Sqd	1					
	101-6	1 Plat						
		1FT 3Sqd 1Plat	4					
		All D Co	6					
1	DUNBAR	2FT 3Sqd 1Plat	3	MG 52#	1350	110	1460	
	107	1Tm(-) 1Sqd MG	3	600 Rds				
	101-7	Sec WpnsPlat	6	58#				
1	DUNBAR	3FT 3Sqd 1Plat	3	MG 52#	1350	110	1460	
	108	2Tm(-) 1Sqd MG	3	600 Rds				
	101-8	Sec WpnsPlat	6	58#				
1	DUNBAR	CO CoD	1	3 PRC-25	1350	125	1475	
	109	Radioman CoD	2	75#				
	101-9	FAC#2	1	PRC-41				
		Radioman FACTm	2	50#				
			6					
1	DUNBAR	Radioman FACTm	3	PRC-47	1350	130	1480	
	110	MG SecLdr	1	90#				
	101-10	WpnsPlat CoD		Batteries				
		1PlatSgt CoD	1	f/PRC-47				
		1PlatCorpsman	1	(40#)				
			6					

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WAVE	HELITeam		SUPPLIES			WEIGHT ()			EXPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	AND EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL		
1	DUNBAR 111 101-11	3FT 1Sqd 2Plt CoD FOtm(-)A/1/13	4	PRC-25 #25	1350	25	1375		
			6						
1	DUNBAR 112 101-12	2PltGd 1SqdLdr 2Plt Gren 1Sqd 2Plt 1FT 1Sqd 2Plt (All D Co)	1 1 1 1 3 6		1350		1350		
1	DUNBAR 113 101-13	2 FT, 1Sqd, 2Plt PltCmdr 2Plt Radioman 2Plt	4 1 1 1	PRC-25 #25	1350	25	1375		
			6						
1	DUNBAR 114 101-14	ANGLICO TM Ammomen 1Sqd MG Sect Wpns Flt Corpsman 2Plt PltCmdr Wpns Flt (All Co B)	2 1 2 2 1 1 1 6	800Rds #70	1350	70	1420		
1	DUNBAR 115 101-15	60mm mortar Sect Ldr Wpns Plt 1Sqd 60mmMor Sect Wpns Plt (All Co D)	1 1 1 5 6	60mmMortar #54 30Rds #90	1350	144	1494		
1	DUNBAR 116 101-16	2SqdLdr 2Plt Gren 2Sqd 2Plt 2FT 2Sqd 2Plt (All Co D)	1 1 1 4 6		1350		1350		
2	DUNBAR 201 201-1	1FT 2Sqd 2Plt 3FT 2Sqd 2Plt (All Co D)	3 3 6		1350		1350		

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WAVE	HELITTEAM		SUPPLIES				ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	
2	DUNBAR 202 201-2	3SqdLdr 2Flat Gren 3Sqd 2Flat 1FT 3Sqd 2Flat All CoD	1 1 4 6		1350		1350
2	DUNBAR 203 201-3	2FT 3Sqd 2Flat 3FT 3Sqd 2Flat All CoD	3 3 6		1350		1350
2	DUNBAR 204 201-4	1Tm 2Sqd MGSec WpnsFlat 2FlatSgt 2FlatCorpsman All CoD	4 1 1 6	MG 52# 1000 Rds 88#	1350	140	1490
2	DUNBAR 205 201-5	2SqdLdr MGSec WpnsFlat CoD 2Tm 2Sqd MGSec WpnsFlat CoD 3SqdLdr Engr Flat	1 4 1 6	MG 52# 1000 Rds 88#	1350	140	1490
2	DUNBAR 206 201-6	3Sqd EngrFlat	6	AN/FRS-4 45# AN/FRS-153 20# 2 Demo Kits 80#	1350	145	1495
2	DUNBAR 207 201-7	2Sqd 60mmMor SecWpnsFlatCoD CoGySet	5 1 6	60mmMor 55# 30Rds 90#	1350	145	1495
2	DUNBAR 208 201-8	3Sqd 60mmMor Sec WpnsFlatCoD WpnsFlatSgt	5 1 6	60mmMor 55# 30 Rds 90#	1350	145	1495
2	DUNBAR 209 201-9	3SqdLdr MGSec 1Tm 3Sqd MGSec Corpsman All WpnsFlat	1 4 1 6	MG 52# 1000 Rds 88#	1350	140	1490
2	DUNBAR 210 201-10	1FT 1Sqd 3Flat 2Tm 3Sqd MGSec WpnsFlat	3 3 6	MG 52# 1000 Rds 88#	1350	140	1490
2	DUNBAR 211 201-11	2FT 1Sqd 3Flat 3FlatCmdr 3FlatRadioman 1SqdLdr 3Flat All D Co	3 1 1 1 6	PRC-25 25#	1350	25	1375

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WAVE	HELITeam FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	SUPPLIES		WEIGHT()		ENPLAN ING STATION
			NO	EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP TOTAL	
2	DUNBAR	3FT 1Sqd 3Plat	4		1350	1350	
	212	3PlatGd	1				
	201-12	3PlatCorpsman All CoD	1 6				
2	DUNBAR	1SqdLdr 3.5Rkt	1	2 3.5Rkts	1350	98	1448
	213	Sec WpnsFlat		26#			
	201-13	1Sqd 3.5RktSec WpnsFlat	5 6	8 Rds 72#			
2	DUNBAR	XO CoD	1	3 PRC-25	1350	75	1425
	214	Radioman CoD	2	75#			
	201-14	FOIm(-) L/1/13	3 6				
2	DUNBAR	2SqdLdr 3Plat	1		1350		1350
	215	1FT 2 sqd 3Plat	3				
	201-15	3PlatSgt	1				
		3PlatCorpsman All CoD	1 6				
2	DUNBAR	2FT 2Sqd 3Plat	3		1350		1350
	216	3FT 2Sqd 3Plat	3				
	201-16	All CoD	6				
3	DUNBAR	3SqdLdr 3Plat	1	12 Rds	1350	132	1482
	301	1FT 3Sqd 3Plat	4	132#			
	301-1	3.5Rkt SecLdr	1				
		WpnsFlat	6				
3	DUNBAR	All CoD					
	302	2Sqd 3.5Sec	6	2 3.5Rkts	1350	98	1448
	301-2	WpnsFlat CoD		26# 8 Rds 72#			
3	DUNBAR	3Sqd(-)Engr	5	PRC-25	1350	112	1462
	303	Flat		25#			
	301-3	CoD SupplyNCO	1	MG 52#			
			6	400 Rds 35#			

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT		PERSONNEL		SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT		WEIGHT()			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	SERIAL NO	TROOP UNIT	NO		PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL			
3	DUNBAR 304 301-4	2FT 3Sqd 3Plat 3Sqd 3.5Rkt Sec WpnsPlat All CoD	3 3 6	2 3.5 Rkt 26# 4 Rds 36#	1350	62	1412			
3	DUNBAR 305 301-5	3FT 3Sqd 3Plat Clerks CoD	4 2 6		1350	40	1390			
3	DUNBAR 306 301-6	HST Tm SP Plat 1Sgt B Co CoDCorpsman	4 1 1 6	PRC-25 25#	1350	25	1375			
3	DUNBAR 307 301-7	CO S-3 S-2 CommO Radioman	1 1 1 2 6	3 PRC-25 30#	1350	90	1440			
3	DUNBAR 308 301-8	S-4 SP Radioman Radioman	1 1 4 6	2 PRC-25 30# PRC-47 93#	1350	153	1503			
3	DUNBAR 309 301-9	S-4 Chief NGF Ln Tm(-)	1 4 5	4 BB-451 68# PRC-25 30# PRC-41 45# PRC-47 93#	1125	236	1361			
3	DUNBAR 310 301-10	ArtyLnTm (-) OpsChief Radioman	3 1 2 6	2 RC-292 80# PRC-25 30#	1350	110	1460			
3	DUNBAR 311 301-11	AirLnTm(-)	5	4 BB-451 68# PRC-25 30# PRC-41 45# PRC-47 93# RC-292 40#	1125	276	1401			
3	DUNBAR 312 301-12	1FT 1Sqd 1Plat 1PlatCorpsman 1PlatSgt CoGySgt All CoB	3 1 1 1 6		1350		1350			

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WAVE	HELITEAM		SUPPLIES			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	AND NO EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT() PERS EQUIP TOTAL		
3	DUNBAR 313 301-13	2FT 1Sqd 1Flat 1SqdLdr 1Flat Gren 1Sqd 1Flat 1RktSqdLdr WpnsFlat(All CoB)	3 1 1 1 6		1350 1350	
3	DUNBAR 314 301-14	3FT 1Sqd 1Flat 2Rkt Tm 1Sqd WpnsFlat	3 3 6	3.5 Rkt 13# 3.5 Ammo 36#	1350 49 1399	
3	DUNBAR 315 301-15	1MG Tm 1Sqd WpnsFlat 1MGSqdLdr 1FlatCorpsman All CoB	4 1 1 6	MG 57.5# MG Ammo 82.5#	1350 140 1490	
3	DUNBAR 316 301-16	1MorSqd Wpns Flat 1FlatCmdr 1FlatRadioman All Co B	4 1 1 6	60mmMor 54# 60mmAmmo 90# 6 PRC-25 25#	1350 169 1519	
4	DUNBAR 401 401-1	CoCmdr Radioman FOtm A/1/13	1 2 3 6	3 PRC-25 75# DonutRoll CommWire 35#	1350 110 1460	
4	DUNBAR 402 401-2	1FT 2Sqd 1Flat 2SqdLdr Gren All CoB	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	
4	DUNBAR 403 401-3	1RktTm 1Sqd WpnsFlat 2FT 2Sqd 1Flat All CoB	2 4 6	3.5kkt 13# 3.5Ammo 36#	1350 49 1399	
4	DUNBAR 404 401-4	3FT 2Sqd 1Flat 2MGTm 1Sqd WpnsFlat	3 3 6	MG 57.5# Ammo 82.5#	1350 140 1490	
4	DUNBAR 405 401-5	1FT 3Sqd 1Flat 1FlatGd WpnsFlatSgt All CoB	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	
4	DUNBAR 406 401-6	2FT 3Sqd 1Flat 3SqdLdr 1Flat Gren All CoB	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT		PERSONNEL		SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT		WEIGHT()		ENPLAN- ING STATION
	SERIAL NO	TROOP UNIT	NO		PEFS	EQUIP	TOTAL		
4	DUNBAR 407 401-7	3FT 3Sqd 1Plat MorSecLdr WpnsPlat AmmoNCO Wpns Plat	4 1 1 1 6		1350		1350		
4	DUNBAR 408 401-8	1FT 1Sqd 2Plat 1SqdLdr 2Plat Gren All CoB	4 1 1 6		1350		1350		
4	DUNBAR 409 401-9	2FT 1Sqd 2Plat 2PlatCorpsman 2PlatSgt All CoB	4 1 1 6		1350		1350		
4	DUNBAR 410 401-10	3FT 1Sqd 2Plat 2RktTm 2Sqd WpnsPlat	4 2 6	3.5Rkt 13 ^{1/2} # 3.5Ammo 36#	1350	49	1399		
4	DUNBAR 411 401-11	2MorSqd WpnsPlat 2PlatCmdr 2PlatRadioman CoClerk All CoB	3 1 1 1 1 6	60mmMor 54# 60mmAmmo 90# PRC-25 25#	1350	169	1519		
4	DUNBAR 412 401-12	1MG Tm 2Sqd WpnsPlat 2MGSqdLdr RktSecLdr Wpns Plat-All CoB	4 1 1 1 6	MG 57.5 MG Ammo 82.5	1350	140	1490		
4	DUNBAR 413 401-13	1FT 2Sqd 2Plat 2RktSqdLdr WpnsPlat 2PlatCorpsman All CoB	4 1 1 1 6		1350		1350		
4	DUNBAR 414 401-14	1RktTm 2Sqd WpnsPlat 2FT 2Sqd 2Plat All CoB	3 1 3 6	3.5Rkt 13 ^{1/2} # 3.5Ammo 36#	1350	49	1399		
4	DUNBAR 415 401-15	3FT 2Sqd 2Plat 2SqdLdr 2Plat Gren All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350		1350		

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WAVE	HELITEAM	PERSONNEL		SUPPLIES			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT	TROOP	UNIT	NO	AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT(PERS EQUIP TOTAL)	
4	DUNBAR 416	Engineers		6	3 Satchel Charges 120#	1350 120	1470
5	DUNBAR 501 501-1	1FT 3Sqd 2Flat		3		1350	1350
		2FlatGd		1			
				4			
5	DUNBAR 502 501-2	2FT 3Sqd 2Flat		3	MG 57.5#	1350 140	1490
		2MGTm 2Sqd		3	Ammo 82.5#		
		WpnsFlat		6			
5	DUNBAR 503 501-3	3FT 3Sqd 2Flat		4		1350	1350
		3SqdLdr 2Flat		1			
		Gren		1			
		All CoB		6			
5	DUNBAR 504 501-4	1FT 1Sqd 3Flat		4		1350	1350
		3FlatCorpsman		1			
		3FlatSgt		1			
		All CoB		6			
5	DUNBAR 505 501-5	2FT 1Sqd 3Flat		4		1350	1350
		1SqdLdr 3Flat		1			
		Gren		1			
		All CoB		6			
5	DUNBAR 506 501-6	3FT 1Sqd 3Flat		3	3.5Rkt 13#	1350 49	1399
		2RktTm 3Sqd		3	3.5Ammo 36#		
		WpnsFlat		6			
5	DUNBAR 507 501-7	1MGTm 3Sqd		4	MG 57.5#	1350 140	1490
		WpnsFlat			Ammo 82.5#		
		3MGSqdLdr		1			
		MGSecLdr		1			
		WpnsFlat		6			
5	DUNBAR 508 501-8	Engrs		5	2 Satchel	1350 40	1390
		CoClerk CoB		1	Charges		
				6	40#		
5	DUNBAR 509 501-9	1FT 2Sqd 2Flat		4		1350	1350
		2SqdLdr 3Flat		1			
		Gren		1			
		All CoB		6			
5	DUNBAR 510 501-10	3FT 2Sqd 3Flat		3	3.5Rkt 13#	1350 49	1399
		1RktTm 3Sqd		3	3.5Ammo 36#		
		WpnsFlat		6			

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WAVE	HELITTEAM FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	SUPPLIES AND WEIGHT ()			ENPLAN- ING STATION
			NO	EQUIPMENT	PERS EQUIP TOTAL	
5	DUNBAR 511 501-11	WpnsPlatCmdrCoB	1	2 PRC-25	1125 50	1175
		WpnsPlatRadioOpCoB	1	50#		
		WpnsPlatCorpsman	1			
		81FOtm H&SCo	2			
			5			
5	DUNBAR 512 501-12	2FT2Sqd3PlatCoB	4		1350	1350
		3RktSqdLdrWpnsPlat	1			
		PlatCorpsmanCoB	1			
			6			
5	DUNBAR 513 501-13	3MorSqdWpnsPlatCoB	4	60mmMor	1350 169	1519
		3PlatCmdr	1	54#		
		RadioOp	1	Ammo 90#		
			6	PRC-25 25#		
			6			
5	DUNBAR 514 501-14	1FT3SqdWpnsPlatCoB	4		1350	1350
		3PlatGd CoB	1			
		1Sgt CoB	1			
			6			
5	DUNBAR 515 501-15	HST Tm	4	PRC-25 25#	900 25	925
5	DUNBAR 516 501-16	2FT3Sqd3PlatCoB	4		1350	1350
		3SqdLdr3Plat	1			
		Gren	1			
			6			
6	DUNBAR 601 601-1	XO CoB	1	3 PRC-25	1350 75	1425
		ArtyFO A/1/13	2	75#		
		RadioOp	2			
		CoB Corpsman	1			
			6			
6	DUNBAR 602 601-2	3FT3Sqd3PlatCoB	3	MG 50#	1350 140	1490
		2MGTm3MGSqdWpnsPlat	3	Ammo 82#		
		All CoB	6			
			6			
6	DUNBAR 603 601-3	HqCmdt	1		1350	1350
		S-3LnO	1			
		H&SCoGySgt	1			
		S-3Clerk	1			
		S-2Clerk	1			
		S-3 NBC NCO	1			
			6			

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT		SUPPLIES				ENPLAN ING STATION
	SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT() PERS EQUIP TOTAL		
6	DUNBAR	CommChief	1	2 PRD-47	1350	161	1511
	604	Radioman	3	#93			
	601-4	MsgCen	2	4BB-451			
			6	#68			
6	DUNBAR	Wiremen	6	5 TA-312	1350	212	1562
	605		6	5MX-306			
	601-5			#180			
				1SB-22 #32			
6	DUNBAR	Radiomen	2	2 PRC-25	1350	230	1580
	606	Wiremen	2	#52			
	601-6	MsgCen	1	3RC 292			
		Tech	1	#144			
			6	2BB-451 #34			
6	DUNBAR	WireChief	1	5TA-312	1350	212	1562
	607	Wiremen	5	5MX-306			
	601-7		6	#180			
				SD-22 #32			
6	DUNBAR	ArtyLnTmRadOp	1	5 PRC-25	1350	147	1497
	608	Radiomen	4	#125			
	601-8	RadioOp NGF	1	1AN/GR-39			
			6	#22			
6	DUNBAR	BrMedO	1	1 PRC-25	1350	25	1375
	608a	Corpsmen	2	#25			
	601-8a	S-4 RadioOp	1				
		XO H&S	1				
		S-1	1				
		6					
6	DUNBAR	S-3 Clerks	2	1 PRC-25	1350	25	1375
	609	H&S Radio Op	1	#25			
	601-9	InterpreterS-1	1				
		H&S Co Clerks	2				
		6					
6	DUNBAR	1stSgt H&SCo	1		1350		1350
	610	S-4 Clerks	4				
	601-10	H&SCo SplNCO	1				
		6					
6	DUNBAR	RadioOp NGF	2	1 PRC-25	1350	25	1375
	611	PltSgt EngrPlt	1	#25			
	601-11	HST (-)	3				
		6					
6	DUNBAR	S-1 Clerks	4		1350		1350
	612	CO & XO Drs	2				
	601-12		6				
6	DUNBAR	PltHq EngrPlt	3	PRC-25 #25	1350	25	1375
	613	HST Team (-)	1				
	601-13	Corpsman	1				
		Photographer	1				
		6					

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL		NO	SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()			ENPLAN- ING STATION
		TROOP	UNIT			PEES	EQUIP	TOTAL	
6	DUNBAR 614 601-14	S-4 Clerk		1	1-RC-292	1190	65	1255	
		Radioman ALO		1	#40				
		SgtMaj		1	1 PRC-25				
		81mm Mortar			#25				
		FSCC Reps		2					
				5					
6	DUNBAR 615 601-15	SecurPltCmdr		1	PRC-25 #25	1350	165	1515	
		Plat Radioman		1	MG #58				
		1 SqdLdr		1	1000 Rds				
		MG Tm (-)		3	#82				
				6					
6	DUNBAR 616 601-16	2 FT 1Sqd		4		1350		1350	
		3 FT (-) 2Sqd		2					
				6					
7	DUNBAR 701 701-1	2 SqdLdr		1	MG #58	1350	140	1490	
		MG Tm 2Sqd		4	1000 Rds				
		2 FT (-) 2Sqd		1	#82				
				6					
7	DUNBAR 702 701-2	2 FT (-) 2Sqd		2		1350		1350	
		3 FT 2Sqd		4					
				6					
7	DUNBAR 703 701-3	SecurPltGd		1		1350		1350	
		Plat Corpsman		1					
		3 FT 3Sqd		4					
				6					
7	DUNBAR 704 701-4	3 SqdLdr		1	MG #58	1350	140	1490	
		MG Tm 3Sqd		4	1000 Rds				
		2 FT (-) 3Sqd		1	#82				
				6					
7	DUNBAR 705 701-5	4 SqdLdr		1	MG #58	1350	140	1490	
		MG Tm 4Sqd		4	1000 Rds				
		3 FT (-) 4Sqd		1	#82				
				6					
7	DUNBAR 706 701-6	SecurPlatSgt		1		1350		1350	
		2 FT 4Sqd		4					
		3 FT (-) 4Sqd		1					
				6					
7	DUNBAR 707 701-7	Recon Plat		6		1350		1350	
7	DUNBAR 708 701-8	Recon Plat		6		1350		1350	
7	DUNBAR 709 701-9	Recon Plat		6		1350		1350	
7	DUNBAR 710 701-10	Recon Plat		6		1350		1350	

6

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WAVE	HELITEAM		AND NO	EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNAL TROOP UNIT			PEFS	EQUIP	TOTAL	
7	DUNBAR 712 701-12	1Sqd 81mm Mor Plat (-)	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	275	1400	
7	DUNBAR 713 701-13	1Sqd 81mm Mort Plat (-)	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	275	1400	
7	DUNBAR 714 701-14	1 SecLdr 81 Plat Hdqs 1Sec	1 4 5	PRC-25 (25) 8 Rds (80) Wire (20)	1125	125	1250	
7	DUNBAR 715 701-15	AsstPlatCmdr Hdqs 81Plat AmmoMan	1 4 6	16 Rds (160) PRC-25 (25) Wire(20) FDC Eap (20)	1325	225	1575	
7	DUNBAR 716 701-16	3Sqd (-) 81 Plat	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	275	1400	
8	DUNBAR 801 801-1	4Sqd (-) 81 Plat	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	275	1400	
8	DUNBAR 802 801-2	2SqdLdr SecHdqs	1 5 6	PRC-25 (25) Wire(20) 8 Rds (80)	1350	125	1475	
8	DUNBAR 803 801-3	5Sqd (-) 81 Plat	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	275	1400	
8	DUNBAR 804 801-4	6Sqd (-) 81 Plat	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	275	1400	

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT		PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	SUPPLIES AND NO EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()			EMPLAN ING STATION
	SEFIAL NO				PEFS	EQUIP	TOTAL	
8	DUNBAR 805 801-5	3SecLdr SecHdqs	1 <u>4</u> 5	PRC-25 (25) 16 Rds (160) Wire(20)	1125	205	1330	
8	DUNBAR 806 801-6	AmmoMan 81PlatCmdr Radioman	4 1 1 <u>6</u>	16 Rds (160) PRC-25 (25)	1325	275	1400	
8	DUNBAR 807 801-7	7Sqd (-) 81 Plat	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	275	1400	
8	DUNBAR 808 801-8	8Sqd (-) 81 Plat	5	Mortar (115) 16 Rds (160)	1125	205	1330	
8	DUNBAR 809 801-9	4SecLdr SecHdqs	1 <u>4</u> 5	PRC-25 (25) 16 Rds (160) Wire(20)	1125	205	1330	

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WAVE	HELITEAM		SUPPLIES			ENPLAN ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT () PERS EQUIP TOTAL	
8	DUNBAR 810 801-10	SecurChief MachineGunner Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 1 4 6	MG #35	1350 35 1385	
8	DUNBAR 811 801-11	MT NCO Radioman MG Man Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 1 1 3 6	PRC-25 #25 MG #35	1350 60 1410	
8	DUNBAR 812 801-12	XO Radioman FDC man Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 1 1 3 6	PRC-25 #25	1350 25 1375	
8	DUNBAR 813 801-13	GySgt Wireman FDC Man Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 1 1 3 6		1350 1350	
8	DUNBAR 814 801-14	CO OpsChief Radioman CO's Driver Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 1 1 1 2 6	PRC-25 #25	1350 25 1375	
8	DUNBAR 815 801-15	SectionChief Cannoneers 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear#80	1350 80 1430	
8	DUNBAR 806 801-16	SecChief Cannoneers 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear#80	1350 80 1430	
9	DUNBAR 901 901-1	SecChief Cannoneers 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear#80	1350 80 1430	
9	DUNBAR 902 901-2	SecChief Cannoneers 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear#80	1350 80 1430	
9	DUNBAR 903 901-3	SecChief Cannoneers 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear#80	1350 80 1430	
9	DUNBAR 904 901-4	SecChief Cannoneers 107mmMorBtry	1 5 6	SecGear#80	1350 80 1430	
9	DUNBAR 905 901-5	107mmMorBtry		107mmMort (Ext)	1465 1465	
9	DUNBAR 906 901-6	107mmMorBtry		107mmMort (Ext)	1465 1465	

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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966Appendix 10 (Assault Schedule) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation
Order 328-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

Beach		BLUE
WAVE TIME	CRAFT/VEHICLE SERIAL	UNIT
1 H-hour	1 LVTP 1 LVTC Ser: 100	Co C (Rein)
2 H+4	3 LCM (6) Ser: 102	Co A (Rein)
3 H+10	2 LCM(8) 1 LCM(6) Ser: 302 385 381	SP Plat(-) BMV Btry A Survey Tm Det, Comm Spt
On Call	2 LCM(8) Ser: 339	Btry A(-)
On Call	1 LCU Ser: 200	At Plat
Non Sched	2 LCM (8) 1 LCU Ser: 305	Tank Plat
Non Sched	1 LCM (6) Ser: 357	H&S Co(-)



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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966

Tab B (Aircraft Armament) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to
Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation
Order 328-66

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.

a. All loading will be for mission against targets generally soft in nature.

b. Pilots will report their ordnance load to TACC using standard Seventh Fleet ordnance Codes.

c. After the completion of each Close Air Support mission the flight leader will report to the controlling agency ordnance expended, damage assessment, and enemy intelligence of immediate tactical importance.



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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)

140800Z August 1966

TAB C (Air Communications) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E
(Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66.

1. GENERAL

- a. Air Communications in accordance with this TAB and Annex F.

2. FREQUENCY PLAN

- a. Air frequencies in accordance with TAB D and Annex F.
b. Net activation times will be promulgated by separate message.

3. CALL SIGNS

- a. Call signs in accordance with TAB E, Annex F, and JANAP 119F.
b. Aircraft tactical voice call signs will be derived from squadron call sign, flight number, and flight position.

EXAMPLE: Event 2 call signs

	First Flight	Second Flight
Flight Leader	Old Nick 1-1	Old Nick 2-1
Second Plane	Old Nick 1-2	Old Nick 2-2
Third Plane	Old Nick 1-3	Old Nick 2-3

4. AUTHENTICATION AND NUMERICAL CODES

- a. Authentication and Numeral Codes in accordance with Annex F.
b. Zulu time will be used for authentication and numeral codes.

5. RECOGNITION

- a. IFF/SIF in accordance with appropriate CINCPACFLT Instructions as indicated below:

AIRCRAFT

Strike and Air Support

MODE 3/CODE

Code 13 15 16

E-3-C-1

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<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>MODE S/CODE</u>
Helo	Code 10 17
Recon	Code 34
Troop Carrier and Itenerant	Code 20
Emergency	Code 77



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Tab D (Air Frequency Plan) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E
(Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66.

LEGEND

- C - Net Control Station
- W - When Directed or Required
- X - Guard
- L - Listen

	COLOR CODE	FREQ	EMIS SION	NET	CRT
		304.7KC	3A3J	TAC	H-1
		439.5KC	3A3J	TAP/HR(P)	H-3
		936.7KC	3A3J	TAR/HR(S)	H-4
	GOLD				
	ALPHA	350.6MC	6A3	TATC/IATC(P)	H-5
	PURPLE				
	BRAVO	289.8MC	6A3	TATC/IATC(S)	H-6
	RED				
	CHARLIE	312.2MC	6A3	TAD-1	H-7
	BLUE				
	DELTA	315.4MC	6A3	TAD-2	H-8
	ORANGE				
	GOLF	326.6MC	6A3	HD-1	H-11
	GREEN				
	HOTEL	368.2MC	6A3	HD-2	H-12
	SILVER				
	KILO	344.2MC	6A3	TAO-1	H-15
		280.2MC	6A3	HeLo CMN	H-19
		251.4MC	6A3	LPH LL	H-20
		364.2MC	6A3	SAR	H-21
		118.3MC	6A3	VHF ITINERANT	H-22
		118.7MC	6A3	VHF ITINERANT	H-23
		243.0MC	6A3	VHF EMER	
		121.5MC	6A3	VHF EMER	
		500KCS	0.1A1	INT'L DISTRESS	
		8364KCS	01A1/	INT'L DISTRESS	
			6A3		

TACC		C			
HDC		X	W		
LPH					
HELO'S				W	W
HELO ESCORT				W	W
CAS A/C				W	W
AIR BASES		X			
TACP'S		X	W		
TAC(A)/TAO				X	W

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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966TAB F (General Instructions) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E
(Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-661. GENERAL INSTRUCTION.

- a. All inbound aircraft will report to their controlling agency on the net assigned when over the specified control point.
- b. Aircraft assigned an "as directed" entry point and altitude will contact their controlling agency as soon as possible after take-off and proceed in accordance with instructions.
- c. Communications in accordance with TAB C.
- d. Aircraft reporting inbound will give the following information:
 - (1) Voice call of flight leader.
 - (2) Event number
 - (3) Number and type of aircraft
 - (4) Position and Altitude
 - (5) Estimated time of departure
 - (6) Ordnance load
- e. Assault helos on ship-to-shore movement in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

2. CONTROL POINTS

- a. Aircraft entry and exit point DANA is 180 degrees 10 NM LPH tacan.
- b. Aircraft orbit point NORTH PLATTE is lake at YS 708845.

3. SEARCH AND RESCUE REFERENCE POINT. The SAR reference point is the USS Iwo Jima, Tacan Chan 20, Indent MY.



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BLT 1-26
 USS Iwo Jima (Lph-2)
 142400H August 1966

Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) FMFPacO PO2000.2C
 (b) BnO 2000.1

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex L (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISUMS.
- (3) The enemy has the capability to:
 - (a) Intercept, jam, or employ imitative deception on any communication circuit.
 - (b) Cut or tap wire lines for purpose of interception or deception.
 - (c) Ambush wire teams during initial wire installation and trouble shooting missions.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) Command Posts

(a) Afloat

1. CTG 79.5	LPH-2
2. BLT 1/26	LPH-2
3. Co A	LPD-2
4. Co B	LPH-2
5. Co C	LPD-2
6. Co D	LPH-2

F-1

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- | | |
|------------------------------|--------|
| 7. Btry A 1/13 | LSD-28 |
| 8. 107mm Mortar Btry 2/12 | LPH-2 |
| 9. 1st Plt Co A, 5th Tk Bn | LSD-28 |
| 10. 1st Plt Co A, 5th Amtrac | LPD-2 |
| 11. 1st Plt Co A, 5th AT Bn | LPD-2 |

(b) Ashore

1. BLT 1/26 Vicinity 824718

- (3) Subordinate units report C. P. locations when established.
2. MISSION. Provide communications and electronics support for the BLT in the amphibious operation and subsequent operations ashore.
3. EXECUTION.
- a. Communications Platoon BLT 1/26
- (1) Guard CLF Tack Net # 1 commencing H-1.
- (2) Guard CLF Tact Net # 2 commencing H-1.
- (3) Be prepared to augment organic and attached units with FM radio equipment.
- (4) Be prepared to provide the following equipment and personnel for operation of the BLT TACLOG aboard the LPH.
- (a) One radio set AN/PRC - 25
- (b) Four radio operators
- (5) Provide message center service for BLT elements embarked aboard the LPH.
- b. Air Support Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).
- c. Shore Party Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).

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d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) References (a) and (b).
- (2) Messenger Service
 - (a) Helicopter messenger between BLT Command Post ashore and the LPH will be announced.
- (3) Radio
 - (a) Radio Nets. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).
 - (b) Call Signs. See Appendix 2 (Call Signs).
 - (c) Check in and guard assigned radio nets at H-1 on D-Day.
 - (d) Attached units will enter the BLT Tactical Net when other means of communications with this Headquarters fail.
 - (e) Radio checks and test counts will be held to an absolute minimum.
 - (f) All stations will tune to Net Control Station.
 - (g) All used dry cells will be returned to this Headquarters for disposal.
 - (h) Immediately report to this Headquarters by other means, known or suspected enemy interference, imitative deception or jamming.
 - (i) Local time will be used on all messages transmitted within the BLT.
- (4) Wire
 - (a) Telephone directory and switchboard names in accordance with Reference (b).
 - (b) All wire lines will be retrieved when departing a position or when leaving the objective area under all circumstances.
 - (c) Whenever a wire team leaves the BLT C. P. they will be accompanied by a fire team to be furnished by C. P. security element.

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- (d) There will be no trouble shooting of wire lines, external of the BLT C. P., after dusk, except as directed by the Communications Officer.
- (e) Radio Relay. See Appendix 4 (Radio Relay).
- (5) Visual Communications. See Appendix 3 (Visual Communications).
- (6) Cryptographic Operations.
 - (a) Coordinates will be concealed in accordance with Annex K. (Check Points)
 - (b) Instructions and materials for internal authentication and coupling to be distributed separately.
 - (c) See ref (b) Para 501 and 502.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See Annex I (Logistics).
- b. Dry cell batteries and wires will be replenished on a daily requested basis by the BLT Supply Officer. All units will carry the following initial supply to operate for 24 hours:

WIRE - - - - - As required
 BA - 30 - - - - - As required
 BA - 386 - - - - - Two (2) per AN/PRC-25

- c. BB - 451 battery charging facilities will be maintained aboard the LPH. Replenishment will be on a one-for-one basis. Users will tag the battery being sent in for recharging. The users identity and locations will be on the tag. Example: FAC #2 - Co"A".
- d. Second and limited third echelon maintenance will be available aboard the LPH. A limited second echelon maintenance capability will exist ashore.
- e. The BLT Communications Officer must be notified of equipment failure and whether or not a replacement is necessary. All evacuated equipment must be tagged by the user indicating the type of trouble, and accompanied by an individual.

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- f. A limited replacement float of communications equipment is available aboard the LPD and, when announced, ashore in the objective area.
- g. All communications equipment will have preventative maintenance accomplished on a continuous basis.
- h. Communication equipment will be waterproofed prior to the landing, when crossing rivers and during rainy weather.


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APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Radio & Frequency Plan.
- 2 - Call Signs
- 3 - Visual Communications
- 4 - Radio Relay

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SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

RED Charlie
 BLUE DELTA
 Orange Golf
 Gree Hotel

1. LEGEND																									
C-	Net Control																								
X-	Guard																								
O-	Be Prepared to Enter as Directed or Required.																								
		M-32	M-33	M-42	M-36	H-3	H-4	H-7	H-8	H-11	H-12	C-9	M-26	C-11R	C-12A	C-12B	M-70	M-71	M-39	H-15	M-65	M-60	M-63	M-62	
		36.65	56.55	56.95	56.65	4395	9367	312.2	315.4	326.6	368.2	8638	49.2	6233	38.5	6335	43.2	46.5	56.8	334.2	68.0	57.4	62.9	57.0	
		81mm Coffire	Arty Coffire (P)	Arty Coffire (S)	TACP Local	TAR/HR (P)	TAR/HR (S)	TAD-1	TAD-2	HD-1	HD-2	NGF Control	NGF Spt 1 (P)	NGF Spt 1 (S)	NGF Spt 2 (P)	NGF Spt 2 (S)	NGF Spt 3 (P)	NGF Spt 3 (S)	SFCP Local	TAO	RR-(BLT) (P)(T)	RR-(BLT) (P)(R)	RR-(BLT) (S)(T)	RR-(BLT) (S)(R)	
BLT 1/26 (FSCC)		X	C	C	C	X	O	X				X							C	C					
BLT 1/26																					X	X	O	O	
81mm Mortar		C																							
107mm Mortar			X	O																					
Btry A/1/13			X	O																					
FAC					X	X	O	X	O	O	O										O				
NGF Spot													O	O	O	O	O	O	X						
NGF Spot#3													O	O	O	O	O	O	X						
TAO																				O					
Tank Pit			X	O																					

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BLT 1/26
USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)
142400H August 1966Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to Annex F (Communications*Electronics)
Operation Order 328-66.

CTG 79.5	HEARSAY
CTG 79.5 Liason	HEARSAY TWO FOUR
TG 79.5	POSITIVE
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)	CROSS WALK
USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2)	SNOW CHIEF
USS THOMASTON (LSD-28)	COCKTAIL GOLF
USS COOK (APD-30)	CAPTOWN BRAVO
ARMY ARTY AIR OBS	HEARSAY TWO FIVE
ARVN RANGER BN	DASHING SHOWER
CG, 173d ABN BDE	HEARSAY EIGHT SIX
HMM 363	DUNBAR
BLT 1/26	GLIMMER
BLT 1/26 REAR	GLIMMER REAR
BLT Collective	INVESTMENT
Co A	GLIMMER ALFA
Co B	GLIMMER BRAVO
Co C	GLIMMER CHARLIE
Co D	GLIMMER DELTA
Provisional Co	GLIMMER NOVEMBER
H&S Co	GLIMMER YANKEE
81mm Mortar Plt	GLIMMER WHISKEY
106mm RR Plt	GLIMMER TANGO
Flame Sec	GLIMMER FOX TROT
FSCC	GLIMMER BAILEY
NGF LN O	GLIMMER TWO SIX OSCAR
NGF SPOT TM	GLIMMER TWO SIX CHARLIE
NGF SPOT #3 TM #1	GERTRUDE TWO SIX ALFA
NGF SPOT #3 TM#2	GERTRUDE TWO SIX BRAVO
ALO	GLIMMER ONE FOUR
FAC #1	GLIMMER ONE FOUR ALFA
FAC #2	GLIMMER ONE FOUR BRAVO
BLT TACLOG (LPH-2)	GLIMMER PRODUCT
TACLOG (LPD-2)	GLIMMER PRODUCT ONE
TACLOG (LSD-28)	GLIMMER PRODUCT TWO

F-2-1

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A Btry, 1/13
 107 mm Mortar Btry
 1/A/5th Amtrac Bn
 1/A/5th AT Bn
 1/A/5th Engr Bn
 1/A/5th Recon Bn
 1/A/5th Tank Bn
 1/A/5th MT Bn
 Force Recon TM 1
 Force Recon TM 2
 Force Recon TM 3
 Div Recon
 HST

Tactical Air Observer
 Shore Party

KALAMAZOO
 HENPECKED
 CHURCH HILL
 FOOLS CAT
 GRUB WORM
 GREEN THUMB
 COWGIRL
 BOOBY TRAP
 CHEMICAL
 FERVENT
 BROADMINDED
 FLOOD TIDE
 EMBANKMENT (LZ NAME OR COMPANY
 ATTACHED TO)
 HEARSAY PLAYBOY
 LUCKY BAG



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BLT 1/26
USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)
142400H August 1966

Appendix 3 (Visual Communications) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 328-66

1. Smoke Signals Will Be As Follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
Signal, Ground, Yellow Smoke M-64 or Grenade, Rifle, Yellow Smoke or Grenade, Hand, Yellow Smoke	Marking of the friendly unit's position or of a secured area for an urgent or normal aircraft landing.
Signal, Ground, Green Smoke M-65 or Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke M-18 or Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke	Please inform us of the enemy direction of position.
Grenade, Rifle, Red Smoke or Grenade, Hand, Red Smoke (When dropped by A/C)	Marking of the enemy position.
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC (White)	Request for radio communications on the air-ground frequency.

2. Illumination Signals Will be as Follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster (One signal is fired)	Encircled or attacked by the enemy. Request support. Type of support must be affirmed by radio.
Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster (Cont. firing of three or more signal)	Request for emergency illumination (Radio Liaison must be established)
Signal, Ground, Green Star M-125 (Hand held)	Request for helo-evacuation .
Signal, Ground, White Star AMM-44A1 or Signal, Ground, White Star Parachute M-127 (Hand held)	Radio Breakdown.

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Signal. Ground, White Star Cluster
(Fire 1 signal)

Request for radio communications
on the air-ground frequency.

Signal, Ground, White Star Cluster
(Cont. firing of three or more signal)

Request cease firing illumination.

Signal, Ground, Red Star Parachute
M-126 (Hand held)

We are withdrawing from this
position.

3. Panel Signals Will Be As Follows:

a Helicopter Landing Point Identification

(1) Wherever possible all landing zones will be marked with an "x" formed by using two panels from either Panel Set AP-30C or A P-30D. The color selected will contrast with the landing point in order to be easily recognized by aircraft. Rifle companies will further identify by using a display showing their respective unit letter designation.

(a) EXAMPLE: Company "A"



(2) Prevailing wind direction will be shown by installing a short pole (about 3 feet) with streamers, flag or pennant of sufficient length to permit the pilot to determine the local wind.

(3) Night marking of helicopter landing points, when tactically feasible, may consist of three flashlights placed at the apex of a triangle or vehicle lights flashed from downwind of the landing point and illuminating the landing area.

(4) Front Line Marking. Marking of friendly front lines will be by use of Panels VS-4/U (Red) placed parallel to the front lines.

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
F-3-2

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USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)
142400H August 1966

Appendix 4 (Radio Relay) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics)
to Operation Order 328-66.



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ELT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966

Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

Ref: None

1. GENERAL. This Annex contains instruction for the submission of Operational Reports by Subordinate Units of the ELT.

2. REPORTS REQUIRED

REPORTS	FROM	TO	TIME	REFERENCE
a. SITREP	All Units	S-3	Commencing at H plus 3 covering previous 3 hrs and every 6 hrs thereafter	Appendix 1 All activity and contacts to be reported in detail EnO 3040.1 Any Significant Item
b. CASUALTY REPORTS	All Units	S-1	As Occuring	Appendix 2
c. SPOT REPORTS	All Units	S-2/ S-3	As Occuring	
d. MAJOR ORDNANCE/ENGR EQUIPMENT LOSS/DAMAGE REPORT	All Units	S-4	As Occuring	
e. JAMMING	All Units	S-3	As Occuring	CG FMFPAC Order PO3000.5A
f. OPSTAT	All Units	S-3	As Occuring	
g. CHANGE OF LINES	All Units	S-3	As Occuring	
h. SFEL/MORT REP	All Units	S-2	As Occuring	A-Patrol Designation B-Size and Type C-Route and Check Points D-Time Out E-Time In
i. PATROL REPORTS	All Units	S-3/ S-2	As Occuring	F-Information Collected

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BLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966

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<u>REPORTS</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
j. OP LOCATIONS	All Units	S-2	As Occuring	A-Designation of OP B-Coordinates C-Azimuth of Sector of Observation D-Time Opened E-Size and Type
k. LOGISTIC SUMMARY REPORT	Shore Party	S-4	D-day submit every 6 hrs, from D+1 submit at 1800 as of 1600	
l. MUSTER REPORTS	All Units	S-1	Upon re-embarkation after Opns Ashore	Message Report
m. REPORT OF SUPPLIES EXPENDED	All Units	S-4	3 days after completion of Opns	Message Report

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APPENDIX:

1. SITREP
2. Major Ordnance/Engr Equip Loss/Damage Report
3. SPOTREP Format

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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966

Appendix 1 (SITREP Format) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation

Time Zone: H

SIT REP (Number)

- A. ENEMY UNITS IN CONTACT
- B. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD
- C. CP LOCATION
- D. FRONT LINES AND BOUNDARIES
- E. SCHEME OF MANUEVER
- F. PATROLS (Size, type, route)
- G. AMBUSHES (Size, location)
- H. COMBAT EFFICIENCY
- I. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
- J. SUPPORTING ARMS (Air, NGF, Arty, Mortar and number of missions each)
- K. OWN STRENGTH (MARINE OFF, MARINE ENL, NAV OFF, NAV ENL)
- L. CASUALTIES (KIA)
- M. CASUALTIES (WIA)
- N. CASUALTIES (Non-battle)
- O. MIA
- P. ENEMY CASUALTIES (Body count, Est. KIA, Est WIA) (Send Clear)
- Q. ENEMY CAPTIVES (Send Clear)
- R. STATUS OF SUPPLIES
- S. EQUIPMENT OUT OF ACTION (What and why)
- T. CAPTURED MATERIAL (What, amount, and where)
- U. CIVIC ACTION (Brief description)
- V. INTENTIONS
- W. UNUSUAL EVENTS

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- Note: 1) If no change from previous report or an item is not applicable, omit. Do not send negative or none.
2) Refer to friendly positions by check point system.
3) Use NUCO for all friendly personnel figures k through o.
4) Use NUCO for Item R.



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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966Appendix 2 (Major Ordnance/Engineer Equipment Loss/Damage Reports) to
Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

1. Report Title: Equipment Casualty Report
2. Format: Message
 - a. Item description.
 - b. Coordinates where lost/damaged.
 - c. DTG of occurrence.
 - d. Extent of damage.
 - e. Circumstances concerning incident.
 - f. Replacement required (yes or no.).
3. Frequency: As occurring.
4. Submitted by: Unit concerned.
5. Submitted to: RLT 1-26.


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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966Appendix 3 (SPOTREP Format) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation
Order 328-66

SPOTREP

- A. Source of Information
- B. Time of Incident
- C. Location of Incident
- D. Complete Description of Incident. Give all Details
- E. Describe Action Taken
- F. Friendly KIA
- G. Friendly WIA
- H. Friendly MIA
- I. Enemy KIA
- J. Enemy WIA
- K. Enemy VCC
- L. Enemy VCS
- M. Weapons and Ammo Captured
- N. Documents and Equipment Captured



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Battalion Landing Team 1/26
 USS IWO JIMA
 141800 August 1966

ANNEX I (Logistics) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) Administrative Order 4-66
 (b) BnO 4000.2 SOP for Tac-Log Party

Time Zone: H

1. SUPPLY

a. General. Supplies to be landed will be the minimum required to accomplish the mission.

(1) Supply Concept. Helicopters will be the primary means of delivering supplies ashore. Most deliveries will be direct from ships to the using units.

(2) Contingency Reserve. To guard against the effects of inclement weather, other operational requirements, and unforeseen circumstances, a contingency reserve will be positioned ashore on order of the Battalion Landing Team Commander. Normally this level of supply will not exceed two days.

b. Supply Sources. Sources of all classes of supply are as designated

<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Alternate</u>
Class I	USS IWO JIMA	USS VANCOUVER
*Class II	USS VANCOUVER	
Class III	USS VANCOUVER	USS THOMASTON
Class IV	USS VANCOUVER	
Class V	USS IWO JIMA	USS VANCOUVER

* Type II Supplies only

c. Preparation and Staging of Supplies

(1) Supplies will be prepared and staged aboard assigned ships and ready for loading either for helicopter or surface craft on D-1. Thereafter, supplies will be prepared in anticipation of the next days operations.

(2) Embarkation Officers and ships' platoons have the responsibility of preparing and staging of supplies as directed by Tac-Log. Refer to reference (b) for Tac-Log operations.

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Battalion Landing Team 1/26

USS IWO JIMA

141800 August 1966

d. Prescribed Load. Prescribed loads are in accordance with reference (a) and as modified below.

(1) Class I - Meal Combat Individual with fuel trioxane-
Four meals will be issued for D-Day. Thereafter 3 meals/day.

(2) Class II - Essential T/E, T/A items as determined by unit commanders. Individual body armor or gas masks to be included upon order of the Battalion Landing Team Commander.

(3) Class III - For vehicles designated to go ashore, full gas tanks. Minimum one expeditious gas can full per vehicle.

(4) Class IV - As determined by unit commanders from assets held.

(5) Class V - Basic Allowance. Items are to be prepared and staged prior to D-day but not issued until the morning of D-day.

(6) Water - Two full canteens/individual. Filled water cans on the basis of $\frac{1}{2}$ gallon/individual. Unit commanders coordinate with embarkation officers to prepare and stage water cans on D-1.

(7) Medical - Unit commanders insure salt tablets and halazone tablets are available to each individual.

e. Supplies and Equipment Available. Refer to reference (a).

f. Control and Distribution

(1) Tac-Log

(a) The Tac-Log Party will be established aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) and will function in accordance with reference (b).

(b) The Tac-Log Party will consist of the following representatives:

Battalion Landing Team S-4 Representative
(Tac-Log Officer)
Battalion Landing Team Embarkation Officer
Battalion Landing Team S-3 Representative
Two radio operators

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Battalion Landing Team 1/26
 USS IWO JIMA
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(c) The embarkation officers of each ship will act as alternate Tac-Log Parties aboard their respective ships.

(d) The Tac-Log Officer will record all supplies moved ashore.

(2) Units will request "EXPRESS" Automatic Resupply Shipments directly from Tac-Log. Refer to Appendix 1 to this Annex. Shipment will be made directly to requesting unit. In the event of communications failure, request express shipments thru the Battalion Landing Team S-4 by the most expeditious means.

(3) Units will request "BUYERS CHOICE" Selective Item Resupply, thru the Battalion Landing Team S-4. The Battalion Landing Team S-4 will contact Tac-Log regarding the delivery of supplies. Refer to Appendix 1 and 2 of Annex I to Operation Order 328-66.

(4) Unit commanders will report the delivery of supplies to this Headquarters (BLT S-4). Tac-Log will be informed and in turn, will notify CTG 79.5.

(5) Unit commanders will record Class II supplies expended and upon termination of the operation, submit listings of items expended. The Battalion Landing Team S-4 will record the expenditure of all other classes of supply. Upon the completion of the operation, CTG 79.5 will be notified.

(6) Levels of supply in the hands of using units in the objective area will not exceed one (1) day of supply for any class.

(7) Every effort will be made to safeguard supplies against damage, pilferage, or waste.

(8) Prior to reembarkation, unit commanders will insure Class V items to be recovered are free of dirt and rust. Recovery points and procedures will be established by Embarkation Officers for their respective ships.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. General

(1) Sanitation and Preventative Medicine

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 USS IWO JIMA
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(a) The tropical climate and heavy rainfall in the operating area create special medical problems. Chief among these are heat exhaustion and tropical diseases. Foot infections from prolonged immersion in water is a distinct hazard. Use of local water or food products is prohibited.

(b) Unit commanders will ensure maximum sanitary discipline under combat conditions.

b. Evacuation

(1) Movement

(a) Casualties requiring evacuation occurring in landing craft or helicopters will remain aboard if possible and be returned to medical facilities afloat. First Aid or Buddy Aid will be rendered whenever practical.

(2) Assault

(a) Casualties occurring ashore will be evacuated directly to the LPH by helicopter.

(b) Surface means will be used if practical.

(4) Casualty Evacuation Control

(a) The LPH is designated the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship (CECS).

(b) A medical officer on the LPH will be designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Officer (CECO).

(5) Casualty Classification, Treatment, and Evacuation Policy

(a) Casualties will be classified and treated in the following order:

1 Minimal: Those requiring minimal treatment to be fit for duty.

2 Immediate: Those requiring immediate treatment to save life or limb.

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3 Delayed: Those capable of having treatment delayed for a period of up to 12 hours without hazard to life or limb.

4 Expectant: Those which are moribund or who cannot reasonably be expected to survive with treatment.

(b) Casualties will be reclassified as condition indicates.

(c) Casualties classified as minimal may be used to the extent practicable to assist in collection and evacuation of other casualties.

(d) Casualties will be evacuated in the following order of priority:

<u>TYPE CASUALTY</u>	<u>EVACUATION PRIORITY</u>
<u>1</u> Immediate	Emergency
<u>2</u> Delayed	Priority
<u>3</u> Minimal	ASAP
<u>4</u> Expectant	ASAP

3. TRANSPORTATION

a. Land. The landing of wheeled and track vehicles will be restricted to those required for accomplishment of the mission. Specific vehicles will be designated at the time determined.

4. SERVICE

a. Functions

(1) Construction. As required.

(2) Maintenance - To be provided by the appropriate service attachment to the Battalion Landing Team. Maximum use will be made of contact teams and end-item replacement.

5. PERSONNEL

a. Strengths

(1) All units will debark with strengths required to provide maximum combat efficiency.

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Battalion Landing Team 1/26
 USS IWO JIMA
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b. Replacements

(1) None available from sources outside the Battalion Landing Team.

(2) Notify the Battalion Landing Team S-1 by the most expeditious means feasible in the event of casualties to key personnel seriously effecting the mission.

c. Discipline, Law and Order

(1) Battalion Standing Operating Procedures in effect.

(2) Minor infractions to be deferred until after operation. Serious incidents and infractions will be reported immediately.

(3) **Straggler** control by the Battalion Landing Team S-1 when the battalion CP is established ashore.

d. Captives

(1) All provisions of the Geneva Convention will be observed.

(2) Units apprehending captives will handle and process them to designated collection point in accordance with Annex B (Intelligence) to this Operation Order.

(3) Location and opening of collection point to be announced.

(4) Disposition of captives by the Battalion Landing Team S-1 will be as directed by CTG 79.5 or other competent higher authority.

(5) The Headquarters Commandant will provide suitable guards as requested by the Battalion Landing Team S-1.

e. Morale and Personnel Services

(1) Medals and Awards. Recommendations submitted to this Headquarters (BLT S-1) in accordance with the provisions of SECNAVINST P1640.1C, FMFPAC Order 1650.1A and 9th MAB Order 1650.1.

(2) Postal

(a) Free mailing privileges will prevail.

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(b) Pickup and delivery of mail will be arranged by the Battalion Landing Team Postal Officer.

(3) Exchange Service

(a) Afloat - Ships Store.

(b) Ashore - None. "C" ration accessory packets will be made available.

(4) Information

(a) All troops to receive indoctrination prior to D-Day. Refer to current landing force information and education material.

(b) Unit commanders keep troops informed of current news and Battalion Landing Team progress as appropriate.

f. Personnel Procedures

(1) Personnel Summary and Casualty reports in accordance with Battalion Order 3040.1A and Appendix 1 (SITREP) to Annex G (Reports) to this Operation Order.

(2) Battalion Administrative Center to commence operating aboard the LPH effective D-1 and to remain in operation until secured by competent authority.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Security of all supplies, equipment and personal effects while aboard ships is the responsibility of embarked commanders.

b. When helicopters are used for logistic support, maximum utilization of space should be attained for the trip, both to and from the LPH.

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 141800 August 1966

c. All material requiring salvage will be reported and returned to amphibious shipping by the most expeditious means.

d. No materials of potential use to the enemy will be left unguarded or discarded.

e. All captured material will be evacuated for evaluation.

f. Units will report type, quantity, condition, location, time and date of all captured material.

g. Use of captured material is prohibited unless approved by this Headquarters.

h. Deadlined equipment will be reported immediately to this Headquarters (BLT S-4).

i. Uniform and Equipment for Debarkation

(1) Utilities with boots

(2) Helmet (green side out)

(3) T/O weapon with corresponding belt, pocket or pouch, two canteens, first aid kit, suspenders, and holster as appropriate.

(4) Individual equipment as appropriate, i.e., compass, k-bar, binoculars, whistles, grenade launchers, etc.

(5) Haversack, poncho, and entrenching tool.



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APPENDIXES

- 1 - Resupply Requisitioning and Shipment
- 2 - Helicopter/Logistics Request

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Appendix 1 (Resupply Requisitioning and Shipment Code) to Annex I (Logistic) to Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: Hotel (-8)

RESUPPLY REQUISITIONING AND SHIPMENT CODE *

AUTOMATIC RESUPPLY				SELECTIVE RESUPPLY			
SHIPMENT CODE	CLASS	DOA	REMARKS	SHIPMENT CODE	CLASS	REQUISITION CODE	REMARKS
	SUPPLY	DOS			SUPPLY	"BUYER'S CHOICE"	Order as appropriate
ALFA	I	1	Number of meals/man/unit Water 1/2 gal man/unit	ALFA	I		1, 2 or 3 meals/man/unit Water at 1/2 gal/man
BRAVO	II	1	Batteries for PRC-25 BA386 only	BRAVO	II		Items and quantity as required
ECHO	III	1	Day of ammo/unit requesting or predetermined amount/unit	CHARLIE	III		"
				DELTA	IV		"
				ECHO	V		"

* NOTE: (1) Regardless of type of shipment requested, the helicopter request must be submitted designating the time and place of delivery. In the event either of these items are unknown, the helicopter request will be submitted in anticipation of the requirement with the understanding the unknowns will be provided before delivery. For the sake of guidelines, the helicopter request must be submitted the day before the requirement. (2) It must also be recognized that the terms "EXPRESS" or "BUYER'S CHOICE" have nothing to do with the speed of delivery, speed, or priority of delivery will be based upon the units requirement, taken into consideration with transportation means available and the Landing Force's overall requirement. Speed of requirements may be stated in Blocks 3 (Emergency, Priority, ASAP, Routine) and Block 4 (Date/Time Required) of the Helicopter Request Form (3) In ordering Express shipments, order only the Class of supply desired. "ALL" are not automatic. Only the amounts within each supply category.

[Signature]
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APPENDIX 2 (Helicopter/Logistic Request) to Annex I to Operation
Order 328-66

Battalion Landing Team 1/26
USS IWO JIMA
141800 August 1966

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SECRET-NOFORNPLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966

Annex K (Checkpoints) to Operation Order 328-66

CHECKPOINTSGRID COORDINATES

MONTHS	820710
DOGS	810770
GIRLS NAMES	840750
CITIES	850790
FLOWERS	880740
CARS	890780

1. Locations will be described by using the checkpoint system. Forward (F) is always 0 degrees Grid, Back (B) is always 180 degrees Grid, Right (R) is always 90 degrees Grid, and left is always 270 degrees Grid. Meters will be given in 100's.

2. Use a name associated with the check point.

Example: Month - June
 Dog - Beagle
 Girls Names - Joan
 Cities - Tulsa
 Flower - Rose
 Car - Ford

3. All locations will be in the following format:

Name, F or B, Meters, L or R, Meters

Example: Road Junction 802707 would be May B3L18.



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WAVE	HELITEAM	PERSONNEL		SUPPLIES	WEIGHT ()		ENL LAN
	FLIGHT	TRUP	UNIT NO	AND	FERS	EQUIP	ING
	SERIAL NO			EQUIPMENT	TOTAL		STATION
9	DUNBAR 907 901-7	107mmMorBtry		107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465	
9	DUNBAR 908 901-8	107mmMorBtry		107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465	
9	DUNBAR 909 901-9	107mmMorBtry		107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465	
9	DUNBAR 910 901-10	107mmMorBtry		107mmMort (Ext)	1465	1465	
9	DUNBAR 911 901-11	FDC	1		1350	1350	
		FDC men	2				
		Wireman	1				
		Riflemen	2				
		107mmMorBtry	6				
9	DUNBAR 912 901-12	CommChief	1		1350	1350	
		FDC Men	2				
		Riflemen	3				
		107mmMorBtry	6				
9	DUNBAR 913/901-13	107mmMorBtry		Trailer (Ext)	1400	1400	
9	DUNBAR 914 901-14	107mmMorBtry		Trailer (Ext)	1400	1400	
9	DUNBAR 915 901-15	107mmMorBtry		Trailer (Ext)	1400	1400	
9	DUNBAR 916 901-16	107mmMorBtry		BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400	
10	DUNBAR 1001 1001-1	107mmMorBtry		BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400	
10	DUNBAR 1002 1001-2	107mmMorBtry		BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400	
10	DUNBAR 1003 1001-3	107mmMorBtry		BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400	
10	DUNBAR 1004 1001-4	107mmMorBtry		BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400	
10	DUNBAR 1005 1001-5	107mmMorBtry		BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400	

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10	DUNBAR 1006 1001-6	107mmMorBtry	BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400
10	DUNBAR 1007 1001-7	107mmMorBtry	BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400
10	DUNBAR 1008 1001-8	107mmMorBtry	BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400
10	DUNBAR 1009 1001-9	107mmMorBtry	BA (1400) (Ext)	1400	1400
10	DUNBAR 1010 1001-10	H&S	CLIW-M274 (900) Supplies (400) (Ext)	1300	1300
10	DUNBAR 1011 1001-11	H&S	CLIW-M274 (900) Supplies (400) (Ext)	1300	1300
10	DUNBAR 1012 1001-12	H&S	CLIW-M274 (900) Supplies (400) (Ext)	1300	1300
10	DUNBAR 1013 1001-13	H&S	CLIW-M274 (900) Supplies (400) (Ext)	1300	1300

On	DUNBAR	XO	1	2 PRC-25	1350	52	1402
Call	1101	S-3 A	1	#52			
	1101-1	Radioman	1				
		AstOpsChief	1				
		RadioChief	1				
			<u>6</u>				
On	DUNBAR	PlatCmdr 81's	1	PRC-25	900	25	925
Call	1102	PlatSgt 81's	1	#25			
	1101-2	RadioOp 81's	1				
		S-2 Chief	1				
			<u>4</u>				



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BLT 1-26

USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
40800H August 1966

Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66

- Ref: (a) AMS L701 sheet, 6442I, BINHGIA 1:50,000
 AMS L701 sheet, 6443 II, TLUA-TICH 1:50,000
 AMS L701 sheet, 6542 IV, BINH-CHAU 1:50,000
 AMS L701 sheet, 6543 III, TANTAo 1:50,000
 (b) NWEP 22-7A
 (c) FMFM 7-4
 (d) CL 4 BnO 3000.1 (SFO for FSCC)

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex A (Task Organization)1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See Current Intelligence Summaries.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Appendix 1 (Artillery)
- (2) Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire)
- (3) Appendix 3 (Air Support)
- (4) Appendix 4 (Offensive Fire Plan).

2. MISSION: BLT 1-26 commencing at H and L hours conducts waterborne and heloborne amphibious assault over Beach Blue and Landing Zone Canary and Blue Bird to establish blocking positions in support of 173rd Airborne Brigade and conduct search and destroy operations.

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operations

- (1) Control and coordination of air and Naval Gunfire initially by CATF (SACC).
- (2) Control and coordination of ground supporting arms by SACC until establishment of FSCC ashore.
- (3) Control and coordination of Naval Gunfire passes ashore upon approval by CATF of request submitted by this headquarters.
- (4) Control and coordination of air remains with CATF.
- (5) Coordination of supporting arms will be returned to SACC prior to commencement of withdrawal.

b. Coordination of Air support. Close air support requests passed on TAR net will be coordinated to the extent that if considered appropriate and safe, the ALC will state "Glimmer 14 Cincurs" or "Disapproves". SACC must give positive approval before the request will be honored by TACC.

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SECRET-NOFORNc. Coordination of Naval Gunfire Support

- (1) During daylight hours following request, the NGF Ship will obtain positive approval from SACC/FSCC on NGF control net before firing a mission.
- (2) Planned night defensive fires will be submitted by NGF spotter to SACC/FSCC for approval prior to darkness. Further approval of individual night firing missions will be "silence is consent".
- (3) Unobserved NGF missions may be called when situation requires it. The ACA is a designated Free Fire Zone.

d. Coordinating of Artillery Fires.

- (1) During daylight hours effected by SACC/FSCC, including consideration of all air activity.
- (2) For night fires the procedures set forth in paragraph 32.(c).2 will be utilized.

e. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) A D Day Schedule of fires will be promulgated seperately.
- (2) Target location will be identified by the Universal Transverse Mercator Grid System, when practical.

4. TARGET INFORMATIONa. Offensive Fire Plan. See Appendix 1.b. Concentration Designation System.

- (1) The concentration designator for artillery, mortars and tanks will be made up of two letters followed by three numbers. The first letter will signify the controlling agency and the second letter will signify the weapon.

- (a) Z - BLT FSCC
- (b) W - 81mm Mortars, B-107mm Howtars, A-105mm Howitzers, X-90mm Tanks.
- (c) The three numbers will signify the concentration number. Block numbers are assigned as follows.

UNIT

81mm Mortars	100-199
90mmTks	200-299
FSCC	300-499
107mm Howtar	500-699
105mm Howitzer	700-999

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- (2) Naval Gunfire will use prefix "N" followed by two numbers.

c. Restricted Targets

(1) Class E Targets

Religious Buildings	Utilities	Bridges
National Shrines	Railroads	Tunnels
Museums	Highways	Med Facilities.

- (2) Destruction of class E targets is prohibited except on approval of SACC/FSCC, or where failure to destroy would seriously jeopardize the mission of the BLT prior to receipt of approval.

- (3) Class E targets destroyed will be reported immediately to this headquarters.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

a. Air Sentries and Lockouts

- (1) Sentries will be positioned at artillery/Tank positions and will cause the firing units the firing units to cease firing when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.

- (2) Artillery forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will cease fire when it appears that the trajectories of artillery and support ship will endanger friendly aircraft.

b. Restrictive Fire Plan

- (1) A restrictive fire plan will be employed when required. These plans will be in accordance with reference (d).

- (2) The restrictive fire plan, if it is required, will be established by this headquarters. The code name for the plan is "HANGNAIL" and each "PLAN HANGNAIL" will be numbered consecutively with each series beginning at 0001 local time.

c. Helicopter Safety

- (1) The Battalion ALC will keep the Fire Support Coordinator informed of the time and location of all scheduled and on call helicopter flights into the combat areas.

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- (2) Unless special coordination procedures are prescribed or required fires on helicopter routes in use are restricted to observed fires where the observer is capable of ensuring the safety of the helicopter using the route.

d. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

- (1) All fires within the AOA will be coordinated by the SACC/FSCC.
- (2) Restricted Fire Zones will be established and promulgated by SACC/FSCC as appropriate.
- (3) Creeping Fires. Creeping fires will be utilized on all fire missions in close proximity to friendly personnel. Determination as to what constitutes "close proximity" is the responsibility of the infantry unit commanders.
- (4) Sight and Charge Check. Battery commanders. Tank Platoon commanders and 81 mm Mortar Platoon Commander will ensure that section chiefs verify elevations, deflection, charges and sight pictures on all fire missions.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a. See Annex F (Comm-Elec)

b. <u>Command Posts</u>	<u>AFLOAT</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>
(1) CFC 19.5	LPH-2	
(2) BFC 1-20	LPH-2	to be announced
(3) Subordinate units submit locations when established.		



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APPENDICES:

- 1 - Artillery
- 2 - Naval Gunfire
- 3 - Air Support
- 4 - Offensive Fire Plan

DISTRIBUTION: Annex C (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to
Operation Order 328-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) See Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire).
- (3) See Appendix 3 (Air Support).
- (4) See Appendix 4 (Offensive Fire Plan).

2. MISSION

a. Btry A, 1st Bn, 13 Marines, lands by surface means on D-Day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and executes assigned missions in direct support of BLT 1-26.

b. 107mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalion, 12 Marines, lands by helicopter on D-Day in accordance with Annex D and executes assigned missions in direct support of BLT 1-26.

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Artillery Employment.

(1) Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Marines will after landing by landing craft over designated beach in accordance with (Landing Plan) establish a firing position in vic of grid coordinator 827717 and provide direct support conventional fires in support of BLT 1-26.

(2) 107mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines will after landing by helicopter in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan), establish a firing position in vicinity of grid coordinates 832717 and provide direct support conventional fires in support of BLT 1-26.

(3) 1st Plat, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th TK BN, will after landing by landing craft over designated beach in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) will be prepared to establish a firing position and provide indirect fires in direct support of BLT 1-26.

SECRET-NOFORNb. Coordination Instructions

- (1) Firing Capabilities Report: The FireCap will be submitted to FSCC each unit upon initial occupation of position and any subsequent occupation. The FireCap report shall consist of following data:
- (a) Position location (by checkpoint).
 - (b) Azimuth of fire (Shackled).
- (2) Ammunition Status Reports will be submitted to this headquarters (FSCC) upon request.
- (3) Firing Chart. Grid Sheet 1:25,000.
- (4) Survey. To be provided by Survey Party, Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Marines as required.
- (5) Priorities of Fire
- (a) Anti-mechanized.
 - (b) Counter battery/counter mortar.
 - (c) Direct fire weapons.
 - (d) Automatic weapons.
 - (e) Observed fires.
 - (f) Unobserved fires.
- (6) Counter-Battery/Counter-Mortars. Semi-Active Policy.
- (7) Azimuth of Fire
- (a) A Btry. 0100
 - (b) 107mm Mortar Btry: To best support units.
 - (c) 1st Plat Tanks: To best support units.
- (8) Concentration Numbers. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (9) Meteorological Data - To be promulgated as available.
- (10) No Fire Lines. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (11) Restriction on Fires. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (12) Ammunition Restrictions. Units will not expend more than eighty percent of available supply rate without approval of BLT Commander.
- (13) Target Information. See Appendix 4 (Offensive Fire Plan).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. See Annex I (Logistics).

E-1-2

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b. Available Supply Rate (Rds/won/day).

105mm Howitzer	<u>80</u>
107mm Howtar	<u>81</u>

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics)

b. Command Post

	<u>AFLOAT</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>
(a) BLT 1-26	LPH-2	To Be Announced
(b) Btry A	LSD-28	Vic 827717
(c) 107 Mortars	LPH-2	Vic 832717
(d) 1st Plat, Co A, 5th Tk Bn	LSD-28	To be announced



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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire Support) to Annex E (Supporting Arms
Coordination to Operation Order 328-66

- Ref: (a) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 332-66
 (b) Maps: AMS Series L701; Sheets 6442 I, II, 6443 II,
 6542 I, IV, 6543 II, III
 (c) FMFM 7-2

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces.

1. See Annex B (Intelligence)
2. See Current ISUMS

b. Friendly Forces.

1. See Annex A (Task Organization)
2. CTG 76.5.1 provides Naval Gunfire Support

2. MISSION Fire support unit supports the landing and operations ashore of BLT 1-26 with Naval Gunfire.

3. EXECUTIONa. Ship Assignments:

1. USS CHANDLER (DD-717), direct support BLT 1-26
2. USS ST. FRANCIS RIVER (LSMR-525), direct support BLT 1-26

b. Coordinating Instructions

1. SACC will initially control all supporting arms in the AOA.
2. FSCC will be established ashore for coordination of supporting arms.
3. Control of Naval Gunfire may be passed ashore upon approval by CATE of CLF's request for control ashore.
4. FSA's in accordance with TAB 1 (Naval Gunfire Support Operations Diagram).
5. Restrictive fire plans in accordance with ref. (a) and Annex E (Supporting Arms Coordination).
6. Priority of fires in accordance with ref (c).
7. Priority of attack of targets in accordance with ref (c).
8. Ship's may conduct direct counterbattery fire without approval of SACC. Should be fired only if enemy battery is clearly endangering the ship.
9. The area enclosed by connecting coordinated YS 6172, YS 6180, YS 7580, and YS 7572 is a no-fire area from 151200H to 161500H due to friendly recon patrols in area.

E-2-1

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10. Scheduled pre H-hour and pre L-hour preparation fires on beach and landing zones will be fired. Schedule of fires to be promulgated separately.
11. Pre-planned on call fires in accordance with Appendix 4, (Offensive Fire Plan).
12. SFCP will submit requests for Naval Gunfire Support to the NGF Ship over the Naval Gunfire Spot net. The following procedures will be effective for clearing missions:
 - a. During Daylight Hours - NGF ships will submit requests for NGF support to SACC/FSCC via NGF control net for approval. A CANDY report, is considered sufficient information.
 - b. During hours of darkness, submit planned night defensive fires to SACC/FSCC for approval. Approval of individual missions at night, whether illumination, harassment and interdiction, or night defensive fires, is not required however, SACC will be notified as missions commence.
13. Unobserved missions may be fired with the approval of the BLT Commander.
14. Smoke missions only on request of the supported unit commander.
15. Illumination missions limited to 48 rounds per hour per ship unless directed otherwise by FSCC.
16. VT and MTF fused projectiles not set on safe will not be fired over the heads or within 300 yards of friendly ships, troops, or landing craft unless specifically requested and authenticated by the supported unit commander.
17. Creep method of spotting will be used in all danger/danger close missions.
18. Ships will use reduced charges, open range, or change position to obtain a line of fire that will ensure clearance of intervening terrain.
19. Target locations will be identified by the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid reference system.
20. Ships and FSCC will guard TAO net during daylight hours.
21. Every effort will be made to preserve cultural, religious, medical, and public utilities installations. Destruction of restricted (Class E) targets is prohibited except on approval of CATF or where failure to destroy would seriously jeopardize the mission of the supported unit.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Ammunition loading and resupply in accordance with ref (a)
- b. Reports

1. PEPPER Reports will be given when reporting on station and at 0900 each day. The following ammunition codes will be used:

<u>TYPE AMMO</u>	<u>SIZE AMMO</u>	
1 - AAC	3"50	- TUCKER
2 - AP	5"38	- RICKENBACKER
3 - AP(INERT)	5"54	- MARMON

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<u>TYPE AMMO</u>	<u>SIZE AMMO</u>
4 - BL&P/BL&T	6"47 - DURANT
5 - COMMON	8"55 - DURANT
6 - HC	5"SSR - STANLEY STEAMER
7 - ILLUM	REDUCED CHARGE - MERCEDES
8 - VF	
9 - VI (NON - FLAG)	
10 - W	
11 - WP	EXAMPLE: 7 RICHENBACHER 248 means 248 5"38 ILLUMINATING ROUNDS

2. Candy reports will include target description
3. Friendly front lines will be reported to FACC every two hours or when changes occur (daylight only) and only as changes occur at night time.

5. COMMUNICATIONS (ELECTRONICS)

- a. NGF Communications IAW TAB 2 (NGF Comm) to Appendix 2 (NGF Support) to Annex B (Supporting Arms Coordination).
- b. SACC located aboard flagship, ICG JIMA.
- c. FACC located at BMT 1-26 Command Post in the field, location to be determined.

TABS:

- A - Naval Gunfire Support Operations Diagram
B - Naval Gunfire Communications


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BLT 1-26

USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to
Operation Order 328-66Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701, sheets 6442 I, 6442 II, 6443 II, 6443 III,
6542 IV (1:50,000)
(b) NWII-22-7(A)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.a. ENEMY FORCES. Annex B (Intelligence)b. FRIENDLY FORCES.

- (1) Air Support will be provided by _____
- (2) CTG 76.5 establishes TACC/TADC as appropriate, provides coordination and control of all aircraft which may be assigned to support operations, exercises air traffic control over all aircraft transiting the ACA.

2. MISSION. Conduct air operations in support of Landing Force.3. EXECUTION.a. Concept of Operations. Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).b. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) ACA (Aircraft Operating Area) defined as: Grid Line YS 86 on the North, Grid Line YS 67 on the West to the sea, Grid Line YS 92 on the East to the sea, sea area as area to seaward with radius of 25 NM centered at Lat. 10-34.7N5 Long 107-36. CE7, and air space over entire ACA to 25,000 feet, except that, when required there will be a "tunnel" for civil airways 10 nautical miles in width from a flight level of 7,000 feet through 11,000 feet along established routes.
- (2) Restrictive Fire Plans, if employed, will be in accordance with reference b and Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (3) Control of air will not be passed ashore.
- (4) CAS aircraft will be under positive control of either a Forward Air Controller (FAC) or Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (TAC(A)) at all times.

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- (5) The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM), Military Grid Reference six (6) digit system of coordinates will be used for target designation.
 - (6) Panels or a suitable substitute will be displayed prior to calling in air strikes to mark friendly front lines.
 - (7) All Helicopters will be available for medical evacuation and logistics resupply as the situation permits. Medical evacuation requests will be given a priority precedence. If casualty is in grave condition, emergency precedence will be used.
 - (8) Attack aircraft will be on station during landings to provide suppression fires, CAS, helicopter escort, and HLZ preparation as required.
 - (9) Standard mission request forms for calling missions will be used.
 - (10) Helicopter landing zones see Annex C (Operation Overlay).
4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS. Annex I (Logistics).
 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS. Annex F (Communications-Electronics).



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TABS

- A - Aircraft Schedule
- B - Aircraft Armament
- C - Air Communications
- D - Air Frequency Plan
- E - Call Signs
- F - General Instructions

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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 140800 H August 1966

TAB A (Air Schedule) to Appendix 3 (Air Support to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66.

Event NO.	MISSION	NUMBER & TYPE A/C	TIME ON STATION	REPORT TO ON NET	PROVIDED BY	NOTES
171	SAR	1 UH-34D	L-15 + Completion of Helo lift	FAIRMONT ORANGE GULF	HMM-363	1
30	LZ/Beach Prep/ Helo Escort	VA	L/H-25 to completion of Helo lift	ICEPACK GOLD ALPHA		1, 2
82	TAC(A)/TAO/spot	UH1E	H/L-25 to sunset	ICEPACK GOLD ALPHA	SLF	1
51	CAS	VA	H/L-25 to sunset	ICEPACK GOLD ALPHA		2, 5
105	Troop Lift	4 UH34D	L-15 to completion	FAIRMONT ORANGE GULF	HMM-363	3, 4
106	Troop Lift	4UH34D	L-15 to completion	FAIRMONT ORANGE GULF	HMM-363	3, 4
107	Troop Lift	4UH34D	L-15 to completion	FAIRMONT ORANGE GULF	HMM-363	3, 4
108	Troop Lift	4UH34D	L-15 to completion	FAIRMONT ORANGE GULF	HMM-363	3, 4
151	MED-POW EVAC	2UH34D	COND III	FAIRMONT ORANGE GULF	HMM-363	5

NOTES

1. Relieve on station.
2. All A/C report to ICE PACK on Button Gold Alpha (350.6 Mc)
3. All helicopters will be available for Med Evac as situation permits.
 E-3A-1

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- 4. Events 105,106,107 and 108 will be prepared to backload on order.
- 5. Event 151 COMD IV Sunset to Sunrise Event 51 COMD III Sunset to Sunrise.

Colmonte
A.A. MONTI

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 140800H August 1966

TAB E (Call Signs) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66

TACC
 HDC
 CTG 76.5
 CTU 76.5.1
 CTU 76.5.2
 CTG 79.5
 LPH-2 USS IWO JIMA
 LSD-28 USS THOMASTON
 LFD-2 USS VANCOUVER
 VA

ICEPACK
 FAIRMONT
 COMPANY STORE
 AZALEA BLOSSOM
 LITERARY
 HERESAY
 CROSS WALK
 COCKTAIL GULF
 SNOW CHIEF

HMM 360
 TACP
 FAC'S
 BLT 1-26
 TAC (A)

DUNBAR
 GLIMMER 14
 GLIMMER 14C, D
 GLIMMER
 PLAY BOY



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PLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 140800H August 1966

Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF COPIES</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF COPIES</u>
CMC (Code A03H)	2	CO, Co B, BLT 1-26	2
CINCPAC	1	CO, Co C, BLT 1-26	2
CG, FMFPac	1	CO, Co D, BLT 1-26	2
Dir, MCLFDC, MCS	1	CO, Btry A (Rein), 1stBn,	2
COMSEVENTHFLT	1	13th Marines	
CG, III MAF	1	CO, 107 Mortar Btry (Rein)	2
CTF 76	7	2nd Bn, 12th Marines	
CTF 79	1	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A,	1
CTG 76.5	4	5th Tank Bn, FMF	
CTG 79.5	6	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A,	1
CO USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)	5	5th Amtrac Bn, FMF	
CO USS THOMASTON	3	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A,	1
(LPD-28)		5th AT Bn	
CO USS VANCOUVER	3	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A,	1
(LPD-2)		5th Engr Bn	
CO HMM 363	5	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A,	1
CO, BLT 1-26	1	5th MT Bn	
XO, BLT 1-26	1	1st Plat (-) (Rein), 3rd	1
S-1, BLT 1-26	1	Force Recon Co, FMF	
S-2, BLT 1-26	1	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A,	1
S-3, BLT 1-26	4	5th Recon Bn	
S-4, BLT 1-26	2	1st Plat, (Rein), Co A,	1
CommO, BLT 1-26	1	5th SP Bn	
MedO, BLT 1-26	1	Logistic Support Unit	1
MPO, BLT 1-26	1	Det, Beachmaster Unit,	1
SupO, BLT 1-26	1	Naval Beach Group	
CO, H&S Co, BLT 1-26	4	S&C Files, BLT 1-26	12
CO, Co A, BLT 1-26	2		93



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