

DECLASSIFIED

5/MCD/lab

Ser: 00465 66

11 APR 1966


~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ (unclassified upon removal of the enclosure)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG iii MAF/NCC MACV ltr 3/jab over 3480
Ser: 0034066 of 29Mar66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology (u)

1. Forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

66-3254

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96602

UNCLASSIFIED
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Copy 1 of 30 Copies
3/jab
3480
Ser: **0034066**
29 Mar 1966

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG FMFPAC msg 251942Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology for February 1966

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).
2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of the enclosure.

E. G. Glidden Jr
E. G. GLIDDEN JR.
Deputy Chief of Staff

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
FEBRUARY 1966

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

Enclosure (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

CONTENTS

PART ONE	ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART TWO	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART THREE	CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
PART FOUR	ENCLOSURES

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
DANANG AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

LEWIS W. WALT
MAJOR GENERAL UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING (1 FEBRUARY-10 FEBRUARY)

KEITH B. McCUTCHEON
MAJOR GENERAL UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING (10 FEBRUARY-28 FEBRUARY)

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR PERIOD 1 FEBRUARY - 28 FEBRUARY 1966

CHIEF OF STAFF	COL GEORGE C. AXTELL, USMC
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	NOT FILLED
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1	COL DON W. GALBREATH, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2	COL JOHN E. GORMAN, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3	COL EDWIN H. SIMMONS, USMC (1-12 FEBRUARY)
	COL JOHN R. CHAISSON, USMC (13-28 FEBRUARY)
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4	COL HAROLD A. HAYES, USMC (1-19 FEBRUARY)
	COL STEVE J. CIBIK, USMC (20-28 FEBRUARY)
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5	COL ERIC S. HOLGREN, USMC
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6	COL ELMER G. GLENNEN JR, USMC
SUPPLY OFFICER	COL HOWARD G. TAFT, USMC
FORCE ENGINEER	LTCOL LESTER G. HARMON, USMC
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS OFFICER	COL FREDERICK C. DODSON, USMC
ADJUTANT	LTCOL BURTON L. LUCAS JR, USMC
COMPTROLLER	CAPT WILSON A. VOIGT, USMC
CHAPLIN	CAPT FRANCIS L. GARRETT, USN
COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU	COL THOMAS M. FIELDS, USMC

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

DIRECTOR, COMMAND CENTER

FOOD SERVICES OFFICER

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

LEGAL OFFICER

SURGEON

MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER

ORDNANCE OFFICER

PROTOCOL OFFICER

PROVOST MARTIAL

SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER

TRANSPORTATION/EMBARKATION OFFICER

SUBORDINATE UNITS

3D MARINE DIVISION

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES
(1-16 FEBRUARY)1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES
(17-28 FEBRUARY)

7TH ENGINEER BATTALION (REIN)

9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION

5TH COMMUNICATIONS BATTALION

SUB UNIT #1, FIRST RADIO BATTALION

PROVISIONAL DOG PLATOON

SUB UNIT #1, 1ST ANGLICO

SENTRY DOG PLATOON
[REDACTED]

LTCOL JOSEPH V. MCLERNON, USMC

LTCOL HENRY G. ROBERTS, USMC

MAJ ANTHONY J. PALONIS JR, USMC

COL VERNON A. PELTZER, USMC

CAPT WILLIAM A. WOLFMAN, USN

LTCOL EDWIN W. KILLIAN, USMC

MAJ WALTER F. BOWRON, USMC

MAJ RALPH H. BROWN, USMC

MAJ LEE H. HARDEE, USMC

COL EDWIN G. WINSTEAD, USMC

MAJ GEORGE F. CRIBB, USMC

COMMANDERMAJGEN LEWIS W. WALT, USMC
(1-10 FEBRUARY)BGEN LOWELL E. ENGLISH, USMC
(10-28 FEBRUARY)

MAJGEN KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON, USMC

LTCOL WILLIAM W. TAYLOR, USMC

LTCOL WILLIAM F. DOEHLER, USMC

LTCOL ERMINE L. MEEKER, USMC

MAJ JOSEPH F. JONES, USMC

LTCOL HERCULES R. KELLY, USMC

CAPT RUSSELL W. RADER, USMC

LT BRUCE E. DAVIS, USMCR

LTCOL CARROLL B. BURCH, USMC

LT LEONARD E. OLIVER, USMCR
[REDACTED]

Enclosure (1)

PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

UNCLAS I. INTRODUCTION

A. General. During February 1966, III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located at coordinates (AT 994754), which is 350 meters west of DANANG Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, and adjacent to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Post. All forces under operational control of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone. III MAF continued to grow as personnel strength increased from 44,971 to 45,504 in February.

B. Activities. III MAF continued operations in the accomplishment of the objectives as established by reference (c). The most significant operation during February was Operation DOUBLE EAGLE.

II. OPERATIONS

A. General. The continuing objective of destruction of VC forces was accomplished during the month by conducting three major operations outside and one within the TAOR's. The majority of contacts with VC forces were by small unit actions, however, one large scale contact was made toward the end of the period. III MAF units disrupted VC Logistic bases, way stations, and camps, and confiscated large caches of rice.

B. Operation DOUBLE EAGLE. This was a coordinated ARVN/USMC/USN operation, conducted in two phases from 28 January to 28 February. Phase I, from 28 January to 19 February, began with an amphibious assault in the southern portion of QUANG NGAI Province. Search and destroy operations were subsequently conducted in the THAC TRU-DUC PHO-NUI DAU-BATO area inland from the landing zones. Phase II Alpha and Bravo operations from 19 February to 28 February, were conducted in an area 10 km west of TAM KY (QUANG TIN Province) and westward. Contact with the VC was generally light and sporadic throughout the search and destroy operation. The operation was successful in destroying VC caves, tunnels, buildings, base camps, bunkers, and fortifications. Significant quantities of rice and salt were captured and turned over to officials for redistribution. Operation DOUBLE EAGLE cost the VC 437 confirmed and 126 estimated dead.

C. Operation TAUT BOW. This battalion size reconnaissance in force, was conducted 7-16 February in area (ZC 1863), (ZC 1866), (AT 8565), (AT 8568). Small VC groups and snipers were encountered throughout the area. Numerous punji traps, mines, and booby traps were discovered. Evidence gathered indicated that the VC had used the area quite extensively. Operation ALASKA is scheduled to be conducted in the area in March 66.

~~SECRET~~

D. Operation NEW YORK. This combined ARVN/USMC operation was conducted 26-28 February east of the Phu Bai TACR. Units engaged in a search and destroy mission established a large scale contact with the enemy in the vicinity of (YD 963148). The VC, initially in well dug in positions, opened fire with mortars, heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Contact continued throughout an afternoon with VC attempts to withdraw. The VC withdrew from the area during darkness. The engagement cost the VC 107 confirmed and 50 estimated dead. Evidence indicated ARVN/USMC units had opposed and destroyed the effective combat potential of the 810th local force battalion.

E. Other Operations. An unnamed one day battalion search and destroy mission, and 10,118 small unit operations, were conducted within the TACRs. 229 contacts were made.

F. Air Support

1. Fixed Wing. III MAF provided fixed wing aircraft during February as indicated in Table I.

TABLE I

III MAF FIXED WING OPERATIONS

<u>TYPE SORTIE</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>				<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>2D AD</u>	<u>TF 77</u>	
Helicopter Escort	220	249			469
Interdiction	109	356			465
Landing Zone Preparation	169	8			177
Close Air Support	1693	14			1707
Photography	109				109
Escort/Cap			94		94
Non Tactical	104				104
Steel Tiger			960		960
Other-Special	69		36		105
Landing Zone Cap	2				2
ECM/ELINT			76	19	95
TOTAL	2475	627	1166	19	4287

2. Helicopter. III MAF helicopters flew 34,163 sorties, transporting 46,319 troops and 2,214 tons of cargo.

III. INTELLIGENCE

A. General. Within the three Marine TACRs, Viet Cong activities continued to emphasize small unit harassing tactics, including sniper fire, probes, frequent use of mines, both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel, and the widespread employment of booby-traps. Toward the end of the reporting period, the Viet Cong tended to demonstrate an increased willingness to accept sustained periods of contact with USMC units. On three separate occasions, enemy forces in company, platoon, and squad strength, maintained contact for periods up to 4½ hours during darkness and broke contact only at their choosing. Enemy activities against ARVN/RF/PF forces included attacks in battalion strength, supported by mortar and recoilless rifles. Each attack appeared to be of a determined, well-planned nature involving close contact, heavy fire power, and in some instances demolitions. Evidence of recent improvements in the logistical support of enemy units within the ICTZ indicated an overall upgrading of the Viet Cong capability to attack or defend. Frequent reports continued to be received of VC intentions to conduct suicide attacks, raids, sabotage of critical installations, and acts of terrorism within the TACRs, however, with the exception of sabotage of the lines of communication, such activities failed to materialize. Significant aspects of enemy activities in the ICTZ were: continued efforts to destroy ARVN/RF/PF forces, isolated outposts, and small detachments; continued harassment of Marine forces while generally avoiding large scale contact with USMC units; increased tendency to maintain contact on selected occasions; increased frequency of sabotage of lines of communication; and the increase by one probable NVA battalion in the enemy order of battle.

B. PHU BAI. The tempo of Viet Cong initiated incidents within and in proximity of the PHU BAI TACR increased over the previous reporting period. The most significant action in this area occurred at the end of the month when elements of a Marine battalion engaged in a search and destroy operation; made contact with an estimated VC battalion approximately 4½ miles east of PHU BAI Airfield. Documents captured during this action indicated the unit in contact was the 810th VC local force battalion. Reports received subsequent to the end of the month indicated that Viet Cong KIA in this engagement was at least 107 (Body Count). Other enemy activity in the area included continued harassment by small arms fire, mining, and booby trapping. Enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the PHU BAI TACR with a strength equivalent to one regiment reinforced by local force and guerrilla elements.

C. DANANG. Within the Danang enclave, the enemy continued to react strongly to incursion of Marine forces into areas normally under his control. Small unit actions were frequent as the enemy continued his resistance to the expansion of the TACR and engaged in harassment, propaganda,

DECLASSIFIED

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

and terrorist activities in rear areas. Heavy use of mines and booby-traps showed a sharp increase over the previous month. The most significant enemy activity was a small scale attack against a patrol operating approximately two miles west of the TAOR. The Viet Cong, in their daylight action, continued to press their attack until the patrol was extracted by helicopter. Enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong/NVA a capability to attack the DANANG TAOR with one regiment (The 1st VC Regiment) and possibly a second regiment (The 36th NVA Regiment) reinforced by two main force battalions and local force and guerrilla elements.

D. CHU LAI. The CHU LAI enclave was the scene of continuing small unit activity by the Viet Cong which included harassment, sniper fire, mining and booby trapping. The most significant enemy initiated incident was a night attack by an estimated VC company, supported by mortar and recoilless rifle fire, directed against a Marine company position in the central portion of the TAOR. The enemy assaulted the friendly position from two directions, but were repulsed and forced to withdraw. Enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the CHU LAI TAOR with two regiments (The 1st and 2d VC Regiments) reinforced by two main force battalions, and local force and guerrilla elements.

E. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION. VC propaganda activities during the month increased sharply from the previous reporting period. The most significant incident occurred at the HUONG THUY District Headquarters within the PHU BAI TAOR. The entire population of LOI BONG Hamlet (approximately 40 families) all having son's in the ARVN, were induced by a VC political cadre and several assistants, to participate in a demonstration at the District Headquarters in protest of the death of an elderly blind man who was accidentally shot in his home during a Marine operation. Other VC propaganda activities included continued distribution of leaflets with slogans such as "Fight Against Americans"; the use of VC entertainment companies; and propaganda reports to foil the RVN pacification plan. The HUONG THUY District police arrested a high school student for producing anti-US/RVN propaganda leaflets which were distributed by the VC.

F. TERRORISM. There was a slight decrease in the number of acts of terrorism reported. Significant incidents included the assassination of one village chief and two hamlet chiefs. Three other civilians who were taking part in religious ceremonies with the village chief were assassinated along with him. The two hamlet chiefs were slain at night by VC who entered their homes. In one instance the VC left a note attached to the victim which related that he was a spy for the Americans, had taken advantage of his position, perpetrated crimes against the people and was therefore designated for assassination. In other acts of terrorism, one priest and two children were killed by the detonation of a VC mine emplaced in a church.

G. Espionage and Sabotage. VC espionage activities increased significantly during February. Reports received indicated a concerted effort by the VC to induce civilian employees at US/RVN installations to gather information including sketches of warehouses, hangars, troop billets, ammunition storage areas, defensive positions, protective mine fields, etc.

SECRET

Enclosure (1)

Other reports indicated the VC have made available 1,300,000\$ VN, to support espionage activities to include organizing subversive nets within local government agencies. All of the TAOR's have been designated as primary targets and recent incidents in these areas indicate VC espionage activities are being increased. A number of documents found in a VC base camp indicated a VC espionage organization operating in the I Corps area. Documents also included detailed maps of the Danang Air Base and a listing of VC agents and a VC "Black List" for Quang Nam Province. This was the first substantial information obtained pointing to an organized intelligence apparatus operating in the Danang TAOR. Incidents of sabotage initiated by the Viet Cong during the month were confined primarily to the lines of communication. Roads, highway bridges, and culverts throughout the ICTZ continued to be frequent targets for sabotage. The railroad between HUE and Danang was sabotaged with such frequency as to indicate a determined enemy effort to completely deny friendly use of this LOC. Reports received during the period indicated continued VC recruitment and exploitation of teenage children for intelligence, reconnaissance, and sabotage activities. In one instance, two Vietnamese males, age 14 and 16, were apprehended near the "Take Ten NCO Club" in Danang, while attempting to set fire to a U. S. vehicle.

H. Field Fortifications. Numerous reports continued to be received of observation and in many cases destruction of complex and extensive Viet Cong fortifications including caves, revetted tunnels, bunkers, weapons emplacements, tactical wire and bamboo fences and trench systems within the ICTZ.

I. Mines and Booby traps. The incidents of enemy use of mines and booby traps increased sharply over the preceding period. Although no significant change was apparent in the types or methods of employment of these explosive devices, their increasing employment indicated a concerted effort by the Viet Cong to use these weapons indiscriminately against troops and civilians.

J. Anti-Aircraft. The frequency of anti-aircraft incidents showed a significant increase over the previous month. Reports continued to be submitted of aircraft receiving occasional small arms fire while approaching the airfield within the enclaves. At the PHU BAI Airfield, an air Vietnam Passenger aircraft received one small arms round during letdown resulting in the wounding of a Vietnamese national aboard. Several unconfirmed sightings of what may have been 37MM anti-aircraft shell bursts were reported by Marine pilots flying over the ICTZ. A comparison of anti-aircraft statistics between January and February indicates the following:

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>PCT CHANGE</u>
Incidents	280	433	+ 54%
Aircraft Hit	63	135	+ 114%

K. Summary of VC Activity. Statistics relating to Viet Cong initiated action and personnel and weapons losses are shown in Tables II, III and IV.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

TABLE II

VC INITIATED INCIDENTS

Ambush	0
Attack	2
Assault by fire	14
Harassing Fire	327
Mining/Booby Trap	89
Hamlet Harassments	4
Sabotage	3
Propaganda	2
AA Fire	487

TABLE III

VC PERSONNEL LOSSES

	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>
KIA	662	303
VCC	58	
VCS	667	
Ralliers	19	

TABLE IV

VC WEAPONS LOSSES

<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Rifle	29
Carbine	17
Machinegun	1
Submachinegun	13
Mortar	1
Pistol	8

~~SECRET~~

enclosure (1)

Rocket Launcher	2
Recoilless Rifle	1
Shotgun	25
M-79 Grenade Launcher	1
Unknown Type	<u>10</u>
	106

L. VC Order of Battle. Table V shows the VC Order of Battle in ICTZ.

TABLE V

VC ORDER OF BATTLE

CONFIRMED

PROBABLE

1 Military Region Headquarters	3 Regiments (1 NVA)
1 Military Sub Region Headquarters	**13 Battalions (3 NVA)
3 Regiments (1 NVA)	5 Companies
*23 Battalions (3 NVA)	
32 Companies	

* Includes 1 AA Battalion and 1 Weapons Battalion

** Includes 1 Weapons Battalion

III MAF Order of Battle has accepted the following newly identified unit in ICTZ.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>RATING</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
3d Battalion, 36th Regiment (NVA)	Unknown	Probable	BT 0030	12Feb66

M. Weather. Weather for the month included short periods of light rainfall and occasional periods of Crachin with drizzle, low ceilings, and attendant fog. These conditions resulted in occasional restriction of friendly forces mobility and air operations. Precipitation for the month is shown in Table VI.

~~SECRET~~

TABLE VI

TOTAL PRECIPITATION FOR FEBRUARY

<u>AREA</u>	<u>PRECIPITATION</u>
DANANG	3.19"
CHU LAI	5.40"
PHU BAI	5.97"

IV. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

A. Strength. The average monthly strength of III MAF was increased from 44,972 in January to 45,504 in February. Table VII shows the Average Personnel Strength for III MAF during February.

TABLE VII

AVERAGE PERSONNEL STRENGTH

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE HEADQUARTERS/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND

	<u>OFFICER</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>	
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
HQ III MAF	83	5	202	3
NCC	8	1	9	0
Sub Unit #2 HqBn, 3dMarDiv	4	0	123	0

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

<u>OFFICER</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
2398	466	35903	6737

B. Casualties. III MAF Casualties are shown in Table VIII.

TABLE VIII

III MAF CASUALTIES - FEBRUARY 1966

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

a TV and radio team from BBC (Civic Action); Lubor Zink, Canada Telegram; Joe Trester, New York Times; Lorenz Stucki, Switzerland Radio/TV; Etienne Anthriue, La' Figero, France; and Jim Lucas, Scripts-Howard.

F. Press Releases. A total of 198 releases were processed. These covered combat operations, Civil Actions, and Vip's visiting III MAF. There were, in addition, 1901 releases forwarded to Fleet Home Town News Center.

X. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE ACTIVITY (RVNAF)

A. General. During the month, I Corps re-established control over one district headquarters formerly lost to the VC. On six occasions during February, ARVN units made contact with multi-battalion VC forces. Additionally, the VC initiated one multi-battalion attack in the QNSS. Lam Son 235, conducted in the 11th DTA; Quyet Thang 74 in the 12th DTA; and a reaction operation to a VC attack on Binh Long Bridge in QNSS, were very punishing on the enemy. While there was a decrease in VC initiated incidents for the second consecutive month, the VC were particularly active along I CTZ's routes of communications. The national railroad between Danang and Hue was out 12 times and 5 trains were mined. Most of these incidents took place in the Hai Van Pass area. Naval gunfire support was almost double that of the month of January 1966, increasing to 5,345 rds from the previous 3,287 rds.

B. Current Operations. I Corps (ARVN) conducted 42 battalion or larger size unit operations during the month, as compared to 55 in January. Contact was made with the VC in 24 of these operations, whereas, last month 23 contacts were made. Five combined and five airmobile operations are included in the total. During February operations against the enemy resulted in 997 VC killed and 135 captured. Both figures showed marked increases over January when there were 513 VC killed and 97 captured. February ARVN and RF/PF battle casualties were 344 KIA and 530 WIA. In January ARVN and RF/PF casualties were 174 KIA and 285 WIA. There were 346 VC suspects detained and 29 defectors came under government control. Weapons losses by ARVN were 320 as compared to the capture of 278 weapons from the VC.

1. Seven significant operations took place in the I Corps area during the reporting period:

(a) Operation Lien Ket 22, a 2d Division controlled exercise during the period 29 January to 12 February 1966, re-established government control in the Minh Long District area of Quang Ngai Province, which was lost to the VC on 30 December 1965. This operation was conducted in conjunction with USMC Operation DOUBLE EAGLE. The 1st and 2d ARVN Marine Battalions; 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment; 37th Ranger Battalion; 4th Platoon, 4th APC Troop, 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment; and two RF companies were committed at various times throughout the operation.

~~SECRET~~
Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

(b) Operation Lam Son 232, conducted from 5 to 11 February, was designed to exploit a B-52 strike. It was a 1st Division controlled exercise conducted approximately 7 miles Southwest of Quang Tri City. Units involved were 2d Battalion, 1st Regiment; 3d Battalion, 1st Regiment; 1st Platoon, 4th Tank Troop, 4th Armored Cavalry; one RF Company; and the Black Panther Company. Enemy losses consisted of 8 KIA, 3 individual weapons, 137 huts, 200 pounds of rice and 1,000 kilos of salt. However, two graves found in the vicinity of the B-52 strike contained an additional 25 VC bodies. ARVN attributed these KIA's to ground fire rather than the B-52 strike.

(c) Another operation, Quyet Thang 74, on 5 to 13 February, netted 47 VC KIA, 35 VCC, 92 VCS, and 1 individual weapon captured. Friendly losses were 6 KIA and 23 WIA. This operation was conducted along Highway 1 in the North-central portion of the Duc Pho Sub-Sector. Units that participated were the 2d Battalion, 4th Regiment; 4th Platoon, 4th APC Troop, 4th Armored Cavalry; 37 Ranger Battalion; and one RF Company.

(d) Operation Lam Son 234, conducted 21 through 26 February, was a 1st Division search and destroy operation in conjunction with two B-52 strikes. It was conducted in the foothills area of Phong Dien in Thua Thien Province. Six ARVN battalions; 3d Platoon, 4th APC Troop, 45th Armored Cavalry; and the Black Panther Company were committed during certain phases of the operation. It was believed that contact was made with two VC battalions. Friendly losses were 15 KIA (1 Australian), 99 WIA, 3 MIA, and 14 individual weapons. The enemy losses were 88 KIA, 1 VCC, 8 individual and 2 crew served weapons.

(e) Operation Lam Son 235 commenced 23 February and is continuing at the end of this reporting period. This operation has inflicted heavy losses on the VC. Enemy losses are 309 KIA, 10 VCC, 48 individual weapons, 17 crew served weapons, and 2 radios. Friendly losses are 31 KIA, 179 WIA including 2 US, 5 MIA, 15 individual weapons, 1 crew served weapon, and 2 radios. The operational area is in the Trieu Phong Sub-Sector. Lam Son 235 was launched as a result of VC initiated actions against RF/PF units in that area. Originally, the operation was small in scale, but when heavy contact was established, the 1st Division committed all its available forces. The 8th Airborne Battalion was obtained from JGS and also committed in this operation. USMC provided 155mm howitzer Artillery support and positioned a battalion (-) reserve force in 1st Division's area upon ARVN's request. The heaviest contact was made on 25 February when a VC battalion was severely mauled by small arms fire, artillery and naval gunfire, and airstrikes.

(f) On 22 February, as a result of a VC attack on Binh Long Bridge (BT 013568), 3 companies of the 11th Ranger Battalion, along with one troop of APC's were committed as a reaction force. This reaction force came under heavy VC mortar and small arms fire; consequently, one USMC company was helilifted to Dien Ban and was employed in the operation. Additionally, 2 companies of the 1st Battalion, 51st

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

<u>BATTLE</u>						<u>NON BATTLE</u>					
<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>		<u>MIA</u>		<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
42	0	600	34	13	0	7	0	16	3	55	11

C. American Overseas Campaign. The results from the American Overseas Campaign, which was conducted in this Command during the month of October 1965, have been received from the MACV Project Officer and are as follows:

3d Marine Division	\$15,916.30
1st Marine Aircraft Wing	5,295.95
30th Naval Construction Regiment	1,094.52
Naval Support Activity, Danang	<u>428.25</u>
TOTAL	\$22,735.02

D. Vietnam Veterans for Public Information Purpose. Force Order 5720.2 (Enclosure (7)), published a program to select ten qualified volunteer personnel monthly, who are due for rotation from Vietnam to CONUS, for public appearances after reporting to new duty stations.

3. Military Police Substation, Danang East. Force/NCC/SA I Corps Order 1630.1 (Enclosure (8)) established a Military Police Substation for Danang East and reiterated the assignment of Military Police responsibilities in the forward portion of the Danang TAOR and in the city of Danang.

E. Special Services Functions

1. Shows

- (a) The Bobby Rydell show gave 12 performances to III MAF units.
- (b) Robert Mitchum, the actor, arrived 26 February 1966 for a four day visit of III MAF/NCC units.
- (c) The Saigon Entertainment Troupe, consisting of 45 members, performed before approximately 3,500 troops of the Danang Area and approximately 2,000 at Chu Lai.

2. Recreation

(a) The initial deposit in the account opened at the American Express Co., Inc, Military Banking Facility, Sukiran, Okinawa, in the name of the Custodian, Force Recreation Fund, III MAF, was for the amount of \$232,729.00.

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

(b) Force recreation fund checks were issued for February to subordinate commands based on \$2.00 per man per month.

3. R&R Program

(a) On 7 February, C130 flights to Okinawa for R&R were cancelled, except for 4 flights from Chu Lai. The purpose for this cancellation was to allocate R&R seats on the Special Assignment Aircraft flights to help fill otherwise empty seats. 35 R&R passengers were placed on Special Assignment Aircraft flights daily.

(b) The CG III MAF has been assigned as the R&R representative of COMUSMACV in the Danang area and final decisions on manifesting, processing, and loading rest with the III MAF.

(c) A conference was held at Danang on 20 February concerning the introduction of commercial aircraft assistance in the R&R program. It was ascertained that Pan American would provide all flights to Hong Kong and Tokyo commencing for the month of March.

4. R&R totals for the month of February 1966 are set forth in Table IX.

TABLE IX

Bangkok	692
Hong Kong	427
Manila	119
Okinawa	1115
Saigon	583
Taipei	111
Tokyo	<u>316</u>
TOTAL	3363

F. Chaplain

1. Total chaplain strength in III MAF/NOC was 60. Denominational distribution was excellent.

2. Seven chaplains participated in Operation DOUBLE EAGLE. During the first week, they conducted 27 weekday services with attendance of 1474. On Sunday, 15 services were held.

140

SECRET

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

3. The III MAF chaplain formulated and presented lectures on religions in Vietnam. Instruction for Chaplains commenced on 21 February in preparation for an indoctrination program on religions of Vietnam. Each chaplain will receive four hours of instructions.

4. Bishop HINES, Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church, arrived at Danang unannounced on 20 February for a one day visit.

5. Dr. Wayne Dahaney, President of the Southern Baptist Convention, visited III MAF on 25 February 1966.

6. On 28 February, all the chaplains in the immediate area of the III MAF Headquarters were invited to be the guests of honor at the Phuoc Duong Pagoda. They observed the children of the Buddhist School as they sang and danced. The chaplains were asked to present awards for scholarship to the best pupils.

G. Adjutant Section

1. The Force Adjutant Section continued to expand its operations during the period. All personnel assigned to the staff of the III MAF were consolidated into Sub Unit #2, Headquarters Company, Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division.

V. LOGISTICS

A. General

1. III MAF/NCC reached a milestone during the reporting period when on 22Feb66, for the first time, there were no ships in the Danang harbor waiting to be off-loaded.

2. The tempo of logistic operations continued at an ever increasing pace with emphasis on attaining the desired stockage of all classes of supply and improving the overall logistic posture of the Force.

3. The projected activation date for the Force Logistic Command (FLC) is 15Mar66, with FISG-Alpha at Danang, FISG-Bravo at Chu Lai and FISU at Phu Bai. The FLC Headquarters is scheduled to be located with the III MAF Headquarters at Danang East. Work is underway at Red Beach to prepare a location for FISG Alpha, Danang. NMCB-1, which arrives in RVN on 15Mar66, will be the prime agency for the preparation and construction of facilities for FISG Alpha, Danang.

4. The following problem areas continue to exist with regard to spare parts availability.

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

- (a) Material Handling Equipment (MHE).
- (b) Acetylene.
- (c) Brake shoes for M-35 2½ ton 6x6 trucks.
- (d) Comm-Elect spare parts for the LAAM Batteries.

1435
a 6 x 6

5. MSR & general road conditions continue to improve. The advent of the dry season allowed a maximum effort to road rehabilitation, including the spreading of crushed rock over most LOC'S.

6. A revised combat active (CA) replacement rate of high usage items, based on experience factors experienced in RVN, was submitted to CG, FMFPac.

7. Positioning of 15 days stock level for a regiment at Hue/Phu Bai of Classes I, III, III (A), & (V) for contingency operations was completed.

8. The Table A&B MILCON program was reviewed & revised and priorities re-adjusted for FY-66 funding, due to the revised out-off provided by CINCPACFLT for the I Corps Area.

B. Engineer

1. Engineer operations progressed satisfactorily throughout the month with the main effort devoted to construction, repair & maintenance of roads at Danang and the airfield facilities at Chu Lai. During the last week of February, LOC'S were disrupted between Danang & Danang East when the Tourane River bridge was damaged by a heavy load passing over the bridge. As a result of the damage, all bridge traffic was secured and essential traffic was ferried across the river by pontoon ferry until repairs were completed on 28 Feb 1966.

C. Supply

1. Tightening up of Red Ball procedures and more aggressive supply action on Red Ball items resulted in a net decrease of 67 items during the month of February. A schedule was set up for the Marine Corps Unified Management Material System Team, which is scheduled to commence instruction for III MAF units on 5Mar66. A Force Bulletin was issued directing the recovery of lightweight tropical utilities and other items of individual equipment prior to each individual's departure from RVN. A Force/NCC Order was published which established/improved controls on Class I subsistence issues and consumption.

2. A recap of Red Ball during February is as follows:

- (a) Total line items on Red Ball 1 February, 308
- (b) Total line items added, 38
- (c) Total line items deleted, 105

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

(d) Total line items on Red Ball 28 February, 241

D. Embarkation & Port Operations

1. The most significant event during the reporting period was that on 22 February the Danang harbor had no vessels in port with cargo for discharge. With the arrival in harbor on 24 February of the USS BROSTRON, cargo off-loading again resumed. This reporting period showed a marked increase in cargo movements. 2911 S/T of retrograde material was listed from Chu Lai and Danang to the 3rd FSR at Okinawa. Cargo moved from Danang to the Hue Phu Bai enclave totaled 1885 S/T. Elements of the 1st Marine Division CP Construction Party commenced debarkation at Chu Lai on 25 February. BLT 2/3 completed debarkation from SLF shipping at Danang on 28 February. The following data is submitted concerning cargo and ships handled during the month:

(a) 27 MSTB ships and 15 USS ships debarked at Danang.

(b) 26 LST's and 8 deep draft ships debarked at Chu Lai.

(c) 97,877 M/T were off-loaded at Danang with a daily average of 3496 M/T and 1944 S/T.

(d) 27,098 M/T were off-loaded at Chu Lai with a daily average of 968 M/T & 570 S/T.

(e) The SS VANTAGE PROGRESS was scheduled to arrive at Subic Bay, Phillipine Islands to off-load cargo for the resumption of the Subic/Chu Lai shuttle.

E. Ordnance.

1. The Force Ordnance Officer attended the Chemical Seminar & Ammunition Conference in Saigon during the period.

2. Mr. John MESKO and one SNCO from the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center arrived in RVN on 1Feb66 with the Stoner weapons system. It is being field tested by the 3d Reconnaissance Bn, 3d Marine Division, FMP.

3. The III MAF Ordnance Section increased from one (1) officer to one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted during the period.

F. Fiscal

1. The Force Comptroller attended the FMFPac budget conference at 3d FSR on 14-15 February. Work was commenced on the III MAF, 4th Quarter FY-66, FY-67, & 68 budget, for submission to the CG, 3d MarDiv, as directed by the Comptroller, FMFPac.

~~SECRET~~
Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~VI. COMMUNICATIONS

A. The III MAF Communication Centers' total message traffic for February experienced a slight decrease as outlined below:

	<u>February</u>	<u>January</u>	<u>Increase/Decrease</u>
Incoming	41,994	41,527	467
Outgoing	30,795	31,614	819
TOTAL	72,789	73,141	352

B. III MAF established tactical liaison communications with Task Force Delta during Operation (DOUBLE EAGLE). One (1) voice radio, one (1) covered and six (6) standard teletype circuits were established via AN/TSC-15 radio during Phase I. The equipment and operating personnel were landed in the objective area with the Task Force Headquarters. An AN/MRC-62 was also helilifted into the objective area to provide a back-up capability for the AN/TSC-15, and to provide an additional teletype circuit.

The radio relay shot from the objective area to Chu Lai, and then to Danang, proved very reliable. The range between the objective area and Danang was approximately 100 miles, and all communications were acceptably reliable. A major problem encountered was a deficiency in operator experience, which caused installation time to be excessive.

During Phase II of the operation, the Communication Team established communications with III MAF from the Task Force ISA. For Phase II, no requirement existed for teletype or radio relay communications, however, three telephone circuits were established between Task Force Delta and the III MAF COC.

The long distance liaison communications established between III MAF Headquarters and Task Force Delta during both Phase I and II of DOUBLE EAGLE proved to be fairly reliable. The difficulties encountered were overcome and a great deal was learned regarding long distance communications.

VII. CIVIC ACTION

A. General. The basic objective of the III MAF Civic Action program remained the same during the month of February. Particular emphasis was placed on education.

B. Joint Coordinating Council. The Council met each week during the month of February, during which two new members were added to the council, Commander of Naval Support Activity and the Senior Representative of the MACV Combined Studies Division for I Corps Tactical Zone. It was reported to the Council that the Danang radio station is in operation, even though all financial problems have not been solved. This is a matter of awaiting approval of the budget.

~~SECRET~~
Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committees. All the committees functioned during the month making studies in their respective fields. The following reports were submitted to the committee.

1. Commodities Distribution Committee. The American Christmas Train and Trucks (ACTT) inventory is near completion, but provincial reports regarding the needs of the people have not yet been submitted. If the reports do not arrive, the commodities will be distributed to provinces following the below listed priorities: (1) Quang Ngai, (2) Quang Nam, (3) Quang Tin, (4) City of Danang, (5) Thua Thien and (6) Quang Tri. The following new members were added to the committee: Naval Support Activity, I Corps Ministry of Social Welfare, and USAID Refugee representative.

2. Education Committee. The committee reported that detailed data surrounding education will be submitted at a later date, but preliminary discussions indicated three primary areas where assistance would be particularly helpful from III MAF in connection with its Back-to-School Program: scholarships for students desiring to attend school beyond the first three grades; secondary school in Hoa Khanh Village, Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province; and elementary schools in those hamlets where there are presently no schools. Indications are that there is no shortage of elementary school teachers.

3. Public Health Committee. The committee reported that medical teams consisting of representatives from U. S. forces, ARVN, and civilians, are visiting refugee camps on a scheduled basis. It was recommended that the Provinces establish a similar committee to promote the exchange of information at that level. 15 more Military Provincial Hospital Assistance Program teams are expected to arrive in country during 1966, with a phase in rate of 3 per month.

D. Medical Assistance. Forty (40) MEDCAP teams provided 81,279 Medical and Dental Treatments to 66,738 Vietnamese citizens in 122 locations.

Skin disease	29.5%
Miscellaneous ailments	20.0%
Headache	15.0%
Respiratory infections	12.0%
Stomach ailments	7.0%
Injuries	5.0%
Dental conditions	4.0%
Diarrhea	4.0%
Fevers	3.5%

The number of treatments by enclaves were:

Danang	40,879
Chu Lai	34,903
Phu Bai	5,497

~~SECRET~~
Enclosure (1)

SECRET

In addition, 16 health workers, 2 volunteer nurses, and 4 volunteer medical trainees, received training during the month. III MAF Medical Officers gave formal training at Hue Medical Health School for 28 students in dental emergencies and 30 in medicine.

E. Project Handclasp. Approximately 34,000 pounds of miscellaneous commodities were received during February.

F. Care Program. During the month of February, III MAF units received 5 blacksmith sets, 16 carpenter kits, 2,475 textile kits, and 74,896 lbs of rice. All goods received have been distributed through GVN officials except for some rice reserves held to meet contingencies. 9,000 dollars of the CG III MAF CARE contingency fund have been allocated toward the Buddhist school and orphanage construction program in Danang.

VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A. The largest psychological operation by III MAF to date was conducted in support of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE. Breakdown of activities and results of Phases I and II of the operation are as follows:

1. Phase I. A total of 2.7 million leaflets were dropped in the area of operation. Both short and long range themes were used, such as: Viet Cong lack of food and poor medical care, loneliness for home and family, united strength of the Government of Vietnam and its allies, surrender appeals, safe-conduct passes, and an explanation of U. S. presence. In addition to the above themes, a new leaflet was developed during the operation. This new leaflet warned Viet Cong not to fire at U. S. aircraft. The leaflet stated that air strikes and artillery fire would be called in on any area where aircraft received ground fire. Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were used to reinforce the themes contained in the printed material. Nine returnees were reported during this phase of the operation.

2. Phase II. 974,000 leaflets were disseminated. These were primarily of immediate tactical significance. All themes were supported with ground and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. On 24 February, a rallier made an appeal for the rallier's family and other villagers to leave the Viet Cong controlled hamlet of Huong Pho. On the first day, a total of 84 persons left the hamlet, including 4 persons discovered to be Viet Cong. On 25 February 1966, an additional 120 persons came out of the hamlet. A total of 10 ralliers were recorded during DOUBLE EAGLE, Phase II. The following propaganda feed-back was received from interrogation of ralliers, VCS, VCC, and refugees:

(a) Viet Cong and villagers do pick up leaflets, but must do so clandestinely. The Viet Cong leaders attempt to collect and destroy all leaflets.

(b) Viet Cong require people to remain in their homes during loudspeaker broadcasts, so that the message will be more difficult to hear.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(c) Counter-propaganda meetings are conducted after Viet Cong and villagers have been exposed to U. S. propaganda. The following are the most common Viet Cong counter-propaganda themes:

(1) Alleged U. S. atrocities such as rape, looting, and destruction of personal property.

(2) Reasons that Viet Cong retreat from advancing U. S. forces is that the force is too insignificant to bother with, and they want to wait for a larger force.

B. III MAF PsyOp Conference.

1. A half-day psyop conference for all Psy/Op officers in III MAF was conducted on 18 February at the I Corps Joint PsyWar/CA Center. Eighteen Officers from the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Marine Division Psy Op Officer attended the conference. These officers were reacquainted with the organization and mission of the I Corps Joint PsyWar/CA Center, and the role of the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office.

2. Presentations were given by each Regimental Psy Op Officer on psychological operations within their areas of responsibility, with emphasis on programs needed to augment present efforts. These programs included:

(a) Establishment of hamlet bulletin boards to fill the gap in information media available to villagers.

(b) Increased coordination with planned civic action projects to add credibility to promises made to provide a better life for villagers under Government of Vietnam control.

(c) Increased time devoted to education on Marine psywar objectives.

3. The following basic objectives of the III MAF Psy Op Program were discussed:

(a) To gain the loyalty and support of the Vietnamese people for the government of Vietnam in conjunction with military civic action.

(b) To reduce the fighting effectiveness of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces.

(c) To encourage Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers to rally to the Government of Vietnam.

C. Organization of 244th PsyOps Company.

~~SECRET~~
Enclosure (1)

SECRET

1. On 15 February 1966, the 1st PsyOps Field Support Detachment (U.S.) in Da Nang, and the 27th PsyOps Field Support Detachment (U.S.) in Quang Ngai, were reorganized under one headquarters to form the 244th Psychological Operations Company. The company will maintain facilities in both locations with the Danang detachment supporting U.S. and ARVN psychological operations in the northern three provinces of I Corps, while the Quang Ngai detachment will support Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The company headquarters is located in Da Nang, and is responsible for administrative and logistics support for the company. The headquarters section is comprised of a Company Commander (Major), First Sergeant (E-8), Supply Sergeant (E-5), and Clerk/Typist (E-4).

IX. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

A. The most notable guest to visit the press center during the month was Secretary of the Agriculture, Orville Freeman. He was briefed by a Danang USAID representative and III MAF G-5. This was well attended by the resident press. CIB continued to stress Civil Action to all outlets, radio/TV, motion picture, and news releases.

B. A DOD motion picture sound/film team assigned by MACV to cover I Corps activities joined CIB. The team consisted of ISO/Photo Marines. The CIB also joined six additional motion picture photographers and one photo officer. They have been placed in Division and Wing commands for more thorough coverage of MAF activities.

C. Photography. During February, 14,810 feet of motion picture film was exposed and forwarded to CMC. Approximately 65% was operational coverage, 15% civil affairs, and 20% special projects. Coverage of special interest included operation DOUBLE EAGLE, Fixed Wing Aircraft Story, and Civil Affairs project for CMC.

D. Radio/Television. 89 radio releases, including a 15 minute program on Operation DOUBLE EAGLE, was forwarded to Headquarters Marine Corps during the month. The Radio/TV section of CIB is working on a civil affairs project in support of the Marine Corps Reserve Care program. This is expected to be completed and forwarded during March.

E. Escorts. The Combat Information Bureau escorted 223 civilian correspondents, representing all Networks and Wire services, and many of the larger daily newspapers and weekly magazines. Notable correspondents included: Ray Moloney, ABC; Julian Pottifer of BBC; Joe Brown, Copley News; Chikahiro Ninagawa, Ryo Ikoke Productions, Japan; Peter Berh and Donn Neff, Time Magazine; Harry Gianneschi, ABC News, Chicago; J. K. Macbeth, Canadian Magazine; Jack Southerland, U. S. News and World Report; Michael Getler and William Coughlin, Missiles and Rockets Magazine; David Burkett, Business Week Magazine; Frank Uhlig, U. S. Navy Institute of Technology; Michael Renard, Newsweek Magazine; Richard Armstrong, Saturday Evening Post; Tak-Oki, Christian Science Monitor; Karsten Prager, Time-Life Magazine;

SECRET
Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

Regiment, were committed to assist the reaction force. Contact lasted for approximately 11 hours, resulting in the friendly elements losing 18 KIA, 48 WIA, 10 MIA, and 14 individual weapons. Enemy losses by body count were 114 KIA. Also, 61 individual weapons, 1 crew served weapon, and 2 radios were captured. It was estimated that VC losses were 300 KIA due to accurate and heavy air and artillery fire.

(g) Operation Quyét Thang 7/G, a Quang Ngai Sector controlled clearing operation, was conducted on 23 February. The 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment, made contact with the enemy and came under intense enemy fire causing a number of friendly casualties. Effective artillery, naval gunfire, and air strikes caused heavy enemy casualties. The 4th Platoon, 4th Armored Cavalry, and two companies of the 37th Rangers were deployed to reinforce the action but the enemy broke contact and withdrew before the arrival of these reinforcements. Friendly losses in this operation were 41 KIA, 35 WIA, 29 MIA, 90 individual weapons and 25 crew served weapons. Enemy losses were 50 KIA and 8 individual weapons.

C. Air Support. US aircraft flew 997 and VNAF flew 413 sorties in the I CTZ in support of ARVN during the month. There were a total of four B-52 strikes; one in Quang Tri Province, one in Quang Nam Province, and two in Thua Thien Province.

D. Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire engaged 230 targets and expended 5,345 rounds throughout the I CTZ.

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~PART THREECHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 February - Operation DOUBLE EAGLE continued from 28 January through 28 February.
- The following VIPS visited III MAF
- | | |
|------------------|--------|
| Mr. Joseph ALSOP | Writer |
|------------------|--------|
- 2 February - RAdm Norel G. WARD
- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| | COMNAVADVERP (MACV) |
|--|---------------------|
- VAdm T. F. CONNOLLY
- | | |
|--|--------------|
| | COMNAVAIRPAC |
|--|--------------|
- 3 February - Mr. Philip C. HABIB
- | | |
|--|---|
| | Political Consul, U. S. Embassy, Saigon |
|--|---|
- Mr. Freeman H. MATTHEWS
- | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| | 2d Secretary, U. S. Embassy, Saigon |
|--|-------------------------------------|
- 4 February - LGen Victor H. KRULAK
- | | |
|--|------------|
| | CG, FMFPAC |
|--|------------|
- 5 February - RAdm Edwin B. HOOPER
- | | |
|--|------------|
| | COMSERVPAC |
|--|------------|
- 7 February - Operation TAUT BOW began
- 9 February - The following VIPS visited III MAF
- | | |
|------------|-----------------------|
| - BGen LEE | CG ROK Marine Brigade |
|------------|-----------------------|
- 10 February - MGen Lewis W. WALT, CG III MAF, Departed RVN for CONUS on TAD.
- MGen Keith B. MCCUTCHEON assumed command of III MAF.
- BGen Lowell E. ENGLISH assumed command of the 3d Marine Division.
- 12 February - The following VIPS visited III MAF
- | | |
|--------------|----------------------|
| - BGen MOORE | MACV Provost Martial |
|--------------|----------------------|
- 13 February - Mr. William C. BLAIR
- | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| | U. S. Ambassador to the Philippines |
|--|-------------------------------------|
- 14 February - Mr. ANDERSON
- | | |
|--|------------------------------|
| | Australian Ambassador to RVN |
|--|------------------------------|
- 15 February - Mr. Raymond F. HUFFT
- | | |
|--|---|
| | Special Consultant to Senator Russell B. LONG |
|--|---|

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

- Congressman John BUCHANAN	Alabama (Republican)
- RAdm G. W. PRESSY	CINCPAC J-4
- BGen Nguyen Xuan TRANG	Chief of the Artillery Command (Saigon)
- Mr. MANSFIELD	Assistant Secretary of State
16 February - Operation TAUT BOW secured	
17 February - The following VIPS visited III MAF	
- Mr. DI SILVA	Far East Expert for Adm RAYBORN
- BGen Walter E. LOTZ	C/S for Comm-Elec, MACV J-4
- BGen DUNN	MACV Engineer
- RAdm WOODING	OICC, RVN
- Sir John GRANDY	Chief Air Marshall, British Commander in Chief, S. E. Asia
- Mr. ETHERINGTON-SMITH, R.G.A.	Great Britian Ambassador to RVN
18 February - MGen Robert H. YORK	CG, Infantry Center, Fort Benning
- MGen W. B. ROSSON	Chief of Staff, MACV
19 February - Operation DOUBLE EAGLE Phase I secured. Phase II Alpha and Bravo began.	
20 February - Danang TAOR expanded to include the Esso POL Terminal	
21 February - The following VIPS visited III MAF	
- BGen BRIGHT	Special Consultant to the Secretary of Defense
SECRET Congressman Jeffrey COHELAN	California (Democrat)

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

- Congressman Olin E. TEAGUE	Texas (Democrat)
- Mr. William J. DRIVER	Veterans Administration
- Mr. Ted CONELL	VA Consultant
24 February - MGen John L. LANE	Commander, Military Traffic and Terminal Service
- BGen William A. STILES	ADC 1st Marine Division
- Col Lloyd J. PTAK	Deputy Director, Command Element MACV COC
- Col John D. SHARP Jr.	MACV COC Deputy Director, Command Element
- Col James W. LINN	MACV COC Operations and Planning Section, MACV COC
26 February - Operation NEW YORK began.	
- The following VIPS visited III MAF	
- Dr. Wayne DAHONEY	President, Southern Baptist Convention
- LGen John A. HEINTAGES	DEP COMUSMACV
27 February - BGen Donald H. MCGOVERN	Assistant C/S J-1, MACV
28 February - BGen William K. JONES	Director, COC, MACV
- Mr. Edward G. LANDSDALE	Special Assistant to the U. S. Ambassador to RVN
- Operation NEW YORK secured.	
- Operation DOUBLE EAGLE Phase II Alpha and Bravo secured.	

~~SECRET~~
Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REFERENCES

- (A) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology, February 1966
- (B) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, February 1966
- (C) COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) dated 21 November 1965 (S)
- (D) MAPS, Vietnam L701 Series, Scale 1:50,000 Sheets 6658 I, II, III, IV, 6659 II, III, IV, 6756 I, IV, 6757 II, III, 6559 I, II, III, IV, 6560 II, III, IV

PART FOUR

ENCLOSURES

- (1) III MAF/NCC TASK ORGANIZATION/Troop List (U)
- (2) III MAF Command Directory
- (3) FLSG Command Chronology for February 1966
- (4) 5th Communication Battalion Command Chronology for February 1966
- (5) 7th Engineer Battalion Command Chronology for February 1966
- (6) Force/NCC Bulletin 5340: Financial report on the results of the American overseas campaign
- (7) Force Order 5720.2: Utilization of Vietnam Veterans for Public Information Purposes
- (8) Force/NCC/SA I Corps Order 1630.1: Military Police, Danang East
- (9) CG, 3dMarDiv ltr of 12 February 1966, Subject: Ideas and suggestions for Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in South Vietnam
- (10) III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Item: Organization and Functions of the Combat Operations Center
- (11) III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Item: Scout/Sentry Dogs
- (12) III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Item: Popular Force Training Centers
- (13) III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Item: Employment of teams from the Force Reconnaissance Company at I CTZ CIDG Camps
- (14) III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Item: Scout Sniper Teams

SECRET
Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET
SECRET

- (15)- III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Item: Adequacy of Regional and Popular Force Authorization
- (16)✓CG III MAF ltr of 15Mar66 Subj: Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned
- (17)✓III MAF G-3 Section Agenda Item: Operation SPARROW HAWK
- (18)✓III MAF G-3 Section presentation for LtGen KRULAK 5 February 1966
- (19)✓1st Battalion, 9th Marines Command Chronology for February 1966 — *filed sep*
- (20)✓CO, U. S. Navy Mobile Construction Battalion Eight Operational Report for February 1966

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

SECRETEnclosure (1)
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO San Francisco,
 California 96602

For/NCC Bul 005440
 3/dhs
 Serial: 0022666
 2 Mar 1966

SECRET
 SECRET

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND BULLETIN 005440


From: Commanding General
 To: Distribution List

Subj: III MAF/NCC Task Organization/Troop List (U)

Ref: (a) III MAF/NCC Order 3121.1B

Encls: (1) III MAF/NCC 31Jan66 Task Organization/Troop List

1. Purpose. To promulgate the III MAF/NCC 31 January 1966 Task Organization/Troop List.
2. Background. Reference (a) requires subordinate units to submit by the 10th day of each month a report of their task organization/troop list based on operational control for the last day of the preceding month.
3. Information. Enclosure (1) contains the 31 January 1966 III MAF/NCC Task Organization/Troop List. Addressees are requested to review enclosure and report changes to this Headquarters.
4. Self-cancellation. 20 March 1966.


 G. C. AXTELL
 Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
 Case 1 (Less B)
 Case 2 (Less G, H, I, M)
 Extra 30

GROUP-4
 Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
 Declassified after 12 years

Copy 109 of 114 Copies

SECRET
 SECRET

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

For/MGC Bul 005440
2 Mar 1966

Task Organization/Troop Ldst - 31 January 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
I. <u>Naval Component Command (ICTZ)</u>	9	18	237	5065			5329
A. <u>Headquarters (DANANG)</u>	6	16					22
1. Det, Sub Unit #2 H&SCo HqBn	6	6					12
2. Det, 5th Comm Bn		10					10
B. <u>30th NCR</u>	3	1	81	2078			2163
1. Hq, 30th NCR (DANANG)	3	1	6	28			38
2. MCB-4 (CHU LAI)			20	505			525
3. MCB-5 (DANANG)			16	514			530
4. MCB-8 (DANANG)			19	394			415
5. MCB-8 (PHU BAI)			1	40			41
6. MCB-9 (DANANG)			14	505			519
7. MCB-11 (DANANG)			5	92			97
C. <u>Nav Supt Act</u>		1	156	2987			3144
1. DANANG		1	122	2665			2788
2. Station Hosp (DANANG)			31	251			282
3. CHU LAI Detachment			3	71			74
II. <u>III Marine Amphibious Force</u>	2308	2787	205	1609	16	6	4153
A. <u>HQ III MAF DANANG</u>	125	804	5	13	16	6	969
1. Headquarters	93	176	5	3	3		277
2. 5th Comm Bn (-)	28	609	10				647
3. Prov Dog Plt	1	11					12
4. 7th CI Tm (CHU LAI)	3	8					11

1

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

For/NCC Bul 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
5. Det. 41st Civil Affairs Co.					16	6	22
a. Team #4 (QUANG TRI)					4	2	6
b. Team #5 (QUANG NGAI)					4	2	6
c. Team #10 (TAM KY)					4	1	5
d. Team #16 (DANANG)					4	1	5
B. <u>Base Defense Bn (DANANG)</u>	30	962	3	54			1049
1. 3d Bn 9th Marines	30	962	3	54			1049
C. <u>7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	35	995	1	18			1049
1. 7th Engr Bn (-Co C)	30	859	1	18			908
2. 1st Bridge Co (-)	5	136					141
D. <u>9th MT Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	19	370		2			391
E. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st ANGLICO</u>	5	43	6				54
1. SAIGON	1	15	1				17
2. BIEN HOA		4	1				5
3. BERIA	1	3					4
4. DANANG		4	1				5
5. QUANG NGAI	1	2					3
6. QUI NHON	1	2					3
7. PLEIKU		3	1				4
8. NHA TRANG		3	1				4
9. CAN THO	1	5	1				7
10. HAM TAN		2					2

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

For/NGC Bul 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
F. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st Radio Bn FMP</u>	5	82					87
1. Hq & 2d Plt. (DANANG)	4	53					57
2. 1st Plt (CHU LAI)	1	25					26
3. 3d Plt (PHU BAI)		4					4
G. <u>3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMP</u>	1113	22623	122	1155			25013
1. <u>HqBn (-)(DANANG)</u>	151	1461	14	24			1650
a. HqCo	114	666	14	24			818
b. Comm Co (-)	12	348					360
c. Service Co.	17	309					326
d. MP Co (-)	5	107					112
e. 3d CIT	2	16					18
f. Det, 1st ITT	1	15					16
2. <u>3d Marines(-)(Rein)(DANANG-PHU BAI)</u>	160	3825	12	192			4189
a. HqCo(Rein)(DANANG-PHU BAI)	16	200	2	5			223
(1) Det, HqBn, 3d MARDIV		3					3
b. 1st Bn. 1st Marines(DANANG)	35	1014	3	60			1112
c. 1st Bn. 3rd Marines(DANANG)	38	1022	3	60			1123
d. 2d Bn. 1st Marines(Rein) (PHU BAI)	71	1589	4	67			1731
(1) 2d Bn, 1st Marines	38	988	3	58			1087
(2) Det HqBn, 3d MarDiv (CIT, DISBU)	2	8					10

3

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

For/NGC Bul 005440

2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
(3) 1st Plt(Rein), Co A, 1st AT Bn(5M50A1 Ontos)	1	20					21
(4) 1st Plt(Rein), Co A, 1st Engr Bn	3	81		1			85
(5) 1st Plt(Rein), CoA, 1st Tk Bn (5M48A3 Tks)	1	27					28
(6) 1st Plt(Rein), CoA, 1st Recon Bn	1	21					22
e. 4th Bn 12th Marines(-)(Rein) (PHU BAI)	27	479	1	9			516
(1) Hq Bty(-)(Rein)(CMR Team)	14	161	1	3			179
(2) Bty M 4thBn(SP)(1-155 How)	4	109		2			115
(3) Bty B 1stBn, 11th Marines (6-105 How)	6	127		2			135
(4) 107mm Mortar Bty, 1st Bn 11th Marines (6 Mortars)	3	82		2			87
3. <u>ADC Command Group (CHU LAI)</u>	9	23					32
4. <u>1st Marines(-)(Rein)(CHU LAI)</u>	101	2535	7	120			2753
a. HqCo	19	191	2	2			214
b. 1st Bn 4th Marines	35	975	2	58			1070
c. 2d Bn 4th Marines	33	970	3	53			1059
d. Co B(-)(Rein) 3d AT Bn (10 M50A1 Ontos)	2	69	2				73
e. Co A(-)(Rein), 1st Engr Bn	3	78		1			82
f. Co A(-)(Rein), 1st Amtrac Bn, FMF (34 LVTP-5, 1 LVTC, 1 LVTR-1 2 LVTE-1)	5	165		3			173

SECRET

SECRETFor/MCG Bul 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
g. Co A(-)(Rein) 1st Tk Bn, FMF(12 M48A3 tanks)	4	84		1			89
5. <u>4th Marines (-)(Rein)(Chu Lai)</u>	32	378	2	6			418
a. HqCo (-)(Rein)	28	282	2	3			315
(1) Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv	3	16					19
b. Co B(-)(Reinf), 3d Engr Bn	2	45		1			48
c. Co C(-)(Rein), 3d Tank Bn(12- M48A3 Gun Tks, 3 M67A2 Flame Tk)	2	51		2			55
6. <u>3d Bn, 12th Marines Arty Bn Gp(Chu Lai)</u> 93	1390		11	30			1524
a. Hq Btry(-)(Rein)	14	164	4	11			193
(1) Det, CMR, HqBtry		14					14
b. Btry M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines (6-155 How)	5	129					134
c. 3d 155 Gun Btry(-)(SP), FMF (4-155 Guns)	4	106					110
d. 1st Plt, 3d 8" How Btry (SP) (2-8in How)	2	43					45
e. 1st Bn 11th Marines(-)(Rein)	31	354	3	7			395
(1) HqBtry (-)(Rein)	17	146	3	3			169
(2) Btry G, 3d Bn 12th Marines (6-105 How)	8	105		2			115
(3) Btry H, 3d Bn 12th Marines (6-105 How)	6	103		2			111
f. 3d Bn(-) 11th Marines	37	580	4	12			633
(1) Hq Btry	12	144	4	3			163

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

For/MCC Bul 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
(2) Btry G (6-105 How)	7	120		3			130
(3) Btry H (6-105 How)	8	119		2			129
(4) Btry I (6-105 How)	7	122		2			131
(5) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 Mortars)	3	75		2			80
7. <u>7th Marines (Rein)(Chu Lai)</u>	134	3645	11	184			3974
a. HqCo(Rein) 7th Marines	19	283	2	4			308
b. 1stBn, 7th Mar	35	959	3	58			1055
c. 2dBn, 7th Mar	32	912	3	54			1001
d. 3d Bn 7th Mar	32	910	3	60			1005
e. Co A 3d AmTrac Bn(47-LVTP 5, 3 LVTC 1, 1 LVTR 1)	5	214		3			222
f. Co C 1st Anti-Tank Bn 15-M50A1 Ontos)	3	86		2			91
g. Co C 1st Engr Bn	4	156		1			161
h. Co B 1st Tank Bn (17-M48A3, 3 M67A2, 1M51)	4	124		2			130
8. <u>9th Marines (Danang)</u>	106	3166	11	165			3448
a. HqCo	14	180	2	3			199
b. 1st Bn, 9th Marines	32	1003	3	56			1094
c. 2d Bn, 9th Marines	30	1014	3	55			1102
d. 3d Bn, 9th Marines	30	969	3	51			1053

SECRET

SECRETFor/MCG Bul 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
9. <u>12th Marines(-)(Rein)(Danang)</u>	113	1688	8	38			1847
a. HqBtry (-)(2_CMRS)	22	209	3	4			238
b. 1st 8" How Btry(SP) (-)(Rein) 4-8" How)	7	161		3			171
c. 3d Plt 3d 155 GunBtry(SP), FMF (2-155G)	1	35		1			37
d. 1st Bn(-) 12th Marines	43	701	2	14			760
(1) HqBtry	14	163	2	4			183
(2) Btry A(6-105 How)	7	115		2			124
(3) Btry A, 1st Bn 11th Mar	8	124		2			134
(4) 107mm Mortar Btry(6 Mortars)	3	75		2			80
(5) Btry C, 1st Bn 12th Mar	8	110		2			120
(6) Btry K, 4th Bn 12th Mar (6-155)(SP)	3	114		2			119
e. 2d Bn(-) 12th Marines	38	599	3	14			654
(1) Hq Btry	14	153	3	5			175
(2) Btry D (6-105 How)	7	114		2			123
(3) Btry E (6-105 How)	7	109		1			117
(4) Btry F (6-105 How)	7	106		3			116
(5) Btry L, 4th Bn, 12th Mar (6-155)(SP)	3	117		3			123
10. <u>3d AT Bn(-)(Rein)(Danang)</u>	17	313		11			341
a. H&S Co (-)	9	140		7			156

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

For/HCC Bnl 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USM</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
b. Co A(-)(Rein)(10-M50A1 Ontos)	4	61		1			86
c. Co C(Rein)(20 M50A1 Ontos)	4	92		3			99
11. <u>3d Engr Bn(-)(Rein)(Danang)</u>	27	707	1	14			749
a. H&S Co	9	117	1	14			141
b. Support Co	4	264					268
c. Co A	5	115					130
d. Co C	6	143					149
e. Co C, 7th Engr Bn	3	68					71
12. <u>3d Med Bn(-)(Danang)</u>	3	101	27	153			284
a. H&S Co	3	101	8	45			157
b. Co C			18	102			120
c. Co D			1	6			7
13. <u>3d Recon Bn (Danang)</u>	21	302	1	17			341
a. H&S Co	9	99	1	6			115
b. Co A	4	66		4			74
c. Co C	4	68		3			75
d. Co D	4	69		4			77
14. <u>Recon Group Alpha(Chu Lai)</u>	8	132		5			145
a. Co B(-)(Rein) 3d Recon Bn	4	63		2			69
b. Co C (Rein) 1st Recon Bn	4	69		3			76

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

For/NCC Bnl 005440
2 Mar 1966
USA

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
15. <u>1st Force Recon Co</u>	9	128		5			142
16. <u>3d MT Bn(-)(Danang)</u>	10	159		7			176
a. H&S Co	7	83		7			97
b. Co A(-)(16 M-35, 2½ Ton tk)	2	45					47
c. 2d Plt Co B(15 M-35 2½ Ton Trucks)	1	31					32
17. <u>1st Amtrac Bn.(-)(Rein). FMF (Danang)</u>	24	546	2	13			585
a. H&S Co(12 LVTP5, 3 LVTC1, 1 LVTR-1)	15	236	2	12			265
b. 1st Prov Armored Amphib Plt, (6 LVTH-6)	2	74		1			77
c. Co B(Rein)(54 LVTP5, 4LVTC1, 1 LVTR1)	7	235					242
18. <u>3d Tank Bn(-)(Rein)(Danang)</u>	22	492	1	11			526
a. H&S Co(-)(7M48A3 tanks)	14	296	1	7			318
b. Co A(-)(Rein)(12 M48A3 Tk and 3 M67A2 Flame Tanks)	3	85		2			90
c. Co B(Rein)(17M48A3 Tk & 3 M67A2 Flame Tanks)	5	111		2			118
d. 1st Plt Co C(5 M48A3 Tanks)		23					23
19. <u>3d Shore Party Bn(-)(Danang)</u>	22	437	1	25			485
a. H&S Co	12	183	1	10			206
b. Co A	3	86		5			94
c. Co B	4	84		5			93
d. Co C	3	84		5			92

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

For/NGC Bul' 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
20. <u>Co C 1st Shore Party Bn(ChuLai)</u>	5	126	1	10			142
21. <u>3d Dental Co (Danang)</u>			8	35			43
22. <u>3rd Bn 1st Mar*</u>	46	1069	4	90			1209
H. <u>First Marine Aircraft Wing</u>	1066	7944	36	151			9197
1. <u>MWHG-1</u>	244	1979	12	55			2290
a. <u>H&ES-1(DANANG)**</u>	147	774	10	30			961
b. <u>MASS-2</u>	19	111					130
(1) <u>Det A (CHU LAI)</u>	4	18					22
(2) <u>Det B (DANANG)</u>	4	12					16
(3) <u>Det C (CHU LAI)</u>	3	6					9
(4) <u>DASC (DANANG)</u>	6	20					26
c. <u>MACS-7</u>	20	204		3			227
(1) <u>Det A (PHU BAI)</u>	2	20					22
d. <u>1st LAAM Bn (DANANG)</u>	26	436	1	11			474
e. <u>2d LAAM Bn(CHU LAI)</u>	32	454	1	11			498
2. <u>MAG-11 (DANANG)</u>	273	1792	5	23			1993
a. <u>H&MS-11</u>	32	426					458
b. <u>MABS-11</u>	13	474	2	19			508
c. <u>VMFA-323</u>	31	274	1	2			308
d. <u>VMCJ-1</u>	32	219	1				252
e. <u>VMF(AW)-312</u>	19	123					142
f. <u>VMF(AW)-314</u>	46	276	1	2			325
	10		1				

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

For/NCC Bul 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
3. <u>MAG-12 (CHU LAI)</u>	175	1530	6	26			1737
a. H&MS-12	42	273					315
b. MABS-12	23	512	3	22			560
c. VMA-211	27	170	1	2			200
d. VMA-214	25	170	1				196
e. VMA-223	27	175		2			204
f. VMA-224	25	170	1				196
g. MATCU-67	6	60					66
4. <u>MAG-16</u>	237	1336	6	19			1598
a. H&MS-16 (DANANG)	34	270					304
b. MABS-16 (DANANG)	13	341	3	7			364
c. Det MABS (PHU BAI)		12					12
d. Det MABS (QUANG NHAU)		2					2
e. Det MABS (QUANG TRI)		2					2
f. SU#1, MABS-16 (DANANG)	10	60		1			71
g. HMM-163 (PHU BAI)	44	127					171
h. HMM-263 (DANANG)	47	165	1	3			216
i. HMM-361 (DANANG)	50	157	1	3			211
j. VMO-2 (DANANG)	33	137	1	5			176
k. MATCU-68	6	63					69

11

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

For/NCC Bul 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
5. <u>MAG-36 (CHU LAI)</u>	237	1307	7	28			1579
a. H&S-36	38	301					339
b. MABS-36	15	363	4	23			405
c. HMM-261	52	178	1	2			232
d. HMM-363	52	164	1	3			220
e. HMM-364	53	151	1				205
f. VMO-6	28	150					178
I. <u>Force Logistic Support Group</u>	110	3364	32	216			3722
1. <u>Force Logistic Support Grp(DANANG)</u>	58	1736	4	34			1832
a. H&S Co(-)(Rein)3d SvcBn	26	353	3	16			398
b. Supply Co(-)(Rein)3d SvcBn	22	769	1	18			810
c. Maint Co(-)(Rein)3d SvcBn	8	415					423
d. Truck Co(-)(Rein)3d SvcBn	2	199					201
2. <u>Force Logistic Support Unit #2 (CHU LAI)</u>	48	1397	22	131			1598
a. FLSU Headquarters	31	952	3	19			1005
(1) H&S Co(Provisional)	12	210	2	8			232
(2) Supply Co(Provisional)	13	388	1	11			413
(3) Maint Co (Provisional)	6	354					360
(4) Shore Party Group(Prov)	6	138	1	10			155
(a) Co A 1st SP Bn	2	12					14
(b) Co C 1st SP Bn	4	126	1	10			141

SECRET

SECRET
SECRETFor/NCC Bul 005440
2 Mar 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
(5) MT Group(Provisional)	11	279		5			295
(a) Co A 7th MTBn(-)	3	84		2			89
(b) 2d Plt Co C 9th Mt Bn	1	27					28
(c) Co A 1st MTBn	1	16					17
(d) Co C 1st MTBn(-)	3	76		1			80
(e) Co C, 3d MTBn	3	76		2			81
(6) Co B, 3d MedBn (Rein)		28	18	97			143
3. Force Logistic Support Unit #2 (PHU BAL)	4	231	6	51			292
a. FLSU Headquarters	2	175		4			181
(1) H&S Co (Provisional)	1	27		4			32
(a) Supply Plt		63					63
(b) Maint Plt	1	85					86
(2) Co B, 3d MTBn(-)	2	40					42
(3) Co A, 3d MedBn		16	6	47			69

(* 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines presently OPCON Task Force Delta)

(** Total does not include 3 DOD Technical Representatives)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco
 California 96602

7A/gnc
 10 March 1966

COMMAND DIRECTORY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u> <u>"PARCHMENT" OR</u> <u>AS INDICATED</u>	<u>RTD</u>
CG/NCC/SA I Corps	*LtGen	WALT, L. W.	6, or DANANG 6100	6/66
Senior Aide	*Capt	COMMONS, A. T.	DANANG 6155	4/66
Aide	1stLt	DAVIDSON, W. D.	62, or DANANG 6100	4/66
Aide	*1stLt	WINDUM, D. D. M.	62, or DANANG 6100	8/66
Political Advisor	Mr.	THOMSEN, S. B.	DANANG 6293	7/66
Dep CG/NCC	*MGen	MCCUTCHEON, K. B.	MOMENT 5 or DANANG 6384	5/66
Aide	*Capt	CAMPBELL, W. R.	MOMENT 4 or DANANG 6334	

CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION

Chief of Staff	Col	AXTELL, G. C.	5, or DANANG 6383 or 6100	10/66
Dep Chief of Staff	Col	GLIDDEN, E. G. Jr.	5, or DANANG 6383 or 6100	11/66
Staff Secretary	Maj	CORRIEVAU, O. J.	38, or DANANG 6100	7/66

G-1 SECTION

G-1	Col	GALBREATH, D. W.	1	8/66
Asst G-1	LtCol	DOXEY, D. T.	201	3/66
Asst G-1	LtCol	REDALEN, D. L.	101	9/66

G-2 SECTION

G-2	Col	GORMAN, J. E.	2	8/66
Asst G-2	LtCol	NELSON, A. A. Jr.	2	3/66
Cmbt Intell Off	LtCol	PECK, W. H.	202	7/66
Liaison Off/Plans	Maj	BUCK, J. A.	602	5/66
Intell Specialist COC	Maj	HEBERT, C. G.	102	2/67
Air Intell Off	Maj	SNYDER, F. Jr.	202	5/66
Asst Cmbt Intell Off	Capt	ARMSTRONG, S. A.	602	2/67
Force CI Officer	Capt	BREWSTER, C. W.	702	10/66
Target Off COC	Capt	CARROLL, J. T.	102	2/67
Special Intell Off	Capt	PURCILLY, J. C.	602	9/66
AdminO	Lt	REAVES, E. M.	102	5/66
Statistics Off	Lt	SANDERS, S. F.	602	4/66
LNO (I Corps)	Lt	BATES, J. F.	DANANG 6447	8/66

Enclosure (2)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT SECTION

Headquarters Comdt	Maj	PALONIS, A. J. Jr.	34	10/66
Supply Off	Capt	ASH, D. I.	134	12/66
Company Off	1stLt	SAENZ, O.	134	2/67
Company Off	CWO	WARD, G. B.	134	2/67

LEGAL SECTION

Legal Off	Col	PELTZER, V. A.	17	5/66
-----------	-----	----------------	----	------

MEDICAL SECTION

Medical Off	Capt	WULFMAN, W. A.	16	2/66
Asst Medical Off	Comdr	GAY, L. W.	16	2/66

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

Motor Transport Off	*LtCol	KILLIAM, F. W.	SHOVE 35	1/66
---------------------	--------	----------------	----------	------

ORDNANCE SECTION

Ordnance Off	Maj	BOWRON, W. F.	121	11/66
--------------	-----	---------------	-----	-------

PROTOCOL SECTION

Protocol Off	Maj	BROWN, R. H.	62 or DAF	206 11/66
--------------	-----	--------------	-----------	-----------

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

Provost Marshal	*Maj	HARDEE, L. H.	SHOVE 27	11/66
-----------------	------	---------------	----------	-------

SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

Special Services Off	Col	WINSTEAD, E. G.	37	
Asst Spl Serv Off	Maj	SHERMAN, J. A. Jr.	37	7/67
OIC China Beach	*1stLt	FOGELBERG, C. R.	MUTINY, asst China Beach Det	8/66
OIC R&R Program	*1stLt	SCHLACKENBERG, F. J.	44	9/66
Asst Spl Serv O/Enter- in/Spl Proj Off	1stLt	SMITH, L. H.	37	11/66
Asst OIC R&R Program	2ndLt	WILSMANN, W. K.	44	4/66

PLY SECTION

Ply Off	Col	TAYLOR, H. G.	21	1/66
Asst Supp O	1stLt	HANSON, J.	21	2/67

TRANS/EMBARK SECTION

Trans/Embark Off	Maj	CRIBB, G. F.	39	8/66
Asst Embark Off	Capt	MUSTAPICH, A. P.	304	4/66

DECLASSIFIED

G-3 SECTION

G-3	Col	CHAISSON, J. R.	103	2/67
Asst G-3	Col	WEGLEY, D. E.	103	8/66
Opns Off/Air	Col	MORRISON, G. W.	103	4/66
LnO, MACV	Col	WYCKOFF, D. P.	TIGER 448	
Base Def Coord	LtCol	SIEGLER, R. B.	503	2/67
Asst Opns Off	LtCol	SCHLESBERG, G. R.	103	6/66
Ground Opns Off	LtCol	WEBSTER, C. A.	103	8/66
Asst Opns Off	Maj	EIDSON, R. E.	103	8/66
Asst Opns Off/Air	Maj	FIBICH, M. J.	103	1/67
Asst Opns Off	Maj	HOGGONELL, W. M.	103	2/67
Asst Opns Off	Maj	GARTEN, M. C.	103	9/66
Asst Opns Off	Maj	ROBINETT, H. M.	103	3/67
Opns Off Ground	Maj	FRIEDRICH, P. B.	103	9/66
Historical Off	Maj	RAPP, J. H.	103	3/67
Prov Dog Plt	1stLt	DAVIS, B. E.	MUTINY 76	4/66
LnO, MACV	1stLt	FARMER, H. T.	TIGER 448	9/66

G-4 SECTION

G-4	Col	CIBIK, S. J.	4	2/67
Asst G-4	LtCol	HEITZLER, J. S.	4	4/66
Log Plans Off(Gnd)	LtCol	SKVARIL, W. J.	204 or 404	10/66
Log Opns Off	LtCol	ZLOGAR, A. J.	104	6/66
Asst G-4	LtCol	SHAPPER, J. W.	104	3/67
Asst Log Plans Off	Maj	BUCKMAN, J. "G"	404	4/66
Asst Log Opns Off	Maj	CLARK, "C" "P"	104	4/66
Asst Log Opns Off	Maj	FICHTER, J. A.	104	2/67
Asst Log Opns/AddOff	Maj	DAVIS, L. O.	104	3/67
Asst Log Opns/AddOff	Maj	KCCOOL, W. G.	404	3/67
A/C Maint.Off	Maj	JOHNSON, L. G.	104	3/67

G-5 SECTION

G-5	Col	HOLMGRAIN, E. S.	301	2/67
Asst G-5	LtCol	EVANS, D. L. Jr.	301	3/67
Asst G-5	Maj	KEEVER, C. J.	301	4/66
Civic Action Off	Maj	MELCHER, P. F.	301	10/66
Asst G-5	Capt	DOUGLAS, D. M.	301	3/67
Pay War Off	1stLt	MOSEY, F. D.	301	6/66
Asst G-5	1stLt	GREENBELLS, W. H.	301	3/67

G-6 SECTION

G-6	Maj	ANDERSON, T. A.	103	2/67
-----	-----	-----------------	-----	------

CONTROLLER

Comptroller	Capt	VOIGT, W. A.	50	9/66
-------------	------	--------------	----	------

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Force Chaplain	Capt	GARRETT, P. L.	19	10/66
Asst Force Chaplain	Lt	RUDASKY, R. M.	19	8/66

DECLASSIFIED

ADJUTANT SECTION

Adjutant	LtCol	LUCAS, B. L. Jr.	7	9/66
Asst Adj/PersOff	Capt	MCDERMOTT, P. L.	7	3/66
S&C Off	1stLt	BURNS, D. E.	107	4/66
Asst S&C Off	1stLt	AYERS, R. A.	107	3/67

REPRODUCTION SECTION

Reproduction Off	CWO-3	SPIKES, A. W.	307	3/67
------------------	-------	---------------	-----	------

COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

Officer in Charge	Col	FIELDS, T. M.	DANANG 6259	2/67
Asst OIC	Maj	STYLES, M. J.	DANANG 6259	10/66
Admin Off	Capt	SVEC, M. R.	DANANG 6259	11/66
Press Center Man	Capt	GAFFNEY, J. A.	FUM. 165 or 166	4/66
Photo Off	2ndLt	CARPENTER, J. E.	DANANG 6259	7/66
Opns Off	2ndLt	TUCKER, F.	DANANG 6259	8/66
Press & Escort Off	WO	SMITH, J. T.	DANANG 6259	6/66

CEO SECTION

CEO	Col	DODSON, F. C.	10	3/66
Asst CEO	Maj	HARTER, R. H.	110	4/66
Asst CEO	Maj	KYLE, D. W.	110	2/67
Asst CEO	Maj	ILLG, F. G.	110	6/66
Asst CEO	Maj	HULL, R. R.	110	3/67
Asst CEO	Capt	HOWE, D. T.	310	4/66
Freq Coord	1stLt	HOWE, R. G.	310	4/66

COMMAND CENTER

Director	LtCol	MCLERNAN, J. V.	105 or DANANG 6383	6/66
Watch Off	Major	O'TOOLE, J. L.	105 or DANANG 6383	4/66
Watch Off	Capt	KELLY, D. A.	105 or DANANG 6383	4/66
Watch Off	Capt	MIKSON, M. E.	105 or DANANG 6383	4/66
Watch Off	Capt	O'CONNELL, J. H.	105 or DANANG 6383	4/66

DATA PROCESSING

Data Processing Off	*Capt	GORMAN, M. W.	KIT CARSON(DPP 16)	7/66
---------------------	-------	---------------	--------------------	------

ENGINEER SECTION

Engineer Off	LtCol	HARMON, L. G.	15	9/66
Asst Engr Off	LtCol	HETRICK, L. W.	15	1/67
Asst Engr Off	Capt	BUSS, R. H.	15	4/66

FOOD SERVICES SECTION

Food Services Off	LtCol	ROBERTS, H. G.	MOMENT 58	10/66
-------------------	-------	----------------	-----------	-------

DECLASSIFIED

NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND STAFF

Deputy C/S	Col	BOYD, R. W.	DANANG 6257	6/66
Asst C/S N-1	1stLt	HANKINS, F. T.	DANANG 6257	6/66
Asst C/S N-3	LtCol	EUBANKS, F. F. Jr.	DANANG 6257	10/66
Asst C/S N-4	Capt	PIRATHER, G. D.	DANANG 6257	6/66
Asst C/S N-6 Base Development	Comdr	MOORE, D. C.	DANANG 6257	12/66
Asst N-6	Maj	CANDLER, D. G. Jr.	DANANG 6257	9/66
Real Prop Off	LtCol	LANGLEY, C. F.	DANANG 6257	8/66
Asst Real Prop Off	Capt	HAMBY, R. L.	DANANG 6257	2/67

* Denotes additional, joint, or attached duty.

Report errors, changes, and/or omissions to the Force Adjutant, PARCHEMENT 7.

B. L. Lucas, Jr.
 B. L. LUCAS, Jr. *FL*
 LtCol USMC
 Force Adjutant

SUB UNIT #1 First Radio BN

53

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco
 California 96601

FOR/NCC BUL 5340
 1/DLR/es
 2 February 1966

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND BULLETIN 5340

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander
 To: Distribution List

Subj: Financial Report on the Results of the American Overseas Campaign

1. Purpose. To publish information concerning the results of the American Overseas Campaign.

2. Background. The Annual American Overseas Campaign was conducted within this Command during October 1965. This Campaign supported the American Social Health Association, the American-Korean Foundation, the United Service Organization, Radio Free Europe Fund, CARE, the National Recreation Association, the S. S. HOPE, International Social Service, and the United Seamen's Service. The contributions to this campaign were delivered to the Project Officer, Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for accounting and further processing.

3. General Information

a. The MACV American Overseas Project Officer has reported the following financial results for the Campaign:

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>3dMarDiv</u>	<u>1stMAW</u>	<u>30thNCR</u>	<u>NSA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
AMERICAN SOCIAL HEALTH ASSN	701.76	192.28	30.35	16.25	940.64
AMERICAN-KOREAN FOUNDATION	431.09	129.60	37.20	7.60	605.49
UNITED SERVICES ORGANIZATION	3,495.13	1,047.03	360.50	164.35	5,067.01
RADIO FREE EUROPE FUND	1,040.68	344.25	97.92	22.00	1,504.85
CARE	2,169.55	836.68	180.16	79.05	3,265.44
NATIONAL RECREATION ASSN	347.63	83.10	25.51	5.25	461.49
S. S. HOPE	1,841.42	639.29	151.29	55.40	2,685.40
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SERVICE	208.25	86.95	11.06	8.95	315.21
UNITED SEAMEN'S SERVICE	270.05	77.68	20.32	16.85	384.90
UNDESIGNATED	5,410.74	1,859.09	180.21	52.55	7,502.59
TOTAL	\$15,916.30	\$5,295.95	\$1,094.52	\$428.25	\$22,735.02

Enclosure (6)

DECLASSIFIED

For/NCC Bul 5340
2 February 1966

b. The total contributions of all U. S. Forces under United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, were \$74,989.83.

4. Appreciation. It is extremely gratifying to know that despite the long and tiring hours of hard work performed daily by the personnel of this Command, that they were willing to do even more by giving their donations to this Campaign. Well done!

5. Self-cancellation. 28 February 1966.


L.W. WALT

DISTRIBUTION:
Case 1 (less B,I)
Info copy to:
Case 2 A

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco
California 96601

ForO 5720.2
1/DLR/ref
17 February 1966

FORCE ORDER 5720.2

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Utilization of Vietnam Veterans for Public Information Purposes

Ref: (a) MCO 5720.46
(b) FMFPACO 5720.4
(c) ForO 05727.1

REPORT REQUIRED: Vietnam Veterans Volunteering for Public Affairs Speaking
Appearances (MC-5720-13) Par 3

1. Purpose. To implement the program established by references (a) and (b) to select qualified volunteer personnel, who are due for rotation from Vietnam to CONUS, for public appearances after reporting to new duty stations.

2. Background. Reference (a) reveals that the Marine Corps has a continuing requirement to inform the American public of its activities in Vietnam. One of the most important assets in accomplishing this task is the use of returning veterans of the Vietnamese conflict. These Marines can help to explain the Marine Corps presence in Vietnam by participating in such activities as public appearances, speech making, and radio, television, and newspaper interviews. Reference (c) sets forth guidance to establish an indoctrination program for rotating personnel.

3. Action. To implement this program the following actions will be taken:

a. The Division and Aircraft Wing Commanders will:

(1) Ensure that all their assigned personnel in Vietnam are briefed prior to departure for CONUS. This briefing will include the present Department of Defense policy guidance for personnel returning from Vietnam which reads as follows:

Enclosure (7)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ForO 5720.2
17 February 1966

"Policy now in effect is that military personnel returning to the U. S. after a tour of duty in Vietnam may discuss Vietnam, their service there and any aspect of the U. S. effort about which they are knowledgeable. This does not eliminate the requirement to insure that military personnel who have had access to classified security information are reminded not to disclose such information. Similarly, it is established and accepted policy that Defense Department personnel, unless specifically cleared to do so, should not speak on the foreign policy implications of the U. S. involvement in Vietnam, but should defer questions or inquiries on this subject to the Department of State for authoritative response."

(2) Select the best qualified volunteers, both officer and enlisted, to present the Marine Corps and its activities in Vietnam to the public. Considerations should be given to the following criteria:

(a) Home of record and next duty station, to ensure thorough coverage to CONUS bases.

(b) Personnel selected should be articulate, knowledgeable and representative Marines.

(c) Rank, age, and experience, to include a wide range for use with a variety of audiences.

(3) Forward to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AG) via Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, arriving at FMFPac by the 1st of each month, a list of selectees. Indicate name, rank, service number, home of record and next duty assignment if known. Selectees will be reported during the month that they will be rotated, i.e., the report forwarded to reach FMFPac by 1 March will contain the names of March rotatees. Copy of selectees report will be furnished this Headquarters.

b. Commencing for the month of March 1966 and monthly thereafter, the personnel quotas are as follows: 3d Marine Division, 2 officers and 5 enlisted; 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 1 officer and 2 enlisted.


G. C. AXTELL
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 1; (less B, E, F, I)

INFO COPY:

Case 2; A, B, C.

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco
California 96601

For/NCC/SA I CorpsO 1630.1
1/DWG/ref
10 February 1966

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND/SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS ORDER 1630.1

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander/Senior
To: Distribution List

Subj: Military Police, Danang East

1. Purpose. The purpose of this directive is to establish a Military Police Substation for Danang East, to specify responsibilities for provision of personnel thereof, and to reiterate the assignment of Military Police responsibilities in the forward portion of the Danang TAOR and in the City of Danang.

2. Background

a. The growth of US facilities and cantonment areas in Danang East requires more positive military police control than can be effected merely through extended patrol coverage out of the Headquarters of the Provost Marshal, Danang City.

b. The Mayor of Danang has requested a separate Provost Marshal authority or headquarters with which his representative can deal in Danang East.

c. Present military police personnel available to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, including personnel from the 504th Military Police Battalion, U. S. Army, and from the 6252d Air Police Squadron, U. S. Air Force, are inadequate to undertake additional responsibilities. It is anticipated that additional military police personnel will be available to this Headquarters soon. After their arrival the requirement for augmentation to the existing Military Police capability as described herein will be eliminated.

3. Discussion

a. All major III Marine Amphibious Force/Naval Component Command units must temporarily contribute personnel in proportion to their unit strength in Danang TAOR, in order to supplement the limited members of military police now available.

b. Supervisory personnel and equipment necessary to establish and maintain a Military Police Substation, Danang East, must be provided out of current assets, until such time as there is a U. S. Marine Corps Force Military Police Battalion available.

Enclosure (8)

DECLASSIFIED

For/NCC/SA I CorpsO 1630.1
10 February 1966

c. Camp TIEN SHAW is the designated area in which the Danang East Military Police Substation will be temporarily established.

d. The Commanding Officer, Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division, will continue to fulfill military police responsibilities in all areas of the 3d Marine Division west of the main PX, the Danang City gate at BT 015779, and the road bridge at BT 027733. The Provost Marshal, I Corps Army Advisory Group, will continue to fulfill military police responsibilities in the City of Danang.

4. Action

a. Commanding General, 3d Marine Division: Provide twelve (12) Military Police supervisory personnel and equipment necessary to establish and maintain the Danang East Military Substation. In addition, provide fourteen (14) enlisted for military police duties in Danang East.

b. Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing: Provide eight (8) enlisted for military police duties in Danang East.

c. Commander, 30th Naval Construction Regiment: Provide Three (3) enlisted for military police duties in Danang East.

d. Commanding Officer, Naval Support Activity, Danang: Provide five (5) enlisted for military police duties in Danang East. (This is in addition to the twenty-five (25) men previously designated for Port Security responsibilities.

5. Administration. Personnel will report to the Provost Marshal, Military Police Compound, Danang Airfield by 15 February 1966 for a period of 60 days TAD assignment.

Keith B. McCutcheon

KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON

Acting

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 1, A, I

Case 3 (Less A)


INFO COPY:

Case 2; Q(41)

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96601

3/JRF/pnc
3120.1
12 February 1966



From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Ideas and suggestions for consideration in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Operations

Encl: Ideas and suggestions for Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in South Vietnam

1. Enclosure (1) containing ideas and suggestions for Counter-Guerrilla Warfare is forwarded to unit commanders for consideration, and if appropriate, exploitation. Some of the material contained in enclosure (1) has been combat tested, while other material therein has not been.

2. The contents of enclosure (1) are not to be construed as LESSONS LEARNED, rather it is intended to generate ideas and concepts which when combat tested may well be a basis for future LESSONS LEARNED. Comments and recommendations concerning future concepts for Counter-Guerrilla Warfare are invited.

D. P. Wyckoff
D. P. WYCKOFF
By direction

Distribution: "B" & "G" less 200-
212 Plus 6-1, 5-1,
9-1, CG III MAF (5)

Enclosure (9)

DECLASSIFIED

3120.1
12 February 1966CONCEPTS/THEORIES FOR COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE

1. Communications with villages/hamlets in area.
 - a. Hand-held signal flares provide a ready means for local village/hamlet chiefs to inform outposts that VC units are in the area.
2. What is the best way to interdict river traffic?
 - a. Use of tank searchlights, with river covered by fire from tanks and infantry weapons.
 - b. Can searchlights be mounted on LVTH-6 and LCVP's for use in river interdiction?
 - c. Can local sampans be procured for use in rivers?
 - d. Can UHLE's with searchlights be utilized in conjunction with UHLE Gunships to interdict river traffic?
 - e. Can explosives be planted underwater in vicinity of bridges to interdict VC swimmers on a bridge destruction mission?
3. What VC harboring sites are located within artillery range? Have daylight H&I fires been placed on these areas?
4. How can the VC infrastructure be infiltrated?
5. What methods/procedures can be used to stimulate the local populace in VC controlled areas with a strong desire to rid themselves of VC domination?
6. Is an incentive system in effect for the delivery of information concerning the enemy?
7. On occasion it has been noted that VC Forces tend to attack small units on patrol. If the patrol has a preponderance of fire support readily available (artillery and air) and the means of controlling it, then VC Forces can be easily destroyed.
8. What assistance projects can be provided to the local Vietnamese villagers as visual, long-lasting proof of our will and determination to help the people?
 - a. Digging of wells.
 - b. Repair of schools, providing school supplies, providing athletic equipment to schools

3120.1
12 February 1966

- c. Repair/painting of hospitals/dispensaries/orphanages
- d. Providing medical instruction to Vietnamese trainees in conjunction with the MEDCAP Program.
- e. Leveling of area for farming use.
- f. Providing English language instructors to schools or conducting classes for the Vietnamese people in the local area.

9. Application of fire:

a. It has been stated, "know what you are shooting at". When supporting/small arms fire is used - nothing adds fuel to the VC propaganda line any faster than wounding civilians.

10. Green smoke in jungle areas is hard to spot from aircraft - especially during inclement weather or in the late afternoon.

AMEN!
11. Establishing a separate admin/logistics net takes the pressure off the always busy tactical net, especially in battalion size or larger operations.

12. What would be the effect of prepping a helicopter landing zone with lazy dogs and CBU-2's?

13. When operating in heavily forested/jungle area, gasoline chain saws can clear a landing zone mighty fast!

14. Unless in contact with the enemy, stop and organize before too late in the day, lifting in replenishment supplies in the late afternoon. This assures readiness for an early-morning jump off.

15. At what range is the VC demolition man when he detonates a electrically controlled mine? Is there any pattern to the distance or direction from the mine site?

16. Whenever cutting wires leading to an electrically detonated charge, it is recommended that wires be cut singly, one strand at a time. Otherwise pliers make an excellent contact.

17. The intensity and frequency of VC action will diminish in direct proportion to the length of time a unit maintains control over a given area and establishes a good working relationship with the local people.

18. When moving through heavy bamboo thicket and jungle area, one well sharpened machete per fire team expedites movements.

19. If possible, avoid trails through villages, unimproved roads and stream beds as these are ideal ambush sites.

20. Select sharp, intelligent, resourceful radio operators for command circuits.

-2-

Enclosure (1)

DECLASSIFIED

3120.1

12 February 1966

21. All aircraft should know infantry call signs and frequencies in the area of operations.
22. For emergency gunship support and if you have radio communications, you can mark your own position with smoke - pass magnetic azimuth, target description and distance to target to gunship, then adjust.
23. Check back with intelligence agencies and determine the general contents of documents captured/turned in by patrols, then inform the unit that discovered/captured the document. This will stimulate interest in intelligence collection.
24. Keeping radio transmission short and to the point and using key phrase codes means more air time available for operational use and less chance of being jammed.
25. None of our own equipment should be left behind unless it is totally destroyed. Even a weak radio battery has enough electric current left to detonate an electrically fused mine.
26. Return enemy fire with every weapon immediately available to fix and destroy him. Pay particular attention to firing supporting fires on enemy escape routes.
27. Insist, on 10 to 15 meters interval between troops at all times. Spread units laterally if possible, thus presenting the minimum possible ambush target.
28. The use of scout fire teams operating ahead of each platoon surely provides early warning of VC activity.
29. In approaching a village that you're about to search, watch for:
 - a. Lack of people moving in the village and fields.
 - b. Attitude of children - do they gather around and shout, etc., or do they stay away?
 - c. Does the village look lived-in but no people are moving about?
 - d. Lack of activity can very well indicate VC in the area.
30. All patrols must maintain communications with a reporting headquarters and preferably should have an artillery/mortar FO if a night patrol. Day patrols should include a FAC team, if possible, in order to exploit targets of opportunity.
31. If possible, select helicopter extraction zones that have no high ground or heavily vegetated terrain within 400 meters. Establish defense. Be prepared to provide suppression fires for helicopters. Never leave less than 30 Marines for the last lift. FO's and FAC teams come out in the last lift of helicopters.

DECLASSIFIED

3120.1
12 February 1966

MORE OFTEN IF IN PADDIES

32. A foot inspection, conducted once a week, greatly assists in preventing foot infections.
33. Be prepared to illuminate any area of the TAOR.
34. Whenever installing AP/AT/Claymore mines, give careful consideration to the enemy and friendly observation that can be provided of the mine location. Cover obstacles by fire.
35. Formulate and rehearse plans to reinforce any unit in your area at any time.
36. In the event of a shortage of rifle oil, number 10 weight motor oil becomes a good field expedient.
37. Apply linseed oil to stocks liberally because of the heat in the dry season and the dampness during the monsoons. Salad oil is a temporary substitute.
38. When briefing a unit for operations, consider briefing at a joint assembly with all leaders present, from the squad leader level up.
39. Well water and water from mountain streams is only safe for consumption when halizone/other purification tablets are used.
40. Dispatching night patrols and ambushes after darkness prevents enemy observation.
41. Those personnel assigned to night patrols/ambushes should sleep during daylight hours. Once an ambush is established, allow no movement, smoking, sleeping or talking. Ambush remains in place until after sunrise. No individual movement until ambush assembles for return patrol.
42. On occasion, the VC will feign death after being fired at. If you can still see the enemy, add a few rounds for insurance.
43. Conducting a flame-thrower demonstration at night, either tank or portable type, will have a strong psychological effect on the VC.
44. While on extended tactical operations, give consideration to the use of three-man foxholes. More rest means more alert Marines for the next day's fighting.
45. Allowing headquarters personnel to participate as members of rifle company night patrols and ambushes allows them to actively participate with line troopers in the war, thus breaking the routine of their jobs and greatly assisting their morale and sense of participation.
46. Wearing utility caps instead of helmets provides a keener sense of hearing at night.

Enclosure (1)

4

DECLASSIFIED

3120.1

12 February 1966

47. The Artillery Liaison Officer with the battalion command group should submit "Stonewall Reports" to the FSCC/Supporting artillery unit every half hour when on the move. Company forward observers should likewise keep higher headquarters informed with appropriate "Stonewall Reports".

48. The means for conducting Psychological Warfare, namely leaflet drops and airborne announcements in Vietnamese are available and could be used almost constantly. Flood the area with pamphlets. The Viet Cong cannot possibly pick up and destroy all the pamphlets we drop, so some will reach the individual Viet Cong soldier and the local populace. Most of the people are in their villages at night and cannot refrain from hearing airborne Psywar Broadcasts.


49. Battalion armorers are capable of inspecting all battalion weapons once each month. Companies can be phased in dependent upon their tactical commitments.

50. TACTICS:

a. In an effort to further deceive the Viet Cong forces as to a predictable direction of attack TACTICS LIGHTNING, JIG SAW AND CIRCLE are set forth below.


b. LIGHTNING

(1) CONCEPT. A deceptive type clear and destroy operation designed to deny Viet Cong Forces from predicting the axis of attack. One Rifle Company is portrayed below, however it is feasible to apply this tactic on a larger scale unit, which can be helilifted in or move to a line of departure under cover of darkness. (Diagrams not to scale)




3120.1
12 February 1966


NOTE: This tactic could be employed with three rifle companies maneuvering over a wide front as portrayed below.



JIG SAW. Another deceptive type pattern of a scheme of maneuver to deprive VC Forces from predicting the direction of attack.



Enclosure (1)

3120.1
12 February 1966

Rifle Companies move into positions - A - B - C after dark, ambush locally until one-half hour prior to daybreak, commence search and destroy at daybreak, upon arrival at platoon ambush sites - establish ambushes until following morning, thereby flooding the area against VC movement.

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 2 Feb 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENDA SUBJECT: Organization and Functions of the Combat Operations Center

Reference: (a) COMUSMACV Directive Number 525-6 dated 3Dec65

Enclosure: (1) Communications Diagram

1. FACTS:

a. COMUSMACV organized a Combat Operations Center at MACV headquarters in December 1965. The purpose of the COC was to give the commander a means of directing, monitoring and controlling operations in the tactical zones of RVN.

b. With the increasing tempo of operations in I CTZ, the Commanding General required an improved means of directing and controlling various units within and outside the enclaves.

c. Although, in general, communications were available to III MAF, they were not centralized sufficiently to permit rapid and timely correlation and dissemination of command information throughout the MAF.

d. A means of disseminating timely combat intelligence and operational information to subordinate, adjacent and higher headquarters was needed.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Mission. III MAF Combat Operations Center, short title MAFCOC, will be organized to provide the Commanding General with a means of rapidly directing and controlling all subordinate units during all conditions of combat. It will serve as a centralized source of intelligence and operational information for the purpose of assisting the Commanding General in evaluating situations and providing the Commanding General the best available current information upon which to base decisions. A secondary mission of the COC is to provide information to higher headquarters, subordinate and adjacent units.

b. Functions.

(1) Provide a center where the Commanding General and principal staff officers can confer with subordinate units, adjacent and higher

CONFIDENTIAL
 Enclosure (10)

CONFIDENTIAL

headquarters.

(2) Record, plot and disseminate all significant operational and intelligence information received from/to subordinate units.

(3) Record, plot and disseminate all significant operational and intelligence information from/to adjacent units.

(4) Record, plot and disseminate all significant operational and intelligence information from/to higher headquarters.

(5) Maintain status of all alert forces.

(6) Maintain status of specially organized units such as Sparrow Hawk, Night and Day Express when activated.

(7) Maintain status of all alert forces.

(8) Insofar as possible, maintain status of Coastal Surveillance Force and Harbor Defense.

c. Organization.

(1) COC has following organizations:

(a) G-3 has staff cognizance over the structure and facilities. Designates officer-in-charge for coordination purposes.

(b) Personnel manning center:

1. Normal conditions.

- a. G-3 Watch Officer (24 hours)
- b. G-3 Journal Clerk (24 hours)
- c. G-2 Watch Officer (24 hours)
- d. G-2 Journal Clerk (24 hours)
- e. G-3 Recon Officer (Normal working hours)
- f. G-3 Supporting Arms Officer (Normal working hours)
- g. G-2 COB Personnel (Normal working hours)

2. Emergency Conditions. In addition to the above personnel, the following personnel will man the center during emergency conditions:

- a. Base Defense Coordinator

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Either G-3 or Deputy G-3
- c. Either G-2 or Deputy G-2
- d. Space is provided for the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff.

(2) The COC maintains the following permanent records:

- (a) G-3 Journal
- (b) G-2 Journal

(3) Communications available to the COC are diagrammed in enclosure (1).


3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. None at this time.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN BY III MAF:

- a. Formalize and improve the Standing Operating Procedures for III MAF COC.


CONFIDENTIAL



- ⊕ PHONE
- ⊕ PHONE TO BE INSTALLED (DIAL)
- SB SWITCHBOARD
- R RADIO REMOTE
- TT TELETYPE

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF LIAISON NET



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

--- RADIO RELAY
--- TSC-15

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

G-3 Section
5 Feb 1966

Subj: AGENDA ITEMS SCOUT/SENTRY DOGS

Q. Does III MAF envision any major disadvantages to having the dog platoons organized within the MP Battalion rather than a separate company?

A. III MAF has always been reluctant to associate the dog platoons with the MP Battalions. The fact that they were attached and a part of the MP Battalion would connote that the dogs have an MP type mission. This is not the case. The sentry dog must not be associated with control of people, but with control and surveillance of an area. The sentry dog performs his duty best in an area that is devoid of normal traffic. Even more remote from the MP mission is that of the scout dog. Scout dogs should be used as tactical weapons. They are employed with combat patrols, possible ambushes, searches for weapons, and in possible enemy hiding areas. Since neither the scout or sentry dog platoons are associated with the MP mission, it is strongly recommended that they be organized in a company under MAF control.

Q. What are III MAF's recommendations for replacements of handler/dogs?

A. Handlers should be ordered from CONUS via either basic scout dog or basic sentry dog school as appropriate. This basic training will make the change over from the old to the new handler much easier than attempting to train someone who has had no formal schooling. If a dog becomes a casualty, his replacement should be programmed from CONUS.

Q. If trained replacements (handler) are provided, how long does III MAF estimate it will take for handler and dog to be ready for Deployment?

A. If the old handler is present and capable of working with the new handler, less than one week should be sufficient to complete the transition. If the old handler is a casualty and not capable of working with the new handler, the time may vary from one to three weeks, depending upon the temperament and type (scout or sentry) dog.

Enclosure (11)

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 3 Feb 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENDA SUBJECT: Popular Force Training Centers

1. FACTS:

a. Facilities exist in each province in I Corps for the training of Popular Forces as follows:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>TRAINING CENTER</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>	<u>ADVISOR</u>
QUANG TRI	DONG HA	300	Capt T. D. PEARSON (USA) WO B. F. DAVIS (AUST)
THUA THIEN	LONG THO	300	1stLt R. L. CODY (USMC) WO P. J. MCGRELLIS (AUST)
QUANG NAM	THANH HA	600	1stLt J. O. RAGSDALE (USA) WO C. KEIOSHEI (AUST) 1stSgt J. B. CERRIDGE (USMC)
QUANG TIN	TAM KY	400	1stLt W. L. GIBSON (USMC)
QUANG NGAI	SAN BAY	500	1stLt G. J. CHRISTY (USMC) MSgt C. JAMES (USA)

b. The training centers have the capability of training Popular Force recruits and conducting Popular Force refresher training. Further, each training center has the capability of training Regional Force replacements.

c. Popular Force recruit training is for a period of seven weeks, refresher training a period of three weeks, and Regional Force replacement training for a period of 12 weeks.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Evaluation by Province.

(1) DONG HA training center is located 12 miles north of the city of QUANG TRI. The capacity of this training site is actually 600, but one

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure (12)

CONFIDENTIAL

half was recently occupied by an ARVN unit, reducing the Popular Force capacity to 300. Presently negotiations are under way to determine whether a new PF training center will be constructed or ARVN will move out. To date this has not been resolved. There are no Popular Forces in training at the present time. Scheduled funds were not forwarded to the Province 1 January so training was postponed. It was to commence after TET with an input of 247 Popular Force recruits. There are two advisors with this training center, an Army captain and an Australian warrant officer. The captain was just recently assigned to this duty.

(2) LONG THO training center is located about 4-5 miles east of the city of HUE. Although it has a limited capacity of 300, the staff state that this figure can be doubled by using an abandoned limestone mill for billeting. There are presently 200 Popular Force recruits in training with additional input scheduled after TET. This is an excellent training center, well staffed and well organized. Advisors to this training center are a Marine lieutenant and an Australian warrant officer.

(3) THANH HA training center is located approximately 4-5 miles east of the Provincial capital of HOI AN. Capacity is 600 with 350 recruits presently in training. This also is a fine training center and staffed with three advisors, an Army lieutenant, an Australian warrant officer and a Marine first sergeant.

(4) TAM KY training center is located on the outskirts of TAM KY and has a capacity of 400. There are no recruits in training at the present time since, as was the case at DONG HA, funds were not available 1 January so training was postponed. The first class was scheduled to commence after TET with an input of 223 Popular Force recruits. There is one advisor assigned to this training center, a Marine lieutenant.

(5) SAN BAY training center is located in the vicinity of the air strip in QUANG NGAI and has a capacity of 500. There are no recruits in training at the present time since the decision was made to postpone training until after TET. The program was to start after the holiday with the surprisingly low input of 109 Popular Force recruits. This may be due in part to the fact that a new training center is being constructed with five of total planned ten buildings being complete. The new center promises to be an excellent facility. Advisors to the SAN BAY center are a Marine lieutenant and an Army master sergeant.

b. Coordination with III MAF Popular Force Program.

(1) The Popular Force improvement program initiated by III MAF was discussed in some detail with advisors in each training center and was enthusiastically endorsed. Further the feasibility of placing a Marine NCO in each training center was discussed with advisors and in each case this proposal was considered to have merit. Plans are presently underway to place an NCO in each of the Training Centers.

c. Attaining Force Authorizations.

(1) III MAF has taken the position that the present authorized

CONFIDENTIAL

allowance of Popular Forces is an attainable goal for 1966. The following figures present the case:

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Present for duty</u>
Popular Forces	28986	23013	20111

(2) The above figures indicated that an input of 5973 is required to attain this strength or, more realistically, 8875 present-for-duty Popular Forces are required to attain the desired force level. In view of the fact that only 550 are presently in training and 48 possible training weeks remain in 1966 this indicates that the training centers must remain at near capacity for the remainder of the calendar year. With a possible six training cycles (7 week cycle) remaining and a potential of 12600 trained personnel, the proposed goal could be reached in addition to providing for losses during the year, and training the required number of RF replacements. This is reinforced by the fact that with the input scheduled immediately after TET, this brings the Training Center population to a little over 1100, or 1000 short of capacity.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Place a Marine NCO in each Popular Force Training Center to provide the dual function of assisting the training center advisory staff and to provide III MAF with first hand knowledge on Popular Force Training.

b. Continue to focus attention at all levels on the importance of Popular Forces and the necessity of expanding the recruiting program.

c. Insure that advisory personnel are thoroughly familiar with the critical need for Popular Forces and continually highlight this need in discussion with counterparts.

d. Continue requesting MACV to influence the RVNAF Joint General Staff to:

- (1) Increase recruiting base for PF.
- (2) Raise PF pay and allowances.
- (3) Expedite providing equipment authorized under the revised T/E.
- (4) Provide uniforms.
- (5) Provide funds for improvement of training centers.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN BY III MAF:

a. Implementing recommendations a through d.

b. Further, III MAF is expanding the Marine/Popular Force program designed to increase the effectiveness and prestige of the Popular Forces with a view to increasing recruitment.

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

G-3 Section
18 Feb 1966

SECRET

**AGENDA SUBJECT: Employment of Teams from the Force Reconnaissance Company
at I CTZ CIDG Camps**

1. FACTS:

a. With the increased tempo of operations, a need for the extension of III MAF reconnaissance activities in I CTZ became evident.

b. It was considered that CIDG Camps, located beyond III MAF TAOR's in I CTZ, could provide relatively secure bases of operation for reconnaissance patrols.

c. The force reconnaissance company is composed of 4 man teams trained to conduct long range patrols over extended periods.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Late in November 1965, 3 Force Reconnaissance teams were deployed to BA TO, a CIDG Camp located in southern QUANG NGAI Province. These teams conducted a series of combined and unilateral reconnaissance patrols, the sightings of which, served to establish VC movement patterns and locations in that area. BA TO was selected due to its proximity to the area of operations for "DOUBLE EAGLE". Late in January 1966, 6 more reconnaissance teams and a battery (-) of artillery were deployed to BA TO. This force established a reconnaissance screen along the Western boundary of the area of operations, providing CG TF Delta with timely and accurate formation of VC movement in that area.

3. CONCLUSIONS:

a. That the use of BA TO extended CG TF Delta's reconnaissance capability without the necessity for concurrent commitment of tactical units for purposes of base security.

b. That CIDG Camps can be effectively utilized to provide relatively secure bases for reconnaissance operations of larger tactical units.

SECRET

Enclosure (13)

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

G-3 Section
19 Feb 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENDA SUBJECT: Scout Sniper Teams

1. FACTS:

a. III MAF has formed Scout Sniper Teams. At present 68 personnel have been trained.

b. The equipment in use at present:

- (1) Winchester Model 70
- (2) U. S. Rifle Caliber .30 M1-D
- (3) 8X UAERTL telescope
- (4) Japanese 3X9 variable telescope
- (5) M-84 telescope

2. DISCUSSION:

a. The equipment in use has proven to be satisfactory, however, certain characteristics of the telescopic sights are not ideal. The ideal telescopic sight should be:

- (1) Not susceptible to moisture or fogging.
- (2) Durable construction.
- (3) Equipped with universal mount to permit adjustment of sight level to individual needs.
- (4) Ability to adjust scope to an exact range as opposed to adjusting by a number of clicks.
- (5) Equipped with cross hair and minute dot.

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (14)

CONFIDENTIAL

b. There exists a need for an optical range finder to assist the sniper in determining the proper range. Terrain in I CTZ offers a difficult problem in range estimation.

c. Employment techniques have become almost standard throughout the III MAF. Certain basic considerations are applicable to all methods of employment.

(1) Snipers should be employed in pairs to minimize eye fatigue.

(2) Snipers do not have the capability of sustaining themselves in a fire fight.

d. Methods of employment are:

(1) Conventional offense

(2) Conventional defense

(3) Patrols

(4) Daylight Ambush - both extended and close

(5) Counter-Sniper

(6) Blocking positions

e. The Marine Corps has authorized the formation of Sniper Platoons. These platoons will consist of 1 Officer and 35 men. 33 men will be equipped with sniper rifles.

3. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Either weapon now in use is satisfactory as a sniper rifle. The M70 has proven to be somewhat more accurate and reliable.

b. The telescope sights, although satisfactory, have some undesirable features which need to be corrected.

c. With the implementation of the Sniper Platoons a significant increase in capability should be realized.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS:

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 4 Feb 1966

SECRET

ADDENDUM TO AGENDA SUBJECT: Adequacy of Regional and Popular Force Authorization

1. FACTS:

a. Since publishing the above agenda subject certain changes have been made that effect the overall force requirements.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. The 80 man Rural Construction Group was to be implemented 1 January and plans were disseminated throughout I Corps. The Province Chief of Thua Thien took immediate action and organized 11 teams or 880 personnel. However, toward the latter part of January, Saigon indicated that the concept had been changed to a 50 man group. Recent developments have changed the concept further and the Ministry of Rural Construction has settled on a 59 man group.

b. At this time the exact organization and concept of this 59 man group is not known except for the fact that the 40 man Peoples Action Team is still incorporated with the Rural Construction Group. This move remains in consonance with III MAF recommendations.

c. Thus the effect of the change in the Rural Construction Group is reflected in a reduction in the total force requirement. The total force requirement for the Rural Construction Group is now reduced from 20,000 to 14,750.

d. The assumption is made that the concept will remain unchanged, that is that the Rural Construction Group has the capability to pacify a hamlet in three months. In view of this III MAF projections remain valid that 250 Rural Construction Groups would be required to pacify these hamlets in I Corps that have not been secured.

e. The point is made once again that the creation of the Rural Construction Group accentuates the requirement for Popular Forces rather than reduces it. Also the proposed pay and allowance structure for the Rural Construction Group adds urgency to the requirement to improve pay and benefit scales for the Popular Forces if they are to survive.

SECRET

Enclosure (15)

SECRET

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Make appropriate representation on the establishment of Popular Force requirements.

b. Support the formation of the Rural Construction Group and make representation on the establishment of requirements.

c. Continue efforts to improve the Popular Force pay and benefit scales.

4. ACTION BEING TAKEN BY III MAF:

a. Implementing the recommendations stated above.

b. Maintaining a flexible policy in order to work within framework established or altered by the GVN.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibous Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96602

Copy ___ of ___ Copies
3/dhs
3430
Ser: **028066**
15 Mar 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Counter Insurgency Lessons learned; forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) Lessons Learned Marine Division
(2) Lessons Learned Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) Lessons Learned Logistic Support Group

1. Enclosures (1), (2), and (3) are forwarded herewith for your information and use.
2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of enclosures (1), (2), and (3).


J. R. CHAISSON
By direction

DISTRIBUTION:
COMUSMACV (5)
CG USARV (5)
CG FFORCEV I (5)
CG FFORCEV II (5)

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure (16)

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

LESSONS LEARNED MARINE DIVISION

3/JCL/wmr
3430.1
15 Mar 1966

LESSONS LEARNED - JANUARY 1966
I ADMINISTRATIVE (None Included)
II INTELLIGENCE

1. ITEM: TAGGING CAPTIVES

DISCUSSION: Tagging of captives can be expedited by using pre-stamped tags made with address-o-graph plates.

RECOMMENDATIONS: As an expedient, use address-o-graph for preparation of POW tags.

Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/JCL/wmr
3430.1
15 Mar 1966

III OPERATIONS - TRAINING1. ITEM: LAAW (M79)

DISCUSSION: The LAAW has proven to be a definite asset as it increases the high explosive fire power of small units. The expended tube should be disposed of so as to prevent use by the VC.

RECOMMENDATIONS: As stated.

2. ITEM: HELO-LOADING

DISCUSSION: During operation QUICK STEP, assault troops were pre-loaded at the MAG-36 helo pad. Transportation to the pad was accomplished by truck convoy. This procedure required less helicopter fuel permitting the initial wave to accommodate nine combat-loaded Marine perhelicopter, resulting in more Marines landing at L-hour. This method insures timely meeting of L-hours and maximum initial troop lift capability because of reduced fuel load.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Where feasible, consider trucking troops to helicopters in situations where flight distance/time will be shortened.

3. ITEM: LOCATING AND DESTRUCTION OF RIVER BANK CAVE

DISCUSSION: In one operation, demolitions charges were set along a river bank suspected to contain hidden caves. This technique resulted in the capture of several VC hidden in caves and tunnels with under water entrances which otherwise might not have been discovered. This method blows the tops off the caves thus exposing the entrance.

RECOMMENDATIONS: As stated.

Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/JCL/wmr
3430.1
15 Mar 1966

IV LOGISTICS (None Included)
V COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

1. ITEM: USE OF SHACKLE CODES

DISCUSSION: Current communication procedure states that coordinates of all enemy contacts should be sent in the clear to preclude compromise of the shackle system. The coordinates of apprehension sites of VCS should be encoded to preclude the possible plotting of the units axis of advance by the enemy.

RECOMMENDATIONS: As stated.

Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL3/JCL/wmr
3430.1
15 Mar 1966SPECIAL REPORT OF COMPANY "B" PATROL OF 27 DEC 1965

"This special report is an account of a 17 man combat patrol sent out from the 3d Platoon, Company "B", 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. This patrol, and supporting arms, accounted for a total of 41 VC killed by body count. The patrol leader was a First Lieutenant, and the patrol was reinforced with two M60 machine guns and one 60mm mortar. The area of activity was approximately 11 miles south of DANANG, in the vicinity of the hamlet of QUANG HA (1). The patrol was a regular combat patrol, dispatched to an area of known VC activity, with the mission of killing or capturing VC and destroying trenchlines or hiding places. The patrol was approximately 4500 meters south of its platoon patrol base and 3500 meters south of the Company CP when contact was established.

The patrol was proceeding in a southerly direction when it received four or five rounds of sniper fire from the west, at a distance of about 300 meters. Upon receiving this fire, the patrol leader dispatched a fire team to the ridgeline to his west to search out the snipers and afford the patrol additional flank protection. As the patrol approached the hamlet of QUANG HA (1), at a distance of about 30 meters, it received a heavy volume of fire from the treeline to its front and from the right flank (See Diagram of Vicinity of Action). This initial high volume of fire lasted about five to six minutes and accounted for the total Marine casualties of one killed and six wounded, as well as the death of a VCS that the patrol had earlier apprehended. The initial burst of fire killed the radioman with the patrol and destroyed his radio, and the VC then directed their fire at the two machine guns, rendering one inoperative. It is estimated that over 50 VC occupied the ambush site with at least 15 automatic weapons.

The patrol and its flank fire team returned fire immediately. It is possible that the VC were not aware of the flanking fire team, because the VC soon commenced a frontal assault, from their concealed positions to the front of the patrol. In the assault, the Marines' fire, from the flanking fire team especially, took a deadly toll, as the 12 VC attempting to assault from the front were exposed in the open at close range. These 12 VC were killed by Marine small arms fire. Simultaneously with the assault from the front, the VC located to the west in the north-south axis of the L-shaped ambush attempted to move onto the sandy ridge on the patrol's right flank; these VC were spotted by the flanking fire team and were taken under fire in the open, resulting in nine VC KIA.

At this time, it was noticed that an additional 40 to 50 VC occupied positions about 50 to 100 meters to the rear of the ambush site. This was disclosed when they came forward to recover the bodies and weapons of their fallen comrades, using meathooks to drag away the bodies.

Enclosure (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/JCL/wmr
 3430.1
 15 Mar 1966

It would be well to point out that at this time the patrol had fought over 30 minutes against a VC force superior in number, and with only 10 Marines who were not casualties; this fact prevented the Marines from recovering any weapons. They did continue to fire at the VC who were policing the battlefield, however, another three VC were killed while dragging off bodies and weapons.

After the enemy fire diminished, the patrol leader moved forward to the high ground. At this time he heard a shrill whistle, apparently a VC withdrawal signal. As the VC started to withdraw, the patrol placed 18 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on them, resulting in an unknown number of VC casualties.

Since the radio had been rendered inoperative, the patrol leader earlier had fired a prearranged pyrotechnic signal for assistance. Now, after the firing subsided, the patrol leader put the assistant patrol leader in command and started to return, with another man, to his platoon patrol base to make sure that reinforcements were on the way, and to guide the reinforcements. After he had travelled about 1200 meters, the patrol leader met two ONIOS with an accompanying squad of infantry who were enroute to the action.

With communications reestablished through this reinforcing unit, the patrol leader requested helicopter MedEvac and additional support of two tanks from his Company CP. The patrol leader then returned to the area of contact, searched the area where the mortars had fired, and discovered large pools of blood and pieces of bodies. Within five minutes of his return, the two tanks, with an additional rifle squad, arrived from the Company CP; at this time the MedEvac helicopters also arrived, and while the MedEvac was being completed, the tanks engaged the withdrawing VC with long range fire from their machine guns and 90mm guns. This fire resulted in another 13 VC KIA, which were observed and counted by the Tank Commander and Company "B" Commander, who had arrived on the scene with the tanks.

After the MedEvac was completed, the escort helicopter remained behind and provided covering fire while Company "B" units withdrew. This escort accounted for an additional three VC KIA. After all friendly units had withdrawn from the area, the AO called an artillery fire mission on 20 VC withdrawing to the south, resulting in one confirmed VC KIA and seven probable VC KIA.

The total casualty figures for the encounter were:

a. USMC

(1) KIA - One

Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL3/JCL/wmr
3430.1
15 Mar 1966

(2) WIA - Six (including one DOW)

b. VC

(1) KIA - 41 confirmed, and additional 15 to 20 probable.

(2) WIA - Unknown

Although no weapons were recovered from the scene of the battle, due to the heavy activity taking place while the patrol was vastly outnumbered, the following equipment was recovered:

- 1 Cartridge belt
- 3 BAR magazines
- 1 M26 fragmentation grenade
- 41 caliber .45 rounds
- 1 Thompson sub-machine gun magazine
- 2 aluminum cigarette lighters with "403" engraved upon them.
- 1 GVN identification card
- 1 billfold
- 2 camouflage soft covers
- 1 notebook with writing
- 1 red neckerchief
- 1 caliber .30 round
- 1 cigarette pouch
- 1 poncho
- 1 camouflage jacket, with live foliage attached.

Only a representative amount of equipment was taken from the scene; much expended brass and several bloody camouflage jackets were left in the area.


The VC encountered were well-camouflaged, occupied freshly-dug positions, displayed good fire control, and gave indications of being a well-disciplined, hard-core unit. Their fatal mistake was an assault that was perhaps premature, and a failure to recognize the flanking fire team position. Their camouflage was excellent, consisting basically of a woven bamboo lattice interplated with three to four strips of green vegetation. This lattice was placed on their back and secured by a string tied around the waist, and rendered the VC almost indistinguishable, even when they moved out of their prepared positions to assault the patrol."

Enclosure (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/JCL/wmr
3430.1
15 Mar 1966

"B" CO, 1/9 AMBUSH INCIDENT ON 27DEC65



* SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL3/JCL/wmr
3430.1
15 Mar 1966SPECIAL REPORT OF PATROL EMPLOYING HELICOPTERBORNE REACTION FORCE

- "1. As was suggested by the Regimental Commander during the Commanders' meeting on 21 January, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines arranged for a helicopterborne reaction force to be employed in conjunction with a patrol for the purpose of exploiting any contacts with VC during the patrol.
2. At 24074H, a reinforced squad from Company C was transported by two H-34 helicopters from the Company C Combat Base, BS 625991, to a landing zone at BT 669990. A gunship escort as well as an AO were provided for the landing. After the landing, the H-34 helicopters returned to the Combat Base to park and wait for possible employment with a reinforced squad-sized reaction force. The AO and gunship remained on station in the objective area as the patrol moved northward along the ridgeline towards Dong Le (5), BT 666011.
3. At 240810H, the AO spotted 10 to 12 VCS dressed in black pajamas moving north along a trail BT 655016. The Company Commander of Company C decided to deploy the reaction force to stop, seize, and search this group of VCS. The reaction squad was airborne at 0825H, and by 0830H had the target in sight. The VCS were observed to be carrying packages, and one of the VCS appeared to be trying to hide his package. All ran from the helicopters as they approached.
4. The helicopters landed at BT 655015, 50 meters from the fleeing VCS, who were loudly commanded to halt several times in Vietnamese. A number of warning shots were fired, and the gunship fired in front of the VCS to turn them back, but they continued to flee. The squad then pursued and fired for effect. In the ensuing action, three of the fugitives were killed, one captured uninjured, and three captured wounded. All were determined later by ITT to be confirmed VC. The H-34 helicopters were called in to retract the squad and the captives; this was completed by 1000H.
5. The squad patrol moving north along the ridgeline in grid square BT 6600 was aware of the reaction force being deployed, and moved into a blocking position southeast of the reaction force. This action was uneventful. After retraction of the reaction force, the patrol continued on its mission, searched Dong Le (5) without contact, and was retracted by the same helicopters at BT 665002.

Enclosure (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/JCL/wmr
3430.1
15 Mar 1966

6. This mission could be described as an air-ground team in miniature. As such, it was clear success. Moreover, it showed excellent potential for further development and use in the Company C zone east of the Song Tra Bong River. At all times, the troops, transport helicopters, gunship, and AO were closely coordinated in a team effort. Because the reaction force helicopters parked in the Company C Combat Base, the reaction force was able to take off a mere 15 minutes after the target was sighted. Even after the reaction force was landed, close teamwork continued as the gunship acted in effect as a blocking force and helped locate several fleeing VC that were not visible to the Marines on the ground. In one case, the AO spotted a wounded VC, dropped a green smoke grenade on his position, thereby leading the Marines to the spot and resulting in his capture.

7. It is highly recommended that helicopters continue to be made available for employment as described above.

Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

LESSONS LEARNED MARINE AIRCRAFT1. ITEM: LEAFLET DROPS

COMMENT: Experience gained during the past month indicates that leaflet drops using the MK-12 delivery technique as outlined in NWIP 41-3 produces unsatisfactory dispersion resulting in the dropping of all the leaflets in a small area. For better dispersion, a delivery of leaflets at about 400 knots at an altitude of 2000' to 3000' in straight and level flight is recommended.

2. ITEM: DELIVERY METHOD FOR BOX FIN BOMBS

COMMENT: Previous delivery methods of the AN/M-57 250# GP (Box Fin) bomb has resulted in aircraft being exposed to effective ground fire for long periods due to the carriage speed restriction of 350 knots and low altitude patterns used (A4). This becomes a significant problem in areas of operations that are heavily defended. The low/slow delivery method keeps the air speed within limits, but was designed to be used against unopposed targets under low ceilings. A delivery method has been devised which keeps the airspeed within limits using 10,000' roll in at slow speed, brakes out, 80% or less, 40-45 degree dive angle using a 4000' release with a 2500' recovery. Release speed using this method is approximately 350 knots. A sight setting of 160 mils has produced satisfactory target results. This method minimizes the period of time the delivery aircraft is exposed to effective hostile fire.

3. ITEM: HELICOPTER FLARE SUPPORT

COMMENT: Artillery flares have proven highly satisfactory illumination for night med-evac missions enabling the pilot to see terrain outline. Once a flare is ignited, however, the pilot loses his night vision capability necessitating continuous illumination until completion of landing and/or pick up.

4. ITEM: POTABLE WATER IN CAMP LIVING AREAS

COMMENT: Several man and equipment hours have been saved daily by the 1st LAAM Bn utilizing a 3000 gallon fabric water tank in the Battalion Headquarters living area. The tank has pipes laid to the living area with taps located between each two tents.

5. ITEM: SEVERAL M-36 2 1/2 TON VEHICLES WERE DEADLINED IN 1ST LAAM BN DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF 6 TN BATTERIES

COMMENT: As a temporary measure the 2HN battery, manually utilized on the 1/4 ton and 3/4 ton vehicle, was substituted for the 6TN. This battery was made to fit in the oversize battery case by utilizing wood blocks.

Enclosure (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL6. ITEM: WIRE LANDLINES BETWEEN UNITS

COMMENT: These lines have been overheaded on 10-15 foot bamboo poles. Since this has been done the difficulties experienced because of broken lines have been negligible. This solution is certainly not new, but can be overlooked in an environment where other commitments can take precedence.

7. ITEM: USING RADAR CROSS-TELL WITHIN A LAAM BN BETWEEN THE UPS-1 SEARCH RADAR AND A FIRING BATTERY WHEN THE PULSE ACQUISITION RADAR OF THAT BATTERY IS DOWN

COMMENT: Battery "C", 1st LAAM Bn, has a Pulse Acquisition Radar in a down status awaiting parts. The Battalion search radar, the UPS-1, is located in the vicinity of Battery "C". A hot line has been installed from the UPS-1. This has served as a temporary measure that allows the Battery to have the necessary radar search information. The close proximity of the Battery and the UPS-1 allow this to work satisfactorily without a parallax problem.

8. ITEM: A REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR AN AIRBORNE RADIO RELAY UNIT DURING AMPHIBIOUS OR HELIBORNE ASSAULTS

COMMENT: The Airborne Direct Air Support Center (DASC) has been utilized, as an airborne radio relay agency. However, when the requirement is for radio relay and not for a DASC then the utilization of the DASC in the role is uneconomical. There is a need for equipment which will allow automatic radio relay without requiring a complete DASC.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALLESSONS LEARNED LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUPI. SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE1. ITEM: INFANTRY WEAPONS REPAIR

DISCUSSION: Peacetime procedures for the operation of infantry weapons maintenance floats are impractical in a combat environment. Current directives basically prohibit exchanging a float item for one to be evacuated or for one which can be repaired within the RDD specified by the customer. However, with few exceptions in front-line units, replacement items must be made available immediately for infantry weapons requiring disposition or repair. Thus, the allowable exceptions to the float exchange restrictions must be the norm, in order for the units to maintain their required combat capability.

RECOMMENDATION: That supply/maintenance procedures be revised to permit maintenance units directly supporting combat units to automatically provide a replacement item for any infantry weapon which cannot be repaired on-site and for which the customer requests an immediate replacement.

2. ITEM: BRAKE LININGS

DISCUSSION: Vietnam's consistently high temperatures and the almost total absence of hard-surfaced roads and staging areas combine to produce a brake lining mortality rate greatly in excess of that experienced under most operating conditions. This is especially true of heavy vehicles such as 2½ ton trucks and 6000 lb. forklifts which are in almost constant use. These vehicles move a large percentage of all materiel in-country but also experience two of the highest deadline rates, principally because of brake failures. Down time continues to be unacceptably long because brake linings are not supplied with adequate speed and regularity.

RECOMMENDATION: That aggressive action to supply brake linings be continued, and if possible, increased.

That industry be requested to develop brake linings designed specifically for use under extreme conditions of heat and mud, sand or dust.

3. ITEM: NYLON TIE DOWN STRAPS

DISCUSSION: Nylon tie down straps are being used to secure cargo to the beds of the vehicles rather than the customary link chains, as there is a lack of binders to secure the chains. The nylon straps

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

are lighter, stronger and less expensive than the metal chains. Thus they are easier to handle and require less space to store. These straps are currently being used in C-130 aircraft.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that nylon straps be adopted as standard cargo lashing devices on Marine Corps cargo vehicles.

4. ITEM: SEMI TRAILER, 6 TON, 2 WHEEL M-118 WITH DOLLY CONVERTER, M-197A1

DISCUSSION: The bridging trailers, M-118, are being utilized in the following manner when possible. Two M-118 semi trailers are assigned to one M-54 five ton cargo vehicle. The semi trailers are then shuffled between load and unload points. In this manner one trailer is loaded while the prime mover is transporting the other and vice versa. By dropping the trailer at an expected loading area with an undetermined time of arrival of cargo, such as 15th Aerial Port, much time and labor is saved in handling and loading of the cargo. Otherwise the cargo would have to be handled twice by the MHE while the prime mover and semi trailer were dispatched to the loading site. This method saves much time and effectively utilizes the existing man power and MHE.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that this process be utilized wherever possible.

5. ITEM: INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT RADIO CIRCUIT

DISCUSSION: Over-the-beach and over-the-road handling of all classes of supply in great volume requires timely and flexible coordination. Experience has shown that even the best of pre-planned coordination, vehicles must be responsive to unexpected changes in ship loading and unloading schedules. This is particularly pertinent when cargo is being handled simultaneously over several piers and beaches.

Currently an integrated Marine Corps/Navy FM radio circuit, utilizing Radio Set, AN/PRC-10, links each beach and pier with the Naval Support Activity Operations Center, the coordinator of marine trucking, cognizant roadmasters, and the Headquarters of Marine Supply Activities within the FLSG.

This radio circuit has contributed to a speedier reaction to changing transportation requirements; which, in turn, has resulted in a more economical and productive utilization of marine trucking.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That planning for future employment of logistic units include provision of personnel and equipment to activate an integrated radio circuit appropriate to the situation

Further, that consideration must be given to the possible requirement for providing compatible equipment to Navy elements.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

G-3 Section
19 Feb 1966

AGENDA SUBJECT: Operation SPARROW HAWK

1. FACTS:

a. III MAF required a means of rapidly deploying small units as separate maneuver elements to exploit VC contacts within the TAORS. As a result the SPARROW HAWK concept was formulated.

b. SPARROW HAWK comprises the following:

(1) 3 - UH-34

(2) 2 - UH1E gunships

(3) One Squad (Rein) (22 men equipped with T/O weapons) plus:

(a) 4 - M72 light anti tank weapons

(b) 1 - M-60 light machine gun

(c) 1 - 3.5" rocket launcher with WP rounds.

(d) 1 - 60MM Mortar.

c. The squad and the helicopters are located at a major landing facility within a TAOR; at HUE PHU BAI airstrip; at Marble Mountain Air Facility and at KY HA helicopter strip at CHU LAI.

d. SPARROW HAWK squad and helicopter crews are briefed together on the situation before launch.

e. Average elapsed time from request submission to the DASC to landing time has been twenty minutes.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Concept of operation envisions the rapid deployment of the SPARROW HAWK squad to the rear or flanks of small VC units to assist in blocking, fixing and destroying them. The SPARROW HAWK is not designed to be used as a means of reinforcing units in combat. The UH1E gunships are used for

Enclosure (17)

supporting fires and for aerial observers.

b. Requests for the SPARROW HAWK squad are made by the Battalion Commander direct to the DASC; DASC alerts the aircraft; crews are briefed; aircraft are launched.

c. The aircraft switch to the tactical net of the requesting battalion upon becoming airborne. The requesting battalion commander assumes operational control of the squad upon landing. The UH-34 aircraft return to base or a nearby landing zone awaiting to retract the squad.

d. SPARROW HAWK alerts are active in all three enclaves.

3. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Operation SPARROW HAWK has given III MAF a small, effective air/ground unit able to respond to the battalion commanders' request in a rapid manner without tying down large forces of either infantry or helicopters.

b. The combined briefing of pilots and squad has proven to be one of the most significant features to the success of SPARROW HAWK.

c. Although the amount of VC killed to date has been small, the use of this fast acting force has undoubtedly prevented a number of friendly casualties.

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 1 Feb 1966

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESENTATION FOR LTGEN KRULAK 5 February 1966

Subj: Scheduled Deployments and Operations

1. Introduction. During your October visit we gave you a time-phased forecast of future operations. We wish now to review that forecast in light of:

a. The introduction of PAVN elements and the resurgence of VC main force elements in I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. The build-up of III MAF from 12 to 18 battalions in the period January through June 1966 and the possible introduction of the ROZ Marine Brigade into ICFZ in July 1966.

2. Review of Basic Strategy.

a. The October forecast proposed a strategy that concentrated first on the coastal region between Da Nang and Chu Lai; thence northward from Da Nang to Hue to the DMZ, southward from Quang Ngai to the Binh Dinh border and up the great inland valleys.

b. This concept stated that:

(1) Present secure base areas would remain essentially unchanged; i.e., that is coastal enclaves at Hue Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai.

(2) TAOEs would be gradually expanded; their rate of expansion governed by the ability of the GVN to fill in behind.

(3) Temporary combat bases would be established as necessary for inland operations.

c. We concluded that with 18 battalions, by June 1966, we should be able to make the entire coastal region relatively secure, also significant progress toward securing the inland valleys. This prediction was based on several assumptions, not the least of which was that the GVN could keep pace with our gains.

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (10)

UNCLASSIFIED

d. It now appears that we were optimistic in so far as the time schedule was concerned; however, our faith in the validity of our basic strategy remains unchanged.

3. Scheduled Deployments.

a. We are now at 13 battalions. Assuming that the build-up of III MAF continues to 21 battalions, here is how we propose to deploy these new battalions:

(1) Presently, we have:

(a) One battalion at Phu Bai.

(b) The 3d and 9th Marine regimental headquarters, with a total of six battalions, at Danang.

(c) The 1st and 7th Marine regimental headquarters, with a total of five battalions, at Chu Lai.

(2) After Double Eagle BLT 3/1 goes into Chu Lai.

(3) HLF-4 Hqs, now serving as a nucleus for the TF Delta command group, will, after Double Eagle, be redeployed from Chu Lai to Danang and will receive BLTs 2/3 and 3/4 which are scheduled to arrive in February and March.

(4) March also marks the scheduled arrival of the 1st Marine Division Hq. Our posture would then be:

(a) The 3d Marine Division with its three regiments, the 3d, 4th, and 9th Marines at Danang - eight battalions at Danang and one battalion at Phu Bai.

(b) The 1st Marine Division with two regiments, the 1st and 7th Marines, at Chu Lai, totalling six battalions.

(5) During April through June, the 1st Marine Division would receive its third regiment; i.e., the 5th Marines, to bring Chu Lai up to a total of 9 battalions.

(6) In July, the ROK Marine Brigade would arrive and would be assigned to Phu Bai, relieving the US Marine battalion which would return to Danang.

4. Location of ROK Marine Brigade.

a. COMUSMACV has suggested Quang Ngai, because:

(1) Importance of Quang Ngai.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Proximity to Qui Nhon and the ROK Capital Division.

b. JGS and I Corps are understood to favor Tam Ky.

c. III MAF favors Phu Bai because:

(1) By July we should be prepared to take larger role in combat operations in 1st Division tactical area.

a. Operations north of Hue.

b. Defense of expanded facilities.

(2) If the above requirement is not met by the ROK Marine Brigade, it will have to be met by a U. S. Marine regiment.

(3) Positioning the Brigade at Quang Ngai would require opening a new enclave with its commitment overhead in support and security requirement.

(4) The resultant posture of forces would be unbalanced, weighted too heavily in the south, too lightly in the north.

5. Conclusions.

a. We consider 10 battalions to be the minimum requirement to secure, develop, and defend our base areas. This we accept as a constant.

b. From January through July the number of battalions available for mobile operations increases from 2 to 11.

c. Even in the face of the PAVN buildup, with this force we should be able to make the entire coastal regions reasonably secure - or at least from Quang Tri to Quang Ngai reasonably secure - and also make considerable progress up the inland valleys by the end of 1966.


d. If we do not get the ROK Marine Brigade, we still should be able to make the coastal region from Hue to Quang Ngai reasonably secure by the end of 1966.

6. Expansion of the TAORs. We will continue to expand our TAORs, gradually and carefully, gauging our expansion both to our own tactical needs and the ability of the GVN to fill in behind us.

a. Hue Phu Bai.

(1) The Battalion Commander has recommended an expansion of his TAOR along Highway One, both to the northwest and southeast. This is under study.

UNCLASSIFIED



(2) If a major air and port facility is developed at Hue, the TAOR will necessarily have to be greatly expanded.

(3) The estimated force requirement to secure and defend such an expanded TAOR would be a minimum of three battalions. Alternative sources for such a force would be:

- (a) ROK Marine Brigade.
- (b) U. S. Marine Regiment.
- (c) U. S. Army Brigade.

b. Danang.

(1) We have just asked for a small increase in the Danang TAOR to include the Lien Chien POL facility.

(2) In the near future we will probably ask for an extension of the TAOR to include the entire Hai Van pass area. We will need this before a Hawk battery can be located on Hill 700.

c. Chu Lai. A month ago we asked for a small extension of the Chu Lai TAOR at its northwest corner and a considerable extension of the Reconnaissance Zone. It has not yet been formally approved. However, an advance copy of the I Corps reply indicates that Gen THI not only approves this extension, but will request III MAF to expand the TAOR to the southwest to include Binh Son.

7. PAVN/VC Threat in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

a. Gen WESTMORELAND was recently given an intelligence briefing that indicated as many as 22 PAVN and VC battalions in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. We were directed to develop contingency plans to meet this threat. Our preparations and plans were discussed with Gen WESTMORELAND during his visit on 26 January.

b. Our own estimate of the enemy OOB shows only 9 VC battalions. We estimate the enemy's most probable courses of action as follows:

- (1) Attack Khe Sanh and Ba Long in Quang Tri Province.
- (2) Attack other outposts and Special Forces camps.
- (3) Increase interdiction of LOC's.
- (4) So-called suicide and mortar attacks against Phu Bai.
- (5) Attack of RVN units and positions with equivalent of two regiments.



SECRET

c. COMUSMACV has ordered the 25th Division to be prepared to provide a two battalion task force to Danang in the event we have to execute our contingency plans for Quang Tri and Thua Thien province. Liaison and physical reconnaissance by the 25th Division has been made. The Army task force would take over the 3d Marines zone of responsibility here at Danang. This would permit the deployment of the entire 3d Marine regiment northward.

8. February Operations. COMUSMACV requires us, by the 15th of each month, to submit a projected schedule of battalion and larger sized operations for the forthcoming month. We anticipate that most of our mobile resources during the first 15 days of February will be absorbed by DOUBLE EAGLE. Operations scheduled for the remainder of the month are as follows:

a. Operation TAUT BOW. This is a planned deep reconnaissance by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion into Happy Valley west of the Danang TAOR. Expected duration is eight days. An infantry battalion will be held in immediate reserve to support this operation.

b. Operation SWIFT WIND. This will be in exploitation of intelligence gained during Operation TAUT BOW. Primary means of movement will be on foot. It is planned to use one infantry battalion reinforced with one reconnaissance company. Expected duration is six days.

c. Operation EASTERN STAR. This will be a re-entry into Starlight and Piranha area. One battalion will move overland from Chu Lai. A second battalion will go in by helo lift. Expected duration is four days.

d. Operation EARLY DAWN. This will be a two day combination overland and helo lift of a light battalion into the Gia Long tomb area northwest of Phu Bai.

e. Operation RAZOR EDGE. A light battalion plus a 4 gun battery of 105mm howitzers will be put into the Special Forces camp at Khe Sanh to conduct reconnaissance in force and offensive operations within its capabilities. Expected duration is two weeks.

f. Operation SILVER SPOON. We plan to place a light battalion plus a 4 gun 105mm howitzer battery into An Hoa - this is the base which was used for artillery support during Operation MALLARD. The mission will be reconnaissance in force and offensive operations within its capabilities. Ultimate objective is to open land lines of communication from Danang into An Hoa. Duration of this operation is stated as two weeks but it is really open-ended.

9. March-April Operations.

a. COMUSMACV charged us with conducting two major operations in the

SECRET

SECRET

January - February time period.

(1) Operation Mallard in Quang Nam province to locate and destroy major VC units in that province and disrupt local infiltration/resupply routes.

(2) Operation Double Eagle in Quang Ngai province to locate and destroy enemy forces, possibly the 18th PAVN Regiment, which have been operating in that province.

b. In like manner we have been charged to conduct two major operations in the March - April time period.

(1) Operation ADAM is to locate and destroy VC forces and their base areas in the border area of Quang Nam - Quang Tin provinces. This is the old HARVEST MOON area and elements are probably still there.

(2) Operation ANGUS is to locate and destroy VC forces and their base areas in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

U. S. NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION EIGHT
 CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
 96601

MCBS/REP/jig
 5213/3
 Ser: 348
 4 March 1966

From: Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion EIGHT
 To: Commander Naval Construction Battalions, Pacific

Subj: Operations report for month ending 25 February 1966; submission of

Ref: (a) COMCBPACINST 5213.1C
 (b) COMCBPAC OPORD 23-65

Encl: (1) Administrative Summary
 (2) Equipment Status Report
 (3) Training Report
 (4) Labor Distribution Report
 (5) Construction Item Summary
 (6) Progress and Performance Chart
 (7) Fiscal Summary
 (8) Progress Photographs

CG III MAF

1. Employment Status. In accordance with reference (a), the MCB EIGHT Operations report for the month of February is submitted with enclosures (1) through (8). In accordance with reference (b), MCB EIGHT is deployed to Da Nang East, Republic of Vietnam. The primary mission of the unit is construction in support of U.S. Military Forces. A detached unit is deployed to Hue Phu Bai to execute certain work orders assigned to MCB EIGHT. The performance of the detached unit is included in this report.

2. Unit Movements. None.

3. Significant Events. The NSA Galley No. 1, completed on 17 February 1966, served its first meal on 22 February after a brief dedication ceremony. During the period 19-24 February, MCB EIGHT was visited by the following persons:

CAPT E.G. UNDERHILL, CEC,	CBPAC
CAPT W. C. WILLIAMS, SC,	CBCEN PORHUE
CAPT C. A. LIPPINCOTT, MC,	COMSERVPAC
CDR D. HAGEDORN, SC,	CBPAC
LTCOL D. RIDDERHOFF, USMC,	CBPAC

The annual supply inspection was held during the same period of time.

4. Major Problems. The shortage of crushed rock for concrete aggregate and road surfacing material is so acute that several key projects are being delayed. The shortage is attributed to insufficient rock crusher capacity and the excessive down time of existing equipment. Attempts have been made to procure 3/4" minus rock from Vietnamese sources; however, the quality of this rock was unsatisfactory.

5. Significant Events Planned. During the period 13-30 March 1966, members of the CBPAC Staff will visit MCB EIGHT to conduct an operations and readiness inspection.

P.A. Phelps
 P. A. PHELPS

Copy to:
 COMCBPAC (1)
 CINCPACFLT (1)
 COMSERVPAC (1)
 COMSERVLANT (1)
 COMCBLANT (2)
 OIC CBBU (2)
 CO CBCEN PORHUE (2)
 CO NAVSCOLCONST (1)
 OIC NAVSCOL CEC OFF (1)
 CO NCEL (1)
 BUDOCKS (CODE 50) (2)
 COMCONCR (1)
 CG FMFPAC (1)
 CG III MAF (1)
 CO MCB ONE (1)

CO MCB THREE (1)
 CO MCB FOUR (1)
 CO MCB FIVE (1)
 CO MCB SIX (1)
 CO MCB SEVEN (1)
 CO MCB NINE (1)
 CO MCB TEN (1)
 CO MCB ELEVEN (1)
 CO MCB FORTY (1)
 OICC SAIGON (1)
 DIRECTOR OF NAVAL HISTORY (1)



Enclosure (20)

DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Administrative Summary for February 1966.

1. Personnel Summary.

	ON BOARD DEPLOYMENT SITE	ATTACHED BUT NOT AT SITE	TOTAL PIRS ASSIGNED	CHANGES DURING PERIOD	
				RECEIPTS	TRANSFERS
E-9	0	0	0	0	0
E-8	7	0	7	0	0
E-7	31	0	31	1	0
E-6	37	5	42	7	1
E-5	46	4	50	3	2
E-4	111	14	125	9	7
Non-Rated	178	16	194	27	17
Totals	430	39	449	27	17
Officers	19	2	21	0	0

- Breakdown of personnel attached but not at deployment site.

	DETACHMENT	SEABEE TEAMS	REAR ECHELON	ADVANCE/DELAY PARTY	SCHOOLS	HOSP	BRIG	LEAVE	TAD
OFF.	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ENL.	30	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	4

2. Reenlistments.

- a. Separations eligible for reenlistment 17.
Career 0. Non Career 17.
- b. Reenlistments 1.
Career 0. Non Career 0.
- c. Not recommended for reenlistment 2.
Career 0. Non Career 2.
- d. Personnel receiving separation interviews 2.

3. Safety.

a. Monthly Accident Summary.

	ON DUTY	OFF DUTY	MANDAYS LOST	\$ DAMAGES
FIRST AID	21	5	N.A.	N.A.
LOST TIME	1	0	6	N.A.
VEHICLE	1	0	N.A.	\$20.00

b. Stand-up Safety Meetings : 80.

4. Discipline.

Number of cases heard at Captain's Mast: 13; awarded NJP: 13; awarded court-martial: 0.

5. Morale.

- a. The morale of the unit remains high.
- b. Berthing, consisting of sixty-four (64) strongbacked tents, is adequate. Replacement of canvas with corrugated metal is being held up by the current shortage of lumber.
- c. Food continues to be excellent.

Enclosure (1)

ENCLOSURE (2)

		EQUIPMENT STATUS			Unit: USN MCB EIGHT FEBRUARY 1966		
TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	NUMBER ASSIGNED	NUMBER BORROWED OR RENTED	TOTAL ON HAND	DURING REPORTING PERIOD		TOTAL NUMBER DEADLINED END OF PERIOD	
				ADDED TO D/L	OFF D/L		
AUTOMOTIVE	P25A	122	0	122	2	1	1
	AUGMENT	5	0	5	0	0	0
CONSTRUCTION	P25A	99	0	99	3	1	6
	AUGMENT	28	2	30	0	1	1
	SUPP. FUNC. COMP.						
MATERIAL HANDLING	P25A	6	0	6	0	0	0
	AUGMENT						

NOTE: Mobile Crane, USN 22-01443, suffered a bent boom butt and is presently deadlined. The remaining mobile crane is at Hue Phu Bai.

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (3)

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Training Report for February 1966.

1. Training Conducted.

<u>TRAINING ACTIVITY</u>	<u>COURSE OR LESSON</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>NUMBER ATTENDING</u>
MCB EIGHT	STEELWORKER OJT	10 days	1
MCB EIGHT	WATER TREATMENT	7½ days	2
"B" CO., 1/9 MARINES	3.5" ROCKET LAUNCHER	5 hours	18
"B" CO., 1/9 MARINES	M-60 MACHINE GUN	2½ hours	15

2. Correspondence and Extension Courses.

	<u>ENROLLED</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>
a. OFFICER COURSES	3	1
b. ENLISTED COURSES	21	6
c. USAFI	5	0

3. Examinations Administered.

- a. USAFI/GED: 3.
- b. Advancement in Rate: None.

Cmel #8

DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (4)

LABOR DISTRIBUTION REPORTPERIOD ENDING 25 FEBRUARY 1966

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Work Days This Period: 23.

Average on board personnel at employment site: 435.

	<u>MANDAYS</u>			<u>PERCENT</u>
	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	
Direct Labor				
Total CI Direct Labor	4943	484	5427	
Total Fill-in Direct	182	0	182	
Total Direct Labor	5125	484	5609	41
Indirect Labor				
X01 Const. Equip, Maint.	918			
X02 Operations & Engineering	276			
X03 Project Supervision	950			
X04 Project Expediting				
X05 Location Moving	509			
X06 Project Material Support	70			
X07 Tool and Spare Parts Issue	306			
Total Indirect Labor	3020			25
Military Operations & Readiness				
M01 Military Operations	32			
M02 Military Security	1120			
M06 Contingency Mat'l Readiness	30			
Total Military Operations & Readiness	1182			10
Disaster Recovery Operations	0			
Training				
T01 Technical Training	7			
T02 Military Training	8			
Total Training	15			
Total Productive Labor	9842	484	9826	76
Overhead Labor				
Y01 Admin & Personnel	432			
Y02 Medical & Dental Depts.	185			
Y03 Ships Service & Special Serv.	60			
Y04 Supply & Disbursing	217			
Y05 Commissary	845			
Y06 Camp Upkeep & Repair	457			
Y07 Security	115			
Y08 Leave & Liberty	379			
Y09 Sickcall, Dental, Hosp.	95			
Y10 Personal Affairs	59			
Y11 Lost Time	29			
Y12 TAD Not For Unit	176			
Total Overhead Labor	3049			24
Total Labor Available	12391			100

Incl 114

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (5)

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. No. 6PCAO4

Title: LCU/LCM Ramps

CWE: \$595,000.00

Description: This project consists of placing sand fill on highly compressible hydraulic fill, constructing four (4) boat ramps, three (3) docks, and a 314' timber pier.

Location: Da Nang Map Series: L701, Sheet 6659 III, Tourane

Grid Coordinates: 033761

Narrative: All docks and ramps are complete except for placing the DBST surface course. The surface course is now under construction. The timber fender and steel waler systems are complete on 650' of the quay wall. Approximately 100' of the quay wall deadman system is complete. Excavation is in progress for installation of an additional 300' of the deadman system. MCB EIGHT has recently been placed in charge of the dredging operation. The battalion will control the location of the dredges intake and discharge. Presently one dredge is in operation, but a second dredge is expected to be operating soon. Construction of the timber pier will begin when the dredging operation is complete in that area and NSA makes a barge available. Completion of the quay wall is scheduled for 1 June and the timber pier by 1 July 1966.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	5 Oct 65				
2. Comp. Date	15 Sep 66	1 Jul 66			
3. Percent Comp.	35%	55%	50%	10%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	7,388	15,019	7,559	1,490	
b. Other Mil.	0	0	0	0	
c. Civilian	0	0	0	0	
5. Indirect MD				910	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (M & MN)					
9. Material In Place					

Data for items 6, 7, 8, and 9 above is now being accumulated for all projects and will appear in future reports.

020115

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PAA21

Title: NSA Galley

CWE:

Description: This project consists of a three butler building complex in a T-shaped configuration to house a 1000 man messhall, officers' and CPO's mess, galley, scullery, and offices.

Location: Da Nang East Map Series: Series L701, Sheet 6659 II, BAI BAC

Grid Coordinates: 061820

Narrative: This project was completed on 17 February. After a brief dedication ceremony, the first meal was served on 22 February. Considerable difficulty was encountered in getting the boiler controls to operate automatically. Most of the problem was attributed to the fact that the boiler had been in storage for approximately fourteen (14) years. The boiler controls will be repaired when parts now on order arrive on site. The galley has been accepted by NSA.

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>PROGRESS DATA</u>		<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
		<u>CURRENT EST.</u>				
1. Start Date	14 Oct 65	14 Oct 65				
2. Comp. Date	15 Mar 66	17 Feb 66				
3. Percent Comp.	80%	100%		100%	28%	
4. Direct MD						
a. Unit	2,562	1,935		1,935	534	
b. Other Mil.	0	0		0	0	
c. Civilian	0	0		0	0	
5. Indirect MD					326	
6. Support MD						
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)						
8. Equipment Costs (O & MN)						
9. Material In Place						

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. No. 6PAA45

Title: V.I.P. Guest House

CWE:

Description: This project consists of small building demolition; erection of a quonset hut; improvements of exterior utilities, facilities, and drainage; painting interior and exterior of quonset hut; living room/dining room paneling; bathroom modifications; rewiring the house; painting interior and exterior of the house; installing screen doors; and repairing tile roof.

Location: Da Nang East Map Series: Series L701, Sheet 6659 II, BAI BAC

Grid Coordinates: 059777

Narrative: Several small items remain unavailable, preventing completion of the work. Recent additions to the scope of work include building and installing two screen doors and a window. This has been completed. Materials needed to repair the tile roof, another recent addition to the project, are being procured.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	17 Oct 65				
2. Comp. Date	7 Dec 65	10 Mar 66			
3. Percent Comp.	100%	98%	97%	1%	Completion pending delivery of materials.
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	615	615	598	10	
b. Other Mil.	0	0	0	0	
c. Civilian	0	0	0	0	
5. Indirect MD				6	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O & MN)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 1112

Title: MCB EIGHT CANTONMENT

CWE:

Description: This project includes the construction of necessary living, admin, messing, medical, and dental facilities. Also included are roads and shops necessary to execute the battalion's construction mission.

Location: Da Nang East Map Series: Series L701, Sheet 6659 II, BAI BAC

Grid Coordinates: 064 724

Narrative: One concrete grease rack was poured for the "A" Company Shop. Approximately 70% of the sheeting is installed and the electrical wiring is complete for the shops. Conversion of strongbacks to metal roofs has been delayed due to the lack of lumber and nails. Erection of the butler building for the CTR has been delayed since all concrete is being poured on higher priority jobs.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	30 Aug 65				
2. Comp. Date	31 Dec 65	1 Jun 66			
3. Percent Comp.	100%	90%	91%	6%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	7,140	8,130	7,373	520	
b. Other Mil.	0	0	0	0	
c. Civilian	0	0	0	0	
5. Indirect MD				318	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O & MN)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PAAL6

Title: 5th COMMUNICATION BATTALION
CANTONMENT

CWE: \$50,337

Description: This project consists of constructing 105 strongbacked tents, one 500-man standard galley-messhall, five 8-hole latrines, one 25' x 50' shower building, and a water distribution system.

Location: Da Nang East Map Series: L701 Sheet 6659 II, BAI BAC

Grid Coordinates: 065 748

Narrative: The scope of this project was recently expanded to include installing a water distribution system from the storage tank to the shower and galley. All work is now complete except for screening the strongbacks and installing the water distribution system. Lack of materials prevents the completion of this project.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	8 Nov 65	8 Nov 65			
2. Comp. Date	1 Jan 66	10 Mar 66			Completion pending receipt of materials.
3. Percent Comp.	100%	98%	95%	5%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	4,120	1,050	1,000	56	A large portion of the work has been done by the customer with seabee supervisors. No record was kept of the Marines' time.
b. Other Mil.	0				
c. Civilian	0				
5. Indirect MD				34	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O&MN)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PMA49

Title: SECONDARY POWER, 5TH COMM. BATT.

CWE:

Description: Install secondary power to 105 strongbacked tents and galley.

Location: Da Nang East Map Series: L701 Sheet 6659 II, BAI BAC

Grid Coordinates: 065748

Narrative: This project was completed 4 February 1966.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	17 Jan 66				
2. Comp. Date	1 Feb 66	4 Feb 66			
3. Percent Comp.	100%	100%	100%	8%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	60	51	51	4	
b. Other Mil.	0	0	0	0	
c. Civilian	0	0	0	0	
5. Indirect MD				2	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O & MN)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PGA32

Title: NSA STORAGE AREA

CWE: \$40,000.00

Description: Construct 32 Butler Buildings in four groups of 8 buildings each, roads, ditches, fences, and an open storage area.

Location: Da Nang East Map Series: Series L701, Sheet 6659 III, Tourane

Grid Coordinates: 0579

Narrative: Two butler building groups are complete. The slab has been poured and approximately 80% of the siding installed for the third group. The foundation wall and piers have been poured for the fourth group of buildings. No buildings are on site for the fourth group but they are expected soon. The scope of this project was enlarged by the addition of roadwork and open storage facilities that were previously assigned to MCB FIVE. The use of "HUCK" fasteners has greatly reduced the time required to sheet the buildings. Original manday estimates have been revised to reflect the change in procedure. Completion is scheduled for 15 May 1966.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	14 Nov 65				
2. Comp. Date	30 Sep 66	15 May 66			
3. Percent Comp.	32%	55%	66%	31%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	22,363	5,008	3,367	1,551	
b. Other Mil.	0	0	0	0	
c. Civilian	0	1,200		460	
5. Indirect MD				948	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O & MN)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PNAL4

Title: Da Nang East Road Maintenance

CWE:

Description: Maintain Da Nang East Road from NSA Maintenance Shops to bridge south of Marble Mountain.

Location: Da Nang East Map Series: L701 Sheet 6659 III, Tourane

Grid Coordinates: 057743

Narrative: A crew composed of both Seabees and indigenous personnel are employed daily in patching and maintaining the Da Nang East Road. Loads greatly in excess of design loads cause the road to deteriorate rapidly.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	1 Oct 65				
2. Comp. Date	15 Jun 66	1 Jun 66			
3. Percent Comp.	60%	60%	68%	11%	
4. Direct MD	1,100	900	613	100	
a. Unit					
b. Other Mil.	0	0		0	
c. Civilian	0	200		26	
5. Indirect MD				61	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O&M)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PAA17

Title: "A" MED. FIELD HOSPITAL
CANTONMENT

CWE:

Description: This project consists of building 30 strongbacks, one 8-hole latrine, one shower building, one 500-man galley, and providing necessary drainage.

Location: Hue Phu Bai Map Series:

Grid Coordinates:

Narrative: This project is complete except for constructing drainage ditches. This will be done when higher priority work is completed.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	13 Oct 65				
2. Comp. Date	15 Mar 66	20 Mar 66			
3. Percent Comp.	86%	85%	95%	0%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	2342	900	853	0	
b. Other Mil.	0	0	0	0	
c. Civilian	0	0	0	0	
5. Indirect MD				0	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O&M)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PPA04

Title: "A" MED. EMERGENCY OPERATING
FACILITY

CWE:

Description: This project consists of constructing two 20' x 48' quonsets
for use as an operating room and recovery ward.

Location: Hue Phu Bai Map Series:

Grid Coordinates:

Narrative: This project was completed 21 February 1966.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	23 Oct 65				
2. Comp. Date	7 Dec 65	24 Feb 66			Completion date slipped because quonsets did not arrive on site until January.
3. Percent Comp.	100%	100%	100%	35%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	590	313	313	109	
b. Other Mil.	0	0	0	0	
c. Civilian	0	0	0	0	
5. Indirect MD				66	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O&M)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PAA38

Title: Second Battalion, First
Marines Cantonment

CWE:

Description: Construct 263 strongbacks, 13 8-hole latrines, one 500-man standard galley-messhall, three 500-man modified galleys, and five shower buildings.

Location: Hue Phu Bai

Map Series:

Grid Coordinates:

Narrative: Forty-four (44) strongbacks are complete and 180 strongbacks are under construction. Lack of screening material prevents completion of the strongbacks now under construction. All galleys, showers, and latrines are complete.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	27 Oct 65				
2. Comp. Date	30 Mar 66	30 Mar 66			
3. Percent Comp.	80%	80%	65%	4%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	3,050	2,394	1,544	100	No records have been kept of customer self-help
b. Other Mil.	0				
c. Civilian	0				
5. Indirect MD				61	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (OMN)					
9. Material in Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PGA06

Title: 2ND BATT. 1ST MAR. BUTLER
BUILDING

CWE:

Description: This project consists of constructing one butler building.

Location: Hue Phu Bai

Map Series:

Grid Coordinates:

Narrative: The foundation has been poured. However, no butler building is on site and it is understood that this building has been eliminated from the program for this unit.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	20 Oct 65				
2. Comp. Date	15 Dec 65	1 May 66			
3. Percent Comp.	100%	10%	17%	0%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	660	246	42	0	
b. Other Mil.	0	0	0	0	
c. Civilian	0	0	0	0	
5. Indirect MD				0	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O & MN)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PGAL2

Title: FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT UNIT
NUMBER TWO BUTLER BUILDINGS

CWE:

Description: Construct Four (4) butler buildings, two (2) for equipment
Maintenance and two (2) for storage.

Location: Hue Phu Bai Map Series:

Grid Coordinates:

Narrative: Two of the butler buildings are complete. The footings and
slabs have been poured for the two remaining buildings.PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	2 Jan 66				
2. Comp. Date	25 Apr 66	25 Mar 66			
3. Percent Comp.	53%	70%	61%	37%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	2,640	984	600	368	
b. Other Mil.	0	0	0	0	
c. Civilian	0	0	0	0	
5. Indirect MD				225	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O&MN)					
9. Material In Place					

CONSTRUCTION ITEM SUMMARY

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

C.I. NO. 6PAA39

Title: FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT UNIT
NUMBER TWO CANTONMENT

CWE:

Description: Construct 80 strongbacks, three 8-hole latrines, one shower building, and one 500-man modified galley.

Location: Hue Phu Bai

Map Series:

Grid Coordinates:

Narrative: Twenty (20) strongbacks are complete and sixty (60) are 75% complete. Lack of screening material prevents completion of this project.

PROGRESS DATA

	<u>ORIG EST.</u>	<u>CURRENT EST.</u>	<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>	<u>THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Start Date	4 Nov 65				
2. Comp. Date	1 Mar 66	1 Apr 66			Completion pending receipt of necessary materials.
3. Percent Comp.	98%	80%	94%	20%	
4. Direct MD					
a. Unit	2,100	500	470	101	No record has been kept of customer self-help mandays.
b. Other Mil.	0				
c. Civilian	0			0	
5. Indirect MD				62	
6. Support MD					
7. Support Costs (Project Funds)					
8. Equipment Costs (O & MN)					
9. Material In Place					

DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (7)

Unit: USN MCB EIGHT

Period Ending: 25 February 1966

FISCAL SUMMARY OF CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

	DURING REPORTING PERIOD	DEPLOYMENT TO DATE
PROJECT SUPPORT COSTS (PROJECT FUNDS)		
PROJECT EQUIPMENT	POL \$3,644.32	POL \$12,517.44
SUPPORT COSTS (O&MN)	E/S \$9,119.69	E/S \$54,458.69
PROJECT MATERIAL IN PLACE		

Note: All project funds were withdrawn from MCB EIGHT by 3ONCR ltr ser. 93 of 24 January 1966.

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl # 7

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PHOTOGRAPH CAPTIONS

1. LCU/LCM Ramp, 6PCA04. Excavation for deadman system behind quay wall. Camera pointing north.
2. LCU/LCM Ramp, 6PCA04. Ramp #3 complete except for dredging berm from entrance. Equipment in background working on quay wall. Looking northwest.
3. NSA Galley, 6PAA21. NSA Galley dedication ceremony. Left to right, CWO COLLINS; CDR P.A. PHELPS, C.O. MCB EIGHT; LT SHERMAN; RADM T.R. WESCHLER, CO.MANDER, NSA DA NANG.
4. NSA Storage Area, 6PGA32. Siding nears completion for third group of butler buildings. Camera facing east.

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl # 8

DECLASSIFIED