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31 MAY 1966

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
~~_____~~ (unclassified upon removal of the basic report)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG III MAF/MACV ltr 3/rel over 3480 Ser
0054066 of 10May66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

1. Forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

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66-4769

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO San Francisco 96602

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Copy 1 of 10 Copies
3/rel
3480
Serial **0054066**
10 May 1966

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From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG, FMFPac msg 251942Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology for March 1966

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).
2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon release of the enclosures.

E. G. Glidden Jr.
E. G. GLIDDEN JR.
Deputy Chief of Staff

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III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

MARCH 1966


GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

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
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PART ONE	ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART TWO	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART THREE	CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
PART FOUR	APPENDICES



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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

DANANG AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

LEWIS W. WALK

LIEUTENANT GENERAL UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

COMMANDING (9 MARCH-31 MARCH)

KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON

MAJOR GENERAL UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

COMMANDING (1 MARCH - 8 MARCH)

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR PERIOD 1 MARCH-31 MARCH 1966

CHIEF OF STAFF

BOEN JONAS M. PLATT USMC

(15MAR-31MAR)

COL GEORGE C. AXTELL USMC

(1MAR-14MAR)

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

COL ELMER G. GLIDDEN JR. USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

COL DON W. GALBREATH, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

COL JOHN B. GORMAN, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

COL JOHN R. CHAISSON, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4

COL STEVE J. GIBIK, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5

COL ERIC S. HOLMGREN, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6

MAJ TILTON A. ANDERSON, USMC

SUPPLY OFFICER

COL HOWARD G. TAFT, USMC

FORCE ENGINEER OFFICER

LTCOL LESTER G. HARMON, USMC

COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS OFFICER

COL FREDERICK C. DODSON, USMC

ADJUTANT

LTCOL BURTON L. LUCAS JR, USMC

COMPTROLLER

CAPT WILSON A. VOIGHT, USMC

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[REDACTED]

CHAPLAIN

COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

DIRECTOR, COMMAND CENTER

FOOD SERVICES OFFICER

LEGAL OFFICER

SURGEON

MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER

ORDNANCE OFFICER

PROTOCOL OFFICER

PROVOST MARSHAL

SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER

TRANSPORTATION/EMBARKATION OFFICER

CAPT FRANCIS L. GARRETT, USN

COL THOMAS M. FIELDS, USMC

LTCOL JOSEPH V. McLERNON, USMC

LTCOL HENRY G. ROBERTS, USMC

COL VERNON A. PELTZER, USMC

CAPT WILLIAM A. WOLFMAN, USN

LTCOL EDWIN W. KILLIAN, USMC

MAJ WALTER F. BOWRON, USMC

MAJ RALPH H. BROWN, USMC

MAJ LEE H. HARDEE, USMC

COL EDWIN G. WINSTEAD, USMC

MAJ GEORGE F. CRIBB, USMC

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SUBORDINATE UNITS

3D MARINE DIVISION

1ST MARINE DIVISION
(29MAR-31MAR)

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND
(15MAR-31MAR)

1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

7TH ENGINEER BATTALION (REIN)

9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION

5TH COMMUNICATIONS BATTALION

SUB-UNIT #1, FIRST RADIO BATTALION

COMMANDER

BGEN LOWELL E. ENGLISH, USMC
(1MAR-3MAR)

LTCOL LEWIS W. WALT, USMC
(9MAR-17MAR)

MGEN WOOD B. KYLE, USMC
(13MAR-31MAR)

MGEN LEWIS J. FIELDS, USMC

MGEN KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON, USMC

COL GEORGE C. AXTELL, USMC

LTCOL WILLIAM F. DOEHLER, USMC

LTCOL HERMINE L. MEYER, USMC

MAJ JOSEPH F. JONES, USMC

LTCOL HERCULES R. KELLY, USMC

CAPT RUSSELL W. RADER, USMC

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[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE COMPANY
(10MAR-31MAR)

MAJOR ANTHONY J. PALONIS JR, USMC

SUB UNIT #1, 1ST ANGLICO

LTCOL CARROLL B. BURCH, USMC

SENTRY DOG PLATOON

MAJOR TONARD W. OLIVER, USMC

SCOUT DOG PLATOON

LT ROBERT V. WILDER, USMC

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PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General. During March 1966, III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located at Coordinates (AT 993754), which is 350 meters west of Danang Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, and adjacent to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Post. All forces under operational control of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone with the exception of ANGLICO detachments that were operating in all four CTZ's. III MAF continued to grow as average personnel strength increased from 45,504 to 51,905 during March.

B. The month of March saw the III MAF increase to a Force of two divisions, one Wing, and a Logistics Command. Major General Lewis J. FIELDS arrived in-country with the 1st Marine Division. Major General Wood B. KELE relieved Lieutenant General Lewis W. WALT as Commanding General of the 3d Marine Division, marking the first time since Marines landed in force in Vietnam that General WALT was not concurrently the Commanding General of III MAF and the 3d Marine Division. Colonel George C. AXTELL assumed Command of the newly activated Force Logistic Command.

C. Activities. III MAF continued operations in the accomplishment of the objectives as established by reference (e), COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (3-66) dated 30 March 1966.

II OPERATIONS

A. General. The continuing objective of destruction of VC/NVA forces was accomplished during the month by conducting seven major operations outside and eight within the TAORs. The majority of contacts with enemy forces were by small unit actions; however, five large scale contacts were made by major units. III MAF elements destroyed numerous bunkers, tunnels, fortified positions, booby traps, areas of refuge, and confiscated large caches of rice.

B. Operation NEW YORK, a combined ARVN/USMC operation, was conducted 26 February - 3 March east of the PHU BAI TAOR. Units engaged in a search and destroy mission established a large scale contact with the enemy in the vicinity of (YD 963148). The VC, initially in well dug positions, opened fire with mortars, heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Contact continued throughout the afternoon of the 27th, then the VC began to withdraw after darkness. Contact was light and sporadic from then until units were returned to PHU BAI TAOR. The engagement cost the VC 122 confirmed and 50 estimated dead.

C. Operation UTAH, a coordinated 4 battalion USMC/ARVN operation was conducted 4-8 March in area (BS 6383) (BS 6378) (BS 5381) and (BS 5386), QUANG NGAI Province. USMC units were heavily engaged with an enemy force estimated at two Battalions. The enemy was well equipped and fought from well fortified

positions, employing large volumes of small arms, automatic weapons, 81mm mortar, and 60mm mortar fire. Enemy units identified during the battle were elements of the 1st VC and 36th NVA Regiments. The engagement cost the VC/ 358 confirmed and 325 estimated dead.

D. Operation TEXAS, a coordinated USMC/ARVN operation was conducted 20-25 March in the area to the east of AN HOA outpost, QUANG NGAI Province. The operation began as a reaction to the loss of AN HOA outpost by VN Regional Force troops on 18 March. USMC units established heavy contact with enemy units in fortified villages throughout the area. Enemy units engaged were identified as elements of the 1st VC Regiment and 69th and 70th Main Force Battalions. The battle cost the VC 405 confirmed and 439 estimated dead.

E. Operation OREGON, a Battalion Search and Destroy operation, was conducted 20-23 March in THUA THIEN Province, 25km northwest of HUE, in the vicinity of (YD 5644). USMC units helilifted into the area established heavy contact with an estimated VC main force battalion in a well fortified village complex. The engagement cost the VC 99 confirmed and 53 estimated dead.

F. Operation INDIANA, a coordinated USMC/ARVN operation, was conducted 28-30 March in the vicinity of LAM LOC (1), (BS 5776), QUANG NGAI Province. The operation began as a reaction to an attack by an unknown size enemy force upon the 3/5th ARVN unit that had been left in the area after Operation TEXAS. USMC units established heavy contact with an estimated VC Battalion supported by 81mm mortars and automatic weapons. The VC broke contact during darkness and fled from the area across the river to the north. The engagement cost the VC 69 confirmed and 60 estimated dead.

G. Operation KINGS, a Battalion Search and Destroy operation, was conducted 19-28 March in the southern sector of the DANANG TAOR. Contact with the VC was generally light and sporadic throughout the operation. The operation was successful in destroying enemy fortifications, caves, tunnels, trench lines, booby traps, and bunkers. Operation KINGS cost the VC 59 confirmed and 83 estimated dead.

H. Other operations. Two unnamed battalion Search and Destroy operations were conducted outside the TAORs with no significant contact. Seven Battalion Search and Destroy operations and 6,887 small unit operations were conducted within the TAORs. 760 contacts were made.

I. Air Support

1. Fixed Wing. III MAF provided fixed wing aircraft during March as indicated in Table I.

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TABLE IIII MAF FIXED WING OPERATIONS

TYPE SORTIE	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>			
	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>2D AD</u>	<u>TF 77</u>
Close Air Support	434*		54	
Direct Air Support	861		67	
Landing Zone Preparation	75	41		
Escort Held	264	412		
Interdiction	123		1148	
Photo	160			
ECM	1		64	38
Other Tactical	29		17	4
Non Tactical	147			
Escort Aircraft			59	31
Air Defense				
Steel Tiger			1659	
	<u>2094</u>	<u>453</u>	<u>3068</u>	<u>73</u> 5,688

2. Helicopter. III MAF provided Helicopter aircraft during March as indicated in Table II.

TABLE IIIII MAF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

<u>TYPE SORTIE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Armed Helo	689
Convoy Escort	54
Combat Troop Carrier	3439
Combat Cargo	1665

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Logistic Troop Carrier	2021
Logistic Cargo	1998
Command & Control	121
Search & Rescue	141
Tactical Med Evac	932
Recon	656
Tactical Air Coord (Airborne)	114
Tactical Aircraft Recovery	8
Training	42
Maintenance	235
VIP	195
Admin/Liaison	866
PsyOps	4
Other	133
<hr/>	
TASKS	13,313
SORTIES	33,120
CARGO TONS	2,121
PASSENGERS	43,128

J. J. Naval Gunfire Support. Naval gunfire supported III MAF units with 457 rounds of 5 inch ammunition.

III. INTELLIGENCE

A. General. Viet Cong activities within and adjacent to the three Marine TAORs continued to emphasize small unit harassing tactics including sniper fire, occasional probes, the extensive employment of both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and the widespread use of booby traps. While frequent small unit activities were initiated by the Viet Cong, only two attacks were conducted against Marine positions. In each instance, the attacking force was estimated to be less than platoon size in strength.

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Although no large scale attacks materialized against USMC units, the Viet Cong continued their harassments and attacks against ARVN/RF/PF positions and outposts. The most significant attack was one launched in estimated regimental strength against the isolated CIDG camp at A SHAU in the north-west portion of the I CTZ. During this sustained attack which resulted in the loss of the Camp after 3 days of fighting, the enemy employed units estimated as regimental size, 120mm and 81mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles.

1. Enemy forces continued to avoid large scale contact with Marine units, but fought in a determined manner when surrounded or when defending critical areas. Lines of communication continued to be the frequent targets of Viet Cong harassment and sabotage resulting in the mining of vehicles and rolling stock and the demolition of sections of highways and the railroad. Although frequent reports were received of Viet Cong intentions to conduct raids and attacks against critical installations within the TAORs, such activities failed to materialize. A substantial increase was noted in reports and sightings of Viet Cong and NVA units in the northwestern and southern portions of the I CTZ indicating a possible build-up for large scale operations in the coastal plain.

B. PHU BAI. Within and in proximity of the Phu Bai TAOR, Viet Cong activity continued at approximately the same level as during the previous reporting period. The most significant contact with enemy forces in the general area occurred approximately 30 kilometers northwest of the TAOR during operation OREGON. Elements of a reinforced Marine battalion engaged an estimated VC main force battalion. In the course of this action, Marine forces killed 99 of the enemy (body count).

1. Enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the Phu Bai TAOR with a strength equivalent of two regiments (the 1st Provisional Regiment composed of the 800th, 802nd and 804th battalions and the 95th B NVA Regiment) supported by 1 local force battalion (the 810th battalion).

C. DANANG. In and adjacent to the Danang TAOR, enemy initiated activity continued to consist primarily of harassment in the rear of forward Marine positions and resistance by small groups to incursions by USMC forces into areas normally under Viet Cong control. In one instance, a Marine listening post in the southeastern portion of the TAOR was attacked by an unknown number of Viet Cong. The enemy repulsed. Enemy use of mines and booby-traps increased over the previous reporting period with several new and ingenious hand-made firing mechanisms reported. The most significant action occurred on the 25th of March when a Viet Cong force estimated at 2 companies counter attacked USMC positions during Operation KINGS on the southern boundary of the TAOR. In repelling this counter attack, Marines killed 41 Viet Cong. A total of 59 Viet Cong were killed (body count), during the entire course of Operation KINGS.

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1. Enemy strength in this area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the Danang TAOR with a strength equivalent to 2 regiments (composed of the 5th, 70th and 80th MF battalions and the R-20, 49th and Chu Dung battalions) reinforced by 2 unidentified MF battalions.

D. CHU LAI. Viet Cong activity within and near the Chu Lai TAOR continued to emphasize small unit harassing tactics, sniper fire, mining and booby-traps. A single, small scale attack by approximately 25 Viet Cong employing small arms and 60mm mortars was directed against an 8" howitzer position and nearby rifle company positions on 23 March. The attack was repulsed with unknown enemy losses. The most significant encounter with the enemy in proximity to the TAOR occurred during operations UTAH and TEXAS. Operation UTAH was conducted against elements of the 1st VC and 36th NVA Regiments approximately 8 miles SW of the TAOR. 358 (body count) enemy were killed during the action. On 20 March, Operation TEXAS commenced against elements of the 1st VC regiment and 60th and 70th main force battalions in an area approximately 4 to 8 miles southwest of the TAOR. As a result of this action 405 Viet Cong were killed (body count).

1. Enemy strength in the area gave the Viet Cong a capability to attack the Chu Lai TAOR with the equivalent of two regiments (the 1st VC and the 36th NVA regiments) reinforced by 2 MF battalions (the 52nd and 109th battalions).

E. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION. VC propaganda efforts increased significantly during March within the Phu Bai, Danang, and Chu Lai TAORs. Activity was centered within the east central portion of the Danang TAOR where reports indicated that the Viet Cong propaganda program was emphasizing conciliatory appeals directed at U.S. troops. Themes employed pointed to a renewed and well-organized Viet Cong effort to demoralize U.S. forces by stressing that they are fighting for an unjust cause.

F. POLITICAL UNREST. General NGUYEN CHANH THI was removed from the position of I Corps Commander on 10 March 1966. This GVN action touched off a series of rallies and demonstrations in the major urban areas within I CTZ. The agitation appeared to have local military support and stressed the requirement for immediate reinstatement of General THI and dissolution of the military government in Saigon. These activities were conducted under the auspices of an organization called the Military-Civilian Struggle Council (MCSC). Demonstrations were centered at first in the city of Danang with General THI's removal as the main issue. Large scale anti-government rallies and a two day general strike were held. Most business establishments in the city were closed during the strike and large numbers of Vietnamese employed by U.S. civil contractors/U.S. Military failed to report to work. Subsequently, in the city of HUE, a struggle committee called the Popular Forces To Struggle For The Revolution (PFSR) was formed. It appeared to be influenced by Buddhist and student leaders who re-directed the pro-THI movement toward opposition to the KY administration. Students and political cadres

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pressed demands for the reinstatement of General THI and the dissolution of the military government in Saigon in favor of a civil government. In Danang, the MSCS renamed their organization after the HUE PFSR and began to direct their attention at the central government. Toward the end of the month, an increased effort by the struggle forces was undertaken including use of anti-U.S. slogans and banners. At the close of the reporting period, the PFSR was directing its attention toward ~~operating~~ an incident involving U.S. personnel in order to bring further attention to the movement.

G. TERRORISM. The Viet Cong continued their attempts to intimidate the civilian populace with terroristic activities during the reporting period. Significant incidents included the assassination of a seventy year old Vietnamese, the murder of a small child, and increased efforts to collect rice and taxes from villagers. In some instances, the Viet Cong reportedly placed mines at village entrances without the villagers knowledge. Public highways within I CTZ were occasionally mined by the VC. A total of 16 civilians were reported killed when buses in which they were riding detonated mines. These activities indicated a continuing effort by the VC to terrorize the local population through both selected and indiscriminate killings, and to separate the people from the already tenuous control exercised by local government authority.

H. ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE. Viet Cong efforts in this sphere increased significantly in each of the TAORs. Reports received indicated that a concerted effort to organize an effective espionage network within the Danang area is being emphasized by the VC. Espionage employing numerous low-level agents may already be established as indicated by reports that known VC organizers are present in the city of Danang for undisclosed purposes. An accelerated effort to recruit and train low-level agents for the purpose of eliciting information from U.S. personnel appears to be under way. VC sniper companies were reported to be undergoing training in sabotage methods and the use of explosives and submachine guns. Upon completion of training, these companies are reportedly to be sent to various cities to conduct sabotage operations. Ten incidents of sabotage were reported along the railroad from Hue to Danang. These activities included the destruction of bridges, culverts and the derailment of rolling stock by the use of explosives.

I. FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. Frequent reports continued to be received of the sighting and in many cases destruction of enemy field fortifications throughout the I CTZ. The works encountered included hasty emplacements of various types and deliberate fortifications including reinforced tunnels, bunkers, weapons emplacements, trench systems and tactical and protective barbed wire and bamboo fences.

J. MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS. The employment of makeshift and often ingeniously rigged mines and booby traps within and adjacent to the TAORs decreased slightly over the previous month. Their pattern of employment indicated a continued reliance on the part of the VC to use these weapons indiscriminately against civilians and the military.

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K. ANTI-AIRCRAFT. The frequency of anti-aircraft incidents showed a marked increase over the previous reporting period. Reports continued to be received throughout I CTZ of aircraft being subjected to occasional small arms fire on take off and landing. Aircraft supporting the defense and subsequent evacuation of the CIDG camp at A SHAU were brought under intense and accurate 12.7mm AA machinegun fire. A comparison of anti-aircraft statistics between February and March indicates the following:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>PCT CHANGE</u>
INCIDENTS	433	482	+11%
AIRCRAFT HIT	133	182	+37%

L. SUMMARY OF VC ACTIVITY. Statistics relating to Viet Cong initiated action and personnel and weapons losses for the reporting period are shown in Tables III, IV and V.

TABLE IIIVC INITIATED INCIDENTS

AMBUSH	1
ATTACK	2
ASSAULT BY FIRE	1
HARASSING FIRE	437
MINES/BOOBY TRAPS	80
HAMLET HARASSMENT	1
OTHER HARASSMENT	4
SABOTAGE	1
PROPAGANDA	8
AA FIRE	513

TABLE IVVC PERSONNEL LOSSES

	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>
KIA	1382	1245
VCC	54	
VCS	793	
RALLIERS	106	
WPNS	226	

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TABLE VVC/NVA WEAPONS LOSSES

RIFLE	24
CARBINE	73
MACHINEGUN	9
SUBMACHINEGUN	66
MORTAR	7
PISTOL	5
ROCKET LAUNCHER	2
M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHER	1
UNKNOWN TYPE	36

M. VC ORDER OF BATTLE. Table VI shows the VC order of battle in I CTZ.

TABLE VIVC ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>PROBABLE</u>
1 Military Region Hqs.	10 Bns
1 Military Sub-region Hqs	5 Companies
3 Regt (2 NVA)	
*27 Bns (NVA)	
32 Companies	

*Includes 1 AA Bn and 2 Wpns Bns

III MAF Order of Battle has accepted the following newly identified units in I CTZ.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>RATING</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
95th B Regt (NVA)	2,000	Conf	BT 0030	31Mar66

N. WEATHER. Weather for the month included a few periods with a trace of precipitation and occasional periods of crachin with attendant low ceilings and fog. These conditions resulted in several occasions during which friendly forces mobility and air operations were restricted in certain localities. Precipitation for the month is shown in Table VII.

TABLE VIITOTAL PRECIPITATION FOR MARCH

<u>AREA</u>	<u>PRECIPITATION</u>	<u>MEAN FOR MONTH</u>
Danang	None	1.0"
Chu Lai	None	1.0"
Phu Bai	Trace	0.0"

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IV. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

A. STRENGTH. The average monthly strength of III MAF was increased from 45,504 in February to 51,905 during March. Table VIII outlines the average personnel strength for III MAF during March.

TABLE VIII

AVERAGE PERSONNEL STRENGTH

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE HEADQUARTERS

	<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>	
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
HQ III MAF	100	5	220	3
H&S Co	5	0	128	0

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

2679 510 40978 7648

B. CASUALTIES. III MAF casualties are shown in Table IX.

TABLE IX

1. Battle

<u>KIA</u>		<u>WIA</u>		<u>DOW</u>		<u>MIA</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
244	8	974	56	25	0	7	0

2. Non-battle

<u>DEATHS</u>		<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
8	1	77	9

C. COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAM

1. The character of service in Vietnam makes it mandatory that personnel reporting for duty receive an early indoctrination in those regulations which govern the actions of individuals, conditions under which they must serve, and the goals and missions of the United States and III MAF. Force/Naval Component Command Bulletin 1710 (Enclosure 2) implements the program.

2. Force/Naval Component Command Order 1730.3 (Enclosure 3) established an indoctrination program on the religious and religious practices in Vietnam. The program is designed to promote understanding of the people of Vietnam. Its content is intended to provide basic information on the religious life and value system of the indigenous people.

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D. PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLE POLICY. Force/Naval Component Command Order 1700.2 (Enclosure 4) establishes policy and instructions concerning privately owned vehicles in Vietnam.

E. RATION CARD REGULATIONS. Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam directed that rationing of certain controllable items of exchange merchandise be adopted. The procedure was instituted primarily to relieve burdens imposed upon the logistical system and to control excessive supply and demand of goods to personnel in country. Force/Naval Component Command Order 1746.1 (Enclosure 5) implements the Directive and provides regulations governing the issuance and use of Ration Cards.

F. SPECIAL SERVICES

1. Shows

(a) Robert Mitchum, the actor, departed on 1 March 1966 after visiting 30 units of this Command.

(b) Billy Casper and Hack Miller, pro golfers, arrived on 5 March and departed on 7 March. They visited 30 units during this period.

(c) The "Ann Margret Show" visited III MAF during the period of 13 and 14 March. The Troupe gave performances at Hill 327, Danang, Camp Tien Sha (Danang East), Phu Bai, and Chu Lai. Approximately 13,000 men attended the performances.

2. Recreation Construction. Work is in progress on the new Exchange and USO Building in the new recreation area at the base of hill 327. The second phase of construction at China Beach commenced with priority of work on the rehab of the office building and bath house.

3. R&R Program

(a) There were no significant problem areas in the R&R Program during the month of March.

(b) R&R totals were as set forth in Table X.

TABLE X

BANGKOK	• 612
HONG KONG	408
TAIPEI	78
TOKYO	495
MANILA	188
OKINAWA	1088
SAIGON	681
TOTAL	<u>3726</u>

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G. CHAPLAIN. An indoctrination program dealing with religion in Vietnam is now fully implemented throughout III MAF. Chaplains have presented lecture #1. Troop response has exceeded expectations. Lecture #2 has been completed and is ready for presentation.

V. LOGISTICS

A. General

1. The Tempo of logistics operations continued to increase with the growth of Force strength. The improving stockage of all levels of supply is aiding the overall logistic posture of the Force. "Red Ball", Critipak, and the use of air parcel post continues to be of major value in overcoming isolated supply problems.

2. The Force Logistics Command (FLC) was activated on 15 March 1966. Headquarters FLC, with FLSG-ALPHA is located at Danang, FLSG BRAVO at Chu Lai, and FLSU at Phu Bai. A new area for FLSG ALPHA was surveyed and staked out near Red Beach by Force Engineers during this period. Frames and foundations for an 8 Butler Building complex were erected and work commenced on internal roads to serve the area.

3. Strikes and civil disturbances in the Danang and Hue-Phu Bai areas intermittently handicapped construction projects and port operations during this period. Not only did indigenous laborers fail to show up for work during certain periods but, additionally, cargo movement was channelized to avoid precipitating political incidents.

4. A ground route reconnaissance was conducted along Route #1 from Hue-Phu Bai north to Dong Ha to update engineer intelligence on lines of communication (LOC).

5. The G-4 Section has undertaken a study to ascertain logistics support required to support elements of the Republic of Korea, 2d Marine Brigade (-) (Rein) in the event these units are introduced into I CTZ in support of the III MAF mission.

6. Studies are underway by this Headquarters to increase the logistic support capability of possible increased force structure in the Hue-Phu Bai area.

7. A III MAF Logistics (SOP) was published and distributed to all units during March (Enclosure 8).

8. The III MAF Food Services Officer attended a conference in Alameda, California from 22-24 March 1966. Principal topics concerned "Subsistence and Refrigeration". Subsistence forecasts were planned and future requirements for chill and freeze facilities for in-country forces were presented.

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9. 10,000 sets of disposable mess gear have been received by III MAF for the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions to field test in areas where water is in short supply.

B. Engineer. Major Force Engineer accomplishments for March included a step-up of military assistance in construction of the new III MAF CP; initiation of construction of the new FLSG ALPHA storage area near Red Beach; sufficient completion of ASP #2 for use in alleviating ammunition storage problems; continued work on the 1st Marine Division CP at Chu Lai; maintenance and improvement of roads; completion of 5 class 60 timber trestle bridges; rehabilitation of Danang Air Base perimeter lights; aid in construction of 12 new bunkers for air base defense; route reconnaissance along Route #1 from Phu Bai to Dong Ha (YD 345 605); and termination of the downtown Danang ferry operation for urgent use of the 60T raft in support of 9th Marines on BAU XAU River (AT 991642).

C. Supply

1. III MAF Red Ball records were mechanized during the month of March. This procedure reduced the administrative work load of providing weekly status reports to FMFPac. It also established a better management tool by providing more accurate reconciliation of records between III MAF and major commands involved. No other significant changes occurred in the Red Ball program. A recap of Red Ball during the month of March follows:

Total line items on Red Ball - 1 March	241
Total line items added	74
Total line items deleted	68
Total line items on Red Ball 31 March	247

2. The 3000 equipment operation on the Marine Corps Unified Material Management System (UMMS) for supply personnel at Danang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai.

D. Embarkation and Port Operation

1. The most significant event during the month of March was the arrival of the First Marine Division at Chu Lai. Cargo offerings from Danang to Chu Lai were 8877 S/T for the month, which is an all time high, exceeding the previous high of November 1965 by 3000 S/T. Fifteen days of supply for a regiment was shipped from Danang to Phu Bai via LCU and trucks. An AKA was requested from Commander, Seventh Fleet to assist in lifting cargo from Danang to Phu Bai. The USS SKAGIT was assigned this mission. Loading of the SKAGIT at Danang was hampered by civil disturbances. Civil disturbances at Hue also hindered the offload of the USS WHETSTONE. The following data is submitted concerning cargo and ships handled during the month.

(a) 28 USN ships and 18 MSTs ships debarked or embarked at Danang.

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(b) 23 LST's and 6 Deep Draft ships debarked at Chu Lai.

(c) 162,254 M/T were offloaded at Da nang with a daily average of 5,234 M/T and 3,049 S/T.

(d) 40,424 M/T were offloaded at Chu Lai with a daily average of 1,304 M/T and 653 S/T.

E. Fiscal. A re-allocation of AIK funds within III MAF units was required during this quarter due to the hiring of additional civilian employees and a pay increase on 1 January 1966. The AIK fund for the first quarter CY 66 was closed out.

F. Ordnance. The month of March was highlighted by the visit of Major General F. A. HANSEN, US Army, Commanding General, Munitions Command. General HANSEN was briefed on ammunition off-loading and Class V & VA resupply systems. Mr. R. H. ERICHSEN, Equipment Specialist, Headquarters Army Weapons Command, Rock Island, Illinois visited III MAF concerning problems affiliated with the Howitzer SP 155mm, M109. Ground illumination and pyrotechnic signals became a matter of concern as actual expenditures exceeded planned expenditures. A study was undertaken during this period to determine and recommend new expenditure rates for these items. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing now has the capability to employ E159/E158 cannister cluster Riot Control air delivered munitions.

G. Medical. The 1st Hospital Company, FMF, and the 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Marine Division, FMF (-), arrived in-country during this period and were positioned at Chu Lai. The USS REPOSE departed the Da nang area for Subic Bay, P.I. on 10 March 1966 with an unknown return date. Hospital facilities are adequate with two Division Medical Battalions in-country, a Force Hospital Company, and a 400-bed Navy hospital complex at Marble Mountain, Da nang East, which is about 80% complete.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS

A. The III MAF Communication Center experienced a substantial increase in total message traffic from the previous month. Total message traffic figures were as follows:

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>Increase</u>
Incoming	41,994	47,994	6,000
Outgoing	30,795	34,330	3,535
Total	72,789	82,324	9,535

B. During the month, civil unrest in Da nang required continuous communications with major units in the Da nang complex. A radio circuit was established in the III MAF Combat Operation Center for this purpose.

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C. With the arrival of the 1st Marine Division Command Group at Chu Lai, command and control communications between III MAF and the 1st Marine Division were required. One General Purpose entry into Defense Communications System, two teletype circuits, six voice switchboard trunks and two voice hot lines were established. Three of the above circuits are carried via in-country tropospheric scatter system and the remainder on U.S. Marine Corps radio relay equipment.

D. With the establishment of the Force Logistics Command, a requirement to establish communications between the subordinate Force Logistics Command unit at Chu Lai existed. Two voice switchboard trunks were established between Force Logistics Command and Force Logistics Support Group "B". Establishment of circuits between Force Logistics Command and Force Logistics Support Unit #2 (Phu Bai) is in the planning stage.

E. Fixed plant communications, equipment and a Field Technical Assistance Team from NAVSEEC arrived in Danang. Two complete sets will be installed in the 1st Marine Division communication center during April.

VII. CIVIC ACTION

A. General. The basic objectives of the III MAF Civic Action Program remained the same during the month of March. Continued emphasis was placed on education, especially in the area of vocational training.

B. Joint Coordinating Council. The council met weekly during March. The council experienced minor reorganization by formalizing the Roads Committee and dissolving the Public Safety Committee. There was a discussion of the processing of grievances as received by Census Grievance Teams. The council agreed to consider those grievances which require coordinated action on the part of more than one agency.

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committees. All committees of the council functioned during the month making studies in their respective fields. The following reports were submitted to the council.

1. Port of Danang Committee. The committee reported that the proposed military plans for the port were explained to the GVN officials and approved by them. Additionally, the civilian plans were presented to the military for approval. There were no conflicts in the two plans and both were subsequently approved by the Central Government in Saigon. A final decision has not been made on the Port of Danang Committee membership.

2. Roads Committee. The committee reported on the plans and problems in connection with road construction and maintenance, bridge replacement and maintenance, and rock quarry operations in I Corps Tactical Zone. An agreement has been reached on the location of a second Danang river bridge. Naval Support Activity, Danang, agreed to maintain all main supply routes in the Danang area used by military forces.

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3. Psychological Operations Committee. The committee report was concerned primarily with problems surrounding the operation of Radio Danang. The problems center around three areas; (1) inadequate financial support, (2) poor programming, (3) equipment deficiencies. Radio Saigon provides financial support which is inadequate to meet local operating expenses and wages. JUSPAO is currently assisting in the payment of wages. Programming is primarily done by Radio Saigon. They provide approximately 70-80% of the present program schedule with themes primarily of interest to Saigon. Local officials would prefer a requirement of 40% or less. Equipment problems center around insufficient spare parts and an inadequate antenna system.

4. Education Committee. The committee reported that it had discussed teacher qualifications and teacher salaries, the need for scholarships, and the need for additional vocational training. There is presently a shortage of funds specifically designated for teachers salaries and there is no provision for paying a teacher that is employed in a self-help school. Payment of salaries is a continuing requirement and should therefore be included in the GVN Budget. The idea of establishing scholarships for deserving primary students was well received. There is a definite need for increasing opportunities in vocational training. USAID and NSA both offered assistance in this area. NSA announced that LtJg McRAY, a new member on the Education Committee, would be made available to assist USAID in increasing vocational training opportunities within the city of Danang.

5. Commodities Distribution Committee. The committee reported that the American Christmas Trucks and Trains inventory had been completed and that all medical supplies, bar soap and some clothing had been distributed to units for further local distribution. Tactical units received 20% of all commodities and the remainder was divided between the provinces according to need. A requirement for a permanent Joint Working Force to control commodities distribution was discussed. A team was formed to study the requirement but has not reported to the committee. The committee announced that transportation of supplies from Saigon could be expected to improve due to increased cooperation between various agencies and military units. USAID has been allotted space on military transportation which, if not required by USAID, may be utilized by volunteer agencies for movement of their commodities. III MAF can expect to receive 15% of all undesignated commodities arriving in-country. USAID reported the establishment of storage facilities in Danang for a 30 day inventory of Catholic Relief Society (CRS) and CARE commodities. A representative from "C" Detachment, 5th Special Forces Group was added to the committee membership.

D. Medical Assistance. During the month of March, forty-eight (48) MEDCAP teams provided 95,891 medical and dental treatments to 76,656 Vietnamese citizens in 158 locations. This represented a 20 percent increase in treatments over previous months. Distribution of treatments were as follows:

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Skin Disease	19.0%
Respiratory Infections	18.0%
Miscellaneous Ailments	16.0%
Headache	11.5%
Stomach Ailments	10.6%
Diarrhea	8.5%
Injuries	7.4%
Dental Conditions	6.0%
Fevers	3.0%

The number of treatments by TAOR were:

Danang	56,394
Chu Lai	27,734
Phu Bai	11,763

Twenty one (21) health workers and two voluntary nurses received training during the month. III MAF Medical/Dental Officers gave formal training at Hue Medical Health school for 30 students in medical emergencies and 30 in dental emergencies.

E. CARE Program During March, III MAF units received 7,186 school kits, 49 masonry kits, 259 woodworking kits, 4,735 textile packages, 3,800 sewing kits, 150 physical education kits, 50 canisters salt and 260 bags of rice. A majority of the goods received have been distributed through GVN officials.

F. Project HANGLASB Approximately 5,535 pounds of miscellaneous commodities were received by III MAF during March.

VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A. Major Operations

1. Operation Texas. The largest tactical psyops campaign in March was conducted in support of Operation Texas. Primary psyops support was provided by Detachment 2 (Quang Ngai), 244th Psychological Operations Company (U.S. Army). A total of 298,000 leaflets were dropped from U-10 psywar aircraft, and 10 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted. The following themes were used throughout the operations:

(a) Viet Cong leaders desert their wounded on the battlefield, while the GVN and its allies provide excellent medical care.

(b) Explanation of U. S. presence.

(c) Appeal for civilians to remain in their homes while Marines are in the area so that the Viet Cong cannot hide behind them.

(d) Surrender appeal.

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(e) Warning not to shoot at aircraft.

(f) Safe-conduct passes.

2. Operation Oregon. Although no tactical psyops were conducted in direct support of Operation Oregon, leaflet drops were conducted in the area of operations on the day following the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Leaflets explained the presence of Marines during the operation and the Chieu Hoi program.

B. New Developments

1. Utilization of Ralliers. The techniques of using ralliers to write letters which can be converted into leaflets, and to produce tape recordings, have been used by III MAF for several months. During March, a program was initiated whereby ralliers accompanied ground audio/visual psywar teams into rural hamlets in the Danang TAOR, and gave speeches relating the hardships of their life with the Viet Cong, the differences between life for villagers in Viet Cong controlled areas and GVN controlled areas, and specific reasons for their decision to rally. Ralliers also appealed to the families of Viet Cong to urge their husbands and sons to take advantage of the Chieu Hoi program.

2. Leaflet Development. Two (2) new leaflets were developed to support a campaign to enlist the assistance of villagers in locating mines and booby traps. These leaflets explained to the people that these devices injure more curious children than U.S. and ARVN soldiers, and offer a reward to persons who provide information leading to the discovery of mines and booby traps. The 3dMarDiv indicated that the use of these leaflets had resulted in a small amount of initial success.

C. Viet Cong Propaganda. A comparison of current Viet Cong propaganda found during March with past material on file at I Corps Joint PsyWar/CA Center, indicated a decrease in efforts to reach U.S. audiences and an increase directed at ARVN Forces. Most Viet Cong leaflets found in I Corps attempted to cause disaffection on the part of ARVN military personnel with their American ally.

D. Reproduction. III MAF received 159 reams of 22" X 34" paper which had been requisitioned for psyop printing requirements. This amount of paper will produce approximately 2 million leaflets, which constitutes approximately a 6 week supply under normal operating circumstances. 500,000 leaflets were printed from this stock during March.

IX. COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU

A. The Escort Section had its busiest month since the establishment of the CIB in May 1965. A total of 489 escorted trips were made to the field

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during March. Operational coverage of Utah, Texas, New York and Oregon accounted for the majority of these trips. The return of newly promoted Lieutenant General WAIT and the 3d Marine Division change of command were widely covered by the Press.

B. Photography. The Photo Section forwarded a total of 20,510 feet of motion picture footage during March. This included material from all three photo sections and the DOD Team assigned to I Corps area. 80% of the footage was operational and military feature coverage. 15% concerned civic action and the remaining 5% was VIP coverage. CIB photo is working on a special Chaplain feature requested by Headquarters Marine Corps. The arrival in RVN of the new Marine Helicopters, CH-46, was also covered with still and motion picture shots. The DOD Team completed a film feature on Combat Engineers.

C. Radio/Television. The radio section made 94 releases during the month which covered interviews and special radio programs. These were primarily concerned with operational coverage.

D. Escorts. 489 Representatives of the Press were escorted to the field. 53 of the total were escorted to cover civic action stories from the Combined Action Company at Chu Lai and Danang, to medical aid stations, construction of schools and churches, and rural reconstruction.

X. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE ACTIVITY (RVNAF)

A. General

1. VC initiated incidents rose to 435 this month compared to 284 in February; however, incidents on the National Railroad declined from 17 last month to 12 this month. The VC initiated a multi-battalion attack against the CIDG border camp of A SHAU and, although the VC suffered heavy casualties, the camp was evacuated. Following the attack on A SHAU, a Special Forces Delta Force was deployed for the first time in I Corps. The mission of the Delta Force was to gain information on enemy movement out of the A SHAU Valley. Throughout the I Corps Zone ARVN and USMC forces conducted successful operations against multi-battalion forces and for protection of the rice harvest. Security around Danang was expanded when the USMC Extended their TAOR to the southeast.

2. The abrupt change of commanders in I Corps and 1st Division created considerable political unrest in I Corps. Repercussions from the political situation have been growing in magnitude and intensity and have extended into the military establishment.

B. Current Operations

1. I Corps (ARVN) conducted 49 battalion or larger size unit operations during the month as compared to 42 in February. There were 4 combined and 7 airmobile operations included in the above figure. Contact was made with the VC in 26 of these operations (24 last month) resulting in

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1501 VC KIA and 120 VCC, 437 VCS and 25 defectors detained. Last month's totals were 997 VC KIA, 125 VCC, 346 VCS and 29 defectors detained. ARVN and RF/PF combat losses were 381 KIA and 799 WIA (344 KIA and 530 WIA last month). The weapons figures were 474 captured and 444 lost. Last month 320 weapons were lost and 278 captured. Losses at A SHAU are not included in the above figures for they will be covered separately in paragraph C.1 below.

2. Three significant operations took place in the I CTZ during the reporting period:

(a) Lien Ket 26/Utah, a combined heliborne ARVN/USMC operation, was significant because of the losses sustained by the VC. This operation, conducted 4-7 March just northwest of Quang Ngai City, was the result of intelligence gained from a captured VC. ARVN losses were 30 KIA and 120 WIA (1 US). Enemy losses were 228 KIA (US confirmed), 300 additional KIA (estimated), 7 VCC, 7 VCS and 34 weapons captured.

(b) Operation Delta, a 1st ARVN Division controlled reconnaissance operation, began on 15 March in Thua Thien Province. Special Forces Delta teams, Roadrunner teams and two Ranger companies were shuttled in and out of the operations area for a period of fifteen days to gather information on suspected enemy movement west of Hue. The information gathered during this operation is still being processed at the close of this reporting period. Friendly losses during the operation were 2 KIA, 2 WIA (US), 3 MIA and 2 HUB helicopters. Enemy losses were 4 KIA, 15 KBA (estimated), 3 VCS, 2 WIA and 3 weapons captured.

(c) On 17 March the 2d Company of 3/3 ambushed an unknown number of VC in the Phong Dien Sub-sector. The company established positions along a trail which was known to have been used by the VC. After darkness, the company moved from established positions to ambush sites where it engaged the VC at approximately 2230 hours. Fire and noise discipline were excellent; artillery was used to seal off the enemy's escape routes once contact was established. Results of the ambush were 50 VC KIA and 30 weapons captured against 16 Friendly WIA.

C. VC Activities

1. During March, the number of VC initiated incidents increased to 435 as opposed to 284 for February. Highlighting VC activity was the attack on A SHAU on 9-10 March. Information obtained prior to 6 March from captured enemy documents and two NVA defectors gave indications of an enemy buildup and preparation for an attack. The camp was reinforced on 8 March by a CIDG strike force company and 17 USSF. At 0350 hours on 9 March the camp began receiving heavy 81mm mortar fire. The attack continued until 1730 hours on 10 March when evacuation and E&E plans were effected. Of the 434 personnel in the camp, 248 (including 5 USSF) are listed as missing. Approximately 172 (including 5 USSF) of the 248 missing are believed KIA, the remaining

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186 (including 12 WIA USSF) were evacuated. Over 500 weapons of all types were lost as well as 4 fixed wing aircraft and 4 helicopters. Enemy casualties were estimated at 600 to 800 KIA. There were 307 airstrikes flown in support of the beleaguered camp.

2. Other VC incidents included the simultaneous mortaring of five areas in and around Hoi An in Quang Nam Special Sector on 22 March.

3. On the political scene, the dismissal of General Nguyen Chanh Thi on 10 March precipitated a series of strikes and demonstrations that are growing in intensity. The dismissal provided an opportunity for those elements discontented with the present government to vent their views. Perhaps the most vociferous of those discontents were the Buddhists and student groups. Anti-American propaganda was seen and heard in Danang and Hue. On the whole, demonstrations and Buddhist religious ceremonies were orderly and without violence.

4. In the I CTZ, the VC still retain the capability to launch regimental size attacks at any time and place of their choosing. The possibility of terroristic attacks in the Danang Area against US installations and billets continue. Political unrest may be used by the VC to spread anti-American propaganda and to foment open violence.

D. Rural Construction. At the end of the first quarter, 8 out of 178 hamlets programmed in the I CTZ for construction during Phase I of the 1966 plan were secured. This is 4% of the first quarter program. An additional 101 (59% hamlets were considered undergoing construction at the close of the reporting period. The lack of trained cadre and increasing VC activity have accounted for the slow progress. This increase in VC activity is most noticeable in Quang Ngai Province. The Mo Duc area is no longer under GVN control and the cadre has been withdrawn. The new province chief of Quang Nam, Dr. Chi, continues to gain confidence in his job and is taking an increasing interest in the National Priority Area.

E. PsyOps/CA. As a result of increased command and advisory emphasis, there was an improvement in the use of psywar in conjunction with ground tactical operations. Approximately 4.7 million leaflets were dropped and there were approximately 94 hours of airborne broadcasts. Unfortunately, there was a 35% decline in Chien Hoi returnees. The decline in the returnee rate was attributed to increased VC counter-propaganda measures.

F. Personnel-Strength Accounting. Desertions in February 1966 again showed an upward trend in the ARVN Regular Forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone. This possibly was the result of the TET holidays, the increased number of tactical operations, and the political unrest and uncertainty that has prevailed.

G. Regional Force/Popular Force

1. Due to the recent relaxing of restrictions, it is reported that recruiting has picked up considerably, particularly in Quang Nam Province.

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Exact figures are not available at this time but are being compiled. During March RF/PF combat losses were 144 KIA, 88 WIA, and 55 MIA. This is compared to VC losses of 163 KIA and 25 VCC. Weapons losses continue with an unfavorable ratio of 204 lost against 37 captured.

2. The welfare program to support RF/PF widows and dependents continued to progress very well with 50,000 pounds of foodstuffs distributed to RF/PF widows and dependents. Under the food supplement program 20,000 pounds of foodstuffs were distributed to PF families. Over 700,000 pounds of foodstuffs have been manifested from Saigon for future distribution in support of the above programs. I Corps received 28 sewing machines, 25 woodworking kits and 25 mason kits to implement the RF/PF rehabilitation program for widows and dependents during the month.

H. Logistics

1. Rail transportation in the I Corps area continued to be restricted by VC action and depletion of available rolling stock. During March, only 600 tons of supplies were moved by rail. Road convoy operations improved during the month enabling an increase in depot stockage levels in the 1st Division area. However, stockage levels are still below safety levels at depots in that area. Stockage levels in the 2d Division are generally satisfactory.

2. The supply of rice in the Corps area during the month was insufficient to fill demands. Depot stockage was at a zero balance and using units were required to subsist from their prescribed loads. On 22 March, 2500 tons of rice were received by ship. This shipment alleviated the present shortage although general strikes hampered unloading operations. Additional shipments are required at an early date to prevent stocks from again falling below safety levels. Adequate stocks of most Class V items are available, however some critical shortages exist.

I. Engineer

1. Keeping Highway 1 open remains the primary Engineer task. VC activity against roads and bridges continued to cause interruption in convoy movement capability. The ARVN reaction time (damage to repair) continued to be excellent, enabling Highway 1 to be passable 90% of the month. Highway 1 has deteriorated however, and lack of adequate maintenance funds was a serious problem.

2. The railroad between Danang and Hue was open 50% of the month. The VC destroyed 7 railroad bridges, mined trains and tracks on 3 occasions and tore up rails on 2 occasions. Bridge timbers, bridge decking, crushed rock, cement and PSP remain in critical short supply.

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PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 March - Operation DOUBLE EAGLE Phase II B terminated.
- 3 March - Operation NEW YORK terminated.
- 4 March - Operation UTAH began.
- 6 March - Operation UTAH terminated.
- 9 March - LtGen WALT returned RVN. Reassumed command of III MAF & 3dMarDiv.
- 10 March - H&S Company III MAF activated. Sub-Unit #2, Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division dissolved.
- 15 March - Force Logistics Command activated.
- 17 March - Operation MASSACHUSETTS began.
- 18 March - Operation MASSACHUSETTS terminated.
- MGen Wood B. KYLE assumed command of 3d Marine Division.
- 19 March - Operation KINGS began.
- 20 March - Operation TEXAS began.
- Operation OREGON began.
- 23 March - Operation OREGON terminated.
- 25 March - Operation TEXAS terminated.
- 27 March - Unnamed battalion operation in the CO BI THANH TAN area began (YD 5430)
- 28 March - Operation INDIANA began.
- Operation KINGS terminated.
- 29 March - Operation ALABAMA began.
- MGen Lewis J. FIELDS, CG, 1stMarDiv, arrived in RVN to assume command of 1stMarDiv units in the Chu Lai area.
- 30 March - Operation INDIANA terminated.
- Operation ALABAMA terminated.

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CHRONOLOGY OF VIP VISITS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
1-4Mar66	Hao Chang YU	LtGen.	CMC, Republic of China
1-4Mar66	Joi-Chieh HSU	BGen	Director, Civil Affairs Bureau Ministry of National Defense Republic of China
1-4Mar66	Lin-Cheng KUNG	MGen	CG, 1stMarDiv, Republic of China
1-4Mar66	Cher-Yuan CHANG	MGen	CG, 81st Inf Div, Republic of China
1-4Mar66	Hui-Teuan SHIH	MGen	CG, 1st Marine Brigade, Republic of China
1-2Mar66	Walter WELHAM	RAdm	CINCPAC Surgeon
1-2Mar66	William GRAHAM	Dr.	Rand Corps (GS-18)
1Mar66	Edward G. LINDDALE	Mr.	Special Assistant to the Ambassador of RVN
4-5Mar66	Robert R. WILLIAMS	BGen	Director, Army Aviation
4Mar66	William C. WESTMORELAND	Gen	COMUSMACV
4Mar66	U.S. Grant SHARP	Adm	CINCPAC
5Mar66	Carroll H. DUNN	BGen	Director, Construction Directorate, MACV
5Mar66	R. R. WOODING	RAdm	OICC, RVN
4-5Mar66	Berton SPIVY	LtGen	Director, J-5, JCS
5Mar66	Royal N. BAKER	BGen	Chief Far Easter Division, J-5, JCS
5Mar66	George M. SEIGNIOUS	BGen	Director, Policy Planning Staff, ISA of OSD
5Mar66	William C. HAMILTON	Mr.	Dep Director, Far East Region, ISA
9Mar66	E. R. QUESADA	LtGen	USAF (Ret)

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
9Mar66	G. L. MEYERS	MGen	2d Air Div, Vice Commander
9-10Mar66	William W. SPRUANCE	BGen	USAF, Air Adjutant
9-16Mar66	Dean R. HAVRON	Dr.	Human Sciences Research Inc.
10Mar66	Jung Shik KONG	LtGen	CMC, ROK
10Mar66	Sung Chul PARK	BGen	CG, Chin Hai Marine Base
10Mar66	John A. HEINTAGES	LtGen	Deputy, COMUSMACV
10Mar66	William K. JONES	BGen	COC, Saigon
11Mar66	F. A. HANSEN	MGen	CG, Army Munitions Command
12-13Mar66	F. A. BARDSHAR	RAdm	Head of a Special Study Group
12Mar66	William C. WESTMORELAND	Gen	COMUSMACV
12Mar66	William K. JONES	BGen	COC, Saigon
12Mar66	Anthony RUMBOLD	Sir	British Ambassador to Thailand
12Mar66	R.G.A. ETHERINGTON-SMITH	Mr.	British Ambassador to RVN
13-14Mar66	John TILLSON	MGen	MACV J-3
15Mar66	John WILTON	LtGen	Chief of General Staff, Australian Military Forces
15Mar66	O. D. JACKSON	BGen	Commander, Australian Forces in RVN
15Mar66	R. S. ABBEY	MGen	Deputy Chief of Staff, MACV
16-19Mar66	Victor H. KRULAK	LtGen	CG, FMFPAC
16Mar66	Wood B. KYLE	MCor	CG, 3dMarDiv
16Mar66	Randolph C. DICKENS	BGen	ADC, 1st Inf Division
17-18Mar66	W. F. CASSIDY	LtGen	Chief of Engineers, Dept of Army

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
18Mar66	Joseph H. MOORE	LtGen	Deputy COMUSMACV for Air Ops and Cmdr, 2d Air Division
18Mar66	William C. WESTMORELAND	Gen	COMUSMACV
18Mar66	Norvel G. WARD	RAdm	NavAdvGrp
21Mar66	Frank GOFFIO	Mr.	Executive Director, CARE
21Mar66	H. STROUSE	Mr.	Director, CARE in RVN
21Mar66	Jack HAUSER	Mr.	Asst Director, CARE in RVN
21Mar66	R. RAMP	Mr.	Senior Field Representative, CARE in RVN
22Mar66	Melvin ZAIS	BGen	Deputy CG, Field Forces #1
22-24Mar66	John J. HYLAND	VAdm	COMSEVENTHFLT
23Mar66	Nguyen Hua CHI	Dr.	Quang Nam Province Chief
23-24Mar66	John DUGAN	Mr.	Director, American Red Cross
23-24Mar66	John GORDON	Mr.	Director, SMI Far Eastern Area, ARC
23-24Mar66	Harry MC CULLOHS	Mr.	Director of Operations in RVN, ARC
24Mar66	Walter E. LOTZ	BGen	MACV J-6
25-26Mar66	D. M. SHOWERS	RAdm	Assistant C/S for Intelligence, CINCPACFLT
25-26Mar66	A. S. HEYWARD	VAdm	CNATRA
28-29Mar66	M. R. WHITE	RAdm	COMFAIRWESTPAC
28Mar66	G. L. MABRY	BGen	ADC, 1st Armored Division
28Mar66	R. S. ABBEY	MGen	Deputy Chief of Staff, MACV
31Mar66	J. E. MORRISON	BGen	USAF, Chief NSAPAC
31Mar-1Apr66	Harry H. CRITZ	MGen	CG, Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

SECRET
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PART FOURREFERENCES

- (a) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology, March 1966
- (b) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, March 1966
- (c) 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, March 1966
- (d) Force Logistic Command Chronology, March 1966
- (e) COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI 3-66) of 30 March 1966 (S) ✓
- (f) MAPS, Vietnam L701, Series, scale 1:50,000 sheets 6658 I, II, III, IV, 6659 II, III, IV, 6756 I, IV, 6757 II, III, 6559 I, II, III, IV, 6560 II, III, IV

ENCLOSURES

- ✓(1) Summary of Sub-Unit One 1st ANGLICO operations from 1-15 March 1966
- ✓(2) Force/Naval Component Command Bulletin 1710; Subj: Indoctrination matter for personnel reporting aboard
- ✓(3) Force/Naval Component Command Order 1730.3; Subj: Lecture discussions on Religion in Vietnam
- ✓(4) Force/Naval Component Command Order 1700.2; Subj: Policy and Instructions concerning Privately Owned Vehicles in Vietnam
- ✓(5) Force/Naval Component Command Order 1746.1; Subj: Regulations Governing Ration Cards
- ✓(6) 7th Engineer Battalion (-) (Rein) Command Chronology for March 1966
- ✓(7) 5th Communication Battalion Command Chronology for March 1966
- ✓(8) III MAF/NCC Logistics SOP
- ✓(9) III MAF Task Organization/Troop List, 31 March 1966
- ✓(10) CG III MAF Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned Report
- ✓(11) Overlays of III MAF TAOR's and RZ's
- ✓(12) CG III MAF msg 020712Z Apr concerning "County Fair" Operations
- ✓(13) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines Command Chronology for March 1966

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S E C R E T

R 160903Z
 FM SUB UNIT ONE FIRST ANGLICO
 TO RUMNMF/CG III MAF
 INFO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T

SUB UNIT ONE FIRST ANGLICO SUMMARY 1--15 MARCH 1966 (U)

A. DURING THE PERIOD 1 TO 15 MARCH 1966 ANGLICO UNITS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE LIAISON AND SPOTTING FOR NAVAL GUNFIRE IN VIETNAM AND IN ADDITION PROVIDE LIAISON AND SPOTTING SUPPORT FOR THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONS: HARRISON, WHITE WING, HAM TAHN 36, EAGLE CLAW, KNOCK KNEE, AND ROUGH RIDER.

B. A TOTAL OF 61 NGF MISSIONS WERE CONTROLLED BY ANGLICO SPOTTERS WITH 23 IN I CORPS, 13 IN II CORPS, 15 IN III CORPS AND 10 IN IV CORPS. 499 TARGETS WERE TAKEN UNDER FIRE. AMMUNITION EXPENDED ON THESE MISSIONS 7,363 RDS AAC, 355 RDS HE, 150 RDS WP, 184 RDS

PAGE 2 RUMFKB 534 S E C R E T

IIL, 12 RDS COM, 329 RDS VT, 5 RDS 5" HC, 550 RDS 6" HC.

C. NO ANGLICO PERSONNEL INITIATED OR PARTICIPATED IN ANY CIVIL ACTION DURING THIS PERIOD.

D. STATEMENT OF PERSONNEL ON BOARD READ ACROSS IN FOUR COLUMNS.
 D.

	USMC OFF	USMC ENL	USN OFF	USN ENL
SAIGON	2	16	1	0
BIEN HOA	0	4	1	0
BARIA	0	3	0	0
DANANG	0	4	1	0
QUANG NGAI	1	2	0	0
QUIN NHON	1	2	0	0
PLEIKU	0	3	1	0
CAN THO	0	3	1	0
NHA TRANG	0	2	1	0
HAM TAN	0	2	0	0
CA MAU	0	2	0	0
TOTAL	4	43	6	0

E. NO PROBLEMS OPERATIONAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE EXIST AT THIS TIME.
 GP-4

Encl (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco
California 96602

FOR/NCCBul 1710
1A/ref
15 March 1966

FORGE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND BULLETIN 1710

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander
To: Distribution List

Subj: Topic Item Check List for subject matter to be used in indoctrination of personnel reporting aboard for duty

Encl: (1) Indoctrination subjects for newly arrived personnel, check list

1. Purpose. To publish a list of directives issued by this Headquarters which require promulgation to newly arrived personnel as a part of their indoctrination for service in Vietnam.

2. Background. The unique character of service in Vietnam makes it mandatory that personnel reporting for duty receive an early indoctrination in those regulations which govern the actions of individuals, unusual conditions under which they must serve, and the goals and missions of the United States and this Command. The directives listed in enclosure (1) contain subject matter which is required to be included in the indoctrination program.

3. Action. Commanders will review their indoctrination program to ensure that subject matter cited in the directives listed in enclosure (1) is included.

4. Self-cancellation. 31 August 1966.


G. C. AXTELL
Chief of Staff

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Encl (2)

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FOR/NCCBul 1710
15 March 1966INDOCTRINATION SUBJECTS FOR NEWLY ARRIVED PERSONNEL, CHECK LIST

<u>SUBJ</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
1. Liberty Regulations and Standards of Personal Conduct	F/NCCO 1050.1A
2. Treatment of Captured Personnel	FO 1060.2
3. Privately Owned Automobiles	F/NCCO 1700.1
4. Purchase and Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages	FO 1710.1
5. Missions, Objectives, and Responsibilities of U. S. Forces in RVN	FO 1710.4
6. Religion in Vietnam	F/NCCO 1730.3
7. Request Mast	FO 1740.1
8. Control of Postal Money Orders	F/NCCO 2740.1
9. Prevention of Contraband in Personal Baggage	FO 4651.1
10. Use of U. S. Currency, Piasters, and Price Control	FO 1752.1A
11. Monetary Control Regulations	F/NCCO 7220.1
12. Possession of Privately Owned Firearms and other Unauthorized Dangerous Weapons	FO 8100.2
13. Extension of Tours of Duty for "time lost" in RVN	F/NCCBul 1300 of 12Jan66
14. Unintentional Firing of Weapons	CG III MAF/NCC msg 040812ZMAR66
15. Untoward Incidents involving Vietnamese Nationals	ICCI 1610.1
16. Respect for the Law, Property, Institutions, Traditions and Customs of the Republic of Vietnam	ICCI 5370.1A
17. Unauthorized Possession and Use of Narcotic and Habit Forming Drugs	CG III MAF/I Corps Area Coordinator ltr of 9Feb66
18. Personal Property War Trophies	FO 3801.1

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FOR/NCCBul 1710
15 March 1966

- | | |
|--|------------------------------|
| 19. Handling of Captured Personnel, Material and Documents | FO 01060.1 |
| 20. Personal Photography | F/NCC/SA I Corps
Bul 1700 |
| 21. Counterintelligence | FORBul 3850 |
| 22. Rules of Engagement | To be published |
| 23. "Nine Rules" (MACV Card Issue one per individual) | |

Encl sure (1)

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Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
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FOR/NCC O 1730.3

1/ref

2 March 1966

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND ORDER 1730.3

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander
To: Distribution List

Subj: Lecture-Discussions on Religion in Vietnam

Ref: (a) Force O 1710.4
(b) FMFPac 042338Z FEB 66 (NOTAL)

1. Purpose. To establish a troop indoctrination program on the religions and religious practices in Vietnam. The program is designed to enhance the capability of all military personnel to relate effectively with the people of Vietnam. Its content is intended to provide basic information on the religious life and value systems of the indigenous people.

2. Background. Reference (a) established a Command Information Program specifically related to the MACV area of operations. Reference (b) directed that troop indoctrination, pointed toward a greater awareness of the religious aspects of the people of Vietnam, be initiated immediately.

3. Information. Officers of the Chaplain Corps will provide instruction. The program will consist of two lectures. The first will contain a survey of the religions of Vietnam; and the second will discuss specific religious practices of the people with particular reference to those practices about which U. S. Military personnel should be knowledgeable. The Chaplains received instructions and organized plans in the subject areas during February.

4. Action

a. Commanders will immediately implement this program utilizing the services of assigned chaplains. For those units not having chaplains assigned, arrangements for lectures will be made through the appropriate supervisory chaplain. Chaplains will be consulted on scheduling matters to avoid conflict with their primary duties.

b. It is desired that the initial indoctrination be completed at the earliest practicable date. Thereafter these lectures-discussions will be conducted on a once a month basis for those personnel who have reported during the interim since the previous lectures.

EWc/ (3)

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FOR/NCC O 1730.3
2 March 1966

c. Attendance of a maximum number of personnel, officer and enlisted, is required. Upon completion of the initial lecture coverage, commanders are directed to make a consolidated report to this Headquarters showing the number of personnel who attended in relation to total strength. This is intended to be a one-time report.

G. C. AxteLL
G. C. AXTELL
Chief of Staff

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Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
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California 96602

For/NCCO 1700.2
1A/ref
27 March 1966

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND ORDER 1700.2

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander
To: Distribution List

Subj: Privately Owned Vehicles, policy and instructions concerning

Ref: (a) MACV Directive Number 58-3 of 31Dec65 (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Form (Command Operators Permit)

1. Purpose. To implement reference (a) and publish policy concerning the ownership and operation of privately owned vehicles, and administrative procedures attendant thereto.

2. Cancellation. Force/NCC Order 1700.1 is hereby cancelled.

3. Policy

a. The purchase for local use, ownership, operation, or importation of privately owned automobiles to include any three-wheeled vehicles in the Republic of Vietnam is prohibited for members of this Command.

b. The operation of rented, hired, or leased automobiles to include any three-wheeled motor vehicles in the Republic of Vietnam is prohibited for members of this Command.

c. The operation and ownership of motorscooters, motorcycles and motorbikes are authorized subject to strict controls as set forth herein. The area of authorized operations will be designated by the senior subordinate commands for their assigned personnel. In this connection, operations off military compounds will be prohibited except to proceed to and from areas of military installations as approved by the parent command.

d. As a matter of policy this Command does not encourage the operation and ownership of these vehicles. Authority to operate them on a restrictive basis as a measure of transportation convenience for personnel commuting between billeting and working area is the only basis for sanctioning them in this area in the present condition of combat operations.

4. General

encl (4)

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For/NGC O 1700.2
27March1966

a. Vehicle Registration Requirements

(1) Motorscooters, motorcycles and/or motorbikes that weigh 30 kilos or more, are capable of exceeding 30 KPH or employ a recoil or battery starter will be registered and issued a license number to be displayed on front and rear of vehicle.

(2) Motorbikes which must be started by pedaling or which can maintain momentum by the use of pedals need not be registered.

b. Operators License Requirements

(1) U. S. Armed Forces personnel and U. S. Civilian employees operating motorscooters, motorcycles and/or motorbikes that weigh 30 kilos or more, are capable of exceeding 30KPH, or employs a recoil or battery starter must have in their possession a valid Vietnamese driver's license specifically designating the type of vehicle they are authorized to operate.

(2) A Vietnamese driver's license is not required for operating motorbikes which must be started by pedaling or which can maintain momentum by the use of pedals.

(3) Personnel will not permit other individuals to operate authorized privately owned vehicles under their control unless such persons have valid driver's licenses in their possession.

c. Liability Insurance. Personnel will not operate authorized privately owned vehicles without a minimum of 100,000 piasters (or equivalent) of third person liability insurance, and will not authorize others to operate their vehicles unless the insurance policy covers such operation. Motorbikes which must be started by pedaling or which can maintain momentum by use of pedals do not require liability insurance.

d. Sales. A privately owned vehicle as authorized by this order must be in-country 18 months before it may be sold to anyone other than U. S. Armed Forces personnel.

e. Parent Command Operators Permit. Personnel will not operate authorized privately owned vehicles without possession of a command operators permit. This permit is issued upon presentation or proof of vehicle registration, valid Vietnamese driver's license and liability insurance. In addition, the operators permit will indicate the geographical restrictions for operations (see enclosure (1)).

5. Administration

a. Vehicle Registration Procedure

(1) Complete GSO Form 8 in two copies and mail to Registration Branch, Provost Marshal Department, Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon, c/o FPO, San Francisco 96243.

For/NCOO 1700.2
27 March 1966

(2) GSO Forms 8 are available at the Pass and Tag Office, III Marine Amphibious Force Military Police Compound, Danang.

b. Operators License Procedure

(1) Personnel applying for a Vietnamese drivers license will acquaint themselves with the information booklet on Vietnamese Traffic Laws and Traffic signs available at the III MAF Provost Marshal Office.

(2) Application for a Vietnamese driver's license may be submitted by mail to Transportation Officer, Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon, c/o FPO, San Francisco 96243. A valid U. S. driver's license or U. S. Government Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit and two full-face photographs, 4X6cm, will accompany the application.

(3) Applicants that do not hold a valid U. S. driver's license or U. S. Government Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit will attach four full face photographs, 4X6cm and a medical certificate of good health to the application. Driver license applications are available at Pass and Tag Office, III Marine Amphibious Force Military Police Compound, Danang.

6. Safety

a. Crash helmets will be worn at all times when operating or riding a motorscooter, motorcycle, or motorbike.

b. Due to the heavy congestion of vehicles and pedestrian traffic extreme caution and defensive techniques will be exercised at all times to ensure safe driving measures.

7. Law Enforcement

a. Personnel in receipt of two traffic violations will lose their operators permit for a period of three months.

b. Personnel operating a privately owned vehicle in an area other than authorized by the Command Operator's Permit, will lose their operating privileges on the first offense.

c. Liability Insurance Procurement. Commercial insurance may be obtained in the City of Danang.

8. Action

a. Senior subordinate commands to this Headquarters will establish procedures to comply with the contents of this order within ten days after receipt.

For/NCCO 1700.2
27 March 1966

b. III MAF Provost Marshal will, commencing 15 April 1966, conduct required traffic inspections to ensure that motorscooter, motorcycle, and/or motorbike operators are complying with the requirements of this Order.



J. M. PLATT
Chief of Staff

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For/NCCO 1700.2
27 March 1966

COMMAND OPERATOR'S PERMIT NO _____

UNIT _____
(Military address)

NAME _____ GRADE _____ SER NO _____

VEHICLE REGISTRATION NO _____

AREA OF OPERATIONS AUTHORIZED:

Example (1)-Confines of the Danang Air Field only.

Example (2)-Confines of Marble Mountain Air Facility only.

Example (3)-NSA Danang Enlisted Billeting Area to White Elephant
only - direct route only.

Example (4)-Airfield Compound Chu Lai.

OTHER RESTRICTIONS:

OTHER EXCEPTIONS:

SIGNATURE _____
(Commanding Officer)

Copy to:
III MAF Provost Marshal

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco
California 96601

FOR/NCCO 1746.1
1/ref
15 March 1966

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND ORDER 1746.1

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander
To: Distribution List

Subj: Ration Cards; regulations governing

Ref: (a) MACJ1 ltr SerNo 702 of 3Feb66 - Subj: Control Exchange
Merchandise

Encl: (1) Ration Card Control Register
(2) Certification of Lost or Stolen Ration Card

1. Purpose. To promulgate regulations governing the issuance and use of MACV Ration Cards.

2. Background. Reference (a) directed that rationing of certain control-
lable items of Exchange Merchandise be placed into effect immediately.
Due to non-availability of sufficient numbers of ration cards it has been
necessary to delay compliance. Ration cards of the new series are now
available for distribution and will be placed into use in the Exchanges in
the I Corps area soon, commencement date to be announced by appropriate
Bulletin.

3. Policy and Punitive Provisions. Ration cards permit authorized patrons
of the AAFES and the Field Exchange which operate as extensions of the AAFES
Exchange to purchase limited amounts of rationed items. Rationed items will
be sold only to customers who possess a valid ration card. The following
restrictions govern the use of ration cards:

- a. Cards are not transferable.
- b. Only one card is permitted each authorized patron.
- c. Cards are valid for thirteen months from date of issue.
- d. Cards may not be sold, bartered or placed in pawn to any person.
- e. Cards must be turned in to the proper authority upon departure
from the Republic of Vietnam.

4. Information. There are many purposes for having a ration control
system. The most important are as follows:

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FOR/NCCO 1746.1
15 March 1966

- a. Controls on the amount of merchandise shipped into RVN are necessary because of the burden imposed on the logistical system.
- b. Excessive purchases for illegal purposes contribute to out of stock conditions, thereby limiting availability to authorized patrons.
- c. The Vietnamese Government is concerned with the scope of black-market trade in U. S. Exchange items and has requested that the U. S. Military authority take positive action to control U. S. goods at point of sale.

5. Issuance of Cards

a. General. Ration cards must be carefully handled, accounted for and distributed to all eligible personnel. Security of the cards is most important and a continuing chain of accountability by serial number is mandatory from MACV down through the administrative chain of command and finally to the individual recipient. In order to accomplish this, it is desired that the cards be handled in the same way that identification cards are administered. In brief, this requires commanding officers maintaining stocks of ration cards to be personally responsible for the following security and accountability functions:

- (1) The approval of requisitions for cards from higher headquarters.
- (2) Verification of serial numbers and total number of cards received.
- (3) Furnishing adequate storage to provide for strict security of blank cards at all times.
- (4) The maintenance of an issue register as described in paragraph 5b and a destruction record as described by paragraphs 5c and 6.
- (5) Every six months or upon relief of the issuing agent, inventory blank cards and inspect the records to verify the disposition of each card.

b. Initial Issuance - All personnel authorized exchange privileges will be issued a ration card by the organization upon whose rolls the individual is carried. Data on the card will be carefully filled out with typewriter or pen-printing. A record of issues will be maintained by the organization on MACV Form 332 (enclosure (1)). This record will be maintained in the organization's files for 18 months from month of issuance. Additionally an entry will be made in each individual's SRB or OQR, showing date of issuance and the serial number of the card.

c. Subsequent Issuance - The procedure for a subsequent issuance to an individual, presumably on the occasion of an extension of RVN tour, will be the same except that the old card will be recovered, accounted for by an appropriate log entry, and then destroyed by burning. Logs of destroyed cards will be retained for one year. An appropriate entry will again be

FOR/MCCO 1746.1
15 March 1966

made in the individual's SRB or OQR, recording the recovery of the old card and the issuance of a new card by serial numbers. Those rationed items that have previously been purchased and marked out on the old card, except monthly allocations, will be transferred to the new card.

d. Replacement Issuance for Lost Cards - Replacement ration cards will be issued by the individual's organization, provided the commanding officer or his designate is satisfied that a justifiable loss has occurred. The same issuing procedure will be utilized as described above in 5a except that a loss entry will be shown in the SRB or OQR and a certification in the format of enclosure (2) will be filled out in duplicate. The original will be retained in the organization's files and the duplicate forwarded to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attention: G-1). Based upon the individual's certification that he has previously purchased rationed items that were marked out on the lost card, these will be transferred to the replacement card.

6. Recovery of Cards. In addition to the recovery described in paragraph 5c above, upon permanent rotation out of RVN, the ration card of each individual so departing will be recovered by the individual's organization, recorded in a log and destroyed at the time, and an appropriate entry will be recorded in the individual's SRB or OQR. Log records of destroyed cards will be retained for one year.

7. Use of Ration Cards. Detailed exchange procedures will not be covered in this directive. For those items that are controlled by rationing and that require a ration card, the appropriate block will be crossed out at the time of purchase with a ball-point pen.

8. Action. Major subordinate commands will:

a. Assign a designated officer to pick up and receipt for a block of cards of sufficient number to satisfy the initial issuance requirements of the command plus 25% additional to cover replacement requirements for three months. (These cards will be available for issue in III MAF G-1 office to the designate of 1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Naval Support Activity, Danang, 30th Naval Construction Regiment, and Force Logistics Support Group).

b. Effect distribution to subordinate commands, insuring that at each echelon of command receipts are held by a designated officer for blocks of serials issued to subordinate units.

c. Include a check of the requirements specified in paragraph 5, relative to the issuance, accountability, and security of cards, in routine administrative inspections.

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FOR/NCCO 1746.1
15 March 1966

d. Report any irregularities which are clearly contrary to the purpose of this program, and the spirit and intent of this Order, to this Headquarters.



G. C. AXTELL
Chief of Staff

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AAFES Officer (5)

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO San Francisco
California 96302

ForO P4000.5
4B/rlm
13 March 1966

FORCE ORDER P4000.5

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedure for Logistics (SOP)

Encl: (1) Locator Sheet

Reports Required: As indicated in appropriate sections:

1. Purpose. This order encompasses procedures and policies for Logistic Support of the III Marine Amphibious Force (RVN).
2. Recommendations. Subordinate Commanders are encouraged to submit recommendations for changes or modifications for the improvement of this Standing Operating Procedure. Recommended changes will be submitted to this Headquarters (Attn: G-4).
3. Certification. Reviewed and approved this date.

APPROVED:
G-4
Capt. [Signature]


G. C. AXTELL
Chief of Staff

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Force0 P4000.5
13 March 1966

LOCATOR SHEET

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure for Logistics

Location: _____

Enclosure (1)

DECLASSIFIED

ForO P4000.5
13 March 1966STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR LOGISTICSTABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Section</u>
General	I
Engineer	II
Motor Transport	III
Embarkation-Transportation	IV
Supply	V
Maintenance	VI
Ordnance	VII
Medical	VIII

APPENDIX

References	A
Logistics Terminology	B

ForO P4000.5
13 March 1966

SECTION 1

GENERAL

101. Purpose. To publish in one document the policies and procedures for the logistic support of all elements of the III MAF, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; to prescribe functions, procedures and responsibilities relative to logistic support; and to provide information to users on the logistic support available.

102. Background. In its most comprehensive sense, logistics are those aspects of military operations which deal with: (1) design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of materiel; (2) movement, evacuation and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and (4) acquisition or furnishing of services. It comprises both planning and implementation, including the determination of requirements.

103. Applicability. This Logistics Standing Operating Procedures is applicable to all personnel, installations and activities which receive their logistics support from the III Marine Amphibious Force. It will apply as a basis for all logistics support, except when subsequent directives from higher Headquarters establish a precedence over this SOP.

104. Organization for Logistic Support. The Force Logistics Command is tasked to provide sustained logistic support to all III MAF forces in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ), including isolated components thereof during operations ashore and subsequent amphibious assault operations in RVN. Listed below are the Force Special Staff Officers through which specific logistic support is coordinated:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>Phone</u>
Engineer	Force Engineer	Parchment 15
Food Service	Force Food SvcO	Moment 58
Supply	Force Supply O	Parchment 21
Funds-AIK	Force Comptroller	Parchment 21
Transportation	Force MTO	Parchment 8
		Shove 35
Medical	Force Medical O	Parchment 16
Embarkation	Force Emb/Trans O	Parchment 39
Base Development	Base Development O	Motley 29
Real Estate	Real Estate O	Motley 29
Ordnance	Force Ordnance O	Parchment 8

105. Real Estate.

a. Policy

(1) The right to use real estate by Department of Defense elements of the U. S. Mission in the RVN will be acquired in one of two ways:

ForO P4000.5
13 March 1966

(a) By written lease with private owners in accordance with COMUSMACV Directive No. 405-3 of 12Jan66.

(b) By written agreement with the Government of VietNam (GVN) in accordance with MACV Directive 405-1 of 30Aug65.

(2) GVN - owned real estate will be requested and utilized whenever possible.

(3) All leasing for DOD elements in ICTZ will be accomplished by leasing officers established by the Naval Component Commander (NCC) to serve the area for which base development responsibilities exist.

(4) Lease - Is defined as a written agreement instrument which grants exclusive possession and use of a definite parcel of land, building, or other property or part thereof, for a specified period of time; revocable at will, or as otherwise provided in the instrument, in consideration of a return for rent.

b. Procedures for Requesting Real-Estate for III MAF/NCC in ICTZ.

(1) In accordance with I Corps Coordinator Instruction 11011.1 dtd 13Feb66.

106. Logistic Terminology. (See appendix B)

SECTION II (ENGINEER)201. General

1. Engineer resources available to III MAF are based on the minimum essential engineer support required in order to accomplish the assigned mission. The engineer capability is relatively balanced as to type and quantity of equipment and skills. Engineer units are available for providing close combat engineer support for ground units, and general support for both ground and aviation units.

2. It is essential that the limited engineer troops available be employed on work requiring technical skills and special equipment. They must not be regarded as pools of laborers and mechanics to be allotted individually for expedient purposes.

202. Engineer Resources Available

1. 3rd Engineer Battalion, 3rd Marine Division: The primary engineer unit of the 3rd Marine Division. Responsible for providing close combat engineer support as required by the Division.

2. 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division: The primary engineer unit of the 1st Marine Division. Responsible for providing close combat engineer support as required by the Division.

3. 7th Engineer Battalion, FMF: OPCON of III MAF. Provides general engineer support to the Force as directed. Includes following type missions: Add depth to and/or reinforce the Division engineer capability; provides general engineer support for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Logistics Command and other Force level units.

4. 9th Engineer Battalion, FMF: OPCON of III MAF. (When introduced into country). Provides general engineer support to the Force as directed. Includes following type missions: Add depth to and/or reinforce the Division engineer capability; provides general engineer support as feasible for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Logistics Command and other Force level units.

5. 1st Bridge Company, FMF: OPCON of 7th Engineer Battalion. Provides prefabricated floating and fixed bridging for installation as authorized or directed by Commanding General, III MAF. Performs other engineer tasks as directed by Commanding Officer, 7th Engineer Battalion.

6. 1st and 3rd Shore Party Battalions, 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions respectively, while their primary mission is shore party operations, possess an inherent secondary engineer capability for general engineer support as directed by the Commanding General of their parent Division.

7. Thirtieth Naval Construction Regiment is under OPCON of the Naval Component Commander and is primarily responsible for base development construction in support of III MAF/NCC. It provides general engineer support for III MAF as directed by the Commander, Naval Component Command.

203. Requirements for Engineer Assistance. The following policies will be followed in the submission of requests for engineer assistance:

1. Requests will be submitted through the normal chain of command.
2. Work will be accomplished at the lowest command echelon having the requisite capability.
3. Organic engineer resources will be used to the maximum as a condition precedent to requesting non-organic engineer support.
4. Requests for assistance from the following units will be submitted to this Headquarters (SC1-15):
 - a. 7th Engineer Battalion, FMF
 - b. 9th Engineer Battalion, FMF
 - c. 1st Bridge Company, FMF
 - d. 30th Naval Construction Regiment

204. Road and Bridge Construction/Maintenance

1. Responsibilities for road construction, repair and maintenance will be assigned to engineer units consistent with their missions, capabilities and geographical locations. Current responsibilities are designated in the Force Order 11000.1 series.

2. Inherent in road maintenance responsibility is the requirement for dust suppression. During periods of dry weather, unpaved roads present a serious dust hazard to both health and safety. A continuous effort must be maintained to suppress this dust hazard with whatever means are available or can be improvised.

3. In general, engineer units with road responsibilities are also required to construct, repair and maintain bridges within their areas of responsibilities; however, should a bridging requirement be beyond the capability of organic resources the 1st Bridge Company attached to the 7th Engineer Battalion may be required to render assistance in any location.

4. While primary responsibility for roads is an engineer function, at times it may not be possible for engineers to cope with adverse conditions. This is especially true during the monsoon season. At such times all units must render assistance in maintaining roads open to traffic. In addition, even under normal conditions, all units are responsible for filling potholes and maintaining local drainage on roads through or adjacent to their areas.

205. Engineer Equipment

1. The successful accomplishment of engineer missions is largely dependent upon proper maintenance of engineer equipment. Commanders who hold items of engineer equipment, including engine generators, are responsible for maintenance, record keeping, and submission of required equipment reports. FMFPac Order 4700.1 series (SOP for Maintenance of Engineer Equipment) outlines in detail command responsibilities for these and other procedures to be followed regarding engineer equipment.

2. Recent experience in RVN has shown that there is a tendency on the part of commands to hold on to engineer items when there is a need for higher echelon maintenance or to improvise parts in order to keep the equipment operating as long as possible. This practice is contrary to regulations and cannot be tolerated. In the long run the command will suffer more than if proper procedures are followed. Equipment so handled generally deteriorates more rapidly and when it ceases to function it takes longer to repair than if it were turned in for maintenance at the proper time.

3. To assist commanders in insuring that proper procedures are followed in the maintenance and care of engineer equipment, a Maintenance Contact Team from Force Logistics Command will perform continuous on-the-job inspections of generators, refrigeration units and air conditioners. In addition, Ad Hoc Maintenance Contact Teams will make unscheduled on-the-job inspections of other selected engineer items and related records.

206. Reports. The following reports are required for submission to Headquarters, III MAF/NGC (SCI-15):

1. Weekly Project Status Summary

a. This report is to be submitted by Force Engineer units and the 30th Naval Construction Regiment to cover the period 1800 Wednesday to 1800 Wednesday the following week. This report is to reach this Headquarters no later than 1200 each Thursday and will include the following information:

- (1) Project description
- (2) Scope of project
- (3) Location of project
- (4) Date or estimated date project started
- (5) Estimated percent complete
- (6) Progress during reporting period
- (7) Current status (Provides a summary of progress to date)
- (8) Plans for ensuing week
- (9) Date or estimated date or estimated date of completion
- (10) Cost of project (contract projects only)
- (11) Remarks
- (12) Drawings, sketches, pictures, etc.

b. Insofar as practical, the Weekly Project Status Summary will be submitted in narrative format suitable for verbatim inclusion in reports to higher headquarters. Should any significant event occur between reporting periods, a one time report, utilizing the above format, will be submitted by the fastest means possible, including telephone (Parchment - 15).

2. Monthly Lines of Communication (LOC) Report

a. This report is to be submitted by the Commanding Officer, I Corps Advisory Group; Commanding General, 1st & 3rd Marine Division; and Commanding Officer, 7th Engineer Battalion in accordance with instructions contained in the Force/NCC/SA I Corps Order 2010.1 series. The report will

cover the period from the 15th of one month to the 15th of the following month and will reach this Headquarters (SCIO15) by the 25th of each month.

b. All units under operational control of III MAF/WCC will submit spot reports on damaged/destroyed aspects of LOC's as data becomes available, utilizing the format contained in the Force/WCC/SA I Corps Order series described above.

3. Land Mine Fields Report

a. Locations of all minefields (except protective fields) will be reported to this Headquarters (SCIO-15) by any units discovering or emplacing mines in their areas of responsibility. Prior to emplacing mines, a report will also be submitted showing the proposed layout. This will be followed by a report showing the final disposition of the minefield. Reports will be submitted on DA Form 1355 and in accordance with instructions contained in Chapter 6 of FM 20-32. German is the Force Order 3571.3 series.

4. Road Trafficability Report

a. All units will report as rapidly as possible to the III MAF Engineer Officer (Paragraph-15) any road condition encountered which affects the normal flow of traffic or presents a hazardous driving condition. This report will be followed by appropriate III MAF action to insure that the road is repaired and/or traffic restrictions are imposed as appropriate.

5. Engineer Equipment Reports

a. Reports required on engineer equipment are outlined in detail and will be in accordance with FMFPac Order 4700.1 series (SOP for Maintenance of Engineer Equipment).

SECTION IV (EMBARKATION/TRANSPORTATION)401. General

1. This section establishes policies and procedures for the coordination, control and transportation of personnel, equipment and the movement of non-tactical supplies by common user air, surface, and commercial transportation means.

a. The procedures for the procurement and allocation of air, sea and surface transportation space as outlined herein are applicable to all commands under the operational control of III MAF.

402. Responsibilities

1. Commanders at all echelons are directed to plan transportation requirements and submit requests for shipment in sufficient time to permit the various transportation agencies in RVN to coordinate and efficiently allocate space that will allow maximum utilization of assets available.

2. The Force Embarkation Officer is responsible for ensuring that optimum utilization of all modes of transportation, to meet III MAF requirements, are properly programmed. To accomplish this end the Force Embarkation Officer will:

a. Maintain a current listing of intra-corps and intra-theater transportation capabilities available to III MAF.

b. Receive, consolidate, and process all requests for amphibious shipping in accordance with FMFPac Order 4600.1.

3. Receive and process all requests for transportation of non-tactical supplies and equipment for movement within and from III MAF area of operation, and allocate priorities of shipment based on available transportation.

4. Coordinate with COMUSMACV's TMA District Transportation Office, Danang, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and CO, NAVSUPACT on the use of available air-sea and surface transportation for intra-corps movement.

5. Insure that priorities established for the movement of freight/passengers are compatible with operational requirements. The Embarkation Officer is authorized to change the mode of transportation and priority of shipment when the situation dictates.

6. Provide MACV with selected data on transportation requirements, allocation and utilization as required.

7. Provide MACV with selected data on transportation requirements, allocation and utilization as required.

8. Provide a central point of contact which can advise all transportation agencies as to which priority air and sea lifts should move first when transportation requirements exceed capability.

403. In-country air and surface movements

1. Air Movements. In-country tactical/logistical air movements within the capability of the First Marine Aircraft Wing will be accomplished by organic aircraft. Request for special air lift will be submitted in accordance with paragraph 407.

a. When above airlift requirements exceed the capability of First Marine Aircraft Wing, the Force Embarkation and Transportation Officer will submit airlift requirements to the MACV District Transportation Office, Danang.

2. Passengers traveling on routine business will report directly to the air terminal for transportation. Orders must be presented to establish priority and for manifesting. When the required travel date is known in advance, it is recommended that all passengers request manifesting prior to reporting to the terminal.

3. Routine air freight may be delivered to an air terminal by any authorized Shipping and Receiving Section. A Transportation Control and Movement Document (DD-1384) will be prepared and presented to the air terminal with the cargo. Cargo offered to an air terminal will be placed in a common cargo pool. The air terminal will establish lift priorities of traffic with the same priority designation. Small (less than 10,000 pounds) in-country shipments on scheduled aircraft through 15th Aerial Port are authorized by contacting Cargo ATCO, Danang 6156.

4. Surface Movement. Commercial truck and rail will be utilized for the shipment of non-tactical cargo to the maximum extent possible. The MACV District Transportation Office, Danang will process and obtain land transportation for all elements of III MAF. TCMD's will be prepared by authorized Shipping and Receiving agencies and submitted to this Headquarters for processing and allocation of priority. For commercial transportation shipments, the TCMD must include point of pick up and point of delivery.

404. In-country Water Movements.

1. In-country coastal water movements may be scheduled on MSIS, Fleet Shipping, or ships/craft under the operational control of Naval Support Activity, Danang.
2. Requests for coastal water movement will be submitted to this Headquarters in accordance with paragraph 407. The Force Embarkation Officer will consolidate all requests and assign lift of organizations and/or cargo on the first space available that will satisfy the requirement.
3. FLSU One (Force Logistics Support Group BRAVO when activated) will consolidate all non-tactical lift requirements from Chu Lai and submit requests for transportation to the Naval Support Activity, with an information copy to this Headquarters. FLSU Two (FLSU when activated) will process non-tactical lift requirements from Phu Bai in the same manner.
4. Tactical organizations requiring coastal transportation for personnel and equipment will submit requirements to their parent organization for approval prior to forwarding to this Headquarters.

405. Out of Country Surface Movement

1. All requirements for out of country surface movements will be processed in accordance with the same procedures as set forth in paragraph 404 above.
2. Organizations assigned amphibious shipping for out of country lifts will furnish one copy of approved loading plans to this Headquarters.
3. Loading Status Report and Sailing Reports will be submitted in accordance with Chapter 5, FMFPac Order P4600.1. This Headquarters will be made an information addressee for these reports.

406. Embarkation Training

1. Complex weapons, equipment, ships and aircraft, coupled with combat loading principals of all units sailing for deployment with this command, or operating along the coast, requires that trained embarkation personnel be assigned all III MAF organizations through Battalion/Squadron level, in accordance with current T/Os.

2. Subordinate commanders will continuously take advantage of available training courses conducted by LFTUPAC at Okirawa to insure that each unit of embarkation team size, or larger, has personnel qualified to perform embarkation duties. When a shortage of trained embarkation personnel exists within a unit/units, a request for special Landing Force Training Unit Mobile Training Team courses will be submitted to this Headquarters.

3. In addition to unit "on the job" training, commanders are urged to conduct periods of instruction in embarkation procedures and techniques for as many personnel as feasible during all coastal operations.

407. Transportation Requests

1. Procedure

a. All requests for reservations on scheduled flights for individual personnel on TAD/PCS or leave will be made to Air Freight and Passenger Terminal. At Danang, for Marine Air Freight, call Moment and ask for Air Freight. The number for 15th Aerial Port is Danang 6240. At Chu Lai, call Oxwood and ask for Air Freight. At Phu Bai, call Phu Bai-14. The Terminal will manifest personnel on flights and inform the requesting personnel of the "show time" at the Terminal Office.

2. Organizations requiring block allocation of space will request assignment of such space on a routine basis to the First Marine Aircraft Wing ATCO. Request for allocation of space on in-country Air Force/MATS aircraft will be referred to the Force Embarkation Office for coordination with DTO ATCO Danang.

3. All other requirements for shipment will be submitted to the Force Embarkation Officer in sufficient time to allow for appropriate transportation to be assigned. Format for transportation requests will be in accordance with the following:

- a. Figure 4 - 1 Air Transportation Request
- b. Figure 4 - 2 Operational Shipping Request
- c. Other cargo requests: Submit on standard DD Form 1384 (TCMD)

4. Passenger Priority. Priorities set forth below apply to Marine Corps and U. S. Navy personnel. Unless otherwise directed by this Headquarters, personnel of other services and authorized civilians will be transported on

U. S. Marine Corps aircraft on a "space available" basis only. Normally a passenger assigned a given priority will take precedence over cargo with a like priority.

a. Priority I: Emergency air evacuation of medical patients.

b. Priority II: (1) Emergency Leave

(2) Permanent Change of Station orders

(3) Temporary additional duty

c. Priority III Permissive type travel orders

d. Priority IV Leave and all other

5. Cargo Priorities

a. General. All cargo will be assigned a shipment priority and requested delivery date by the shipper. If circumstances permit, it will be positioned for loading one day prior to the requested shipment date.

b. Assignment of Priorities. For cargo requisitioned through normal channels, the assigned supply designator as outlined in MCO 4400.16 will serve as the basis of assignment of shipment priority as indicated below. For cargo not assigned a supply priority designator, the shipper will determine the shipment priority based on the urgency of the need for the item by the intended recipient. This Headquarters may adjust priorities as required to satisfy the more urgent need of any III MAF unit.

c. Shipment Priorities

Priority I: Mail (includes U. S. Mail and Guard Mail). Supply priority designators 1 through 3. Cargo specifically assigned this priority by Wing, Division or higher Headquarters.

Priority II: Supply priority designators 4 and 5.

Priority III: Supply priority designators 11 and 12 and routine shipments.

Priority IV: Supply priority designators 16 and 17.

FORMAT FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION REQUEST

ALPHA: UNIT REQUESTING AIRLIFT.

BRAVO: AIRLIFT POINT OF ORIGIN/LOADING AREA.

CHARLIE: AIRLIFT DESTINATION/UNLOADING AREA.

DELTA: DATE AND TIME OF LOAD AVAILABILITY.

ECHO: DATE AND TIME REQUIRED AT DESTINATION.

FOXTROT: SECURITY CLASSIFICATION IF MISSION IS CLASSIFIED.

GOLF: PRIORITY AND JUSTIFICATION.

HOTEL: PASSENGER: WEIGHT AND NUMBER.

INDIA: BAGGAGE: WEIGHT AND CUBE.

JULIET: MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT LESS VEHICLES - DESCRIPTION,
WEIGHT AND CUBE.

KILO: VEHICLES: NOMENCLATURE, DIMENSION IN INCHES (LXWXH)
WEIGHT AND CUBE.

LIMA: EXCESSIVE DIMENSION ITEMS: NOMENCLATURE IN INCHES (LXWXH),
AND WEIGHT OF ANY ITEM OF MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN
VEHICLES WHICH MEASURE IN EXCESS OF 60 INCHES IN ANY DI-
MENSION.

MIKE: TOTAL AIRLIFT REQUIREMENT-WEIGHT AND CUBE.

NOVEMBER: SPECIAL INSTRUCTION: INDICATE IF CARGO IS CLASSIFIED,
PROHIBITED, OR RESTRICTED AND WHETHER SPECIAL HANDLING OR
SAFEGUARDING IS REQUIRED.

FORMAT FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION REQUEST

OSCAR:

CONTACT OFFICERS. NAME, ORGANIZATION AND TELEPHONE
NUMBER OF CONTACTS AT BASES OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION.

FORMAT FOR OPERATIONAL SHIPPING REQUEST

ALPHA: NUMBER OF OFFICERS.
BRAVO: NUMBER OF ENLISTED.
CHARLIE: TOTAL DRUM OF POL.
DELTA: TOTAL GALLONS OF BULK POL BY TYPE (III OR IIIA).
ECHO: AMMUNITION BY CUBIC FEET AND S/T.
FOXTROT: SQUARE FEET, CUBIC FEET AND S/T OF VEHICLES.
GOLF: CUBIC FEET AND S/T OF REMAINING BULK CARGO (DO NOT
INCLUDE IN THIS TOTAL CUBE OF POL, AMMUNITION, VEHICLES
OR SUPPLIES PRELOADED ON VEHICLES).

SECTION V (SUPPLY)

501. General. III MAF Marine Ground Units will requisition supplies from cognizant FLSC/FLSU. III MAF Marine Aviation Units will requisition Marine Corps supplied items through the same media, except parts peculiar to the AN/TPQ - 10. MASS - 2 is authorized to requisition direct from MCSC Barstow for parts peculiar to the AN/TPQ - 10. Navy supplied items will be covered by Wing directives.

502. Responsibilities

1. The Force Supply Officer performs the general duties of a special staff officer with respect to general supply matters; monitors supply status of Class I, II, IV and V; furnishes advice and information relative to supply procedures including property accounting, responsibility and standardization of material.

2. Approves requisitions for emergency supplies from RVNAF depots on a reimbursement in-kind basis.

3. Is responsible for the RESU BALL Program.

503. Changes to Tables of Equipment. Experience in Vietnam indicates that some current allowances are inadequate, particularly encampment/garrison equipment. When it becomes apparent that a change is necessary, Commanders will recommend changes in accordance with Table of Allowances general instructions paragraph 10 and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Order 4441.3D recommendations from Division and Wing units will not be routed via III MAF, however an info copy will be provided this Headquarters. Recommendations for changes to the Table of Equipment (T/E) for H&S Company, III MAF and other units administratively attached will be routed via Headquarters, III MAF.

504. Requisitioning. The proper document to be utilized is the Single Line Item Transaction Document (SLITD) NAVMC 10493-SD. Procedures for preparation and submission of this form to FLSC/FLSU are contained in MCO P4400.15B and MCO P4400.29A.

505. Tracer Action. Tracer action will be taken on requisitions in accordance with MCO 4400.16B as modified by FMFPac message 271944Z July, CMC message 261753Z October and FMFPac message 010615Z January.

506. Issue Procedures. Detailed instructions will be promulgated by Force Logistics Command.

507. Shipment of Personal Effects

1. Personal effects and baggage of all service members who cannot care for their own property will be handled in accordance with Marine Corps Personnel Manual (MCO P5000.3). Each piece will be tagged and marked with all pertinent information (name, rank, serial number, organization, next of kin, address of hospital or personal effects and baggage center as appropriate) by the individual's parent unit.

2. Personnel effects and baggage will be turned in to the cognizant FLSG/FLSU for shipment. Extreme care will be exercised to prevent loss, theft or damage. A clear audit trail will be maintained by proof of receipt and proof of shipment. Priority handling and shipping will be used when feasible.

3. Personnel may ship personal effects on PCS orders by preparing the sea bag, box or container for shipment, properly marking with complete destination address and identification of sender and delivering to shipping and receiving section, FLSG. Shipment will be by surface and 60 days is normal travel time.

508. Individual Uniform Clothing

1. Individual uniform clothing brought into RVN is restricted to the following:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 2 Badge, Rating blue on khaki or Group Rate mark, blue on khaki as appropriate (Navy only) | 1 Insignia, BofS metal (DT or HC) (Navy only) |
| 1 Bag, Duffel | 1 Raincoat, mens nylon rubber-coated |
| 2 Belt, trousers web khaki | 2 Shirt, mens cotton khaki w/quarter length sleeve |
| 1 Buckle, f/belt web khaki | 3 Shirt, mens cotton green (utility) |
| 2 Cap, Garrison cotton khaki | 1 Shoe, dress pr. |
| 2 Cap, utility cotton green | 2 Boot, combat leather or nylon pr. |
| 6 Drawers, mens cotton white | 2 Socks, mens pr. |
| 2 Insignia, grade, Enl personnel green on khaki pr. | 4 Socks, mens w/cushion sole pr. |
| 1 Insignia, branch of service left only black/bronze | 3 Trousers, mens cotton green (utility) |
| 3 Insignia, grade, Enl personnel; Metal | |

2 Trousers, mens khaki pr.
 6 Undershirt, mans cotton white
 2 Laces footwear, nylon 64 inch
 1 Laces footwear, nylon 30 inch

2. The above authorized items only will be issued on the gratuitous in-kind replacement system to all enlisted Marines in RVN. Clothing will be purchased to replace items lost or damaged through individual negligence. An officer will certify in writing under these circumstances.

3. Lightweight utilities and tropical boots are issued gratuitously to all hands except that Headquarters and Support personnel are not authorized tropical boots. Lightweight utilities are organizational/company property and will be recovered from the Marine prior to rotation.

509. Red Ball System. The Red Ball System is designed to identify critical logistics problems and provide intensive follow-up and expedited supply action (beyond the priority system) for priority O2 items which meet the criteria. Units may nominate items in this category for inclusion in the Red Ball system via the cognizant Division/Wing Supply Officers and FLSG to the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Supply Officer). Each recommendation will include FSN, Nomenclature, Qty, RUC, Doc Nr, Pri and end item application. Validity, notification of shipment by air and availability in stock for redistribution will be determined by Division/Wing and FLSG prior to item being designated Red Ball by the Force Supply Officer. Prompt reporting of receipt or change of status for removal from Red Ball is mandatory. CG, III Marine Amphibious Force ltr 21/RAA/4400-1 to Distribution List of 25 January 1966 provides further instructions on the Red Ball System.

510. Asset Review

1. All units will continuously review requisition status and take timely action to assign higher priority if needed, cancel items no longer required and maintain local records (including 708 cards) accurately and up to date.

2. Excess serviceable items will be turned in to FLSG.

3. Excess unserviceable major end items will be turned in complete (i.e. no cannibalization) to FLSG for repair/rebuild and return to stock.

4. Repairable components may be exchanged on a one for one basis without requisition at FLSG. Force Order 4000.3 applies.

511. Requisitioning on Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Every effort will be made to obtain supplies through normal channels. However, in cases where the item cannot be obtained within the required time frame and the item is on hand in I Corps RVNAF stocks, requisitions may be submitted to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Supply Officer). Each requisition will be passed by III MAF to Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam for approval prior to release by RVN, except in cases of military urgency wherein approval will be granted by CG III MAF.

512. Inventory Procedures. Inventories for organic accounts will be conducted as prescribed in MCO 4400.15B except that the requirement for inventory upon relief of supply officer has been waived for units in RVN by FMFPac message 260329Z January 1966.

513. Computation of Inventory Control Data by Organic Supply Accounts. Portion of MCO P4400.15B requiring six movements in six months for computing inventory control data is suspended. Due outs will be considered as demands in computation of AMRD.

SECTION VI (MAINTENANCE)

601. General. The purpose of this section is to set forth policies and procedures for the performance of maintenance by organizations of the III Marine Amphibious Force and for requesting maintenance support from the Force Logistic Command. (FLC).

602. Responsibilities

1. Unit Responsibilities. It is a command responsibility to ensure that organizational maintenance as authorized by appropriate TO's is properly performed. Unit commanders will ensure that their equipment receives timely and thorough maintenance. Preventive maintenance by the individual Marine under supervision must be emphasized and to be effective, must be comprehensive.

2. Force Logistics Command Responsibilities. The FLC will provide the following echelons of maintenance support for III MAF units:

a. Third & limited fourth echelon maintenance on those items of Marine Corps equipment for which the units do not possess their own organic capability.

b. Total third and fourth echelon of maintenance for Communications - Electronics equipment, including test equipment for those items of Marine Corps equipment for which the units do not possess their own organic capability.

c. Second echelon maintenance for those units not possessing their own organic capability, as well as overflow second echelon maintenance for ground units and overflow third for wing units.

3. Limited fourth echelon maintenance is defined as that amount of 4th echelon maintenance which can be performed by the Force Logistics Command as determined by the following factors.

a. Availability of the necessary repair parts, tools, test equipment, facilities, technical publications, and personnel possessing the skills necessary to perform the required maintenance.

b. Limited fourth echelon should not be performed unless it can be accomplished in a timely manner; without expenditure of excessive man-hours, or to the detriment of third echelon maintenance.

4. Fourth echelon maintenance beyond the capability of Force Logistics Command to perform is provided by the 3d Force Service Regiment (3dFSR).

5. Depot maintenance (5th echelon) will not be performed by III MAF Units, except when directed by higher headquarters. Equipment requiring depot maintenance will be evacuated by the FLC in accordance with current directives.

6. III MAF Units will not exceed their authorized echelons of maintenance. Higher Headquarters may authorize a unit higher echelons of maintenance on specific equipments for specified periods when it is considered prudent and in the best interest of the Marine Corps.

7. Test Equipment calibration support for Marine Corps furnished test equipment as required by III MAF Units will be provided by the FLC.

603. Material Control Procedures

1. Turn-In Procedures.

a. Equipment requiring field maintenance will be delivered to the appropriate agency of the FLC. All equipment will be accompanied by a Tactical Equipment Repair Order (TERO) properly prepared in accordance with paragraph 604.

b. Organizational maintenance, which includes preventive maintenance, will be completed within the units capability prior to delivery of equipment to the FLC agency. Where organizational maintenance has not been accomplished, document numbers must be shown for repair parts required to complete organizational maintenance. Equipment with parts missing will be accompanied by a listing of the missing parts and the reason therefore.

c. Equipment delivered to the FLC agency for repair will be inspected by personnel of that agency prior to acceptance to insure that organizational maintenance has been accomplished.

d. Equipment requiring maintenance for causes other than normal wear and use, except combat damage, will be accompanied by written certification on the TERO that requisite investigations or reports have been initiated. If this certificate is not received, the FLC maintenance facility will segregate and tag the equipment and report all details to this Headquarters. Further inspections or repair will be suspended pending clarification. Under no circumstances will this procedure delay the repair or replacement of critical combat essential equipment.

e. TERO's accompanying equipment to the FLC agency which has sustained water submersion or damage will be so annotated. The approximate duration of submersion and corrective action taken should be included. The unit turning in equipment to FLC for repair should dry all canvas, leather, or other parts susceptible to mold, mildew or corrosion, whenever possible prior to turn-in.

f. Records of technical inspections and maintenance records (modification and maintenance cards, Maintenance Logs, Engineer Records, Vehicle Jackets and Gun Books, etc.), will accompany all equipment delivered to the FLC agency.

2. Completed Work

a. Upon completion of all field maintenance by the FLC agency the using unit will be promptly notified. All equipment will be picked up within 48 hours after notification. Direct liaison between supported units and FLC maintenance shops for expeditious handling of equipment is encouraged.

b. Items being returned to the owner will be inspected jointly by qualified individuals designated by the unit commander and the FLC maintenance facility. Discrepancies noted will be corrected expeditiously by the maintenance facility. The unit representative will be advised as to the estimated date of completion if it is not possible to correct the discrepancy immediately. After completion, the unit will again be notified and equipment jointly inspected, prior to acceptance by the using unit.

c. Upon acceptance, the unit representative will return his receipt and receive a completed copy of the TERO upon which all maintenance, repair, and cost data will have been entered.

3. Evacuation of Serviceable/Unserviceable Equipment

a. Equipment which exceeds the repair capability of the maintenance facility, whether determined by normal maintenance procedures or as the result of a Limited Technical Inspection, will be processed for evacuation to the 3d FSR by the FLC.

b. Equipment which has been coded "x" by the FLC will be disposed of in accordance with existing directives.

c. When the equipment of a unit has been evacuated to the 3d FSR or Condition Coded "x", the unit will be notified by a Letter of Unserviceable Property prepared by the FLC. This letter constitutes authority for the using unit to drop the item from their account and to requisition a replacement.

Care must be exercised in order to prevent ordering complete assemblies to replace components or vice versa. Direct liaison is authorized between the owning unit and the maintenance facility in order to eliminate possible delays in processing combat essential equipment and to resolve any differences that may arise.

604. Preparation of the TERO

1. Work requests shall be prepared on TACTICAL EQUIPMENT REPAIR ORDER (TERO) (NAVMC 10245-50 REV 2-61) and delivered to the appropriate maintenance shop in accordance with paragraph 602 above at the same time that the equipment is delivered for turn-in.

2. All pertinent data required in the heading of the TERO will be filled in by the unit requesting the work.

3. The signature appearing in the "Authorized by" block will be made by an individual so designated by the Commanding Officer.

4. The following information will be included in the "Remarks" block:

a. Is the equipment combat essential as defined by current directives. (Yes - No).

b. If an "On Deadline Report" has been submitted, indicate if the deadline is of a voluntary or involuntary nature, and the date the report was submitted.

c. The date the equipment became inoperative.

d. The reporting unit code (RUC) of the requesting unit.

e. The USMC or other serial number.

f. Job Order Number (JON).

g. TERO's submitted for the repair of engine equipment must contain the following additional information:

(1) Make and Model.

(2) Accumulated months in use.

(3) Accumulated cost of repairs.

(4) Accessories or attachments missing.

h. In the event a component being turned in for repair deadlines a combat essential item of equipment, the end item deadlined and its serial number will be indicated.

i. The priority which is to be used when ordering repair parts.

j. In addition, a brief description of the work to be performed or the symptoms or effects to be corrected should be indicated in the remarks block.

605. Equipment Modification Control

1. Modification of Marine Corps equipment is an integral part of the total maintenance mission and is a direct command responsibility. To insure an effective modification program within the III MAF, all units will comply with the provisions of MCO 10010.27 and the policy set forth herein.

2. Items requiring urgent modification will not be deadlined unless the modification or a separate directive indicates that dead-lining is mandatory.

3. Modifications within the 1st and 2nd echelons of maintenance will be accomplished by using organizations. Requisitions will be initiated by using units and submitted to the supporting FLSG through the appropriate modification control center.

4. Third echelon maintenance modifications will be accomplished by the FLSG or other third echelon maintenance activities as appropriate. Requisitions for materials required for modifications of equipment will be initiated by the appropriate FLSG based on requirements developed and submitted by each of the major command modification control centers.

5. Major commands and supporting FLSG's will establish modification control centers to provide management of the modification program within respective commands. Functions to be performed by the control centers are outlined below.

a. Maintain liaison with the special staff sections within the command having cognizance over the various commodity categories so as to determine modification requirements and to resolve technical problems.

b. Determine requirements for modification kits and material within respective commands.

c. Coordinate requisitioning of modification kits and material as appropriate within respective commands in accordance with provisions of paragraph 605.1 above.

d. The FLC modification control centers, in coordination with major command control centers, will schedule the induction of equipment to be modified by the appropriate FLSG.

e. Maintain staff cognizance to ensure timely accomplishments and reporting of modifications.

606. Maintenance Float. The FLC is assigned the responsibility for the management and maintenance of the maintenance float and the direct exchange programs. The FLC will prepare the necessary directives, for issue by this Headquarters, to establish policies and procedures for the operation of these programs. Aviation peculiar maintenance float items will remain with Marine Aircraft Wing Units.

607. Technical Instruction/Maintenance Contact Teams

1. Technical Instruction Teams will be organized by the Force Logistics Command to assist unit commanders in the training, (OJT), of their personnel. Requests for these teams will be submitted to the FLSG/FLSU seven (7) days prior to the date desired. The requests will indicate the instruction desired, number of men to be instructed, and special equipment requirements. FLC will provide Technical Instruction Teams in Motor Transport, Engineer (To include engine generators), Communications - Electronics, and Ordnance.

2. Maintenance contact teams will be furnished by FLSG/FLSU's when "on-site" repair may be successfully accomplished in a more expeditious or efficient manner than through established evacuation procedures. Requests for maintenance contact teams should be made in accordance with FORCE ORDER 4710.1.

3. Technical Instruction Teams are also available from FMFPac (FMFPacO 1500.6A) and may be requested through this Headquarters.

608. Repair of Time Pieces. (See FORCE ORDER 4400.2).

609. Equipment Maintenance Records. Marine Corps Technical Instruction 4700-15/1 and TECHNICAL MANUALS 11240 and 11275.1 contain instructions for the preparation and maintenance of equipment records. The importance of the maintaining accurate equipment records cannot be over-emphasized as these records provide information for determining life expectancy, accumulated costs of repairs and pinpointing recurring deficiencies. Commanders and

responsible personnel concerned with material maintenance will insure adherence to current directives in the maintaining of equipment records.

610. Replacement and Evacuation Program. The Replacement and Evacuation Program will be managed by the major commands as directed by current directives.

611. Reports

1. Unsatisfactory Equipment Reports.

a. All commanders of units at which a reportable equipment deficiency is detected will report to this Headquarters (Attn: AC of S, G-4) in accordance with MCO 4700.1C utilizing Form 10293-SD (Rev. 8-59).

2. Other reports (Instructions to be issued).

SECTION VII (ORDNANCE)

701. General. This Standing Operating Procedure is intended to establish policy and provide guidance to subordinate units of III MAF. It defines the responsibilities of the major subordinate commands of III MAF relative to:

1. Maintenance and repair of Class II and Class II(A) ordnance equipment and related supplies.
2. The supply and handling of Class V and Class V(A) ammunition and explosives.
3. Logistical instructions and administrative supply procedures governing the procurement, allocation, and accountability control of ordnance equipment and ammunition which are not otherwise covered.

702. Responsibility

1. All commanders at every level of command bear the inherent responsibility for the safety of operation, the serviceability, and the proper care and maintenance of ordnance materiel, including ammunition under his control (see paragraph 102006 Marine Corps Supply Manual, Vol. I).
2. The Force Ordnance Officer is the Commanding General's principal assistant in ordnance and ammunition matters. In this capacity the Force Ordnance Officer is responsible for:
 - a. Advising the Commander and Staff in ordnance and ammunition matters.
 - b. Supervision and coordination of ordnance maintenance and ammunition supply for all III MAF units.
 - c. Coordination and supervising technical inspections of ordnance equipment and ammunition as directed by CG, III MAF.
 - d. Recommending the allocation and assignment of ordnance and ammunition personnel assigned to III MAF.
3. Force Logistic Command (FLC), under the operational control of Headquarters III MAF, is responsible for the following ordnance support:
 - a. Field Maintenance Support of Class II Ordnance items organic to III MAF less those items held by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

b. Ordnance Supply Support for all Class II ordnance items of III MAF.

c. The establishment, as directed by this Headquarters, and operation of Ammunition Supply Points (ASP's) and Class V dumps for the receipt, storage, and issue of Class V items.

d. The requisitioning of Class V items for the support of combat operations and maintaining prescribed stock levels in DOA's as established by separate classified directives.

e. For the evacuation of ordnance Class II items beyond the capability of repairing to 3d Force Service Regiment.

4. Commanding General, 1st Marine Division and 3d Marine Division are responsible for:

a. Determination of stock levels DOA's of ammunition that are required to support current ground operations.

b. Configuration of Class V items requisitioned.

c. Monitoring of assets and expenditures.

5. Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is responsible for:

a. The establishment and operation of Class V(A) ASP's and dumps.

b. The requisitioning and reporting of assets and expenditures in accordance with current directives. (See reports paragraph 506).

c. The maintenance and supply support of ordnance Class II(A) and related supplies.

6. All commanders will conduct periodic inspections to determine the condition of ordnance and insure the readiness of ordnance equipment and related supplies, including ammunition, for which they are responsible.

703. Class II and Class II(A) Ordnance items

1. Force Logistic Command has the capability of third echelon maintenance. Items requiring a higher echelon of maintenance will be evacuated to Third Force Service Regiment, Okinawa.

2. Individual and crew served weapons, in which there is a high density, will be repaired and returned to the responsible unit. However if the item is beyond the capability of repair by Force Logistic Command a direct exchange with a like item from the maintenance float will be effected.

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3. Items which are classed as depot secondary reparable will be procured in accordance with MCO 4442.3, "Management of Depot Secondary Reparables" as modified by separate directives.

4. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is primarily concerned with ordnance Class II(A) items which are Navy owned/procured items. These are covered by separate directives.

704. Class V and V (A)

1. Class V expenditures rates are as determined by MCO 8010.1. These rates may be recomputed based on usage data. The Commanding Generals, 1st Marine Division and 3rd Marine Division, as the major consumers of Class V items, will recommend changes to the expenditure rates in DOA's.

2. Training Ammunition. There are no separate allowances for training ammunition. All Class V expenditures will be referred to as combat expenditures during the current deployment.

3. DOA's of ammunition authorized as Basic Allowances or Prescribed Loads will be the subject of separate classified directives.

4. Storage of Class V and V (A) will be in accordance with DA, TM 9-1300-206, November 1964, "Care, Handling, Preservation, and Destruction of Ammunition", during the period of current deployment in RVN.

5. Malfunctions and/or accidents involving ammunition/explosives.

a. Malfunction of ammunition will be reported in accordance with Marine Corps TI 8010-15/1. When forwarding the message report of ammunition malfunction the following information addressee's will be added to those already required by Marine Corps TI 8010-15/1.

(1) CG, III MAF.	(4) CG, 1st MAF f/CI V(A)	(7) CG, USARV, TSN
(2) COMUSMACV	(5) CG, 2d AirDiv, TSN f/CI V(A)	(8) CG, 1st MarDiv
(3) CG, 1st MarDiv	(6) CG, 5th SF CP, NHA TRANG	

Malfunctions are as follows:

- (1) Premature blasts or explosions.
- (2) The fall of the projectile outside of the normal pattern.
- (3) Any other erratic or unpredicted performance.

c. Supply

(1) The Naval Ordnance Facility, Sasebo acts as the Inventory Control Point for Class V resupply of WestPac units. Naval Magazine, Subic, is the primary storage point for Class V (A).

(2) The following requisitioning procedures will be used in requisitioning Class V items:

(a) All requisitions for resupply of III MAF ASP's will be submitted by message traffic in MILSTRIP format with no limitation on the number of items per page. Priority BFTO will be used.

(b) All Class V will be by priority O5 requisition except when air shipment is required. Class V items submitted on a priority O2 requisition will be shipped via air.

(c) The Force Logistic Command will prepare weekly requisitions based on the weekly expenditure report or in anticipation of a high demand on certain items as advised by the CG, III MAF and or CG, 3d Marine Division and CG, 1st Marine Division.

(d) Requisitions for Class V items not held at Naval Ordnance Facility, Sasebo will be passed by Naval Ordnance Facility, Sasebo directly to either the Naval Magazine (NAVMAG), Subic or ASP #2 Okinawa, with information to all concerned.

(e) When the requisition is either passed or filled by Naval Ordnance Facility, Sasebo, Naval Ordnance Facility will also initiate a requisition to replenish the WestPac storage points.

(f) Stock levels at WestPac storage points are established in days of ammunition (DOA's) by separate classified directives.

(3) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing will be responsible for establishing procedures for the requisitioning and stock levels to be maintained for Class V (A) items for units organic or attached thereto.

d. Transportation. Force Logistic Support Group (Force Logistic Command when activated) will coordinate transportation from point of off-loading to the respective ASP's for Class V. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing responsible for similar arrangements for Class V(A).

e. Land transportation of Class V and V(A) items.

(1) Commanders of vehicles utilized for transportation of ammunitions/explosives items will insure:

(a) That a pre-loading check is made to insure that the vehicle is suitable for transporting ammunition and explosives.

(b) After loading, the vehicle will be inspected to prevent overloading and that the cargo is secure so as to prevent shifting or dislodging while in transit.

(c) Items will be covered whenever possible.

(d) O/NCOIC of loading will insure the compatibility of items loaded and enforce the safe handling procedures.

(e) Non-sparking dunnage will be utilized for ammunition when outer container is metal.

(f) Tonnage of truck transported loads will not exceed 2000 lbs of explosive weight with a minimum interval between trucks of 100 yards.

(g) Only drivers who have a valid explosive drivers license will operate vehicles transporting H.E. and bulk ammunition ICC Classes A and B. (USN ORD Pamphlet 5; TM 9-1300-206; Drivers Handbook; MCO 8020.1____ refers).

(h) No ferrous metal tools, carbides, matches, electrical storage batteries, flammable substances, acids, oxidizing or corrosive compounds will be carried in bed of vehicle.

(i) Vehicles containing ammunition/explosives will not be parked in a shop, garage, or congested area over night. The minimum dispersion of at least 100 yards between explosive carrying vehicles will be maintained, consistent with security and the tactical situation.

705. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. (See Force Order 8027.1).

706. Reports

1. Monthly Class V and VA Expenditures and Asset Reports

a. Submitted by:

(1) Commanding General, Force Logistic Command will be

e. Land transportation of Class V and V(A) items.

(1) Commanders of vehicles utilized for transportation of ammunition/explosives items will insure:

(a) That a pre-loading check is made to insure that the vehicle is suitable for transporting ammunition and explosives.

(b) After loading the vehicle will be inspected to prevent overloading and that the cargo is secure so as to prevent shifting or dis-
loing while in transit.

(c) Items will be covered whenever possible.

(d) O/NCOIC of loading will insure the compatibility of items loaded and enforce the safe handling procedures.

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(i) Vehicles containing ammunition/explosives will not be parked in a shop, garage, or congested area over night. The minimum dis-
persion of at least 100 yards between explosive carrying vehicles will be maintained, consistent with security and the tactical situation.

705. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. (See Force Order 8027.1).

706. Reports

1. Monthly Class V and VI Expenditures and Asset Reports

a. Submitted by:

(1) Commanding General, Force Logistic Command will be

responsible for reporting the expenditures and assets of FLC controlled dumps only.

(2) Commanding General, Third Marine Division and First Marine Division will report the monthly Class V expenditures and assets for Third Marine Division and First Marine Division controlled dumps only.

(3) Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing will report the monthly Class VA expenditures and assets of Class VA storage facilities under Wing control and are located in RVN.

b. CMC ltr AOAF-ws-7 over 4A22165 of 16Aug65 and CG, FMFPac ltr 8/kfa over 8011 of 23Jul65 applies.

c. The monthly Class V or VA Expenditure and Assets Report will be forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code CSX-8).

(1) One copy to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

(2) Two copies to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force. (Note: One copy will be retained by III MAF and one copy will be forwarded to the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: MACJ42-AM) by the 10th day of each month.)

(3) One copy to the Commanding General, Third Marine Division.

d. All issues from Ammunition Supply Points (ASP's) will be considered as combat expenditures. Class V items carried by the unit as their Basic Allowance will not be included.

2. Monthly Requisition and Assets Status Report, Class V Materiel

a. Marine Corps Order 8015.2 established requirement and describes the format for the Monthly Requisition Status Report, Class V Materiel (Report Symbol MC-4410-11).

b. Submitted as of 2400 of the last day of each month by the Commanding Officer, Force Logistic Command to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code CSX) so as to insure receipt on or before the date specified in MCO 8015.2. Distribution of copies will be as follows:

(1) One copy to the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force.

(2) One copy to Commanding General, Third Marine Division and First Marine Division.

(3) One copy to Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Naval Ordnance Facility, c/o F.O, San Francisco, California 96601.

3. Weekly Class V Expenditure Report.

a. Submitted by priority EFTO message to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Information addressees will include:

(1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force.

(2) Commanding General, Third Marine Division and First Marine Division.

b. This report will be submitted weekly as of 2400 Saturday listing expenditures only by Federal Stock Class/DCDAC/Quantity.

4. Unserviceable Equipment Reports UER's. Will be submitted in accordance with MCO 4700.1C.

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APPENDIX A

ForO P4000.4
13 March 1966

REFERENCES

- a. MCO 3000.2 (Subj: Operating Effectiveness Reporting) This order prescribes the Fleet Marine Force Operational Effectiveness Reporting System.
- b. ForO 4000.1 (Logistics Summary Report LOGSUM) This order publishes guidance and a format for the submission of a bi-monthly narrative LOGSUM Report to this Headquarters. Reports will be as of 050800 and 200800 and will reach this Headquarters by 081200 & 231200 each month.
- c. ForO 4000.2 (Equipment Density Report) This order publishes instructions relative to the submission of reports on equipment density to this Headquarters.
- d. Force/Naval Component Command O 5213.1 (Administrative Situation Reports) This order publishes instructions to subordinate commands and staff sections for the submission of topics to be included in the III MAF/NCC Administrative Daily Situation Report.
- e. I Corps Coordinator Instruction 11011.1 (Real Estate Procedures) This instruction outlines the procedures for the acquisition of real estate in RVN and is applicable to all organizations.
- f. FMFPac Order 4600.1 (Embarkation SOP) Self explanatory
- g. FMFM 4-2 (Embarkation) Self explanatory
- h. FMFPac Order 4000.3 (New Items of Equipment) This order sets down procedures for the receipt of new items of equipment in the Marine Corps.
- i. FMFPac Order 4000.13 (Combat-Essential Equipment) This order prescribes reporting procedures, amplifies policy concerning the deadline of combat essential equipment and specific procedures for machine processing the Readiness for Combat of Combat Essential Fleet Marine Force Equipment Report.
- j. MCBul 4000 of 2Apr65 (Organizational Maintenance Procedures) This directive emphasizes organizational maintenance procedures and command responsibility.
- k. MCO 4700.1C (Unsatisfactory Equipment Reports (UER's)) This directive spells out procedures and requirements for the submission of Unsatisfactory Equipment Reports (UER's) Form 10293-SD (UER).
- l. FMFPac Order 3000.1 (Engineer Equipment Report SOP) This order publishes instructions for the standardization of operations, training and employment of engineer units under the cognizance of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
- m. MCO 4442.3 (Management of Secondary Reparable Items in the Marine Corps) This order establishes policy for the management of reparable items within the Marine Corps in order to provide for maximum response to operational requirements of users.

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FCPO PA000.5
13 March 1966

- n. MCO 4400.16 (Material Priority System) This order establishes a material requisition and issue priority system and requisition tracer system which will ensure that requests for material, and tracer action thereon, are processed in accordance with the military importance of the requesting activity.
- o. MCO 8010.1 (Class V Logistics Procedures) This order prescribes Class V logistical procedures for use in the planning and support of combat operations involving Fleet Marine Forces.
- p. USAR PAC Reg No., 700-2 of 31Dec64 (Logistics Policies and Procedures for Supply of USMC Units in WestPac) This regulation provides for the Logistic Procedures of USAR PAC for the supply of USMC units in WestPac.
- q. FMPac Order 4000.2 (Mount Out and Garrison Levels of Class II Supplies and Equipment) This order prescribes levels of supply for Marine Corps Class II supplies and equipment (Less individual Clothing and Maintenance Float).
- r. III MAF msg 281002Z Jan66 (Stockage Objectives for all 5 Classes of Supply within III MAF) This message establishes stockage objectives for Classes I, II, III, IV and V for III MAF.
- s. FMPac msg 150402Z Feb66 (Formalizing the "Red Ball" System) This message spells out the functions of the "Red Ball" system and recommends to CMC that this system be given formal recognition through out the Marine Corps.
- t. CMC ltr AORG-1aw-6 to CG, FMPac of 10Feb66 (Refitting and Resupply of Rotating BLT's and the SLF) This document provides for equipment to be added to the FMPac 3d and 4th echelon Maintenance Float Allowance held by 3dFSR for rotating BLT's and the SLF.
- u. FMPac Order 000100.13 (IS) (Intra-Theatre BLT Rotation) This document provides for the procedures and schedules for the rotation of units within WestPac.
- v. FMPac Order 4700.13 (Standing Operating Procedures for Maintenance of Engineer Equipment) This order provides for the maintenance of engineer equipment for units of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

APPENDIX B

ForO P4000.5
13 March 1966LOGISTICS TERMINOLOGY

<u>TERM</u>	<u>EXPLANATION</u>
Assault Shipping	Shipping assigned to the amphibious task force for the transportation of the landing force to the objective area.
Assault Supplies	In amphibious operations, those supplies carried in the assault shipping, the term includes the prescribed loads of the landing force and landing force supplies.
Automatic Supply	The system by which supplies are shipped or issued for a predetermined period of time without requisition by using units. Requirements for automatic supply are based upon estimates or usage experience. Automatic supply is normally used to provide supply support where it is impractical for using units to submit requisitions in accordance with normal supply procedures.
Beach Support Area	An area centered around the landing beaches which is established and initially operated by the shore party which has the facilities for unloading of troops and material and the support of the forces ashore. It includes facilities for the evacuation of wounded, prisoners of war, and captured material.
Classes of Supply	Class I - Rations and water Class II - Clothing, organizational equipment, and vehicles including spare parts which are fixed by allowance list. Class III - Fuel and lubricants Class IV - Items not otherwise classified and for which no allowance lists are prescribed by the using unit. Class V - Ammunition and explosives.

FCR0 P4000.5
13 March 1966

Classes of Aviation Supplies

Class of aviation supplies and equipment are indicated by the letter (A) after the Roman Numeral. (Class IIIA, Fuel and Lubricants).

Concept of Logistic Support

A planning document which states the general requirements of the units for supply, transportation, service, and medical support for each successive period of the operation and the general plan for meeting these requirements. It is derived from the commander's concept of operations.

**Day of Ammunition
(DOA)**

A unit of measurement of ammunition expressed in terms of rounds per weapon, unit, individual, kit, set, or using device equivalent to the quantity of ammunition required to support an individual marine, unit, or landing force for one day.

**Days of Supply
(DOS)**

A unit of measurement equivalent to the amount of materiel and supplies of all classes required to support an individual marine, a unit, or a landing force for one day in combat; including replacements, replenishment and project requirements.

Floating Dump

Temporary storage facilities established by units of the landing force in landing craft, ships or amphibian vehicles from which supplies are available "on call" for delivery by the landing craft, amphibian vehicle or helicopter to units ashore during ship-to-shore movement.

Follow-up shipping

Ships not originally a part of the amphibious task force but which deliver troops and supplies to the objective area after the assault phase has begun.

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13 March 1966

Force Logistic Support Group

A task organization of combat service support units designed to provide logistic support directly to units of a Marine Division and/or a Marine Aircraft Wing or other major elements of a landing force.

Force Logistic Support Unit

A subordinate task organization of the force logistic support group responsible for performing specific logistic support tasks assigned by the force logistic support group commander.

General Unloading Period

The unloading period which is primarily logistic and quantitative in character and emphasizes speed and volume of unloading operations.

Helicopter Support Team

A task organization which is formed and equipped for employment in a landing zone to facilitate landing and movement of helicopter borne troops, equipment and supplies and to evacuate selected casualties and prisoners of war.

Landing Force Supplies

Supplies required for the support of the landing force in the objective area excluding those specifically allocated for support of designated subordinate units (prescribed loads). For amphibious operations, landing force supplies constitute the major part of assault supplies carried in assault shipping.

Landing Site

1. A designated area within a landing zone, where helicopters can land.
2. A continuous segment of coast line over which troops, equipment and supplies can be landed by naval forces.

Landing Zone

A specified zone within an objective area used for the landing of assault aircraft, including helicopters.

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13 March 1966

Level of Supply

The amount of materiel stated in days of supply (or days of ammunition for Class V) authorized for the supply support of a unit during a specified period of time. The level of supply consists of two elements: The operating level and the safety level.

**Logistic Support Area
(LSA)**

A complex of supply installations and facilities from which logistic support is provided by designated combat service support elements to designated tactical elements.

Mount-out Supply

A generic term for specific quantities and types of supplies maintained by designated supply agencies external to the landing force. Except for authorized allowances or individual and organic supplies and operating stocks in the custody of FMF units, assault supplies for the landing force are provided from this source.

Operating Level

The amount of materiel stated in days of supply (or days of ammunition for Class V) required to sustain the operations of a unit during the interval between the time a request or requisition is submitted and the arrival of resupply. The operating level includes the amount required to meet unit replenishment, replacement, and project requirements during the resupply interval and the amount required to maintain unit supply agencies at minimum prescribed levels.

Requirements

Requirements for supplies and equipment are classified according to the purpose for which they are needed.

Initial Requirements

Supplies and equipment authorized for issue to individuals and units pursuant to allowance publications.

ForO P4000.5
13 March 1966**Replacement and Replenishment Requirements**

Supplies and equipment required to maintain equipment and units at prescribed levels. It comprises the supplies and equipment required for maintaining the individual and organic equipment initially issued and for replenishing that which is worn out, consumed, expended, or lost.

Project Requirements

Supplies and equipment not included in authorized allowances, but required for a specific mission.

Resupply

In amphibious operations, those supplies transported to the objective area in follow-up shipping and air transport, required to maintain the operating level of supply for the landing force. The term "resupply" may also be used for supplies and equipment provided to subordinate units of the landing force by logistic support agencies within the objective area.

Schedule of Logistic Tasks

A planning document which states the detailed requirements of a unit for supply, transportation, service, and medical support in terms of specific types, quantities, times, and places. It is the means of translating the commander's general plan for logistic support as stated in the concept of logistic support into specific logistic support tasks for publication in administrative plans or orders.

Shore Party

A task organization of the landing force formed for the purpose of facilitating the landing and movement across the beaches of troops, equipment, and supplies; to provide supply to the landing force; to evacuate casualties and prisoners of war; and to facilitate the beaching, retraction, and salvaging of landing ships and craft. It comprises elements of both naval and landing forces.

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Tactical Logistical Group
(Tac-log)

A group organized from personnel within the landing force to advise Navy control officers of landing force requirements during the ship-to-shore movement.

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(To be Issued)

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO San Francisco, California 96602

ForBul 005440

3/jfc

Ser: 0043608

16 April 1966

SECRET

SECRET

FORCE BULLETIN 005440

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: III MAF Task Organization/Troop List (U)

Ref: (a) III MAF/NCC Order 3121.1B
(b) CG III MAF ltr 3/jfc over 5440 Ser 023566 of 6Mar66

Encl: (1) III MAF March Task Organization/Troop List

1. Purpose. To promulgate the III MAF 31 March 1966 Task Organization/Troop List.
2. Background. Reference (a) requires subordinate units to submit by the 5th day of each month a report of their task organization/troop list based on operational control for the last day of the preceding month.
3. Information. Enclosure (1) contains the 31 March 1966 III MAF Task Organization/Troop List. Naval Component Command has been omitted. Addressees are requested to review enclosure (1) and report changes to this Headquarters.
4. Self-cancellation. 30 May 1966.

J. M. PLATT
Chief of Staff

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ForBul 005440
16 April 1966

Task Organization/Troop List - March 1966

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
I. <u>III Marine Amphibious Force</u>	3134	44702	292	1891	16	6	50041
A. <u>HQ III MAF DANANG</u>	128	426	5	4	16	6	585
1. Headquarters	122	359	5	3			489
2. Sentry Dog Platoon	1	37					38
3. Scout Dog Platoon	1	41		1			43
4. 7th CI Team	4	11					15
5. Det, 41st Civil Affairs Co.					16	6	22
a. Team #4 (QUANG TRI)					4	2	6
b. Team #5 (QUANG NGAI)					4	2	6
c. Team #10 (TAM KY)					4	1	5
d. Team #16 (DANANG)					4	1	5
B. <u>Base Defense Bn (DANANG)</u>	32	952	3	48			1035
1. 1st Bn, 9th Marines	32	952	3	48			1035
C. <u>5th Comm Bn (-)(Rein), FMF (DANANG)</u>	30	735		10			775
1. 5th Comm Bn (-)	30	691		10			731
2. Det 7th Engr Bn		22					22
3. Det H&S Co III MAF		22					22
D. <u>7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein)</u>	38	1042	1	17			1098
1. 7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)	36	990	1	16			1043
a. 7th Engr Bn (-)	30	845	1	16			892

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
b. 1st Bridge Co (-)	6	145					151
2. Det, 7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein) (PHU BAI)	2	52		1			55
a. Det, 7th Engr Bn	2	47		1			50
b. Det, 1st Bridge Co		5					5
E. <u>9th MT Bn (-)(Rein)(DaNang)</u>	24	348	1	10			38
1. 9th MT Bn (-)	23	323	1	10			357
2. 1st Plat, Co D, 7th MT Bn	1	25					26
F. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st Anglico</u>	4	43	6				53
1. Saigon	2	16	1				19
2. Bien Hoa	0	4	1				5
3. Beria	0	3	0				3
4. DaNang	0	4	1				5
5. Quang Ngai	1	2	0				3
6. Qui Nhon	1	2	0				3
7. Pleiku	0	3	1				4
8. Nha Trang	0	2	1				3
9. Can Tho	0	3	1				4
10. Ham Tan	0	2	0				2
11. Ca Mau	0	2	0				2
G. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st Radio Bn</u>	3	97					100
1. Hq & 2d Plat (DaNang)	2	57					59
2. 1st Plat (Chu Lai)	1	30					31

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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
H. <u>1st Marine Division (-)(Rein)</u> <u>(CHU LAI)</u>	615	10800	99	595			12109
1. <u>HqBn (Rein)</u>	145	1321	19	41			1526
a. HqBn							
b. 1st Dental Co (-)							
c. 7th CIT (-)							
d. Det 3d ITT							
e. 2nd SSC Tm							
2. <u>1st Marines (-)(Rein)</u>	73	1842	9	93			2017
a. HqCo (-)							
b. 3dBn							
c. 2dBn, 4thMar							
d. Det, HqCo, 1stBn, 4thMar							
3. <u>7th Marines (-)</u>	95	2520	10	144			2769
a. HqCo							
b. 1stBn							
c. 2dBn (-)							
d. 3dBn							
4. <u>Chu Lai Defense Command</u>	10	318					328
a. Det, HqCo, 2dBn, 7thMar							
b. CoE, 2dBn, 7thMar							
c. CoF, 2dBn, 7thMar							
5. <u>11th Marines (-)(Rein)</u>	123	1821	12	33			1989
a. HqBtry (-)							
b. 1stBn (-)(Rein)							

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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
(1) HqBtry (-)							
(2) BtryC (5-105 HOW)							
(3) BtryG, 12thMar (5-105 HOW)							
c. 3dBn (16-105 HOW, 5-107 Howtar)							
d. 4thBn (-) (Rein)							
(1) HqBtry							
(2) Btry M (5-155 HOW (SP))							
(3) 3d 155MM Gun Btry (-) (4-155 Gun (SP))							
(4) Plt 3d 8" HOW Btry (SP) (2-8" HOW (SP))							
e. 3d 8" HOW Btry Gru							
(1) 3d 8" HOW Btry (SP) (-) (4-8" HOWs (SP))							
(2) Btry K, 11thMar (6-155 HOW (SP))							
(3) Plt, 3d 155MM Gun Btry (SP) (2-155 Gun (SP))							
6. <u>1st Recon Bn (-)</u>	22	318	2	23			365
a. H&S Co (-)							
b. CoA (-)							
c. CoC							
d. CoD							
7. <u>1st AT Bn (-) (29 ONTOS)</u>	18	294	1	5			318
a. H&S Co (-)							
b. CoA							
c. CoC							

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	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
8. <u>1stTkBn (-) (32-M48 Tks, 8-M67 Flame Tks)</u>	32	472	2	10			516
a. H&SCo (-)							
b. CoA (-)							
c. CoC							
9. <u>1stMTBn (-)</u>	14	195	2	5			216
a. H&SCo (-)							
b. CoC							
10. <u>1stEngrBn (-)</u>	22	542	1	10			575
a. HqCo (-)							
b. Spt Co (-)							
c. CoA (-)							
d. CoCC							
11. <u>1st Med Bn (-)</u>	3	94	30	140			267
a. H&SCo (-)							
b. CoA (-)							
c. CoC							
d. CoD							
12. <u>1st SP Bn (-)</u>	20	268	2	24			314
a. H&SCo (-)							
b. CoA (-)							
c. CoC							
13. <u>3d AmTrac Bn (-) (56-LVTP-5)</u>	24	480	2	11			517
a. H&SCo (-)							

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	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
b. CoA (Rein)							
14. <u>7th MT Bn (-)</u>	14	287	1	7			309
15. <u>1st Hosp Co (-)</u>	0	28	6	49			83
I. <u>3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FME 894</u>	17847	113	944				19798
1. <u>HqBn (-) (DA NANG)</u>	150	1443	6	24			1623
a. HqCo	113	630	6	23			772
b. Comm Co (-)	12	343	0	0			355
c. Serv Co	15	327	0	0			342
d. MP Co (-)	4	116	0	1			121
e. 3d CIT	3	20	0	0			23
f. Det, 1st ITT	3	15	0	0			18
2. <u>3d Marines (-)(Rein)(DA NANG)</u>	94	2528	9	129			2760
a. HqCo	19	281	2	9			307
b. 1stBn, 3d Marines (Rein)	41	1280	4	70			1395
(1) 1stBn, 3dMar	34	978	4	54			1070
(2) Co C, 1stBn, 4thMar	3	158		8			169
(3) Co D, 1stBn, 1stMar	4	144		8			156
c. 2dBn, 3dMar	34	967	3	54			1058
3. <u>4thMar (-)(Rein)(PHU BAI)</u>	228	5268	23	253			5772
a. HqCo	20	254	2	4			280
b. Det, HqBn	3	25					28
c. Det, CommCo, HqBn		8					8

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	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
d. Det, 3d ITT	1	2					3
e. Det, 3d CIT	2	4					6
f. 1stBn, 1stMar	31	922	3	44			1000
g. 2dBn, 1stMar	31	1047	3	19			1100
h. 1stBn, 4thMar	23	534	3	33			593
i. 3dBn, 4thMar	35	1076	2	52			1165
j. 3dBn(-)(Rein), 12thMar	49	661	3	12			725
(1) HqBtry (Rein)	20	118	2	2			142
(2) Btry H (6-105mm How)	5	89		2			96
(3) Btry I (6-105mm How)	8	125	1	2			136
(4) Btry C, 1stBn, 12th Mar (6-105mm How)	7	93		2			102
(5) Btry B, 1stBn, 11th Mar (6-105mm How)	6	129		2			137
(6) Mortar Btry, 1stBn 11thMar (6-107mm How)	3	82		2			87
(7) Btry M, 4thBn, 12th Mar (6-155mm How Sp 6-155mm How Towed)	5	114		2			121
k. Co B, 3d MF Bn	5	95		1			101
l. Prov Recon Group Bravo	8	163		9			180
m. Co C (Rein), 3d TkBn (17 M48A3 Tks, 3 M67A2 Flame Tks)	6	114		2			122

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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
n. Co B (-)(Rein), 3d ATBn (10 M50A1 ONTOS)	3	65		2			70
o. Co A, 3d Med Bn		18	7	68			93
p. Co B 3d Engr Bn (Rein)	5	148		2			156
q. Det, 3d Shore Party Bn	1	43		3			47
4. <u>9th Marines (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	109	3296	11	154			3570
a. HqCo	17	259	2	7			285
b. 2dBn, 9th Mar	30	1031	3	46			1110
c. 3dBn, 9thMar	31	1024	3	54			1109
d. 3dBn, 3dMar	31	982	3	47			1063
5. <u>12th Marines (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	138	2004	12	39			2193
a. HqBtry (-)(2-CMRS)	26	220	4	5			255
b. 1st 8" HowBtry (SP) (6- 8" How)	9	207		3			219
c. 1st 155 Gun Btry (SP) (6-155 Guns)	6	142		3			151
d. 1stBn (-)(Rein), 12thMar	38	526	4	11			579
(1) HqBtry	13	149	4	4			170
(2) Btry A (6-105mm How)	6	98		2			106
(3) Btry A, 1stBn, 11th Mar (6-105mm How)	7	95		2			104
(4) Btry B (6-105mm How)	8	108		1			117
(5) 107mm Mortar Btry (6- 4.2 Mortar & 6-107mm Mortar)	4	76		2			82

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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
f. 4th Bn (-), 12thMar	22	318		7			347
(1) HqBtry	13	122		3			138
(2) Btry K, 4thBn, 12th Mar (6-155mm How SP & 6-155mm How towed)	5	106		2			113
(3) Btry L, 4thBn, 12thMar (6-155mm How SP & 6- 155mm How towed)	4	90		2			96
6. <u>3d Recon Bn (DANANG)</u>	18	250	1	13			282
a. H&S Co	12	117	1	7			137
b. Co A	2	67		3			72
c. Co A	4	66		3			73
7. <u>3d Anti-tank Bn (-)(DANANG)</u>	20	380		9			409
a. H&S Co (-)	11	183		6			200
b. Co A (Rein)(15 M50A1 ONTOS)	4	93		2			99
c. Co C (Rein)(20 M50A1 ONTOS)	5	112		1			118
8. <u>3d Tank Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	37	580	1	11			629
a. H&S Co (-)(2 M48A3 Tks)	25	325	1	8			359
b. 1st Plt Co C (5 M48A3 Tks)		22					22
c. Co A (-)(Rein)(12 M48A3 Tks and 3 M67Aw Flame Tks)	5	101		1			107
d. Co E (Rein)(17 M48A3 Tks & 3 M67A2 Flame Tks)	7	132		2			141

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
9. <u>1st AmTrac Bn (-)(Rein), FMF</u> <u>(DANANG)</u>	25	598	2	13			638
a. H&S Co (11 LVTP5, 3 LVTC1, 1 LVTR 1 + 8 LVTE1)	20	312	2	15			349
b. 1st Prov Armored Amphib Plt, 2 (6 LVTH6 & 1 LVTP5 (CMD))		73		2			77
c. Co A (42 LVTP5, 3LVTC1, 1 LVTR1)	7	233					240
d. Co B (42 LVTP5, 3 LVTC1, 1 LVTR1)	8	238					246
10. <u>3d Engr Bn (-)(Rein)(DANANG)</u>	31	756	1	13			801
a. H&S Co	13	147	1	13			174
b. Supt Co	4	279					283
c. Co A (-)	4	80					84
d. Co C	5	146					151
e. Co C, 7th Engr Bn	5	103					108
11. <u>3d Shore Party Bn (DANANG)</u>	23	389	1	26			439
a. H&S Co	11	164	1	11			187
b. Co A	4	76		5			85
c. Co B	4	70		5			79
d. Co C	4	79		5			88
12. <u>3d MT Bn (-)(DANANG)</u>	18	240		8			266
a. H&S Co	6	67		8			81
b. Co A	6	86		8			92
c. Co C	6	87					93

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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
13. <u>3d Med Bn (-)(DANANG)</u>	3	115	25	201			344
a. H&S Co	3	101	10	43			154
b. Co C			7	49			56
c. Co D			6	51			57
d. Co B		14	2	58			74
14. <u>3d Dental Co (-)</u>			21	51			72
a. DANANG			12	38			50
b. CHU LAI			6	9			15
c. PHU BAI			3	4			7
J. <u>1st Marine Aircraft Wing</u>	1230	9043	50	163			10486
1. <u>MWHG-1 (DANANG)</u>	267	2356	23	74			2720
a. H&HS-1 (DANANG)	124	851	12	31			1018
b. MASS-2 (DANANG)	39	206		3			248
(1) Det A (CHU LAI)	6	18					24
(2) Det B (DANANG)	3	8					11
(3) Det C (PHU BAI)	3	12					15
(4) Det D (DONG HA)	2	6					8
(5) DASC (CHU LAI)	4	9					13
c. MACS-7 (CHU LAI)	25	242		2			269
(1) Det A (PHU BAI)	2	19					21

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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
d. 1st LAAM Bn (DANANG)	28	494		10			532
e. 2d LAMM Bn (CHU LAI)	31	491	2	10			534
2. <u>MAG-11 (DANANG)</u>	211	1980	7	21			2219
a. H&MS-11 (1-C117D)	40	452					492
b. MABS-11	16	555	3	18			592
c. VMFA-314 (15-F4B)	44	288	1	2			335
d. VMFA-542 (15-F4B)	53	281	1	1			336
e. VMT(AW)-235 (13-F8E)	27	195	1				223
f. VMJ-1 (4-EF-10B, 2-RF-8A)	31	209	1				241
3. <u>MAG-12 (CHU LAI)</u>	214	1747	7	18			1986
a. M&MS-12 (1-C117D)	49	427					476
b. MABS-12	23	591	3	15			632
c. VMA-211 (19-A4E)	35	168	1	1			205
d. VMA-223 (21-A4E)	34	167	1	2			204
e. VMA-224 (22-A4E)	33	162	1				196
f. VMA-311 (21-A4C)	33	171	1				205
g. MATCU-67	7	61					68
4. <u>MAG-16 (MARBLE MTN)</u>	304	1658	8	26			1996
a. H&MS-16 (1-C117D, 8-CH37C)	31	302					333

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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
b. Det H&MS-16	9	61		1			71
c. MABS-16	13	398	3	7			421
d. Det MABS-16 (PHU BAI)		12					12
e. Det MABS-16 (TAM KY)		2					2
f. Det MABS-16 (QUANG TRI)		2					2
g. HMM-163 (PHU BAI)(20 UH34)	50	158	1	3			212
h. HMM-164 (24-CH46)	56	189	1	3			249
i. HMM-263 (22-UH34D)	51	157	1	3			212
j. HMM-361 (24-UH34D)	50	164	1	3			218
k. VMO-2 (20-UH1E)	38	153	1	6			198
l. MATCU-68 (PHU BAI)	6	60					66
5. <u>MAG-36 (KY HA)</u>	234	1302	5	24			1565
a. H&MS-36 (1-C117D)	39	317					356
b. MABS-36	12	361	4	24			401
c. HMM-261 (23-UH34D)	50	165					215
d. HMM-363 (22-UH34D)	48	151					199
e. HMM-364 (21-UH34D)	54	156	1				211
f. VMO-6 (16-UH1E)	31	152					183
K. <u>Force Logistic Command</u>	136	3369	14	100			3619
1. <u>Headquarters FLC</u>	11	19					30
a. Det H&SCo III MAF	11	19					30

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	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
2. <u>Force Logistic Support Group</u> <u>Alpha/3dSvc Bn (Rein)</u>	77	2186	11	83			2358
a. Force Logistic Support Group Alpha/3dSvcBn (Rein) (DANANG)	61	1786	5	33			1885
(1) H&S Co	30	373	3	15			421
(2) Supply Co	19	781	2	18			820
(3) Maint Co	8	427					435
(4) Truck Co	4	205					209
b. Force Logistic Support Unit #2 (PHU BAI)	16	400	6	50			472
(1) FLSU #2 Hq	11	287		3			301
(2) H&S Co (Prov)	5	59		3			67
(3) Supply Plt	2	97					99
(4) Maint Plt	4	131					135
(5) Co B, 3d MT Bn (-)	5	95					100
(6) Co A, 3d MedBn		18	6	47			71
3. <u>Force Logistic Support Group</u> <u>Bravo/1stSvcBn (Rein)</u>	48	1164	3	17			1221
a. H&S Co	21	184	2	7			214
b. Supply Co	14	415	1	10			429
c. Maint Co	11	441					452
d. Truck Co	2	124					126

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
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(2) Lessons Learned Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) Lessons Learned Logistic Support Group

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LESSONS LEARNED MARINE DIVISION

3/JCL/wmr
3430.1
15 Mar 1966

LESSONS LEARNED - JANUARY 1966
I ADMINISTRATIVE (None Included)
II INTELLIGENCE

1. ITEM: TAGGING CAPTIVES

DISCUSSION: Tagging of captives can be expedited by using pre-stamped tags made with address-o-graph plates.

RECOMMENDATIONS: As an expedient, use address-o-graph for preparation of POW tags.

Enclosure (1)

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 15 Mar 1966

III OPERATIONS - TRAINING1. ITEM: LAAW (M79)

DISCUSSION: The LAAW has proven to be a definite asset as it increases the high explosive fire power of small units. The expended tube should be disposed of so as to prevent use by the VC.

RECOMMENDATIONS: As stated.

2. ITEM: HELO-LOADING

DISCUSSION: During operation QUICK STEP, assault troops were pre-loaded at the MAG-36 helo pad. Transportation to the pad was accomplished by truck convoy. This procedure required less helicopter fuel permitting the initial wave to accommodate nine combat-loaded Marine perhelicopter, resulting in more Marines landing at L-hour. This method insures timely meeting of L-hours and maximum initial troop lift capability because of reduced fuel load.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Where feasible, consider trucking troops to helicopters in situations where flight distance/time will be shortened.

3. ITEM: LOCATING AND DESTRUCTION OF RIVER BANK CAVE

DISCUSSION: In one operation, demolitions charges were set along a river bank suspected to contain hidden caves. This technique resulted in the capture of several VC hidden in caves and tunnels with under water entrances which otherwise might not have been discovered. This method blows the tops off the caves thus exposing the entrance.

RECOMMENDATIONS: As stated.

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IV LOGISTICS (None Included)
V COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

1. ITEM: USE OF SHACKLE CODES

DISCUSSION: Current communication procedure states that coordinates of all enemy contacts should be sent in the clear to preclude compromise of the shackle system. The coordinates of apprehension sites of VCS should be encoded to preclude the possible plotting of the units axis of advance by the enemy.

RECOMMENDATIONS: As stated.

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15 Mar 1966SPECIAL REPORT OF COMPANY "B" PATROL OF 27 DEC 1965

"This special report is an account of a 17 man combat patrol sent out from the 3d Platoon, Company "B", 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. This patrol, and supporting arms, accounted for a total of 41 VC killed by body count. The patrol leader was a First Lieutenant, and the patrol was reinforced with two M60 machine guns and one 60mm mortar. The area of activity was approximately 11 miles south of DANANG, in the vicinity of the hamlet of QUANG HA (1). The patrol was a regular combat patrol, dispatched to an area of known VC activity, with the mission of killing or capturing VC and destroying trenchlines or hiding places. The patrol was approximately 4500 meters south of its platoon patrol base and 3500 meters south of the Company CP when contact was established.

The patrol was proceeding in a southerly direction when it received four or five rounds of sniper fire from the west, at a distance of about 300 meters. Upon receiving this fire, the patrol leader dispatched a fire team to the ridgeline to his west to search out the snipers and afford the patrol additional flank protection. As the patrol approached the hamlet of QUANG HA (1), at a distance of about 30 meters, it received a heavy volume of fire from the treeline to its front and from the right flank (See Diagram of Vicinity of Action). This initial high volume of fire lasted about five to six minutes and accounted for the total Marine casualties of one killed and six wounded, as well as the death of a VCS that the patrol had earlier apprehended. The initial burst of fire killed the radioman with the patrol and destroyed his radio, and the VC then directed their fire at the two machine guns, rendering one inoperative. It is estimated that over 50 VC occupied the ambush site with at least 15 automatic weapons.

The patrol and its flank fire team returned fire immediately. It is possible that the VC were not aware of the flanking fire team, because the VC soon commenced a frontal assault, from their concealed positions to the front of the patrol. In the assault, the Marines' fire, from the flanking fire team especially, took a deadly toll, as the 12 VC attempting to assault from the front were exposed in the open at close range. These 12 VC were killed by Marine small arms fire. Simultaneously with the assault from the front, the VC located to the west in the north-south axis of the L-shaped ambush attempted to move onto the sandy ridge on the patrol's right flank; these VC were spotted by the flanking fire team and were taken under fire in the open, resulting in nine VC KIA.

At this time, it was noticed that an additional 40 to 50 VC occupied positions about 50 to 100 meters to the rear of the ambush site. This was disclosed when they came forward to recover the bodies and weapons of their fallen comrades, using meathooks to drag away the bodies.

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It would be well to point out that at this time the patrol had fought over 30 minutes against a VC force superior in number, and with only 10 Marines who were not casualties; this fact prevented the Marines from recovering any weapons. They did continue to fire at the VC who were policing the battlefield, however, another three VC were killed while dragging off bodies and weapons.

After the enemy fire diminished, the patrol leader moved forward to the high ground. At this time he heard a shrill whistle, apparently a VC withdrawal signal. As the VC started to withdraw, the patrol placed 18 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on them, resulting in an unknown number of VC casualties.

Since the radio had been rendered inoperative, the patrol leader earlier had fired a prearranged pyrotechnic signal for assistance. Now, after the firing subsided, the patrol leader put the assistant patrol leader in command and started to return, with another man, to his platoon patrol base to make sure that reinforcements were on the way, and to guide the reinforcements. After he had travelled about 1200 meters, the patrol leader met two ONIOS with an accompanying squad of infantry who were enroute to the action.

With communications reestablished through this reinforcing unit, the patrol leader requested helicopter MedEvac and additional support of two tanks from his Company CP. The patrol leader then returned to the area of contact, searched the area where the mortars had fired, and discovered large pools of blood and pieces of bodies. Within five minutes of his return, the two tanks, with an additional rifle squad, arrived from the Company CP; at this time the MedEvac helicopters also arrived, and while the MedEvac was being completed, the tanks engaged the withdrawing VC with long range fire from their machine guns and 90mm guns. This fire resulted in another 13 VC KIA, which were observed and counted by the Tank Commander and Company "B" Commander, who had arrived on the scene with the tanks.

After the MedEvac was completed, the escort helicopter remained behind and provided covering fire while Company "B" units withdrew. This escort accounted for an additional three VC KIA. After all friendly units had withdrawn from the area, the AO called an artillery fire mission on 20 VC withdrawing to the south, resulting in one confirmed VC KIA and seven probable VC KIA.

The total casualty figures for the encounter were:

a. USMC

(1) KIA - One

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(2) WIA - Six (including one DOW)

b. VC

(1) KIA - 41 confirmed, and additional 15 to 20 probable.

(2) WIA - Unknown

Although no weapons were recovered from the scene of the battle, due to the heavy activity taking place while the patrol was vastly outnumbered, the following equipment was recovered:

- 1 Cartridge belt
- 3 BAR magazines
- 1 M26 fragmentation grenade
- 41 caliber .45 rounds
- 1 Thompson sub-machine gun magazine
- 2 aluminum cigarette lighters with "403" engraved upon them.
- 1 GVN identification card
- 1 billfold
- 2 camouflage soft covers
- 1 notebook with writing
- 1 red neckerchief
- 1 caliber .30 round
- 1 cigarette pouch
- 1 poncho
- 1 camouflage jacket, with live foliage attached.

Only a representative amount of equipment was taken from the scene; much expended brass and several bloody camouflage jackets were left in the area.


The VC encountered were well-camouflaged, occupied freshly-dug positions, displayed good fire control, and gave indications of being a well-disciplined, hard-core unit. Their fatal mistake was an assault that was perhaps premature, and a failure to recognize the flanking fire team position. Their camouflage was excellent, consisting basically of a woven bamboo lattice interplaced with three to four strips of green vegetation. This lattice was placed on their back and secured by a string tied around the waist, and rendered the VC almost indistinguishable, even when they moved out of their prepared positions to assault the patrol."

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"B" CO, 1/9 AMBUSH INCIDENT ON 27DEC65



* SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

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SPECIAL REPORT OF PATROL EMPLOYING HELICOPTERBORNE REACTION FORCE

- "1. As was suggested by the Regimental Commander during the Commanders' meeting on 21 January, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines arranged for a helicopterborne reaction force to be employed in conjunction with a patrol for the purpose of exploiting any contacts with VC during the patrol.
2. At 2407'4H, a reinforced squad from Company C was transported by two H-34 helicopters from the Company C Combat Base, BS 625991, to a landing zone at BT 669990. A gunship escort as well as an AO were provided for the landing. After the landing, the H-34 helicopters returned to the Combat Base to park and wait for possible employment with a reinforced squad-sized reaction force. The AO and gunship remained on station in the objective area as the patrol moved northward along the ridgeline towards Dong Le (5), BT 666011.
3. At 240810H, the AO spotted 10 to 12 VCS dressed in black pajamas moving north along a trail BT 655016. The Company Commander of Company C decided to deploy the reaction force to stop, seize, and search this group of VCS. The reaction squad was airborne at 0825H, and by 0830H had the target in sight. The VCS were observed to be carrying packages, and one of the VCS appeared to be trying to hide his package. All ran from the helicopters as they approached.
4. The helicopters landed at BT 655015, 50 meters from the fleeing VCS, who were loudly commanded to halt several times in Vietnamese. A number of warning shots were fired, and the gunship fired in front of the VCS to turn them back, but they continued to flee. The squad then pursued and fired for effect. In the ensuing action, three of the fugitives were killed, one captured uninjured, and three captured wounded. All were determined later by ITT to be confirmed VC. The H-34 helicopters were called in to retract the squad and the captives; this was completed by 1000H.
5. The squad patrol moving north along the ridgeline in grid square BT 6600 was aware of the reaction force being deployed, and moved into a blocking position southeast of the reaction force. This action was uneventful. After retraction of the reaction force, the patrol continued on its mission, searched Dong Le (5) without contact, and was retracted by the same helicopters at BT 665002.

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6. This mission could be described as an air-ground team in miniature. As such, it was clear success. Moreover, it showed excellent potential for further development and use in the Company C zone east of the Song Tra Bong River. At all times, the troops, transport helicopters, gunship, and AO were closely coordinated in a team effort. Because the reaction force helicopters parked in the Company C Combat Base, the reaction force was able to take off a mere 15 minutes after the target was sighted. Even after the reaction force was landed, close teamwork continued as the gunship acted in effect as a blocking force and helped locate several fleeing VC that were not visible to the Marines on the ground. In one case, the AO spotted a wounded VC, dropped a green smoke grenade on his position, thereby leading the Marines to the spot and resulting in his capture.

7. It is highly recommended that helicopters continue to be made available for employment as described above.

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LESSONS LEARNED MARINE AIRCRAFT W1. ITEM: LEAFLET DROPS

COMMENT: Experience gained during the past month indicates that leaflet drops using the MK-12 delivery technique as outlined in NWIP 41-3 produces unsatisfactory dispersion resulting in the dropping of all the leaflets in a small area. For better dispersion, a delivery of leaflets at about 400 knots at an altitude of 2000' to 3000' in straight and level flight is recommended.

2. ITEM: DELIVERY METHOD FOR BOX FIN BOMBS

COMMENT: Previous delivery methods of the AN/M-57 250# GP (Box Fin) bomb has resulted in aircraft being exposed to effective ground fire for long periods due to the carriage speed restriction of 350 knots and low altitude patterns used (A4). This becomes a significant problem in areas of operations that are heavily defended. The low/slow delivery method keeps the air speed within limits, but was designed to be used against unopposed targets under low ceilings. A delivery method has been devised which keeps the airspeed within limits using 10,000' roll in at slow speed, brakes out, 80% or less, 40-45 degree dive angle using a 4000' release with a 2500' recovery. Release speed using this method is approximately 350 knots. A sight setting of 160 mils has produced satisfactory target results. This method minimizes the period of time the delivery aircraft is exposed to effective hostile fire.

3. ITEM: HELICOPTER FLARE SUPPORT

COMMENT: Artillery flares have proven highly satisfactory illumination for night med-evac missions enabling the pilot to see terrain outline. Once a flare is ignited, however, the pilot loses his night vision capability necessitating continuous illumination until completion of landing and/or pick up.

4. ITEM: POTABLE WATER IN CAMP LIVING AREAS

COMMENT: Several man and equipment hours have been saved daily by the 1st LAAM Bn utilizing a 3000 gallon fabric water tank in the Battalion Headquarters living area. The tank has pipes laid to the living area with taps located between each two tents.

5. ITEM: SEVERAL M-36 2 1/4 TON VEHICLES WERE DEADLINED IN 1ST LAAM BN DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF 6 TN BATTERIES

COMMENT: As a temporary measure the 2HN battery, manually utilized on the 1/4 ton and 3/4 ton vehicle, was substituted for the 6TN. This battery was made to fit in the oversize battery case by utilizing wood blocks.

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CONFIDENTIAL6. ITEM: WIRE LANGLINES BETWEEN UNITS

COMMENT: These lines have been overheaded on 10-15 foot bamboo poles. Since this has been done the difficulties experienced because of broken lines have been negligible. This solution is certainly not new, but can be overlooked in an environment where other commitments can take precedence.

7. ITEM: USING RADAR CROSS-TELL WITHIN A LAAM BN BETWEEN THE UPS-1 SEARCH RADAR AND A FIRING BATTERY WHEN THE PULSE ACQUISITION RADAR OF THAT BATTERY IS DOWN

COMMENT: Battery "C", 1st LAAM Bn, has a Pulse Acquisition Radar in a down status awaiting parts. The Battalion search radar, the UPS-1, is located in the vicinity of Battery "C". A hot line has been installed from the UPS-1. This has served as a temporary measure that allows the Battery to have the necessary radar search information. The close proximity of the Battery and the UPS-1 allow this to work satisfactorily without a parallax problem.

8. ITEM: A REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR AN AIRBORNE RADIO RELAY UNIT DURING AMPHIBIOUS OR HELIBORNE ASSAULTS

COMMENT: The Airborne Direct Air Support Center (DASC) has been utilized, as an airborne radio relay agency. However, when the requirement is for radio relay and not for a DASC then the utilization of the DASC in the role is uneconomical. There is a need for equipment which will allow automatic radio relay without requiring a complete DASC.

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CONFIDENTIALLESSONS LEARNED LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUPI. SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE1. ITEM: INFANTRY WEAPONS REPAIR

DISCUSSION: Peacetime procedures for the operation of infantry weapons maintenance floats are impractical in a combat environment. Current directives basically prohibit exchanging a float item for one to be evacuated or for one which can be repaired within the RDD specified by the customer. However, with few exceptions in front-line units, replacement items must be made available immediately for infantry weapons requiring disposition or repair. Thus, the allowable exceptions to the float exchange restrictions must be the norm, in order for the units to maintain their required combat capability.

RECOMMENDATION: That supply/maintenance procedures be revised to permit maintenance units directly supporting combat units to automatically provide a replacement item for any infantry weapon which cannot be repaired on-site and for which the customer requests an immediate replacement.

2. ITEM: BRAKE LININGS

DISCUSSION: Vietnam's consistently high temperatures and the almost total absence of hard-surfaced roads and staging areas combine to produce a brake lining mortality rate greatly in excess of that experienced under most operating conditions. This is especially true of heavy vehicles such as 2½ ton trucks and 6000 lb. forklifts which are in almost constant use. These vehicles move a large percentage of all materiel in-country but also experience two of the highest deadline rates, principally because of brake failures. Down time continues to be unacceptably long because brake linings are not supplied with adequate speed and regularity.

RECOMMENDATION: That aggressive action to supply brake linings be continued, and if possible, increased.

That industry be requested to develop brake linings designed specifically for use under extreme conditions of heat and mud, sand or dust.

3. ITEM: NYLON TIE DOWN STRAPS

DISCUSSION: Nylon tie down straps are being used to secure cargo to the beds of the vehicles rather than the customary link chains, as there is a lack of binders to secure the chains. The nylon straps

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are lighter, stronger and less expensive than the metal chains. Thus they are easier to handle and require less space to store. These straps are currently being used in C-130 aircraft.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that nylon straps be adopted as standard cargo lashing devices on Marine Corps cargo vehicles.

4. ITEM: SEMI TRAILER, 6 TON, 2 WHEEL M-118 WITH DOLLY CONVERTER, M-19741

DISCUSSION: The bridging trailers, M-118, are being utilized in the following manner when possible. Two M-118 semi trailers are assigned to one M-54 five ton cargo vehicle. The semi trailers are then shuffled between load and unload points. In this manner one trailer is loaded while the prime mover is transporting the other and vice versa. By dropping the trailer at an expected loading area with an undetermined time of arrival of cargo, such as 15th Aerial Port, much time and labor is saved in handling and loading of the cargo. Otherwise the cargo would have to be handled twice by the MHE while the prime mover and semi trailer were dispatched to the loading site. This method saves much time and effectively utilizes the existing man power and MHE.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that this process be utilized wherever possible.

5. ITEM: INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT RADIO CIRCUIT

DISCUSSION: Over-the-beach and over-the-road handling of all classes of supply in great volume requires timely and flexible coordination. Experience has shown that even the best of pre-planned coordination, vehicles must be responsive to unexpected changes in ship loading and unloading schedules. This is particularly pertinent when cargo is being handled simultaneously over several piers and beaches.

Currently an integrated Marine Corps/Navy FM radio circuit, utilizing Radio Set, AN/PRC-10, links each beach and pier with the Naval Support Activity Operations Center, the coordinator of marine trucking, cognizant roadmasters, and the Headquarters of Marine Supply Activities within the FISG.

This radio circuit has contributed to a speedier reaction to changing transportation requirements; which, in turn, has resulted in a more economical and productive utilization of marine trucking.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That planning for future employment of logistic units include provision of personnel and equipment to activate an integrated radio circuit appropriate to the situation

Further, that consideration must be given to the possible requirement for providing compatible equipment to Navy elements.

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO San Francisco 96502

Copy ___ of ___ Copies

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Ser:

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Subj: Overlays of III MAF TAOR's and RZ's, forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) Overlay of HUE PHU BAI TACR and RZ
(2) Overlay of DANANG TAOR and RZ
(3) Overlay of CHU LAI TAOR and RZ

1. The enclosed overlays depict III MAF TAOR's and RZ's as presently agreed upon with I Corps.
2. The purpose of this transmittal is to insure up-dating to reflect recently approved changes.

J. R. CHAISSON
By direction

Copy to:
CMC
CG, FMFPac
CG, FMFPac/I MAC (FWD)
CG, I Corps
CG, 2d ROK Mar Bde
CG, I FFORCEV
CG, 1st MarDiv
CG, 3d MarDiv
CG, 1st MAW
CO, FLC
CO, I Corps Adv Gru

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years.

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(1971)

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MESSAGE FORM 7-1 CONFIDENTIAL

3d. MarDiv CG 1001 MAF

TO CG 3D MARDIV

CG 1ST MARDIV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: "COUNTY FAIR" OPERATIONS

1. COMMENCING IN FEBRUARY 1966, THE 9TH MARINE REGIMENT HAS CONDUCTED THREE "COUNTY FAIR" OPERATIONS WITHIN THE DANANG TAOR. THE "COUNTY FAIR" OPERATION IS A COORDINATED GVN-USMC SEARCH TYPE ACTION INCORPORATING CIVIC ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MEASURES. IN THE OPERATION, A PRE-SELECTED HAMLET IS SURROUNDED BY USMC FORCES DURING PRE-DAWN HOURS. DURING THE DAY THE POPULATION IS ASSEMBLED AT THE COLLECTION POINT. A COMPLETE CENSUS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION

PAGE TWO C O N F I D E N T I A L

IS CONDUCTED BY GVN AUTHORITIES WHO LIKEWISE ENGAGE IN A VIGOROUS PROGRAM TO CONVINCING THE POPULACE OF THE GVN CONCERN FOR THEIR WELFARE AND OF GVN-ARVN EFFORTS TO PREVENT A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. MEDICAL TREATMENT AND FOOD IS PROVIDED THE POPULATION WHILE A THROUGH SEARCH OF THE HAMLET IS CONDUCTED TO FERRET OUT VC WHO MAY BE IN HIDING.

2. ONE SUCH OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED ON 7-8 MARCH 1966 AT DUONG SON(2) HAMLET AT COORDINATES (AT995677) NEAR DANANG. 5VC WERE KILLED AND 7 VCS APPREHENDED DURING THE OPERATION. 1 GMM PISTOL, 1 CHICOM CARBINE AND 1 US CARBINE WERE CAPTURED.

3. ON 17 MARCH 1966, THE BELOW QUOTED DOCUMENT WAS CAPTURED AT (AT 952651) THIS DOCUMENT MAY SERVE AS AN INDICATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE "COUNTY FAIR" OPERATIONS.

"AT 0200 ON 7 MARCH, A COMBINED FORCE OF US AND GVN MILITARY PERSONNEL NUMBERING 600 (SIC) LAUNCHED A SEARCH OPERATION IN A HAMLET OF "H" (DUONG SONG HAMLET), COORDINATES (AT 996678). THE US AND GVN FORCES DISPLACED THE VILLAGERS TO CENTRAL AREA WHERE OUR CADRE WERE SEPARATED FROM THEM. SOME OF OUR CADRE AND GUERRILLA FIGHTERS WERE FORCED TO EMERGE FROM THEIR HIDING PLACES IN TUNNELS SO AS TO TRY TO CONTACT (HOLD WITH) THE PEOPLE.


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ENCLOSURE - (12)

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 MESSAGE FORM - 

 3d MarDiv - 2100/1

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PAGE THREE C O N F I D E N T I A L

AS A CONSEQUENCE, FIVE OF OUR MEN WERE KILLED BY US AND GVN SOLDIERS. THIS SHOULD SERVE AS A LESSON (WARNING) TO ALL OF US. THE ENEMY MAY CONDUCT THIS SAME TYPE OF OPERATION IN THE FUTURE IN OTHER AREAS. THIS WARNING MUST BE DISSEMINATED TO ALL OF THE VILLAGES. WATER AND FOOD STOCKS, ADEQUATE FOR A PERIOD OF THREE TO FIVE DAYS MUST BE PREPARED. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY THAT OUR FORCES RESIST THE EFFORTS OF THE ENEMY TO SURROUND THE HAMLET, AND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE ESCAPE THE ENCIRCLEMENT. (SIGNED) BANG, COMMANDER OF HQ-73

4. FOR 3D MARDIV - SUGGEST YOU DISSEMINATE THE FOREGOING VC REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUR OPERATION.

5. FOR 1ST MARDIV - SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER THE USE OF THIS TYPE OF OPERATION WHERE APPROPRIATE.

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 BT

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