

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 164
Marine Aircraft Group 15
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFPac
APO, San Francisco 96602

J:GIL:krm
003A04669
15 Feb 1969

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander Task Group 79.5

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 January 1969 to 31 January 1969

Ref: (a) MCC 5750.2
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) HM-164 Command Chronology

1. In compliance with references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

R. E. Trundy
R. E. TRUNDY

HMM-164

HMM-164
S+C #00502

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Jan 69

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 164
Marine Aircraft Group 15
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFPac
FPO, San Francisco 96602

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COMBAND CHRONOLOGY

1 January 1969 to 31 January 1969

- PART I ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
- PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Enclosure (1)
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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation

HM-164

Commander

LtCol. R. T. TRUNDY 1-31 Jan 69

Subordinate Units

None

Attached Units

None

2. Location

1-31 Jan 69 USS TRIPOLI, LPH-10

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer	Maj. A. F. RIEBECK	1-31 Jan 69
Operations Officer	Maj. D. D. WILSON	1-31 Jan 69
Administrative Officer	Capt. R. J. BLANCHFIELD	1-31 Jan 69
Maintenance Officer	Maj. R. J. MC GAN	1-31 Jan 69
Logistics/Supply Officer	Maj. J. M. EICHELBERGER	1-31 Jan 69
Intelligence Officer	Capt. F. L. GAUSE	1-31 Jan 69
NATOPS Officer	1stLt. T. U. WALL	1-31 Jan 69
Safety Officer	Maj. E. A. BIRZER	1-31 Jan 69

4. Average Monthly Strength

<u>NAVAL AVIATORS</u>	<u>AGO</u>	<u>FLIGHT SURGEON</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>BOEING REP</u>	<u>G. E. REP</u>
42	2	1	173	1	1

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the reporting period HMM-164 supported Special Landing Force Bravo and the embarked Battalion (3/26) during a rehearsal 8 January 1969 in preparation for Operation Bold Mariner. 1010 Marines were lifted to Landing Zone Peyton and returned to LPH-10 and LPD-5 in $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Just 5 days later on 13 January 1969 HMM-164 lead by its Commanding Officer, LtCol. R. T. TRUNDY, landed the assault forces of Operation Bold Mariner by lifting 1156 Combat Marines of BLT 3/26 (Rein) into the Batangan Peninsula in three hours and twenty minutes flight time. The strike was extremely difficult in that the weather was 500 feet overcast with 1 mile visibility. Fortunately no enemy fire was received during the insertion of the BLT. During the remainder of the reporting period the squadron supported the Bold Mariner Operation with logistical resupply, troop movement, and medical evacuation. The squadron was responsible for the transporting of a large percentage of the approximately 11,000 detainees moved to the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC). In addition the squadron flew administrative flights for Special Landing Force Bravo and the Amphibious Ready Group. Grand totals as indicated in Part IV, Statistical Summary, were 4932 sorties, 818.4 tons, 15,024 passengers including 195 medevacs for 1078.2 total hours for the month.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 Jan 69 4 aircraft to Wing for augmentation
 of their assets

2 Jan 69 4 aircraft Wing augmentation

4 Jan 69 3 aircraft Wing augmentation

8 Jan 69 3 aircraft augmentation
 HM-164 takes part in rehearsal for
 Operation Bold Mariner

9 Jan 69 4 aircraft Wing augmentation

10 Jan 69 8 aircraft Wing augmentation

13 Jan 69 Commencement of Operation Bold Mariner
 on the Batangan Peninsula, Republic of
 Viet Nam.
 HM-164, lifting BLT 3/26, to established
 cordon in its portion of the AOA.

17 Jan 69 Squadron began placing a Corpsman in
 "working birds" during logistical
 resupply. Rarely was there a time
 when "working birds" already in the
 area could not react within minutes
 to a MEDEVAC request. Therefore it
 was felt it would be beneficial to
 have one "working bird" assigned to
 answer the request with medical assistance
 aboard. The lives saved by this action
 cannot be assessed, but it is noteworthy
 that the majority of medical evacuees
 were mine and bobby trap victims, frequently
 having severed limbs.

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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

STATISTICAL SUMMARY (Taken from after action reports and corrected daily flight schedules).

<u>DATE</u>	<u>RELEVAC</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
1	22	374	13.1	176	29.9
2	7	453	25.3	231	47.3
3	1	362	3.1	68	12.3
4	0	351	2.3	100	21.0
5	0	310	7.7	129	24.0
6	0	146	0.3	46	7.9
7	0	58	0.8	15	2.0
8	0	2020	2.0	250	41.9
9	0	519	7.6	136	30.8
10	1	519	26.1	187	41.2
11	1	414	4.5	100	20.2
12	0	115	3.5	32	13.6
13	1	1156	16.9	268	60.6
14	1	867	18.0	164	44.3
15	3	157	48.7	146	31.4
16	1	437	47.4	183	46.4
17	10	208	21.2	105	33.8
18	0	595	39.5	180	52.4
19	3	258	50.3	204	51.5
20	0	432	37.6	130	46.4
21	0	449	32.8	173	41.7
22	0	741	44.7	238	49.9
23	2	1010	109.6	367	45.0
24	0	467	22.7	159	44.6
25	32	696	36.2	217	42.8
26	13	502	26.3	158	31.3
27	29	301	32.5	188	39.0
28	22	172	26.2	125	25.9
29	11	263	22.6	142	29.3
30	11	282	45.3	162	34.6
31	24	310	43.6	153	35.2
TOTALS	195	15,024	818.4	4932	1078.2

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 164
Marine Aircraft Group 15
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFPac
FPO, San Francisco 96602

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14 February 1969

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BOLD MARINER/RUSSELL BEACH,
Part II (U)

Ref: (a) CTF 79 msg 220226Z Jan 69 (C)
(b) CTG 79.5 OPLAN 120-YR (S)

Encl: (1) After Action Report
(2) Statistical Summary

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) and (2) are submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) and (2).

R. T. Trundy
R. T. TRUNDY

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RUSSELL BEACH
of BOLD MARINER
24 Jan - 9 del-69

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14 February 1969AFTER ACTION REPORT1. Name

Operation Bold Mariner/Russell Beach, Part II

2. Dates

24 January 1969 - 9 February 1969, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam.

3. Command Location

USS Tripoli (LPH-10)

4. Task Organization

HMM-164

5. Mission

Provide helicopter support to BLIF 3/26 and the landing force reserve and be prepared to conduct other air operations as directed by the CLF.

6. Execution24 January 1969

At 1200H operational control of the squadron passed from CTF 79 to CTG 79.5 for the final phase of the operation. YF-11 was externally lifted out of Bright-Lad Kilo's position. Lt's ROTTRUP and HOWE had made an emergency landing there on 23 January 1969 when an engine failed. Squadron aircraft flew 82 sorties, 19.8 flight hours, and lifted 381 troops/passengers including 252 detainees, and 13.7 tons of cargo.

25 January 1969

This was one of the heaviest flying days in the reporting period. Totals for the day were 217 sorties, 42.8 flight hours, 696 troops/passengers, including 433 detainees transported to The Combined Holding Interrogation Center (CHIC), 45 replacements for Mike Company, and 32 MEDEVAC's. 36.2 tons of cargo were moved during the day.

26 January 1969

India Company minus was lifted to the Bright-Lad Command Post. Totals for the day included 158 sorties, 31.3 hours, 502 troops/passengers

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including 285 detainees to CHIC, 13 MEDEVAC's, and 26.3 tons of cargo.

27 January 1969

Totals for the day included 188 sorties, 39.0 hours, 301 troops/passengers including 29 MEDEVAC's and 32.5 tons of cargo.

28 January 1969

Totals for the day include 125 sorties, 25.9 flight hours, 172 troops/passengers, including 22 MEDEVAC's and 26.2 tons of cargo.

29 January 1969

Totals included 142 sorties, 29.3 hours, 263 troops/passengers, including 11 MEDEVAC's, and 22.6 tons of cargo. YF-15 received moderate small arms fire in the vicinity of BS 730820 and BS 715805 while low leveling back to the AGA from CHIC. The flight leader decided to low level due to restrictive fire plans between CHIC and Bright-Lad's position. The aircraft received 7 hits and returned 150 rounds of .50 caliber fire.

30 January 1969

Totals for the day included 162 sorties, 34.6 flight hours, 282 troops/passengers, including 11 MEDEVAC's, and 45.3 tons of cargo. One squadron aircraft received light small arms fire from BS 720980 while flying at 2000 feet resulting in no hits.

31 January 1969

Totals for the last day in the month included 153 sorties, 35.2 flight hours, 310 troops/passengers including 24 MEDEVAC's, and 43.6 tons of cargo.

1 February 1969

Due to very restrictive weather conditions Squadron aircraft were able to conduct only limited resupply, troop lift and MEDEVAC missions. Totals for these missions were 25 sorties, 3.5 hours, 35 troops/passengers, including 20 MEDEVAC's, and 3 tons of cargo. Two squadron aircraft were able to assist in Vertical Replenishment of the USS Tripoli from the USS Mars flying an additional 105 sorties, 5.3 hours, 32 passengers, and 62.5 tons of cargo.

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Again low ceilings and visibility severely hampered flight operations. One section of aircraft rode North out of bad weather aboard the USS Ogden and then launched to Danang for needed medical supplies and aircraft engines. Totals for the day were 50 sorties, 5.9 hours, 99 troops/passengers including 48 replacements for Kilo company, and 5 tons of cargo.

3 February 1969

Weather conditions improved sufficiently to allow the squadron to complete troop lift and resupply missions postponed from the previous two days. The days totals which include assistance in vertical replenishment, were 321 sorties, 46.7 flight hours, 366 troops/passengers, including 2 MEDEVAC's, and 103.6 tons of cargo.

4 February 1969

Totals for the day were 120 sorties, 21.8 flight hours, 261 troops/passengers, and 32.7 tons of cargo.

5 February 1969

The backload of BLT 3/26 commenced with ^{the} squadron transporting Kilo company to the USS Ogden and Lima Company, W/1/13, and a Recon Platoon to the USS Tripoli. Totals included 159 sorties, 25 flight hours, 679 troops/passengers, including 1 MEDEVAC, and 20.1 tons of cargo.

6 February 1969

The backload continued with C/1/13 being helilifted to the USS Monticello and 15 tons of ammunition being moved from the BSA at White Beach to the USS Ogden. One platoon of Mike company was lifted into BS 795858 in the morning and returned to White Beach in the afternoon. Totals for the day were 172 sorties, 36.2 flight hours, 357 troops/passengers, including 32 MEDEVAC's, and 21.7 tons of cargo.

7 February 1969

10 tons of ammunition was backloaded from the White Beach to the USS Ogden. During the day the squadron flew 82 sorties, 18.2 flight hours, 357 troops/passengers, including 32 MEDEVAC's, and 21.7 tons of cargo.

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8 February 1969

The backload continued with the squadron moving 30 tons of ammunition from the BSA to the USS Ogden. Totals included 222 sorties, 34.8 flight hours, 337 troops/passengers, including 1 MEDEVAC, and 67.3 tons of cargo.

9 February 1969

The operation was completed with the backload of the remainder of the troops/passengers and equipment from White Beach. Totals included 128 sorties, 30.6 flight hours, 523 troops/passengers and 16.8 tons of cargo.

7. Results

a. Casualties: None

b. Fire Incidents

<u>A/C FIRED ON</u>	<u>INCIDENTS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>NO. HITS</u>
2	1	1	7
<u>ALTITUDE</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>NO. HITS</u>	
0-499	1	7	
500-999	0	0	

8. Commander's Analysis

a. Operations Ashore

(1) Flight operations ashore consisted of resupply, medevac, troop transport, visual reconnaissance, command and control, and administrative missions.

(2) The following problem areas were encountered during this phase of the operation.

(a) Problem: Delay in Logistical Support due to Fire Support Coordination.

Discussion: Fire support coordination created significant delays in helicopter movement from point to point ashore and in one instance all helo operations had to be secured for a period of about four hours. Unless helicopter approach and retirement routes are free from conflicting supporting fires, allowing maximum utilization of helicopter assets, fire support coordination as such is not effective.

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Recommendation: The FSC Annex should specify the procedures for establishing priorities regarding CLF requests for simultaneous fire support and helicopter logistical support.

(b) Problem: Delays in resupply caused by requesting units refusing to accept supplies allegedly ordered by them.

Discussion: On numerous occasions after being told in the LSA, BSA, or by combat cargo that designated loads were for a specific unit, the unit refused the load on the grounds that:

- (1) The unit had not requested the cargo.
- (2) The unit had requested a lesser amount of cargo.
- (3) The tactical situation prevented accepting the load at that time.

Recommendation: Sufficient prior logistical planning between small unit commanders, HST teams, and the Battalion S-4 in regard to daily requirements would prevent this problem from recurring.

(c) Problem: Excessive use of HST frequency or HST not being up on the assigned frequency.

Discussion: The landing zone control frequency was constantly utilized for passing all manner of traffic not related to the logistical resupply of units causing unnecessary delays for pilots attempting to contact individual teams. Further, it was the rule rather the exception to find HST teams not on the air during the morning or during initial logistical deliveries.

Recommendation: HST teams must come up on the air whenever helicopters are supporting the battalion and not rely on being passed the word of impending supply from the battalion. After a radio check, teams should keep traffic to a minimum to ensure prompt response to calls from the supporting helicopters. A headset with covered earphones would be most helpful for the use of HST teams.

(d) Problem: Meteorological information.

Discussion: Initially, meteorological information, weather conditions and forecasts, for Chu Lai and Danang were not readily available.

Recommendation: In future operations the establishment of a communications link between the LPH and shore meteorology stations

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would seem essential. Services from units ashore having weather reconnaissance capability should be requested in support of the Amphibious Task Force.

(e) Problem: Low ceiling and visibility conditions.

Discussion: Monsoon weather conditions were a hindrance to flight operations throughout most of the period. However, weather restrictions caused suspension of flight operations in only a few instances.

Recommendation: That all echelons of command recognize the capabilities and limitations of supporting aircraft with respect to weather. Had below minimums weather existed for longer periods, coupled with significant enemy fire, surface means of resupply, medevac, and troops movement would have been required.

b. Backload Operations: No significant problems were encountered.

9. Commander's Comments

The command and staff relationship between the host base (LPH-10), the Special Landing Force staff, the Battalion Landing Team and the Helicopter Transport Squadron was outstanding. The response time of the BLT/HMM team is particularly noteworthy. The direct line between the BLT commander ashore and the helicopters afloat provided timely and appropriate reaction to the BLT requirements.

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY

OPERATION BOLD MARINER, Part II

24 JANUARY - 9 FEBRUARY 1969

DATE	TROOPS/ PASSENGERS	MEDEVACS	TONS OF CARGO	SORTIES	FLIGHT HOURS
JAN 24	381	0	13.7	82	19.8
25	696	32	36.2	217	42.8
26	502	13	26.3	158	31.3
27	301	29	32.5	188	39.0
28	172	22	26.2	125	25.9
29	263	11	22.6	142	29.3
30	282	11	45.3	162	34.6
31	310	24	43.6	153	35.2
FEB 1	67	20	65.5	130	8.8
2	99	0	5.0	50	5.9
3	366	2	103.6	321	46.7
4	261	0	32.7	120	21.8
5	679	1	20.1	159	25.0
6	357	32	21.7	172	36.2
7	271	0	15.7	82	18.2
8	337	1	67.3	222	34.8
9	523	0	16.8	128	30.6
TOTALS	5867	198	594.8	2611	485.9

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