

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 165  
Marine Aircraft Group 15  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFPac  
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3:IBJ:wcw  
003A32668  
21 November 1968

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From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation DARING ENDEAVOR (U)

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 OPLAN 120-YR (S)

Encl: (1) After Action Report  
(2) Statistical Summary

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted.

2. This letter may be downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) and (2).

  
G. L. PATRICK

HM-165  
COMBAT/ARPT Opn DARING ENDEAVOR  
10-17 Nov 1968

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TAB A

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21 November 1968AFTER ACTION REPORT1. NAME

Operation Daring Endeavor

2. DATES

10 - 17 November 1968, Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, Republic of Vietnam

3. COMMAND LOCATION

USS Tripoli (LPH-10)

4. TASK ORGANIZATION

HMM-165

Det. HML-167

Det. HML-367

5. MISSION

Provide helicopter support in accordance with landing plan. Be prepared to provide helicopters for command/control, medevac, and emergency resupply. Be prepared to conduct operations in any portion of area of operation.

6. EXECUTION10 November 1968

Fifteen aircraft were launched between 0610 and 0645, from the USS Tripoli (LPH-10). Thirteen CH-46A's and four UH-1E's were in support of Operation Daring Endeavor, while two CH-46A's were used as SAR aircraft for the Operation. At H-hour, 0720H, GOLF Company of BLT 2/7 was inserted in LZ Blue Jay (BT 195548). At the end of D-day, transportation had been provided for 378 troops, 4 medevacs, and 6 tons of cargo. 150 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition was expended. 34.7 flight hours were logged.

11 November 1968

Eight aircraft executed a company size lift from the USS Tripoli to Thanh My (BT 182538). 348 troops and 7.3 tons of cargo were lifted throughout the day. The night medevac standby aircraft were scrambled to pickup 2 emergency and 4 priority medevacs from the Thanh My area. 33.6 flight hours were logged.

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21 November 196812 November 1968

Early on the morning of D plus 2, FOX Company was helo lifted to Barrier Island and a sweep was conducted of that area. Moderate small arms fire was encountered. 525 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition was expended during the troops lift. A total of 194 sorties were flown with 960 troops and 21.4 tons of cargo moved in 42.1 flight hours.

13 November 1968

Extensive re-supply missions were conducted by six aircraft on D plus 3, of Operation Daring Endeavor. 19.7 tons of cargo was air-lifted to the command post and forward positions in the operational area. 83 troops and 4 medevacs were transported during reenforcement and medevac operations. 20.5 flight hours were logged.

14 November 1968

20.3 flight hours were flown during D plus 4, of Operation Daring Endeavor. 193 troops and 8.9 tons of cargo were lifted by 1 aircraft. Twenty medevacs were retrieved, mostly of a routine nature.

15 November 1968

Resupply, troop-lift, and medevac missions were conducted by 7 aircraft during a total flight time of 25.6 hours. 3 medevacs, 158 troops and 18.3 tons of cargo were helo-lifted on D plus five.

16 November 1968

HOTEL Company was lifted from BT 199519 to BT 224524. 113 troops were lifted by four aircraft in two lifts. A total of 162 sorties were flown while lifting 549 passengers. An aircraft on a medevac mission received intensive automatic small arms fire at BT 217545 causing damage to the fuel system. The aircraft made an emergency landing at BT 223545. BLT 2/7 provided area security with tanks and one infantry platoon. The aircraft was quickly repaired by a squadron maintenance crew and flown back to the USS Tripoli that evening. 33.3 flight hours were logged.

17 November 1968

On the final day of the operation, nine aircraft participated in back loading the BLT by lifting 820 troops and 16.6 tons of cargo in 205 sorties. 28.2 flight hours were logged.

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21 November 19687. RESULTS

a. Casualties: None

b. Fire Incidents:

<u>A/C FIRED ON</u>	<u>INCIDENTS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>NO. HITS</u>
8	21	1	2
<u>ALTITUDE</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>No. HITS</u>	
0-499	1	2	
500-999	0	0	
1000-1499	0	0	
1500-2000	0	0	
Over 2000	0	0	

8. COMMANDER'S ANALYSISa. Ship to Shore Operations

(1) The helicopterborne assault was launched on 10 November 1968. Utilizing thirteen CH-46A's, four UH-1E gunships, one OV-10A, and one UH-1E C and C aircraft. Two additional CH-46A's remained overhead in an SAR status. One rifle company was helilifted into the primary landing zone.

(2) Naval gunfire preparation of the landing zone was unsatisfactory. Shells were observed to land in the river 500 to 750 meters beyond the zone. Slow adjustment of inaccurate naval gunfire caused L hour to be delayed approximately 20 minutes.

(3) There was no fixed wing landing zone preparation due to poor weather conditions in the operating area.

(4) The following problems hampered efficient helicopter utilization in the ship to shore phase.

(a) PROBLEM: Inaccurate naval gunfire.

CONCLUSION: None.

SOLUTION: Plan operations to include a rehearsal with adjustment of actual naval gunfire. More detailed plans and briefing for naval gunfire spotter. A prebriefed alternate communications net.

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21 November 1968(b) PROBLEM: Low ceilings.CONCLUSION: Monsoon season.SOLUTION: Ceiling adequate for low level delivery: Coordinate the approach and let down of fixed wing air support to coincide with the cessation of naval gunfire. Aircraft on station above an overcast could be called down in a clear area at sea in time to commence their run in, upon lifting of naval gunfire.SOLUTION: Ceiling adequate for required helicopter lift but too low for close air support: Use all weather aircraft under remote control. (TPQ-10)b. Operations Ashore

(1) Flight operations ashore consisted of resupply, medevac, troop transport, and administrative missions.

(2) The following problem areas were encountered during this phase of operation.

(a) PROBLEM: Utilization of CH-46A's.CONCLUSION: Due to the limited area of operation and the short distances from ship to shore, consideration to the possibility of using less helicopters to perform certain routine missions would possibly have been better than large numbers of aircraft operating in confined areas for the purpose of saving a small amount of time.SOLUTION: Personnel assigning missions should coordinate task and aircraft assignment with the squadron. A better understanding of helicopter capabilities and limitations is essential to planning.(b) PROBLEM: Resupply of ground units.CONCLUSION: Inadequate preparation for resupply of ground units.SOLUTION: Automatic resupply should be planned, staged, and ready for delivery. Unexpected emergency items may be added as required.(c) PROBLEM: Landing Zones.CONCLUSION: Landing zones were generally sandy causing an unfavorable engine environment.SOLUTION: Make every effort to select landing zones in an area without sand, loose dirt, debris or other loose foreign objects.4  
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21 November 1968(d) PROBLEM: Helicopter Support Teams.

CONCLUSION: Performance of Helicopter support teams was marginally acceptable at the beginning of the operation. After discussion with SLF staff personnel, much improvement was noted.

SOLUTION: Helicopter support team personnel should have good radios with adequate batteries and be required to monitor assigned frequencies when required

SOLUTION: Helicopter support teams should be kept aware of the current tactical situation in order to be able to brief pilots prior to commencing approach.

SOLUTION: Helicopter support team personnel should be supplied with adequate quantities of smoke and directed to keep it available for signaling helicopters on the pilots request.

9. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

a. The command and staff relationship between the host base (LPH-10), the Special Landing Force staff, the Battalion Landing Team and the Helicopter Transport Squadron was outstanding. The proximity and cordial atmosphere of the people concerned lent a new dimension to the **planning and coordinated execution** of the helicopter support mission. Problem areas which developed were immediately confronted and resolved by a united effort with the mutual interest of getting the job done in the best way possible. It was this factor alone among all other considerations that indicated the continued viability of the SIF concept.

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
OPERATION DARING ENDEAVOR  
10 - 17 NOVEMBER 1968

DATE	TROOPS/ PASSENGERS	MEDEVACS	TONS OF CARGO	SORTIES	FLIGHT HOURS
Nov 10	331	4	6.0	89	34.7
11	348	6	7.3	165	33.6
12	960	21	21.4	165	42.1
13	83	4	19.7	66	20.5
14	193	20	8.9	90	20.3
15	158	4	18.3	99	25.6
16	549	4	5.7	162	33.3
17	820	0	16.6	205	28.2
TOTALS	3442	63	103.9	1041	238.3

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Enclosure (2)  
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MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 165  
Marine Aircraft Group 15  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
APO, San Francisco, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
1 November 1968 to 5 December 1968

INDEX

- PART I -- ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
- PART II -- NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III -- SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV -- SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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ENCLOSURE (1)