

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

MFRO407147

9/11 Classified Information

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

Event: Interview of [redacted]  
Date: February 11, 2004  
Special Access Issues: ~~TS/SCI~~  
Prepared by: Sarah Webb Linden  
Reviewed by: Yoel Tobin  
Team Numbers: One  
Location: FBI Headquarters  
Participants: 9-11 Commission: Yoel Tobin, Thomas Dowling, Sarah Linden  
Federal Bureau of Investigation: Robert Sinton

**Interviewee Background**

(U) [redacted] has worked for the FBI for 17 years. He has been an analyst within the Counterterrorism Division since 1992. Initially he worked Iran and Hezbollah matters; in 1993, after the first World Trade Center bombing, he transferred to the Sunni Islamic Extremist unit. In 1996 he was temporarily assigned to the Khobar Towers bombing investigation. With the exception of the year he spent working on Khobar Towers, [redacted] has focused primarily on Southeast Asia fundamentalists such as Ramzi Yousef and the Bojinka plot. [redacted] is currently assigned to the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, International Terrorism Operations Section, Extraterritorial Investigations Unit.

**Khobar Towers**

(U) [redacted] did not recall many details of the Khobar Towers bombing investigation. He left the investigative team prior to the U.S. indictment of subjects. On the specific subject of Al Qaeda involvement with the plot, [redacted] commented that they investigated all available Al Qaeda sources and connections and realized that the facts did not support Al Qaeda involvement.

(TS) [redacted] had never been part of an investigation as heavily compartmentalized as Khobar. Case information was highly restricted, with as few as 20 people initially allowed access. Because the FBI agents on-scene were not allowed to conduct any unilateral interviews or investigations on Saudi soil [redacted]

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**Khalid Sheikh Mohammed**

(S) [redacted] worked on matters concerning Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) from 1995 through 2003. He read some, though not all, of KSM's post-capture interrogation reports.

(S) [redacted] stated that in 1996 KSM was in Doha, Qatar. He had been there since at least 1993, working for the Ministry of Water and Electricity. After the U.S. indicted KSM for his involvement in the Manila Air case, the FBI sent a rendition team to the Gulf. Part of the team

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
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advanced to Doha, Qatar in preparation for his capture. The remainder of the team waited in [redacted] with a plane, ready to travel to Qatar and pick up KSM and his captors. After several days the Qatari government informed the U.S. that KSM had been under surveillance and had somehow escaped.

(S) [redacted] did not know exactly who funded KSM's travel while he was working for the Qatar Ministry of Water and Electricity. He speculated that Qatar's Ministry for Religious Endowment paid KSM to travel around and distribute cash to organizations and Islamic charities. [redacted] did not feel that UBL was the likely source of KSM's travel monies.

(S) [redacted] believed that KSM did not join Al Qaeda until after the 1998 East Africa bombings. As late as 1997, KSM was aligned with Abdul Rasul Sayef, who was one of UBL's adversaries. Even after he joined Al Qaeda, KSM was not considered a significant player in the organization until after 09/11/2001. Immediately following the attacks, a variety of U.S. intelligence sources pointed to KSM (or "Ramzi Yousef's cousin") as the source of the operation.



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**Bojinka**

(S) [redacted] [redacted] did not believe that Bojinka was an Al Qaeda plot. Wali Khan was linked to UBL (they had fought together in Afghanistan), but had never sworn bayat because Khan wanted to remain independent. Khan and KSM were part of a loose network of extremists

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who had trained in Al Qaeda camps but were not Al Qaeda operatives. As for Khalifa, there was no evidence he funded or knew of the plot, despite his close association with Wali Khan. Ramzi Yousef was brought in by Wali Khan, and had no prior affiliation with Khalifa or UBL.

(S) [redacted] did not see thousands of dollars moving to support Bojinka and considered it a fairly low-cost operation. There was no requirement for casing flights, since flight schedules could be obtained from the airlines. [redacted] was certain the operatives had little funding because Wali Khan only got bailed out of prison [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[redacted] Khan in the Philippines. [redacted] stated that no money came from Riduan Isomuddin's/Hambali's Malaysian company Konsijoya, which had at that point only conducted one (failed) business transaction.

(S) [redacted] knew of only five operatives involved in Bojinka: KSM, Abdul Hakim Murad, Ramzi Yousef, Wali Khan, and [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[redacted] 9/11 Classified Information was not indicted with the rest because the FBI had no information on him other than aliases. [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[redacted] 9/11 Classified Information on the periphery of the Bojinka group: like Khalifa, he knew the players but not the plot.

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