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MFR 04017151

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of John Brennan
Type of Event: Interview
Date: October 8, 2003
Special Access Issues: Top Secret
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Team Number: Team 2
Location: Headquarters
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Brennan's CIA Career

John Brennan entered the Agency in 1980 and went through the Directorate of Operation's career trainee program. He moved to the Directorate of Intelligence and

[redacted] held analyst positions in the Near East South Asia Division (NESA) [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [redacted] rising to serve as head of the issues branch of NESA for two years.

Brennan was [redacted] in the Counterterrorist Center from August 1990 to March 1992. He next served as the deputy division chief [redacted] until 1994. Brennan next served as executive assistant (EA) to the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Later he handled the President's Daily Brief for [redacted] White House officials, including George Tenet. Tenet asked Brennan to assist with preparations for Tenet's confirmation hearings for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and Brennan later served as DDCI Tenet's EA from 1995 - 1996. In the summer of 1996, Brennan became the deputy director of NESA [redacted]

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In August 1999, Brennan became the chief of staff for DCI Tenet. He became the Deputy Executive Director of CIA in March of 2001 and the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center in March 2003.

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Brennan was asked about the DCI declaration of war memo. He said he does not specifically remember seeing the memo. He said however that 1997 through 1999 was a time of increasing concern about terrorism.

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Brennan said there was "an increasing drumbeat" during this period and the declaration of war was part of things moving forward in the intelligence community.

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)

Brennan's first point about TTIC was that it is a "joint venture" of five principal partners. Of these, CIA has [redacted] at the center; DoD [redacted] DHS [redacted] FBI [redacted] and State [redacted]. There is also representation from the Capitol Police and the Department of Energy. State and local government officials are not integrated into TTIC.

Approximately [redacted] staff are analysts or perform analytic work, but he is still uncertain of what should be the right size for TTIC.

Brennan said that TTIC is still grappling with what its mission is. When TTIC was set up, there was unanimity among the principals that TTIC's mission was to integrate information systems to enable TTIC personnel to have 360 degree access to information and bring an integrated perspective to the President and the country's senior leadership on terrorist issues. However, there were many practical day-to-day issues that were unresolved -- starting with how do you define "terrorist threat"?

Brennan stated that within 60 days of the center's establishment he decided that he believed "terrorist threat" should be defined broadly. His vision is that TTIC should be the center of gravity for terrorism analysis, to include strategic analyses, in much the same a military joint command brings together forces from different services. He believes other USG terrorism units will eventually migrate to TTIC or will have clearly

defined separate responsibilities within their parent organization. Doing this would require new memoranda of understanding and new business practices for TTIC than what has yet been established. He suggested that all the major players in TTIC supported this vision, except for CIA.

Concerns about the direction of TTIC led to the appointment of a DCI task force led by Richard Kerr. Other task force members include Dale Watson (former FBI), Floyd Carter, Paul Redmond (former CIA and former DHS), Tom Wolfe (former CIA/DI), Rebecca Donnegan (former CIA/OIG), Aris Pappas (former CIA), and Patrick Hughes (retired general, former director of DIA). They were to make recommendations to the DCI about the future of TTIC during the week of October 12th. According to Brennan, the group is looking across the government at the fact that many entities do similar things, but in fact gaps and seams still exist. Brennan stated that he was going to present his vision of what the TTIC should be to the DCI at the same time as the Kerr group. He emphasized that he wanted decisions about the future of TTIC to be made quickly so that appropriate arrangements could be made before TTIC moves to its new location next year.

Brennan stated that he saw TTIC as the unique opportunity to get terrorism analysis right in the United States Government. TTIC could serve as a central hub for strategic analytic expertise with discrete areas of responsibility franchised out to various units as appropriate. For instance, he stated JITF-CT should continue with its force protection mission.

Brennan said that some are concerned that his vision of TTIC could be a slippery slope that could lead to wholesale changes for the CIA. Everyone accepts his concept of TTIC as a terrorism analysis center of gravity except CIA. He acknowledged that he had ideas about restructuring CIA (and by extension the entire IC) that he advanced while he was CIA's Deputy Executive Director and that these ideas are similar to the ideas found in Larry Kindsvater's paper on restructuring the intelligence community along a Goldwater-Nichols model.

Brennan also said some have concerns he wants a Department of Terrorism but he would argue against a separate organization. Brennan says he wants a joint organization because new and separate organizations lead to bureaucratic competition. (He made the same point about the idea of creating an MI-5. It would be another stovepipe and competitor, although he acknowledged the need for developing the capability of analysis of domestic intelligence.) Brennan said he supported "red teams" and competitive analysis but asserted it should be done in a structured way not in the current "ad hoc" manner. In his view, TTIC as an organization needs to be legislated but it is still early with several issues needing resolution.

Brennan said he is trying to persuade CIA officials [redacted] that CIA has to share information and realize how it fits into the big picture and the overall government effort. Brennan stated that Maureen Baginski is deferring on her efforts to develop a strategic intelligence effort until [after decisions on

TTIC are made]. He is trying to get the CTC analysts doing strategic analysis [redacted] moved to the TTIC. He claimed even these "strategic" analysts at CTC are pulled in too many directions and wear too many hats, and so some matters are dropped. The remaining [redacted] should remain in CTC to inform and drive operations. The FBI will put aside developing a strategic analytical unit, deferring to TTIC. DHS is relying on TTIC for analysis that will be used by the information analysis component of the department.

Brennan also argued that Congress should address how the Homeland Security Act interacts with the National Security Act of 1947 and make clear the divisions of labor expected within the homeland security/national security structure. (He emphasized throughout the interview that officials should have clearly articulated responsibilities.) Brennan did describe, however, one instance where the division of labor is clear. He said that in the past when CIA had warning information about a threat to a domestic entity, the CIA's [redacted]

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[redacted] a tear-line report. Now, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the statutory responsibility to provide alerts to state and local governments and the private sector. (FBI is responsible for interaction with state and local law enforcement.)

Other TTIC Issues

TTIC is not an operational unit, i.e. it is not involved in the collection of intelligence information either overseas or domestically. If it was one would have to reconsider the authority given to the organization. TTIC does, however, identify collection requirements and feed them into the collection agencies (CIA, NSA, FBI, etc). TTIC is trying to put together a requirements system because there are gaps in the current system. TTIC receives reporting from all the collection agencies to include receiving unprocessed NSA reporting.

TTIC could have the effect of having a "forcing function" on larger issues. The terrorism challenge is bigger than any agency. Addressing the mission, structure, information systems and personnel design of TTIC could force the community, especially CIA, to rethink the community structure, to promote thinking about terrorism and other issues in a joint manner. In CIA, the DO/DI structure inhibits reorganization. Government has become more matrixed and the Executive and Legislative branches need to decide how to organize government agencies to deal with today's and tomorrow issues. In some respects rethinking the organizational design of the community to address terrorism could lead to a form of a Goldwater Nichols reorganization of the intelligence community.

In May 2004, TTIC will move [redacted] In September 2004, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division and CIA's CTC will move [redacted]

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TTIC is developing a "red cell" capability. It will have no production responsibility. It will "wallow in the data" and produce alternative analysis. The Red Cell will focus on terrorist skills sets, work backwards on terrorist event to think through terrorist thinking and methods of operations; it will look for straws in the wind.

TTIC participates in war gaming exercises but through DHS or the FBI. DHS engages with state and local governments and the FBI engages with state/local law enforcement elements in war gaming.

The threat matrix

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It is produced for the topmost officials of the government to inform them and to report on actions taken with respect to the terrorist threat information. Not every piece of threat information is disseminated but high impact, low probability information is disseminated to government leaders.

TTIC Accomplishments

Brennan stated that TTIC has responsibility for the Threat Matrix. TTIC has a program office to fulfill the requirements of the MOU on information sharing with respect to technology and business practices.

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Brennan stated that he is trying to set up business practices that can drive collaboration and integration of information through information sharing standards and metadata standards. He believes there needs to be a combined and collective effort to force compliance in the agencies. With respect to integration and exploitation, Brennan said that TTIC is using cutting edge techniques as well as brute force techniques to mine terrorism-related data, and has made identifications this way. Brennan expressed his concern about the rich environment of information that does not get captured, particularly state and local information.

Brennan stated that TTIC is trying to identify knowledge gaps but that a process does not yet exist to bring forward requirements on the domestic side. It is not easy to answer the question where is the best place to go to get domestic information necessary in counter-terrorism (for instance, on critical infrastructures).

Brennan said that TTIC people have been sent to JTTFs.

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Brennan clarified that TTIC will still have a role in the USG's watchlist effort. He said TTIC took over the TIPOFF program and it will maintain the TIPOFF data base as a 24/7 service to agencies such as FTTTF, Dept. of State, DoD, DHS, etc. FBI's watchlist center will bring in domestic information and have access to the TTIC database. The National Watchlist Center, headed by a TSA official, will report to the Attorney General via the FBI; it will service all the agency centers.

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In response to the question of who is in charge of warning Brennan said that it is clear in the law that the DCI has responsibility to do terrorist warning. What element in the bureaucracy will produce the terrorist warning remains unclear. No one has told CTC that they do not have responsibility for terrorist warning. A decision has to be made and formally articulated about which intelligence community element, TTIC or CTC. The Kerr Group study will address the warning issue and make recommendations on the subject to the DCI.

Answering TTIC Critics

Some members of Congress have been highly critical of TTIC. They have argued that the Homeland Security Act called for an intelligence fusion center at the Department of Homeland Security and the creation of TTIC flaunts and undermines this requirement. Notable among these critics is Chairman Christopher Cox of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. Brennan's response is that the Secretary of Homeland Security's jurisdiction ends at the water's edge, 95% of threat information comes from abroad, and that only a joint entity such as TTIC can ensure a worldwide view of the terrorist threat.

Other critics charge TTIC is too much of a CIA organization. Brennan said the center is "purple" and would like to be more so. TTIC is not a CIA organization but an independent unit reporting directly to the DCI. He does not view himself as a CIA officer while serving as the director of TTIC. With respect to TTIC's interaction with state and local governments, he said the Center's interaction has been done when requested by DHS

Brennan said that TTIC can not bring people into the center on detail because it "does not exist" (through statute). However, he said because individuals come to TTIC on assignment they come with their home agency authorities which enables the Center through these individuals to do many things.

Brennan doesn't accept the criticism that there is too much involvement by Washington and TTIC in any and all threats. He said that you have to jump on matters even if they are low probability – because of the potential for high impact. He said senior policymakers are “in the weeds” because 9/11 was so devastating and there is “no margin for error.” TTIC has to be able to inform policymakers about the context of the threat and how the threat is being handled.

NOTE: Brennan promised a copy of his power point slides discussed during the interview.