

DHS Intel Flow on Border Security Intel and Information

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Heads of Intel for ICE (immigration internal enforcement) and BCP (border protection) and representatives from DHS Information Analysis Directorate and TTIC [redacted] on the relationship and flow of information between these units and the distribution of information on individual aliens through watchlists and databases.

Type of event: Briefing, responsive to DHS Briefing Request No. 2

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Special Access Issues: none

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Team Number: 5, Border Security

Location: GSA, Rm. 5125

Participants - Non-Commission:

Participant	Agency position	Contact Information
Joan Zolak	- BTS senior intel advisor - Detailed from DEA	-
Bill Parrish	- Assistant Secretary, IAIP - Threat assessment and vulnerabilities	-
Roy Surret	- Director Intel BCBP - Former Customs	-
Jeff Casey	- Director Intel ICE - Former Customs	-
Charlie Bartoldis	- BCBP, Office of Filed Operations, Director National Targeting Center - Former Customs	-
[redacted]	- TTIC, [redacted] [redacted] - FBI detailee	-
John Rollins	- DHS, ASIA (supporting Parrish) - [redacted]	-
Nick Grant	- DHS/TSA Intel Operations	-
Tim Long	- DHS/ICE/Intel Program - Doing database reconciling	-

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Participants - Commission:

Team 5: Betty Swope
Janice Kephart-Roberts
Susan Ginsburg
Tom Eldridge

Team 1B: John Tamm

Team 7: Bill Johnstone

Documents/ handouts received by Commission:

“DHS Intelligence Reporting Flow Chart”

“Organization of Border and Transportation Security Directorate”

TEXT:

Joan Zolack/BTS

Significant strides in working together and intel issues. In February/March, BTS received its mandate to look at intel and ensure needs met.

A DHS intelligence working group meets every Tuesday for 2 hours with all relevant intelligence chiefs, including BCIS, Coast Guard and USSS. Issues considered at these meetings are:

1. Systems connectivity
2. marriages of information
3. Sharing of information, e.g. from NTC and Coast Guard where DHS components need to be talking. Processes and procedures now being put into place for info sharing.
4. Chiefs now understand each others' needs and have access to databases.

Relationship between BTS and IAIP: work together on daily basis.

IAHSC Watch Center.

1. Watch Center is an example of the relationship between BTS and IAIP.
2. 15 DHS agencies represented: ATF, DEA and DHS components all there, as well as NSA and CIA.
3. 24/7 by Gen. Matthew Broderick.
4. produces Homeland Security Intel Reports (“hissers”)

5. Operational/situational/investigative data fully integrated and properly vetted.
Examples:
- a. persons stopped at borders; state registration information on license plates;
 - b. suspected terrorist activity on NYC bridge was evaluated in watch center, and DEA was able to show narcotics trafficking, that info provided to ICE
 - c. taxi driver of immigration interest was making deposits of \$10,000 sums, leading to funding of an Islamic school.
6. video link with White House

Charlie Bartoldis, National Targeting Center

Q from Susan: how does it work at the border if you get a TIPOFF hit?

Primary inspector gets hit on screen when person approaches through primary. Person escorted to secondary. ICE and JTTF notified and have option of attending secondary interview. Interview conducted using all available FBI and CIA information. Makes decision whether person is of interest and needs further querying v. decision to exclude.

E.G. Montreal case: Person approached pre-clearance at Montreal. Was a Tipoff record holder. Had no concurrent travelers or associates. USG has no authority to arrest or forbid travel in Canada; can only make recommendations to Canadian authorities. In this case, recommended to let individual continue on travel to US for further questioning at PoE. So picked guy up at Chicago by ICE, FBI. Took prints, pocket litter. NTC coordinated response and policy directives of all agency actors. Needed to make decision as to whether enough information to exclude based on INA, and in this case not enough to exclude. May also decide on a waiver.

Q from Susan: who makes final determination as to entry of a suspected terrorist?

Inspector and port director in field. However, if case where a TIPOFF and visa revocation hit, must have concurrence from JTTF, Intel, BICE and CBP via National Targeting Center. Cannot release without consulting Tim Goyer at NTC (former chief INS lookout). Legal standard still INA.

Normal entry processing.

Passenger Analytic Units review manifests of incoming flights for exact matches to watchlists. 98% of time the Advanced Passenger Information (API) is provided. ATS (Automated Targeting System) uses: APISystem, NCIC, TECS, CLASS, IBIS, NAILS, and NSEERS. At primary, the machine readable passport (MRV) is checked to see if a hit. (TIPOFF and visa revocations not available pre-boarding.)

Processing of mideast aliens.

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If an alien of mideast origin has a visa and no lookout hit, then must register with NSEERS where 2 finger prints and a photo is taken. Alien may be sent to secondary.

Joan Zolak

Big difference post 9-11.

1. communication amongst DHS agencies
2. at land borders.
 - a. [REDACTED]
 - b. databases checked (only US), as was done with Ressam in rental car.
 - c. If US passport holder or frequent crosser and not a resident of Toronto or Detroit, sent to 2ndary for all those persons governed by NSEERS or policy of secretary.
 - d. In Canada, cooperation is by province.
3. working with state DMVs to get registration information on car owner including DOB, name, etc.
4. in re to no fly and selectee list, airlines must run names; if a no fly individual, must bar from flight
[REDACTED]
6. JFK hits: ICE interviews person; then if terrorist nexus, call JTTFs. Shortly after 9/11, JTTFs still taking persons for further questioning and no intel provided back.

Bill Parrish, Assistant Secretary IAIP, DHS

Q from Janice: what is the value added of TTIC for DHS and vice versa?

TTIC: no statute, just exec order. TTIC looking both foreign and domestic (Director CIA, Deputy Director FBI).

IAIP: governed by Homeland Security Act (DOD, DHS). Responsible under the act for conducting vulnerability assessments. Gave Chicago example, where rec'd intel from NSA, which DHS then did threat vulnerability (list of high value targets) and recommendations to mayor of Chicago and Illinois governor.

1. IAIP and DHS analysts at TTIC. 10% of TTIC analysts will be provided by IA. What detailees give DHS is an IA analyst who is representing DHS operational interests at TTIC, and access to other agencies, such as CTC. Analyst can request that data be sent to other agencies.
2. Information Analysis: "Incubator" to produce fusion analysts – folks who can do operational and analytical intel assessments and work with BICE, TSA, Coast Guard, and USSS.
3. DHS analysts in TTIC who can pull info from their agencies on persons of interest.
4. E.g., Riyadh bombing: immediately produced a DHS alert as to characteristics of Riyadh attack and was able to declassify info and produce a tear line so could send to state and locals.

Q from Janice: how is DHS using intel community information to enhance border security?

IAIP pulls intel community data on capabilities of Al Qaeda, as determined by information [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [redacted] IA then does analysis to give advice to state and local customers, for example provide advice as to where state/locals should put resources: e.g., put security to look for pre-surveillance teams vs. hiring 100 officers to stand on a bridge. Goal is to privatize target's possible responses to threat assessments, i.e. let assessments have effect of encouraging commercial entities to safeguard own interests. DHS reaches out to FBI to learn surveillance patterns of terrorists and then uses that information in threat assessments.

Also produces DHS morning summary. State and locals can put info into it; e.g., requests for more surveillance equipment at the northern and southern borders.

Big challenge right now is connectivity and integration of databases.

Jeff Casey, Director Intelligence, ICE

1. 400 people, including those doing alien detention and removal
2. creation of ICE and CBP units as stand alone intel shops has resulted in greatly enhanced commingling of intelligence and analytic information up and down the DHS intel food chain.
3. 80% of work supports operational capabilities so that providing:
 - a. meaningful actionable intel to persons in the field by taking classified information and scrubbing down to secret or lower so investigators can use it;
 - b. take classified info and look for applicability to programs;
 - c. take advantage of all info.; from street with relevance to intel community and DHS, and push it up to IAIP through reporting process
 - d. support for Customs financial or WMD work, or INS investigations.
 - e. SARs – used to catch and remove absconders; this is an example of information used for purposes it was not originally collected
 - f. Pre 9/11 only on *receiving* end of intel community; now, if relevant or of interest (threat based/national security), ICE Intel finds itself pushing thru IA in reporting format and then passing information to TTIC. Is a two way street in TTIC information passing.
4. Tim Long . Attempting to integrate NSEERs, TIPOFF, I-94s, banking data, trade data to determine who of 19 affiliates are here in US in the "numerically integrated intelligence system". Will be happy to demo.

Roy Surret, Director Intelligence, CBP:

Mission from Bonner: 100% of CBP intel work is terrorism. (Pre 9/11 mission 80%-90% to counter narcotics trafficking.)

1. receiving 30,000 pieces of intel per month
2. 40 people, all former Customs right now, for agency 2.5 times the size of ICE
3. key issues since March: - 90% work out of customs
4. getting out of legacy INS lookout folks
5. get agriculture intel

ICE and CBP: produce analytical products, conduct assessments, trends, "HISRs," liaison with DHS and international programs on cargo – work on CSI in support of BCBP.

Told JKR will look to see if can lookback pre 9/11 at stops due to alert inspectors v. intel alerts v. TIPOFF.

9/11 Closed by Statute

TTIC

Note: will need to follow-up.

Mission: to integrate databases to create

9/11 Classified Information

1. TTIC created in 2002 by Executive Order 12333.

2. 9/11 Classified Information Historically, terrorist database had one customer, CIA. Now TTIC seeks to include as much information on terrorists as possible. Trying to make database all-source and all-service database in one place.

9/11 Classified Information

- a. Intel community to have a larger access for analytic tool. 9/11 Classified Information
- b. Identify data elements that don't require highest classification
- c. 9/11 Classified Information
- d. Website will have analytic tools with ability of [redacted] to log on at their level of classification. Right now, 56 JTTFs can get [redacted] although FBI has yet to provide any information to the TTIC database.
- e. unclassified is goal, but bigger challenge is to declassify by breaking down components
- f. 9/11 Classified Information
- g. legal requirements; will use TIPOFF as example
- h. [redacted]

9/11 Classified Information

TIPOFF's

purpose is for watchlisting, visa denial and revocation. TIPOFF's current customer is intel community (along with DoS Consular Affairs). TTIC seeks to merge law enforcement and intel community needs together. In months ahead, will have a unified process and hope to fold analysts from TIPOFF into TTIC.

9/11 Classified Information