

Event: Patrick Ducey, Director, JITF-CT (DIA), September 2001 – September 2003

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Participants – non-Commission: Patrick Ducey, and a representative from DIA-GC

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(U) BACKGROUND

(U) Mr. Ducey was a Navy analyst in the Navy from 1976 and then joined DIA as an analyst in Intelligence Production and Analysis doing Current Intelligence on China. In the mid-1980s he made SES and was in charge of Estimates. He headed Military Foreign intelligence until 1993. He was working Europe for DIA. He then went to CINCEUR/SHAPE/SACEUR and worked the Balkans from 1993-1997 at Mons and then he moved to Brussels and worked for Gen. Clark 1997-2001 working Kosovo and Macedonia. Just before coming to JITF-CT on 20 Sep 2001 he was Director of Intelligence for NATO at HQ (J2).

(U) On 9/11 he was having lunch with a friend while visiting Denmark. He knew the attacks were terrorism right away, but he was not sure it was al Qa'ida. His trip to the US to take over JITF-CT was delayed because of the post 9/11 hold on air traffic.

(U) JITF-CT

(S) After the USS Cole bombing, DIA got \$3M gradually until FY03 and transitioned their Joint Terrorist Activity Center (JTAC) to be the JITF-CT. It constituted just a name change; there were no new billets, but they did get more resources. They had and have exceptionally good analysts on the long term issues. They also have some new analysts they are apprenticing. JITF-CT has depth and knowledge on the target. They worked al Qa'ida and all other groups [REDACTED] were doing true analysis and they were global. They worked the world-wide force protection mission – in garrison and in transit. They did not have the domestic mission. Their number one priority was and is transnational terrorism, al Qa'ida. And they use all sources for their analysis.

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(U) Their Open Source efforts were limited to leadership statements mostly. They didn't have the time or resources to do in-depth open source collection and analysis. FBIS was doing the news services. JITF-CT had a small internal effort mostly manned by new contractors waiting for clearances. It has been rather ad hoc.

[REDACTED] HUMINT. CIA is number 1 by far with [REDACTED] HUMINT reporting. JITF-CT gets the normal reporting stream and they have regular interaction with reports officers. After 9/11 CIA lowered the reporting bar and increased the volume of reporting. DHS supplies about [REDACTED] the HUMINT reports and it is not of the same depth. Mr. Ducey had no information on ABLE DANGER. JITF-CT found it hard to understand the sources for DHS and CIA HUMINT reports. On a case by case basis they could have a dialogue about this and get source information so they could evaluate them. They liked to track credibility themselves. They only work with CTC not the rest of CIA (DO, DI).

(U) WARNING AND INFORMATION SHARING

(S) One of the Cole lessons learned by VADM Wilson (and it's a lesson after 9/11 too) was there is no single place where all the terrorist information came together. They now get volumes from CIA and more from the FBI. JITF also had personal relationships with some people at the NYFO and WFO. But "evidence versus intelligence" is still an issue. JITF-CT has one person at FBI; FBI has no people at JITF-CT. Their FBI detailee found boxes of stuff from the WTC 93 bombing that was not used for the prosecution. The FBI said, "you can have that." This was all paper not digits so they scanned the documents. There was no database. JITF-CT requested the PENTBOMB database and still has not gotten it. Which gets back to one of DIA's favorite questions, "who owns the data?" Their answer is "the USG, not the collectors."

(S) NSA has enormous volumes of information in repositories. This relationship is working but there is no single database. Some material has been translated and some has not been. Much of it is fragmentary from the nature of SIGINT. They have people, places and data. They are not open, but JITF-CT is accustomed to that. The DIA detailees sent to NSA got the access they needed.

(S) CIA is the same. They were short of resources and JITF-CT sent detailees. But the JITF-CT people at CTC can't export data. CIA must serialize reports (like NSA) for tracking [they can't have reports that seem to confirm each other when really it's the same information]. Everybody thinks they need to share more, but not when it comes to their own stuff. More stuff should've been reported, but NSA analysts were overworked and were focused on their target. The question is "who makes the decision whether something is of intelligence value?" This is important since CT is a game of fragments. He knows the decision needs to be made, but he doesn't want to NSA analysts to make the decision at their level.

(S) ADM Wilson called for a common repository of CT information after the Cole bombing long before 9/11. No one was building it. DIA built its infrastructure on the premise that they could host such a repository if no one else did. ENCLAVE is air-

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gapped and DIA pledged to meet any security requirement for any and all agencies. DIA thought "if we build it they will come," it didn't happen. They have three layers - air gapped; JITF-CT only; and all DIA.

(TS//SI) SIGINT is enormously important.

9/11 Classified Information

SIGINT is valued most. Terrorists think they have secure communications and they come closer to the truth; but we still only gets bits of stories. They use cell and internet, but USG disclosures and leaks have hurt.

9/11 Classified Information

That material is hand-carried to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF. NSA and JITF-CT had good relations, but they have to build more trust and confidence. They have been best on geo-location.

9/11 Classified Information

DIA does not get raw FISA derived intelligence. DoJ said it would happen a year ago and it still isn't there.

(TS//SI)

9/11 Classified Information

Everyone has their own names database. That is the same for DEA which has an enormous LE Sensitive data base. In 2001 they got lots of hits and they sent the results to FBI for the domestic mission. DIA does not have the domestic force protection mission.

(TS//SI) JITF-CT has a targeting element with Special Forces now so they are in offensive operations for Direct Action.

9/11 Classified Information

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9/11 Classified Information

They gave targeting information to the SECDEF and JCS and there has been great pressure to support CT in the war. They are engaged but

9/11 Classified Information

CTC Director Rodriguez is better than Cofer Black was about cooperating.

9/11 Classified Information

Mr. Ducey

questions, "where does DoD fit?" in these kinds of missions.

(U) Management. Mr. Ducey did not know about the transformation of DHS. In the IC there are new organizations and FBI has new missions. There has been constructive change but it has been excruciatingly slow. Then TTIC popped out suddenly and is supposed to be the single place with direct digital access, by remote access. But the DDO refused to play and DDI said only the integrees would have access to their data and only on-site. CTC and CTD are supposed to move with TTIC. TTIC is now viewed as CIA only. FBI is not happy because it's not neutral. We must put the pieces together. The Threat is reported by DDO and FBI (so we can't get them this way). Reporting is closely held by both. It is really DDO centric and DDI suffers too.

(C) Analysis. CTC only has slices of the problem (like DI). There is not a whole lot of strategic analysis going on - they don't do trends or evolution or other groups. They put out only a few products. There was no NIE even after the embassy bombings. No one

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requested one or initiated one even after the attacks in the 1990s. There were some good pieces by people like [REDACTED] There were some DIA initiatives.

(C) From Sep 2001 until June 2002, JITF-CT was in a constant state of crisis management. Reporting was done on perishable items. The threat thread was about 1-2 pages and there were 6-12 of those per day with depth and outlook. They had to put in the "so what", the meaning.

(C) DHS/IA&IP. Maybe the TTIC should have them. What about a NCTC? Mr. Ducey is cynical about that working. JITF-CT will still retain their own efforts because they need immersion on the DoD target and FP. They need immersion in TTIC and with their contractors. DHS/IA is struggling to define itself and decide what kind of analysis it should do. They should bring together threat and vulnerability.

(S) Everyone struggles with roles. Analysis is fine but the DCI and SECDEF said "let's go get these guys" so they do targeting. Only a few can do this. DDO/CTC can. FBI is trying by marrying their intelligence with field operations. DoD has some strong authorities for Direct Action [REDACTED]

9/11 Classified Information

[REDACTED] The DCI is a reasonable person if you have a case to make. It is really hard to manage the entire community and the DCI doesn't have the leverage. The Departments don't want him to have the budget; DoD is jealous. It's also political and the country has been against concentrating too much intelligence in one place. Competitive analysis is needed. The IC effort on CT is not strongly managed. Strategy, resources, priorities are not pulled together. Someone needs to request and do the NIE so it can be the basis of a strategy.

(U) There is no red cell in JITF-CT. But competitive analysis happens within the organization. They encourage it and it is valued. Sometimes they task it, but more often analysts just know what needs to be written and what to write - the bosses don't tell them what to write; they're relatively independent.

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