

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

MEMO 4019776

Event: Interview of NY Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) [redacted]

Date: September 16, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

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Team number: 6

Location: FBI, New York Field Office

Participants Non-Commission: Assistant General Counsel Sean O'Neill

Participants - Commission: Mike Jacobson, Caroline Barnes

Background

[redacted] graduated from NC State in 1983 with a degree in Business Management and Economics. He joined FBI Charlotte in 1983 and worked there until 1985. He then transferred to the NY Office and worked with the Special Surveillance Group (SSG) squad until 1990. He became an analyst in 1990, and worked Russian émigrés until the WTC bombing in 1993, when he became an IT analyst. He was initially on the I-46 squad working the TERRSTOP case, then worked [redacted] until 2002. All the FCI and IT analysts were assigned to I-24, and SSA Mark Chidicomo completed their performance appraisals although on a day-to-day basis they sit and work with the various substantive squads.

Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) Kevin Donovan split the analysis squad in 2002 and Herlocker (now Acting ASAC) became supervisor of the IT analysts (IT-7). The IT supervisors began telling Donovan that they did not know what the threat was, so in July 02 [redacted] searched ACS, open sources, and [redacted] information to produce the first Threat Warning and Indicators Notice (TWIN). It was a 10 page EC classified S/NF. He used to produce an LES version as well, but stopped doing that because it was too time-consuming to do both. He recognizes the need for an LES version, however, and Herlocker just arranged for an [redacted]

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[redacted] This person missed being hired as an analyst "by a hair's breadth," and is interested in doing analysis.

Threat Analysis Products; ADIC Daily Briefing; Thursday Briefing

The TWIN report goes to everyone on the JTTF, all SACs, ASACs and Coordinating SSAs (CSSAs), and to ACS and the TRR (Terrorism IIRs) Unit. It is classified SECRET

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By Kiv JADA, Date 5/2014

and contains no ORCON information so that the non-FBI JTTF personnel can share it with their home agencies. It is published every Friday, and consists of a couple of paragraphs describing each threat and "analyst comments" wherever they are available. It is approved by Herlocker and by the substantive squad that provided the information where necessary. It also lists the sources for the information. [9/11 Classified Information]

[9/11 Classified Information] The FBI is an insular organization and may not have access to all of it. Currently he is not including any FBI information in the report due to a lack of time but he could do that in the future.

The TWIN report has been popular with customers, and it helps other agencies to understand the FBI's information/collection requirements.

He knows most other field offices are not doing reports like the TWIN because many in the NE corridor have asked to receive the TWIN. Each field office should place it in a subfile on ACS so it can be searched.

[redacted] also transmits the NYPD Intelligence Branch daily open source piece which he places on the Intranet and sends to the JTTF.

For the ADIC daily briefing which has been going on for about one month, he taps JTTF information and the FBI ASAC case matrix and shares copies of supporting documentation. The briefing goes to the ADIC, the SACs from all Divisions, the IT and DT ASACs, CIA, NYPD, Herlocker [redacted] and [redacted] (NCIS analyst detailed to FBI). [redacted] gives the briefings. [redacted] maintains the case matrix for [redacted] coming into work on Sundays to update it. The briefing lasts anywhere from 15 to 45 minutes.

[redacted] thinks the FBIHQ mandated threat assessment that NYO IRS [redacted] has been working on is going to be a statistical piece, primarily for Congress. He thinks it may not even be disseminated to the field, and that even if it is it will not be that useful.

The Thursday briefing is attended by about 30 people, including all the executives from the JTTF agencies and everyone who attends the daily ADIC briefing. It's been going on for a couple of years. They discuss current threats and how the situations are unfolding (situation reports). [redacted] starts the briefing, and then attendees who have something to contribute speak up.

NYPD

The mission of the NYPD Intelligence Branch is to try to do what the JTTF is doing at the unclassified level. The Branch has a lot of resources and can move them quickly to counter the threat. He's not sure they are moving their resources wisely, however. There is a duplication of effort because of the existence of this Branch. There is a rivalry between the CT and Intelligence Branches, somewhat due to the management style of the NYPD.

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Chief Pulaski (now in charge of CT and Intelligence Branches) believed that NYPD should be in charge of the CT mission, was very intense, and wanted to be updated 24 hours per day. He still calls into the Call Center every two hours 24/7. Pulaski got reigned in by the NYPD, but the FBI still took a beating after 9/11 about information sharing. The information the FBI shares w/Commissioner Ray Kelly is never enough and he says so publicly, probably to keep the FBI on its toes.

Usually a NYPD sergeant attends the ADIC briefing, not Inspector Waters, so it's a missed opportunity for senior NYPD executives to get involved.

The NYPD "beats everything to death."

The NYPD's goal is to get information to One Police Plaza "quickest, not best."

The NYPD Call Center runs the "strange" calls down (70%) and turns the CT calls (30%) over to the JTTF. This works well.

JTTF

The JTTF is an outstanding concept. The FBI could not do what it does without the NYPD. At the worker bee level the relationship is a very good one.

The FBI needs to re-establish itself as the lead of the JTTF because there is a power struggle going on right now w/the NYPD. Pre-9/11 the arrangement worked fine because there was only one NYPD Lieutenant (he was the only manager) and had been with the NYO a long time; he was not here to fight. Post-9/11, the number of NYPD executives on the JTTF increased. [redacted] thinks this is Commissioner Kelly's way of controlling things and keeping his ear to the ground. Now it's a race internally within the NYPD to see who can get the information to One Police Plaza first. Some cops do not have an understanding of the need for clearances – he thinks this is primarily a training issue. Now there are too many NYPD personnel on the JTTF and they have too much influence. Sheehan goes to FBIHQ with complaints and has tried to direct the FBI to do certain things.

Access to USIC Information

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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CIA both report old information and the FBI reacts because there's no indication that it's been reported before. FBIHQ should take responsibility for disseminating this information and advising when it's old.

[redacted] thinks any information regarding specific threats to NYC or any US location should not be ORCON and should contain a tearline as a lower classification level.

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He's dealt with the Department of Homeland Security in NY State, which he views as primarily an administrative body with no enforcement powers, so it does not bring much to the table. The NJ Homeland Security Department has some law enforcement power, he believes. He believes that DHS needs to be "reigned in." It must clearly state its sources, and whether the information being reported is old or new.

He's heard of TTIC, but has not had much interaction with it. He's heard that one TTIC product, the President's Threat Report (PTR), has contained inaccurate information. He believes that TTIC takes information from other agencies and then misquotes or misrepresents it.

Analysis

[redacted] does not know what his job title is right now – it's changed so many times. NY is "on the cutting edge" because it has an Office of Intelligence branch and is the first field office to have one. He thinks that the NY's Office of Intelligence is moving in the right direction, but needs to be in a SCIF'd environment. He said management must set forth clear requirements for the analyst position and move those who do not qualify out of the job.

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[redacted] Baginsky "threw out" the three proposed analyst positions (tactical, strategic, reports officer) in favor of one analyst position/title, and then the field can decide how many of each type of analyst they need. He thinks this

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is a good way to handle things. The NYO needs mostly tactical analysts, some strategic and some reports officers.

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[redacted] thinks he falls in the Reports Officer category and has applied for that position.

He finds it hard to get information out of FBI HQ. He worked with HQ analysts on IT- [redacted] issues when he worked those at the NYO. HQ analytical reports go to the SAC and ADIC and not to the people in the field who actually need them. The reporting is not in ACS. HQ analytical reports should be forwarded to the field (in NY, the Intelligence Squad) via email. [redacted] would like to see the HQ analysts assist the field more. When HQ analysts have been detailed to NY (through temporary duty assignments), they have been more interested in obtaining information than in sharing it or really providing assistance. He does not see much threat analysis coming out of HQ, and that is why he developed the TWIN report.

Information Technology Resources

The NY computer support personnel are incompetent, they are not paid enough and there are not enough of them. May have been promoted from within. At Chelsea (where all of the analysts are moving soon, and the entire JTTF will move there as well – the DT section is moving first) he will have access to Intelink and FBI/ACS on his desktop (using a switchbox). They need printers to go along with their computers, and they need to be color printers so that they can produce professional-looking threat products using high-end graphics. The NYO has no graphics support right now.

They've had to struggle with Management Information Systems (MIS) in order to get I2 Analyst Notebook, although they do have it now. The MIS Unit Chief responsible for this is the former Chief of the Steno Pool who has no computer training. Herlocker had to go over this person's head to the Administrative ASAC to obtain I2. The analysts received their I2 training one full year before they actually received the product.

[redacted] can get around well in ACS only because he has spent so much time using it – it's a very clunky system. What he's seen of Trilogy looks good, but he'll truly believe it when he actually has it on his desktop.

Training

[redacted] has taken the Bureau's Counterintelligence Analytical Methodologies (CAM) course, a two-week FSI course, I2, Penlink, a Quantico briefing course, a two-week DIA/Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) CT course, ANACAPA, and the FBI's basic CT course.

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He is aggressive about seeking out training opportunities, and managers have been supportive of his getting training.

Reactive vs. Preventive

thinks the FBI has made great strides toward becoming more preventive. He specifically mentioned the TWIN, the large presence of the NYPD on the JTTF, the briefings, WMD and Infrastructure Protection Squads, as indicators of the change.

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