

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD****Event:** Interview of FBI Special Agent [REDACTED]**Type of event:** Interview**Dates:** November 17, 2003**Special Access Issues:** None**Prepared by:** Michael Jacobson**Team Number:** 1A**Location:** FBI, San Diego Field Office**Participants – Non-Commission:** Assistant General Counsel Randy Blair**Participants – Commission:** Hyon Kim, Michael Jacobson

[REDACTED] was involved into the investigations of al-Harbi and [REDACTED]. They didn't really parse out the investigations, and looked at the two together. The two came to their attention when they were looking at the hijackers' toll records. [REDACTED] was in charge of Hazmi's residential phone in San Diego. In reviewing these records, they uncovered contacts between the hijackers and a cell phone registered to 2 individuals. They recognized one of the subscribers' address as a military facility. They reached out to NCIS and they looked into them. NCIS told the FBI that the two had just wrapped on training on the East Coast, and then returned to Saudi Arabia. The FBI just missed them. The NCIS did a nice work up and time line on [REDACTED] and Harbi.

The FBI got [REDACTED] and Harbi's toll records as well. This part of the investigation was worked out of SIOC. [REDACTED] understanding is that the FBI has sent a lead to [REDACTED] but he doesn't know. He knows that the two received training at the Navy facility in North Island.

Al-Harbi's address was at a military facility, while [REDACTED] came back to Falls Church, Virginia. He thinks that it was either a mosque or a cultural society. His San Diego cell phone was registered to Falls Church, Virginia. There were quite a few calls from Hazmi to Harbi, and far fewer calls to [REDACTED]. There was speculation at the time that maybe Hazmi was related to Harbi. He doesn't know what ever came of that. They were also never able to determine whether another person was using the hijackers' phone, and called these two.

[REDACTED] recalls that Hazmi called Bayoumi from this phone. Some of the calls made from Hazmi's phone were made by [REDACTED] called his uncle, the Syrian Embassy, someone in Yuma, Arizona, and someone in Seattle. Bayoumi also

gave his cell phone to the hijackers to use. The hijackers were supposed to take over a lease from Hashim al-Attas. They gave Bayoumi's number as the POC. [redacted] has no idea why they would have been using Bayoumi's cell phone. The calls made regarding al-Attas's apartment were the only ones from Bayoumi's phone that he can say were made by the hijackers. The apartment manager (George Harb), said that he called the hijackers on a certain number. This happened to be Bayoumi's cell phone. [redacted] tried to pin down an exact date for this call, but couldn't do so. He thinks that it was in either February or March of 2000. It was within 30 days of when the hijackers arrived in San Diego. It didn't make any sense as to why the hijackers would be moving already. The speculation was that al-Attas was leaving and that he said to the hijackers that they could take over the lease, but they never actually did. He thinks that this apartment was cheaper. Harb told the FBI that Midhar had a temper. When Harb told Midhar that he would need to provide a deposit for the apartment, he flew off the handle. Harb said that he had dealt with Midhar, but did not know Bayoumi. He said that he may have spoken to Bayoumi once. He thinks that he called the number and that the person who answered handed the phone to Midhar. Harb told Midhar that he couldn't move into the apartment until he paid the deposit, and he never heard from the hijackers again. To clarify, in the application for al-Attas's apartment, Midhar gave Bayoumi's cell phone number with the name "Omar." He doesn't know why Midhar gave this number, considering the hijackers had their own phone by this point.

He doesn't recall many contacts between Bayoumi and [redacted] and he would have recognized [redacted] number. Some of Bayoumi's calls were to Saudi Embassy lines. There were a few other "hits" in their review of Bayoumi's phone. Basically, everyone had contact with Bayoumi. Bayoumi was in contact with Thumairy, at Thumairy's home phone number. Bayoumi was mainly calling back to the Saudi Cultural Mission in Washington, D.C. In a search of his office, they found books, educational pamphlets, etc. The FBI got the personnel list from [redacted]

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

The NCIS put together a big folder on [redacted] and Harbi. We should ask [redacted] an NCIS agent, about this.

Bayoumi's calls to [redacted] in the U.S. could be written off a business. He thinks that the timing of some of these calls though was suspicious. During the same time period the time that the hijackers arrived in the U.S., Bayoumi made calls to [redacted]. He also made calls to Al-Thumairy. The "chance meeting" between Bayoumi and the hijackers is very suspicious. The contact between Bayoumi and [redacted] is also suspicious. There is no other remarkable contact that he can think of, shedding light on Bayoumi's activities. [redacted] did note that most of the calls from Bayoumi's phone can be attributed to his wife. He let others look into the Bayoumi-Aulaqi relationship since they were already familiar with it. He can't recall contact between Bayoumi and others, but he did note that Bayoumi was in touch with other imams because of his position in the mosque. At the end of Bayoumi's stay in San

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

Diego, there were many calls to London. There was the call from the hijackers to the number in Yemen associated with al-Qa'ida. This was run down by New York.

The leads to [redacted] all went through SIOC, and San Diego did not deal with directly.

[redacted] does not recall other calls made by the hijackers.

[redacted] was on the Evidence Response Team. He was involved in the search of Modhar Abdullah's residence. He was also part of the interview team of Osama Owadallah. There was information linking Owadallah to [redacted]. They couldn't tell the court about it. During the initial interview, he thought that Owadallah was open and candid. [redacted] In the initial interview he just said that [redacted] had provided him with shelter. Then it turned out that Owadallah had been handling some of the finances for [redacted] and also reviewed the UBL video. During the polygraph session he admitted a lot more. He was inconsistent with how many times he met Mihdhar and Hazmi. In the first interview, he said he met them only once. He said that he didn't remember Midhar but recognized Hazmi. He said that he may have seen him either at work or at the mosque. In another he said that it was more like 40-50 times, and that he helped them set up a computer. [redacted] thinks that the latter answer was more credible. He also finds it unlikely that he only knew Hazmi and not Midhar. They were practically joined at the hip. The only separation was that Hazmi played with a soccer team in San Diego and Midhar did not.

[redacted] [redacted] noted, was on everyone's mind, because they had seen him surveilling the FBI office in San Diego. [redacted] is not sure whether or not they've been able to connect [redacted] directly to the hijackers. He didn't know that [redacted] stayed at a [redacted]. Owadallah also worked with all of the associates at the Texaco. [redacted] doesn't know a lot of the details of the investigation. He basically only knows what he heard in the interviews, since that was his role in the investigation.

[redacted] noted that the rudimentary training he received at Quantico on CT did not prepare him to work CT cases.