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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of FBI Special Agent Christopher Mamula

Type of event: Interview

Date: August 7, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Barbara A. Grewe

Team Number: 6

Location: FBI Washington Field Office

Participants – Non-Commission: Sean O’Neill, FBI

Participants – Commission: Senior Counsel Barbara A. Grewe, Counsel Peter Rundlet

Background

Christopher Mamula graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1989. He became an investigator in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations where he remained until 1996. He then went into a family business until August 1999 when he entered on duty with the FBI as a Special Agent. In December 1999 he was assigned to the Washington Field Office (WFO). He was assigned to squad NS-24 which was a counterintelligence (CI) squad with responsibility for [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[redacted] 9/11 Classified Information On September 11, 2001, he was assigned to the WFO command post for one month. He then was temporarily detailed (TDY) to Headquarters for three days. He was supposed to help set leads to the FBI legal Attaches overseas but this did not work out. He, along with five others, was then TDY’d to squad NS-4 at WFO to handle PENTTBOM leads and help out with other squads cases. Later NS-4 became squad IT-3 which handles [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

September 11 command post

When Mamula was assigned to the WFO command post on September 11 he was put on the leads desk to handle Rapid Start leads. He said he handled these by hand. Then Investigative Analysts would enter the information into the computer. Mamula said initially there was such a backlog of leads that no one could check whether they were duplicates. The idea he said was after the information was entered into the computer to try and check whether leads had already been set on particular information. Mamula said there was a massive influx of calls post-September 11. The leads would be sent to the fourth floor at WFO, agents there would pick up the leads and investigate them, and then bring the information back to the leads desk for the lead to be cleared.

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International terrorism squads and cases

Mamula noted that after September 11 the CI side was reorganized. His squad, NS-4, became IT-3. His supervisor is Don Demay. He stayed on the same squad but it had a new name. This squad was assigned to handle 9/11 Classified Information The squad had three additional agents who were moved from criminal squads to this squad. All of the cases on this squad were 199s [terrorism intelligence cases]. Although he thought there might have been one 265 [criminal terrorism case] developed at one point. There has been no particular counterterrorism training for people on his squad. Some agents, particularly those from the criminal side, have applied for the week-long basic international terrorism course but they have been too busy to actually attend the course.

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165 Mamula described the process for opening 199 cases. He said a preliminary investigation (PI) may be opened by an agent without getting permission from someone but the agent will generally speak to his or her supervisor before doing so. A full field investigation, however, requires the approval of an Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC). An agent cannot close a case without permission of his supervisor and the writing of a Letter Head Memorandum (LHM). If the case involved a U.S. person, the LHM must be sent to Headquarters. Cases that were included in the Director's Book, generally either high profile cases or ones involving threats, must also be reported to Headquarters. If the original lead came from Headquarters, one also knew that it was important and action on the case should be reported back to Headquarters. Generally the supervisor and the ASAC decide what needs to go to Headquarters. He said they have a sense of what is important. Mamula said he spoke to a Headquarters supervisor "100 times more" now than when he was on a CI squad. He said primarily he was just letting Headquarters know what he is doing on the respective matter.

Analysis and Information sharing

Mamula said he does not create Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) or disseminate intelligence from his cases. He said that the issue of IIRs had not arisen until recently and he does not know anyone who has written one. Source reporting is now (in the last three weeks or a month) sent to the Joint Intelligence Task Force (JITF) [note: this appears to be a reference to the new intelligence squad]. He sends an electronic communication (EC) with the source's information but he only includes a source number, not the source's identity. He has concerns about sharing source reporting with analysts because he believes they may compromise the source. He said the purpose of sending the information to the JITF is to coordinate the data and enhance the use of available data. He said that prior to the JITF no one was doing this with the information. Prior to this procedure, he sent source reporting 9/11 Classified Information

He identified as the only analyst assigned to his squad. He said it is difficult to receive analytical support. He believes that there should be one analyst for every two agents. He said he receives toll records, bank records, and surveillance logs

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and he needs an analyst to pore through all these records to find relevant information. He said, however, that this is not happening. He said, "To be honest, it is very difficult to get analytical support." He noted that [redacted] is the only analyst for the 14 agents on his squad. He said the cases are massive and go on for years. He argued that agents need analysts who have the time to pore through massive amounts of data. He claimed that [redacted] had never successfully done anything for him.

He "has no idea" what [redacted] job is going to be once the new intelligence squad is operating. He thought maybe it would involve gathering information for reports. He opined that they were not there yet in terms of having analysts perform the type of tasks that need to be done -- "no way." He said the analytical support process "needs fixing." He said the analysts need to be "real analysts," not just another agent assigned to the squad. He believes analysts need to have some subject matter expertise as well as analytical skills. Mamula identified [redacted] and [redacted] as analysts who could find information and put together link charts.

Relationship with other agencies

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When Mamula worked on CI matters he sent his data to the CIA because he knew that they would be able to analyze it. He said that he just got it done because he did not want to sit on the information. Headquarters was aware of this. He said he had a good relationship with the CIA. The FBI was worried about spies, not "positive intelligence" -- meaning information that can be put to use. The FBI did not know how to exploit information or maybe did not have the need to do so. He said he now sends a lot of information to [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information Mamula said he also did this some with [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[redacted] 9/11 Classified Information He receives general threat information [redacted]
[redacted] 9/11 Classified Information He later noted, however, that, unlike NSA, the CIA is not service oriented. [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information
[redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

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[redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

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Mamula does not have much dealing with the NSA representative, "Scott." NSA would get background on a country or a person for him but not much else. Most of the NSA materials are Top Secret (TS) but Mamula's squad did not have a Secure

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Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF) where he can read TS materials. He also does not have a TS STU phone. He has access to a Secret STU phone on his desk. He noted that there are four STUs for his squad and one just happens to be on his desk. To use a TS STU he needs to go to the WFO command post. He receives classified faxes at the command post as well.

Language Specialists

657 Mamula used the language specialists (LSs) before September 11 when he was working on CI matters. Since September 11 the LSs have been busy translating documents found in searches. Mamula believes the LSs are all "real good - excellent." He noted that he does not now have a FISA warrant in place although his squad has several. He said that when he did have a FISA running that he spoke on a daily basis with the LS working on his material. He said the decision of how often the agent speaks with the LS is an agent specific thing. He said the "tech cuts" were given to the agent handling the particular case. The case agent then decides who else will receive the information. On [redacted] [redacted] his squad is handling the FISA material is sent to all squad agents. This information is not sent to the JTF but he noted that it has access to all of the rest of the case file that is in ACS (automated case support computer files). He said ACS access to source reporting is restricted so such information is sent separately. He said grand jury information is also restricted. He believed nothing else was restricted. In fact he says that source recruitments are no longer protected. He said they were reducing security to increase information sharing.

Assets

Mamula has three assets. He inherited one of them from his supervisor Don Demay and developed two of them on his own. He believes that it is easier to develop assets in the CT arena because he is out interviewing people and chatting with them regularly. He said assets are the best thing because that is how cases are made. He believes recruitment of assets is not hard - it is the handling and managing of assets that he finds difficult. He said this is very time consuming. He described the amount of paperwork involved as "unbelievable." To pay a source is "very cumbersome." He argued that an agent only has time for one really good asset. He noted that agents generally have to meet their assets at night. Taking them out for a cup of coffee requires a complex reimbursement process. When he has an asset use an undercover telephone he has to pay the bills himself. He said the administrative section makes the rules governing such things but does not understand the job so it makes rules that do not make sense. Although supervisors generally need to know about what the agent is doing with an asset, he never had a supervisor ask about the validation of an asset's bona fides.

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

Mamula said he only has very case specific contact with members of the JTTF. He noted they can do things that he cannot do himself. He believes they can be "invaluable." For example, he said they can put him in contact with the "right people." He has found them

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to be very efficient at helping him get things done. He believes the JTTF is "a very good idea." He said he treats the members of the JTTF who are from other agencies just like any other FBI agent. He said they make it easy to do that.

Recent changes

Mamula thought the Patriot Act was important because it broke down the "wall" between CI and criminal agents and facilitates information sharing. He said he can also share intelligence case information (other than FISA derived information) with Assistant United States Attorneys now.

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Prior to September 11, PIs were a waste of time because all an agent could do was identify someone and do basic checks. Now agents can conduct surveillance and issue National Security Letters to get documents. Agents still cannot [redacted] [redacted] but otherwise they can do so much more now.

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive