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**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

Event: [REDACTED] (FBI Washington Field Office Analyst) Interview

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Special Access Issues: None

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Team Number: 6

Location: FBI Washington Field Office

Participants - Non-Commission: FBI Assistant General Counsel Bob Sinton

Participants - Commission: Peter Rundlet and Mike Jacobson

**Background**

[REDACTED] has a BA in international studies from American University, which he received in 1993. After college, he went to work in Estonia for one year, teaching English. He completed a masters degree in strategic intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College in August 2002. In September 1996, he joined the FBI as an intelligence analyst, and was assigned to the International Terrorism Analytic Unit at FBIHQ. He worked [REDACTED] which were 99% overseas investigations. In 1999, he transferred to the Washington Field Office, where he worked as an analyst on the Extraterritorial squad. He was reassigned to the Amerithrax investigation after 9/11, and he is still assigned to that investigation.

**Overview of CT program at the Washington Field Office**

[REDACTED] provided an overview of the Terrorism program at WFO. Prior to 9/11, there was one squad responsible for state sponsors [REDACTED] which then became two squads [REDACTED]. There was one squad for Sunni extremist, which included Hamas, PIJ, and al-Qa'ida. For his squad, until the early 1990s WFO was responsible all overseas terrorism. Then Miami took over responsibility for [REDACTED] terrorism, and in 1998 NY took over on al-Qa'ida overseas incidents. WFO was then responsible for other incidents overseas, regarding other terrorist groups, with the exception of [REDACTED].

Since 9/11, WFO has been slightly restructured. The Sunni extremist squad became the PENTTBOM squad, which is now responsible for al-Qa'ida and for PENTTBOM. There are two new International Terrorism squads, for major offenders. This squad will attempt to bring criminal charges, and will use any means of deterrent prosecution to after someone. Their primary job is to disrupt. He hasn't had any dealings with them.

The Anthrax investigation started in October 2001, and there are separate Amerithrax squads. The extraterritorial squad is still the same.

The Joint Terrorism Task Forces have gotten so big that they split. One is now a National Capitol Response squad. The Emergency Response Team and the HAZMAT team are assigned to the JTTFs.

### Anthrax Investigation & HQ Centralization

There are two analysts assigned to the Anthrax investigation. There are 40-50 analysts throughout the Bureau working on this investigation part time. They generally prepare background reports on people of interest during the investigation. These analysts are supervised by a Supervisory IRS in Oklahoma City, and it's called the "Technical Analysis Group." The reason it's run there is that after OKBOM, this office developed certain proficiency at these types of profiles and products, and they have the most experience with it.

On the Amerithrax investigation, most of the assignments have been top down, although he has initiated his own projects as well. He has been able to direct collection on some occasions. The investigation has been closely managed by HQ. There is an Inspector at HQ, who reports to an AD, and to the Director, and the Director receives weekly briefings on the investigation. This degree of HQ involvement is unusual. HQ is definitely more involved than they were before 9/11. His opinion, is that this increased involvement is "neutral." There are now "fly away" squads, and more cases run by HQ. New York used to be the office of origin on overseas al-Qa'ida cases, and now it's run by HQ. The "war" against al-Qa'ida is being run out of HQ.

### Working on the Joint Intelligence Task Force & the Extraterritorial Squad

[redacted] is now officially assigned to the intelligence squad. He is pleased with it, and wanted to be on this squad. This is the first time that WFO has had something like this. The supervisor will be responsive to the office's intelligence needs. Traditionally, the field analysts have not been part of any program, but are just a bunch of positions. In some cases, the agents just didn't know how to use them. Now, the intelligence supervisor can watch their back if the agents are trying to give them administrative work. Right now, it's all in flux. When they have more time, they will be able to produce longer term, better products. In the past, it was hard to reach out for help with a project [redacted] because you were assigned to a specific operational squad. Now, you'll be able to do so.

On the criminal side of the house, they have always been centralized. His squad used to be a criminal intelligence squad, which primarily did things like [redacted] etc. Now, they are going to intelligence squad meetings, and getting taskings for IIRs.

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When he was on the extraterritorial squad, he did tactical intelligence support.

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[redacted] He worked everything overseas. He would liaise with CIA and NSA to get actionable intelligence. His squad has been involved in arresting 6 people since 1983. [redacted] was able to participate in one of the renditions recently. He knew more than the SAs about the actionable intelligence in the case. They tracked down one of the three suspects, and then went to try and figure out where the other two were. [redacted] went to try and help them in that task.

The type of products [redacted] produced included various tactical intelligence products which includes: covering leads, writing requests for information to the CIA and NSA, and giving information to the intelligence community for exploitation. Most of the products were short turn around in scope. He has worked closely with DIA, but more when he was at HQ. They are involved in counterdrug/counterinsurgency in [redacted]

He will still be doing the same thing on this new squad, just with a different chain of command. He noted that there will also be indications and warnings analysts on his new squad, in addition to the strategic intelligence analysts.

#### Analytic Issues

Right now, all of the analysts are Intelligence Operations Specialists. These individuals will be eligible to apply for Reports Officer and Intelligence Analyst positions. In these positions, he would be eligible for promotion to a higher grade than as an Operations Specialist. He hasn't heard whether the postings for these positions are on hold or not. He knows that they are posting for HQ Reports Officers and Intelligence analysts now. [redacted] noted that working at HQ did give him a good perspective, and helps him in his current job. On the extraterritorial squad, 98% of his work was for overseas cases. He needed to have a lot of contact with other agencies, and needed to work closely with them. [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information and he worked with them. There are new representatives there now, and he is working with them as well. He generally received information from the CIA and NSA on a timely basis. They would often tip him on information they knew was relevant for his cases. They were located in a SCIF.

#### The FBI's ability to handle highly classified information

Overall, in his opinion the Bureau has been bad at handling TS information. This information was not available electronically, but only in hard copy format. The position of the field office was that you didn't need a formal cover sheet, etc, if you were using a "working copy" of a TS document, but for a final copy you did. In many cases, he would take NSA and CIA information, and write tear lines. He doesn't recall instances where these tear lines he drafted were rejected.

There have been additional problems recently in this regard. The CIA has been classifying all of a certain type of information as compartmented (more details available

in classified notes). In many cases, he's seen the same information from FBI available as unclassified. FBI agents will often write up unclassified FD-302s with the same information. The CIA has gone back and forth on whether this type of information needs to be compartmented. The current [redacted] will not print hard copies of this information for the FBI, because he thinks that it should be compartmented.

There still is not a TS LAN at WFO, and not many SCIFs. There are about 3-4 stand alone computers with TS/SCI in SCIFs in the room [redacted]. He has been able to type Top Secret macros there when he's had to. He has no idea about when the TS LAN will be put in place. The HQ TS LAN is up and running. They still have to SCIF entire floors at WFO to put the TS LAN in place.

#### Access to intelligence databases and to intelligence products

[redacted] uses Intelink every day. Analysts at WFO are getting access to it, but for a long time they didn't have it. One of the problems was a lack of SCIFs. He also has access to [redacted]. For a while, he was the only person at an FBI field office with access to this. At WFO, they have 4 Intelink terminals. This was more than enough to handle the demand. They don't have Intelink CI available.

[redacted] also mentioned many other databases to which he has access. They include: telephone applications, TECS (Customs), Drugx, UNI, Suspicious Activity Reports, major case database, NCIC. He also uses Choicepoint and Lexis/nexis. He had access to all of these databases even prior to 9/11, and had access to all of them at HQ with the exception of NCIC. They will make it mandatory for people on the intel squad to have access to intelink.

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#### Changes in the law since 9/11

The changes in the law have helped. Prior to the Patriot Act, it wasn't really clear whether they could do topical research, such as on WMD. Now, it is more clear. They could always search for information on the Internet on specific people if they were of investigative interest. In accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines, they could search for initial leads, they couldn't randomly look for things on people who were not of investigative interest. The biggest change has been the wall. Before 9/11, there were problems with the separation between criminal and intelligence investigations. This has been a pleasant change.

## Training

The burden for training used to be more on the individual. It was only by finding courses and seeking them out that you could take training courses. He didn't have any of his requests for training turned down. The College of Analytic Studies will help address the previous problems. After 9/11, they have received a little training, such as they special events analysis course. He has gone to 2 inservices at [redacted]. He has not taken the basic IRS course, because only IRSs who entered on duty after 10/1/99 had to take this course. They will be starting to do joint training exercises for analysts with the New Agent training. The end result will be that agents and analysts will then know and understand more about what the other does.

As far as his own personal training on legal guidelines and changes in the law, he has read the Patriot Act several times, and the AGG. He reviews them when needed. He recalls that they received an email that it was mandatory for the agents to read the FISA CT opinion, and that analysts should read it. Agents also have quarterly legal training. Finally, the National Security Law Unit has its own Intranet site, which he checks as well.

[Information on FISAs in investigations he has worked on is contained in the classified notes.]

## Analytic/Intelligence Reforms & Analytic Career Development

As far as analytic career development, in the past field analyst positions only went to a GS-12. He took a two grade cut in pay to come from HQ to the field. Now, with these new positions, the operations specialist will top out at a GS-13, and the Reports Officers and Intelligence analyst positions will go up to a GS-14. The supervisory analysts will be eligible for GS-14s.

There are currently 28 analysts at WFO. In the past, they have been managed by 25 separate people. WFO never had supervisory non-agent analysts in the past. Now they are scheduled to have at least three. As far as resources, WFO is understaffed from an analytic perspective. They have 700 agents, and 28 analysts. Pre 9/11, they really had 4 IT analysts.

He's been involved in drafting a concept of operations for the analytic program. In the draft CONOP, they've proposed that there be a 1:4 ratio of analysts to agents in the field offices. The squad supervisor could either be an analyst or an agent. This would be a big step, as all squad supervisors in the past have been agents. The supervisory analytic positions will be posted initially as a GS-13. He doesn't know what the agents on the intel squad will do. Maybe developing sources and information?

The FBI plans to implement a centralized collection management and collection requirements system. They will then help the operational squads collect intelligence

based on these priorities. The intel squad will be involved in asset validation (the strategic analysts will). [redacted] noted that achieving the full capacity for the intelligence program is still 5-6 years away. Collection management is one of the biggest things that HQ is pushing. The intel squad will be WFO's intelligence management component. [redacted] thinks that the changes will be painful, but will ultimately have positive results. Once people start seeing the benefits, they will react more positively. He has heard a number of different things about when reports officers will come on board. He's heard things ranging from a few weeks, to the end of the Fiscal Year.

[redacted] spoke about the use of additional sensitive techniques, and this information is contained in the classified notes.]

[redacted] again noted that before 9/11, the intelligence personnel were individually owned by the squads, and there was not really an FBI-wide intelligence program. The current changes are not universally well regarded. Some of the veterans, in particular, appear to be less enthusiastic. HQ's plan is to have one out of ten agents assigned to the intelligence programs at the field office. [redacted] is aware of a lot of this from his role on the advisory board to the Executive Assistant Director for intelligence.

**Difficulty of tying individuals to specific terrorist groups**

[redacted]

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**Working with Language Specialists and Legal Attaches**

[redacted] used to work with language specialists daily. He would send things to them for translation. LSs always went on renditions, both to negotiate with the host government, and to ensure the person understood their Miranda rights.

He has worked well with the Legats. He notifies HQ when he's in contact with them, as is required. It is different setting leads for Legats. You can't make the same demands for requests from foreign governments as you can from field offices. There are particularly great relations between Legat London and the British. In fact, [redacted]

[redacted]

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