

MFR 04019880

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

Event:

Type of Event: Interview of Paul Reid (Intelligence Operations Specialist, Federal Reserve Board; former Arlington County Police officer assigned to JTTF)

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Special Access Issues: None

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Team number: 6

Location: FBI, Washington Field Office

Participants Non-Commission: Assistant General Counsel Randy Blair

Participants – Commission: Barbara Grewe and Michael Jacobson

**Background**

Reid worked for Metro Transit Police for about a year and a half. He then joined the Arlington Police Department, where he remained for 25 years. He served as a patrol officer for three years, then became a criminal investigator, and he later transferred to Arlington PD's vice squad. At some point prior to 9/11, he was designated as Arlington's intelligence person. Reid noted that pre-9/11, most cities police departments did not have intelligence squads, and that only the largest cities' departments did. Even though he was working intelligence matters, he still was responsible for working on more typical criminal cases, such as gambling and prostitution. Originally, he was working with one partner on intelligence matters, but his partner was transferred.

**Role on JTTF pre 9/11**

As the intelligence officer, he served as the liaison to the WFO JTTF, beginning in 1997. WFO wanted him to come on to the JTTF in a full time capacity. However, the Chief of the Arlington P.D. at the time (Chief Stover) disagreed. There were 350 officers in Arlington, but Chief Stover did not think that they needed someone at the JTTF full time. Chief Flynn came on board in about 1999, and he felt even more strongly about this. Reid had a conversation with Flynn, in which Flynn told him that he did not want to send anyone to the JTTF. As background, Flynn was an officer in Newark, and then the chief of a small police department in Massachusetts before coming to Arlington.

As a result, Reid continued to liaise with the JTTF, but in a fairly limited capacity. He wasn't doing much intelligence work at all. Normally, the chief or some other high level Arlington police official would have a question, and he would have to go over to the JTTF to find out an answer. Reid would often go over to ask the questions in person, just so people there would begin to recognize him. At the time, Dick Klein was the only state or local officer assigned full time to the JTTF.

Reid already had his clearances from when he worked on the FBI's "Innocent Images" Task Force. While on this task force, he worked on cases involving CIA and Pentagon employees, so it actually required having a clearance. He had TS clearance at the time, and he thinks that it took between 6-8 months for the clearance process. This was not bad, he noted, given that he has many foreign contacts and has traveled overseas on quite a few occasions (Reid had a consulting business for some time and had foreign clients). Reid noted that he was the only person at the time (pre-9/11) with a security clearance in the Arlington Police Department.

### **Attitude of Police Chief towards JTTF, the FBI, and Security Clearances**

Reid admitted though, that Flynn was a hard read on these issues, even after 9/11: he knew that it was politically correct to have a liaison but he didn't want to commit a body. In addition, Flynn wasn't so fond of the FBI. This attitude is quite common among state and local officials. Flynn always feels like the FBI is holding back on him. The reality is that they are not. Reid thinks that the FBI has been very open with him (Reid). He noted that this is the only place where state and local police have access to this type of information. If he has a question, he can go ask and he will get immediate access to relevant intelligence. What occurs in many cases is that they don't have more specifics to give Flynn, but where he thinks that they do. There are also cases where the JTTF isn't in the loop on particular matters. For example, AD Van Harp had a conference call with the police chiefs in which he brought up a particular matter. Flynn wanted to know why he hadn't heard about this from Reid, but the reality was that Reid and the JTTF were not aware of this matter. He thinks that Flynn was mad, not because the information was so significant, but because he hadn't heard about it from Reid.

After 9/11, Reid went to Flynn, and Flynn agreed to do a MOU regarding his participation on the JTTF. It was a tough sell, and the Deputy Chief was always trying to pull him back. Flynn and Farr wanted him to work 3 days in Arlington, and 2 days a week for the JTTF. Reid worked part time for the Innocent Images Task force, and found this to be unworkable.

Flynn and Farris' attitudes are a contrast from the position of many other state and local police departments. After 9/11, others were very eager to get on board. The FBI couldn't get these people clearances fast enough, due to the volume. They ended up prioritizing, and getting the Chiefs and Deputies clearances first. Reid does not know of any chiefs or deputy chiefs who had clearances before 9/11. After 9/11, everyone wanted clearances. Anyone below the level of a captain had to provide a letter indicating why

they needed clearances. Now it has slowed down a little, and the FBI will consider anyone who can justify having clearances.

Flynn and Farris' attitudes were also different from that of Ron Carley, the Arlington town manager. He's a big proponent of the JTTF. When he was so positive about it, Flynn and Farr really realized that it was the politically correct thing to do.

After 9/11, Flynn asked Reid to bring him the forms for a Top Secret clearance. Reid did so, and Flynn looked at them and decided that they were too burdensome. He said to Reid that he wasn't going to fill them out, but that it was o.k, because Reid would just tell him whatever he needed to know. Needless to say, Reid commented, this put him in an impossible position. He recalls that Van Harp also had a conversation with Flynn about getting Flynn an interim secret clearance, but he's not sure what ever happened with that. The Deputy Chief, Jay Farr, was not any better. Even after 9/11, he tried to pull Reid off of the JTTF. He did not see CT as a long-term problem, and he thought that the real long-term problems for them were the crimes in Arlington county.

#### Role on JTTF post 9/11

Reid was not assigned to the JTTF full time until 9/11. On 9/11, the FBI called him and told him to come over. They had all of his passes ready for him to come on board full time. For the immediate period after 9/11, he was working with Rapid start leads and intelligence leads. Being on the JTTF has dramatically increased his access to information. Before 9/11 it was hard to pick up the phone and just call an agency and request sensitive information. A big part of the intelligence world is based on trust. Cold calls don't always go over well in this world. Before 9/11 when he wanted information about a specific case, he was told to send in a request on official letterhead signed by the chief, and that they would then see what they could do. Now he has immediate access to this information. The responses he would get pre-9/11 were also pretty limited. He would then have to go and meet with the JTTF personnel and explain why he wanted the information and how it was relevant to him. This was a pretty cumbersome process. He thinks that if he had been fully assigned to the JTTF prior to 9/11, he would have been granted access to all of this information, and that this was not just a post-9/11 shift in attitude.

Reid did note that even prior to 9/11, he would sometimes get a call about things the FBI was doing in Arlington. Some agents were more protective than others about their cases. There were cases where he didn't receive a call until after the FBI had conducted the search, for example. A lot of this comes down to the mindset of the individual case agent. He thinks that the mindset is changing in this regard, and agents are doing a much better job of notifying him of things occurring in his territory. This change is the result of a different in attitude by the case agents and the supervisors cracking the whip. More generally, Reid said that the police department personnel are very involved, not only in JTTF cases but in IT and DT cases as well. For example, the FBI was working [redacted] cases in Arlington and they wanted him involved. As an example of how well things are working, he is now starting to get information to pass

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along the other way as well. Arlington cops will tell him about their criminal cases, and ask him to notify the FBI criminal squads.

Once he was on the JTTF full time, he was looking out for Arlington's interests. He would send over reports on matters relevant to Arlington. He doesn't know whether or not any of these reports reached Flynn or not. He would send it over to the lieutenant, who would pass it to the captain, who would pass it to the Deputy Chief and then to Flynn.

When he was on the Arlington PD and assigned to the JTTF, he was involved in the cases out of Arlington in which significant events are occurring. He also has his own case load. An example would be: an Arlington police officer goes to an apartment based on a suspicious activity report. He would then take over and work this case. Reid would not be notified when the FBI opened an investigation on someone in Arlington. He would only be notified when something major was occurring, such as a search, arrest, or threat report. He would not necessarily know about the normal [REDACTED]

The FBI and ASAC Perren were always really good about trying to get Arlington relevant information. For example, they recently received a threat to an Arlington country club. Reid sat down with the FBI to [REDACTED]. Some of the information he would pass on to Flynn was of interest to him, while other information was not.

He thinks that overall the JTTF at WFO is working well. He can't think of any point when he's asked for information and not received it from FBI. The new chief in Arlington is much more supportive of the JTTF. He came in with clearances, and still has them.

### NLETs and BOLOs

As far as NLETs and BOLOs, anyone can put these out, and they cover a much broader range of matters than just terrorism. Only "certified" police departments are eligible to receive them though. Unfortunately, sometimes they just generate more questions. The WFO JTTF also puts out a weekly bulletin, at the "Law Enforcement Sensitive" level. They include whatever information they can in there. He thinks that all of the JTTFs are doing this. They are trying to disseminate them fairly broadly.

### JTTF post 9/11

After 9/11, the JTTF was basically responding to fire drills. It has slowed down a little bit, but for a while it was crazy. In the meantime, they are also trying to stay up to speed on the intelligence. Their mandate now is to follow up on everything. It has gotten a little busier lately with the recent Ashcroft al-Qa'ida hijacking warning. As far as why it was slower, they go back and forth in debating this. One possibility is that the public

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has grown more complacent, and the other is that al-Qa'ida has completed the surveillance for whatever their next operation is. Another possibility is that al-Qa'ida has decided that the troops in Iraq are such an easy target that they are just going to focus on them for now.

Reid gave a recent illustrative example of something the JTTF is involved in. Air Marshals were on a flight to Dulles on July 25, 2003 and two Middle Eastern men were acting suspiciously. The Marshals contacted the ground for assistance. They were stopped and questioned, and claimed not to know each other. The JTTF followed up on this after they were released, and discovered that they had taken at least six flights together. This, in his opinion, is vintage 9/11 tradecraft. He wishes that the TSA personnel had called them at the time to let them know what was going on, instead of letting them go. They have told them many times to call them when things happen, but it comes down to the human factor.

**Current responsibilities for the Federal Reserve Board and access to relevant intelligence information and databases**

Reid is currently an Intelligence Operations Specialist with the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. He has been with the Fed for five months. In his current position working for the Federal Reserve Board, he and another IOS [redacted] look at all of the incoming intelligence. They will review all of the rapid start leads from all jurisdictions. They will also review information that comes in through their secure LEO on line accounts. He is part of the Intelligence Executive Group, which shares information over LEO on line. Most of this information, he noted, is Law Enforcement Sensitive. Reid also has access to ACS, [redacted] and to Intelink, and thinks that [redacted] has the same access.

9/11 Classified Information

The information that he receives has been eye opening for the Fed. They realized that they did not have an intelligence component. He will provide them with reports on surveillances of the Fed, etc. Greenspan has personal security, and he also receives intelligence reports relating to threats to Greenspan. Greenspan and his people now have clearances, so he can share this information with them. [redacted]

9/11 Classified Information

As far as his current responsibilities, he is assigned to Gaye Harrington's squad (the JTTF). She has come up with a list of industries and assignment analysts to cover them. He's responsible for the financial sector. He will search the systems for relevant

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intelligence. He looks on Rapid Start, reads the DHS advisories, as well as classified information from CIA. At WFO, they also put BOLOs, NLETS on the Intranet, which he will also look at, though he acknowledged that the Intranet is not searchable. He will also review LEO on line information. If he sees something of interest, he can pick up the phone and call the originator with additional questions. In his searches, he will look for information with relevance for DC, which he would pass on to the JTTF. People on the JTTFs and the IT squads will also come to him with questions. They are trying to come up with a system which tracks hostile surveillances. This is a hot issue, and people at the Pentagon are working on it. Hopefully, at this point if an agency sees a hostile surveillance they would send in a report to Rapid Start. They've been trying to convince agencies to send in this type of information. He and [redacted] have been going out there to try and convince them of the merits of doing so.

9/11 Classified Information

He is not producing finished intelligence, but his unit is. For example, they produce a weekly intelligence report with significant activities. It is available to all the agencies at WFO and it is classified. They also have a classified bulletin board in their squad area with information from HQ. he will look at that. This is usually general, nationwide type information, sometimes originally from CIA and NSA.

In terms of the FBI response on 9/11, Arlington Police was basically satisfied. The police played a secondary role to the Fire Department though. The police department was relegated to traffic control. Flynn was on vacation for the first few days after 9/11, and didn't get on scene until a few days after the attacks.

### The Regional Intelligence Center

Reid said that the Police Chiefs are concerned about the creation of the Regional Intelligence Center. They don't want to devote people to working there. It sounds to him like it would be another place where local cops can call into. However, he said that right now they can do the same thing with the JTTF. He's not sure that the RIC will represent any type of "value added." Another problem is that the police chiefs don't want to share information with each other, which they are worried they might have to at the RIC.

Reid thinks that the patrol officers are already getting information. In Arlington, for example, they have morning roll calls. Sometimes he will send in information that should be included in the morning roll call. The Federal Protective Service even has a virtual role call. The police agencies also have internal systems in which they can get this type of information out to the local patrol officers. The JTTFs have been putting on training for the state and local authorities, which has also helped increase their knowledge.

### TTIC and Department of Homeland Security Analytic Products

He hasn't seen any TTIC products.

9/11 Classified Information

9/11 Classified Information

Reid does not know what

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the role of TTIC is. He's not really sure what it is they are doing. His partner is not the most sharing person, but he thinks that information is an issue with which TTIC has been struggling. He does see Department of Homeland Security advisories all of the time. He thinks that these are produced by their intelligence analysis section. However, this is often old, regurgitated information. For example, DHS recently sent an advisory about threats to financial institutions. He received a call from personnel at the FRB asking about it. He looked into it and found that this was information he had known about and passed to them four months earlier. There was nothing new.

NJTTF

He has had limited interaction with the NJTTF. He's not sure what they are doing. He's trying to focus on WFO. Two of the JTTF representatives at WFO [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] were detailed to the NJTTF, and came back and said that they were better off at WFO. Most of what they were doing over there was just reading through classified reports. They were trying to develop different products, but he doesn't recall whether he's ever received any products from them. He thinks that maybe the NJTTF is more of a management level operation.

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

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