

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

Event: **Patrick M. Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, DHS**

Type of Event: Interview

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Special Access Issues: None

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Team number: 6

Location: Department of Homeland Security, Nebraska Avenue

Participants Non-Commission: Associate General Counsel, DHS

Participants – Commission: Christine Healey, Lloyd Salvetti, Susan Ginsburg, Caroline Barnes, and Peter Rundlet

**Background.** Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, U.S. Army (Retired), assumed his current position as Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis (IA) on November 17, 2003. Hughes had been the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from 1996-1999.

**Information Analysis.** IA falls under the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Undersecretariat at DHS. Admiral Frank Libutti (Ret.) is the Undersecretary at IAIP. When Hughes arrived, he assumed that his job was to be the head of intelligence for DHS. He said the Department's senior intelligence officers are Secretary Ridge, Deputy Secretary Loy, Undersecretary Libutti, and him. He fulfills the role of chief of intelligence for the Department and so there is a dotted line from him to the Secretary on the organizational chart. Hughes said that IA was originally designed to complement the Infrastructure Protection element as the intelligence piece, conducting assessments of vulnerabilities and of risks.

**Status of IA when he arrived.** Hughes said that when he arrived, there were "27 people, no capability, wartime conditions – a total mess." He said the status was "unbelievable." There was not much capability to do anything. The 27 people were primarily analysts. Hughes said that they had no automated messaging system, no database, no tools – only Microsoft Office. "We had very limited connectivity for special compartment intelligence (HCS, GAMMA, etc.)." This is better now.

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**Current Connectivity.** Hughes said their connectivity is now "pretty robust." They have access to the Internet, SIPRNET, NIPRNET, JWICS, JRIES, SVTS, STUs, and Grey Phones. He said that the personnel from the FBI, NSA, CIA, and NGA all have full access to their home systems. Hughes assessed their connectivity as "good," but said that they need connectivity to databases – file and data transfer. Right now, he said of their database, "nothing is in it." They are making plans. Hughes said that DHS needs to build a "system of systems" inside of DHS. CIO Steve Cooper is the person responsible for the technical management side of the process, and Undersecretary Libutti is the business manager of it. Connectivity with outsiders is "good, not great." He said the Secret Service has an internal communication system that is now hooked up at DHS. Secret Service only shares with IA right now, which is contrary to the broad sharing approach Hughes wants to encourage, but he said he is "going slow" with the Secret Service given their mission to protect the President.

DHS cannot operate at the Top Secret/SCI level yet. The USSS, Coast Guard, ICE, CBP, and TSA all have SCIFs, but the rest of DHS does not. Hughes said they must hand carry stuff to people with a need to know. They have asked for SCIF space, but there is inadequate space in general right now. The whole Navy base needs renovation, and it goes slowly.

**Current Mission of IA.** The job of IA is to get intelligence from wherever they can get it and to convert it to "DHS-utility form" so that DHS can understand the threat environment to inform, warn, and assist people of the United States. Hughes said they are getting intelligence from wherever they can get it, fusing, and analyzing it.

**Sources of their Intelligence.** They are also using "domestic information" about the foreign presence in the US, from the private sector, from "people on the street," from people like Bob Orr at CBS News. They are also getting "Law enforcement" information, which is case-related, investigative information and intelligence from all of the INTs ("multi-INT combined intelligence"). They receive raw intelligence from the DHS legacy agencies involved in collection such as ICE, USSS, the Federal Protective Service, CBP, etc. These organizations write Homeland Security Intelligence Reports (HSIRs).

Intelligence from [redacted] Most of what DHS receives is already processed intelligence, although they do get raw intelligence from police reports. They do get CIRs, IIRs TDs, TDXx, etc. Hughes said that they get a lot of reporting

[redacted] He said he is trying to build more of a community at DHS. Before there was more tension and conflict, but he has begun to get buy-in and the Secretary supports his efforts. Hughes stated that DHS's strength will be bringing these disparate pieces together.

**Development of DHS Collection Requirements.** Hughes said he was not sure how many different intelligence personnel had including personnel from all DHS components and promised to find out. He noted that the USSS was small, but good, and that CPB, ICE, and the Coast Guard all had intelligence personnel. Hughes stressed that each component does its own sharing – IA does not do it for them. Though they are “just now” starting to coordinate and centralize some components of the intelligence sharing in certain areas because the broader Intelligence Community has requested that DHS produce one, not five separate, reports. Right now, IA has “something of a structure for imagining what” they will need. The have five trained collection managers and they are trying to develop a “collection list.” Hughes said he was proud that they have generated a DHS collection strategy. He said that the had sent off their collection requirements to the NHRTC “today,” and that now they are fully integrated with Charlie Allen and his collection requirements.

Hughes said that that the flow of information is “not perfect, but good enough to get by with some pain. We have to *pull* what should have been pushed. But we’ve made a lot of progress.” Hughes said that IA became more assertive “about two or three weeks ago.” They have become more demanding, he said, because “we had to be.” He noted that the Homeland Security Act says that the Secretary will be given information. Hughes said that this is the case, with some exceptions, but compliance is narrowly drawn -- only telling the Secretary, which is not the spirit of the law. Hughes said that five individuals – the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Frank Libutti, Asa Hutchinson, and Hughes – are authorized to receive the intelligence. Hughes said that he understands that national intelligence is “sensitive stuff” and that we don’t want to compromise it, but “we have just entered the Intelligence Community and we need to see it.” To facilitate this, they have created a Special Access Program (SAP) to help facilitate others to see it.

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**Interaction with TTIC, FBI, CTC, Others.** Hughes indicated that IA is on a much different scale, at present, than TTIC, the FBI, and others. We are an internal support organization like INR, J2, the DI, or like the Counterterrorism Division at FBI, but “we are DHS guys, and so we are different in scale and have a different mandate.” He said they both contribute to and draw from the knowledge pool in the Intelligence Community. They are “still trying to make our place” in the IC and don’t have a complete identity yet. “Next year” they will have a complete identity, Hughes said.

Hughes said that “we analyze what we get and we get a lot, but we don’t get raw traffic – and we don’t need it.” He said that they can ask for the underlying raw intelligence from the IC, but, so far “I never have.” He thinks that they would honor most such requests.

**IA Intelligence Production.** Hughes said that they are doing what has never been done before: taking foreign intelligence, domestic information (including from state, local, tribal, and municipal law enforcement and private sector data), and law enforcement information (primarily from the FBI on the national level) and then pushing all of the information to the center. Hughes said that they have created a category called Sensitive Homeland Security Information (SHSI), which is a sanitized version of the more highly classified information they draw from these other sources.

**TTIC and Threat Warnings.** When asked to distinguish what IA is supposed to do from what the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) is supposed to do, Hughes responded by discussing recent threat reporting that he received directly – from a CBS news reporter regarding a threat to an interior state bordering the one of the Great Lakes. He said that he immediately telephoned his contact from the area, as well as people at FBI Headquarters and the White House. His point seemed to be that they receive some threats directly and that IA’s contacts at the local level are better.

**IA vs. the JTTFs.** This led to a discussion about communication with state and local authorities and whether DHS is in competition with the FBI Joint Terrorist Task Forces (JTTFs). Hughes said that “to some extent” they were in competition with the JTTFs. “It is our mandate. We’d like to do it as a partner. We have subordinate elements – such as ICE and the Secret Service – on the JTTFs. But we do have points of friction.” When asked how to resolve this, Hughes stated that it was IA’s job to inform states and municipalities – not the JTTFs’. IA, he said, has support, warning, and informing functions.

**Relationship with TTIC.** Hughes stated that IA has a “tremendous” relationship with TTIC – that IA’s closest partnership is with TTIC. Hughes said he speaks with the Director of TTIC – John Brennan – every day. He said later that DHS does not do the

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degree that DHS does. He said that DHS does not want to do [redacted]  
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**Warning.** When asked who in the government has responsibility for warning, Hughes said "me" (although it was not clear that he meant for the government, as opposed to just DHS). He said that there is a lot of coordination and that the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) might learn of a threat before he does – but then he gets it "right away." He then informs the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and the Undersecretary for IAIP. He do whatever needed to be done – even if he couldn't reach his superiors. He would tend to learn of intelligence that originated from foreign sources from TTIC first. He said that IA duplicates effort with Northcom to some extent, but that Northcom's focus is supposed to be determined by DoD's presence and facilities. He said he thinks that it doesn't make sense because it is difficult to separate the threat to military and from the threat to civilians (e.g., water sources, etc.).

Hughes said there is some duplication and overlap with others, but that this is good and necessary – "necessary redundancy." When asked how the responsibilities will be rationalized, he said he had "no clue how it should shake out."

He said they are trying to deconflict with the FBI's JTTFs. "We just got out of diapers and we are just starting to assert ourselves. Everyone else is in the eighth grade – or higher." He said the delineation of roles and missions is important – not political and can't be solved overnight. It will evolve over time. With respect to the FBI, he said his goal is "jointly and concurrently." Sometimes he has made calls to locals and the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI field office in the area will get "bent out of shape."

When asked how the warning actually occurs, he said he has a long list of telephone contacts that he personally uses to make calls – "from Highway Commissioners to NYPD Commissioners." They are his Homeland Security Contacts (POCs).

**TTIC v. DHS.** When asked about the Report of the Inspector General of DHS in which the IG indicated that there was duplicative responsibilities given to TTIC that hindered DHS's ability to develop their own capacity, Hughes disagreed and said that the IG didn't talk to him.

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