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Event: J. Chris Ingliss, NSA, Special US Liaison Officer London (SUSLOL)

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Prepared by: Lorry Fenner

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Participants – non-Commission: Chris Ingliss, [redacted] (GC).

Participants – Commission: Col. Lorry Fenner, Gordon Lederman

(U) BACKGROUND.

[redacted] Mr. Ingliss is a 1976 graduate of the USAF Academy. He went to work for NSA in 1985 in Information Security. He later was selected for a Management Development Program spending 3 years in NSA operations areas including [redacted] engineering, Special Operations Officer (SOO) in the NSOC (National SIGINT Operations Center), and the Encryption Policy office. From 1997-2001 he was first the Deputy Chief (focusing on Korea) and then the Chief (taking the lead for China) of the China/Korea Production line. And from February 2001 until July 2003 he was Deputy Director and then Director of Analysis and Production (A&P) in the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID/S2). In July 2003 he was assigned to his current position in London(SUSLOL). We agreed to discuss Analysis and Production first.

(U) Signals Intelligence Directorate (previously DO)/ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION.

[redacted] Mr. Ingliss recalled that NSA Director Hayden and Deputy Director Black gave him his marching orders and SID Director Maureen Baginski gave him more day-to-day oversight when he took the new A&P job in February 2001. They told him that the challenge of the SIGINT Enterprise was to recast capability development and application in a changed world within a complex communications environment characterized by "volume, velocity and variety." Also, there was no monolithic target any longer. He confronted very diverse "information needs" from customers for which his analysis and production capacity was spread very thin. He was charged with directing the [redacted] critical fronts or product lines which called for agility and flexibility given that NSA was stretched so thinly. Since requirements were up and resources were down there was a lot of angst among managers and the workforce that NSA could not do the job as detailed and deeply as they would have liked. NSA could not stare all-day-every-day at a target. They all knew NSA could not use yesterday's methods against tomorrow's challenges.

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And there was not enough money and people. There was a disparity between what needed to be done and what was optimal. He thought for a while he'd concentrate on quick-fixes. However, DIRNSA believed that they needed to crack the nexus between capability and application, and that NSA needed to connect with other countries and other intelligence agencies. Therefore there could be no strategy without transformation. The collective wisdom was that [redacted] was probably the way forward.

(U) TRANSFORMATION.

(U) Mr. Ingliss said that in 2000 NSA seniors knew they would need dramatic and aggressive change to face the new challenges. First they would need to address capabilities and application in A&P, then within NSA, and then with other IC organizations. Mr. Ingliss recalled that terrorism was only one of a number of high priority problems. On 9/10/2001, he would not have known if the next crisis was going to be drugs, China/Taiwan, or North Korea launching a test missile. In the fall of 2000 the NSA vision "crisped up." The DIRNSA chartered an internal team under [redacted] (including Ms. Baginski, Mr. Crumm and Mr. Ingliss) on transformation and they were to look at reorganization and reengineering the whole enterprise. At the same time, an "external team" of [greybeards] seniors who were cognizant started with a "clean sheet" to do the same. The teams came to the same conclusion.

(U) REQUIREMENTS.

[redacted] Mr. Ingliss said that previously priorities were governed by PDD 35 and the subordinate National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL). The transformation had to also address the NSRL and change the customers' mindset. It was hard to change before 9-11 because the customers were so wed to what they were getting from NSA, and each customer was separate. As a consequence, the whole of the enterprise was really less than the parts. NSA was clear about what was first and what was last but was not very good at sorting out priorities in the middle of the PDD35 tiers and making fine-grained diversions. Also, PDD-35 did not allow for differentiation within a target – for example, PDD-35 presupposed that anything [redacted] at the same level of priority. [redacted] NSA lacked agility because customers resisted movement of resource, and resources were not fungible between targets. Resources decreased by [redacted] in the 1990s while requirements went up and NSA lacked agility. And there was no way to predict where NSA needed to be in the next year.

[redacted] The PDD 35 replacement, NSPD 26, and the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) were designed to increase agility and responsiveness. The producers should now be able to discriminate better between the [redacted] National SIGINT Requirements with their [redacted] Essential Elements of Information (EEIs). Mr. Ingliss avers that the NIPF is a step in the right direction.

(U) When responding to the question of balancing customer needs with the essential task for intelligence to "prevent another Pearl Harbor", Mr. Ingliss addressed the requirement

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to prevent strategic surprise. He stated that he always cautions his analysts about watching the trees but keeping the forest in mind. He feels that they sometimes can get lost in the NSRs and ignore the big picture. Preventing the next strategic surprise is a higher-order principle that helps analysts decide what to focus on. (He defined a strategic surprise not just as a specific attack but also as a matter over the long term, such as the rise of China.) Before 9-11 they felt they were in a box. Now they can get beyond being reactive. They realize sometimes the customers don't know what to ask and they can initiate an effort from a big picture perspective to anticipate the customer's needs.

[redacted] He noted that there is difference between production and analysis is that production is more of going-through-the-motions while analysis is higher order and intellectual. The lesson of [redacted] was that analysts needed to think about [redacted] and to imagine things at a second order of analysis.

[redacted] Mr. Ingliss stated that change was occurring at NSA before 9-11. He maintained that the data points were moving NSA toward transformation long before. The data points included [redacted]

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[redacted] As a result of these and other events, NSA knew analysis and production had to change. They had to move from "observation to seeing to imagining" in order to get it right.

(U) COUNTERTERRORISM.

[redacted] He had distance from [redacted] but he realized that we could not think that an organization's lack of size and its nonstate status affected its ability to harm us. Pre-9-11, DIRNSA talked about small groups' ability to leverage the telecommunications infrastructure; the USSR used to build telecommunications, but al Qa'ida can just use COTS technology and achieve enormous leverage.

(U) Mr. Ingliss acknowledged that more funding was going to [redacted] Everyone knew [redacted] had to be strengthened. At the time, about 5 % of NSA's production and analysis resources were dedicated to [redacted] issues. DIRNSA knew CT was important and was adding resources to that product line and those related. [redacted] of resources were moved to go against CT, which was a very big deal at the time. The movement of resources to CT was painful and prompted screams from customers.

(U) RESOURCES.

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[redacted] Mr. Ingliss pointed out that some resources are not or less fungible, like linguists. The existing system reduced any agility. There was a lack of flexibility because of scarcity of resources including linguists [redacted] There was competition for scarce resources between the [redacted] production lines mixed between some geographic and some functional orientations. In general, the production lines were too close to customers. The production lines were "myopic" and were like "warlords," and he needed to break the stranglehold of the production lines on resources.

(U) Mr. Ingliss believes that DIRNSA knew before 9-11 that what was called for was central control of resources. That's what DIRNSA directed with the transformation. NSA knew in the late 1990s it was still overcommitted [redacted] of the resources, a percentage which was absolutely huge. But the [redacted] and the customers were both saying it was still too small to produce or [redacted] etc. Still the Corporation had to make tough decisions and these had to be "effects based" decisions.

[redacted] In February 2001 in his new position, Mr. Ingliss made it clear that the Offices of Primary Interest (OPIs/TOPIs) did not own the resources. The nation owned the resources. The Corporation – principals - would decide were the resources were needed most. But NSA needed a mechanism to move resources more flexibly so they established an office called Deployment Services under [redacted] [interview completed] where all the analysis and production (including linguists, signals development, et al) resources would be centralized and then deployed to Product Lines more rationally and flexibily to accommodate surges. The A&P no longer had to ask permission to move people but had to have a defensible position so that customers could be engaged by NSA's customer relations office to understand why the changes were made. With 9-11, NSA could not just declare that [redacted] resources were being moved to CT, but A&P was just starting to "take babysteps" to implement this new system in the spring/summer of 2001 and could do it step-by-step. A number of linguists and analysts were moved to CT after [redacted] made a strong business case for the move from (largely) [redacted] Also, there was an effort to develop more synergy among product lines – such as [redacted] and CT. Resources could be moved both physically and virtually.

[redacted] After 9-11, A&P put [redacted] people on the CT [redacted] problem. Deployment Services moved [redacted] physically and another [redacted] virtually to support the Global War on Terrorism. This could not have happened if the Transformation hadn't put the mechanism in place ahead of time.

9-11 changed customers' attitudes and had a big cathartic effect on customers. Customers were much more tolerant about moving resources after 9-11. After the catastrophe, one could take risks and move resources and innovate with partnerships which were all resisted and rejected before. He pointed out though that all post-9-11 moves were done within risk assessments in consultation with the customers who would lose. Increasingly the customers have been asking "when do I get those resources back for my issues?" With [redacted] a long term war on terrorism, the answer might be "never." Customers seem to assume that the world will

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"go back to normal." Risk areas have been exposed by this reorientation of resources and need to be recognized by the decision makers.

(U) Mr. Ingliss observed that with finite resources the only way to get coherence between the parts of the Enterprise is to have one person in charge of developing coherence of process and parts and to set up the process to make sure that everyone understands the whole picture. Leadership must set the vision for the workers and then allow for decentralized and distributed execution. Leadership should not micromanage. There is a balance between having centralized facilitation of decisionmaking, which might hinder creativity, and decentralized execution, which might leap to overlaps and inefficiencies.

(U) Mr. Ingliss said that CMS and DIRNSA set the strategic vision. He had little relationship with CMS and DDCI/CM Joan Dempsey. Mr. Ingliss had significant if not daily communication with the ADCI/Collection Charlie Allen. He felt they definitely had a strong collection and analysis feedback loop that was thoughtful – Mr. Allen understands that the opportunities and insights from analysis and collection drive each other. The ADCI/C was trying to achieve optimization across INTs. Mr. Ingliss was very responsive to daily and weekly inputs from Mr. Allen. In contrast, Mr. Ingliss did not view the ADCI/A&P as strong. He clarified that the position was vacant for months after John Gannon left and more recently filled by Mark Lowenthal. He continued that the ADCI/A&P has a different approach than Charlie Allen. He believes Mr. Lowenthal is intent on creating infrastructure and common practices and creating leverage across INTs for his customers but is not focused on a daily or even monthly perspective and is not looking at how the IC executes its mission. Col. Fenner noted that [redacted] informed Mr. Allen's thinking, and Mr. Ingliss agreed that it would have been helpful for Mr. Lowenthal to help in decisionmaking on tradeoffs between INTs. One of the key questions is how to ensure that all of the INTs make optimal contributions.

[redacted] Mr. Ingliss gave an example of the strength of the ADCI/C's efforts. The [redacted] was really a SIGINT and IMINT issue, but everyone in the IC wanted to "rush to the ball." Charlie Allen said "not everyone" and insured that everyone used their resources more wisely, even though it meant that collection in this instance was unevenly distributed across the INTs. Mr. Ingliss noted that it is helpful to have someone in the IC trying to figure out optimization. He recalled that the former ADCI/A&P, John Gannon, took a strategic view on analytic resources such as improving language and analytic tool development and sought to build strategic partnerships. Mr. Gannon was less forceful than Mr. Allen but was trying to bring more partnership to analytic units. Mr. Ingliss had little overlap with Mr. Gannon.

[redacted] Mr. Ingliss thought NSA had about a [redacted] He stated that even if it was [redacted] NSA had to make the best contribution it could make. In responding to the question of how to assess failure, he responded that the measure is whether you did the best job you could do with the resources you had. In response to the question of how CMS could help, he opined that 9-11 was a collective failure. He said he is not looking for someone to make choices for him so that he does not have to "take the rap." Rather, everyone has to

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optimize what they have and each is responsible. CMS needs to design the apparatus to optimize across agencies for collaborative relations. CMS should make issues community issues so that the parts of the IC develop collaborative relationships and resources can be shifted. Fine-grained choices can only be made within a discipline. CMS should avoid simple enumerations of priorities. CMS should set overall priorities, which is an art not a science. The enumeration of priorities needs to be achieved by intense collaboration to tap the relative strengths of each discipline.

(U) NSA STRATEGY.

[redacted] Mr. Ingliss stated that NSA knew the strategy had to address "volume, velocity, and variety" in the communications environment to address the present and future challenges of SIGINT – the strategy had to shift from "gathering" to "hunting" so more resources had to go to signals development (analysis on the front end) rather than technology. NSA wanted to have [redacted] but to decide intelligently what to collect in actuality. SIGINT development needs to be done by analysts who have an all-source context and also extraordinary knowledge of SIGINT itself – which he called "steering[ing] SIGINT in an all-source context." This all- source analysis has to be on the front end of the cycle. We should move in that direction, but NSA is not at the point that SIGINT development is done from an all-source context.

(U) SUSLOL.

[redacted] Mr. Ingliss recalled that DIRNSA and Mr. Black's direction to him as SUSLOL was to optimize the relationship with the UK for the US. SUSLOL serves as the DCI's representative for cryptology with the UK. It is a strategic partnership (not quid pro qou) that is broad and is based at Cheltenham with GCHQ [redacted] It is highly-leveraged and has long-term strategic benefits for the U.S. He principally deals with GCHQ, which has [redacted] civilians and [redacted] military personnel.

[redacted] The relationship with GCHQ needs to be done in an all-source context. Indeed, as SUSLOL he has all-source partnerships. At the U.S. embassy, [redacted] and he has good relationships with them. [And they have a relationship with the [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [redacted] as the then-NSA CT product line chief helped arrange this. [Now he is director of analysis for the TTIC; interview completed]. Mr. Ingliss specified that this is a SIGINT-only partnership at this point. He also pointed out that NSA is also working [redacted] heavily on CT.

[redacted] As such the GCHQ needs leads [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [redacted] while NSA classifies information as "NOFORN" by exception. NOFORN is a bias and not an absolute impediment to information-sharing. Mr. Ingliss agrees that the NOFORN caveat is a barrier to our international partnerships and believes the bias should be against this

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absolute impediment [redacted]. He believes that [redacted] is moving in this direction now. [redacted] (with overt DCI support, and the DCI has made overt statements that NOFORN should be eliminated regarding CT) have started a pilot sanitization program with [redacted] and the NSA CT product line concerning CT information. They are proactively pushing intelligence to our partners to help GCHQ

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[redacted] is also part of this collaborative enterprise. The [redacted] representative [redacted] is pushing a partnership with the [redacted] Mr. Ingliss pointed out that many seniors have come to visit and hear about this including Secretary Stenbit and DIA Director Admiral Jacoby. [redacted] They are seeking to address the collective challenge collaboratively.

(U) Mr. Ingliss said he got an excellent turnover from his predecessor Barbara McNamara [Interview requested] who had the relations on a solid footing.

(U) Mr. Ingliss also discussed his relationship with Bill Crumm, NCEUR [interview completed], who is charged with support to EUCOM and State in relation to policy. Mr. Crumm gets all the senior NSA reps in Europe together routinely. Mr. Ingliss also has a relationship to [redacted] And he mentioned chief of CT/I for USD/I General Boykin.

[redacted] We do not know enough about [redacted]. GCHQ has done a study in [redacted]

(U) Mr. Ingliss wanted to speak to us further about the current challenges and future programs in England whether in the US when he returns for meetings or if we travel to the UK. Our assessment is that a further interview would be very constructive.

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