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MFR 03003644

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: [redacted]

Type of event: Interview

Date: 07.21.03

Special Access Issues: Not applicable

Prepared by: Emily Walker / transcribed by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number: 9

Location: Telephone, Los Angeles

Participants - Non-Commission: [redacted]

[redacted]

Participants - Commission: Emily Walker

NOTE: INTERVIEW FOR NON-ATTRIBUTION / OFF THE RECORD

Body:

Question 1: Who do you recommend from JTTF as primary targets for interviews?

[redacted]

- 1) [redacted] 9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive
- 2) 9/11 [redacted] Law Enforcement Sensitive
- 3) Tom Corrigan, NYPD retired;
- 4) Ken Maxwell, Jetblue, VP of security, FBI retired;
- 5) Jack Cloonan, ABC News Consultant, FBI retired; and
- 6) Key individuals mentioned in his book, The Cell.

Question 2: What in your view was the main problem leading to 9/11?

[redacted] The CIA erred. They had key evidence that could have made a difference.

Question 3: Biggest failure post-9/11?

[redacted] The biggest failure after 9/11 was to bring rapid change to DC. The Rudman/Hart Commission (1997-2001) had been sitting on the shelf. After 9/11, President Bush dusted it off and implemented the first recommendation in the Executive Summary – set up Homeland Security Czar. They picked Ridge as a political favor for having won Pennsylvania but skipped over qualified candidates. This was a hugely critical time and it was a big mistake. For one year they had no staff and no authority. The Czar was meant to develop a master intelligence plan internally but a plan has not been developed or funded.

Question 4: Is there a smoking gun?

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[redacted] The June meeting between FBI and CIA when the CIA brought information and photographs of a Malaysia meeting qualifies. They knew Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. Tenet had tasked CIA to find any potential threats in and outside the US who could be the source of the intelligence supporting a future attack in the US. The CIA had received photographs and other intelligence from the Malaysia meeting of Al Qaeda. At that point – when we knew of the meeting – we had a time bomb on our hands and the CIA knew it. CIA met with the FBI but did not give them enough information to help find the group in the US. The FBI had an idea - some of the people had appeared from the Cole bombing but they were prohibited by law from searching on Google (as [redacted] did while working with 20/20) and thus were not able to find that the “scoop” was available (on-line credit cards, addresses, real names, etc.). It was too late by August when the FBI finally received information from the CIA to access the available online information.

Further, pre-9/11 Tenet was coming from a lower post - a bureaucrat, a risk adverse official and did not push the Agency. Post-9/11 all gloves came off and he received the go-ahead to do what he had to do. It's been more successful, exemplified by the arrests in Pakistan. But the US historically has never been able to catch the “big guy” - Castro, Quadaffi, Hussein, Osama.

Question 5: What would be some best practices of LA that we could bring to the NY hearings?

[redacted]
1) Roof-top evacuation – It is a law that requires helicopter pads on every building over 20 stories in LA. LA has 15 helicopters with the LAPD and the fire department has more.

But there were different issues with the WTC. Prior to 1993 they locked the roofs to prevent security breaches from thrill seekers (tight rope walkers and hang-gliders). After 1993, when evidently there was roof-top evacuation at the WTC, they set up a system of locks that could be opened with a key card or electronically. When the plane severed the building, the wires were cut and the key pad could not work, so roof doors could not be opened.

Also, the transmission towers were on the top of one of the buildings so no helicopter could have landed.

2) Fast track evacuation procedures are in development in LA. Every week fire, airport, harbor, etc. get together for briefings so they stay on the same page. Drills are also being practiced. This could be a good focus for best practices.

ADDITIONALLY:

He volunteered on the private sector:

Joe Dunn, currently of UBS Warburg, was in NYPD in charge of the APPLE program which was the link between law enforcement and the private sector pre-9/11. This program was set up after 1993 to communicate threats to the private sector. It was in effect on 9/11 and [redacted] believes that messages were

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sent on blackberries and pagers regarding who should evacuate, where they should go, and the status of the airports, bridges and tunnels. LAPD is now all equipped with Nextel pagers.

- 1) [redacted] agreed to contact Emily regarding LA best practices; and
- 2) He will meet additional 9/11 teams.

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9/11 Personal Privacy

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