

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

Event: Meeting with Former Head of Solomon Smith Barney Security Building 7 WTC

Type of event: Briefing

Date: Jan . 5, 2004

Special Access Issues: NA

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Team Number: 8

Location: Commission Office 26 Federal Plaza, NY NY

Participants - Non-Commission: Peter J. Mulroy, Senior Specialist, Merrill Lynch Global  
Technology and Services

Participants - Commission: Emily Walker, Sam Caspersen, George DelGrosso

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss issues and background of Building 7 of the WTC. Peter Mulroy served as head of Security for Solomon Smith Barney (SSB) at WTC Building 7. Peter had worked in this building for a number of years and was very familiar with the operations and security issues related to the building and the complex.

SSB was one of many tenants in this building (which included OEM, Secret Service, DOD, Home Insurance and others). Silverstein owned and managed the building. His chief security person, Jim Corrigan, worked very well with Mulroy and the two had a close relationship in protecting the building. Corrigan died on Sept. 11, 2001. Mulroy stated that he only had control over the floors occupied by SSB which were 26-47. Both Silverstein and SSB used Advantage Security to provide guards for the building.

On Sept. 11, 2001, Mulroy felt the boom of the first plane hitting Tower 2. He called his head of security at Citigroup's Greenwich street office. He saw the jet in the building across the street, the paper fluttering and the smoke. He took the elevator down to the cafeteria on the 4<sup>th</sup> floor (the elevators were still working). He picked up people exiting the cafeteria and told them NOT to go upstairs. He said that there were at least 1000 people in the cafeteria and no one was listening to him tell people not to go up. People were trying to use the phones behind the

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reception desk to call others, but he needed to keep some lines open and refused to let more than 2 phones be used (for which he was criticized later).

Peter said he had been trained for fires and bombs, getting people off 2 floors up and 2 floors down, doing a cursory search to make sure people were out and calling the police. Now he says there is more training, including evacuation training, but prior to 9-11 that training had not occurred. He said he knew the stairwells, but they were not labeled on every floor. In addition, the building at one time had call boxes in the stairwells, but some had recently been removed because they were working and the owner would not pay to have them replaced. Removing them reduced the possibility that someone might try to use it thinking it was working.

Between the first and second planes, he was told that the windows on Floor 47 were cracked (that was the fitness center). The property manager was at the dentist, so the back up was Mike Catalano, an engineer who was shared by SSB. He recommended that we interview Mike (which is set up).

Peter said that an announcement was NOT made inbetween the first and second planes to evacuate. He, in SSB, did not have the ability (physically) to make a separate announcement and did not have the authority to make an announcement different from the building owner. He did ask for a bullhorn. After the second plane hit, Shaun O'Keefe was at the fire console station. Peter said that Shaun made an announcement NOT to evacuate after the second plane hit. Peter felt that they must work as a team and he did not make a different announcement.

SSB staff, however, and some vendors, were panicing and some were already coming down the stairs. (The elevators were still working). He said that people were exiting the Washington Street promenade. Heath McClelland and Tom Jones were the last out from SSB and they went out the loading dock. He said people were doing their jobs as fire wardens on the floors. SSB Head of Human Resources, Brad Thomas, however, repeatedly asked Peter why he didn't make an announcement for people to evacuate. Peter said he could not do so.

SSB had practiced fire drills, but only the mandatory 2 per year. He said that most people seemed to be able to find their way out. He said that all the people except himself and one other

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person (that he knew of) were out of the building before the first tower collapsed. He did not leave until the fire department rescued him at 12:15 that day. He was in the building for the first and second tower collapsing, could not breath or see anything. He had no flashlight, just the bullhorn.

Peter mentioned that there were a number of security and safety issues that had been raised over the years, but were ignored by Silverstein, SSB or the Port Authority. He said that Jim Corrigan had asked the Fire Dept. to examine the 2 diesel tanks which were on the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> floors because he knew that was not approved by code. The fire department could not do anything about it because the Port Authority was immune from building code, so they were left as it. The other tanks were in the basement. He also spoke about the issue of having guards check ID's, which Silverstein didn't want to spend the money on, but SSB insisted. He also spoke about the fact that no one checked people entering the cafeteria so anyone could get into the building that way. He was again told to leave that issue alone.

At one point, OEM asked Peter for chairs because they were going to set up a triage center in the loading dock. This in the end was not done as the building had suffered damage.

In terms of collapsing, Peter wondered when they merged two buildings (at some point earlier), how the steel was impacted. He wasn't sure. He did mention, the building had a lot of problems with systems.

Peter mentioned that the property owners are really key in the security and safety of the building. He feels that the situation at Merrill is significantly better. But the ability of the company to get information and be connected to the local community is largely "word of mouth" and personal relationships, not systems or methods that are standard and consistent. He is a member of the 1<sup>st</sup> Precinct and the Fire Safety Directors Assoc of NY which has made significant recommendations post 9-11. He did mention that there is not much communication in terms of plan sharing between companies in related buildings, although Merrill (for example), would tell AMEX if it were conducting a drill. When asked if the assembly points were duplicative, he said that he didn't know. No one had ever asked that question.