

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Background Briefing on DoD

Type of event: Briefing

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Team Number: 3

Location: RAND Corporation, Washington DC office

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Suggested Publications: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997 AFSC Pub 1 and the Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations 13 Apr 95 Joint Pub 5-0 (we have both of these)

There are two different types of military planning processes at the Pentagon:

- 1) the deliberative planning process, which follows a formal structure (as outlined in the Joint Staff Officers' Guide) and results in operations plans and contingency plans. Rumsfeld is changing some of the planning process now. Note: there is some civil/military tension. It has come to a head with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz; and
- 2) crisis response planning, which follows a less formal, reactive structure with no formal rules. This varies by administration.

In general, planning goes from various civilian officials, to the JCS, to the CINCDoms. The CINCS construct the military plans. The CINCS are responsible for developing operations plans for their own regions based on the guidance received. Other military and civilian officials review the plans. In reality, however, the procedure is constantly interactive and constantly being revised. Most plans have a two-year cycle and are reviewed by the SecDef every two years. Plans are very hard for most civilians to understand, let alone to assess. It was very hard for the NSC in particular to get its hands around military planning issues.

There are 3 different types of plans:

- 1) operations plans w/ TPFDDs¹ (most detailed)
- 2) contingency plans w/ TPFDDs (less detailed)
- 3) contingency plans w/out TPFDDs (least detailed)

The "op" plans, of which there are less than half a dozen, are quite large, numbering thousands of pages. There are more contingency plans, and even more of the minor contingency plans.

¹ Time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD): This is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data, non-unit-related cargo and personal data, and movement data for the plan.

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CINCS – they always have opportunities to influence the policy process. It is not always just top-down. The CINCS are responsible for the warfight so they want to influence resource allocations. Joint monthly readiness reviews by the CINCS was established because the CINCS wanted more say in resource allocations.

CINCENT is a busy CINC. It believed Afghanistan was a “backwater” country. It did not put their best people on the “Stans” and there was also a lot of “deadweight” on the “Stans.” The focus of deliberative planning effort was on N. Korean and Iraq rather than counterterrorism.

SOCCENT was the key for deliberate planning regarding SOF in Afghanistan. A problem with SOF is that they are very secretive and this secrecy makes it hard for them to coordinate with others. SOFs are very compartmentalized so we don't know where they are or what they are doing.

The 1993 bottom-up review did list terrorism as a major concern. The military was to focus on terrorism and prepare for dealing with potential terrorist threats. This led to a DIA assessment of the threat. But from 1993-1995, the focus was more on hostage rescue and state-sponsored terrorism. In 1998, the threat assessment was broadened to include force protection for foreign deployed troops, e.g. in Bosnia there was tremendous concern regarding Mujahedin attacks.

On September 12, there was a plan on the shelf for Afghanistan. While prior planning was done, as noted earlier, not much attention was paid to Afghanistan. The plans on the shelf were likely those used as the basis of planning for Enduring Freedom. So, there was some work done because they were told to plan something.

There was criticism that the Clinton administration was spending resources doing silly things (e.g., taking children to school, rather than focused on warfighting). There was also a concern that the administration got involved in military action that contradicted the Weinberger Doctrine. Perry got it right when he said to use force when interests are commensurate with the costs and risks involved. The Perry approach was that every case is to be assessed on its own merits (use the military and assets when the risks are weighed against the threat to US interests). However, there was no 9-11 yet so we could not deal with a war and it was difficult in that case to energize the Pentagon (ie. serious threat needed to justify action). Now you have 9-11. Costs and risks of inaction are too high. This administration is much more forceful with the military.

Did the military trust Clinton to use force responsibly?

Tom: I never had a bad experience. The military planners did not resent me because I was a Democrat. However, there was some evidence of military suspicion of the Clinton administration, but it had little effect. A bigger issue was simply military resistance to civilian officials doing planning.

The Clinton White House was only going to spend a certain amount of political capital on the military. After the “gays in the military” issue, they were only willing to push the military but so far. They wanted the military and defense not to be a problem (ie. did not want crises and the military in general, to be an issue). They also did not want to spend too much money.

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The military does not always present extreme options such as Tomahawks versus full-blown invasion. At USAF, they developed five to six air options before the conflict, recognizing the importance of flexibility.

At the upper levels, it is very much personality driven. When Clinton came in, it was tense. There was a suspicion of Powell. The administration had not worked with the military before. This was exacerbated by the Somalia and Bosnia situations. Over time, the Perry-Shalikashvili relationship was great, but before that there was tension. Cohen had a good relationship with the Chairman but a bad relationship with the Combatant Commanders.

Intelligence

Intelligence reform in the 1990s emphasized intelligence support for the warfighter. There were numerous institutional and interagency changes, and technological investments, to encourage this. However, to get a major change in collection, you need high-level civilian attention (need SecDef attention).

Intelligence has many assets and involved agencies. A great deal of time and effort has been spent improving intelligence to help the warfighter. It is much better now. Iraq is an example of the success of this. Once the war started, there were huge improvements. How can we prioritize what is needed from intelligence? One way to address this is to have more interaction between the military and intelligence. There are now more representatives from the agencies embedded in the military staff. We need to continue having liaisons.

The IC now has more innovative techniques. A lot is ad hoc (going around the system). Overall however, the IC is not quick enough to adapt to the new threat. The IC must think creatively of going after high value targets.

Other general notes

August 98 – very few people knew about the missile strike beforehand.

Did we have contingency plans with the UK for Afghanistan?

Tom: we have worked with the UK a great deal in the past. Note: while Tom stated we have a long history working with the UK military, he did not specifically say we had worked with them on contingency plans for Afghanistan.

Communication between the White House and Pentagon is pretty bad sometimes.

While the NSC advises the president, to second guess the CINCs is very unusual. As noted, it is hard for civilians to assess large operations and plans.

CENTCOM is an army-dominated command, so it is not surprising their options were land-heavy.

Lessons Learned

What are the lessons?

Dave: should have invested more in threat assessment. More HUMINT. How has intelligence changed to ensure the right people have the right information?

There was a failure of the government to understand the threat prior to the attack. What resources were devoted to learning more about this threat at the time? Was there resistance to understanding

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the threat? Where did this resistance come from and what lied behind this resistance? This is really an inside the beltway issue.

Tom: should have had more interactions with guard, reserves, state and local 1st responders. Should have focused on communications, training, equipment, and other difficulties.

What did the military do well?

Tom: Engagement in the region. There was great payoff for the small investment of engagement [redacted] which allowed us to establish relationships. This paid off even though the Clinton administration was criticized for these engagement efforts. [redacted]

9/11 Closed by Statute

Future Interview Recommendation

Recommends talking to Ed O'Connell at RAND who did targeting at CENTCOM (regarding DoD's ability to go after novel threats, going after high-value targets, targeting for OEF², etc).

My questions:

1. Was there or was there not something on the shelf?
2. Where did the communication gap occur? Principals, CINCs? Why was Afghanistan a "backwater" issue when the President, Clark and Tenet kept saying terrorism was so important and were asking for military options?
3. More information on [redacted] position on these issues.
4. Did the military just not want to engage?
 - what are the real underlying reasons for this lack of desire to engage or to be creative in developing plans despite the request to do so.
5. Are we wrong? Did the military really provide the best options? Was the intelligence simply not adequate for the warfighter?
6. How can I get access to the "plan" that was on the shelf?
7. What about the USAF plans referred to (more information needed)?

9/11 Classified Information

² Operation Enduring Freedom.