

MFR 030/0907

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview with Lynne Osmus

Date: October 3, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: John Raidt

Team Number: 7

Location: FAA SCIF

Participants – Non Commission: Lynne Osmus

Participants -- Commission: Bill Johnstone and John Raidt

Career Background

(U) Lynne Osmus started with the FAA in 1979 as a federal police officer at Dulles when the FAA owned the airports. Osmus had previously held a summer job as a screener. 1981-1986: held various positions with the FAA security field Office in Los Angeles, including as a Federal Air Marshal. 1986-1987: GS-14 with the Domestic Security Program. 1988: Branch manager in airport security; 1989: Division manager, and then acting director of Policy for CAS. (Prior to 1988 operations and planning were rolled up into one organization that was just a day-to-day operations program. The 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act changed the structure adding offices to look at long term analysis including the Office of Policy which did more long-term planning and rulemaking; and the Office of Operations which managed field operations, FAM, PSIs to conduct inspections and ensure compliance with policy). 1990: Director of the Office of Policy (ACP); 1990-1991 (6 months): Assistant to Administrator Busey; 1991-1995: Director of Operations; May 1995-November 1998: Chief of Staff for FAA Administrator Hinson and FAA Administrator Garvey; 1998-November 2000: Director of FAA Brussels Office conducting airport assessments. Nov. 2000 – June 2001: Acting Asst. Administrator for Aviation Policy and International. June 2001—February 2002: Deputy Asst. Administrator for Security (ACS 2); Served as liaison with TSA to create the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between FAA and TSA; Now serves as Asst. Administrator for Security and Hazardous Materials.

Mission of CAS

(U) Protect aviation by making sure we had appropriate countermeasures for U.S. carriers operating domestically and overseas (Part 108), and for foreign air carriers serving the U.S. (Part 129). The requirements for assessing foreign airports bumped up against sovereignty issues. We were enforcing the ICAO standards.

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Threat

(~~SSI~~) The focus was on passenger aircraft because history and the intelligence assessments showed this was the target of opportunity and choice. The threat was hijacking and then shifted to Improvised Explosive Devices. Osmus said we had always perceived the threat as overseas, but after the WTC bombing in 1993, the threat at home was more evident.

Response

(~~SSI~~) Osmus identified one of the strengths of the system as the emergence of automated data systems, that did tasks such as organize inspection data and conduct trend analysis. She cited the work of Mike McCormick to quantitatively assess threats and identify weaknesses in order to aid in the development of countermeasures.

(~~SSI~~) The weakness of the system is the "human factor" that with so many people churning through the system, and so few incidents, complacency sets in. The problem with complacency is why Claudio Manno's shop (ACI) kept trying to reach out to the Air Carrier's security directors to let them know the threat to civil aviation was real so that they would approve the necessary measures.

(~~SSI~~) Osmus did not see a laborious rulemaking process as a big problem because the FAA had the authority to expeditiously issue Security Directives (SD's) if a counter measure was required.

(~~SSI~~) Cost was a big issue to the air carriers, and given the absence of problems they were reluctant to take costly action. In the case of a specific threat, such as Bojinka, the air carriers were very responsive. They understood the threat overseas, but it was hard for them to conceive of the domestic threat.

(~~SSI~~) Another problem identified by Osmus was that the Security Directors for the air carriers were former FBI and DIA folks who would call colleagues from their former agencies. Often the information they received from their former colleagues would undermine the FAA's assessments.

Roles and Responsibilities

(~~SSI~~) Osmus said that she was not troubled by the division of roles and responsibilities. Screening was an appropriate function for the air carriers because they had liability, the aircraft and the schedule and the air carriers wanted to maintain control of the function.

(~~SSI~~) Osmus said that there had been debate about whether the screening function should be taken away from the air carriers. GAO and the IG looked into it, but they concluded that changing the model was not advisable because the aircraft was the responsibility of the air carriers.

(~~SSI~~) According to Osmus the air carriers wanted the responsibility because screening affected the timing of their operations. The possibility of having the airports conduct the screening caused problems with consistency in the application of security from airport to airport. There was no impetus to change the model. The cost of federalizing the function was also a big issue.

Intelligence

(~~SSI~~) Strengths: FAA intelligence office was one of the best in government. It drew experienced people but taught them to see things from an aviation standpoint.

(~~SSI~~) Weaknesses: While intelligence sharing had improved by 2001, the FBI and other members of the IC did not fully recognize the need for FAA to have the information they wanted. FBI was not as interested in developing intelligence as in investigating it.

Prescreening

(~~SSI~~) CAPPS—The criteria (weights and factors) on which it was based was solid. FAA did outreach to other agencies in developing CAPS' scoring criteria, and in the mid-1990's

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(~~SSI~~) Osmus indicated that Jim Padgett could help explain what the criteria were and how they factored in suicide hijacking. The problem with developing CAPPS was the limited database of what attackers looked like. The operational problem was that the program scooped up a lot of people that weren't a threat. This shook public confidence in the program. Osmus said that the CAPPS program was developed specifically for checked baggage because that's where the threat was perceived

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[Redacted] they needed a system to prioritize who posed the greatest threat. Osmus said it was envisioned that CAPPS could play a larger role than just baggage screening but that Admiral Flynn would have made a determination on this point in the 1996-1997 time frame. Osmus did not recall an SD that was allowed to expire that would have subjected selectees to greater checkpoint scrutiny.

(~~SSI~~) Prior to CAPPS the FAA utilized a manual pre-selection criteria program to identify individuals who may pose a threat.

(~~SSI~~) No fly orders—These were issued in the form of SD's. Some of the carriers were able to load the list of names directly into their computer reservations systems, others had to apply it manually. Post 9-11 the FBI developed a list of about [Redacted] people – this became known as the watch list. Sometimes FBI would go directly to the air carrier to help in a particular case.

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Checkpoint Screening

(SSI) Strength: [REDACTED]

Knives

(SSI) Osmus said there were two factors leading to the 4" standard. 1) Traditional hijackers used weapons such as guns, explosive and large knives. Small knives were not part of the equation. 2) Sometime in the 1980's FAA conducted an informal survey of state laws to determine what was and wasn't legal to carry. The 4" standard was drawn from that canvas.

Detection

(SSI) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] With respect to the magnetometer's capabilities for detecting knives 4" or below Osmus suggested that we consult LYLE MALOTKY who was FAA's scientific advisor, and who is now at TSA. He can tell us the metal content that the magnetometers can detect. (COURTNEY TUCKER can tell us about the number of knives confiscated by the system).

(SSI) Osmus said that she is not sure whether there was a concern that magnetometers were unable to detect some items that were prohibited under Part 108 and the ACSSP. She added however that terrorists were building high tech IED's so they were focused on high tech threats, not low tech threats like small knives.

Access Control

(SSI) The airport credentials all personnel with access to the AOA. The responsibility to conduct background checks and, if necessary, the criminal check, for the purpose of credentialing employees were as follows:

(SSI) The airport was responsible for doing a 10-year employment check on its employees. If any year could not be accounted for a criminal check was conducted. Air carriers were responsible for doing the same check on its employees, and those of its contractors, and then would pass the check onto the airport for credentialing. The FAA was responsible for facilitating the criminal checks that required the assistance of the federal government.

(SSI) Osmus said that access control continues to be one of her greatest concerns, though there is no evidence this factor had an impact with respect to the 9/11 hijackings.

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Aircraft Protection

(~~SSI~~) Osmus stated that the Common Strategy for air crew response to hijacking was in the process of being updated again as of 9/11. Flight attendants were taught to [redacted] and to understand the other resources that were brought to bear.

(~~SSI~~) The Federal Air Marshal program (FAM) was placed under the FAA by a presidential directive. FAM training was adjusted to address the tactics that Hezbollah was using. Training increased in the early 90's, as FAM wanted a permanent force with high firing standards.

(~~SSI~~) Osmus stated that an evaluation assessing the hijack threat concluded that a FAM program should be continued. A written report was produced. By the mid 1990's FAM flights were all international based on the threat assessment. Osmus said that the FAA didn't perceive a huge hijacking threat. She referred us to Greg McLaughlin who could discuss with us the size adjustment decisions.

Safety vs. Security

(~~SSI~~) Security didn't exist 30 years ago. While safety has always been part of the equation, the goal of transportation is to move from point A to point B—and security is perceived as getting in the way of efficiency. Whereas an air carrier could lose a certification because of safety issues, security was not a certificate issue. She concurred that the industry generally viewed security measures as "intrusive" to their operations.

(~~SSI~~) Osmus agreed that even though air carriers are no longer responsible for screening, they are an integral part of security and must remain engaged. She said that since Pan Am 102 security had jointed safety and efficiency as the major focal points for the FAA and even thought the head of FAA Security and much if it s personnel were drawn from outside of the agency, she didn't believe this impeded the position and budget of the security function.

Role of Air Carriers

(~~SSI~~) Osmus pointed out that the carriers do still have security responsibilities and that airline (and airport) employees, can and should be like a neighborhood watch. They can best see changes in the norm which might be a security threat.

General Aviation (GA)

(~~SS~~) Osmus said that AOPA worked-up a GA security program and training materials. She recommended we contact Andy Cebula at AOPA for details (phone number 301 695-2203).

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The Day of 9-11

(SSI) Osmus was at home sick. Canavan was out of town. Claudio Manno called her to say an aircraft was off route and headed toward New York City. Osmus was in her basement and didn't hear the call. Manno called back just after the first aircraft struck the WTC. Osmus estimated that it was between 30-35 minutes between Manno's first and second calls to her. Osmus went to the ACC at the Washington Operations Center getting there sometime between 11:00 and noon. She went to the video-conferencing room. She doesn't remember everyone who was there except that she knows Administrative Garvey and Deputy Administrator Monte Belger were there. They were on a broad administration phone bridge. Garvey and Belger were mainly listening in to what was going on.

(SSI) When asked who the FAA's hijack coordinator was, Osmus indicated that it was Lee Longmire who was ACO 1, but that there was really nothing for him to do. Osmus stated that she does not remember any other plots that day that were confirmed.

(SSI) Osmus stated that she does not recall any discussion of checking the grounded aircraft for other hijackers, nor does she recall any discussion of contacting the cockpits of aircraft still in the air and requiring them to secure them. Osmus said to check with Jane Garvey and the ATC people about such orders.

(SSI) Osmus confirmed that the executive summary (which mentions the gun story) was produced for Mike Canavan and the Administrator. She did not know who produced the summary but indicated that it was drawn from the information put up on the butcher paper in the ACS working room at FAA HQ. She thought that perhaps KAY PAYNE—Canavan's administrative assistant might know who produced the executive summary given to Canavan.

(SSI) Osmus stated that Claudio Manno was in touch with the FBI throughout the day, and that the FBI was at each of the airports.

(SSI) Osmus confirmed that there were three centers of activity at FAA HQ on 9/11/2001:

- 1) The Aviation Crisis Management Center which was in the Washington Operations Center and which contained the videoconferencing center where Garvey, Belger, et. Al. were on the phone bridge. (10th floor) (Lee Longmire in charge)
- 2) The ACS working room (3rd floor) (Chuck Burke in charge)
- 3) ACI watch office (3rd floor) (Claudio Manno in charge after 9/11)

(SSI) Osmus agreed that there was a great deal of confusion about the situation and said that it all happened so fast that everybody in the system was doing their own thing as best they could. She was not sure whether they had enough information in the early hours to

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conclude that the cockpit crew of other flights should have been warned. Garvey and Belger were in contact with the airline CEOs on 9/11.

(~~SSI~~) Osmus mentioned CARRIE RILEY who has been the crisis management expert at FAA for a long time. She can talk about the process of how the crisis management system was supposed to work.

(~~SSI~~) Osmus stated that within 48 hours they had to analyze what had happened to determine the necessary counter-measures to get planes back-up. It was clear they had the wrong hijack model with different weapons than the system had anticipate as the threat.

Post 9-11

(~~SSI~~) Osmus stated that she has some concerns about the nation's ability to respond to aviation crisis under the current bureaucratic structure. Now that ATC is under FAA and the security function is under TSA, she worries that there will be a lack of coordination.

(~~SSI~~) Osmus recommended that the commission talk to Lyle Molotky who was the scientific advisor at FAA and who is now with TSA.

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