

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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Event: Interview of **General Peter Pace**

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Team: 3 (Counterterrorism Policy)

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General Peter Pace is currently the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). He assumed that position on October 1, 2001. Prior to his current position, General Pace served as the Combatant Commander for the United States Southern Command, from September 8 until September 30, 2001. From November 2, 1997 to September 8, 2000, he served as Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces at Atlantic/Europe/South. General Pace also served as the Director of Operations (J3) in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from August 5, 1996 to 23 November 1997.

#### The Office of the Vice Chair, JCS (VCJCS)

The office of the VCJCS was originally established to focus on issues of acquisition and procurement of resources. However, when Pace assumed his current office in October 1, 2001, the attacks of September 11, 2001 had already occurred and his time was focused on providing military advice to the Chairman on the global war on terrorism (GWOT) and on Iraq. On average, General Pace spends approximately 80 percent of his time on operational issues and 20 percent on acquisition and procurement issues.

#### The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Generals Meyers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and General Pace have regular interaction with the Service Chiefs and the Combatant Commanders. One of the tasks of both Generals Pace and Myers is to be advisors to the Service Chiefs on issues related to the organization of their services in meeting today's security threats.

An additional task is to review the organization of the Combatant Commands (CC) to ensure they are prepared to meet the national security threats to the U.S. After 9-11, the question raised was whether there should be a change in the Unified Command Plan. The Chiefs discussed the way in which the military is postured and what recommendations should be made to for improvements. The issue of most concern at the time was whether there should be a command in the United States for homeland security. This discussion led to the establishment of

NORTHCOM.<sup>1</sup> Another change was new responsibilities given to USSOCOM, which now has the responsibility of a supported command for the GWOT. Both of these changes were the result of the Chiefs and combatant commands discussing relevant issues in a deliberative process.

### The Development of Military Plans

In the formulation of military plans, the JCS is the link between the Chiefs of the services and the Combatant Commanders. Statutorily, each Service Chief provides military advice to the Chairman. In the process of developing military plans and operations, the CC's will come to Washington and brief on the way in which they would execute the plan and operation. During the meetings in Washington, the CC and JCS representatives provide collective advice to the combatant commander. If the plan is viable, the CC would return to his command and continue developing the plan until it is ready to be presented to the President.

### Khobar Towers

Pace was the J3 when Khobar Towers was attacked. At that time, the general belief was that Iran was responsible. It was years later when Pace learned who planned the attack. In the aftermath of the attack, there was a change within the Pentagon. For the first time within JCS an entity was established that was dedicated to the protection of U.S troops.

### The Development of a Military Plan

After 9-11, the Chairman tasked all the combatant commands to develop their own CT plans for their AOR. These plans were given to J3 for review and revision.

To illustrate the military planning process, he used the example of the Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM) who has within his area of responsibility the Philippines. In the Pacific Command, there is regular CT planning. The commander planned what he believed the military should do regarding terrorism in the Philippines. A number of options were developed. One option was the U.S. military taking the lead without assistance from another country and without permission from the Philippines. This would not be the best option, but it was one considered. Another option was to train the Philippine army to engage in CT operations in their own country. The CC could rely on U.S. intelligence and assist the Philippine army in the protection of their country and ultimately in the larger CT effort.

The commander of PACOM met with Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman Myers and informed them that he would like to pursue the option of training the Philippine army. The commander explained how he could train the Philippine army in one year to eighteen months and provide them with other needs during

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<sup>1</sup> Pace is not aware of any discussion about the establishment of a NORTHCOM type of command within the United States prior to 9-11.

that period (food, a place to live, etc). At the conclusion of the eighteen months, the Philippine army would possess the skills necessary to conduct military operations against CT targets

After these discussions with Rumsfeld and Myers, the commander refined the plan. The next step was to bring in the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, followed by the Philippine government, and the military. Each step was a deliberative process and only after everyone was pleased with the plan was it taken to the next level.

As a result of this process, today there is an ongoing program to train and feed the Philippine army to conduct operations against terrorists on the island. This story is an example of how an idea that originates in the Pentagon is taken on by a commander. However, it also illustrates what can happen under the initiative of a commander. Regardless of how an idea originates, the process is the same. There is a great deal of back and forth within the military and then back and forth with civilians and other agencies including the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the local U.S. Ambassadors and the relevant authorities in the country involved.

#### How the Military is Adapting to its Combating Terrorism Mission

The process of the National Command Authority (NCA) deciding upon USG military action is cumbersome. There is not enough time to come back to Washington, D.C. to discuss military operations in response to timely intelligence. Terrorists move around and do not stay in one place. Today in Afghanistan and Iraq there are teams that have the capacity to collect intelligence, and the assets to take action in local areas. These sub regional nodes have been developing an expertise in their region and can understand what kind of actionable intelligence is required to act [redacted] These forces can get to the target quickly and conduct an operation without the backup of a large military.

What makes this process work is that the Principals have predetermined that in certain countries where there are terrorist problems, a small team can conduct operations in a timely manner without having to request permission from the NCA to act. In addition, these teams are not waiting for the terrorists to act first. They act when they have intelligence to do so. They know the limits of their authority and they can deal with problems as they occur. The more familiarity that exists on how the terrorists operate, the more these teams know how to address the terrorist threat.

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Today the relations between the CIA and SOFs are as good as they have ever been. This also extends to the relations between George Tenet and General Meyers as well as at the CC level.

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### How the Government is Adapting to Deal with CT

According to Pace, the USG is very good at preparing the President for making decisions. However, when that decision is to be executed, the question then becomes, what mechanism exists to tie together all the different USG CT efforts? How is the USG to pull it all together? To date there is no mechanism to carry out that task.

Before the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), all the military services were separate. While many individuals in the military resisted the implementation of the Act, through the years the Act has resulted in a joint service in many respects. This has been a positive outcome. What is needed now is a joint interagency task force for the global war on terrorism that ties all the agencies' efforts together and sets forth what agency is responsible for what particular area of the GWOT. This would also establish which part of the government has authority for elements in the field, or at least which agencies have coordinating authority to make things happen in the field.

This need for coordination of the agencies is also required below the strategic level. Combatant Commanders require the authority to bring together a joint interagency group in their region when it is necessary. There are currently established Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) in some commands (there is one at CENTCOM). The JIACG is a way to empower the agencies at the regional levels and allow them to take direct action. This is another mechanism that shortens the time required to act on actionable intelligence.

Therefore, a better strategy for coordinating efforts to carry out Presidential decisions is needed. There are two ways to accomplish that goal: and

1. A Goldwter-Nichols Act II at the strategic level for the interagency (he noted that the Center for Strategic and International Studies is working on this issue);

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2. Continue to establish interagency cells outside Washington DC that can act on intelligence received through the use of the different instruments.

A problem in establishing regional interagency mechanisms is that unlike the military, other agencies cannot direct their personnel to go to certain regions of the world. For example, the military can order their people [redacted] For the other agencies, it is voluntary. However, some of the most unpopular places in the world also are where many terrorists find sanctuary. As a case in point, the Embassy in Afghanistan is very under staffed. How can the USG establish a viable JIACG in important parts of the world when the interagency group may not be properly staffed? Agencies should develop incentive programs to encourage their employees to work in some of these less popular areas. For example, promotions in the Department of State should be based on individuals spending time in some of these regions, which will provide the necessary incentive to staff that region.

#### Actionable Intelligence

Intelligence is a very important requirement in the GWOT. However, the USG is weak in its human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. There should be more robust U.S. HUMINT capability that should be trained to work with the HUMINT capabilities of other countries. As noted earlier, the U.S. must improve its speed and ability to take advantage of intelligence that is obtained.

The intelligence that is required for a military operation is what will allow the commander to embark on a military action and achieve strategic impact. Prior to 9-11, the intelligence that was needed to conduct an operation was the location of UBL and other A-Q leaders. It was necessary to know who the key players in A-Q were and what the key nodes were. There must be a good picture of the network and how to take out the nodes to collapse the network. [redacted] can conduct a very good raid operation, however, it is important that they know where to conduct the raid. Once there is intelligence on the nodes, the question becomes how to find UBL or Saddam so the military can drop a missile on their heads or conduct a snatch operation. That type of intelligence was very difficult to obtain prior to 9-11.

It is difficult to obtain actionable intelligence without adequate HUMINT. The US must be able to have access to difficult places, which we could not achieve prior to 9-11. In addition, the HUMINT need not be solely US HUMINT. The US can rely on its allies to help gain access to difficult regions of the world.

#### Why Was the Military Deployment into Afghanistan Difficult Before 9-11?

In addition to the problem of obtaining actionable intelligence, there were other concerns regarding sending troops into Afghanistan. While the U.S. had the ability to go into Afghanistan, the U.S. made a policy decision not to do so if there was no cooperation with President Musharraf, the President of Pakistan. It was State Department's role to contact Musharraf and engage him on this issue. However, since he was a General in the Army, Generals Abizaid and Franks also

engaged. While the US wanted to work with Musharraf and obtain his permission to transit Pakistan, the US could not lean so hard on him that doing so would jeopardize his position. Having said that, if the U.S. knew where UBL was, the U.S. military would have gone to take him out and would have dealt with the Pakistan issue afterwards.

There are also many costs involved in sending troops to into harm's way. As a case in point, the costs that arose for the military in Somalia were the result of faulty policy decisions. The troops were sent to Somalia to relieve the famine in the country. The US military accomplished that task and more. By February 1993, the famine was overcome. The UN was supposed to take over the operation, however, "the UN did not know it was on the team." In May 1993, the decision was made to disarm the locals. However, Somalia is a country of hunters who rely on guns for their food and self protection. In addition, the fact that the SOFs were to be engaged in Somalia was kept so quiet that when they ran into problems, there was no one there to provide them with assistance. The lesson from this experience is that there must be very clear policy before there is military action.

#### Views on Preparing the Final Report

During an earlier luncheon with the Secretary of Defense and some of the 9-11 Commissioners, Pace was asked to give his thoughts on what would be useful in preparing the final report. During the interview, Pace noted several issues to remember when preparing the final 9-11 report.

1. When analyzing facts, look at the environment that existed at the time (pre 9-11) and the perspective of the policy makers at the time. Evaluate the actions taken and decisions made in that light. The question to ask is whether the actions and decisions made sense at that time.
2. One should ask oneself the following: if the policy makers knew then what we know now, what would they have done differently?
3. Finally, the report should include an analysis of what organizational changes are required for the future.

Pace also noted the inherent dilemma in the USG taking positive steps towards the eradication of terrorism on a global scale. The more successful the US is in its CT efforts in the short run, the more comfortable the public will be and hence, the less the public will realize the US is still at war. The public will also be less willing to sacrifice the resources of the nation that must be sacrificed in the GWOT. The public must realize that the GWOT will be with the U.S. for a long time.

#### Who in the US Government is in Charge of the Hunt for UBL?

Generally, each U.S. Department head should feel responsible for doing what he or she can do to find Usama bin Laden. They should all share that responsibility and dedicate as much energy as possible to that effort. However, there is no named individual in the USG who has that as his or her sole responsibility.

While the US has found Saddam Hussein, UBL still remains at large. While many have argued there should have been boots on the ground pre 9-11, there must be an understanding that it was simply too difficult to undertake that task at that time. The US had no intelligence that would help the US locate UBL's whereabouts in Afghanistan. HUMINT was needed. Today, even with 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, we have not yet found UBL. Locating UBL requires an ability to determine where the targets are scurrying in the network. One very good intelligence lead can be followed up with another lead, but that initial lead is required.

### A Terrorism Czar

After giving it serious thought, Pace stated that it might be useful to have one person that is responsible to the President or to the Principals for the GWOT. Tenet may be the person to take on that monumental task because the USG relies on the capabilities of the CIA to locate UBL. At this point, there is no mechanism for Tenet, for example, to go to Treasury and coordinate the activities of the two agencies. Other than close collaboration among these individuals, there is no national coordination of the elements of national power in CT efforts.

### The GWOT: A New Kind of War

Pace noted that the GWOT is a difficult war for people to comprehend. In this war, bombs are not dropping regularly on the U.S. or on U.S. interests overseas. There are no clear indications of war that people can point to on a regular basis. In addition, while the GWOT is a global war, the U.S. does not have freedom to go anywhere in the world it must to hunt terrorists. It is not like WWII when there was freedom to attack the enemy in the many parts of the world. Today there is no global battlefield.

### Draining the Swamp

While the military and the CIA can continue their missions to find and go after terrorist targets, it is also important to drain the swamp. The U.S. must engage in a battle of ideas through persuasion and education of young minds. This is a "war of ideas" and the U.S. is only beginning to realize the magnitude of the task. However, the formula for winning this type of war has remained elusive. It is important that other governments, like Saudi Arabia, understand the need to engage in the war of ideas. The Saudi government was awakened to this need after the May 12 attack on its homeland and today it is taking action to address this problem. The U.S. can work to help them with this task, but not simply through dollars. However, this is not really a U.S. military function.

### Recommendations

Pace concluded the interview with four recommendations for the Commission:

1. Intelligence, intelligence, intelligence. There must be an integration and fusion of intelligence both in the United States and with other countries;
2. HUMINT must be improved;
3. The U.S. must increase its ability to understand and identify the terrorist nodes. The U.S. must respond in a timely manner to intelligence so as to make a difference in capturing and eliminating the terrorists;
4. The entire realm of technology must be improved to assist in tracking the terrorists. However, the US should not become enamored with technology. The analysis of information by individuals is still going to make the crucial difference in the quality of intelligence that can be provided to the warfighter.