

MFR 030/0866

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: John Pugrud, Director of Security Services Directorate, PFPA

Type of event: Interview

Date: October 24, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

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Team Number: 8

Location: PFPA, Pentagon

Participants - Non-Commission: John Pugrud; Paul Embroski (Special Asst. US Attorney)

Participants - Commission: Kevin Shaeffer; Mark Bittinger

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1. John Pugrud's Background: He joined DPS in 1997 and was Deputy Chief of DPS on 9/11; prior assignments included the Joint Staff Security Office and a 24-year career in the USAF.

2. Increasing Importance of the Defense Protective Service (DPS): "On November 13, 1997, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, which assists the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in performing vulnerability assessments of DoD installations worldwide, issued a classified report on its vulnerability assessment at the Pentagon, 'Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) The Pentagon 10-24 October, 1997.' This assessment focused on elements that directly related to combating terrorism, including terrorist act prevention and limiting mass casualties should deterrence fail. It was conducted by a team that included a structural engineer, an infrastructure engineer, a terrorist options specialist, and five physical security specialists." (DODIG Evaluation of the Defense Protective Service, Report Number 9950006F, May 14, 1999).

Over the next three years, this JSIVA and the concern of SECDEF Cohen and DEPSECDEF Hamre brought about various security changes. One prime example was Dr. Hamre mandating that everyone must display a valid Pentagon Building Pass, or Visitor Pass when inside the Pentagon – that the pass must be worn above the waist and should be clearly visible at all times.

A side note on evacuations: In August 2001, just two weeks prior to the 9/11 attack, approximately 25% of the building was evacuated because of a small fire in the kitchen's laundry room. DPS assisted in the evacuation.

3. Establishing a Joint Operations Center (JOC): When an incident is large enough, a JOC may be established off site to facilitate communications with and across multiple government agencies. A motivating factor in setting up a JOC at Fort Myer was the possibility of a second attack. At 0500 on 9/12 the JOC was still being set up. 12-hour shifts were instituted. Pugrud maintained communications with Chief Jester via a cell phone. In "an incident of that magnitude

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it is very much needed." It served a "filtering" function. Chief Plaughter and Christopher Combs, SSA, FBI, WFO, WMD Operations Unit were in charge at the JOC. Pugrud, DPS was an adviser. MG James T. Jackson, commanding general of the US Army Military District of Washington did a good job.

Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Directorate, PFPA, gathered intelligence. PFPA was getting intel from everywhere. "The wall of the fiefdoms are a lot lower these days."

4. Exercises: "Gallant Fox," on July 24, 2003, was a recent chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear exercise held at the Pentagon. See article for more info
http://www.dcmilitary.com/airforce/beam/8_30/features/24463-1.html

5. Rationale for PFPA: On May 9, 2002, DoD announced the establishment of PFPA to provide an improved force protection structure and response capability at the Pentagon and in the national capital region.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/b05092002_bt241-02.html.

PFPA was envisioned to meet DoD's Force Protection Standards based on threat management, anti-terrorism training and vulnerability assessments. It would also provide chemical/biological/radiological protection through a monitoring program, a response team and training. It would provide sufficient manpower for day-to-day demands and emergencies because functional requirements had increased before 9/11 and major security posts increased after 9/11. There was a growing need for additional personnel to respond to major emergencies and to have an institutional permanent workforce dedicated to force protection. PFPA would be a single organization with high visibility within DoD, report to senior DoD officials and be properly resourced.

By becoming an "agency" DPS was able to break the manpower cap/personnel ceiling it was constrained by. PFPA is comprised of the following directorates: Director's Office; Program Integration; Pentagon Police; Information Technology; Criminal Investigation and Internal Affairs; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear; Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection; Security Services.

In terms of gun-carrying officers DPS had 270, PFPA will have an authorized strength of 550. The Security Services Directorate increased from 45 personnel to 95 personnel, some of whom are involved in ongoing camera and alarm installation. The Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Directorate is feeding information to the rest of PFPA and is soliciting current information from Arlington County and the FBI and is staffing active counter-surveillance teams around the Pentagon.