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Principal Ass't Sec for Homeland Defense now.

On Sept 11, I was Deputy Undersec for Policy Integration. In the immediate aftermath, I was in London at the time, I got back early afternoon on the 12th, and immediately following worked on crisis mgmt team working issue of response to civil authorities. Doug Feith was the Undersec at the time. As the rest of the gov't got organizaed about how we were to handle various issues, I rep OSD policy at various mtgs, and with Ridge when he appointed. So I was at the NSC mtgs, either the plus one or principal, depending on what going on. You found Steve Hadley, who was deputy for national security affairs, chairing mtgs now at HSC. Did this until Jan 2002.

In re to the borders, the issue of national guard at airports was first. At the WH that was discussed in chief of staff office. Don't recall who proposed it. Looking to increase seacurity at airports and under what authorities and who whould pay for them. Under authority of governor of states or under federal authority? That has implications as to what they could do: state guard under state law; federal authority made under posse comitatus; state by state money, fed by fed, or state by fed money (title 32 of code). Pentagon ended up deploying under state authority for a fed purpose under title 32. Usually used for training type activities, but as determined by legal counsel, "other activities" permitted security for airports. This way still under control of governors. Natioanl guard authority differed from providing presence at passenger screening to checking cars coming in and out of airports. Initial concept was to increase passenger safety perception during transition from private to public screening and thus an increase local law enforcement presence. Money came out of defense approps of some kind, a supplemental. We all recognized the need. The national guard deployment lasted - I don't recall. I'm sure this was a memorialization of the decision- no memos prepared; had to be a set of orders done. No options memos that I prepared on this topic. Person I worked with most was general Ward, a two star general, on the joint staff. From our perspective, this evolved very quickly, and by time I got involved, was within the first few days deployed. NO discussions with INS or DOJ re this decision.

The next issue at the borders was in fact the issue of augmentation of BP and INS on the Canadian border and their desire to have national guard, when Michigan gov provided Natioanl Guard to Windsor Bridge border processing. That was done without the knowledge of DOD, b/w Gov and INS/Customs. That moved into a broader discussion of augmentation. Initially I rec'd a phone call from Comm'r Bonner, around mid Jan. Frank Libutti was a special ass't, Sec. of Army was exec agency for homeland security. White already had the Exec Agent for Support for Civil Authority- delegation of authroty fromt eh secretary. White was also the homeland security agent. His initial person was Libutti. I took that over from Frank when he left. Position description available. :-to look at how dept ought to organized for homeland security and support other agencies and interagency processes.

We worked issue on numbers of people involved, we elected to deal with it on a total forces bases. Debate centered on "proper role for military" and desire to maintain a civilian character to borders. There were discussions with Sec White on these issues. Office of HS wanted it, and Bonner and Ziglar really wanted. Premised on a short term agreement that was then extended. Clearly function being augmented by a federal authority, enforcing federal law, and so it was determined soldiers should be in activity duty Title 10 service in operational detail to gaining agencies. MOU of Feb. 2002 and issue as to who pays and INS/Customs Economy act reimbursable so they paid. Within MOU, we were responsible for professionalism, but INS/Customs for the actual detail and security. Customs, especially, were trying to hire new persons, and needed help until up and running. Couple of issues on extensions of periods of time when INS/Customs couldn't meet their deadlines. Many were doing just stevedore functions, and thus no arms needed. Under Title 32, still today in NY and Penn Station under state active duty under prerogative of governor. All this time, TSA paying more for air marshals and BP leaving for this reason. From our perspective, carried out in a professional manner. We don't know we did an assessment that said we made a difference; INS/Customs were appreciative of the help. But I don't think this is an effective use of soldiers. The answer is resourcing the civilian agencies to do the work they need to do. What we can do is only a temporary fix. I don't need we need any less resources today than they did on Sept 12.

Didn't have anything to do with our external response to terrorism abroad, but was focuses don the then emerging office of homeland security being set up. Decision-making on NORTHCOM discussion predated 9/11- came out of quadrangle security review- the effective date of NORTHCOM was 1 Oct 2002. Full operational Oct 2003. So we were working with Colorado Springs to get that up and running.

Relationship of Colorado Springs endeavor and enforcement at the borders:- there was no relationship. There is a mission stmt that says NORTHCOM commander is responsible for defending and defeating threats v. US and threats against civil authority. There is a distinction made as to law enforcement activities and military activities. Border is considered law enforcement, not a militarized border. Security rests with civilian law enforcement agency. We can deal with hostile aircraft, or armed forces from another state, but not with small groups of individuals. Our govt has made decision that law enforcement will deal with small bands of potential terrorists. Working on terms of reference centered around Joint Civil Support from Norfolk was nucleus to bring together Colorado Springs. I was informed on standing up issues. Mostly done in forces office and strategy office.

Response to Ashcroft letter. Probably response crafted by homeland security task force and Libutti.

We loaned a Predator to DHS for them to run a couple of tests to serve for efficacy of running for surveillance of border. One of the ways we try to approach is make relevant DOD tech available to other agencies that can help them. Tech Security Working Group is run out of SOLIC and is an interagency group. My office focuses on Tech as well.

There is a reqmt in this authorization that we make state/local tech available. We do the DOD interaction with DHS. We're focused on looking at wh DOD can help DHS:- ground sensors and UAVs. Will look for \$s needed for this. Idea is to leverage what R&D investments we need and then provide it available to DHS. We haven't rec'd any requests yet for the UAVs, but heard the tests were successful.

Most of the laws say we can't do this again if will cost the military its resources.

Any surveillance equipment is relevant as is personal protective equipment. We also do testing.

Homeland Defense and us are consumers of intel, but that's Cambone, not us. We get support from DIA through the JTTF and warnings and tactical threats relating to gen intel, and threats at home and to our troops.

The threat now. Capability for Al Qaida is there but not as high, intent as well. I'd say we're at high, but it is very difficult to quantify the threat when you can't see it.

We have plans in place on how we respond to certain types of CT occurrences. Plan in place for a land defense of the US:- when capability of law enforcement overwhelmed and military has unique abilities to make a difference.

DHS interaction. We are principal POC with DHS. I have that as my jprimary responsibility. I deal formally with Interagency Management Group. We have a liaison coordination place at DHS and we have a DOD on their Watch Floor. I spend a lot of time on holiday issues. At BTS, dealing with aviation security on iding particular flights there may be problems with. What we are doing in air defense intersects with air flight: they do securing the flight, we do the air craft as weapon.

S&T. A lot of research in chem./bio area

IAIP on infrastructure protection. On IA, b/c their operations center is under IA under Gen Broderick work for Libutti and Pat Hughes who is ass't sec for analysis, as a consumer of threat info. Our office also does MOU on DOD personnel who will work over there. Right now about 100 personnel. Over long term, 65 details. Rumsfeld wants to grow out of that.

Doesn't know about high seas Al Qaida ships being apprehended on the high seas.

"Defense in depth" concept: dealing at foreign ports, track vessels, we are getting a lot of information shared on maritime intel, with Coast Guard participation as well.

NORTHCOM have naval vessels that are designated to be assigned if they have a mission requirement for them. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments are often on Naval vessels and they deal with travel documents and have authority in waters and vessels bound for the US.

Priorities:

1. defend the homeland
2. consequence mgmt in event of issues
3. special events like G8 summit
4. Republican and Democratic Conventions.
5. UN General Assembly.
6. Maritime domain
7. northcom has necessary resources need. We don't do budget, but we advocate it.

Talk to Libutti about what going on in fall of 2001, and intel Dr. Cambone. We work with Carol Hove, who is undersecretary to Cambone.