

Commission Sensitive

(R)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of Mary Ann Wyrsh

Deputy Commissioner INS March 1998-Oct. 2000

Acting Commissioner INS Nov. 2000-March 2001

Date: Friday, October 10, 2003

Special Access Issues: [none]

Prepared by: Notes taken by Geoffery Brown Oct. 10, 2003

MFR prepared by Janice Kephart-Roberts on Oct. 20, 2003

Team Number: 5 (Border Security)

Location: NY Commission office

Participants - Non-Commission: Mary Ann Wyrsh

Participants - Commission: Janice Kephart-Roberts
Tom Eldridge

Note: no classification required

Documents received: none

Documents requested at interview under pending document request:

Recording:

NOTES:

Introduction of the Commission to Wyrsh (MW), and intro of border security team

Interviewee. Mary Ann Wyrsh

Background.

- How did you come by your job at INS ? Left federal gov't in 2001 after 34 yrs. Started in poverty program in 1966, since 1971 in department of labor of 27 yrs. Was dir of office of budget for 8 years, then dir of unemployment ins. Program (federal state program). 1997 Chief of operations for employment and training administration. At INS in Deputy and Acting Commissioner positions 1998 march 1st , left march 30th 2001 at UN deputy high commissioner for refugees

chris sale (deputy commissioner of ins prior to MW). MW was recommended to Doris M by an acting deputy at dept of labor (Cynthia Metlzer).

- what did Meissner tell you your job would entail?

Described it as the classic deputy dealing with budget personnel, had policy office with Bob Bach (now perhaps at Rockefeller center), so not as involved in policy.

Doris Meissner appointed by president, senate confirmed. She had a political schedule C assistant, Bob Bach's position was political schedule C. Public information officer was. There may have been one other that was a political officer. The other may have been the congressional liaison.

SES ES6 Position. INS was politicized in 1980s. Made the deputy career and took out the political appointees so it would be run by career officers instead. Since she was in the SES since 1969 it was as simple as being transferred from one agency to another.

Meissner described MW's policy role as INS having an amazing infusion of resources that would have to be both managed and justified. So good relations needed to be kept with Steve Colgate of DoJ. Had to meet with Dir of INS Management, and the Chief of Staff. Meissner wanted the agency to be good stewards of the resources it had received.

It was clear that Bach was in charge of policy. MW had no background in immigration policy.

Gain in resources: Early on in Clinton Admin was a very large crime bill with a heavy infusion of \$\$ that got by with budget caps. INS was the recipient of some of that because of border security. Plussing up of border security, especially across San Diego and El Paso. People were extremely concerned about petty crime in their neighborhoods. So a lot of resources went to Ident System and border patrol plussing up. Received a great deal of technology money. People began to think about detention systems, attempt to upgrade POE systems, robust systems at certain points of entry. Lots of excess to central databases. TECS system.

Impression of challenges at INS: Was told by Steve Colgate that INS had a "bad kid on the block" image. Ungovernable. MW came to think of that attitude as galling, INS could never shed its image. Had just had an issue with Citizenship USA. INS seemed hopeless, and that is how it was portrayed. But George Bolinger portrayed it as having challenges but that the citizenship had been taken out and placed under a Bob Brat (DoJ). Sent by the department, that part of the INS was in temporary receivership by the DoJ. The day MW got to the job this Bob Bratt had to leave. He ran into difficulties with a trip to Russia.

So the citizenship part was in receivership of a sort. It was fraught with some issues, but MW had been "done" with stint at labor, and INS looked like the right place to go for an interesting last job for the federal government.

Inside INS she worked with the Chief of Staff, with Jeff Weber (budget office first) then the next budget officer (Bob Gardner), George Bolinger (head of management). Worked heavily with IT and finance personell. At the DoJ worked with Steve Colgate (assistant AG for management), Adrian Curtiss, Janice ____, Bob Deggleman. Deggleman had brought in PriceWaterhouseCoopers to do an oversight. DoJ had a parental, judgmental attitude towards INS. Colgate was a big proponent of heavy oversight.

In early days went to a briefing with Bob Deggleman and PWC. The barrated the performance of the INS. It was not pleasant. Asked Colgate why the lecture on INS. IT had to do with implementation of a datasystem for citizenship. It was the new technology that was for citizenship. INS was not doing very well with it. MW complained to Colgate on the treatment and wanted to get to a more constructive relationship. SO Colgate lent INS BJ Vaughn to work with technology. She worked in the citizenship office with Bill Yates.

Another example would be a budget meeting in which someone is extremely uncivil, they were like this in public meetings. Sometimes they would work with her on solutions, but MW was told not to confront AttGen by Colgate.

From three years away DoJ did help with citizenship. They did listen to budget recommendations at the staff level, but that is very political. MW found it an extremely negative culture. Mostly this was the relationship with the DoJ, not necessarily the feelings within INS.

Liaisons on INS with DoJ: The chain that was helpful were those around the Deputy Attorney General office, especially on domestic polity over citizenship and immigration numbers. The voices from areas of high citizenship backlogs were very hard, and on all types – James Costello, Jon Morten, Kevin Olsen to a small extent but he was more management. Brad ----. DAG office interested in serving both AG and DAG. AG was very hands on. She would have weekly meetings and reports. Had many interests. She focused mostly on citizenship and back logs and so on, but also on detention, on reforming detention, southwest border, hiring agents (border patrol), Hiring figures on inspectors. Not much on internal inspections. Needed to have targeted inforcement. Needed to find patterns in immigration law violations. Didn't want to embarrassing raids. Was a specific florist shop in florida where INS was accused of using hard handed techniques, and thus would be accused by human rights organizations.

At White House Maria Estevezsa.

- what were the high priorities at the time you became Deputy Commissioner in early 1998?
- Who did Commissioner and Deputy answer to on a day to day basis?

Information avenues and intelligence.

- What role, if any, did you see for the INS in counterterrorism?

Never had issues on counterterrorism. Was in meetings on the Sammy Al Arian case (gentleman in florida). AG wanted to detain and/or deport. And MW was in meetings on those special interest occasions.

INS Title 8, counterterrorism: AG never expressed much interest in pushing it further. Unit in the Gneral Counsels office (Laura Baxster) that would work on Special Cases.

INS had counterterrorism task force (JTTF) agents.

Law enforcement aspects of INS job: Wasn't experienced, so would ask a lot of questions. Never felt inadequate. Some of the work on that type of issue was common sense, after MW would receive the background brief on an issue.

She was upfront that she wasn't part of the law enforcement background but she was comfortable in her position.

Work site enforcement, and other site of enforcement there are large differences. And its different then counterterrorism.

Sense of way it operated: Assumption was that the people on the JTTFs were there as an immigration arm that assisted. Never got into the operations, Mike Piersons, Ken Elwood or the head of investigations at INS would have had more to do with these investigations than MW.

They participated in these JTTFs at a secret level, so the information never really met the management department.

She remembers one of the INS JTTF force, disrupt operations with smugglers had a good amount of real time data. INS agents thought this individual could be apprehended, and worked across the administration to receive the intelligence and pinpoint someone, but State Department didn't let that happen.

MW remembers a meeting with Richard Clarke sometime in late 1991 over the Student Visas Program (CIPIRES). The question was if you would start to report on/tracking if a person changes major, etc. Did Clarke want to expand the program? It had to do with a certain requirement. Clarke said he wanted the system up faster. MW had the impression that Clarke had some intelligence that "things" were happening. No other meetings with Clarke. Remembers in hindsight and in aftermath that the possible threat of te

Remembers having a briefing on sleeper cells in 2000. It was during discussions on Sammy _____. There were people that the FBI and INS wanted to deport but wanted to keep watching.

Pre 9/11 were worried that people up on minor immigration charges were just waiting to conduct attacks.

MW remembers discussions trying to deport or arrest or leave these suspects. Counter terrorism INS agents seemed to aware of dangers, but MW never sat in a meeting were there was specifics discussed.

What reactions came from meeting with Clarke? MW said that they were working on the data system, and Clarke wanted other datafields provided for CiPres system. Clarke was

concerned. MW does not remember what he was trying to do. These discussions took place within larger domestic policy discussions (that the White House partook in).

INS was actively working on the system but there were certain discussions regarding suspects course selection.

Was worried about the educational lobbies. Clarke believed a lot more information on foreign students needed scrutinized.

Meetings with Jackie Benars. MW could see CiPres was being designed and put together not from technical people/ And the city always wanted to know what kind of fees could be used.

Orin B would get some money loaned to keep developing CiPres. Weren't sure what its acceptance and fees would do to the education community.

People in congressional office headed up to hill trying to convince the education lobby not to undo the bill, That it wouldn't hurt the schools, etc.

In the end this was attempted in the committee, and it was lost in the vote.

Something they needed in strict congressional language that was being worked. Jackie Bedners would know about it. When MW left IN it was just being tested.

Been suggested that INS caved to education lobby on CiPress: It should have been in the hands of the right people to work on. Didn't have a good plan on how the technology would work. The implementation of the fee scheme was shown to MW.

MW does believe the education lobby "did us in". Appropriations.

Letters from congressional leaders repealing Cypres resulted on some of it ending up "on life support). They were working with Kennedy, and the personell in the commission. You had to continue working with the education lobby.

Remember thinking to self after 9/11 hijackers were established as students thought that "they could never do that again." MW did not "take on" the educational lobby.

Impression of disconnect with CiPres push? Ask Jackie.

Decisions about particular form for the proposal for the fee: Talked a lot about if the fee would be paid abroad or after the fact. Lots of discussions that if they paid after they got in country, there would be no incentive. Thought international banks could be brought in to participate with paying beforehand.

Commission staff informed MW that the result was for students to pay directly to the schools. Eventually proposals that were rejected was that if the student didn't pay they were loose their visa status.

MW and INS were worried that the students, after started classes, had no incentive to pay, wouldn't pay, the system would loose the students, and the schools did not want to be tasked with a policing role over INS issues. Schools didn't want students deported after term began.

COUNTERTERRORISM

- Did you receive regular intelligence briefings? NO.

The Commissioner may have received regular intelligence briefings. Cliff Landsman was one of the intel officers she would occasionally speak with. The Head of Operations Mike Pierson, and then the huge interior enforcemtn and the inspectations and so on would deal much more with constant intel. Especially the border patrol. Thinks the system was decentralized but MW never had role. Did occasionally receive briefings on people who were naturalized for intelligence reasons. All was Top Secret on individual basis that she would sign off on.

Mike Pierson had an eight oclock intel warning meeting in the morning. Could be ship tracking, Mexican border issues, etc. But MW wasn't involved on it.

After 9/11 MW doesn't believe it would change her need for an intel brief but would have liked more assurance that someone was robustly monitoring intel for INS matters.

MW never heard of UBL as deputy commission except for Sammy ___.

After she became the acting commissioner she became aware of a concern over how big the terrorist cell threat could be. MW remembers meetings with the FBI and the Attroeny General. She remembers that INS was frustrated with their position with FBI. INS couldn't get enough information. Didn't know if they should deport or detain certain suspected terrorist groups. FBI was not forthcoming with INS personnel that were dealing with security issues. MW remembers these issues for about two years.

DoJ at top was just as frustrated with the FBI. Meetings trying to decide what to do with "Sammy ___, his brother in law and another guy in Jersey." People wanted perfect information. The AG wanted the "smoking gun".

MW stated that she just remembers being in these meetings and partaking in these discussions. But the discussion dealt mostly on if there was enough act (AG).

Secret Evidence discussions on "IN Camera" sessions that judges wouldn't support. From the top of the justice department the message on what was there wouldn't be enough would be coming from AG advisors (James Costello, AG herself).

MW doesn't remember if it was worry over offending Islamist community.

MW did sometimes receive briefings from NSU and Dan Cadman. Dan was one who wanted to pick up "that guy in Houston". TBCS (Tim Reynolds) in justice ____

Cadman would sometimes come and initiate some informal discussions on his work, but he would mostly deal with Pierson's office. Remember Dan be frustrated and wanting more resources for JTTF. INS figured if FBI thought JTTF needed more resources the FBI could provide it.

MW believes in one or two budget cycles may have plussed up Cadman's JTTF or national security unit people.

MW stated that people may not have realized how important filling Cadman's request was.

Remembers discussions with Mike Cronin on how to protect the northern border. Theory was it would be protected by good intelligence. Better cooperation with Canadians, plus up the people working on intel on northern border. But didn't translate into resources.

Didn't plus up INS intel. Cliff Landsman acted in job almost whole time MW was there. Head on intel had left, Cliff was acting and stayed acting the whole time. Under Operations section of INS is the Intelligence section. MW doesn't remember George Regan. MW didn't have the ability to make Cliff "head of intel". MW thought it was important to have a full position instead of acting (2020 hindsight).

FBI would have gone to Mike Pierson for more assistance on JTTF. INS had a liaison at the operations level with CIA, and that would go through Pierson as well.

UBL 1998 fatwah - not aware of.

39 and INS responsibility for terrorism never brought to MW's attention. She would see the operations side of that. Would hear of people trying to get into country, aware of successful lookouts, and for turning around of people.

Tipoffs and lookouts. Terrorists coming from a visa waver country? Would remember times would someone would be taken off a plane when it got in country.

Not aware of INS naturalization of those involved in the Kenya bombings.

Not much of an attempt for MW to be aware of how terrorists had used the INS system.

Bock and Pierson would have been responsibility for terrorism policy if there was that role.

Most of the pressure from the white house would be involved on human rights watch reports at detention centers. From domestic policy side not much on terrorism. But Pierson and Cliff and Dan may have been in meetings on terrorism.

Fraud Issues: had to do in benefits area where INS wanted to make sure that identities of people was checked and they weren't doing something wrong regarding their applications or inside investigations on the benefit offices. "Hot dog vendor" outside Newark. Instances when people inside own offices were corrupt. But most fraud through clamaints.

Strategy on how to counteract fraud nothing agency wide. Mostly those reports would come through the document lab or through inspectors on passports stolen or lost stamps. Warning reporting.

Photo supstition, flase stamps, use of benefits other than students, extension of students, asylum, marriage fraud – MW had never heard the concept of terrorism directly associated with what she heard of these cases. Lots of emphasis on smuggling systems. Document label would report on alerts. Really never heard "be careful about terrorists using" these fraud methods. Mostly would be for benefit of individuals. But "Dan and those guys" may have done that in conjunction with other offices.

MW thinks Mike Pierson should be asked on this.

Case of three of four pilots receiving wavers because of applications pending. Standard operating procedure for INS. What was done as deputy commissioner? MW spent a lot of time on citizenship benefits. Worked with Bill Yates and "Fuji" to pick out people who could do a large amount of processing. LA was a huge issue in terms of back logs. Miami, NY – focused on big cities and systems would be worked out to get service levels up. By focusing on citizenship causes huge back log on adjustment of status processing. Adjustment of status doubled in one year. Citizenship wasn't necessarily pressure from White House. People were extremely frustrated. Customer service. Throwing people into citizenship to be voters wasn't part of it. It was customer service oriented. At the same time INS was moving a new data system in. They were taking care of the easiest applications first. Had deal with FBI that it would turn around. Was some issue with the CIA. MW did have some attention on judication happening without CIA finishing its background. Bill Yates and Cadman did meet with CIA on these application matters.

Interest in biometrics with inspection and judication process: MW – there was an interest that went across a whole range. MW got involved immediately on border crossing cards. Produced those cards without so many flaws. The tracking of these things was extensive. Were making state dept. cards too. Fingerprint data on the info stripe on the back on these cards. But answer on how the cards would be read had not come through. And when MW left there were no readers or scanners on the borders. INS makes

these cards and they aren't read. Bordercards were produced without a business plan on producing the entire system. OMB did not like the expense of making the card. OMB contact was Steve ___ and David ___. They thought a different card should be used. So the INS did a business case for the card but never did that for the border crossing card or the green card. OMB said that would take billions of dollars in readers so the loop of the system never was completed. Should have had a closed circuit.

MW believes most people thought Section 110 would be killed. Entry exit program would be dropped in that regard, and was a separate issue. Right before her entry in INS was an issue on who would be in charge of policy. Offices like border control, investigation, detention were under operations. Wasn't just stovepiping it was two people having the same jobs. Bob Bock in charge of policy and programs. Doors and analyzers of doors in the same place. Mike Pierson had an op office with op inspection unit, op intel, border patrol, enforcement. And Bob Bock had Mike Cronin, inspect policy, detention policy. A month before she arrived it had been separated by Doris. All the tasks were worked across lines. Detention was not working in the policy area so the whole detention office was set up under Pierson. Under that regard entry/exit was more policy, not program, so he had his inspectors doing tests on cards. MW felt it was more complicated than their testing scenarios. MW had the impression that the border special commercial interest entities would kill the entry exit program.

MW in charge of goals and objectives and IT and such. They categorized the IT efforts and that entry/exit group would come report to MW. MW would tell them not to promise they could accomplish their goals when they couldn't.

Automated I94 with Mike Cronin's group was the same scenario. MW would see that the program was being kept alive but that it wasn't fleshed out or working. She wanted these initiatives put into law. Trying to convince airlines that the program was good. Got USAIR coming into Philadelphia to do it. But that was all. MW wanted them to try and get that mandated, but it never happened.

The citizenship benefits system was a success, as far as MW is concerned. Bob Bock's was the policy end of these initiatives. MW wasn't satisfied with that. MW was skeptical, but only saw these initiatives episodically.

Shouldn't be fooled by the CiPress program. Testing a system, a prototype card that worked, but when assessed as to it going nationwide, how it would work, how info would be crossed between agencies and organizations, that technology was abandoned. Another CiPress project was set up under someone else than Morry. Morry didn't have a good plan. He would talk a lot on what was going to happen, but didn't have the underlying requirements down. MW couldn't see where it was going.

Civil liberty issue concerns on tracking foreign students? The one they had was web enabled, and they had the security of it set in. MW didn't express concerns on civil liberties and CiPres. If scratched underneath Morry's design, there wasn't any implementable substance, in a technical sense. Morry was taken off the project, and a

task force of IT shop INS people had a plan. They were on their way to an initial deployment. MW doesn't recall a goal date for national deployment.

Refugees process: Global terrorism has had a negative effect of refugee process. In Geneva MW has asked people what the processes are that stopped the refugee process. Perhaps large ports of admission. Refugee resettlement units have people "backed up" in a number of countries. Can't move people forward in certain areas of the world. Not entirely aware of what the block is. Spoken to Kelly Ryan of the State Department. Delay and no answer hold refugees up. MW does not interact with federal gov't refugee clearance agencies. Does not interact with FBI/CIA. Interacts with State Dept. DHS has a role and MW acts with them through "circuit riders". For refugee processing areas DHS would send its people to foreign areas to do the INS part of refugee work (Nairobi, Bangkok, etc.). There will be a refugee core within DHS. BCIS Joe Cuttingly they may work with (Joe acting head of international operations). PRM people have told MW working with DHS on backlogs.

MW knows that the FBI has access to check on some refugee issues in Bosnia. FBI wants records on refugee applications. On people that may already be in the US. That is MW's assumption. She works with the lawyers who work on these issues. She's cleared the FBI to receive access to what they're looking into.

MW hasn't had any conversations over negative repercussions of slow down in refugee processing on US image abroad. Thought is that this is a "blip". Part of it is on the UNHCR and other agencies (NGOs) slow down on checking people.

Terry Rush in PRM. Cathleen Thomson who works for Joe Cuttingly (Cuttyhe). Philis Coven (UNHCR), on loan from Cuttingly's unit.

For a long time there was a standard grouping of Russians, CIS, Vietnamese peoples in "refugee pot". Then there were the Bosnians and the Serbs. But now it is a more diffuse group. The question is "what is the logical group for resettlement?"

Biggest refugee hosting country is Tanzania. Question is for which subset is the durable solution resettlement. The first solution is return and repatriation. Which group gets resettled? That's easy for certain subgroups in Russia or Vietnam. It's harder with people from failed states.

Liberian camp. All come into the "Zone of Reception" in Cote d'Ivoire. Xenophobia started. Question now is without Taylor now, and some of them being combatants. There are some rules considering refugees. It isn't attributable in a whole to actions but the current administration.

MW believes US is looking for a great deal amount more of information of refugees.

Sense is that the US government is working with UNHCR and refugee coordinators to identify groups and to admit refugees. Optimistic.

Tripartite consultations in Geneva with all state departments that take in refugees that talk on how to work bringing in a greater capacity for refugees.

MW does receive intel on failed states and location of camps as rest areas for combatants. Militarization of camps. US gov will say a camp is too militarized, and UNHCR is involved in moving them. But MW only once received intel on a problem in one office in one country, and UNHCR cooperated. But MW doesn't receive any active intel.

MW suggests commission staff speak with Paul Rosenberg, or Glen Norton on the student visa system.

If was acting commissioner at INS? MW – made a lot of progress on IT improvement. If could have would have gotten some of the uncertainty that prevailed between policy and operations roles rationalized. People did not know what their jobs were. That was a flaw. It gets into people working on projects without a full plan.

Bob Bock reported through her, but she did not have much ability to dictate his operations.

DHS and INS reorganization: MW thinks it happened too fast. The one immigration act benefits and enforcement. Those two meet at certain levels, so if you separated them, there wouldn't be that much interaction. Possible that enforcement could get out of control if not working in conjunction with benefits. They are symbiotic, not separate entities. There was a thought that the inspectors were always the people that were law enforcement but also facilitation. The question would be if they're totally over in law enforcement, and they used to do a lot of benefit work, and in their off time they were doing student work. They met the public in a whole range of ways. What happens to that function and bent of mind if they're only in enforcement? So MW thinks that symbiosis is lost.

Criticism that INS focused too much on benefits side? MW – we were doing a lot on smuggling enforcement. Investigators did get additional systems to do strategic enforcement. Broke up smuggling rings on Tysons Foods and Dunkin Doughnuts. That was very good work. Some of the work site enforcement stuff wasn't only Clinton Admin, it was tight economy – if you took not too much effort get a lot of stuff. Iowa Beef Packers example. We had some plants to do an industry. We knew in central US slaughterhouses are employing illegals. How to have a deterrent effect? Fell a foul of some of that. Bipartisan thought INS was being too hard. INS needed to be more aware of complexities. Think AG was interested in enforcement. They wanted enforcement to be more thoughtful – strategic – only have 5 to 6 thousand investigators. What can be done to diminish the illegals. That's where the interior enforcement strategy came about. MW recollects they had five areas of concern and depending on your location that you would pick and choose from those priorities and construct own field enforcement plan on how to enforce. Bock and Pierson were responsible. Investigators and that particular enforcement

act was the most independent minded. So a national strategy didn't really take. They were independent and thought they knew what they were doing in their own priorities. Innovated and independent. MW thought the investigators – until you got Joe Green in there – you would shudder when you found out what they were up to. They weren't thinking through how it looked. MW – what did they gain from these raids? Need to develop systemic thinking. In different districts and regions they would have meetings to discuss issues. Would identify corridors and regions for entry and employment of illegals. Needed to have ID cards, communication with employers – basically you get some enforcement from non-aggressive routes. There were regional meetings to share cooperative ways to achieve compliance. For examples of the effects of these initiatives you would have to ask Jonny Williams or ---- Blackman.

POEs – Some of those on the southwest border were doing terrific things.

Commission staff requested agency papers on refugee issues, for MW contacts towards those papers. **Robert Mocmay – mentioned at the end as a contact.**

- How often?
- What was included?
- What was your knowledge of Islamic fundamentalism and UBL?
- Who from *within the INS*?
 - Intel. Unit (George Regan, Cliff Landsman)
 - NSU
 - Lookout Unit
 - Counsel's Office on special interest cases
 - The field
 - JTTF detailees or CIA detailees
 - Headquarters Operations Center.

Please explain the roles of each of these units within the INS.

- Who did you receive intelligence from *outside the INS*?
 - DOJ DAG or Jim Reynolds Office
 - FBI
 - CIA
 - NSC or Dick Clarke
 - Ever any meetings at NSC or with Dick Clarke ? requests for assistance?
 - Ever any meetings with Freeh or Mueller or other FBI persons requesting assistance?
 - The CIA?

Was the DOJ, FBI, CIA, White House supportive of INS in CT?

- Did you ever seek more intelligence? How did you view your relationship with the intelligence community?
- At what point did you become aware of the activities of terrorists in the US? Islamic fundamentalist terrorists?
- Were you aware of UBL's 1998 fatwah?

Response to intelligence/information received.

s

- sWere you aware of UBL as a threat? Did anyone see UBL as a threat and that the INS had a role to play on the borders and in internal enforcement b/c of INS exclusive Title 8 authority?
- Were you aware of PDD-39 requiring INS to exclude terrorists? What was your response to that requirement?
- To the Africa bombings of '98?
- To Ressam and the millennium plot in late 1999?
- **Strategies.**
 - Was there ever a CT strategy drafted? If so,:
 - Who was tasked with CT policy?
 - Who was tasked with CT operations.
 - To what extent did hdqtrs know of CT operations ongoing?
 - View of the internal enforcement strategy?
 - Did you ever request analyses be conducted on terrorist penetration of the border, especially after the Ressam /millennium case?
- **Budget resources.**
 - who ultimately responsible for INS budget?
 - What were the budget priorities?
 - What allocation to internal enforcement?
 - To CT?
 - To inspections technology?
 - To fraud training and technology?
 - Did you ever seek out DOJ, OMB or Congress to provide more funding on CT?
 - To what extent was Congress, from you vantage point, interested in the INS playing a role in CT considering INS exclusive jurisdiction over Title 8?

Policy Council. Who instituted it and what was its purpose?

Programs.

Student tracking.

- What did you see as the purpose/mission of CIPRIS

- Briefing of by Berez
- Fee schedule reg. What was the process by which the fee regulation was meted out within the INS prior to its publication for comment?

Entry / exit .

- 1996 law mandated it. What happened to it?

Refugees and global terrorism

1. What is your view of the impact of global terrorism on the refugee admission process?
2. Are you aware of any terrorists using the refugee process to gain admission to the US?
To any other country?
3. What is the impact on other countries – either their views of the U.S. or their own willingness to accept refugees – of the current drop in refugee admissions?
4. What is the name of the **office at DHS** focused on refugee admissions? NAME OF OFFICE and location of office in DHS
5. Whom do you recommend our speaking with at DHS about the current refugee admission process? NAME OF DHS person
6. Whom do you recommend our speaking with at DOS about the current refugee admission process? NAME of DOS person (Kelly? Dewey?)
7. What do you think the USG needs to do to raise the level of refugee admissions to meet the Presidential commitment level of 70,000 from the current under 28,000? (If there is paper on this, that would be good.) Is she optimistic that the US will return to its previous level?
8. In your current position at UNHCR do you receive intelligence relating to refugees and refugee camps? (If so, from whom? Adequate? Impact on policy and practice?) (If not, is this a problem in your mind?)

If appropriate, how do we follow up with her for more details on these matters?