Scoggins is currently a Military Operations Specialist with ZBW.

Scoggins has experience as an Airspace Procedure Specialist and as an ATC specialist in Area D with the FAA, and was a F4 crew chief with the military between 1976 and 1980.

Scoggins noted that there are MOS positions only at a few facilities, and the position is commonly referred to now as a “Mission Coordinator” at the TMU.

On 9/11 Scoggins was advised of the hijack at approximately 8:35 EDT. He first thought of the Luftansa hijack, and did not want to “clutter” the situation being handled at the center, but when he went to the floor was asked by Dan Bueno to check on “fighters”. Scoggins went to call NEADS to request a fighter scramble, but Joe Cooper was already doing that. The procedures for this are in a Letter of Agreement at Otis Air Force Base, noted Scoggins. According to the agreement between ZBW and NEADS, the military would call ZBW and inform them of the scramble, so the reverse order of the set procedure might have caused some confusion. Scoggins also noted that Burlington, VT has lost its air defense requirement and capability.

At NEADS, Scoggins has experience dealing with Bill Airs, of the Department of Defense (DoD). Scoggins is also aware of a new FAA representative at NEADS, currently a position filled by Steve Colbertson. According to the 7610.3 regulation, according to Scoggins, each air defense facility is required to have an FAA representative, but only WADS had one. Now each does.
If Scoggins had placed the call to NEADS on 9/11, he noted he would have called Battlestaff at Huntress, not Bill Airs. Scoggins noted that Sergeant Powell was on the phone, and that the Weapons Office at Battlestaff is next to the ID Controller. Scoggins stated that the calls “went the way they should have”, considering in the case of a hijack the center is supposed to notify the ROC, but is not confident in the ROC’s ability to facilitate military cooperation. Scoggins does not believe there was a necessity to call Herndon or the WOC before NEADS.

Scoggins noted that the agreement for escort procedures reached between First Air Force Langley, 102nd Fighter Wing, and Otis Air Force Base, and ZBW does not cover internal procedures.

Regarding the scramble, Scoggins followed Cooper’s initial call with phone calls of his own on the DSN phone that were not recorded. Scoggins stated he made 30 to 40 calls trying to ID AA11 as a primary target at position 20 degrees south of Albany. He attempted to get NEADS to ID AA11 and to receive altitude information. He was told later that the altitude estimate would have been only within 6,000 feet. He stated in his efforts to obtain this information he spoke with a Major Deskins and with Sergeant Powell. The miscommunication between Scoggins and the military was in the military request for a latitude and longitude read out, which to Scoggins indicated the military did not understand the use of the term “primary target” within the FAA. To the FAA “primary target” indicates a beacon code whereas to the military “primary target” is an actual target.

When AA11’s speed decreased, an indication of a drop in altitude, both Scoggins and Bueno became extremely concerned. Scoggins was able to convey to Sergeant two approximate sets of latitude and longitude points, but the military was unable to identify AA11’s primary. The TMU was notified of the first WTC impact three or four minutes afterwards, and TMU started to realize that their dialogue with the military at that point had not been productive.

Scoggins did not think the first WTC impact was AA11. He stated that he “wouldn’t have believed it.” He believed the reports that it was a small aircraft, and asked NEADS to scramble fighters from Atlantic City.

AA11 went off radar at ZBW after its impact, but ZBW personnel still tried to find it. A minute or two later ZBW personnel conceded that it was AA11. TMU informed the Telcon call, but got a call afterwards saying AA11 might still be airborne and headed towards DC. As far as Scoggins knew the Telcon had a grouping of agencies on it. He heard that an aircraft was headed towards the White House, turned, and hit the Pentagon. Scoggins believes this call amongst others was recorded at NEADS. He never learned who originally reported AA11 heading towards DC.

Scoggins believes the fighters from Otis were off the ground in about twelve minutes, but noted that that was still too late to intercept even UAL175. He does not believe the
fighters would have gone supersonic. Scoggins noted that FAA Chapter 76.4 states that the FAA control a scramble until the fighters were within range of the target, then would keep fighters at a safe distance.

Scoggins noted that he remembers an exercise in 1995 or 1996 that involved a military scramble to escort a hijacked aircraft, and the fighter was unable to intercept. He believes this exercise was joint FAA/military and was done through ATB200.

Scoggins noted that in the event of a hijack TMU calls NEADS and the OMIC calls Henrdon.

Scoggins noted that the DEN line makes escort notification procedures obsolete by informing all the necessary parties at once. He would like to see more participation in DHS by TSA.