

Interviewee: **Consul General Douglas C. Rohn**

Date: October 20, 2003

Location: US Consulate, Karachi Pakistan

Participants: Kevin Scheid, Dylan Cors

Drafted by: Kevin Scheid

Reviewed by:

Additional Info: This interview was conducted during the Commission staff delegation's five-hour visit to Karachi. Mr. Scheid performed the interview of Douglas Rohn and Douglas London at the same time to make best use of the time, although separate interview write-ups were done for each.

Mr. Rohn has been in the country as Consul for three months. He has been in Pakistan for several months longer serving in Islamabad as special advisor to the Ambassador. He served at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from September 2001 to January 2003 and has held posts in Africa (DCM Gambia, 1996 to 1999; DCM Niger 1999 to 2001). He has also done several tours in Latin America.

There are three Consulates in Pakistan: Karachi, Peshawar, and Lahore. Visas are not granted at the Consulates, this has been centralized at the embassy in Islamabad. The Karachi Consulate appears to be under siege given the multiple levels of security that the delegation had to pass through to get to the interview. The main consulate building has been abandoned and is now a buffer from the busy street that it is located on. Behind the Consulate is a smaller building that is being used as the main Consulate.

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The Consulate has about 18 permanent staff with about 115 Foreign Service nationals. Its main mission is [redacted] to work with port security and transportation agencies in Karachi to facilitate shipments to Afghanistan. For the most part, due to security, the consulate is small given that Karachi is a city of 15 million. [redacted]

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The Consul did not have a very informed understanding of the type and sophistication of the threat in Karachi or the region. He had no estimate of the al Qai'da presence, though he recognized that they have long operated in the region. His insights into the terrorist threat, from his few months on the job, were very basic and didn't provide any new information... "we've been attacked here in Karachi, the bad guys are out there, I'm trying to keep American safe."

There have been several terrorist attacks on Americans in Karachi as well as at the Consulate itself. In 1995 there was the shuttle bus shooting with several killed; in January of 2002; there was the suicide car bombing that killed 12 Pakistanis outside the consulate security wall; and more recently, in February of 2003, there was what appeared as a random act of shooting by an individual that took an AK-47 from a Karachi police officer, killed the officer and ran across the street shooting at the compound hitting some of the guards. In the case of the car bombing the Consul wasn't aware of how these incidents had been investigated or what the conclusions were

about the state of the local threat. He felt that the compound was under constant state of siege and that he was complying with security. He had, for example, recognized that on the public, State Department front, he was responsible for reducing the US presence. [REDACTED]

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All across the Karachi region the security situation was not good. Sectarian violence in the regions is quite common and the anti-American sentiment is strong. There is no American presence in Sindh given this situation and the lack of presence is known. The July 4, 2003 killing of 50 Shia's in Quetta reflects the Consul's concerns with the region.